THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE,

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SOME

THOUGHTS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION.

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THOUGHTS

SOME

TO EDWARD CLARKE, OF CHIPLEY, Eſq;

SIR,

THESE Thoughts concerning Education, which now come abroad into the world, do of right belong to you, being written ſeveral years ſince for your ſake, and are no other than what you have already by you in my letters. I have ſo little varied any thing, but only the order of what was ſent you at different times, and on ſeveral occaſions, that the reader will eaſily find, in the familiarity and faſhion of the ſtyle, that they were rather the private converſation of two friends, than a diſcourſe deſigned for public view.

THE importunity of friends is the common apology for publications men are afraid to own themſelves forward to. But you know I can truly ſay, that if ſome, who having heard of theſe papers of mine, had not preſſed to ſee them, and afterwards to have them printed, they had lain dormant ſtill in that privacy they were deſigned for. But thoſe whoſe judgment I defer much to, telling me, that they were perſuaded, that this rough draught of mine might be of ſome uſe, if made more publick, touched upon what will always be very prevalent with me. For I think it every man's indiſpenſible duty, to do all the ſervice he can to his country: And I ſee not what difference he puts between himſelf and his cattle, who lives without that thought. This ſubject is of ſo great concernment, and a right way of education is of ſo general advantage, that did I find my abilities anſwer my wiſhes, I ſhould not have needed exhortations or importunities from others. However, the meanneſs of theſe papers, and my juſt diſtruſt of them, ſhall not keep me, by the ſhame of doing ſo little, from contributing my mite, when there is no more required of me, than my throwing it into the public receptacle. And if there be any more of their ſize and notions, who liked them ſo well, that they thought them worth printing, I may flatter myſelf, they will not be loſt labour to every body.

I MYSELF have been conſulted of late by ſo many, who profeſs themſelves at a loſs how to breed their children; and the early corruption of youth is now become ſo general a complaint, that he cannot be thought wholly impertinent, who brings the conſideration of this matter on the ſtage, and offers ſomething, if it be but to excite others, or afford matter of correction. For errors in education ſhould be leſs indulged than any: Theſe, like faults in the firſt concoction, that are never mended in the ſecond or third, carry their afterwards-incorrigible taint with them, through all the parts and ſtations of life.

I AM

THE EPISTLE DEDICATORY.

I AM ſo far from being conceited of any thing I have here offered, that I ſhould not be ſorry, even for your ſake, if ſome one abler and fitter for ſuch a taſk, would in a juſt treatiſe of education, ſuited to our Engliſh gentry, rectify the miſtakes I have made in this: it being much more deſirable to me, that young gentlemen ſhould be put into (that which every one ought to be ſolicitous about) the beſt way of being formed and inſtructed, than that my opinion ſhould be received concerning it. You will, however, in the mean time bear me witneſs, that the method here propoſed has had no ordinary effects upon a gentleman's ſon, it was not deſigned for. I will not ſay the good temper of the child did not very much contribute to it, but this I think, you and the parents are ſatisfied of, that a contrary uſage, according to the ordinary diſciplining of children, would not have mended that temper, nor have brought him to be in love with his book; to take a pleaſure in learning, and to deſire, as he does, to be taught more, than thoſe about him think fit always to teach him.

BUT my buſineſs is not to recommend this treatiſe to you, whoſe opinion of it I know already; nor it to the world, either by your opinion or patronage. The well educating of their children is ſo much the duty and concern of parents, and the welfare and proſperity of the nation ſo much depends on it, that I would have every one lay it ſeriouſly to heart; and after having well examined and diſtinguiſhed what fancy, cuſtom, or reaſon adviſes in the caſe, ſet his helping hand to promote every where that way of training up youth, with regard to their ſeveral conditions, which is the eaſieſt, ſhorteſt, and likelieſt to produce virtuous, uſeful, and able men in their diſtinct callings: Though that moſt to be taken care of, is the gentleman's calling. For if thoſe of that rank are by their education once ſet right, they will quickly bring all the reſt into order.

I KNOW not whether I have done more than ſhewn my good wiſhes towards it in this ſhort diſcourſe; ſuch as it is the world now has it; and if there be any thing in it worth their acceptance, they owe their thanks to you for it. My affection to you gave the firſt riſe to it, and I am pleaſed, that I can leave to poſterity this mark of the friendſhip has been between us. For I know no greater pleaſure in this life, nor a better remembrance to be left behind one, than a long continued friendſhip, with an honeſt, uſeful, and worthy man, and lover of his country. I am,

SIR, your moſt humble and moſt faithful ſervant,

7. March, 1690.

JOHN LOCKE.

SOME

THOUGHTS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION.

§ 1. A SOUND mind in a ſound body, is a ſhort, but full deſcription of a happy ſtate in this world: he that has theſe two, has little more to wiſh for; and he that wants either of them, will be but little the better for any thing elſe. Men's happineſs, or miſery, is moſt part of their own making. He whoſe mind directs not wiſely, will never take the right way; and he whoſe body is crazy and feeble, will never be able to advance in it. I confeſs, there are ſome men's conſtitutions of body and mind ſo vigorous, and well framed by nature, that they need not much aſſiſtance from others; but, by the ſtrength of their natural genius, they are, from their cradles, carried towards what is excellent; and, by the privilege of their happy conſtitutions, are able to do wonders. But examples of this kind are but few; and I think I may ſay, that, of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, uſeful or not, by their education. It is that which makes the great difference in mankind. The little, or almoſt inſenſible, impreſſions on our tender infancies, have very important and laſting conſequences: and there it is, as in the fountains of ſome rivers, where a gentle application of the hand turns the flexible waters into channels, that make them take quite contrary courſes; and by this little direction, given them at firſt, in the ſource, they receive different tendencies, and arrive at laſt at very remote and diſtant places.

§ 2. I IMAGINE the minds of children, as eaſily turned, this or that way, as water itſelf; and though this be the principal part, and our main care ſhould be about the inſide, yet the clay cottage is not to be neglected. I ſhall therefore begin with the caſe, and conſider firſt the health of the body, as that which perhaps you may rather expect, from that ſtudy I have been thought more peculiarly to have applied myſelf to; and Health.

and that alſo, which will be ſooneſt diſpatched, as lying, if I gueſs not amiſs, in a very little compaſs.

Health. § 3. How neceſſary health is to our buſineſs and happineſs; and how requiſite a ſtrong conſtitution, able to endure hardſhips and fatigue, is, to one that will make any figure in the world; is too obvious to need any proof.

§ 4. The conſideration I ſhall here have, of health, ſhall be, not what a phyſician ought to do, with a ſick or crazy child; but what the parents, without the help of phyſick, ſhould do for the preſervation and improvement of an healthy, or, at leaſt, not ſickly conſtitution, in their children: and this perhaps might be all diſpatched in this one ſhort rule, viz. That gentlemen ſhould uſe their children, as the honeſt farmers and ſubſtantial yeomen do theirs. But becauſe the mothers, poſſibly, may think this a little too hard, and the fathers, too ſhort, I ſhall explain myſelf more particularly; only laying down this, as a general and certain obſervation for the women to conſider, viz. that moſt children's
Tenderneſs. conſtitutions are either ſpoiled, or at leaſt harmed, by cockering and tenderneſs.

Warmth. § 5. The firſt thing to be taken care of, is, that children be not too warmly clad or covered, winter or ſummer. The face, when we are born, is no leſs tender than any other part of the body: it is uſe alone hardens it, and makes it more able to endure the cold. And therefore the Scythian philoſopher gave a very ſignificant anſwer to the Athenian, who wondered how he could go naked in froſt and ſnow: "How," ſaid the Scythian, "can you endure your face expoſed to the ſharp winter air?" "My face is uſed to it," ſaid the Athenian. "Think me all face," replied the Scythian. Our bodies will endure any thing, that from the beginning they are accuſtomed to.

An eminent inſtance of this, though in the contrary exceſs of heat, being to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhew what uſe can do, I ſhall ſet down in the author's words, as I meet with it in a late ingenious voyage: * 'The 'heats, ſays he, are more violent in Malta, than in any part of Europe; 'they exceed thoſe of Rome itſelf, and are perfectly ſtifling; and ſo much 'the more, becauſe there are ſeldom any cooling breezes here. This 'makes the common people as black as gypſies: but yet the peaſants defy 'the ſun: they work on, in the hotteſt part of the day, without intermiſſion, or ſheltering themſelves from his ſcorching rays. This has con- 'vinced me that nature can bring itſelf to many things, which ſeem im- 'poſſible, provided we accuſtom ourſelves from our infancy. The Mal- 'teſes do ſo, who harden the bodies of their children, and reconcile them 'to the heat, by making them go ſtark naked, without ſhirt, drawers, 'or any thing on their head, from their cradles, till they are ten years 'old.'

* Nouveau voyage du Levant, 150.

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Give me leave, therefore, to adviſe you, not to fence too carefully againſt the cold of this our climate: there are thoſe in England, who wear

wear the ſame cloaths winter and ſummer, and that without any inconvenience, or more ſenſe of cold than others find. But if the mother will needs have an allowance for froſt and ſnow, for fear of harm; and the father, for fear of cenſure; be ſure let not his winter-cloathing be too warm: and amongſt other things remember, that when nature has ſo well covered his head with hair, and ſtrengthened it with a year or two's age, that he can run about by day without a cap, it is beſt that by night a child ſhould alſo lie without one; there being nothing that more expoſes to head-ach, colds, catarrhs, coughs, and ſeveral other diſeaſes, than keeping the head warm.

§ 6. I HAVE ſaid [he] here, becauſe the principal aim of my diſcourſe is, how a young gentleman ſhould be brought up from his infancy, which in all things will not ſo perfectly ſuit the education of daughters; though, where the difference of ſex requires different treatment, it will be no hard matter to diſtinguiſh.

§ 7. I WOULD alſo adviſe his feet to be waſhed every day in cold water; and to have his ſhoes ſo thin, that they might leak and let in water, whenever he comes near it. Here, I fear, I ſhall have the miſtreſs, and maids too, againſt me. One will think it too filthy; and the other, perhaps, too much pains to make clean his ſtockings. But yet truth will have it, that his health is much more worth than all ſuch conſiderations, and ten-times as much more. And he that conſiders how miſchievous and mortal a thing, taking wet in the feet is, to thoſe who have been bred nicely, will wiſh he had, with the poor people's children, gone bare-foot; who, by that means, come to be ſo reconciled by cuſtom, to wet their feet, that they take no more cold or harm by it, than if they were wet in their hands. And what is it, I pray, that makes this great difference between the hands and the feet in others, but only cuſtom? I doubt not, but if a man from his cradle had been always uſed to go bare-foot, whilſt his hands were conſtantly wrapped up in warm mittins, and covered with handſhoes, as the Dutch call gloves; I doubt not, I ſay, but ſuch a cuſtom would make taking wet in his hands as dangerous to him, as now taking wet in their feet is to a great many others. The way to prevent this, is to have his ſhoes made ſo, as to leak water; and his feet waſhed conſtantly every day in cold water. It is recommendable for its cleanlineſs: but that, which I aim at in it, is health. And therefore I limit it not preciſely to any time of the day. I have known it uſed every night, with very good ſucceſs, and that, all the winter, without the omitting it ſo much as one night, in extreme cold weather: when thick ice covered the water, the child bathed his legs and feet in it; though he was of an age not big enough to rub and wipe them himſelf; and when he began this cuſtom, was puling and very tender. But the great end being to harden thoſe parts, by a frequent and familiar uſe of cold water, and thereby to prevent the miſchiefs, that uſually attend accidental taking wet in the feet, in thoſe who are bred otherwiſe; I think it may be left to the prudence and convenience of the parents, to chuſe either

Feet.

night or morning. The time I deem indifferent, ſo the thing be effectually done. The health and hardineſs procured by it, would be a good purchaſe at a much dearer rate. To which if I add the preventing of corns, that to ſome men would be a very valuable conſideration. But begin firſt in the ſpring with luke-warm, and ſo colder and colder every time, till in a few days you come to perfectly cold water, and then continue it ſo, winter and ſummer. For it is to be obſerved in this, as in all other alterations from our ordinary way of living, the changes muſt be made by gentle and inſenſible degrees; and ſo we may bring our bodies to any thing, without pain, and without danger.

Alterations.

How fond mothers are like to receive this doctrine, is not hard to foreſee. What can it be leſs, than to murder their tender babes, to uſe them thus? What! put their feet in cold water in froſt and ſnow, when all one can do is little enough to keep them warm! A little to remove their fears by examples, without which the plaineſt reaſon is ſeldom hearkened to; Seneca tells us of himſelf, ep. 53 and 83, that he uſed to bathe himſelf in cold ſpring-water in the midſt of winter. This, if he had not thought it not only tolerable, but healthy too, he would ſcarce have done, in an exuberant fortune, that could well have borne the expence of a warm bath; and in an age (for he was then old) that would have excuſed greater indulgence. If we think his ſtoical principles led him to this ſeverity; let it be ſo, that this ſect reconciled cold water to his ſufferance: what made it agreeable to his health? for that was not impaired by this hard uſage. But what ſhall we ſay to Horace, who armed not himſelf with the reputation of any ſect, and leaſt of all affected ſtoical auſterities? yet he aſſures us, he was wont in the winter ſeaſon to bathe himſelf in cold water. But perhaps Italy will be thought much warmer than England, and the chillneſs of their waters not to come near ours in winter. If the rivers of Italy are warmer, thoſe of Germany and Poland are much colder, than any in this our country; and yet in theſe, the Jews, both men and women, bathe all over, at all ſeaſons of the year, without any prejudice to their health. And every one is not apt to believe it is a miracle, or any peculiar virtue of St. Winifred's well, that makes the cold waters of that famous ſpring do no harm to the tender bodies that bathe in it. Every one is now full of the miracles done, by cold baths, on decayed and weak conſtitutions, for the recovery of health and ſtrength; and therefore they cannot be impracticable, or intolerable, for the improving and hardening the bodies of thoſe who are in better circumſtances.

If theſe examples of grown men be not thought yet to reach the caſe of children, but that they may be judged ſtill to be too tender and unable to bear ſuch uſage; let them examine what the Germans of old, and the Iriſh now do to them; and they will find that infants too, as tender as they are thought, may, without any danger, endure bathing, not only of their feet, but of their whole bodies in cold water. And there are, at this day, ladies in the highlands of Scotland, who uſe this

diſcipline to their children, in the midſt of winter; and find that cold water does them no harm, even when there is ice in it.

§. 8. I SHALL not need here to mention ſwimming, when he is of an age able to learn, and has any one to teach him. It is that ſaves many a man's life: and the Romans thought it ſo neceſſary, that they ranked it with letters; and it was the common phraſe to mark one ill-educated, and good for nothing; that he had neither learned to read, nor to ſwim: "Nec literas didicit, nec natare." But beſides the gaining a ſkill, which may ſerve him at need; the advantages to health, by often bathing in cold water, during the heat of ſummer, are ſo many, that I think nothing need to be ſaid to encourage it; provided this one caution be uſed, that he never go into the water, when exerciſe has at all warmed him, or left any emotion in his blood or pulſe. Swimming.

§ 9. ANOTHER thing, that is of great advantage to every one's health, but eſpecially children's, is, to be much in the open air, and very little, as may be, by the fire, even in winter. By this he will accuſtom himſelf alſo to heat and cold, ſhine and rain; all which if a man's body will not endure, it will ſerve him to very little purpoſe in this world: and when he is grown up, it is too late to begin to uſe him to it: it muſt be got early and by degrees. Thus the body may be brought to bear almoſt any thing. If I ſhould adviſe him to play in the wind and ſun without a hat, I doubt whether it could be borne. There would a thouſand objections be made againſt it, which at laſt would amount to no more, in truth, than being ſun-burnt. And if my young maſter be to be kept always in the ſhade, and never expoſed to the ſun and wind, for fear of his complexion, it may be a good way to make him a beau, but not a man of buſineſs. And although greater regard be to be had to beauty in the daughters, yet I will take the liberty to ſay, that the more they are in the air, without prejudice to their faces, the ſtronger and healthier they will be; and the nearer they come to the hardſhips of their brothers in their education, the greater advantage will they receive from it, all the remaining part of their lives. Air.

§ 10. PLAYING in the open air has but this one danger in it, that I know: and that is, that when he is hot with running up and down, he ſhould ſit or lie down on the cold or moiſt earth. This, I grant, and drinking cold drink, when they are hot with labour or exerciſe, brings more people to the grave, or to the brink of it, by fevers, and other diſeaſes, than any thing I know. Theſe miſchiefs are eaſily enough prevented, whilſt he is little, being then ſeldom out of ſight. And if during his childhood, he be conſtantly and rigorouſly kept from ſitting on the ground, or drinking any cold liquor, whilſt he is hot, the cuſtom of forbearing, grown into a habit, will help much to preſerve him, when he is no longer under his maid's or tutor's eye. This is all I think can be done in the caſe. For, as years increaſe, liberty muſt come with them; and, in a great many things, he muſt be truſted to his own conduct, ſince there cannot always be a guard upon him; except what you Habits.

put

Habits. put into his own mind, by good principles and eſtabliſhed habits, which is the beſt and ſureſt, and therefore moſt to be taken care of. For, from repeated cautions and rules, ever ſo often inculcated, you are not to expect any thing, either in this, or any other caſe, farther than practice has eſtabliſhed them into habit.

Cloaths. §. 11. ONE thing the mention of the girls brings into my mind, which muſt not be forgot; and that is, that your ſon's cloaths be never made ſtrait, eſpecially about the breaſt. Let nature have ſcope to faſhion the body, as ſhe thinks beſt. She works of herſelf a great deal better and exacter, than we can direct her. And if women were themſelves to frame the bodies of their children in their wombs, as they often endeavour to mend their ſhapes, when they are out, we ſhould as certainly have no perfect children born, as we have few well-ſhaped, that are ſtrait-laced, or much tampered with. This conſideration ſhould methinks keep buſy people (I will not ſay ignorant nurſes and boddice-makers) from meddling in a matter they underſtand not; and they ſhould be afraid to put nature out of her way, in faſhioning the parts, when they know not how the leaſt and meaneſt is made. And yet I have ſeen ſo many inſtances of children receiving great harm from ſtrait-lacing, that I cannot but conclude, there are other creatures, as well as monkies, who, little wiſer than they, deſtroy their young ones, by ſenſeleſs fondneſs, and too much embracing.

§ 12. NARROW breaſts, ſhort and ſtinking breath, ill lungs, and crookedneſs, are the natural and almoſt conſtant effects of hard boddice, and cloaths that pinch. That way of making ſlender waiſts, and fine ſhapes, ſerves but the more effectually to ſpoil them. Nor can there, indeed, but be diſproportion in the parts, when the nouriſhment, prepared in the ſeveral offices of the body, cannot be diſtributed, as nature deſigns. And therefore, what wonder is it, if, it being laid where it can, or ſome part not ſo braced, it often makes a ſhoulder, or a hip, higher or bigger than its juſt proportion? It is generally known, that the women of China, (imagining I know not what kind of beauty in it) by bracing and binding them hard from their infancy, have very little feet. I ſaw lately a pair of China ſhoes, which I was told were for a grown woman; they were ſo exceedingly diſproportioned to the feet of one of the ſame age, amongſt us, that they would ſcarce have been big enough for one of our little girls. Beſides this, it is obſerved, that their women are alſo very little, and ſhort-lived; whereas the men are of the ordinary ſtature of other men, and live to a proportionable age. Theſe defects in the female ſex of that country, are by ſome imputed to the unreaſonable binding of their feet; whereby the free circulation of the blood is hindered, and the growth and health of the whole body ſuffers. And how often do we ſee, that ſome ſmall part of the foot being injured, by a wrench or a blow, the whole leg or thigh thereby loſes its ſtrength and nouriſhment, and dwindles away? How much greater inconveniencies may we expect, when the thorax, wherein is placed the heart and ſeat

of

of life, is unnaturally compreſſed, and hindered from its due expanſion?

§ 13. As for his diet, it ought to be very plain and ſimple; and, if I might adviſe, fleſh ſhould be forborn, as long as he is in coats, or at leaſt, till he is two or three years old. But whatever advantage this may be, to his preſent and future health and ſtrength, I fear it will hardly be conſented to, by parents, miſled by the cuſtom of eating too much fleſh themſelves; who will be apt to think their children, as they do themſelves, in danger to be ſtarved, if they have not fleſh, at leaſt twice a day. This I am ſure, children would breed their teeth with much leſs danger, be freer from diſeaſes, whilſt they were little, and lay the foundations of an healthy and ſtrong conſtitution much ſurer, if they were not crammed, ſo much as they are, by fond mothers and fooliſh ſervants, and were kept wholly from fleſh, the firſt three or four years of their lives. Diet.

But if my young maſter muſt needs have fleſh, let it be but once a day, and of one ſort, at a meal. Plain beef, mutton, veal, &c. without other ſauce than hunger, is beſt: and great care ſhould be uſed, that he eat bread plentifully both alone and with every thing elſe. And whatever he eats, that is ſolid, make him chew it well. We Engliſh are often negligent herein; from whence follows indigeſtion, and other great inconveniencies.

§ 14. For breakfaſt and ſupper, milk, milk-pottage, water-gruel, flummery, and twenty other things, that we are wont to make in England, are very fit for children: only in all theſe let care be taken, that they be plain, and without much mixture, and very ſparingly ſeaſoned with ſugar, or rather none at all: eſpecially all-ſpice, and other things, that may heat the blood, are carefully to be avoided. Be ſparing alſo of ſalt, in the ſeaſoning of all his victuals, and uſe him not to high-ſeaſoned meats. Our palates grow into a reliſh and liking of the ſeaſoning and cookery, which by cuſtom they are ſet to; and an over-much uſe of ſalt, beſides that it occaſions thirſt, and over-much drinking, has other ill effects upon the body. I ſhould think that a good piece of well-made and well-baked brown bread, ſometimes with, and ſometimes without, butter or cheeſe, would be often the beſt breakfaſt for my young maſter. I am ſure it is as wholeſome, and will make him as ſtrong a man as greater delicacies; and if he be uſed to it, it will be as pleaſant to him. If he at any time calls for victuals between meals, uſe him to nothing but dry bread. If he be hungry, more than wanton, bread alone will down; and if he be not hungry, it is not fit he ſhould eat. By this you will obtain two good effects: 1. That by cuſtom he will come to be in love with bread; for, as I ſaid, our palates and ſtomachs too are pleaſed with the things we are uſed to. Another good you will gain hereby is, that you will not teach him to eat more nor oftener than nature requires. I do not think that all people's appetites are alike: ſome have naturally ſtronger, and ſome weaker ſtomachs. But this I think, that many are made gor-

Diet. mands and gluttons by cuſtom, that were not ſo by nature: and I ſee, in ſome countries, men as luſty and ſtrong, that eat but two meals a day, as others that have ſet their ſtomachs by a conſtant uſage, like larums, to call on them for four or five. The Romans uſually faſted till ſupper; the only ſet meal, even of thoſe who ate more than once a day: and thoſe who uſed breakfaſts, as ſome did at eight, ſome at ten, others at twelve of the clock, and ſome later, neither ate fleſh, nor had any thing made ready for them. Auguſtus, when the greateſt monarch on the earth, tells us, he took a bit of dry bread in his chariot. And Seneca in his 83d epiſtle, giving an account how he managed himſelf, even when he was old, and his age permitted indulgence, ſays, that he uſed to eat a piece of dry bread for his dinner, without the formality of ſitting to it: though his eſtate would have as well paid for a better meal (had health required it) as any ſubject's in England, were it doubled. The maſters of the world were bred up with this ſpare diet: and the young gentlemen of Rome felt no want of ſtrength or ſpirit, becauſe they ate but once a day. Or if it happened by chance, that any one could not faſt ſo long, as till ſupper, their only ſet meal; he took nothing but a bit of dry bread, or at moſt a few raiſins, or ſome ſuch ſlight thing with it, to ſtay his ſtomach. This part of temperance was found ſo neceſſary, both for health and buſineſs, that the cuſtom of only one meal a day held out againſt that prevailing luxury, which their eaſtern conqueſts and ſpoils had brought in amongſt them: and thoſe, who had given up their old frugal eating, and made feaſts, yet began them not till the evening. And more than one ſet meal a day, was thought ſo monſtrous, that it was a reproach, as low down as Cæſar's time, to make an entertainment, or ſit down to a full table, till towards ſun-ſet. And therefore, if it would not be thought too ſevere, I ſhould judge it moſt convenient, that my young maſter ſhould have nothing, but bread too for breakfaſt. You cannot imagine of what force cuſtom is: and I impute a great part of our diſeaſes in England to our eating too much fleſh, and too little bread.

Meals. § 15. As to his meals, I ſhould think it beſt, that, as much as it can be conveniently avoided, they ſhould not be kept conſtantly to an hour. For, when cuſtom hath fixed his eating to certain ſtated periods, his ſtomach will expect victuals at the uſual hour, and grow peeviſh if he paſſes it; either fretting itſelf into a troubleſome exceſs, or flagging into a downright want of appetite. Therefore I would have no time kept conſtantly to, for his breakfaſt, dinner, and ſupper, but rather varied, almoſt every day. And if, betwixt theſe, which I call meals, he will eat, let him have, as often as he calls for it, good dry bread. If any one think this too hard and ſparing a diet for a child, let them know, that a child will never ſtarve, nor dwindle for want of nouriſhment, who, beſides fleſh at dinner, and ſpoon-meat, or ſome ſuch other thing at ſupper, may have good bread and beer, as often as he has a ſtomach: for thus, upon ſecond thoughts, I ſhould judge it beſt for children to be ordered. The morning is generally deſigned for ſtudy, to which a full ſtomach is but an

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ill preparation. Dry bread, though the beſt nouriſhment, has the leaſt temptation: and no body would have a child crammed at breakfaſt, who has any regard to his mind or body, and would not have him dull and unhealthy. Nor let any one think this unſuitable to one of eſtate and condition. A gentleman, in any age, ought to be ſo bred, as to be fitted to bear arms, and be a ſoldier. But he that in this, breeds his ſon ſo, as if he deſigned him to ſleep over his life, in the plenty and eaſe of a full fortune he intends to leave him, little conſiders the examples he has ſeen, or the age he lives in. Meals.

§ 16. His drink ſhould be only ſmall beer; and that too he ſhould never be ſuffered to have, between meals, but after he had eat a piece of bread. The reaſons why I ſay this are theſe: Drink.

§ 17. 1. More fevers and ſurfeits are got by people's drinking when they are hot, than by any one thing I know. Therefore, if by play he be hot and dry, bread will ill go down; and ſo, if he cannot have drink, but upon that condition, he will be forced to forbear. For, if he be very hot, he ſhould by no means drink. At leaſt, a good piece of bread firſt to be eaten, will gain time to warm the beer blood-hot, which then he may drink ſafely. If he be very dry, it will go down ſo warmed, and quench his thirſt better: And, if he will not drink it ſo warmed, abſtaining will not hurt him. Beſides, this will teach him to forbear, which is an habit of greateſt uſe for health of body and mind too.

§ 18. 2. Not being permitted to drink without eating, will prevent the cuſtom of having the cup often at his noſe; a dangerous beginning and preparation to good fellowſhip. Men often bring habitual hunger and thirſt on themſelves by cuſtom. And, if you pleaſe to try, you may, though he be weaned from it, bring him by uſe to ſuch a neceſſity of drinking in the night, that he will not be able to ſleep without it. It being the lullaby, uſed by nurſes, to ſtill crying children; I believe mothers generally find ſome difficulty to wean their children from drinking in the night, when they firſt take them home. Believe it, cuſtom prevails, as much by day as by night; and you may, if you pleaſe, bring any one to be thirſty every hour.

I once lived in a houſe, where, to appeaſe a froward child, they gave him drink, as often as he cried; ſo that he was conſtantly bibbing: And though he could not ſpeak, yet he drank more in twenty-four hours than I did. Try it when you pleaſe, you may with ſmall, as well as with ſtrong beer, drink yourſelf into a drought. The great thing to be minded in education is, what habits you ſettle: and therefore in this, as all other things, do not begin to make any thing cuſtomary, the practice whereof you would not have continue and increaſe. It is convenient for health and ſobriety, to drink no more than natural thirſt requires: and he that eats not ſalt meats, nor drinks ſtrong drink, will ſeldom thirſt between meals, unleſs he has been accuſtomed to ſuch unſeaſonable drinking. Habits.

§ 19. Above all, take great care that he ſeldom, if ever, taſte any wine, or ſtrong drink. There is nothing ſo ordinarily given children in Strong drink.

Strong drink. England, and nothing ſo deſtructive to them. They ought never to drink any ſtrong liquor, but when they need it as a cordial, and the doctor preſcribes it. And in this caſe it is, that ſervants are moſt narrowly to be watched, and moſt ſeverely to be reprehended, when they tranſgreſs. Thoſe mean ſort of people, placing a great part of their happineſs in ſtrong drink, are always forward to make court to my young maſter, by offering him that which they love beſt themſelves: and, finding themſelves made merry by it, they fooliſhly think it will do the child no harm. This you are carefully to have your eye upon, and reſtrain with all the ſkill and induſtry you can: there being nothing, that lays a ſurer foundation of miſchief, both to body and mind, than children's being uſed to ſtrong drink; eſpecially to drink in private with the ſervants.

Fruit. § 20. FRUIT makes one of the moſt difficult chapters in the government of health, eſpecially that of children. Our firſt parents ventured paradiſe for it: and it is no wonder our children cannot ſtand the temptation, though it coſt them their health. The regulation of this cannot come under any one general rule: for I am by no means of their mind, who would keep children almoſt wholly from fruit, as a thing totally unwholeſome for them: by which ſtrict way they make them but the more ravenous after it; and to eat good and bad, ripe or unripe, all that they can get, whenever they come at it. Melons, peaches, moſt ſorts of plums, and all ſorts of grapes in England, I think children ſhould be wholly kept from, as having a very tempting taſte, in a very unwholeſome juice; ſo that, if it were poſſible, they ſhould never ſo much as ſee them, or know there were any ſuch thing. But ſtrawberries, cherries, gooſe-berries, or currans, when thorough ripe, I think may be very ſafely allowed them, and that with a pretty liberal hand, if they be eaten with theſe cautions. 1. Not after meals, as we uſually do, when the ſtomach is already full of other food. But I think they ſhould be eaten rather before, or between meals, and children ſhould have them for their breakfaſts. 2. Bread eaten with them. 3. Perfectly ripe. If they are thus eaten, I imagine them rather conducing, than hurtful, to our health. Summer-fruits, being ſuitable to the hot ſeaſon of the year they come in, refreſh our ſtomachs, languiſhing and fainting under it: and therefore I ſhould not be altogether ſo ſtrict in this point, as ſome are to their children; who being kept ſo very ſhort, inſtead of a moderate quantity of well-choſen fruit, which being allowed them, would content them, whenever they can get looſe, or bribe a ſervant to ſupply them, ſatisfy their longing with any traſh they can get, and eat to a ſurfeit.

APPLES and pears too, which are thorough ripe, and have been gathered ſome time, I think may be ſafely eaten at any time, and in pretty large quantities; eſpecially apples, which never did any body hurt, that I have heard, after October.

FRUITS alſo dried without ſugar I think very wholeſome. But ſweetmeats of all kinds are to be avoided; which, whether they do more harm to the maker or eater, is not eaſy to tell. This I am ſure, it is one of the

the moſt inconvenient ways of expence, that vanity hath yet found out; and ſo I leave them to the ladies. Fruit.

§ 21. Of all that looks ſoft and effeminate, nothing is more to be indulged children than ſleep. In this alone they are to be permitted to have their full ſatisfaction; nothing contributing more to the growth and health of children, than ſleep. All that is to be regulated in it is, in what part of the twenty-four hours they ſhould take it: which will eaſily be reſolved, by only ſaying, thas it is of great uſe to accuſtom them to riſe early in the morning. It is beſt ſo to do, for health: and he that, from his childhood, has by a ſettled cuſtom made riſing betimes eaſy and familiar to him, will not, when he is a man, waſte the beſt and moſt uſeful part of his life in drowzineſs and lying a-bed. If children therefore are to be called up early in the morning, it will follow of courſe, that they muſt go to bed betimes; whereby they will be accuſtomed to avoid the unhealthy and unſafe hours of debauchery, which are thoſe of the evenings: and they who keep good hours, ſeldom are guilty of any great diſorders. I do not ſay this, as if your ſon, when grown up, ſhould never be in company paſt eight, nor ever chat over a glaſs of wine till midnight. You are now, by the accuſtoming of his tender years, to indiſpoſe him to thoſe inconveniencies as much as you can: and it will be no ſmall advantage, that contrary practice having made ſitting-up uneaſy to him, it will make him often avoid, and very ſeldom propoſe midnight-revels. But if it ſhould not reach ſo far, but faſhion and company ſhould prevail, and make him live, as others do, above twenty, it is worth the while to accuſtom him to early riſing and early going to bed, between this and that; for the preſent improvement of his health, and other advantages. Sleep.

Though I have ſaid, a large allowance of ſleep, even as much as they will take, ſhould be made to children when they are little; yet I do not mean, that it ſhould always be continued to them, in ſo large a proportion, and they ſuffered to indulge a drowzy lazineſs in their beds, as they grow up bigger. But whether they ſhould begin to be reſtrained at ſeven, or ten years old, or any other time, is impoſſible to be preciſely determined. Their tempers, ſtrength, and conſtitutions muſt be conſidered: But ſome time between ſeven and fourteen, if they are too great lovers of their beds, I think it may be ſeaſonable to begin to reduce them, by degrees, to about eight hours, which is generally reſt enough for healthy grown people. If you have accuſtomed him, as you ſhould do, to riſe conſtantly very early in the morning, this fault of being too long in bed will eaſily be reformed, and moſt children will be forward enough to ſhorten that time themſelves, by coveting to ſit up with the company at night: though, if they be not looked after, they will be apt to take it out in the morning, which ſhould by no means be permitted. They ſhould conſtantly be called up, and made to riſe at their early hour; but great care ſhould be taken in waking them, that it be not done haſtily, nor with a loud or ſhrill voice, or any other ſudden violent noiſe. This often affrights children,

Sleep. and does them great harm. And ſound ſleep, thus broke off with ſudden alarms, is apt enough to diſcompoſe any one. When children are to be wakened out of their ſleep, be ſure to begin with a low call, and ſome gentle motion; and ſo draw them out of it by degrees, and give them none but kind words and uſage, till they are come perfectly to themſelves, and being quite dreſſed, you are ſure they are thoroughly awake. The being forced from their ſleep, how gently ſoever you do it, is pain enough to them: and care ſhould be taken not to add any other uneaſineſs to it, eſpecially ſuch as may terrify them.

Bed. § 22. LET his bed be hard, and rather quilts than feathers. Hard lodging ſtrengthens the parts; whereas being buried every night in feathers, melts and diſſolves the body, is often the cauſe of weakneſs, and the forerunner of an early grave. And, beſides the ſtone, which has often its riſe from this warm wrapping of the reins, ſeveral other indiſpoſitions, and that which is the root of them all, a tender weakly conſtitution, is very much owing to down-beds. Beſides, he that is uſed to hard lodging at home, will not miſs his ſleep (where he has moſt need of it) in his travels abroad, for want of his ſoft bed and his pillows laid in order. And therefore I think it would not be amiſs, to make his bed after different faſhions; ſometimes lay his head higher, ſometimes lower, that he may not feel every little change he muſt be ſure to meet with, who is not deſigned to lie always in my young maſter's bed at home, and to have his maid lay all things in print, and tuck him in warm. The great cordial of nature is ſleep. He that miſſes that, will ſuffer by it: and he is very unfortunate, who can take his cordial only in his mother's fine gilt cup, and not in a wooden diſh. He that can ſleep ſoundly, takes the cordial: and it matters not, whether it be on a ſoft bed, or the hard boards. It is ſleep only that is the thing neceſſary.

Coſtiveneſs. § 23. ONE thing more there is, which hath a great influence upon the health, and that is going to ſtool regularly; people that are very looſe, have ſeldom ſtrong thoughts, or ſtrong bodies. But the cure of this, both by diet and medicine, being much more eaſy than the contrary evil, there needs not much to be ſaid about it: for if it come to threaten, either by its violence, or duration, it will ſoon enough, and ſometimes too ſoon, make a phyſician be ſent for: and if it be moderate or ſhort, it is commonly beſt to leave it to nature. On the other ſide, coſtiveneſs has too its ill effects, and is much harder to be dealt with by phyſick; purging medicines, which ſeem to give relief, rather increaſing than removing the evil.

§ 24. IT being an indiſpoſition I had a particular reaſon to enquire into, and not finding the cure of it in books, I ſet my thoughts on work, believing that greater changes than that, might be made in our bodies, if we took the right courſe, and proceeded by rational ſteps.

1. THEN I conſidered, that going to ſtool was the effect of certain motions of the body, eſpecially of the periſtaltick motion of the guts.

2. I CONSIDERED, that ſeveral motions that were not perfectly voluntary,

tary, might yet, by uſe and conſtant appplication, be brought to be habitual, if by an unintermitted cuſtom they were at certain ſeaſons endeavoured to be conſtantly produced. Coſtiveneſs.

3. I HAD obſerved ſome men, who, by taking after ſupper a pipe of tobacco, never failed of a ſtool; and began to doubt with myſelf, whether it were not more cuſtom, than the tobacco, that gave them the benefit of nature; or at leaſt, if the tobacco did it, it was rather by exciting a vigorous motion in the guts, than by any purging quality; for then it would have had other effects.

HAVING thus once got the opinion, that it was poſſible to make it habitual; the next thing was to conſider, what way and means were the likelieſt to obtain it.

4. THEN I gueſſed, that if a man, after his firſt eating in the morning, would preſently ſolicit nature, and try whether he could ſtrain himſelf ſo as to obtain a ſtool, he might in time, by a conſtant application, bring it to be habitual.

§ 25. THE reaſons that made me chuſe this time, were:

1. BECAUSE the ſtomach being then empty, if it received any thing grateful to it, (for I would never, but in caſe of neceſſity, have any one eat, but what he likes, and when he has an appetite) it was apt to embrace it cloſe by a ſtrong conſtriction of its fibres; which conſtriction, I ſuppoſed, might probably be continued on in the guts, and ſo increaſe their periſtaltick motion; as we ſee in the Ileus, that an inverted motion, being begun any-where below, continues itſelf all the whole length, and makes even the ſtomach obey that irregular motion.

2. BECAUSE when men eat, they uſually relax their thoughts; and the ſpirits, then free from other employments, are more vigorouſly diſtributed into the lower belly, which thereby contribute to the ſame effect.

3. BECAUSE, whenever men have leiſure to eat, they have leiſure enough alſo to make ſo much court to madam Cloacina, as would be neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe; but elſe, in the variety of human affairs and accidents, it was impoſſible to affix it to any hour certain; whereby the cuſtom would be interrupted: whereas men in health ſeldom failing to eat once a day, though the hour be changed, the cuſtom might ſtill be preſerved.

§ 26. UPON theſe grounds, the experiment began to be tried, and I have known none, who have been ſteady in the proſecution of it, and taken care to go conſtantly to the neceſſary-houſe, after their firſt eating, whenever that happened, whether they found themſelves called on or no, and there endeavoured to put nature upon her duty; but in a few months they obtained their deſired ſucceſs, and brought themſelves to ſo regular an habit, that they ſeldom ever failed of a ſtool, after their firſt eating, unleſs it were by their own neglect. For, whether they have any motion or no, if they go to the place, and do their part, they are ſure to have nature very obedient.

§ 27. I WOULD therefore adviſe, that this courſe ſhould be taken with a child

Coſtiveneſs. child every day, preſently after he has eaten his breakfaſt. Let him be ſet upon the ſtool, as if diſburdening were as much in his power, as filling his belly; and let not him or his maid know any thing to the contrary, but that it is ſo: and if he be forced to endeavour, by being hindered from his play, or eating again till he has been effectually at ſtool, or at leaſt done his utmoſt, I doubt not but in a little while it will become natural to him. For there is reaſon to ſuſpect that children being uſually intent on their play, and very heedleſs of any thing elſe, often let paſs thoſe motions of nature, when ſhe calls them but gently; and ſo they, neglecting the ſeaſonable offers, do by degrees bring themſelves into an habitual coſtiveneſs. That by this method coſtiveneſs may be prevented, I do more than gueſs: having known, by the conſtant practice of it for ſome time, a child brought to have a ſtool regularly after his breakfaſt, every morning.

§ 28. How far any grown people will think fit to make trial of it, muſt be left to them; though I cannot but ſay, that conſidering the many evils that come from that defect, of a requiſite eaſing of nature, I ſcarce know any thing more conducing to the preſervation of health than this is. Once in four and twenty hours, I think is enough; and no-body, I gueſs, will think it too much. And by this means it is to be obtained without phyſick, which commonly proves very ineffectual, in the cure of a ſettled and habitual coſtiveneſs.

Phyſick. § 29. THIS is all I have to trouble you with, concerning this management, in the ordinary courſe of his health. Perhaps it will be expected from me, that I ſhould give ſame directions of phyſick, to prevent diſeaſes: for which, I have only this one, very ſacredly to be obſerved: Never to give children any phyſick for prevention. The obſervation of what I have already adviſed, will, I ſuppoſe, do that better than the ladies diet-drinks, or apothecary's medicines. Have a great care of tampering that way, leſt, inſtead of preventing, you draw on diſeaſes. Nor even upon every little indiſpoſition is phyſick to be given, or the phyſician to be called to children; eſpecially if he be a buſy man, that will preſently fill their windows with gally-pots, and their ſtomachs with drugs. It is ſafer to leave them wholly to nature, than to put them into the hands of one forward to tamper, or that thinks children are to be cured in ordinary diſtempers, by any thing but diet, or by a method very little diſtant from it; it ſeeming ſuitable both to my reaſon and experience, that the tender conſtitutions of children ſhould have as little done to them as is poſſible, and as the abſolute neceſſity of the caſe requires. A little cold-ſtilled red poppy-water, which is the true ſurfeit-water, with eaſe and abſtinence from fleſh, often puts an end to ſeveral diſtempers in the beginning, which, by too forward applications, might have been made luſty diſeaſes. When ſuch a gentle treatment will not ſtop the growing miſchief, nor hinder it from turning into a formed diſeaſe, it will be time to ſeek the advice of ſome ſober and diſcreet phyſician. In this part, I hope, I ſhall find an eaſy belief; and no-body can have a pretence to doubt the advice of one, who has ſpent

time in the ſtudy of phyſick, when he counſels you not to be too forward in making uſe of phyſick and phyſicians. Phyſick.

§ 30. And thus I have done with what concerns the body and health, which reduces itſelf to theſe few and eaſily obſervable rules. Plenty of open air, exerciſe, and ſleep; plain diet, no wine or ſtrong drink, and very little or no phyſick; not too warm and ſtreight cloathing; eſpecially the head and feet kept cold, and the feet often uſed to cold water and expoſed to wet.

§ 31. Due care being had to keep the body in ſtrength and vigour, ſo that it may be able to obey and execute the orders of the mind; the next and principal buſineſs is, to ſet the mind right, that on all occaſions it may be diſpoſed to conſent to nothing, but what may be ſuitable to the dignity and excellency of a rational creature. Mind.

§ 32. If what I have ſaid in the beginning of this diſcourſe be true, as I do not doubt but it is, viz. that the difference to be found in the manners and abilities of men, is owing more to their education than to any thing elſe; we have reaſon to conclude, that great care is to be had of the forming children's minds, and giving them that ſeaſoning early, which ſhall influence their lives always after. For when they do well or ill, the praiſe or blame will be laid there: and when any thing is done aukwardly, the common ſaying will paſs upon them, that it is ſuitable to their breeding.

§ 33. As the ſtrength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardſhips, ſo alſo does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himſelf his own deſires, croſs his own inclinations, and purely follow what reaſon directs as beſt, tho' the appetite lean the other way.

§ 34. The great miſtake I have obſerved in people's breeding their children has been, that this has not been taken care enough of in its due ſeaſon; that the mind has not been made obedient to diſcipline, and pliant to reaſon, when at firſt it was moſt tender, moſt eaſy to be bowed. Parents being wiſely ordained by nature to love their children, are very apt, if reaſon watch not that natural affection very warily; are apt, I ſay, to let it run into fondneſs. They love their little ones, and it is their duty: but they often with them cheriſh their faults too. They muſt not be croſſed, forſooth; they muſt be permitted to have their wills in all things; and they being in their infancies not capable of great vices, their parents think they may ſafely enough indulge their little irregularities, and make themſelves ſport with that pretty perverſeneſs, which they think well enough becomes that innocent age. But to a fond parent, that would not have his child corrected for a perverſe trick, but excuſed it, ſaying it was a ſmall matter; Solon very well replied, "Aye, but cuſtom is a great one." Early.

§ 35. The fondling muſt be taught to ſtrike, and call names; muſt have what he cries for, and do what he pleaſes. Thus parents, by humouring and cockering them when little, corrupt the principles of nature in

Early. in their children, and wonder afterwards to taſte the bitter waters, when they themſelves have poiſoned the fountain. For when their children are grown up, and theſe ill habits with them; when they are now too big to be dandled, and their parents can no longer make uſe of them as play-things; then they complain, that the brats are untoward and perverſe; then they are offended to ſee them wilful, and are troubled with thoſe ill humours, which they themſelves infuſed and fomented in them; and then, perhaps too late, would be glad to get out thoſe weeds which their own hands have planted, and which now have taken too deep root to be eaſily extirpated. For he that has been uſed to have his will in every thing, as long as he was in coats, why ſhould we think it ſtrange that he ſhould deſire it, and contend for it ſtill, when he is in breeches? Indeed, as he grows more towards a man, age ſhews his faults the more, ſo that there be few parents then ſo blind, as not to ſee them; few ſo inſenſible as not to feel the ill effects of their own indulgence. He had the will of his maid before he could ſpeak or go; he had the maſtery of his parents ever ſince he could prattle; and why, now he is grown up, is ſtronger and wiſer than he was then, why now of a ſudden muſt he be reſtrained and curbed? why muſt he at ſeven, fourteen, or twenty years old, loſe the privilege which the parent's indulgence, till then, ſo largely allowed him? Try it in a dog, or an horſe, or any other creature, and ſee whether the ill and reſty tricks they have learned when young, are eaſily to be mended when they are knit: and yet none of thoſe creatures are half ſo wilful and proud, or half ſo deſirous to be maſters of themſelves and others, as man.

§ 36. We are generally wiſe enough to begin with them, when they are very young; and diſcipline betimes thoſe other creatures we would make uſeful and good for ſomewhat. They are only our own offspring, that we neglect in this point; and having made them ill children, we fooliſhly expect they ſhould be good men. For if the child muſt have grapes, or ſugar-plums, when he has a mind to them, rather than make the poor baby cry, or be out of humour; why, when he is grown up, muſt he not be ſatisfied too, if his deſires carry him to wine or women? They are objects as ſuitable to the longing of twenty-one or more years, as what he cried for, when little, was to the inclinations of a child. The having deſires accommodated to the apprehenſions and reliſh of thoſe ſeveral ages, is not the fault; but the not having them ſubject to the rules and reſtraints of reaſon: the difference lies not in the having or not having appetites, but in the power to govern, and deny ourſelves in them. He that is not uſed to ſubmit his will to the reaſon of others, when he is young, will ſcarce hearken or ſubmit to his own reaſon, when he is of an age to make uſe of it. And what kind of a man ſuch a one is like to prove, is eaſy to foreſee.

§ 37. These are overſights uſually committed by thoſe who ſeem to take the greateſt care of their children's education. But, if we look into the common management of children, we ſhall have reaſon to wonder,

in the great diſſoluteneſs of manners, which the world complains of, that there are any footſteps at all left to virtue. I deſire to know what vice can be named, which parents, and thoſe about children, do not ſeaſon them with, and drop into them the ſeeds of, as often as they are capable to receive them? I do not mean by the examples they give, and the patterns they ſet before them, which is encouragement enough; but that which I would take notice of here, is the downright teaching them vice, and actual putting them out of the way of virtue. Before they can go, they principle them with violence, revenge, and cruelty. "Give me a "blow that I may beat him," is a leſſon, which moſt children every day hear: and it is thought nothing, becauſe their hands have not ſtrength enough to do any miſchief. But I aſk, does not this corrupt their minds? is not this the way of force and violence, that they are ſet in? and if they have been taught when little, to ſtrike and hurt others by proxy, and encouraged to rejoice in the harm they have brought upon them, and ſee them ſuffer; are they not prepared to do it, when they are ſtrong enough to be felt themſelves, and can ſtrike to ſome purpoſe? Early.

THE coverings of our bodies, which are for modeſty, warmth, and defence, are, by the folly or vice of parents, recommended to their children for other uſes. They are made matter of vanity and emulation. A child is ſet a longing after a new ſuit, for the finery of it: and when the little girl is tricked up in her new gown and commode, how can her mother do leſs than teach her to admire herſelf, by calling her, "her little "queen," and "her princeſs?" Thus the little ones are taught to be proud of their cloaths, before they can put them on. And why ſhould they not continue to value themſelves for this out-ſide faſhionableneſs of the taylor or tire-woman's making, when their parents have ſo early inſtructed them to do ſo?

LYING and equivocations, and excuſes little different from lying, are put into the mouths of young people, and commended in apprentices and children, whilſt they are for their maſter's or parent's advantage. And can it be thought that he, that finds the ſtraining of truth diſpenſed with, and encouraged, whilſt it is for his godly maſter's turn, will not make uſe of that privilege for himſelf, when it may be for his own profit?

THOSE of the meaner ſort are hindered by the ſtreightneſs of their fortunes, from encouraging intemperance in their children, by the temptation of their diet, or invitations to eat or drink more than enough: but their own ill examples, whenever plenty comes in their way, ſhew that it is not the diſlike of drunkenneſs and gluttony that keeps them from exceſs, but want of materials. But if we look into the houſes of thoſe who are a little warmer in their fortunes, their eating and drinking are made ſo much the great buſineſs and happineſs of life, that children are thought neglected, if they have not their ſhare of it. Sauces, and ragouſts, and foods diſguiſed by all the arts of cookery, muſt tempt their palates, when their bellies are full: and then, for fear the ſtomach ſhould be overcharged,

Early. a pretence is found for the other glaſs of wine, to help digeſtion, though it only ſerves to increaſe the ſurfeit.

Is my young maſter a little out of order? the firſt queſtion is, "What "will my dear eat? what ſhall I get for thee?" Eating and drinking are inſtantly preſſed: and every body's invention is ſet on work to find out ſomething luſcious and delicate enough to prevail over that want of appetite, which nature has wiſely ordered in the beginning of diſtempers, as a defence againſt their increaſe; that, being freed from the ordinary labour of digeſting any new load in the ſtomach, ſhe may be at leiſure to correct and maſter the peccant humours.

And where children are ſo happy in the care of their parents, as by their prudence to be kept from the exceſs of their tables, to the ſobriety of a plain and ſimple diet; yet there too they are ſcarce to be preſerved from the contagion that poiſons the mind. Though by a diſcreet management, whilſt they are under tuition, their healths, perhaps, may be pretty well ſecured; yet their deſires muſt need yield to the leſſons, which every-where will be read to them upon this part of epicuriſm. The commendation that eating well has every-where, cannot fail to be a ſucceſsful incentive to natural appetite, and bring them quickly to the liking and expence of a faſhionable table. This ſhall have from every one, even the reprovers of vice, the title of living well. And what ſhall ſullen reaſon dare to ſay againſt the public teſtimony? or can it hope to be heard, if it ſhould call that luxury, which is ſo much owned, and univerſally practiſed by thoſe of the beſt quality?

This is now ſo grown a vice, and has ſo great ſupports, that I know not whether it do not put in for the name of virtue; and whether it will not be thought folly, or want of knowledge of the world, to open one's mouth againſt it. And truly I ſhould ſuſpect, that what I have here ſaid of it might be cenſured, as a little ſatire out of my way, did I not mention it with this view, that it might awaken the care and watchfulneſs of parents in the education of their children; when they ſee how they are beſet on every ſide, not only with temptations, but inſtructors to vice, and that perhaps in thoſe they thought places of ſecurity.

I shall not dwell any longer on this ſubject; much leſs run over all the particulars, that would ſhew what pains are uſed to corrupt children, and inſtil principles of vice into them: But I deſire parents ſoberly to conſider, what irregularity or vice there is, which children are not viſibly taught; and whether it be not their duty and wiſdom to provide them other inſtructions.

Craving. § 38. It ſeems plain to me, that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power of denying ourſelves the ſatisfaction of our own deſires, where reaſon does not authoriſe them. This power is to be got and improved by cuſtom, made eaſy and familiar by an early practice. If therefore I might be heard, I would adviſe, that, contrary to the ordinary way, children ſhould be uſed to ſubmit their deſires, and go without their longings, even from their very cradles. The very firſt thing they ſhould learn

to know, ſhould be, that they were not to have any thing, becauſe it pleaſed them, but becauſe it was thought fit for them. If things ſuitable to their wants were ſupplied to them, ſo that they were never ſuffered to have what they once cried for, they would learn to be content without it; would never with bawling and peeviſhneſs contend for maſtery; nor be half ſo uneaſy to themſelves and others as they are, becauſe from the firſt beginning they are not thus handled. If they were never ſuffered to obtain their deſire by the impatience they expreſſed for it, they would no more cry for other things, than they do for the moon. Craving.

§ 39. I SAY not this, as if children were not to be indulged in any thing, or that I expected they ſhould, in hanging-ſleeves, have the reaſon and conduct of counſellors. I conſider them as children, who muſt be tenderly uſed, who muſt play, and have play-things. That which I mean is, that whenever they craved what was not fit for them to have, or do, they ſhould not be permitted it, becauſe they were little and deſired it: nay, whatever they were importunate for, they ſhould be ſure, for that very reaſon, to be denied. I have ſeen children at a table, who, whatever was there, never aſked for any thing, but contentedly took what was given them: and at another place I have ſeen others cry for every thing they ſaw, muſt be ſerved out of every diſh, and that firſt too. What made this vaſt difference but this, that one was accuſtomed to have what they called or cried for, the other to go without it? The younger they are, the leſs, I think, are their unruly and diſorderly appetites to be complied with; and the leſs reaſon they have of their own, the more are they to be under the abſolute power and reſtraint of thoſe, in whoſe hands they are. From which I confeſs, it will follow, that none but diſcreet people ſhould be about them. If the world commonly does otherwiſe, I cannot help that. I am ſaying what I think ſhould be; which, if it were already in faſhion, I ſhould not need to trouble the world with a diſcourſe on this ſubject. But yet I doubt not but, when it is conſidered, there will be others of opinion with me, that the ſooner this way is begun with children, the eaſier it will be for them, and their governors too: and that this ought to be obſerved as an inviolable maxim, that whatever once is denied them, they are certainly not to obtain by crying or importunity; unleſs one has a mind to teach them to be impatient and troubleſome, by rewarding them for it, when they are ſo.

§ 40. THOSE therefore that intend ever to govern their children, ſhould begin it whilſt they are very little; and look that they perfectly comply with the will of their parents. Would you have your ſon obedient to you, when paſt a child? Be ſure then to eſtabliſh the authority of a father, as ſoon as he is capable of ſubmiſſion, and can underſtand in whoſe power he is. If you would have him ſtand in awe of you, imprint it in his infancy; and, as he approaches more to a man, admit him nearer to your familiarity: ſo ſhall you have him your obedient ſubject (as is fit) whilſt he is a child, and your affectionate friend when he is a man. For methinks they mightily miſplace the treatment due to their Early.

Early. children, who are indulgent and familiar when they are little, but ſevere to them, and keep them at a diſtance when they are grown up. For liberty and indulgence can do no good to children: their want of judgment makes them ſtand in need of reſtraint and diſcipline. And, on the contrary, imperiouſneſs and ſeverity is but an ill way of treating men, who have reaſon of their own to guide them, unleſs you have a mind to make your children, when grown up, weary of you; and ſecretly to ſay within themſelves, "When will you die, father?"

§ 41. I IMAGINE every one will judge it reaſonable, that their children, when little, ſhould look upon their parents as their lords, their abſolute governors; and, as ſuch, ſtand in awe of them: and that, when they come to riper years, they ſhould look on them as their beſt, as their only ſure friends: and, as ſuch, love and reverence them. The way I have mentioned, if I miſtake not, is the only one to obtain this. We muſt look upon our children, when grown up, to be like ourſelves; with the ſame paſſions, the ſame deſires. We would be thought rational creatures, and have our freedom; we love not to be uneaſy under conſtant rebukes and brow-beatings; nor can we bear ſevere humours, and great diſtance, in thoſe we converſe with. Whoever has ſuch treatment when he is a man, will look out other company, other friends, other converſation, with whom he can be at eaſe. If therefore a ſtrict hand be kept over children from the beginning, they will in that age be tractable, and quietly ſubmit to it, as never having known any other: and if, as they grow up to the uſe of reaſon, the rigour of government be, as they deſerve it, gently relaxed, the father's brow more ſmoothed to them, and the diſtance by degrees abated; his former reſtraints will increaſe their love, when they find it was only a kindneſs for them, and a care to make them capable to deſerve the favour of their parents, and the eſteem of every body elſe.

§ 42. THUS much for the ſettling your authority over your children in general. Fear and awe ought to give you the firſt power over their minds, and love and friendſhip in riper years to hold it: for the time muſt come, when they will be paſt the rod and correction; and then, if the love of you make them not obedient and dutiful; if the love of virtue and reputation keep them not in laudable courſes; I aſk, what hold will you have upon them, to turn them to it? Indeed, fear of having a ſcanty portion, if they diſpleaſe you, may make them ſlaves to your eſtate; but they will be never the leſs ill and wicked in private, and that reſtraint will not laſt always. Every man muſt ſome time or other be truſted to himſelf, and his own conduct; and he that is a good, a virtuous, and able man, muſt be made ſo within. And therefore, what he is to receive from education, what is to ſway and influence his life, muſt be ſomething put into him betimes: habits woven into the very principles of his nature; and not a counterfeit carriage, and diſſembled outſide, put on by fear, only to avoid the preſent anger of a father, who perhaps may diſinherit him.

§ 43. THIS

§ 43. THIS being laid down in general, as the courſe ought to be taken, it is fit we come now to conſider the parts of the diſcipline to be uſed, a little more particularly. I have ſpoken ſo much of carrying a ſtrict hand over children, that perhaps I ſhall be ſuſpected of not conſidering enough what is due to their tender age and conſtitutions. But that opinion will vaniſh, when you have heard me a little farther. For I am very apt to think, that great ſeverity of puniſhment does but very little good; nay, great harm in education: and I believe it will be found, that, cæteris paribus, thoſe children who have been moſt chaſtiſed, ſeldom make the beſt men. All that I have hitherto contended for, is, that whatſoever rigour is neceſſary, it is more to be uſed, the younger children are; and, having by a due application wrought its effect, it is to be relaxed, and changed into a milder ſort of government. Puniſhments.

§ 44. A COMPLIANCE, and ſuppleneſs of their wills, being by a ſteady hand introduced by parents, before children have memories to retain the beginnings of it, will ſeem natural to them, and work afterwards in them, as if it were ſo; preventing all occaſions of ſtruggling, or repining. The only care is, that it be begun early, and inflexibly kept to, till awe and reſpect be grown familiar, and there appears not the leaſt reluctancy in the ſubmiſſion, and ready obedience of their minds. When this reverence is once thus eſtabliſhed, (which it muſt be early, or elſe it will coſt pains and blows to recover it, and the more, the longer it is deferred) it is by it, mixed ſtill with as much indulgence, as they made not an ill uſe of, and not by beating, chiding, or other ſervile puniſhments, they are for the future to be governed, as they grow up to more underſtanding. Awe.

§ 45. THAT this is ſo, will be eaſily allowed, when it is but conſidered what is to be aimed at, in an ingenuous education; and upon what it turns. Self-denial.

1. HE that has not a maſtery over his inclinations, he that knows not how to reſiſt the importunity of preſent pleaſure or pain, for the ſake of what reaſon tells him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue and induſtry; and is in danger of never being good for any thing. This temper, therefore, ſo contrary to unguided nature, is to be got betimes; and this habit, as the true foundation of future ability and happineſs, is to be wrought into the mind, as early as may be, even from the firſt dawnings of any knowledge or apprehenſion in children; and ſo to be confirmed in them, by all the care and ways imaginable, by thoſe who have the overſight of their education.

§ 46. 2. ON the other ſide, if the mind be curbed, and humbled too much in children; if their ſpirits be abaſed and broken much, by too ſtrict an hand over them; they loſe all their vigour and induſtry, and are in a worſe ſtate than the former. For extravagant young fellows, that have livelineſs and ſpirit, come ſometimes to be ſet right, and ſo make able and great men: but dejected minds, timorous and tame, and low ſpirits, are hardly ever to be raiſed, and very ſeldom attain to any thing. Dejected.

To

Dejected. To avoid the danger that is on either hand is the great art: and he that has found a way how to keep up a child's ſpirit, eaſy, active, and free; and yet, at the ſame time, to reſtrain him from many things he has a mind to, and to draw him to things that are uneaſy to him; he, I ſay, that knows how to reconcile theſe ſeeming contradictions, has, in my opinion, got the true ſecret of education.

Beating. § 47. THE uſual lazy and ſhort way by chaſtiſement, and the rod, which is the only inſtrument of government that tutors generally know, or ever think of, is the moſt unfit of any to be uſed in education; becauſe it tends to both thoſe miſchiefs; which, as we have ſhewn, are the Scylla and Charybdis, which, on the one hand or the other, ruin all that miſcarry.

§ 48. 1. THIS kind of puniſhment contributes not at all to the maſtery of our natural propenſity to indulge corporal and preſent pleaſure, and to avoid pain at any rate; but rather encourages it; and thereby ſtrengthens that in us, which is the root, from whence ſpring all vicious actions and the irregularities of life. From what other motive, but of ſenſual pleaſure, and pain, does a child act by, who drudges at his book againſt his inclination, or abſtains from eating unwholeſome fruit, that he takes pleaſure in, only out of fear of whipping? He in this only prefers the greater corporal pleaſure, or avoids the greater corporal pain. And what is it to govern his actions, and direct his conduct, by ſuch motives as theſe? what is it, I ſay, but to cheriſh that principle in him, which it is our buſineſs to root out and deſtroy? And therefore I cannot think any correction uſeful to a child, where the ſhame of ſuffering for having done amiſs does not work more upon him than the pain.

§ 49. 2. THIS ſort of correction naturally breeds an averſion to that which it is the tutor's buſineſs to create a liking to. How obvious is it to obſerve, that children come to hate things which were at firſt acceptable to them, when they find themſelves whipped, and chid, and teazed about them? And it is not to be wondered at in them; when grown men would not be able to be reconciled to any thing by ſuch ways. Who is there that would not be diſguſted with any innocent recreation, in itſelf indifferent to him, if he ſhould with blows, or ill language, be hauled to it, when he had no mind? or be conſtantly ſo treated, for ſome circumſtances in his application to it? This is natural to be ſo. Offenſive circumſtances ordinarily infect innocent things, which they are joined with: and the very ſight of a cup, wherein any one uſes to take nauſeous phyſic, turns his ſtomach; ſo that nothing will reliſh well out of it, though the cup be ever ſo clean, and well-ſhaped, and of the richeſt materials.

§ 50. 3. SUCH a ſort of ſlaviſh diſcipline makes a ſlaviſh temper. The child ſubmits, and diſſembles obedience, whilſt the fear of the rod hangs over him; but when that is removed, and, by being out of ſight, he can promiſe himſelf impunity, he gives the greater ſcope to his natural inclination;

nation; which by this way is not at all altered, but on the contrary heightened and increaſed in him; and after ſuch reſtraint, breaks out uſually with the more violence. Or, Beating.

§ 51. 4. If ſeverity carried to the higheſt pitch does prevail, and works a cure upon the preſent unruly diſtemper, it is often bringing in the room of it a worſe and more dangerous diſeaſe, by breaking the mind; and then, in the place of a diſorderly young fellow, you have a low-ſpirited moped creature: who, however with his unnatural ſobriety he may pleaſe ſilly people, who commend tame inactive children, becauſe they make no noiſe, nor give them any trouble; yet, at laſt, will probably prove as uncomfortable a thing to his friends, as he will be, all his life, an uſeleſs thing to himſelf and others.

§ 52. Beating then, and all other ſorts of ſlaviſh and corporal puniſhments, are not the diſcipline fit to be uſed in the education of thoſe who would have wiſe, good, and ingenuous men; and therefore very rarely to be applied, and that only on great occaſions, and caſes of extremity. On the other ſide, to flatter children by rewards of things that are pleaſant to them, is as carefully to be avoided. He that will give to his ſon apples, or ſugar-plums, or what elſe of this kind he is moſt delighted with, to make him learn his book, does but authoriſe his love of pleaſure, and cocker up that dangerous propenſity, which he ought by all means to ſubdue and ſtifle in him. You can never hope to teach him to maſter it, whilſt you compound for the check you give his inclination in one place, by the ſatisfaction you propoſe to it in another. To make a good, a wiſe, and a virtuous man, it is fit he ſhould learn to croſs his appetite, and deny his inclination to riches, finery, or pleaſing his palate, &c. whenever his reaſon adviſes the contrary, and his duty requires it. But when you draw him to do any thing that is fit, by the offer of money; or reward the pains of learning his book, by the pleaſure of a luſcious morſel; when you promiſe him a lace-cravat, or a fine new ſuit, upon performance of ſome of his little taſks; what do you, by propoſing theſe as rewards, but allow them to be the good things he ſhould aim at, and thereby encourage his longing for them, and accuſtom him to place his happineſs in them? Thus people, to prevail with children to be induſtrious about their grammar, dancing, or ſome other ſuch matter, of no great moment to the happineſs or uſefulneſs of their lives, by miſapplied rewards and puniſhments, ſacrifice their virtue, invert the order of their education, and teach them luxury, pride, or covetouſneſs, &c. For in this way, flattering thoſe wrong inclinations, which they ſhould reſtrain and ſuppreſs, they lay the foundations of thoſe future vices, which cannot be avoided, but by curbing our deſires, and accuſtoming them early to ſubmit to reaſon. Rewards.

§ 53. I say not this, that I would have children kept from the conveniencies or pleaſures of life, that are not injurious to their health or virtue: on the contrary, I would have their lives made as pleaſant, and as agreeable to them as may be, in a plentiful enjoyment of whatſoever might innocently

Rewards. innocently delight them: provided it be with this caution, that they have thoſe enjoyments, only as the conſequences of the ſtate of eſteem and acceptation they are in with their parents and governors; but they ſhould never be offered or beſtowed on them, as the reward of this or that particular performance, that they ſhew an averſion to, or to which they would not have applied themſelves without that temptation.

§ 54. BUT if you take away the rod on one hand, and theſe little encouragements, which they are taken with, on the other; how then (will you ſay) ſhall children be governed? Remove hope and fear, and there is an end of all diſcipline. I grant, that good and evil, reward and puniſhment, are the only motives to a rational creature; theſe are the ſpur and reins, whereby all mankind are ſet on work and guided, and therefore they are to be made uſe of to children too. For I adviſe their parents and governors always to carry this in their minds, that children are to be treated as rational creatures.

§ 55. REWARDS, I grant, and puniſhments muſt be propoſed to children, if we intend to work upon them. The miſtake, I imagine, is, that thoſe that are generally made uſe of, are ill choſen. The pains and pleaſures of the body are, I think, of ill conſequence, when made the rewards and puniſhments whereby men would prevail on their children: for, as I ſaid before, they ſerve but to increaſe and ſtrengthen thoſe inclinations, which it is our buſineſs to ſubdue and maſter. What principle of virtue do you lay in a child, if you will redeem his deſires of one pleaſure by the propoſal of another? This is but to enlarge his appetite, and inſtruct it to wander. If a child cries for an unwholſome and dangerous fruit, you purchaſe his quiet by giving him a leſs hurtful ſweet-meat. This perhaps may preſerve his health, but ſpoils his mind, and ſets that farther out of order. For here you only change the object; but flatter ſtill his appetite, and allow that muſt be ſatisfied, wherein, as I have ſhewed, lies the root of the miſchief: and till you bring him to be able to bear a denial of that ſatisfaction, the child may at preſent be quiet and orderly, but the diſeaſe is not cured. By this way of proceeding you foment and cheriſh in him that which is the ſpring, from whence all the evil flows; which will be ſure on the next occaſion to break out again with more violence, give him ſtronger longings, and you more trouble.

Reputation. § 56. THE rewards and puniſhments then, whereby we ſhould keep children in order, are quite of another kind; and of that force, that when we can get them once to work, the buſineſs, I think, is done, and the difficulty is over. Eſteem and diſgrace are, of all others, the moſt powerful incentives to the mind, when once it is brought to reliſh them. If you can once get into children a love of credit, and an apprehenſion of ſhame and diſgrace, you have put into them the true principle, which will conſtantly work, and incline them to the right. But it will be aſked, How ſhall this be done?

I CONFESS, it does not, at firſt appearance, want ſome difficulty; but yet I think it worth our while to ſeek the ways (and practiſe them

when found) to attain this, which I look on as the great ſecret of education. Reputation.

§ 57. FISRT, children (earlier perhaps than we think) are very ſenſible of praiſe and commendation. They find a pleaſure in being eſteemed and valued, eſpecially by their parents, and thoſe whom they depend on. If therefore the father careſs and commend them, when they do well; ſhew a cold and neglectful countenance to them upon doing ill; and this accompanied by a like carriage of the mother, and all others that are about them; it will in a little time make them ſenſible of the difference: and this, if conſtantly obſerved, I doubt not but will of itſelf work more than threats or blows, which loſe their force, when once grown common, and are of no uſe when ſhame does not attend them; and therefore are to be forborn, and never to be uſed, but in the caſe hereafter-mentioned, when it is brought to extremity.

§ 58. BUT, ſecondly, to make the ſenſe of eſteem or diſgrace ſink the deeper, and be of the more weight, other agreeable or diſagreeable things ſhould conſtantly accompany theſe different ſtates; not as particular rewards and puniſhments of this or that particular action, but as neceſſarily belonging to, and conſtantly attending one, who by his carriage has brought himſelf into a ſtate of diſgrace or commendation. By which way of treating them, children may as much as poſſible be brought to conceive, that thoſe that are commended and in eſteem for doing well, will neceſſarily be beloved and cheriſhed by every body, and have all other good things as a conſequence of it; and, on the other ſide, when any one by miſcarriage falls into diſ-eſteem, and cares not to preſerve his credit, he will unavoidably fall under neglect and contempt: and, in that ſtate, the want of whatever might ſatisfy or delight him, will follow. In this way the objects of their deſires are made aſſiſting to virtue; when a ſettled experience from the beginning teaches children, that the things they delight in, belong to, and are to be enjoyed by thoſe only, who are in a ſtate of reputation. If by theſe means you can come once to ſhame them out of their faults, (for beſides that, I would willingly have no puniſhment) and make them in love with the pleaſure of being well thought on, you may turn them as you pleaſe, and they will be in love with all the ways of virtue.

§ 59. THE great difficulty here is, I imagine, from the folly and perverſeneſs of ſervants, who are hardly to be hindered from croſſing herein the deſign of the father and mother. Children, diſcountenanced by their parents for any fault, find uſually a refuge and relief in the careſſes of thoſe fooliſh flatterers, who thereby undo whatever the parents endeavour to eſtabliſh. When the father or mother looks ſour on the children, every body elſe ſhould put on the ſame coldneſs to him, and no-body give him countenance, till forgiveneſs aſked, and a reformation of his fault, has ſet him right again, and reſtored him to his former credit. If this were conſtantly obſerved, I gueſs there would be little need of blows or chideing: their own eaſe and ſatisfaction would quickly teach children to court

Reputation. commendation, and avoid doing that, which they found every body condemned, and they were ſure to ſuffer for, without being chid or beaten. This would teach them modeſty and ſhame; and they would quickly come to have a natural abhorrence for that, which they found made them ſlighted and neglected by every body. But how this inconvenience from ſervants is to be remedied, I muſt leave to parents care and conſideration. Only I think it of great importance; and that they are very happy, who can get diſcreet people about their children.

Shame. § 60. FREQUENT beating or chiding is therefore carefully to be avoided; becauſe this ſort of correction never produces any good, farther than it ſerves to raiſe ſhame and abhorrence of the miſcarriage that brought it on them. And if the greateſt part of the trouble be not the ſenſe that they have done amiſs, and the apprehenſion that they have drawn on themſelves the juſt diſpleaſure of their beſt friends, the pain of whipping will work but an imperfect cure. It only patches up for the preſent, and ſkins it over, but reaches not to the bottom of the ſore. Ingenuous ſhame, and the apprehenſion of diſpleaſure, are the only true reſtraints: theſe alone ought to hold the reins, and keep the child in order. But corporal puniſhments muſt neceſſarily loſe that effect, and wear out the ſenſe of ſhame, where they frequently return. Shame in children has the ſame place that modeſty has in women; which cannot be kept, and often tranſgreſſed againſt. And as to the apprehenſion of diſpleaſure in the parents, that will come to be very inſignificant, if the marks of that diſpleaſure quickly ceaſe, and a few blows fully expiate. Parents ſhould well conſider, what faults in their children are weighty enough to deſerve the declaration of their anger: but when their diſpleaſure is once declared to a degree that carries any puniſhment with it, they ought not preſently to lay by the ſeverity of their brows, but to reſtore their children to their former grace with ſome difficulty; and delay a full reconciliation, till their conformity, and more than ordinary merit, make good their amendment. If this be not ſo ordered, puniſhment will by familiarity become a mere thing of courſe, and loſe all its influence: offending, being chaſtiſed, and then forgiven, will be thought as natural and neceſſary as noon, night, and morning, following one another.

Reputation. § 61. CONCERNING reputation, I ſhall only remark this one thing more of it: that, though it be not the true principle and meaſure of virtue, (for that is the knowledge of a man's duty, and the ſatisfaction it is to obey his Maker, in following the dictates of that light God has given him, with the hopes of acceptation and reward) yet it is that which comes neareſt to it: and being the teſtimony and applauſe that other people's reaſon, as it were, by a common conſent, gives to virtuous and well-ordered actions, it is the proper guide and encouragement of children, till they grow able to judge for themſelves, and to find what is right by their own reaſon.

§ 62. THIS conſideration may direct parents, how to manage themſelves in reproving and commending their children. The rebukes and chiding, which their faults will ſometimes make hardly to be avoided,

ſhould not only be in ſober, grave, and unpaſſionate words, but alſo alone and in private: but the commendations children deſerve they ſhould receive before others. This doubles the reward, by ſpreading their praiſe; but the backwardneſs parents ſhew in divulging their faults, will make them ſet a greater value on their credit themſelves, and teach them to be the more careful to preſerve the good opinion of others, whilſt they think they have it: but when, being expoſed to ſhame, by publiſhing their miſcarriages, they give it up for loſt, that check upon them is taken off; and they will be the leſs careful to preſerve others good thoughts of them, the more they ſuſpect that their reputation with them is already blemiſhed. Reputation.

§ 63. But if a right courſe be taken with children, there will not be ſo much need of the application of the common rewards and puniſhments, as we imagined, and as the general practice has eſtabliſhed. For all their innocent folly, playing, and childiſh actions, are to be left perfectly free and unreſtrained, as far as they can conſiſt with the reſpect due to thoſe that are preſent; and that with the greateſt allowance. If theſe faults of their age, rather than of the children themſelves, were, as they ſhould be, left only to time, and imitation, and riper years to cure, children would eſcape a great deal of miſapplied and uſeleſs correction; which either fails to overpower the natural diſpoſition of their childhood, and ſo, by an ineffectual familiarity, makes correction in other neceſſary caſes of leſs uſe; or elſe if it be of force to reſtrain the natural gaiety of that age, it ſerves only to ſpoil the temper both of body and mind. If the noiſe and buſtle of their play prove at any time inconvenient, or unſuitable to the place or company they are in, (which can only be where their parents are) a look or a word from the father or mother, if they have eſtabliſhed the authority they ſhould, will be enough either to remove, or quiet them for that time. But this gameſome humour, which is wiſely adapted by nature to their age and temper, ſhould rather be encouraged, to keep up their ſpirits, and improve their ſtrength and health, than curbed or reſtrained: and the chief art is to make all that they have to do, ſport and play too. Childiſhneſs.

§ 64. And here give me leave to take notice of one thing I think a fault in the ordinary method of education; and that is, the charging of children's memories, upon all occaſions, with rules and precepts, which they often do not underſtand, and are conſtantly as ſoon forgot as given. If it be ſome action you would have done, or done otherwiſe; whenever they forget, or do it aukwardly, make them do it over and over again, till they are perfect: whereby you will get theſe two advantages: firſt, to ſee whether it be an action they can do, or is fit to be expected of them. For ſometimes children are bid to do things, which, upon trial, they are found not able to do; and had need be taught and exerciſed in, before they are required to do them. But it is much eaſier for a tutor to command, than to teach. Secondly, another thing got by it will be this, Rules.

Rules. that be repeating the ſame action, till it be grown habitual in them, the performance will not depend on memory, or reflection, the concomitant of prudence and age, and not of childhood; but will be natural in them. Thus, bowing to a gentleman when he ſalutes him, and looking in his face when he ſpeaks to him, is by conſtant uſe as natural to a well-bred man, as breathing; it requires no thought, no reflection. Having this way cured in your child any fault, it is cured for ever: and thus, one by one, you may weed them out all, and plant what habits you pleaſe.

§ 65. I HAVE ſeen parents ſo heap rules on their children, that it was impoſſible for the poor little ones to remember a tenth part of them, much leſs to obſerve them. However, they were either by words or blows corrected for the breach of thoſe multiplied and often very impertinent precepts. Whence it naturally followed, that the children minded not what was ſaid to them; when it was evident to them, that no attention they were capable of, was ſufficient to preſerve them from tranſgreſſion, and the rebukes which followed it.

LET therefore your rules to your ſon be as few as is poſſible, and rather fewer than more than ſeem abſolutely neceſſary. For if you burden him with many rules, one of theſe two things muſt neceſſarily follow, that either he muſt be very often puniſhed, which will be of ill conſequence, by making puniſhment too frequent and familiar; or elſe you muſt let the tranſgreſſions of ſome of your rules go unpuniſhed, whereby they will of courſe grow contemptible, and your authority become cheap to him. Make but few laws, but ſee they be well obſerved, when once made. Few years require but few laws; and as his age increaſes, when one rule is by practice well eſtabliſhed, you may add another.

§ 66. BUT pray remember, children are not to be taught by rules, which will be always ſlipping out of their memories. What you think neceſſary for them to do, ſettle in them by an indiſpenſable practice, as often as the occaſion returns; and, if it be poſſible, make occaſions.

Habits. This will beget habits in them, which, being once eſtabliſhed, operate of themſelves eaſily and naturally, without the aſſiſtance of the memory. But here let me give two cautions: 1. The one is, that you keep them to the practice of what you would have grow into a habit in them, by kind words and gentle admonitions, rather as minding them of what they forget, than by harſh rebukes and chiding, as if they were wilfully guilty. 2dly, Another thing you are to take care of, is, not to endeavour to ſettle too many habits at once, leſt by a variety you confound them, and ſo perfect none. When conſtant cuſtom has made any one thing eaſy and natural to them, and they practiſe it without reflection, you may then go on to another.

Practice. THIS method of teaching children by a repeated practice, and the ſame action done over and over again, under the eye and direction of the tutor, till they have got the habit of doing it well, and not by relying on rules truſted to their memories; has ſo many advantages, which way ſoever we

conſider it, that I cannot but wonder (if ill cuſtoms could be wondered at in any thing) how it could poſſibly be ſo much neglected. I ſhall name one more that comes now in my way. By this method we ſhall ſee, whether what is required of him be adapted to his capacity, and any way ſuited to the child's natural genius and conſtitution: for that too muſt be conſidered in a right education. We muſt not hope wholly to change their original tempers, nor make the gay penſive and grave, nor the melancholy ſportive, without ſpoiling them. God has ſtamped certain characters upon men's minds, which, like their ſhapes, may perhaps be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary. Practice.

He therefore, that is about children, ſhould well ſtudy their natures and aptitudes, and ſee, by often trials, what turn they eaſily take, and what becomes them; obſerve what their native ſtock is, how it may be improved, and what it is fit for: he ſhould conſider what they want, whether they be capable of having it wrought into them by induſtry, and incorporated there by practice; and whether it be worth while to endeavour it. For, in many caſes, all that we can do, or ſhould aim at, is, to make the beſt of what nature has given, to prevent the vices and faults to which ſuch a conſtitution is moſt inclined, and give it all the advantages it is capable of. Every one's natural genius ſhould be carried as far as it could; but to attempt the putting another upon him, will be but labour in vain; and what is ſo plaiſtered on, will at beſt ſit but untowardly, and have always hanging to it the ungracefulneſs of conſtraint and affectation.

Affectation is not, I confeſs, an early fault of childhood, or the product of untaught nature: it is of that ſort of weeds, which grow not in the wild uncultivated waſte, but in garden-plots, under the negligent hand, or unſkilful care of a gardener. Management and inſtruction, and ſome ſenſe of the neceſſity of breeding, are requiſite to make any one capable of affectation, which endeavours to correct natural defects, and has always the laudable aim of pleaſing, though it always miſſes it; and the more it labours to put on gracefulneſs, the farther it is from it. For this reaſon it is the more carefully to be watched, becauſe it is the proper fault of education; a perverted education indeed, but ſuch as young people often fall into, either by their own miſtake, or the ill conduct of thoſe about them. Affectation.

He that will examine wherein that gracefulneſs lies, which always pleaſes, will find it ariſes from that natural coherence, which appears between the thing done, and ſuch a temper of mind, as cannot but be approved of as ſuitable to the occaſion. We cannot but be pleaſed with an humane, friendly, civil temper, wherever we meet with it. A mind free, and maſter of itſelf and all its actions, not low and narrow, not haughty and inſolent, not blemiſhed with any great defect; is what every one is taken with. The actions, which naturally flow from ſuch a well-formed

Affectation.

formed mind, pleaſe us alſo, as the genuine marks of it; and being, as it were, natural emanations from the ſpirit and diſpoſition within, cannot but be eaſy and unconſtrained. This ſeems to me to be that beauty, which ſhines through ſome men's actions, ſets off all that they do, and takes with all they come near; when by a conſtant practice they have faſhioned their carriage, and made all thoſe little expreſſions of civility and reſpect, which nature or cuſtom has eſtabliſhed in converſation, ſo eaſy to themſelves, that they ſeem not artificial or ſtudied, but naturally to follow from a ſweetneſs of mind and a well-turned diſpoſition.

On the other ſide, affectation is an aukward and forced imitation of what ſhould be genuine and eaſy, wanting the beauty that accompanies what is natural; becauſe there is always a diſagreement between the outward action, and the mind within, one of theſe two ways: 1. Either when a man would outwardly put on a diſpoſition of mind, which then he really has not, but endeavours by a forced carriage to make ſhew of; yet ſo, that the conſtraint he is under, diſcovers itſelf: And thus men affect ſometimes to appear ſad, merry, or kind, when, in truth, they are not ſo.

2. The other is, when they do not endeavour to make ſhew of diſpoſitions of mind, which they have not, but to expreſs thoſe they have by a carriage not ſuited to them: And ſuch in converſation are all conſtrained motions, actions, words, or looks, which, though deſigned to ſhew either their reſpect or civility to the company, or their ſatisfaction and eaſineſs in it, are not yet natural nor genuine marks of the one or the other; but rather of ſome defect or miſtake within. Imitation of others, without diſcerning what is graceful in them, or what is peculiar to their characters, often makes a great part of this. But affectation of all kinds, whenceſoever it proceeds, is always offenſive: becauſe we naturally hate whatever is counterfeit; and condemn thoſe who have nothing better to recommend themſelves by.

Plain and rough nature, left to itſelf, is much better than an artificial ungracefulneſs, and ſuch ſtudied ways of being ill-faſhioned. The want of an accompliſhment, or ſome defect in our behaviour, coming ſhort of the utmoſt gracefulneſs, often eſcapes obſervation and cenſure. But affectation in any part of our carriage, is lighting up a candle to our defects; and never fails to make us be taken notice of, either as wanting ſenſe, or wanting ſincerity. This governors ought the more diligently to look after; becauſe, as I above obſerved, it is an acquired uglineſs, owing to miſtaken education; few being guilty of it, but thoſe who pretend to breeding, and would not be thought ignorant of what is faſhionable and becoming in converſation: and, if I miſtake not, it has often its riſe from the lazy admonitions of thoſe who give rules, and propoſe examples, without joining practice with their inſtructions, and making their pupils repeat the action in their ſight, that they may correct what is indecent or conſtrained in it, till it be perfected into an habitual and becoming eaſineſs.

§ 67.

§ 67. MANNERS, as they call it, about which children are ſo often perplexed, and have ſo many goodly exhortations made them, by their wiſe maids and governeſſes, I think, are rather to be learned by example than rules; and then children, if kept out of ill company, will take a pride to behave themſelves prettily, after the faſhion of others, perceiving themſelves eſteemed and commended for it. But if, by a little negligence in this part, the boy ſhould not put off his hat, nor make legs very gracefully, a dancing-maſter will cure that defect, and wipe off all that plainneſs of nature, which the a-la-mode people call clowniſhneſs. And ſince nothing appears to me to give children ſo much becoming confidence and behaviour, and ſo to raiſe them to the converſation of thoſe above their age, as dancing; I think they ſhould be taught to dance, as ſoon as they are capable of learning it. For, though this conſiſt only in outward gracefulneſs of motion, yet, I know not how, it gives children manly thoughts and carriage, more than any thing. But otherwiſe I would not have little children much tormented about punctilio's, or niceties of breeding. Manners. Dancing.

NEVER trouble yourſelf about thoſe faults in them, which you know age will cure. And therefore want of well-faſhioned civility in the carriage, whilſt civility is not wanting in the mind, (for there you muſt take care to plant it early) ſhould be the parents leaſt care, whilſt they are young. If his tender mind be filled with a veneration for his parents and teachers, which conſiſts in love and eſteem, and a fear to offend them; and with reſpect and good-will to all people; that reſpect will of itſelf teach thoſe ways of expreſſing it, which he obſerves moſt acceptable. Be ſure to keep up in him the principles of good-nature and kindneſs; make them as habitual as you can, by credit and commendation, and the good things accompanying that ſtate: and when they have taken root in his mind, and are ſettled there by a continued practice, fear not; the ornaments of converſation, and the outſide of faſhionable manners, will come in their due time, if, when they are removed out of their maids care, they are put into the hands of a well-bred man to be their governor.

WHILST they are very young, any careleſſneſs is to be borne with in children, that carries not with it the marks of pride or ill-nature: but thoſe, whenever they appear in any action, are to be corrected immediately, by the ways abovementioned. What I have ſaid concerning manners, I would not have ſo underſtood, as if I meant that thoſe, who have the judgment to do it, ſhould not gently faſhion the motions and carriage of children, when they are very young. It would be of great advantage, if they had people about them, from their being firſt able to go, that had the ſkill, and would take the right way to do it. That which I complain of, is the wrong courſe that is uſually taken in this matter. Children who were never taught any ſuch thing as behaviour, are often (eſpecially when ſtrangers are preſent) chid for having ſome way or other failed in good manners, and have thereupon reproofs and precepts heaped upon

Manners. upon them, concerning putting off their hats, or making of legs, &c. Though in this thoſe concerned pretend to correct the child, yet, in truth, for the moſt part, it is but to cover their own ſhame: and they lay the blame of the poor little ones, ſometimes paſſionately enough, to divert it from themſelves, for fear the by-ſtanders ſhould impute to their want of care and ſkill the child's ill behaviour.

For, as for the children themſelves, they are never one jot bettered by ſuch occaſional lectures: they at other times ſhould be ſhewn what to do, and by reiterated actions be faſhioned before-hand into the practice of what is fit and becoming; and not told, and talked to do upon the ſpot, what they have never been accuſtomed to, nor know how to do as they ſhould: to hare and rate them thus at every turn, is not to teach them, but to vex and torment them to no purpoſe. They ſhould be let alone, rather than chid for a fault, which is none of theirs, nor is in their power to mend for ſpeaking to. And it were much better their natural, childiſh negligence, or plainneſs, ſhould be left to the care of riper years, than that they ſhould frequently have rebukes miſplaced upon them, which neither do, nor can give them graceful motions. If their minds are well diſpoſed, and principled with inward civility, a great part of the roughneſs, which ſticks to the outſide for want of better teaching, time and obſervation will rub off, as they grow up, if they are bred in good company; but if in ill, all the rules in the world, all the correction imaginable, will not be able to poliſh them. For you muſt take this for a certain truth, that let them have what inſtructions you will, and ever ſo learned lectures of breeding daily inculcated into them, that which will moſt influence their carriage, will be the company they converſe with, and the faſhion of thoſe about them. Children (nay, and men too) do moſt by example. We are all a ſort of chameleons, that ſtill take a tincture from things near us: Nor is it to be wondered at in children, who better underſtand what they ſee, than what they hear.

§ 68. I mentioned above, one great miſchief that came by ſervants to children, when by their flatteries they take off the edge and force of the parents rebukes, and ſo leſſen their authority. And here is another great inconvenience, which children receive from the ill examples which they meet with, amongſt the meaner ſervants.

They are wholly, if poſſible, to be kept from ſuch converſation: for the contagion of theſe ill precedents, both in civility and virtue, horribly infects children, as often as they come within reach of it. They frequently learn, from unbred, or debauched ſervants, ſuch language, untowardly tricks and vices, as otherwiſe they poſſibly would be ignorant of, all their lives.

§ 69. It is a hard matter wholly to prevent this miſchief. You will have very good luck, if you never have a clowniſh or vicious ſervant, and if from them your children never get any infection. But yet, as much muſt be done towards it, as can be; and the children kept as much as may

may be * in the company of their parents, and thoſe to whoſe care they are committed. To this purpoſe, their being in their preſence ſhould be made eaſy to them: they ſhould be allowed the liberties and freedom ſuitable to their ages, and not be held under unneceſſary reſtraints, when in their parent's or governor's ſight. If it be a priſon to them, it is no wonder they ſhould not like it. They muſt not be hindered from being children, or from playing, or doing as children; but from doing ill. All other liberty is to be allowed them. Next, to make them in love with the company of their parents, they ſhould receive all their good things there, and from their hands. The ſervants ſhould be hindered from making court to them, by giving them ſtrong drink, wine, fruit, play-things, and other ſuch matters, which may make them in love with their converſation. Company.

* How much the Romans thought the education of their children a buſineſs that properly belonged to the parents themſelves, ſee in Suetonius, Auguſt. Sect. 64. Plutarch in vita Catonis Cenſoris; Diodorus Siculus, l. 2. cap. 3.

§ 70. HAVING named company, I am almoſt ready to throw away my pen, and trouble you no farther on this ſubject. For ſince that does more than all precepts, rules, and inſtructions, methinks it is almoſt wholly in vain to make a long diſcourſe of other things, and to talk of that almoſt to no purpoſe. For you will be ready to ſay, "What ſhall I do with my "ſon? If I keep him always at home, he will be in danger to be my "young maſter; and if I ſend him abroad, how is it poſſible to keep him "from the contagion of rudeneſs and vice, which is every-where ſo in "faſhion? In my houſe, he will perhaps be more innocent, but more "ignorant too of the world: wanting there change of company, and "being uſed conſtantly to the ſame faces, he will, when he comes abroad, "be a ſheepiſh or conceited creature."

I CONFESS, both ſides have their inconveniencies. Being abroad, it is true, will make him bolder, and better able to buſtle and ſhift amongſt boys of his own age; and the emulation of ſchool-fellows often puts life and induſtry into young lads. But till you can find a ſchool, wherein it is poſſible for the maſter to look after the manners of his ſcholars, and can ſhew as great effects of his care of forming their minds to virtue, and their carriage to good breeding, as of forming their tongues to the learned languages; you muſt confeſs, that you have a ſtrange value for words, when, preferring the languages of the ancient Greeks and Romans to that which made them ſuch brave men, you think it worth while to hazard your ſon's innocence and virtue, for a little Greek and Latin. For, as for that boldneſs and ſpirit, which lads get amongſt their play-fellows at ſchool, it has ordinarily ſuch a mixture of rudeneſs, and an ill-turned confidence, that thoſe miſbecoming and diſingenuous ways of ſhifting in the world muſt be unlearned, and all the tincture waſhed out again, to make way for better principles, and ſuch manners as make a truly worthy man. He that conſiders how diametrically oppoſite the ſkill of living well, and managing, as a man ſhould do, his affairs in the world, is to that malapertneſs, tricking, or violence, learnt among ſchool-

Company. boys, will think the faults of a privater education infinitely to be preferred to ſuch improvements; and will take care to preſerve his child's innocence and modeſty at home, as being nearer of kin, and more in the way of thoſe qualities, which make an uſeful and able man. Nor does any one find, or ſo much as ſuſpect, that that retirement and baſhfulneſs, which their daughters are brought up in, makes them leſs knowing or leſs able women. Converſation, when they come into the world, ſoon gives them a becoming aſſurance; and whatſoever, beyond that, there is of rough and boiſterous, may in men be very well ſpared too: for courage and ſteadineſs, as I take it, lie not in roughneſs and ill breeding.

Virtue is harder to be got, than a knowledge of the world; and, if loſt in a young man, is ſeldom recovered. Sheepiſhneſs and ignorance of the world, the faults imputed to a private education, are neither the neceſſary conſequences of being bred at home; nor, if they were, are they incurable evils. Vice is the more ſtubborn, as well as the more dangerous evil of the two; and therefore, in the firſt place, to be fenced againſt. If that ſheepiſh ſoftneſs, which often enervates thoſe, who are bred like fondlings at home, be carefully to be avoided, it is principally ſo for virtue's ſake; for fear leſt ſuch a yielding temper ſhould be too ſuſceptible of vicious impreſſions, and expoſe the novice too eaſily to be corrupted. A young man, before he leaves the ſhelter of his father's houſe, and the guard of a tutor, ſhould be fortified with reſolution, and made acquainted with men, to ſecure his virtue; leſt he ſhould be led into ſome ruinous courſe, or fatal precipice, before he is ſufficiently acquainted with the dangers of converſation, and has ſteadineſs enough not to yield to every temptation. Were it not for this, a young man's baſhfulneſs, and ignorance of the world, would not ſo much need an early care. Converſation would cure it in a great meaſure; or, if that will not do it early enough, it is only a ſtronger reaſon for a good tutor at home. For, if pains be to be taken to give him a manly air and aſſurance betimes, it is chiefly as a fence to his virtue, when he goes into the world, under his own conduct.

It is prepoſterous, therefore, to ſacrifice his innocency to the attaining of confidence, and ſome little ſkill of buſtling for himſelf among others, by his converſation with ill-bred and vicious boys; when the chief uſe of that ſturdineſs, and ſtanding upon his own legs, is only for the preſervation of his virtue. For if confidence or cunning come once to mix with vice, and ſupport his miſcarriages, he is only the ſurer loſt; and you muſt undo again, and ſtrip him of that he has got from his companions, or give him up to ruin. Boys will unavoidably be taught aſſurance by converſation with men, when they are brought into it; and that is time enough. Modeſty and ſubmiſſion, till then, better fits them for inſtruction: and therefore there needs not any great care to ſtock them with

confidence beforehand. That which requires moſt time, pains, and aſſiduity, is to work into them the principles and practice of virtue and good breeding. This is the ſeaſoning they ſhould be prepared with, ſo as not eaſily to be got out again: this they had need to be well provided with. For converſation, when they come into the world, will add to their knowledge and aſſurance, but be too apt to take from their virtue; which therefore they ought to be plentifully ſtored with, and have that tincture ſunk deep into them. Company.

How they ſhould be fitted for converſation, and entered into the world, when they are ripe for it, we ſhall conſider in another place. But how any one's being put into a mixed herd of unruly boys, and there learning to wrangle at trap, or rook at ſpan-farthing, fits him for civil converſation, or buſineſs, I do not ſee. And what qualities are ordinarily to be got from ſuch a troop of play-fellows, as ſchools uſually aſſemble together, from parents of all kinds, that a father ſhould ſo much covet it, is hard to divine. I am ſure, he who is able to be at the charge of a tutor at home, may there give his ſon a more genteel carriage, more manly thoughts, and a ſenſe of what is worthy and becoming, with a greater proficiency in learning into the bargain, and ripen him up ſooner into a man; than any at ſchool can do. Not that I blame the ſchool-maſter in this, or think it to be laid to his charge. The difference is great between two or three pupils in the ſame houſe, and three or fourſcore boys lodged up and down. For, let the maſter's induſtry and ſkill be ever ſo great, it is impoſſible he ſhould have 50 or 100 ſcholars under his eye, any longer than they are in the ſchool together: nor can it be expected, that he ſhould inſtruct them ſucceſsfully in any thing but their books; the forming of their minds and manners requiring a conſtant attention, and particular application to every ſingle boy; which is impoſſible in a numerous flock, and would be wholly in vain, (could he have time to ſtudy and correct every one's particular defects and wrong inclinations) when the lad was to be left to himſelf, or the prevailing infection of his fellows, the greateſt part of the four and twenty hours.

But fathers, obſerving that fortune is often moſt ſucceſsfully courted by bold and buſtling men, are glad to ſee their ſons pert and forward betimes; take it for an happy omen, that they will be thriving men, and look on the tricks they play their ſchool-fellows, or learn from them, as a proficiency in the art of living, and making their way through the world. But I muſt take the liberty to ſay, that he that lays the foundation of his ſon's fortune in virtue and good breeding, takes the only ſure and warrantable way. And it is not the waggeries or cheats practiſed among ſchool-boys, it is not their roughneſs one to another; nor the well-laid plots of robbing an orchard together, that make an able man; but the principles of juſtice, generoſity, and ſobriety, joined with obſervation and induſtry, qualities which I judge ſchool-boys do not learn much of one another. And if a young gentleman, bred at home, be not taught more of them, than he could learn at ſchool, his father has made a very ill

Company. choice of a tutor. Take a boy from the top of a grammar-ſchool, and one of the ſame age, bred as he ſhould be in his father's family, and bring them into good company together; and then ſee which of the two will have the more manly carriage, and addreſs himſelf with the more becoming aſſurance to ſtrangers. Here I imagine the ſchool-boy's confidence will either fail or diſcredit him; and if it be ſuch as fits him only for the converſation of boys, he had better be without it.

Vice. VICE, if we may believe the general complaint, ripens ſo faſt now-a-days, and runs up to ſeed ſo early in young people, that it is impoſſible to keep a lad from the ſpreading contagion, if you will venture him abroad in the herd, and truſt to chance, or his own inclination, for the choice of his company at ſchool. By what fate vice has ſo thriven amongſt us theſe few years paſt, and by what hands it has been nurſed up into ſo uncontrouled a dominion, I ſhall leave to others to inquire. I wiſh that thoſe who complain of the great decay of chriſtian piety and virtue everywhere, and of learning and acquired improvements in the gentry of this generation, would conſider how to retrieve them in the next. This I am ſure, that, if the foundation of it be not laid in the education and principling of the youth, all other endeavours will be in vain. And if the innocence, ſobriety, and induſtry of thoſe who are coming up, be not taken care of and preſerved, it will be ridiculous to expect, that thoſe who are to ſucceed next on the ſtage, ſhould abound in that virtue, ability, and learning, which has hitherto made England conſiderable in the world. I was going to add courage too, though it has been looked on as the natural inheritance of Engliſhmen. What has been talked of ſome late actions at ſea, of a kind unknown to our anceſtors, gives me occaſion to ſay, that debauchery ſinks the courage of men; and when diſſoluteneſs has eaten out the ſenſe of true honour, bravery ſeldom ſtays long after it. And I think it impoſſible to find an inſtance of any nation, however renowned for their valour, who ever kept their credit in arms, or made themſelves redoubtable amongſt their neighbours, after corruption had once broke through, and diſſolved the reſtraint of diſcipline; and vice was grown to ſuch a head, that it durſt ſhew itſelf barefaced, without being out of countenance.

Virtue. IT is virtue then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education; and not a forward pertneſs, or any little arts of ſhifting. All other conſiderations and accompliſhments ſhould give way, and be poſtponed, to this. This is the ſolid and ſubſtantial good, which tutors ſhould not only read lectures, and talk of; but the labour and art of education ſhould furniſh the mind with, and faſten there, and never ceaſe till the young man had a true reliſh of it, and placed his ſtrength, his glory, and his pleaſure in it.

Company. THE more this advances, the eaſier way will be made for other accompliſhments in their turns. For he that is brought to ſubmit to virtue, will not be refractory, or reſty, in any thing that becomes him. And therefore I cannot but prefer breeding of a young gentleman at home in his

his father's ſight, under a good governor, as much the beſt and ſafeſt way to this great and main end of education; when it can be had, and is ordered as it ſhould be. Gentlemen's houſes are ſeldom without variety of company: they ſhould uſe their ſons to all the ſtrange faces that come there, and engage them in converſation with men of parts and breeding, as ſoon as they are capable of it. And why thoſe, who live in the country, ſhould not take them with them, when they make viſits of civility to their neighbours, I know not: this I am ſure, a father that breeds his ſon at home, has the opportunity to have him more in his own company, and there give him what encouragement he thinks fit; and can keep him better from the taint of ſervants, and the meaner ſort of people, than is poſſible to be done abroad. But what ſhall be reſolved in the caſe, muſt in great meaſure be left to the parents, to be determined by their circumſtances and conveniencies. Only I think it the worſt ſort of good huſbandry for a father not to ſtrain himſelf a little for his ſon's breeding; which, let his condition be what it will, is the beſt portion he can leave him. But if, after all, it ſhall be thought by ſome, that the breeding at home has too little company, and that at ordinary ſchools not ſuch as it ſhould be for a young gentleman; I think there might be ways found out to avoid the inconveniencies on the one ſide and the other.

§ 71. HAVING under conſideration how great the influence of company is, and how prone we are all, eſpecially children, to imitation; I muſt here take the liberty to mind parents of this one thing, viz. That he that will have his ſon have a reſpect for him and his orders, muſt himſelf have a great reverence for his ſon. "Maxima debetur pueris reve- Example.
"" rentia." You muſt do nothing before him, which you would not have him imitate. If any thing eſcape you, which you would have paſs for a fault in him, he will be ſure to ſhelter himſelf under your example, and ſhelter himſelf ſo, as that it will not be eaſy to come at him to correct it in him the right way. If you puniſh him for what he ſees you practiſe yourſelf, he will not think that ſeverity to proceed from kindneſs in you, or carefulneſs to amend a fault in him; but will be apt to interpret it the peeviſhneſs and arbitrary imperiouſneſs of a father, who, without any ground for it, would deny his ſon the liberty and pleaſures he takes himſelf. Or if you aſſume to yourſelf the liberty you have taken, as a privilege belonging to riper years, to which a child muſt not aſpire, you do but add new force to your example, and recommend the action the more powerfully to him. For you muſt always remember, that children affect to be men earlier than is thought: and they love breeches, not for their cut, or eaſe, but becauſe the having them is a mark or a ſtep towards manhood. What I ſay of the father's carriage before his children, muſt extend itſelf to all thoſe who have any authority over them, or for whom he would have them have any reſpect.

§ 72. BUT to return to the buſineſs of rewards and puniſhments. All Puniſhment.
the actions of childiſhneſs, and unfaſhionable carriage, and whatever time and age will of itſelf be ſure to reform, being (as I have ſaid) exempt

Puniſhment. from the diſcipline of the rod, there will not be ſo much need of beating children, as is generally made uſe of. To which if we add learning to read, write, dance, foreign languages, &c. as under the ſame privilege, there will be but very rarely any occaſion for blows or force in an ingenuous education. The right way to teach them thoſe things, is, to give them a liking and inclination to what you propoſe to them to be learned, and that will engage their induſtry and application. This I think no hard matter to do, if children be handled as they ſhould be, and the rewards and puniſhments above-mentioned be carefully applied, and with them theſe few rules obſerved in the method of inſtructing them.

Taſk. § 73. 1. NONE of the things they are to learn ſhould ever be made a burden to them, or impoſed on them as a taſk. Whatever is ſo propoſed, preſently becomes irkſome: the mind takes an averſion to it, though before it were a thing of delight or indifferency. Let a child be but ordered to whip his top at a certain time every day, whether he has, or has not a mind to it; let this be but required of him as a duty, wherein he muſt ſpend ſo many hours morning and afternoon, and ſee whether he will not ſoon be weary of any play at this rate. Is it not ſo with grown men? What they do chearfully of themſelves, do they not preſently grow ſick of, and can no more endure, as ſoon as they find it is expected of them as a duty? Children have as much a mind to ſhew that they are free, that their own good actions come from themſelves, that they are abſolute and independent, as any of the proudeſt of you grown men, think of them as you pleaſe.

Diſpoſition. § 74. 2. As a conſequence of this, they ſhould ſeldom be put about doing even thoſe things you have got an inclination in them to, but when they have a mind and diſpoſition to it. He that loves reading, writing, muſick, &c. finds yet in himſelf certain ſeaſons wherein thoſe things have no reliſh to him: and, if at that time he forces himſelf to it, he only pothers and wearies himſelf to no purpoſe. So it is with children. This change of temper ſhould be carefully obſerved in them, and the favourable ſeaſons of aptitude and inclination be heedfully laid hold of: and if they are not often enough forward of themſelves, a good diſpoſition ſhould be talked into them, before they be ſet upon any thing. This I think no hard matter for a diſcreet tutor to do, who has ſtudied his pupil's temper, and will be at a little pains to fill his head with ſuitable ideas, ſuch as may make him in love with the preſent buſineſs. By this means a great deal of time and tiring would be ſaved: for a child will learn three times as much when he is in tune, as he will with double the time and pains, when he goes aukwardly, or is dragged unwillingly to it. If this were minded as it ſhould, children might be permitted to weary themſelves with play, and yet have time enough to learn what is ſuited to the capacity of each age. But no ſuch thing is conſidered in the ordinary way of education, nor can it well be. That rough diſcipline of the rod is built upon other principles, has no attraction in it, regards not what humour children are in, nor looks after favourable ſeaſons of inclination.

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And indeed it would be ridiculous, when compulſion and blows have raiſed an averſion in the child to his taſk, to expect he ſhould freely of his own accord leave his play, and with pleaſure court the occaſions of learning: whereas, were matters ordered right, learning any thing they ſhould be taught, might be made as much a recreation to their play, as their play is to their learning. The pains are equal on both ſides: nor is it that which troubles them; for they love to be buſy, and the change and variety is that which naturally delights them. The only odds is, in that which we call play they act at liberty, and employ their pains (whereof you may obſerve them never ſparing) freely; but what they are to learn, is forced upon them: they are called, compelled, and driven to it. This is that which at firſt entrance balks and cools them; they want their liberty: get them but to aſk their tutor to teach them, as they do often their play-fellows, inſtead of his calling upon them to learn; and they being ſatisfied that they act as freely in this, as they do in other things, they will go on with as much pleaſure in it, and it will not differ from their other ſports and play. By theſe ways, carefully purſued, a child may be brought to deſire to be taught any thing you have a mind he ſhould learn. The hardeſt part, I confeſs, is with the firſt or eldeſt; but when once he is ſet aright, it is eaſy by him to lead the reſt whither one will. Diſpoſition.

§ 75. THOUGH it be paſt doubt, that the fitteſt time for children to learn any thing is, when their minds are in tune, and well diſpoſed to it; when neither flagging of ſpirit, nor intentneſs of thought upon ſomething elſe, makes them aukward and averſe; yet two things are to be taken care of: 1. That theſe ſeaſons either not being warily obſerved, and laid hold on, as often as they return; or elſe not returning as often as they ſhould; the improvement of the child be not thereby neglected, and ſo he be let grow into an habitual idleneſs, and confirmed in this indiſpoſition. 2. That though other things are ill learned when the mind is either indiſpoſed, or otherwiſe taken up; yet it is of great moment, and worth our endeavours, to teach the mind to get the maſtery over itſelf; and to be able, upon choice, to take itſelf off from the hot purſuit of one thing, and ſet itſelf upon another with facility and delight; or at any time to ſhake off its ſluggiſhneſs, and vigorouſly employ itſelf about what reaſon, or the advice of another, ſhall direct. This is to be done in children, by trying them ſometimes, when they are by lazineſs unbent, or by avocation bent another way, and endeavouring to make them buckle to the thing propoſed. If by this means the mind can get an habitual dominion over itſelf, lay by ideas or buſineſs, as occaſion requires, and betake itſelf to new and leſs acceptable employments, without reluctancy or diſcompoſure, it will be an advantage of more conſequence than Latin, or Logick, or moſt of thoſe things children are uſually required to learn.

§ 76. CHILDREN being more active and buſy in that age, than in any other part of their life, and being indifferent to any thing they can do, ſo they may be but doing; dancing and Scotch-hoppers would be the ſame Compulſion.

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Compulſion. thing to them, were the encouragements and diſcouragements equal. But to things we would have them learn, the great and only diſcouragement I can obſerve, is, that they are called to it; it is made their buſineſs; they are teazed and chid about it, and do it with trembling and apprehenſion; or, when they come willingly to it, are kept too long at it, till they are quite tired: all which intrenches too much on that natural freedom they extremely affect. And it is that liberty alone, which gives the true reliſh and delight to their ordinary play-games. Turn the tables, and you will find, they will ſoon change their application; eſpecially if they ſee the examples of others, whom they eſteem and think above themſelves. And if the things which they obſerve others to do, be ordered ſo that they inſinuate themſelves into them, as the privilege of an age or condition above theirs; then ambition, and the deſire ſtill to get forward, and higher, and to be like thoſe above them, will ſet them on work, and make them go on with vigour and pleaſure: pleaſure in what they have begun by their own deſire. In which way the enjoyment of their dearly beloved freedom will be no ſmall encouragement to them. To all which, if there be added the ſatisfaction of credit and reputation, I am apt to think, there will need no other ſpur to excite their application and aſſiduity, as much as is neceſſary. I confeſs, there needs patience and ſkill, gentleneſs and attention, and a prudent conduct to attain this at firſt. But why have you a tutor, if there needed no pains? But when this is once eſtabliſhed, all the reſt will follow more eaſily, than in any more ſevere and imperious diſcipline. And I think it no hard matter to gain this point; I am ſure it will not be, where children have no ill examples ſet before them. The great danger therefore, I apprehend is only from ſervants, and other ill-ordered children, or ſuch other vicious or fooliſh people, who ſpoil children, both by the ill pattern they ſet before them in their own ill manners, and by giving them together, the two things they ſhould never have at once; I mean, vicious pleaſures and commendation.

Chiding. § 77. As children ſhould very ſeldom be corrected by blows; ſo, I think, frequent, and eſpecially, paſſionate chiding, of almoſt as ill conſequence. It leſſens the authority of the parents, and the reſpect of the child: for I bid you ſtill remember, they diſtinguiſh early betwixt paſſion and reaſon: and as they cannot but have a reverence for what comes from the latter, ſo they quickly grow into a contempt of the former; or if it cauſes a preſent terror, yet it ſoon wears of; and natural inclination will eaſily learn to ſlight ſuch ſcare-crows, which make a noiſe, but are not animated by reaſon. Children being to be reſtrained by the parents only in vicious (which, in their tender years, are only a few) things, a look or nod only ought to correct them, when they do amiſs: or, if words are ſometimes to be uſed, they ought to be grave, kind, and ſober, repreſenting the ill, or unbecomingneſs of the faults, rather than a haſty rating of the child for it, which makes him not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh whether your diſlike be not more directed to him than his fault. Paſſion-

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nate chiding uſually carries rough and ill language with it, which has this further ill effect, that it teaches and juſtifies it in children: and the names that their parents or preceptors give them they will not be aſhamed or backward to beſtow on others, having ſo good authority for the uſe of them. Chiding.

§ 78. I FORESEE here it will be objected to me: What then, will you have children never beaten, nor chid, for any fault? This will be to let looſe the reins to all kind of diſorder. Not ſo much as is imagined, if a right courſe has been taken in the firſt ſeaſoning of their minds, and implanting that awe of their parents above-mentioned. For beating, by conſtant obſervation, is found to do little good, where the ſmart of it is all the puniſhment is feared or felt in it; for the influence of that quickly wears out, with the memory of it. But yet there is one, and but one fault, for which, I think, children ſhould be beaten; and that is obſtinacy or rebellion. And in this too, I would have it ordered ſo, if it can be, that the ſhame of the whipping, and not the pain, ſhould be the greateſt part of the puniſhment. Shame of doing amiſs, and deſerving chaſtiſement, is the only true reſtraint belonging to virtue. The ſmart of the rod, if ſhame accompanies it not, ſoon ceaſes, and is forgotten, and will quickly, by uſe, loſe its terror. I have known the children of a perſon of quality kept in awe, by the fear of having their ſhoes pulled off, as much as others by apprehenſions of a rod hanging over them. Some ſuch puniſhment I think better than beating; for it is ſhame of the fault, and the diſgrace that attends it, that they ſhould ſtand in fear of, rather than pain, if you would have them have a temper truly ingenuous. But ſtubbornneſs, and an obſtinate diſobedience, muſt be maſtered with force and blows: for this there is no other remedy. Whatever particular action you bid him do, or forbear, you muſt be ſure to ſee yourſelf obeyed; no quarter, in this caſe, no reſiſtance. For when once it comes to be a trial of ſkill, a conteſt for maſtery betwixt you, as it is, if you command, and he refuſes; you muſt be ſure to carry it, whatever blows it coſts, if a nod or words will not prevail; unleſs, for ever after, you intend to live in obedience to your ſon. A prudent and kind mother, of my acquaintance, was, on ſuch an occaſion, forced to whip her little daughter, at her firſt coming home from nurſe, eight times ſucceſſively, the ſame morning, before ſhe could maſter her ſtubbornneſs, and obtain a compliance in a very eaſy and indifferent matter. If ſhe had left off ſooner, and ſtopped at the ſeventh whipping, ſhe had ſpoiled the child for ever; and, by her unprevailing blows, only confirmed her refractorineſs, very hardly afterwards to be cured: but wiſely perſiſting, till ſhe had bent her mind, and ſuppled her will, the only end of correction and chaſtiſement, ſhe eſtabliſhed her authority thoroughly in the very firſt occaſions, and had ever after a very ready compliance and obedience in all things from her daughter. For, as this was the firſt time, ſo, I think, it was the laſt too ſhe ever ſtruck her. Obſtinacy.

Obſtinacy. THE pain of the rod, the firſt occaſion that requires it, continued and increaſed without leaving off, till it has thoroughly prevailed; ſhould firſt bend the mind, and ſettle the parents authority: and then gravity, mixed with kindneſs, ſhould for ever after keep it.

THIS, if well reflected on, would make people more wary in the uſe of the rod and the cudgel; and keep them from being ſo apt to think beating the ſafe and univerſal remedy, to be applied at random, on all occaſions. This is certain however, if it does no good, it does great harm; if it reaches not the mind, and makes not the will ſupple, it hardens the offender; and, whatever pain he has ſuffered for it, it does but endear to him his beloved ſtubbornneſs, which has got him this time the victory, and prepares him to conteſt and hope for it for the future. Thus, I doubt not, but by ill-ordered correction, many have been taught to be obſtinate and refractory, who otherwiſe would have been very pliant and tractable. For, if you puniſh a child ſo, as if it were only to revenge the paſt fault, which has raiſed your choler; what operation can this have upon his mind, which is the part to be amended? If there were no ſturdy humour or wilfulneſs mixed with his fault, there was nothing in it, that required the ſeverity of blows. A kind, or grave admonition is enough, to remedy the ſlips of frailty, forgetfulneſs, or inadvertency, and is as much as they will ſtand in need of. But, if there were a perverſeneſs in the will, if it were a deſigned, reſolved diſobedience, the puniſhment is not to be meaſured by the greatneſs or ſmallneſs of the matter wherein it appeared, but by the oppoſition it carries, and ſtands in, to that reſpect and ſubmiſſion that is due to the father's orders; which muſt always be rigorouſly exacted, and the blows by pauſes laid on, till they reach the mind, and you perceive the ſigns of a true ſorrow, ſhame, and purpoſe of obedience.

THIS, I confeſs, requires ſomething more than ſetting children a taſk, and whipping them without any more ado, if it be not done, and done to our fancy. This requires care, attention, obſervation, and a nice ſtudy of children's tempers, and weighing their faults well, before we come to this ſort of puniſhment. But is not that better, than always to have the rod in hand, as the only inſtrument of government; and, by frequent uſe of it, on all occaſions, miſapply and render inefficacious this laſt and uſeful remedy, where there is need of it? For, what elſe can be expected, when it is promiſcuouſly uſed upon every little ſlip? When a miſtake in concordance, or a wrong poſition in verſe, ſhall have the ſeverity of the laſh, in a well-tempered and induſtrious lad, as ſurely as a wilful crime in an obſtinate and perverſe offender; how can ſuch a way of correction be expected to do good on the mind, and ſet that right? which is the only thing to be looked after; and, when ſet right, brings all the reſt that you can deſire along with it.

§ 79. WHERE a wrong bent of the will wants not amendment, there can be no need of blows. All other faults, where the mind is rightly diſpoſed,

diſpoſed, and refuſes not the government and authority of the father or tutor, are but miſtakes, and may often be over-looked; or, when they are taken notice of, need no other but the gentle remedies of advice, direction, and reproof; till the repeated and wilful neglect of thoſe ſhews the fault to be in the mind, and that a manifeſt perverſeneſs of the will lies at the root of their diſobedience. But whenever obſtinacy, which is an open defiance, appears, that cannot be winked at, or neglected, but muſt, in the firſt inſtance, be ſubdued and maſtered; only care muſt be had, that we miſtake not; and we muſt be ſure it is obſtinacy, and nothing elſe. Obſtinacy.

§ 80. But ſince the occaſions of puniſhment, eſpecially beating, are as much to be avoided as may be, I think it ſhould not be often brought to this point. If the awe I ſpoke of be once got, a look will be ſufficient in moſt caſes. Nor indeed ſhould the ſame carriage, ſerioufneſs, or application be expected from young children, as from thoſe of riper growth. They muſt be permitted, as I ſaid, the fooliſh and childiſh actions, ſuitable to their years, without taking notice of them; inadvertency, careleſſneſs, and gaiety, is the character of that age. I think the ſeverity I ſpoke of, is not to extend itſelf to ſuch unſeaſonable reſtraints; nor is that haſtily to be interpreted obſtinacy or wilfulneſs, which is the natural product of their age or temper. In ſuch miſcarriages they are to be aſſiſted, and helped towards an amendment, as weak people under a natural infirmity; which, though they are warned of, yet every relapſe muſt not be counted a perfect neglect, and they preſently treated as obſtinate. Faults of frailty, as they ſhould never be neglected, or let paſs without minding; ſo, unleſs the will mix with them, they ſhould never be exaggerated, or very ſharply reproved; but with a gentle hand ſet right, as time and age permit. By this means, children will come to ſee what is in any miſcarriage, that is chiefly offenſive, and ſo learn to avoid it. This will encourage them to keep their wills right, which is the great buſineſs; when they find, that it preſerves them from any great diſpleaſure; and that in all their other failings they meet with the kind concern and help, rather than the anger and paſſionate reproaches, of their tutor and parents. Keep them from vice, and vicious diſpoſitions, and ſuch a kind of behaviour in general will come, with every degree of their age, as is ſuitable to that age, and the company they ordinarily converſe with: and as they grow in years, they will grow in attention and application. But that your words may always carry weight and authority with them, if it ſhall happen, upon any occaſion, that you bid him leave off the doing of any even childiſh things, you muſt be ſure to carry the point, and not let him have the maſtery. But yet, I ſay, I would have the father ſeldom interpoſe his authority and command in theſe caſes, or in any other, but ſuch as have a tendency to vicious habits. I think there are better ways of prevailing with them; and a gentle perſuaſion in reaſoning (when the firſt point of ſubmiſſion to your will is got) will moſt times do much better.

Reaſoning. § 81. It will perhaps be wondered, that I mention reaſoning with children: and yet I cannot but think that the true way of dealing with them. They underſtand it as early as they do language; and, if I miſobſerve not, they love to be treated as rational creatures, ſooner than is imagined. It is a pride ſhould be cheriſhed in them, and, as much as can be, made the greateſt inſtrument to turn them by.

But when I talk of reaſoning, I do not intend any other, but ſuch as is ſuited to the child's capacity and apprehenſion. No-body can think a boy of three or ſeven years old ſhould be argued with, as a grown man. Long diſcourſes, and philoſophical reaſonings, at beſt, amaze and confound, but do not inſtruct, children. When I ſay therefore, that they muſt be treated as rational creatures, I mean, that you ſhould make them ſenſible, by the mildneſs of your carriage, and the compoſure, even in your correction of them, that what you do is reaſonable in you, and uſeful and neceſſary for them; and that it is not out of caprice, paſſion, or fancy, that you command or forbid them any thing. This they are capable of underſtanding; and there is no virtue they ſhould be excited to, nor fault they ſhould be kept from, which I do not think they may be convinced of: but it muſt be by ſuch reaſons as their age and underſtanding are capable of, and thoſe propoſed always in very few and plain words. The foundations on which ſeveral duties are built, and the fountains of right and wrong, from which they ſpring, are not, perhaps, eaſily to be let into the minds of grown men, not uſed to abſtract their thoughts from common received opinions. Much leſs are children capable of reaſonings from remote principles. They cannot conceive the force of long deductions: the reaſons that move them muſt be obvious, and level to their thoughts, and ſuch as may (if I may ſo ſay) be felt and touched. But yet, if their age, temper, and inclinations, be conſidered, they will never want ſuch motives, as may be ſufficient to convince them. If there be no other more particular, yet theſe will always be intelligible, and of force, to deter them from any fault, fit to be taken notice of in them, viz. that it will be a diſcredit and diſgrace to them, and diſpleaſe you.

Examples. § 82. But, of all the ways whereby children are to be inſtructed, and their manners formed, the plaineſt, eaſieſt, and moſt efficacious, is to ſet before their eyes the examples of thoſe things you would have them do or avoid. Which, when they are pointed out to them, in the practice of perſons within their knowledge, with ſome reflections on their beauty or unbecomingneſs, are of more force to draw or deter their imitation, than any diſcourſes which can be made to them. Virtues and vices can by no words be ſo plainly ſet before their underſtandings, as the actions of other men will ſhew them, when you direct their obſervation, and bid them view this or that good or bad quality in their practice. And the beauty or uncomelineſs of many things, in good and ill breeding, will be better learnt, and make deeper impreſſions on them, in the examples of others, than from any rules or inſtructions can be given about them.

THIS is a method to be uſed, not only whilſt they are young; but to be continued, even as long as they ſhall be under another's tuition or conduct. Nay, I know not whether it be not the beſt way to be uſed by a father, as long as he ſhall think fit, on any occaſion, to reform any thing he wiſhes mended in his ſon; nothing ſinking ſo gently, and ſo deep, into men's minds, as example. And what ill they either overlook, or indulge in themſelves, they cannot but diſlike, and be aſhamed of, when it is ſet before them in another. Examples.

§ 83. IT may be doubted concerning whipping, when, as the laſt remedy, it comes to be neceſſary; at what times, and by whom it ſhould be done: whether preſently upon the committing the fault, whilſt it is yet freſh and hot; and whether parents themſelves ſhould beat their children. As to the firſt: I think it ſhould not be done preſently, leſt paſſion mingle with it; and ſo, though it exceed the juſt proportion, yet it loſes of its due weight: for even children diſcern when we do things in paſſion. But, as I ſaid before, that has moſt weight with them, that appears ſedately to come from their parents reaſon; and they are not without this diſtinction. Next, if you have any diſcreet ſervant capable of it, and has the place of governing your child (for if you have a tutor, there is no doubt) I think it is beſt the ſmart ſhould come more immediately from another's hand, though by the parent's order, who ſhould ſee it done; whereby the parent's authority will be preſerved, and the child's averſion, for the pain it ſuffers, rather be turned on the perſon that immediately inflicts it. For I would have a father ſeldom ſtrike his child, but upon very urgent neceſſity, and as the laſt remedy: and then perhaps it will be fit to do it ſo, that the child ſhould not quickly forget it. Whipping.

§ 84. BUT, as I ſaid before, beating is the worſt, and therefore the laſt, means to be uſed in the correction of children; and that only in caſes of extremity, after all gentler ways have been tried, and proved unſucceſsful: which, if well obſerved, there will be very ſeldom any need of blows. For, it not being to be imagined that a child will often, if ever, diſpute his father's preſent command in any particular inſtance; and the father not interpoſing his abſolute authority, in peremptory rules, concerning either childiſh or indifferent actions, wherein his ſon is to have his liberty; or concerning his learning or improvement, wherein there is no compulſion to be uſed; there remains only the prohibition of ſome vicious actions, wherein a child is capable of obſtinacy, and conſequently can deſerve beating: and ſo there will be but very few occaſions of that diſcipline to be uſed by any one, who conſiders well, and orders his child's education as it ſhould be. For the firſt ſeven years, what vices can a child be guilty of, but lying, or ſome ill-natured tricks; the repeated commiſſion whereof, after his father's direct command againſt it, ſhall bring him into the condemnation of obſtinacy, and the chaſtiſement of the rod? If any vicious inclination in him be, in the firſt appearance and inſtances of it, treated as it ſhould be, firſt, with your wonder; and

Whipping. then, if returning again a ſecond time, diſcountenanced with the ſevere brow of the father, tutor, and all about him, and a treatment ſuitable to the ſtate of diſcredit before-mentioned; and this continued till he be made ſenſible and aſhamed of his fault; I imagine there will be no need of any other correction, nor ever any occaſion to come to blows. The neceſſity of ſuch chaſtiſement is uſually the conſequence only of former indulgences or neglects. If vicious inclinations were watched from the beginning, and the firſt irregularities which they cauſed, corrected by thoſe gentler ways, we ſhould ſeldom have to do with more than one diſorder at once; which would be eaſily ſet right without any ſtir or noiſe, and not require ſo harſh a diſcipline as beating. Thus, one by one, as they appeared, they might all be weeded out, without any ſigns or memory that ever they had been there. But we letting their faults (by indulging and humouring our little ones) grow up, till they are ſturdy and numerous, and the deformity of them makes us aſhamed and uneaſy; we are fain to come to the plough and the harrow; the ſpade and the pick-ax muſt go deep to come at the roots, and all the force, ſkill, and diligence we can uſe, is ſcarce enough to cleanſe the vitiated ſeed-plat, overgrown with weeds, and reſtore us the hopes of fruits to reward our pains in its ſeaſon.

§ 85. This courſe, if obſerved, will ſpare both father and child the trouble of repeated injunctions, and multiplied rules of doing and forbearing, For I am of opinion, that of thoſe actions, which tend to vicious habits, (which are thoſe alone that a father ſhould interpoſe his authority and commands in) none ſhould be forbidden children, till they are found guilty of them. For ſuch untimely prohibitions, if they do nothing worſe, do at leaſt ſo much towards teaching and allowing them, that they ſuppoſe that children may be guilty of them, who would poſſibly be ſafer in the ignorance of any ſuch faults. And the beſt remedy to ſtop them, is, as I have ſaid, to ſhew wonder and amazement at any ſuch action as hath a vicious tendency, when it is firſt taken notice of in a child. For example, when he is firſt found in a lye, or any ill-natured trick, the firſt remedy ſhould be, to talk to him of it as a ſtrange monſtrous matter, that it could not be imagined he would have done: and ſo ſhame him out of it.

§ 86. It will be (it is like) objected, That whatſoever I fancy of the tractableneſs of children, and the prevalency of thoſe ſofter ways of ſhame and commendation; yet there are many, who will never apply themſelves to their books, and to what they ought to learn, unleſs they are ſcourged to it. This, I fear, is nothing but the language of ordinary ſchools and faſhion, which have never ſuffered the other to be tried as it ſhould be, in places where it could be taken notice of. Why, elſe, does the learning of Latin and Greek need the rod, when French and Italian need it not? Children learn to dance and fence without whipping: nay, arithmetick, drawing, &c. they apply themſelves well enough to, without beating: which would make one ſuſpect, that there is ſomething ſtrange, unnatural,

ral, and diſagreeable to that age, in the things required in grammar-ſchools, or in the methods uſed there, that children cannot be brought to, without the ſeverity of the laſh, and hardly with that too; or elſe, that it is a miſtake, that thoſe tongues could not be taught them without beating. Whipping.

§ 87. But let us ſuppoſe ſome ſo negligent or idle, that they will not be brought to learn by the gentle ways propoſed (for we muſt grant, that there will be children found of all tempers); yet it does not thence follow, that the rough diſcipline of the cudgel is to be uſed to all. Nor can any one be concluded unmanageable by the milder methods of government, till they have been thoroughly tried upon him; and, if they will not prevail with him to uſe his endeavours, and do what is in his power to do, we make no excuſes for the obſtinate: blows are the proper remedies for thoſe: but blows laid on, in a way different from the ordinary. He that wilfully neglects his book, and ſtubbornly refuſes any thing he can do, required of him by his father, expreſſing himſelf in a poſitive ſerious command, ſhould not be corrected with two or three angry laſhes, for not performing his taſk, and the ſame puniſhment repeated again and again, upon every the like default: but, when it is brought to that paſs, that wilfulneſs evidently ſhews itſelf, and makes blows neceſſary; I think the chaſtiſement ſhould be a little more ſedate, and a little more ſevere, and the whipping (mingled with admonition between) ſo continued, till the impreſſions of it, on the mind, were found legible in the face, voice, and ſubmiſſion of the child, not ſo ſenſible of the ſmart, as of the fault he has been guilty of, and melting in true ſorrow under it: If ſuch a correction as this, tried ſome few times at fit diſtances, and carried to the utmoſt ſeverity, with the viſible diſpleaſure of the father all the while, will not work the effect, turn the mind, and produce a future compliance; what can be hoped from blows, and to what purpoſe ſhould they be any more uſed? Beating, when you can expect no good from it, will look more like the fury of an enraged enemy, than the good-will of a compaſſionate friend; and ſuch chaſtiſement carries with it only provocation, without any proſpect of amendment. If it be any father's misfortune to have a ſon thus perverſe and untractable, I know not what more he can do but pray for him. But I imagine, if a right courſe be taken with children from the beginning, very few will be found to be ſuch; and when there are any ſuch inſtances, they are not to be the rule for the education of thoſe who are better natured, and may be managed with better uſage.

§ 88. If a tutor can be got, that, thinking himſelf in the father's place, charged with his care, and reliſhing theſe things, will at the beginning apply himſelf to put them in practice, he will afterwards find his work very eaſy: and you will, I gueſs, have your ſon in a little time a greater proficient in both learning and breeding, than perhaps you imagine. But let him by no means beat him, at any time, without your conſent and direction; at leaſt till you have experience of his diſcretion and temper. Tutor.

Tutor. But yet, to keep up his authority with his pupil, beſides concealing that he has not the power of the rod, you muſt be ſure to uſe him with great reſpect yourſelf, and cauſe all your family to do ſo too. For you cannot expect your ſon ſhould have any regard for one, whom he ſees you, or his mother, or others ſlight. If you think him worthy of contempt, you have choſen amiſs; and if you ſhew any contempt of him, he will hardly eſcape it from your ſon: and whenever that happens, whatever worth he may have in himſelf, and abilities for this employment, they are all loſt to your child, and can afterwards never be made uſeful to him.

§. 89. As the father's example muſt teach the child reſpect for his tutor; ſo the tutor's example muſt lead the child into thoſe actions he would have him do. His practice muſt by no means croſs his precepts, unleſs he intend to ſet him wrong. It will be to no purpoſe for the tutor to talk of the reſtraint of the paſſions, whilſt any of his own are let looſe; and he will in vain endeavour to reform any vice or indecency in his pupil, which he allows in himſelf. Ill patterns are ſure to be followed more than good rules: and therefore he muſt alſo carefully preſerve him from the influence of ill precedents, eſpecially the moſt dangerous of all, the examples of the ſervants; from whoſe company he is to be kept, not by prohibitions, for that will but give him an itch after it, but by other ways I have mentioned.

Governor. § 90. In all the whole buſineſs of education, there is nothing like to be leſs hearkened to, or harder to be well obſerved, than what I am now going to ſay; and that is, That children ſhould, from their firſt beginning to talk, have ſome diſcreet, ſober, nay wiſe perſon about them, whoſe care it ſhould be to faſhion them aright, and keep them from all ill, eſpecially the infection of bad company. I think this province requires great ſobriety, temperance, tenderneſs, diligence, and diſcretion; qualities hardly to be found united in perſons, that are to be had for ordinary ſalaries: nor eaſily to be found any-where. As to the charge of it, I think it will be the money beſt laid out that can be about our children; and therefore, though it may be expenſive more than is ordinary, yet it cannot be thought dear. He that at any rate procures his child a good mind, well-principled, tempered to virtue and uſefulneſs, and adorned with civility and good breeding, makes a better purchaſe for him, than if he laid out the money for an addition of more earth to his former acres. Spare it in toys and play-games, in ſilk and ribbons, laces and other uſeleſs expences, as much as you pleaſe; but be not ſparing in ſo neceſſary a part as this. It is not good huſbandry to make his fortune rich, and his mind poor. I have often, with great admiration, ſeen people laviſh it profuſely in tricking up their children in fine cloaths, lodging, and feeding them ſumptuouſly, allowing them more than enough of uſeleſs ſervants; and yet at the ſame time ſtarve their minds, and not take ſufficient care to cover that, which is the moſt ſhameful nakedneſs, viz. their natural wrong inclinations and ignorance. This I can look on as no other than a ſacrificing to their own vanity; it ſhewing more their pride, than true care of the good

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of their children. Whatſoever you employ to the advantage of your ſon's mind will ſhew your true kindneſs, though it be to the leſſening of his eſtate. A wiſe and good man can hardly want either the opinion or reality of being great and happy. But he that is fooliſh or vicious, can be neither great nor happy, what eſtate ſoever you leave him: and I aſk you, whether there be not men in the world, whom you had rather have your ſon be, with 500l. per annum, than ſome other you know, with 5000l? Governor.

§ 91. The conſideration of charge ought not, therefore, to deter thoſe who are able: the great difficulty will be, where to find a proper perſon. For thoſe of ſmall age, parts, and virtue, are unfit for this employment: and thoſe that have greater, will hardly be got to undertake ſuch a charge. You muſt therefore look out early, and enquire every-where; for the world has people of all ſorts: and I remember, Montaigne ſays in one of his eſſays, That the learned Caſtalio was fain to make trenchers at Baſil, to keep himſelf from ſtarving, when his father would have given any money for ſuch a tutor for his ſon, and Caſtalio have willingly embraced ſuch an employment upon very reaſonable terms: but this was for want of intelligence.

§ 92. If you find it difficult to meet with ſuch a tutor as we deſire, you are not to wonder. I only can ſay, Spare no care nor coſt to get ſuch an one. All things are to be had that way: and I dare aſſure you, that, if you can get a good one, you will never repent the charge; but will always have the ſatisfaction to think it the money, of all other, the beſt laid out. But be ſure take no-body upon friends, or charitable, no, nor bare great commendations. Nay, if you will do as you ought, the reputation of a ſober man, with a good ſtock of learning, (which is all uſually required in a tutor) will not be enough to ſerve your turn. In this choice be as curious, as you would be in that of a wife for him: for you muſt not think of trial, or changing afterwards; that will cauſe great inconvenience to you, and greater to your ſon. When I conſider the ſcruples and cautions I here lay in your way, methinks it looks as if I adviſed you to ſomething, which I would have offered at, but in effect not done. But he that ſhall conſider, how much the buſineſs of a tutor, rightly employed, lies out of the road; and how remote it is from the thoughts of many, even of thoſe who propoſe to themſelves this employment; will perhaps be of my mind, that one, fit to educate and form the mind of a young gentleman, is not every-where to be found; and that more than ordinary care is to be taken in the choice of him, or elſe you may fail of your end.

§ 93. The character of a ſober man, and a ſcholar, is, as I have above obſerved, what every one expects in a tutor. This generally is thought enough, and is all that parents commonly look for. But when ſuch an one has emptied out, into his pupil, all the Latin and Logick he has brought from the Univerſity, will that furniture make him a fine gentleman? Or can it be expected, that he ſhould be better bred, better ſkilled Tutor.

Tutor. in the world, better principled in the grounds and foundations of true virtue and generoſity, than his young tutor is?

To form a young gentleman, as he ſhould be, it is fit his governor ſhould himſelf be well-bred, underſtand the ways of carriage, and meaſures of civility, in all the variety of perſons, times and places; and keep his pupil, as much as his age requires, conſtantly to the obſervation of them. This is an art not to be learnt, nor taught by books: nothing can give it, but good company and obſervation joined together. The taylor may make his cloaths modiſh, and the dancing-maſter give faſhion to his motions; yet neither of theſe, though they ſet off well, make a well-bred gentleman: no, though he have learning to boot; which, if not well managed, makes him more impertinent and intolerable in converſation. Breeding is that, which ſets a gloſs upon all his other good qualities, and renders them uſeful to him, in procuring him the eſteem and good-will of all that he comes near. Without good breeding, his other accompliſhments make him paſs but for proud, conceited, vain, or fooliſh.

Courage, in an ill-bred man, has the air, and eſcapes not the opinion, of brutality: learning becomes pedantry; wit, buffoonery; plainneſs, ruſticity; good-nature, fawning: and there cannot be a good quality in him, which want of breeding will not warp, and diſfigure to his diſadvantage. Nay, virtue and parts, though they are allowed their due commendation, yet are not enough to procure a man a good reception, and make him welcome where-ever he comes. No-body contents himſelf with rough diamonds, and wears them ſo, who would appear with advantage. When they are poliſhed and ſet, then they give a luſtre. Good qualities are the ſubſtantial riches of the mind; but it is good breeding ſets them off: and he that will be acceptable, muſt give beauty, as well as ſtrength, to his actions. Solidity, or even uſefulneſs, is not enough: a graceful way and faſhion, in every thing, is that which gives the ornament and liking. And, in moſt caſes, the manner of doing is of more conſequence than the thing done; and upon that depends the ſatisfaction, or diſguſt, wherewith it is received. This therefore, which lies not in the putting off the hat, nor making of compliments, but in a due and free compoſure of language, looks, motion, poſture, place, &c. ſuited to perſons and occaſions, and can be learned only by habit and uſe, though it be above the capacity of children, and little ones ſhould not be perplexed about it; yet it ought to be begun, and in a good meaſure learned, by a young gentleman, whilſt he is under a tutor, before he comes into the world upon his own legs; for then uſually it is too late to hope to reform ſeveral habitual indecencies, which lie in little things. For the carriage is not as it ſhould be, till it is become natural in every part; falling, as ſkilful muſicians fingers do, into harmonious order, without care, and without thought. If in converſation a man's mind be taken up with a ſolicitous watchfulneſs about any part of his behaviour,

our, instead of being mended by it, it will be constrained, uneasy, and ungraceful. Tutor.

BESIDES, this part is most necessary to be formed by the hands and care of a governor: because, though the errors committed in breeding are the first that are taken notice of by others, yet they are the last that any one is told of. Not but that the malice of the world is forward enough to tattle of them; but it is always out of his hearing, who should make profit of their judgment, and reform himself by their censure. And indeed this is so nice a point to be meddled with, that even those who are friends, and wish it were mended, scarce ever dare mention it, and tell those they love, that they are guilty in such or such cases of ill breeding. Errors in other things may often with civility be shewn another; and it is no breach of good manners, or friendship, to set him right in other mistakes: but good breeding itself allows not a man to touch upon this; or to insinuate to another, that he is guilty of want of breeding. Such information can come only from those who have authority over them: and from them too it comes very hardly and harshly to a grown man; and, however softened, goes but ill down with any one, who has lived ever so little in the world. Wherefore it is necessary, that this part should be the governor's principal care; that an habitual gracefulness, and politeness in all his carriage, may be settled in his charge, as much as may be, before he goes out of his hands: and that he may not need advice in this point, when he has neither time nor disposition to receive it, nor has any body left to give it him. The tutor therefore ought, in the first place, to be well-bred: and a young gentleman, who gets this one qualification from his governor, sets out with great advantage; and will find, that this one accomplishment will more open his way to him, get him more friends, and carry him farther in the world, than all the hard words, or real knowledge, he has got from the liberal arts, or his tutor's learned encyclopædia; not that those should be neglected, but by no means preferred, or suffered to thrust out the other.

§ 94. BESIDES being well-bred, the tutor should know the world well; the ways, the humours, the follies, the cheats, the faults of the age he is fallen into, and particularly of the country he lives in. These he should be able to shew to his pupil, as he finds him capable; teach him skill in men, and their manners; pull off the mask, which their several callings and pretences cover them with; and make his pupil discern what lies at the bottom, under such appearances; that he may not, as unexperienced young men are apt to do, if they are unwarned, take one thing for another, judge by the outside, and give himself up to shew, and the insinuation of a fair carriage, or an obliging application. A governor should teach his scholar to guess at, and beware of, the designs of men he hath to do with, neither with too much suspicion, nor too much confidence; but, as the young man is by nature most inclined to either side, rectify him, and bend him the other way. He should accustom him to make, as much as is possible, a true judgment of men by those marks, which

Tutor. ſerve beſt to ſhew what they are, and give a proſpect into their inſide; which often ſhews itſelf in little things, eſpecially when they are not in parade, and upon their guard. He ſhould acquaint him with the true ſtate of the world, and diſpoſe him to think no man better or worſe, wiſer or fooliſher, than he really is. Thus, by ſafe and inſenſible degrees, he will paſs from a boy to a man; which is the moſt hazardous ſtep in all the whole courſe of life. This therefore ſhould be carefully watched, and a young man with great diligence handed over it; and not, as now uſually is done, be taken from a governor's conduct, and all at once thrown into the world under his own, not without manifeſt dangers of immediate ſpoiling; there being nothing more frequent, than inſtances of the great looſeneſs, extravagancy, and debauchery, which young men have run into, as ſoon as they have been let looſe from a ſevere and ſtrict education: which, I think, may be chiefly imputed to their wrong way of breeding, eſpecially in this part; for, having been bred up in a great ignorance of what the world truly is, and finding it quite another thing, when they come into it, than what they were taught it ſhould be, and ſo imagined it was; are eaſily perſuaded, by other kind of tutors, which they are ſure to meet with, that the diſcipline they were kept under, and the lectures that were read to them, were but the formalities of education, and the reſtraints of childhood; that the freedom belonging to men, is to take their ſwing in a full enjoyment of what was before forbidden them. They ſhew the young novice the world, full of faſhionable and glittering examples of this every-where, and he is preſently dazzled with them. My young maſter, failing not to be willing to ſhew himſelf a man, as much as any of the ſparks of his years, lets himſelf looſe to all the irregularities he finds in the moſt debauched; and thus courts credit and manlineſs, in the caſting off the modeſty and ſobriety he has till then been kept in; and thinks it brave, at his firſt ſetting out, to ſignalize himſelf in running counter to all the rules of virtue, which have been preached to him by his tutor.

The ſhewing him the world as really it is, before he comes wholly into it, is one of the beſt means, I think, to prevent this miſchief. He ſhould, by degrees, be informed of the vices in faſhion, and warned of the applications and deſigns of thoſe who will make it their buſineſs to corrupt him. He ſhould be told the arts they uſe, and the trains they lay; and now and then have ſet before him the tragical or ridiculous examples of thoſe who are ruining, or ruined, this way. The age is not like to want inſtances of this kind, which ſhould be made land-marks to him; that by the diſgraces, diſeaſes, beggary, and ſhame of hopeful young men, thus brought to ruin, he may be precautioned, and be made ſee, how thoſe join in the contempt and neglect of them that are undone, who, by pretences of friendſhip and reſpect, led them into it, and helped to prey upon them whilſt they were undoing; that he may ſee, before he buys it by a too dear experience, that thoſe who perſuade him not to follow the ſober advices he has received from his governors, and the counſel of his

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own reaſon, which they call being governed by others, do it only, that they may have the government of him themſelves; and make him believe, he goes like a man of himſelf, by his own conduct, and for his own pleaſure, when, in truth, he is wholly as a child, led by them into thoſe vices, which beſt ſerve their purpoſes. This is a knowledge, which, upon all occaſions, a tutor ſhould endeavour to inſtil, and by all methods try to make him comprehend, and thoroughly reliſh. Tutor.

I KNOW it is often ſaid, That to diſcover to a young man the vices of the age is to teach them him. That, I confeſs, is a good deal ſo, according as it is done; and therefore requires a diſcreet man of parts, who knows the world, and can judge of the temper, inclination, and weak ſide of his pupil. This farther is to be remembered, that it is not poſſible now (as perhaps formerly it was) to keep a young gentleman from vice, by a total ignorance of it; unleſs you will all his life mew him up in a cloſet, and never let him go into company. The longer he is kept thus hood-winked, the leſs he will ſee, when he comes abroad into open day-light, and be the more expoſed to be a prey to himſelf and others. And an old boy, at his firſt appearance, with all the gravity of his ivy-buſh about him, is ſure to draw on him the eyes and chirping of the whole town volery; amongſt which, there will not be wanting ſome birds of prey, that will preſently be on the wing for him.

THE only fence againſt the world, is a thorough knowledge of it: into which a young gentleman ſhould be entered by degrees, as he can bear it; and the earlier the better, ſo he be in ſafe and ſkilful hands to guide him. The ſcene ſhould be gently opened, and his entrance made ſtep by ſtep, and the dangers pointed out that attend him, from the ſeveral degrees, tempers, deſigns, and clubs of men. He ſhould be prepared to be ſhocked by ſome, and careſſed by others; warned who are like to oppoſe, who to miſlead, who to undermine him, and who to ſerve him. He ſhould be inſtructed how to know and diſtinguiſh men; where he ſhould let them ſee, and when diſſemble the knowledge of them, and their aims and workings. And if he be too forward to venture upon his own ſtrength and ſkill, the perplexity and trouble of a miſadventure now and then, that reaches not his innocence, his health, or reputation, may not be an ill way to teach him more caution.

THIS, I confeſs, containing one great part of wiſdom, is not the product of ſome ſuperficial thoughts, or much reading; but the effect of experience and obſervation in a man, who has lived in the world with his eyes open, and converſed with men of all ſorts. And therefore I think it of moſt value to be inſtilled into a young man, upon all occaſions which offer themſelves, that, when he comes to launch into the deep himſelf, he may not be like one at ſea without a line, compaſs, or ſea-chart; but may have ſome notice before-hand of the rocks and ſhoals, the currents and quickſands, and know a little how to ſteer, that he ſink not, before he get experience. He that thinks not this of more moment to his ſon, and for which he more needs a governor, than the languages

and

Tutor. and learned ſciences, forgets of how much more uſe it is to judge right of men, and manage his affairs wiſely with them, than to ſpeak Greek and Latin, or argue in mood and figure; or to have his head filled with the abſtruſe ſpeculations of natural philoſophy and metaphyſicks; nay, than to be well verſed in Greek and Roman writers, though that be much better for a gentleman, than to be a good Peripatetick or Carteſian: becauſe thoſe antient authors obſerved and painted mankind well, and give the beſt light into that kind of knowledge. He that goes into the eaſtern parts of Aſia, will find able and acceptable men, without any of theſe: But without virtue, knowledge of the world, and civility, an accompliſhed and valuable man can be found no-where.

A GREAT part of the learning now in faſhion in the ſchools of Europe, and that goes ordinarily into the round of education, a gentleman may, in a good meaſure, be unfurniſhed with, without any great diſparagement to himſelf, or prejudice to his affairs. But prudence and good breeding are, in all the ſtations and occurrences of life, neceſſary; and moſt young men ſuffer in the want of them; and come rawer, and more aukward, into the world, than they ſhould, for this very reaſon; becauſe theſe qualities, which are, of all other, the moſt neceſſary to be taught, and ſtand moſt in need of the aſſiſtance and help of a teacher, are generally neglected, and thought but a ſlight, or no part of a tutor's buſineſs. Latin and learning make all the noiſe: and the main ſtreſs is laid upon his proficiency in things, a great part whereof belongs not to a gentleman's calling; which is to have the knowledge of a man of buſineſs, a carriage ſuitable to his rank, and to be eminent and uſeful in his country, according to his ſtation. Whenever either ſpare hours from that, or an inclination to perfect himſelf in ſome parts of knowledge, which his tutor did but juſt enter him in, ſet him upon any ſtudy; the firſt rudiments of it, which he learned before, will open the way enough for his own induſtry to carry him as far as his fancy will prompt, or his parts enable him to go: or, if he thinks it may ſave his time and pains, to be helped over ſome difficulties by the hands of a maſter, he may then take a man that is perfectly well ſkilled in it, or chuſe ſuch an one, as he thinks fitteſt for his purpoſe. But to initiate his pupil in any part of learning, as far as is neceſſary for a young man in the ordinary courſe of his ſtudies, an ordinary ſkill in the governor is enough. Nor is it requiſite that he ſhould be a thorough ſcholar, or poſſeſs in perfection all thoſe ſciences, which it is convenient a young gentleman ſhould have a taſte of, in ſome general view, or ſhort ſyſtem. A gentleman, that would penetrate deeper, muſt do it by his own genius and induſtry afterwards: for no-body ever went far in knowledge, or became eminent in any of the ſciences, by the diſcipline and conſtraint of a maſter.

THE great work of a governor is to faſhion the carriage, and form the mind; to ſettle in his pupil good habits, and the principles of virtue and wiſdom; to give him, by little and little, a view of mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praiſe-worthy; and,

and, in the proſecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and induſtry. The ſtudies which he ſets him upon, are but, as it were, the exerciſes of his faculties, and employment of his time, to keep him from ſauntering and idleneſs, to teach him application, and accuſtom him to take pains, and to give him ſome little taſte of what his own induſtry muſt perfect. For who expects, that under a tutor a young gentleman ſhould be an accompliſhed critick, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of metaphyſicks, natural philoſophy, or mathematics; or be a maſter in hiſtory or chronology? Though ſomething of each of theſe is to be taught him: but it is only to open the door, that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there: and a governor would be much blamed, that ſhould keep his pupil too long, and lead him too far in moſt of them. But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, induſtry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much: and, if he have theſe, he will not long want what he needs or deſires of the other. Tutor.

And, ſince it cannot be hoped he ſhould have time and ſtrength to learn all things, moſt pains ſhould be taken about that which is moſt neceſſary; and that principlly looked after, which will be of moſt and frequenteſt uſe to him in the world.

Seneca complains of the contrary practice in his time: And yet the Burgerſdiciuſes and the Scheiblers did not ſwarm in thoſe days, as they do now in theſe. What would he have thought, if he had lived now, when the tutors think it their great buſineſs to fill the ſtudies and heads of their pupils with ſuch authors as theſe? He would have had much more reaſon to ſay, as he does, "Non vitæ, ſed ſcholæ diſcimus;" We learn not to live, but to diſpute; and our education fits us rather for the univerſity, than the world. But it is no wonder, if thoſe who make the faſhion, ſuit it to what they have, and not to what their pupils want. The faſhion being once eſtabliſhed, who can think it ſtrange, that in this, as well as in all other things, it ſhould prevail; and that the greateſt part of thoſe, who find their account in an eaſy ſubmiſſion to it, ſhould be ready to cry out hereſy, when any one departs from it? It is nevertheleſs matter of aſtoniſhment, that men of quality and parts ſhould ſuffer themſelves to be ſo far miſled by cuſtom and implicit faith. Reaſon, if conſulted with, would adviſe, that their children's time ſhould be ſpent in acquiring what might be uſeful to them, when they come to be men, rather than to have their heads ſtuffed with a deal of traſh, a great part whereof they uſually never do (it is certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and ſo much of it, as does ſtick by them, they are only the worſe for. This is ſo well known, that I appeal to parents themſelves, who have been at coſt to have their young heirs taught it, whether it be not ridiculous for their ſons to have any tincture of that ſort of learning, when they come abroad into the world; whether any appearance of it would not leſſen and diſgrace them in company. And that certainly muſt be an admirable acquiſition, and deſerves well to

Tutor. make a part in education, which men are aſhamed of, where they are moſt concerned to ſhew their parts and breeding.

THERE is yet another reaſon, why politeneſs of manners, and knowledge of the world, ſhould principally be looked after in a tutor: and that is, becauſe a man of parts and years may enter a lad far enough in any of thoſe ſciences, which he has no deep inſight into himſelf. Books in theſe will be able to furniſh him, and give him light and precedency enough, to go before a young follower: But he will never be able to ſet another right in the knowledge of the world, and, above all, in breeding; who is a novice in them himſelf.

THIS is a knowledge he muſt have about him, worn into him by uſe and converſation, and a long forming himſelf by what he has obſerved to be practiſed and allowed in the beſt company. This, if he has it not of his own, is no-where to be borrowed, for the uſe of his pupil: Or if he could find pertinent treatiſes of it in books, that would reach all the particulars of an Engliſh gentleman's behaviour; his own ill-faſhioned example, if he be not well-bred himſelf, would ſpoil all his lectures; it being impoſſible, that any one ſhould come forth well-faſhioned out of unpoliſhed, ill-bred company.

I SAY this, not that I think ſuch a tutor is every day to be met with, or to be had at the ordinary rates: but that thoſe, who are able, may not be ſparing of inquiry or coſt, in what is of ſo great moment; and that other parents, whoſe eſtates will not reach to greater ſalaries, may yet remember, what they ſhould principally have an eye to, in the choice of one, to whom they would commit the education of their children; and what part they ſhould chiefly look after themſelves, whilſt they are under their care, and as often as they come within their obſervation; and not think, that all lies in Latin and French, or ſome dry ſyſtems of logick and philoſophy.

Familiarity. § 95. BUT to return to our method again. Though I have mentioned the ſeverity of the father's brow, and the awe ſettled thereby in the mind of children when young, as one main inſtrument, whereby their education is to be managed; yet I am far from being of an opinion, that it ſhould be continued all along to them: whilſt they are under the diſcipline and government of pupilage, I think it ſhould be relaxed, as faſt as their age, diſcretion, and good behaviour could allow it; even to that degree, that a father will do well, as his ſon grows up, and is capable of it, to talk familiarly with him; nay, aſk his advice, and conſult with him, about thoſe things wherein he has any knowledge or underſtanding. By this the father will gain two things, both of great moment. The one is, that it will put ſerious conſiderations into his ſon's thoughts, better than any rules or advices he can give him. The ſooner you treat him as a man, the ſooner he will begin to be one: and if you admit him into ſerious diſcourſes ſometimes with you, you will inſenſibly raiſe his mind above the uſual amuſements of youth, and thoſe trifling occupations which it is commonly waſted in. For it is eaſy to obſerve, that

many young men continue longer in the thought and converſation of ſchool-boys, than otherwiſe they would, becauſe their parents keep them at that diſtance, and in that low rank, by all their carriage to them. Familiarity.

§ 96. ANOTHER thing of greater conſequence, which you will obtain by ſuch a way of treating him, will be his friendſhip. Many fathers, though they proportion to their ſons liberal allowances, according to their age and condition; yet they keep the knowledge of their eſtates and concerns from them with as much reſervedneſs, as if they were guarding a ſecret of ſtate from a ſpy or an enemy. This, if it looks not like jealouſy, yet it wants thoſe marks of kindneſs and intimacy, which a father ſhould ſhew to his ſon; and, no doubt, often hinders or abates that chearfulneſs and ſatisfaction, wherewith a ſon ſhould addreſs himſelf to, and rely upon, his father. And I cannot but often wonder to ſee fathers, who love their ſons very well, yet ſo order the matter, by a conſtant ſtiffneſs, and a mien of authority and diſtance to them all their lives, as if they were never to enjoy or have any comfort from thoſe they love beſt in the world, till they have loſt them by being removed into another. Nothing cements and eſtabliſhes friendſhip and good-will, ſo much as confident communication of concernments and affairs. Other kindneſſes, without this, leave ſtill ſome doubts; but when your ſon ſees you open your mind to him; when he finds, that you intereſt him in your affairs, as things you are willing ſhould, in their turn, come into his hands, he will be concerned for them as for his own; wait his ſeaſon with patience, and love you in the mean time, who keep him not at the diſtance of a ſtranger. This will alſo make him ſee, that the enjoyment you have, is not without care; which the more he is ſenſible of, the leſs will he envy you the poſſeſſion, and the more think himſelf happy under the management of ſo favourable a friend, and ſo careful a father. There is ſcarce any young man of ſo little thought, or ſo void of ſenſe, that would not be glad of a ſure friend, that he might have recourſe to, and freely conſult on occaſion. The reſervedneſs and diſtance that fathers keep, often deprive their ſons of that refuge, which would be of more advantage to them, than an hundred rebukes and chidings. Would your ſon engage in ſome frolick, or take a vagary; were it not much better he ſhould do it with, than without your knowledge? For ſince allowances for ſuch things muſt be made to young men, the more you know of his intrigues and deſigns, the better will you be able to prevent great miſchiefs; and, by letting him ſee what is like to follow, take the right way of prevailing with him to avoid leſs inconveniencies. Would you have him open his heart to you, and aſk your advice? You muſt begin to do ſo with him firſt, and by your carriage beget that confidence.

§ 97. BUT whatever he conſults you about, unleſs it lead to ſome fatal and irremediable miſchief, be ſure you adviſe only as a friend of more experience; but with your advice mingle nothing of command or authority, nor more than you would to your equal, or a ſtranger. That would be to drive him for ever from any farther demanding, or receiving advan-

Familiarity. tage from your counſel. You muſt conſider, that he is a young man, and has pleaſures and fancies, which you are paſſed. You muſt not expect his inclinations ſhould be juſt as yours, nor that at twenty he ſhould have the ſame thoughts you have at fifty. All that you can wiſh is, that ſince youth muſt have ſome liberty, ſome out-leaps; they might be with the ingenuity of a ſon, and under the eye of a father, and then no very great harm can come of it. The way to obtain this, as I ſaid before, is (according as you find him capable) to talk with him about your affairs, propoſe matters to him familiarly; and aſk his advice; and when he ever lights on the right, follow it as his; and if it ſucceed well, let him have the commendation. This will not at all leſſen your authority, but increaſe his love and eſteem of you. Whilſt you keep your eſtate, the ſtaff will ſtill be in your own hands; and your authority the ſurer, the more it is ſtrengthened with confidence and kindneſs. For you have not that power you ought to have over him, till he comes to be more afraid of offending ſo good a friend, than of loſing ſome part of his future expectation.

§ 98. FAMILIARITY of diſcourſe, if it can become a father to his ſon, may much more be condeſcended to by a tutor to his pupil. All their time together ſhould not be ſpent in reading of lectures, and magiſterially dictating to him what he is to obſerve and follow; hearing him in his turn, and uſing him to reaſon about what is propoſed, will make the rules go down the eaſier, and ſink the deeper, and will give him a liking to ſtudy and inſtruction: and he will then begin to value knowledge, when he ſees that it enables him to diſcourſe; and he finds the pleaſure and credit of bearing a part in the converſation, and of having his reaſons ſometimes approved and hearkened to. Particularly in morality, prudence, and breeding, caſes ſhould be put to him, and his judgment aſked: this opens the underſtanding better than maxims, how well ſoever explained; and ſettles the rules better in the memory for practice. This way lets things into the mind, which ſtick there, and retain their evidence with them; whereas words at beſt are faint repreſentations, being not ſo much as the true ſhadows of things, and are much ſooner forgotten. He will better comprehend the foundations and meaſures of decency and juſtice, and have livelier and more laſting impreſſions of what he ought to do, by giving his opinion on caſes propoſed, and reaſoning with his tutor on fit inſtances, than by giving a ſilent, negligent, ſleepy audience to his tutor's lectures; and much more than by captious logical diſputes, or ſet declamations of his own, upon any queſtion. The one ſets the thoughts upon wit, and falſe colours, and not upon truth; the other teaches fallacy, wrangling, and opiniatry; and they are both of them things that ſpoil the judgment, and put a man out of the way of right and fair reaſoning, and therefore carefully to be avoided by one who would improve himſelf, and be acceptable to others.

Reverence. § 99. WHEN, by making your ſon ſenſible that he depends on you, and is in your power, you have eſtabliſhed your authority; and by being

inflexibly ſevere in your carriage to him, when obſtinately perſiſting in any ill-natured trick which you have forbidden, eſpecially lying, you have imprinted on his mind that awe which is neceſſary; and on the other ſide, when (by permitting him the full liberty due to his age, and laying no reſtraint in your preſence to thoſe childiſh actions, and gaiety of carriage, which, whilſt he is very young, are as neceſſary to him as meat or ſleep) you have reconciled him to your company, and made him ſenſible of your care and love of him by indulgence and tenderneſs, eſpecially careſſing him on all occaſions wherein he does any thing well, and being kind to him, after a thouſand faſhions, ſuitable to his age, which nature teaches parents better than I can: when, I ſay, by theſe ways of tenderneſs and affection, which parents never want for their children, you have alſo planted in him a particular affection for you; he is then in the ſtate you could deſire, and you have formed in his mind that true reverence, which is always afterwards carefully to be continued and maintained in both parts of it, love and fear, as the great principles whereby you will always have hold upon him to turn his mind to the ways of virtue and honour. Reverence.

§ 100. When this foundation is once well laid, and you find this reverence begin to work in him, the next thing to be done is carefully to conſider his temper, and the particular conſtitution of his mind. Stubbornneſs, lying, and ill-natured actions, are not (as has been ſaid) to be permitted in him from the beginning, whatever his temper be: thoſe ſeeds of vices are not to be ſuffered to take any root, but muſt be carefully weeded out, as ſoon as ever they begin to ſhew themſelves in him; and your authority is to take place, and influence his mind from the very dawning of any knowledge in him, that it may operate as a natural principle, whereof he never perceived the beginning; never knew that it was, or could be otherwiſe. By this, if the reverence he owes you be eſtabliſhed early, it will always be ſacred to him; and it will be as hard for him to reſiſt it, as the principles of his nature. Temper.

§ 101. Having thus very early ſet up your authority, and, by the gentler applications of it, ſhamed him out of what leads towards an immoral habit; as ſoon as you have obſerved it in him, (for I would by no means have chiding uſed, much leſs blows, till obſtinacy and incorrigibleneſs make it abſolutely neceſſary) it will be fit to conſider which way the natural make of his mind inclines him. Some men, by the unalterable frame of their conſtitutions, are ſtout, others timorous; ſome confident, others modeſt, tractable or obſtinate, curious or careleſs, quick or ſlow. There are not more differences in men's faces, and the outward lineaments of their bodies, than there are in the makes and tempers of their minds; only there is this difference, that the diſtinguiſhing characters of the face, and the lineaments of the body, grow more plain and viſible with time and age, but the peculiar phyſiognomy of the mind is moſt diſcernible in children, before art and cunning have taught them to

Temper. hide their deformities, and conceal their ill inclinations under a diſſembled outſide.

§ 102. BEGIN therefore betimes nicely to obſerve your ſon's temper; and that, when he is under leaſt reſtraint, in his play, and, as he thinks, out of your ſight. See what are his predominant paſſions, and prevailing inclinations; whether he be fierce or mild, bold or baſhful, compaſſionate or cruel, open or reſerved, &c. For as theſe are different in him, ſo are your methods to be different, and your authority muſt hence take meaſures to apply itſelf different ways to him. Theſe native propenſities, theſe prevalencies of conſtitution, are not to be cured by rules, or a direct conteſt; eſpecially thoſe of them that are the humbler and meaner ſort, which proceed from fear and lowneſs of ſpirit; though with art they may be much mended, and turned to good purpoſe. But this be ſure of, after all is done, the byaſs will always hang on that ſide where nature firſt placed it: and, if you carefully obſerve the characters of his mind now in the firſt ſcenes of his life, you will ever after be able to judge which way his thoughts lean, and what he aims at even hereafter, when, as he grows up, the plot thickens, and he puts on ſeveral ſhapes to act it.

Dominion. § 103. I TOLD you before, that children love liberty; and therefore they ſhould be brought to do the things that are fit for them, without feeling any reſtraint laid upon them. I now tell you, they love ſomething more; and that is dominion: and this is the firſt original of moſt vicious habits, that are ordinary and natural. This love of power and dominion ſhews itſelf very early, and that in theſe two things.

§ 104. 1. WE ſee children (as ſoon almoſt as they are born, I am ſure long before they can ſpeak) cry, grow peeviſh, ſullen, and out of humour, for nothing but to have their wills. They would have their deſires ſubmitted to by others; they contend for a ready compliance from all about them, eſpecially from thoſe that ſtand near or beneath them in age or degree, as ſoon as they come to conſider others with thoſe diſtinctions.

§ 105. ANOTHER thing, wherein they ſhew their love of dominion, is their deſire to have things to be theirs; they would have property and poſſeſſion, pleaſing themſelves with the power which that ſeems to give, and the right they thereby have to diſpoſe of them as they pleaſe. He that has not obſerved theſe two humours working very betimes in children, has taken little notice of their actions: and he who thinks that theſe two roots of almoſt all the injuſtice and contention that ſo diſturb human life, are not early to be weeded out, and contrary habits introduced, neglects the proper ſeaſon to lay the foundations of a good and worthy man. To do this, I imagine, theſe following things may ſomewhat conduce.

Craving. § 106. 1. THAT a child ſhould never be ſuffered to have what he craves, much leſs what he cries for, I had ſaid, or ſo much as ſpeaks for. But that being apt to be miſunderſtood, and interpreted as if I meant a child

child ſhould never ſpeak to his parents for any thing, which will perhaps be thought to lay too great a curb on the minds of children, to the prejudice of that love and affection which ſhould be between them and their parents; I ſhall explain myſelf a little more particularly. It is fit that they ſhould have liberty to declare their wants to their parents, and that with all tenderneſs they ſhould be hearkened to, and ſupplied, at leaſt whilſt they are very little. But it is one thing to ſay, I am hungry; another to ſay, I would have roaſt-meat. Having declared their wants, their natural wants, the pain they feel from hunger, thirſt, cold, or any other neceſſity of nature; it is the duty of their parents, and thoſe about them, to relieve them: but children muſt leave it to the choice and ordering of their parents what they think propereſt for them, and how much; and muſt not be permitted to chuſe for themſelves; and ſay, I would have wine, or white-bread; the very naming of it ſhould make them loſe it. Craving.

§ 107. THAT which parents ſhould take care of here, is to diſtinguiſh between the wants of fancy and thoſe of nature; which Horace has well taught them to do in this verſe,

"Queis humana ſibi doleat natura negatis."

THOSE are truly natural wants, which reaſon alone, without ſome other help, is not able to fence againſt, nor keep from diſturbing us. The pains of ſickneſs and hurts, hunger, thirſt and cold, want of ſleep and reſt, or relaxation of the part wearied with labour, are what all men feel, and the beſt diſpoſed mind cannot but be ſenſible of their uneaſineſs; and therefore ought, by fit applications, to ſeek their removal, though not with impatience, or over-great haſte, upon the firſt approaches of them, where delay does not threaten ſome irreparable harm. The pains that come from the neceſſities of nature, are monitors to us to beware of greater miſchiefs, which they are the forerunners of; and therefore they muſt not be wholly neglected, nor ſtrained too far. But yet, the more children can be inured to hardſhips of this kind, by a wiſe care to make them ſtronger in body and mind, the better it will be for them. I need not here give any caution to keep within the bounds of doing them good, and to take care, that what children are made to ſuffer ſhould neither break their ſpirits, nor injure their health; parents being but too apt of themſelves to incline, more than they ſhould, to the ſofter ſide.

BUT, whatever compliance the neceſſities of nature may require, the wants of fancy children ſhould never be gratified in, nor ſuffered to mention. The very ſpeaking for any ſuch thing ſhould make them loſe it. Cloaths, when they need, they muſt have; but if they ſpeak for this ſtuff, or that colour, they ſhould be ſure to go without it. Not that I would have parents purpoſely croſs the deſires of their children in matters of indifferency: on the contrary, where their carriage deſerves it, and one is ſure it will not corrupt or effeminate their minds, and make them fond of

Craving. of trifles, I think, all things ſhould be contrived, as much as could be, to their ſatisfaction, that they might find the eaſe and pleaſure of doing well. The beſt for children is, that they ſhould not place any pleaſure in ſuch things at all, nor regulate their delight by their fancies; but be indifferent to all that nature has made ſo. This is what their parents and teachers ſhould chiefly aim at: but till this be obtained, all that I oppoſe here, is the liberty of aſking; which, in theſe things of conceit, ought to be reſtrained by a conſtant forfeiture annexed to it.

THIS may perhaps be thought a little too ſevere, by the natural indulgence of tender parents: but yet it is no more than neceſſary. For ſince the method I propoſe is to baniſh the rods, this reſtraint of their tongues will be of great uſe to ſettle that awe we have elſewhere ſpoken of, and to keep up in them the reſpect and reverence due to their parents. Next, it will teach them to keep in, and ſo maſter their inclinations. By this means they will be brought to learn the art of ſtifling their deſires, as ſoon as they riſe up in them, when they are eaſieſt to be ſubdued. For giving vent, gives life and ſtrength to our appetites; and he that has the confidence to turn his wiſhes into demands, will be but a little way from thinking he ought to obtain them. This I am ſure of, every one can more eaſily bear a denial from himſelf, than from any body elſe. They ſhould therefore be accuſtomed betimes to conſult and make uſe of their reaſon, before they give allowance to their inclinations. It is a great ſtep towards the maſtery of our deſires, to give this ſtop to them, and ſhut them up in ſilence. This habit, got by children, of ſtaying the forwardneſs of their fancies, and deliberating whether it be fit or no before they ſpeak, will be of no ſmall advantage to them in matters of greater conſequence in the future courſe of their lives. For that which I cannot too often inculcate, is, that whatever the matter be, about which it is converſant, whether great or ſmall, the main (I had almoſt ſaid only) thing to be conſidered, in every action of a child, is, what influence it will have upon his mind; what habit it tends to, and is like to ſettle in him; how it will become him when he is bigger; and, if it be encouraged, whither it will lead him when he is grown up.

MY meaning therefore is not, that children ſhould purpoſely be made uneaſy: this would reliſh too much of inhumanity and ill-nature, and be apt to infect them with it. They ſhould be brought to deny their appetites; and their minds, as well as bodies, be made vigorous, eaſy and ſtrong, by the cuſtom of having their inclinations in ſubjection, and their bodies exerciſed with hardſhips; but all this without giving them any mark or apprehenſion of ill-will towards them. The conſtant loſs of what they craved or carved to themſelves ſhould teach them modeſty, ſubmiſſion, and a power to forbear: but the rewarding their modeſty and ſilence, by giving them what they liked, ſhould alſo aſſure them of the love of thoſe who rigorouſly exacted this obedience. The contenting themſelves now, in the want of what they wiſhed for, is a virtue, that another time ſhould be rewarded with what is ſuited and acceptable to them;

them; which ſhould be beſtowed on them, as if it were a natural conſequence of their good behaviour, and not a bargain about it. But you will loſe your labour, and, what is more, their love and reverence too, if they can receive from others what you deny them. This is to be kept very ſtanch, and carefully to be watched. And here the ſervants come again in my way. Craving.

§ 108. If this be begun betimes, and they accuſtom themſelves early to ſilence their deſires, this uſeful habit will ſettle them; and, as they come to grow up in age and diſcretion, they may be allowed greater liberty; when reaſon comes to ſpeak in them, and not paſſion. For whenever reaſon would ſpeak, it ſhould be hearkened to. But, as they ſhould never be heard, when they ſpeak for any particular thing they would have, unleſs it be firſt propoſed to them; ſo they ſhould always be heard, and fairly and kindly anſwered, when they aſk after any thing they would know, and deſire to be informed about. Curioſity ſhould be as carefully cheriſhed in children, as other appetites ſuppreſſed. Curioſity.

However ſtrict a hand is to be kept upon all deſires of fancy, yet there is one caſe wherein fancy muſt be permitted to ſpeak, and be hearkened to alſo. Recreation is as neceſſary as labour or food: but becauſe there can be no recreation without delight, which depends not always on reaſon, but oftener on fancy, it muſt be permitted children not only to divert themſelves, but to do it after their own faſhion, provided it be innocently, and without prejudice to their health; and therefore in this caſe they ſhould not be denied, if they propoſed any particular kind of recreation; though I think, in a well-ordered education, they will ſeldom be brought to the neceſſity of aſking any ſuch liberty. Care ſhould be taken, that what is of advantage to them, they ſhould always do with delight; and, before they are wearied with one, they ſhould be timely diverted to ſome other uſeful employment. But if they are not yet brought to that degree of perfection, that one way of improvement can be made a recreation to them, they muſt be let looſe to the childiſh play they fancy; which they ſhould be weaned from, by being made furfeited of it: but from things of uſe, that they are employed in, they ſhould always be ſent away with an appetite; at leaſt be diſmiſſed before they are tired, and grow quite ſick of it; that ſo they may return to it again, as to a pleaſure that diverts them. For you muſt never think them ſet right, till they can find delight in the practice of laudable things; and the uſeful exerciſes of the body and mind, taking their turns, make their lives and improvement pleaſant in a continued train of recreations, wherein the wearied part is conſtantly relieved and refreſhed. Whether this can be done in every temper, or whether tutors and parents will be at the pains, and have the diſcretion and patience to bring them to this, I know not; but that it may be done in moſt children, if a right courſe be taken to raiſe in them the deſire of credit, eſteem, and reputation, I do not at all doubt. And when they have ſo much true life put into them, they may freely be talked with, about what moſt delights them, and be direct- Recreation.

Recreation. directed, or let looſe to it; ſo that they may perceive that they are beloved and cheriſhed, and that thoſe under whoſe tuition they are, are not enemies to their ſatisfaction. Such a management will make them in love with the hand that directs them, and the virtue they are directed to.

Complaints. THIS farther advantage may be made by a free liberty permitted them in their recreations, that it will diſcover their natural tempers, ſhew their inclinations and aptitudes; and thereby direct wiſe parents in the choice, both of the courſe of life and employment they ſhall deſign them for, and of fit remedies, in the mean time, to be applied to whatever bent of nature they may obſerve moſt likely to miſlead any of their children.

§ 109. 2. CHILDREN, who live together, often ſtrive for maſtery, whoſe wills ſhall carry it over the reſt: whoever begins the conteſt, ſhould be ſure to be croſſed in it. But not only that, but they ſhould be taught to have all the deference, complaiſance, and civility one for the other imaginable. This, when they ſee it procures them reſpect, love, and eſteem, and that they loſe no ſuperiority by it, they will take more pleaſure in, than in inſolent domineering; for ſo plainly is the other.

THE accuſations of children one againſt another, which uſually are but the clamours of anger and revenge, deſiring aid, ſhould not be favourably received nor hearkened to. It weakens and effeminates their minds to ſuffer them to complain: and if they endure ſometimes croſſing or pain from others, without being permitted to think it ſtrange or intolerable, it will do them no harm to learn ſufferance, and harden them early. But, though you give no countenance to the complaints of the querulous, yet take care to curb the inſolence and ill-nature of the injurious. When you obſerve it yourſelf, reprove it before the injured party: but if the complaint be of ſomething really worth your notice and prevention another time, then reprove the offender by himſelf alone, out of ſight of him that complained, and make him go and aſk pardon, and make reparation. Which coming thus, as it were, from himſelf, will be the more chearfully performed, and more kindly received, the love ſtrengthened between them, and a cuſtom of civility grow familiar amongſt your children.

Liberality. § 110. 3. As to having and poſſeſſing of things, teach them to part with what they have, eaſily and freely to their friends; and let them find by experience, that the moſt liberal has always moſt plenty, with eſteem and commendation to boot, and they will quickly learn to practiſe it. This, I imagine, will make brothers and ſiſters kinder and civiller to one another, and conſequently to others, than twenty rules about good manners, with which children are ordinarily perplexed and cumbered. Covetouſneſs, and the deſire of having in our poſſeſſion, and under our dominion, more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, ſhould be early and carefully weeded out; and the contrary quality, or a readineſs to impart to others, implanted. This ſhould be encouraged by great commendation and credit, and conſtantly taking care, that he loſes nothing

by his liberality. Let all the inſtances he gives of ſuch freeneſs be always repaid, and with intereſt; and let him ſenſibly perceive, that the kindneſs he ſhews to others is no ill huſbandry for himſelf; but that it brings a return for kindneſs, both from thoſe that receive it, and thoſe who look on. Make this a conteſt among children, who ſhall out-do one another this way. And by this means, by a conſtant practice, children having made it eaſy to themſelves to part with what they have, good-nature may be ſettled in them into an habit, and they may take pleaſure, and pique themſelves in being kind, liberal, and civil to others. Liberality.

If liberality ought to be encouraged, certainly great care is to be taken that children tranſgreſs not the rules of juſtice: and whenever they do, they ſhould be ſet right; and, if there be occaſion for it, ſeverely rebuked. Juſtice.

Our firſt actions being guided more by ſelf-love than reaſon or reflection, it is no wonder that in children they ſhould be very apt to deviate from the juſt meaſures of right and wrong, which are in the mind the reſult of improved reaſon and ſerious meditation. This the more they are apt to miſtake, the more careful guard ought to be kept over them, and every the leaſt ſlip in this great ſocial virtue taken notice of and rectified; and that in things of the leaſt weight and moment, both to inſtruct their ignorance, and prevent ill habits, which, from ſmall beginnings, in pins and cherry-ſtones, will, if let alone, grow up to higher frauds, and be in danger to end at laſt in down-right hardened diſhoneſty. The firſt tendency to any injuſtice that appears, muſt be ſuppreſſed with a ſhew of wonder and abhorrency in the parents and governors. But becauſe children cannot well comprehend what injuſtice is, till they underſtand property, and how particular perſons come by it, the ſafeſt way to ſecure honeſty, is to lay the foundations of it early in liberality, and an eaſineſs to part with to others whatever they have, or like, themſelves. This may be taught them early, before they have language and underſtanding enough to form diſtinct notions of property, and to know what is theirs by a peculiar right excluſive of others. And ſince children ſeldom have any thing but by gift, and that for the moſt part from their parents, they may be at firſt taught not to take or keep any thing, but what is given them by thoſe whom they take to have a power over it; and, as their capacities enlarge, other rules and caſes of juſtice, and rights concerning "meum" and "tuum," may be propoſed and inculcated. If any act of injuſtice in them appears to proceed, not from miſtake, but perverſeneſs in their wills, when a gentle rebuke and ſhame will not reform this irregular and covetous inclination, rougher remedies muſt be applied: and it is but for the father or tutor to take and keep from them ſomething that they value, and think their own; or order ſome body elſe to do it; and by ſuch inſtances make them ſenſible, what little advantage they are like to make, by poſſeſſing themſelves unjuſtly of what is another's, whilſt there are in the world ſtronger and more men than they. But if an ingenuous deteſtation of this ſhameful vice be but carefully and early inſtilled

Juſtice. into them, as I think it may, that is the true and genuine method to obviate this crime; and will be a better guard againſt diſhoneſty, than any conſiderations drawn from intereſt; habits working more conſtantly, and with greater facility, than reaſon: which, when we have moſt need of it, is ſeldom fairly conſulted, and more rarely obeyed.

Crying. § 111. CRYING is a fault that ſhould not be tolerated in children; not only for the unpleaſant and unbecoming noiſe it fills the houſe with, but for more conſiderable reaſons, in reference to the children themſelves; which is to be our aim in education.

THEIR crying is of two ſorts; either ſtubborn and domineering, or querulous and whining.

1. THEIR crying is very often a ſtriving for maſtery, and an open declaration of their inſolence or obſtinacy: when they have not the power to obtain their deſire, they will, by their clamour and ſobbing, maintain their title and right to it. This is an avowed continuing of their claim, and a ſort of remonſtrance againſt the oppreſſion and injuſtice of thoſe who deny them what they have a mind to.

§ 112. SOMETIMES their crying is the effect of pain or true ſorrow, and a bemoaning themſelves under it.

THESE two, if carefully obſerved, may, by the mien, looks, and actions, and particularly by the tone of their crying, be eaſily diſtinguiſhed; but neither of them muſt be ſuffered, much leſs encouraged.

1. THE obſtinate or ſtomachful crying ſhould by no means be permitted; becauſe it is but another way of flattering their deſires, and encouraging thoſe paſſions, which it is our main buſineſs to ſubdue: and if it be, as often it is, upon the receiving any correction, it quite defeats all the good effects of it; for any chaſtiſement, which leaves them in this declared oppoſition, only ſerves to make them worſe. The reſtraints and puniſhments laid on children are all miſapplied and loſt, as far as they do not prevail over their wills, teach them to ſubmit their paſſions, and make their minds ſupple and pliant to what their parents reaſon adviſes them now, and ſo prepare them to obey what their own reaſon ſhall adviſe hereafter. But if, in any thing wherein they are croſſed, they may be ſuffered to go away crying, they confirm themſelves in their deſires, and cheriſh the ill humour, with a declaration of their right, and a reſolution to ſatisfy their inclinations the firſt opportunity. This therefore is another argument againſt the frequent uſe of blows: for, whenever you come to that extremity, it is not enough to whip or beat them; you muſt do it, till you find you have ſubdued their minds; till with ſubmiſſion and patience they yield to the correction; which you ſhall beſt diſcover by their crying, and their ceaſing from it upon your bidding. Without this, the beating of children is but a paſſionate tyranny over them: and it is mere cruelty, and not correction, to put their bodies in pain, without doing their minds any good. As this gives us a reaſon why children ſhould ſeldom be corrected, ſo it alſo prevents their being ſo. For if, whenever they are chaſtiſed, it were done thus without paſſion, ſoberly

and

and yet effectually too, laying on the blows and ſmart, not furiouſly and all at once, but ſlowly, with reaſoning between, and with obſervation how it wrought, ſtopping when it had made them pliant, penitent, and yielding; they would ſeldom need the like puniſhment again, being made careful to avoid the fault that deſerved it. Beſides, by this means, as the puniſhment would not be loſt, for being too little, and not effectual; ſo it would be kept from being too much, if we gave off as ſoon as we perceived that it reached the mind, and that was bettered. For, ſince the chiding or beating of children ſhould be always the leaſt that poſſibly may be, that which is laid on in the heat of anger, ſeldom obſerves that meaſure; but is commonly more than it ſhould be, though it prove leſs than enough. Crying.

§ 113. 2. MANY children are apt to cry, upon any little pain they ſuffer; and the leaſt harm that befals them, puts them into complaints and bawling. This few children avoid: for it being the firſt and natural way to declare their ſufferings or wants, before they can ſpeak, the compaſſion that is thought due to that tender age, fooliſhly encourages, and continues it in them long after they can ſpeak. It is the duty, I confeſs, of thoſe about children, to compaſſionate them, whenever they ſuffer any hurt; but not to ſhew it in pitying them. Help and eaſe them the beſt you can, but by no means bemoan them. This ſoftens their minds, and makes them yield to the little harms that happen to them; whereby they ſink deeper into that part which alone feels, and make larger wounds there, than otherwiſe they would. They ſhould be hardened againſt all ſufferings, eſpecially of the body, and have no tenderneſs but what riſes from an ingenuous ſhame and a quick ſenſe of reputation. The many inconveniencies this life is expoſed to require we ſhould not be too ſenſible of every little hurt. What our minds yield not to, makes but a ſlight impreſſion, and does us but very little harm; it is the ſuffering of our ſpirits that gives and continues the pain. This brawnineſs and inſenſibility of mind, is the beſt armour we can have againſt the common evils and accidents of life; and being a temper that is to be got by exerciſe and cuſtom, more than any other way, the practice of it ſhould be begun betimes, and happy is he that is taught it early. That effeminacy of ſpirit, which is to be prevented or cured, and which nothing, that I know, ſo much increaſes in children as crying; ſo nothing, on the other ſide, ſo much checks and reſtrains, as their being hindered from that ſort of complaining. In the little harms they ſuffer, from knocks and falls, they ſhould not be pitied for falling, but bid do ſo again; which, beſides that it ſtops their crying, is a better way to cure their heedleſneſs, and prevent their tumbling another time, than either chiding or bemoaning them. But, let the hurts they receive be what they will, ſtop their crying, and that will give them more quiet and eaſe at preſent, and harden them for the future.

§. 114. THE former ſort of crying requires ſeverity to ſilence it; and where a look, or a poſitive command, will not do it, blows muſt: for it

Crying.

proceeding from pride, obſtinacy, and ſtomach, the will, where the fault lies, muſt be bent, and made to comply, by a rigour ſufficient to maſter it: but this latter, being ordinarily from ſoftneſs of mind, a quite contrary cauſe, ought to be treated with a gentler hand. Perſuaſion, or diverting the thoughts another way, or laughing at their whining, may perhaps be at firſt the proper method. But for this, the circumſtances of the thing, and the particular temper of the child, muſt be conſidered: no certain invariable rules can be given about it; but it muſt be left to the prudence of the parents or tutor. But this I think I may ſay in general, that there ſhould be a conſtant diſcountenancing of this ſort of crying alſo; and that the father, by his authority, ſhould always ſtop it, mixing a greater degree of roughneſs in his looks or words, proportionably as the child is of a greater age, or a ſturdier temper; but always let it be enough to ſilence their whimpering, and put an end to the diſorder.

Fool-hardineſs.

§ 115. COWARDICE and courage are ſo nearly related to the fore-mentioned tempers, that it may not be amiſs here to take notice of them. Fear is a paſſion, that, if rightly governed, has its uſe. And though ſelf-love ſeldom fails to keep it watchful and high enough in us, yet there may be an exceſs on the daring ſide; fool-hardineſs and inſenſibility of danger being as little reaſonable, as trembling and ſhrinking at the approach of every little evil. Fear was given us as a monitor to quicken our induſtry, and keep us upon our guard againſt the approaches of evil: and therefore to have no apprehenſion of miſchief at hand, not to make a juſt eſtimate of the danger, but heedleſly to run into it, be the hazard what it will, without conſidering of what uſe or conſequence it may be; is not the reſolution of a rational creature, but brutiſh fury. Thoſe who have children of this temper, have nothing to do, but a little to awaken their reaſon, which ſelf-preſervation will quickly diſpoſe them to hearken to; unleſs (which is uſually the caſe) ſome other paſſion hurries them on headlong, without ſenſe, and without conſideration. A diſlike of evil is ſo natural to mankind, that no-body, I think, can be without fear of it; fear being nothing but an uneaſineſs under the apprehenſion of that coming upon us which we diſlike. And therefore, whenever any one runs into danger, we may ſay it is under the conduct of ignorance, or the command of ſome more imperious paſſion, no-body being ſo much an enemy to himſelf, as to come within the reach of evil out of free choice, and court danger for danger's ſake. If it be therefore pride, vain-glory, or rage, that ſilences a child's fear, or makes him not hearken to its advice, thoſe are by fit means to be abated, that a little conſideration may allay his heat, and make him bethink himſelf whether this attempt be worth the venture. But this being a fault that children are not ſo often guilty of, I ſhall not be more particular in its cure. Weakneſs of ſpirit is the more common defect, and therefore will require the greater care.

FORTITUDE is the guard and ſupport of the other virtues; and without courage a man will ſcarce keep ſteady to his duty, and fill up the character of a truly worthy man.

COURAGE, that makes us bear up againſt dangers that we fear, and evils that we feel, is of great uſe in an eſtate, as ours is in this life, expoſed to aſſaults on all hands: and therefore it is very adviſeable to get children into this armour as early as we can. Natural temper, I confeſs, does here a great deal: but even where that is defective, and the heart is in itſelf weak and timorous, it may, by a right management, be brought to a better reſolution. What is to be done to prevent breaking children's ſpirits by frightful apprehenſions inſtilled into them when young, or bemoaning themſelves under every little ſuffering, I have already taken notice. How to harden their tempers, and raiſe their courage, if we find them too much ſubject to fear, is farther to be conſidered. Courage.

TRUE fortitude I take to be the quiet poſſeſſion of a man's ſelf, and an undiſturbed doing his duty, whatever evil beſets, or danger lies in his way. This there are ſo few men attain to, that we are not to expect it from children. But yet ſomething may be done; and a wiſe conduct, by inſenſible degrees, may carry them farther than one expects.

THE neglect of this great care of them, whilſt they are young, is the reaſon, perhaps, why there are ſo few that have this virtue, in its full latitude, when they are men. I ſhould not ſay this in a nation ſo naturally brave as ours is, did I think, that true fortitude required nothing but courage in the field, and a contempt of life in the face of an enemy. This, I confeſs, is not the leaſt part of it, nor can be denied the laurels and honours always juſtly due to the valour of thoſe who venture their lives for their country. But yet this is not all: dangers attack us in other places beſides the field of battle; and though death be the king of terrors, yet pain, diſgrace, and poverty, have frightful looks, able to diſcompoſe moſt men, whom they ſeem ready to ſeize on: and there are thoſe who contemn ſome of theſe, and yet are heartily frighted with the other. True fortitude is prepared for dangers of all kinds, and unmoved, whatſoever evil it be that threatens: I do not mean unmoved with any fear at all. Where danger ſhews itſelf, apprehenſion cannot, without ſtupidity, be wanting. Where danger is, ſenſe of danger ſhould be; and ſo much fear as ſhould keep us awake, and excite our attention, induſtry, and vigour; but not diſturb the calm uſe of our reaſon, nor hinder the execution of what that dictates.

THE firſt ſtep to get this noble and manly ſteadineſs, is, what I have above mentioned, carefully to keep children from frights of all kinds, when they are young. Let not any fearful apprehenſions be talked into them, nor terrible objects ſurprize them. This often ſo ſhatters and diſcompoſes the ſpirits, that they never recover it again; but, during their whole life, upon the firſt ſuggeſtion, or appearance of any terrifying idea, are ſcattered and confounded; the body is enervated, and the mind diſturbed, and the man ſcarce himſelf, or capable of any compoſed or rational action. Whether this be from an habitual motion of the animal ſpirits, introduced by the firſt ſtrong impreſſion; or from the alteration of the conſtitution, by ſome more unaccountable way; this is certain, Cowardice.

that

Cowardice. that ſo it is. Inſtances of ſuch, who in a weak, timorous mind have borne, all their whole lives through, the effects of a fright when they were young, are every-where to be ſeen; and therefore, as much as may be, to be prevented.

THE next thing is, by gentle degrees, to accuſtom children to thoſe things they are too much afraid of. But here great caution is to be uſed, that you do not make too much haſte, nor attempt this cure too early, for fear leſt you increaſe the miſchief inſtead of remedying it. Little ones in arms may be eaſily kept out of the way of terrifying objects, and, till they can talk and underſtand what is ſaid to them, are ſcarce capable of that reaſoning and diſcourſe, which ſhould be uſed to let them know there is no harm in thoſe frightful objects, which we would make them familiar with, and do, to that purpoſe, by gentle degrees, bring nearer and nearer to them. And therefore it is ſeldom there is need of any application to them of this kind, till after they can run about and talk. But yet, if it ſhould happen, that infants ſhould have taken offence at any thing which cannot be eaſily kept out of their way; and that they ſhew marks of terror, as often as it comes in ſight; all the allays of fright, by diverting their thoughts, or mixing pleaſant and agreeable appearances with it, muſt be uſed, till it be grown familiar and inoffenſive to them.

I THINK we may obſerve, that when children are firſt born, all objects of ſight, that do not hurt the eyes, are indifferent to them; and they are no more afraid of a blackamoor, or a lion, than of their nurſe, or a cat. What is it then, that afterwards, in certain mixtures of ſhape and colour, comes to affright them? Nothing but the apprehenſions of harm, that accompanies thoſe things. Did a child ſuck every day a new nurſe, I make account it would be no more affrighted with the change of faces at ſix months old, than at ſixty. The reaſon then, why it will not come to a ſtranger, is, becauſe, having been accuſtomed to receive its food and kind uſage only from one or two that are about it, the child apprehends, by coming into the arms of a ſtranger, the being taken from what delights and feeds it, and every moment ſupplies its wants, which it often feels, and therefore fears when the nurſe is away.

Timorouſneſs. THE only thing we naturally are afraid of, is pain, or loſs of pleaſure. And becauſe theſe are not annexed to any ſhape, colour, or ſize of viſible objects, we are frighted with none of them, till either we have felt pain from them, or have notions put into us, that they will do us harm. The pleaſant brightneſs and luſtre of flame and fire ſo delights children, that at firſt they always deſire to be handling of it: but when conſtant experience has convinced them, by the exquiſite pain it has put them to, how cruel and unmerciful it is, they are afraid to touch it, and carefully avoid it. This being the ground of fear, it is not hard to find whence it ariſes, and how it is to be cured in all miſtaken objects of terror: and when the mind is confirmed againſt them, and has got a maſtery over itſelf, and its uſual fears, in lighter occaſions, it is in good preparation to meet more real dangers. Your child ſhrieks, and runs aways at the ſight

of a frog, let another catch it, and lay it down at a good diſtance from him: at firſt accuſtom him to look upon it; when he can do that, then to come nearer to it, and ſee it leap without emotion; then to touch it lightly, when it is held faſt in another's hand; and ſo on, till he can come to handle it as confidently as a butterfly, or a ſparrow. By the ſame way any other vain terrors may be removed, if care be taken that you go not too faſt, and puſh not the child on to a new degree of aſſurance, till he be thoroughly confirmed in the former. And thus the young ſoldier is to be trained on to the warfare of life; wherein care is to be taken, that more things be not repreſented as dangerous, than really are ſo; and then, that whatever you obſerve him to be more frighted at than he ſhould, you be ſure to toll him on to, by inſenſible degrees, till he at laſt, quitting his fears, maſters the difficulty, and comes off with applauſe. Succeſſes of this kind, often repeated, will make him find, that evils are not always ſo certain, or ſo great, as our fears repreſent them; and that the way to avoid them is not to run away, or be diſcompoſed, dejected, and deterred by fear, where either our credit, or duty, requires us to go on. Timorouſneſs.

But, ſince the great foundation of fear in children is pain, the way to harden and fortify children againſt fear and danger, is to accuſtom them to ſuffer pain. This, it is poſſible, will be thought, by kind parents, a very unnatural thing towards their children; and by moſt, unreaſonable, to endeavour to reconcile any one to the ſenſe of pain, by bringing it upon him. It will be ſaid, it may perhaps give the child an averſion for him that makes him ſuffer; but can never recommend to him ſuffering itſelf. This is a ſtrange method. You will not have children whipped and puniſhed for their faults; but you would have them tormented for doing well, or for tormenting's ſake. I doubt not but ſuch objections as theſe will be made, and I ſhall be thought inconſiſtent with myſelf, or phantaſtical, in propoſing it. I confeſs, it is a thing to be managed with great diſcretion; and therefore it falls not out amiſs, that it will not be received or reliſhed, but by thoſe who conſider well, and look into the reaſon of things. I would not have children much beaten for their faults, becauſe I would not have them think bodily pain the greateſt puniſhment; and I would have them, when they do well, be ſometimes put in pain, for the ſame reaſon, that they might be accuſtomed to bear it without looking on it as the greateſt evil. How much education may reconcile young people to pain and ſufferance, the examples of Sparta do ſufficiently ſhew: and they who have once brought themſelves not to think bodily pain the greateſt of evils, or that which they ought to ſtand moſt in fear of, have made no ſmall advance towards virtue. But I am not ſo fooliſh to propoſe the Lacedæmonian diſcipline in our age or conſtitution: but yet I do ſay, that inuring children gently to ſuffer ſome degrees of pain without ſhrinking, is a way to gain firmneſs to their minds, and lay a foundation for courage and reſolution in the future part of their lives. Hardineſs.

Not.

Hardineſs. NOT to bemoan them, or permit them to bemoan themſelves, on every little pain they ſuffer, is the firſt ſtep to be made. But of this I have ſpoken elſewhere.

THE next thing is, ſometimes deſignedly to put them in pain: but care muſt be taken that this be done when the child is in good humour, and ſatisfied of the good-will and kindneſs of him that hurts him, at the time that he does it. There muſt no marks of anger or diſpleaſure on the one ſide, nor compaſſion or repenting on the other, go along with it; and it muſt be ſure to be no more than the child can bear, without repining or taking it amiſs, or for a puniſhment. Managed by theſe degrees, and with ſuch circumſtances, I have ſeen a child run away laughing, with good ſmart blows of a wand on his back, who would have cried for an unkind word, and have been very ſenſible of the chaſtiſement of a cold look, from the ſame perſon. Satisfy a child, by a conſtant courſe of your care and kindneſs, that you perfectly love him; and he may by degrees be accuſtomed to bear very painful and rough uſage from you, without flinching or complaining: and this we ſee children do every day in play one with another. The ſofter you find your child is, the more you are to ſeek occaſions at fit times thus to harden him. The great art in this is to begin with what is but very little painful, and to proceed by inſenſible degrees, when you are playing, and in good humour with him, and ſpeaking well of him: and when you have once got him to think himſelf made amends for his ſuffering, by the praiſe given him for his courage; when he can take a pride in giving ſuch marks of his manlineſs, and can prefer the reputation of being brave and ſtout, to the avoiding a little pain, or the ſhrinking under it; you need not deſpair in time, and by the aſſiſtance of his growing reaſon, to maſter his timorouſneſs, and mend the weakneſs of his conſtitution. As he grows bigger, he is to be ſet upon bolder attempts than his natural temper carries him to; and whenever he is obſerved to flinch from what one has reaſon to think he would come off well in, if he had but courage to undertake; that he ſhould be aſſiſted in at firſt, and by degrees ſhamed to, till at laſt practice has given more aſſurance, and with it a maſtery, which muſt be rewarded with great praiſe, and the good opinion of others, for his performance. When by theſe ſteps he has got reſolution enough not to be deterred from what he ought to do, by the apprehenſion of danger; when fear does not, in ſudden or hazardous occurrences, diſcompoſe his mind, ſet his body a trembling, and make him unfit for action, or run away from it; he has then the courage of a rational creature; and ſuch an hardineſs we ſhould endeavour by cuſtom and uſe to bring children to, as proper occaſions come in our way.

Cruelty. § 116. ONE thing I have frequently obſerved in children, that, when they have got poſſeſſion of any poor creature, they are apt to uſe it ill; they often torment and treat very roughly young birds, butterflies, and ſuch other poor animals, which fall into their hands, and that with a ſeeming kind of pleaſure. This, I think, ſhould be watched in them; and

and if they incline to any ſuch cruelty, they ſhould be taught the contrary uſage; for the cuſtom of tormenting and killing of beaſts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men; and they who delight in the ſuffering and deſtruction of inferior creatures, will not be apt to be very compaſſionate or benign to thoſe of their own kind. Our practice takes notice of this, in the excluſion of butchers from juries of life and death. Children ſhould from the beginning be bred up in an abhorrence of killing or tormenting any living creature, and be taught not to ſpoil or deſtroy any thing, unleſs it be for the preſervation or advantage of ſome other that is nobler. And truly, if the preſervation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were every one's perſuaſion, as indeed it is every one's duty, and the true principle to regulate our religion, politicks, and morality by, the world would be much quieter, and better-natured, than it is. But to return to our preſent buſineſs; I cannot but commend both the kindneſs and prudence of a mother I knew, who was wont always to indulge her daughters, when any of them deſired dogs, ſquirrels, birds, or any ſuch things, as young girls uſe to be delighted with: but then, when they had them, they muſt be ſure to keep them well, and look diligently after them, that they wanted nothing, or were not ill uſed; for, if they were negligent in their care of them, it was counted a great fault, which often forfeited their poſſeſſion; or at leaſt they failed not to be rebuked for it, whereby they were early taught diligence and good-nature. And indeed I think people ſhould be accuſtomed, from their cradles, to be tender to all ſenſible creatures, and to ſpoil or waſte nothing at all. Cruelty.

THIS delight they take in doing of miſchief (whereby I mean ſpoiling of any thing to no purpoſe, but more eſpecially the pleaſure they take to put any thing in pain that is capable of it) I cannot perſuade myſelf to be any other than a foreign and introduced diſpoſition, an habit borrowed from cuſtom and converſation. People teach children to ſtrike, and laugh when they hurt, or ſee harm come to others; and they have the examples of moſt about them to confirm them in it. All the entertainment of talk and hiſtory is of nothing almoſt but fighting and killing; and the honour and renown that is beſtowed on conquerors, (who for the moſt part are but the great butchers of mankind) farther miſlead growing youths, who by this means come to think ſlaughter the laudable buſineſs of mankind, and the moſt heroic of virtues. By theſe ſteps unnatural cruelty is planted in us; and what humanity abhors, cuſtom reconciles and recommends to us, by laying it in the way to honour. Thus, by faſhion and opinion, that comes to be a pleaſure, which in itſelf neither is, nor can be any. This ought carefully to be watched, and early remedied, ſo as to ſettle and cheriſh the contrary and more natural temper of benignity and compaſſion in the room of it; but ſtill by the ſame gentle methods, which are to be applied to the other two faults beforementioned. It may not perhaps be unreaſonable here to add this farther caution, viz. that the miſchiefs or harms that come by play, inadvertency,

Cruelty. or ignorance, and were not known to be harms, or deſigned for miſchief's ſake, though they may perhaps be ſometimes of conſiderable damage, yet are not at all, or but very gently, to be taken notice of. For this, I think, I cannot too often inculcate, that whatever miſcarriage a child is guilty of, and whatever be the conſequence of it, the thing to be regarded in taking notice of it, is only what root it ſprings from, and what habit it is like to eſtabliſh; and to that the correction ought to be directed, and the child not to ſuffer any puniſhment for any harm which may have come by his play or inadvertency. The faults to be amended lie in the mind; and if they are ſuch as either age will cure, or no ill habits will follow from, the preſent action, whatever diſpleaſing circumſtances it may have, is to be paſſed by without any animadverſion.

§ 117. ANOTHER way to inſtil ſentiments of humanity, and to keep them lively in young folks, will be, to accuſtom them to civility, in their language and deportment towards their inferiors, and the meaner ſort of people, particularly ſervants. It is not unuſual to obſerve the children, in gentlemen's families, treat the ſervants of the houſe with domineering words, names of contempt, and an imperious carriage; as if they were of another race, and ſpecies beneath them. Whether ill example, the advantage of fortune, or their natural vanity, inſpire this haughtineſs, it ſhould be prevented, or weeded out; and a gentle, courteous, affable carriage towards the lower ranks of men, placed in the room of it. No part of their ſuperiority will be hereby loſt, but the diſtinction increaſed, and their authority ſtrengthened, when love in inferiors is joined to outward reſpect, and an eſteem of the perſon has a ſhare in their ſubmiſſion; and domeſticks will pay a more ready and chearful ſervice, when they find themſelves not ſpurned, becauſe fortune has laid them below the level of others, at their maſter's feet. Children ſhould not be ſuffered to loſe the conſideration of human nature in the ſhufflings of outward conditions: the more they have, the better-humoured they ſhould be taught to be, and the more compaſſionate and gentle to thoſe of their brethren, who are placed lower, and have ſcantier portions. If they are ſuffered from their cradles to treat men ill and rudely, becauſe, by their father's title, they think they have a little power over them; at beſt it is ill-bred; and, if care be not taken, will, by degrees, nurſe up their natural pride into an habitual contempt of thoſe beneath them: and where will that probably end, but in oppreſſion and cruelty?

Curioſity. § 118. CURIOSITY in children (which I had occaſion juſt to mention, § 108.) is but an appetite after knowledge, and therefore ought to be encouraged in them, not only as a good ſign, but as the great inſtrument nature has provided, to remove that ignorance they were born with, and which without this buſy inquiſitiveneſs will make them dull and uſeleſs creatures. The ways to encourage it, and keep it active and buſy, are, I ſuppoſe, theſe following:

1. NOT to check or diſcountenance any enquiries he ſhall make, nor ſuffer them to be laughed at; but to anſwer all his queſtions, and explain

plain the matters he desires to know, so as to make them as much intelligible to him, as suits the capacity of his age and knowledge. But confound not his understanding with explications or notions that are above it, or with the variety or number of things that are not to his present purpose. Mark what it is his mind aims at in the question, and not what words he expresses it in: and, when you have informed and satisfied him in that, you shall see how his thoughts will enlarge themselves, and how by fit answers he may be led on farther than perhaps you could imagine. For knowledge is grateful to the understanding, as light to the eyes: children are pleased and delighted with it exceedingly, especially if they see that their enquiries are regarded, and that their desire of knowing is encouraged and commended. And I doubt not but one great reason, why many children abandon themselves wholly to silly sports, and trifle away all their time insipidly, is, because they have found their curiosity baulked, and their enquiries neglected. But had they been treated with more kindness and respect, and their questions answered, as they should, to their satisfaction, I doubt not but they would have taken more pleasure in learning, and improving their knowledge, wherein there would be still newness and variety, which is what they are delighted with, than in returning over and over to the same play and play-things. Curiosity.

§. 119. 2. To this serious answering their questions, and informing their understandings in what they desire, as if it were a matter that needed it, should be added some peculiar ways of commendation. Let others, whom they esteem, be told before their faces of the knowledge they have in such and such things; and since we are all, even from our cradles, vain and proud creatures, let their vanity be flattered with things that will do them good; and let their pride set them on work on something which may turn to their advantage. Upon this ground you shall find, that there cannot be a greater spur to the attaining what you would have the eldest learn and know himself, than to set him upon teaching it his younger brothers and sisters.

§ 120. 3. As children's enquiries are not to be slighted, so also great care is to be taken, that they never receive deceitful and illuding answers. They easily perceive when they are slighted or deceived, and quickly learn the trick of neglect, dissimulation, and falshood, which they observe others to make use of. We are not to intrench upon truth in any conversation, but least of all with children; since, if we play false with them, we not only deceive their expectation, and hinder their knowledge, but corrupt their innocence, and teach them the worst of vices. They are travellers newly arrived in a strange country, of which they know nothing: we should therefore make conscience not to mislead them. And though their questions seem sometimes not very material, yet they should be seriously answered; for however they may appear to us (to whom they are long since known) enquiries not worth the making, they are of moment to those who are wholly ignorant. Children are strangers to all we are acquainted with; and all the things they meet

Curioſity. with, are at firſt unknown to them, as they once were to us: and happy are they who meet with civil people, that will comply with their ignorance, and help them to get out of it.

If you or I now ſhould be ſet down in Japan, with all our prudence and knowledge about us, a conceit whereof makes us perhaps ſo apt to ſlight the thoughts and enquiries of children; ſhould we, I ſay, be ſet down in Japan, we ſhould, no doubt, (if we would inform ourſelves of what is there to be known) aſk a thouſand queſtions, which, to a ſupercilious or inconſiderate Japaneſe, would ſeem very idle and impertinent; though to us they would be very material, and of importance to be reſolved; and we ſhould be glad to find a man ſo complaiſant and courteous, as to ſatisfy our demands, and inſtruct our ignorance.

When any new thing comes in their way, children uſually aſk the common queſtion of a ſtranger, What is it? whereby they ordinarily mean nothing but the name; and therefore to tell them how it is called, is uſually the proper anſwer to that demand. The next queſtion uſually is, What is it for? And to this it ſhould be anſwered truly and directly: the uſe of the thing ſhould be told, and the way explained, how it ſerves to ſuch a purpoſe, as far as their capacities can comprehend it; and ſo of any other circumſtances they ſhall aſk about it; not turning them going, till you have given them all the ſatisfaction they are capable of, and ſo leading them by your anſwers into farther queſtions. And perhaps to a grown man ſuch converſation will not be altogether ſo idle and inſignificant, as we are apt to imagine. The native and untaught ſuggeſtions of inquiſitive children do often offer things that may ſet a conſidering man's thoughts on work. And I think there is frequently more to be learned from the unexpected queſtions of a child, than the diſcourſes of men, who talk in a road, according to the notions they have borrowed, and the prejudices of their education.

§. 121. 4. Perhaps it may not ſometimes be amiſs to excite their curioſity, by bringing ſtrange and new things in their way, on purpoſe to engage their enquiry, and give them occaſion to inform themſelves about them; and if by chance their curioſity leads them to aſk what they ſhould not know, it is a great deal better to tell them plainly, that it is a thing that belongs not to them to know, than to pop them off with a falſhood, or a frivolous anſwer.

§ 122. Pertness, that appears ſometimes ſo early, proceeds from a principle that ſeldom accompanies a ſtrong conſtitution of body, or ripens into a ſtrong judgment of mind. If it were deſireable to have a child a more briſk talker, I believe there might be ways found to make him ſo; but, I ſuppoſe, a wiſe father had rather that his ſon ſhould be able and uſeful, when a man, than pretty company, and a diverſion to others, whilſt a child; though, if that too were to be conſidered, I think I may ſay, there is not ſo much pleaſure to have a child prattle agreeably, as to reaſon well. Encourage therefore his inquiſitiveneſs all you can, by ſatisfying his demands, and informing his judgment, as far as it is capable.

When

When his reaſons are any way tolerable, let him find the credit and commendation of them; and when they are quite out of the way, let him, without being laughed at for his miſtake, be gently put into the right; and, if he ſhew a forwardneſs to be reaſoning about things that come in his way, take care, as much as you can, that no-body check this inclination in him, or miſlead it by captious or fallacious ways of talking with him: for, when all is done, this, as the higheſt and moſt important faculty of our minds, deſerves the greateſt care and attention in cultivating it; the right improvement and exerciſe of our reaſon being the higheſt perfection that a man can attain to in this life.

§ 123. CONTRARY to this buſy inquiſitive temper, there is ſometimes obſervable in children a liſtleſs careleſſneſs, a want of regard to any thing, and a ſort of trifling, even at their buſineſs. This ſauntering humour I look on as one of the worſt qualities can appear in a child, as well as one of the hardeſt to be cured, where it is natural. But, it being liable to be miſtaken in ſome caſes, care muſt be taken to make a right judgment concerning that trifling at their books or buſineſs, which may ſometimes be complained of in a child. Upon the firſt ſuſpicion a father has, that his ſon is of a ſauntering temper, he muſt carefully obſerve him, whether he be liſtleſs and indifferent in all his actions, or whether in ſome things alone he be ſlow and ſluggiſh, but in others vigorous and eager: for though he find that he does loiter at his book, and let a good deal of the time he ſpends in his chamber or ſtudy run idly away, he muſt not preſently conclude, that this is from a ſauntering humour in his temper; it may be childiſhneſs, and a preferring ſomething to his ſtudy, which his thoughts run on; and he diſlikes his book, as is natural, becauſe it is forced upon him as a taſk. To know this perfectly, you muſt watch him at play, when he is out of his place and time of ſtudy, following his own inclinations; and ſee there, whether he be ſtirring and active; whether he deſigns any thing, and with labour and eagerneſs purſues it, till he has accompliſhed what he aimed at; or whether he lazily and liſtleſsly dreams away his time. If this ſloth be only when he is about his book, I think it may be eaſily cured; if it be in his temper, it will require a little more pains and attention to remedy it. Sauntering.

§ 124. IF you are ſatisfied, by his earneſtneſs at play, or any thing elſe he ſets his mind on, in the intervals between his hours of buſineſs, that he is not of himſelf inclined to lazineſs, but that only want of reliſh of his book makes him negligent and ſluggiſh in his application to it; the firſt ſtep is to try, by talking to him kindly of the folly and inconvenience of it, whereby he loſes a good part of his time, which he might have for his diverſion: but be ſure to talk calmly and kindly, and not much at firſt, but only theſe plain reaſons in ſhort. If this prevails, you have gained the point in the moſt deſireable way, which is that of reaſon and kindneſs. If this ſofter application prevails not, try to ſhame him out of it, by laughing at him for it, aſking every day, when he comes to

Sauntering. table, if there be no ſtrangers there, " how long he was that day about " his buſineſs?" And if he has not done it, in the time he might be well ſuppoſed to have diſpatched it, expoſe and turn him into ridicule for it; but mix no chiding, only put on a pretty cold brow towards him, and keep it till he reform; and let his mother, tutor, and all about him, do ſo too. If this work not the effect you deſire, then tell him, " he ſhall " be no longer troubled with a tutor to take care of his education: you " will not be at the charge to have him ſpend his time idly with him: " but ſince he prefers this or that [whatever play he delights in] to his " book, that only he ſhall do;" and ſo in earneſt ſet him to work on his beloved play, and keep him ſteadily, and in earneſt, to it, morning and afternoon, till he be fully ſurfeited, and would, at any rate, change it for ſome hours at his book again: but when you thus ſet him his taſk of play, you muſt be ſure to look after him yourſelf, or ſet ſomebody elſe to do it, that may conſtantly ſee him employed in it, and that he be not permitted to be idle at that too. I ſay, yourſelf look after him; for it is worth the father's while, whatever buſineſs he has, to beſtow two or three days upon his ſon, to cure ſo great a miſchief as his ſauntering at his buſineſs.

§ 125. THIS is what I propoſe, if it be idleneſs, not from his general temper, but a peculiar or acquired averſion to learning, which you muſt be careful to examine and diſtinguiſh. But, though you have your eyes upon him, to watch what he does with the time which he has at his own diſpoſal, yet you muſt not let him perceive that you, or any body elſe do ſo; for that may hinder him from following his own inclination, which he being full of, and not daring, for fear of you, to proſecute what his head and heart are ſet upon, he may neglect all other things, which then he reliſhes not, and ſo may ſeem to be idle and liſtleſs; when, in truth, it is nothing but being intent on that, which the fear of your eye or knowledge keeps him from executing. To be clear in this point, the obſervation muſt be made when you are out of the way, and he not ſo much as under the reſtraint of a ſuſpicion that any body has an eye upon him. In thoſe ſeaſons of perfect freedom, let ſomebody, you can truſt, mark how he ſpends his time, whether he inactively loiters it away, when, without any check, he is left to his own inclination. Thus, by his employing of ſuch times of liberty, you will eaſily diſcern whether it be liſtleſſneſs in his temper, or averſion to his book, that makes him ſaunter away his time of ſtudy.

§ 126. IF ſome defect in his conſtitution has caſt a damp on his mind, and he be naturally liſtleſs and dreaming, this unpromiſing diſpoſition is none of the eaſieſt to be dealt with; becauſe, generally carrying with it an unconcernedneſs for the future, it wants the two great ſprings of action, foreſight and deſire; which, how to plant and increaſe, where nature has given a cold and contrary temper, will be the queſtion. As ſoon as you are ſatisfied that this is the caſe, you muſt carefully enquire whether there be nothing he delights in; inform yourſelf, what it is he is

moſt pleaſed with; and if you can find any particular tendency his mind hath, increaſe it all you can, and make uſe of that to ſet him on work, and to excite his induſtry. If he loves praiſe, or play, or fine cloaths, &c. or, on the other ſide, dreads pain, diſgrace, or your diſpleaſure, &c. whatever it be that he loves moſt, except it be ſloth, (for that will never ſet him on work) let that be made uſe of to quicken him, and make him beſtir himſelf: for in this liſtleſs temper you are not to fear an exceſs of appetite (as in all other caſes) by cheriſhing it. It is that which you want, and therefore muſt labour to raiſe and increaſe; for, where there is no deſire, there will be no induſtry. Sauntering.

§ 127. If you have not hold enough upon him this way, to ſtir up vigour and activity in him, you muſt employ him in ſome conſtant bodily labour, whereby he may get an habit of doing ſomething: the keeping him hard to ſome ſtudy, were the better way to get him an habit of exerciſing and applying his mind. But, becauſe this is an inviſible attention, and no-body can tell when he is, or is not idle at it, you muſt find bodily employments for him, which he muſt be conſtantly buſied in, and kept to; and, if they have ſome little hardſhip and ſhame in them, it may not be the worſe, that they may the ſooner weary him, and make him deſire to return to his book: but be ſure, when you exchange his book for his other labour, ſet him ſuch a taſk, to be done in ſuch a time, as may allow him no opportunity to be idle. Only, after you have by this way brought him to be attentive and induſtrious at his book, you may, upon his diſpatching his ſtudy within the time ſet him, give him, as a reward, ſome reſpite from his other labour; which you may diminiſh, as you find him grow more and more ſteady in his application; and, at laſt, wholly take off, when his ſauntering at his book is cured.

§ 128. We formerly obſerved, that variety and freedom was that which delighted children, and recommended their plays to them; and that therefore their book, or any thing we would have them learn, ſhould not be enjoined them as buſineſs. This their parents, tutors and teachers, are apt to forget; and their impatience to have them buſied in what is fit for them to do, ſuffers them not to deceive them into it: but, by the repeated injunctions they meet with, children quickly diſtinguiſh between what is required of them, and what not. When this miſtake has once made his book uneaſy to him, the cure is to be applied at the other end. And ſince it will be then too late to endeavour to make it a play to him, you muſt take the contrary courſe; obſerve what play he is moſt delighted with; enjoin that, and make him play ſo many hours every day, not as a puniſhment for playing, but as if it were the buſineſs required of him. This, if I miſtake not, will, in a few days, make him ſo weary of his moſt beloved ſport, that he will prefer his book, or any thing, to it, eſpecially if it may redeem him from any part of the taſk of play is ſet him; and he may be ſuffered to employ ſome part of the time deſtined to his taſk of play in his book, or ſuch other exerciſe as is really uſeful to him. This I at leaſt think a better cure than that Compulſion.

forbidding

Compulſion. forbidding (which uſually increaſes the deſire) or any other puniſhment ſhould be made uſe of to remedy it; for, when you have once glutted his appetite, (which may ſafely be done in all things but eating and drinking) and made him ſurfeit of what you would have him avoid, you have put into him a principle of averſion, and you need not ſo much fear afterwards his longing for the ſame thing again.

§ 129. THIS, I think, is ſufficiently evident, that children generally hate to be idle: all the care then is, that their buſy humour ſhould be conſtantly employed in ſomething of uſe to them; which if you will attain, you muſt make what you would have them do, a recreation to them, and not a buſineſs. They way to do this, ſo that they may not perceive you have any hand in it, is this propoſed here, viz. to make them weary of that which you would not have them do, by enjoining and making them, under ſome pretence or other, do it till they are ſurfeited. For example; Does your ſon play at top, and ſcourge too much? Enjoin him to play ſo many hours every day, and look that he do it; and you ſhall ſee he will quickly be ſick of it, and willing to leave it. By this means, making the recreations you diſlike, a buſineſs to him, he will of himſelf, with delight, betake himſelf to thoſe things you would have him do, eſpecially if they be propoſed as rewards for having performed his taſk in that play which is commanded him. For, if he be ordered every day to whip his top, ſo long as to make him ſufficiently weary, do you not think he will apply himſelf with eagerneſs to his book, and wiſh for it, if you promiſe it him as a reward of having whipped his top luſtily, quite out all the time that is ſet him? Children, in the things they do, if they comport with their age, find little difference, ſo they may be doing: the eſteem they have for one thing above another, they borrow from others; ſo that what thoſe about them make to be a reward to them, will really be ſo. By this art, it is in their governor's choice, whether ſcotch-hoppers ſhall reward their dancing, or dancing their ſcotch-hoppers; whether peg-top, or reading, playing at trap, or ſtudying the globes, ſhall be more acceptable and pleaſing to them; all that they deſire being to be buſy, and buſy, as they imagine, in things of their own choice, and which they receive as favours from their parents, or others for whom they have a reſpect, and with whom they would be in credit. A ſet of children thus ordered, and kept from the ill example of others, would, all of them, I ſuppoſe, with as much earneſtneſs and delight, learn to read, write, and what elſe one would have them, as others do their ordinary plays: and the eldeſt being thus entered, and this made the faſhion of the place, it would be as impoſſible to hinder them from learning the one, as it is ordinarily to keep them from the other.

Play-games. § 130. PLAY-THINGS, I think, children ſhould have, and of divers ſorts; but ſtill to be in the cuſtody of their tutors, or ſomebody elſe, whereof the child ſhould have in his power but one at once, and ſhould not be ſuffered to have another, but when he reſtored that: this teaches them, betimes, to be careful of not loſing or ſpoiling the things they have;

have; whereas plenty and variety, in their own keeping, makes them wanton and careleſs, and teaches them from the beginning to be ſquanderers and waſters. Theſe, I confeſs, are little things, and ſuch as will ſeem beneath the care of a governor; but nothing that may form children's minds is to be overlooked and neglected; and whatſoever introduces habits, and ſettles cuſtoms in them, deſerves the care and attention of their governors, and is not a ſmall thing in its conſequences. Play-games.

One thing more about children's play-things may be worth their parents care: though it be agreed they ſhould have of ſeveral ſorts, yet, I think, they ſhould have none bought for them. This will hinder that great variety they are often overcharged with, which ſerves only to teach the mind to wander after change and ſuperfluity, to be unquiet, and perpetually ſtretching itſelf after ſomething more ſtill, though it knows not what, and never to be ſatisfied with what it hath. The court that is made to people of condition in ſuch kind of preſents to their children, does the little ones great harm; by it they are taught pride, vanity, and covetouſneſs, almoſt before they can ſpeak; and I have known a young child ſo diſtracted with the number and variety of his play-games, that he tired his maid every day to look them over; and was ſo accuſtomed to abundance, that he never thought he had enough, but was always aſking, What more? What more? What new thing ſhall I have? A good introduction to moderate deſires, and the ready way to make a contented happy man!

How then ſhall they have the play-games you allow them, if none muſt be bought for them? I anſwer, they ſhould make them themſelves, or at leaſt endeavour it, and ſet themſelves about it; till then they ſhould have none, and till then, they will want none of any great artifice. A ſmooth pebble, a piece of paper, the mother's bunch of keys, or any thing they cannot hurt themſelves with, ſerves as much to divert little children, as thoſe more chargeable and curious toys from the ſhops, which are preſently put out of order and broken. Children are never dull or out of humour for want of ſuch play-things, unleſs they have been uſed to them: when they are little, whatever occurs ſerves the turn; and as they grow bigger, if they are not ſtored by the expenſive folly of others, they will make them themſelves. Indeed, when they once begin to ſet themſelves to work about any of their inventions, they ſhould be taught and aſſiſted; but ſhould have nothing whilſt they lazily ſit ſtill, expecting to be furniſhed from other hands without employing their own: and if you help them where they are at a ſtand, it will more endear you to them, than any chargeable toys you ſhall buy for them. Play-things which are above their ſkill to make, as tops, gigs, battledores, and the like, which are to be uſed with labour, ſhould, indeed, be procured them: theſe, it is convenient, they ſhould have, not for variety, but exerciſe; but theſe, too, ſhould be given them as bare as might be. If they had a top, the ſcourge-ſtick and leather-ſtrap ſhould be left to their own making and fitting. If they ſit gaping to have ſuch things drop into their mouths, they ſhould

Play-games. go without them. This will accuſtom them to ſeek for what they want in themſelves, and in their own endeavours; whereby they will be taught moderation in their deſires, application, induſtry, thought, contrivance, and good huſbandry; qualities that will be uſeful to them when they are men, and therefore cannot be learned too ſoon, nor fixed too deep. All the plays and diverſions of children ſhould be directed towards good and uſeful habits, or elſe they will introduce ill ones. Whatever they do, leaves ſome impreſſion on that tender age, and from thence they receive a tendency to good or evil: and whatever hath ſuch an influence, ought not to be neglected.

Lying. § 131. LYING is ſo ready and cheap a cover for any miſcarriage, and ſo much in faſhion amongſt all ſorts of people, that a child can hardly avoid obſerving the uſe is made of it on all occaſions, and ſo can ſcarce be kept, without great care, from getting into it. But it is ſo ill a quality, and the mother of ſo many ill ones, that ſpawn from it, and take ſhelter under it, that a child ſhould be brought up in the greateſt abhorrence of it imaginable: it ſhould be always (when occaſionally it comes to be mentioned) ſpoken of before him with the utmoſt deteſtation, as a quality ſo wholly inconſiſtent with the name and character of a gentleman, that no-body of any credit can bear the imputation of a lye; a mark that is judged the utmoſt diſgrace, which debaſes a man to the loweſt degree of a ſhameful meanneſs, and ranks him with the moſt contemptible part of mankind, and the abhorred raſcality; and is not to be endured in any one, who would converſe with people of condition, or have any eſteem or reputation in the world. The firſt time he is found in a lye, it ſhould rather be wondered at, as a monſtrous thing in him, than reproved as an ordinary fault. If that keeps him not from relapſing, the next time he muſt be ſharply rebuked, and fall into the ſtate of great diſpleaſure of his father and mother, and all about him, who take notice of it. And if this way work not the cure, you muſt come to blows; for, after he has been thus warned, a premeditated lye muſt always be looked upon as obſtinacy, and never be permitted to eſcape unpuniſhed.

Excuſes. § 132. CHILDREN, afraid to have their faults ſeen in their naked colours, will, like the reſt of the ſons of Adam, be apt to make excuſes. This is a fault uſually bordering upon, and leading to untruth, and is not to be indulged in them; but yet it ought to be cured rather with ſhame than roughneſs. If therefore, when a child is queſtioned for any thing, his firſt anſwer be an excuſe, warn him ſoberly to tell the truth; and then, if he perſiſts to ſhuffle it off with a falſhood, he muſt be chaſtiſed; but, if he directly confeſs, you muſt commend his ingenuity, and pardon the fault, be it what it will; and pardon it ſo, that you never ſo much as reproach him with it, or mention it to him again: for, if you would have him in love with ingenuity, and by a conſtant practice make it habitual to him, you muſt take care that it never procure him the leaſt inconvenience; but, on the contrary, his own confeſſion, bringing always with it perfect impunity, ſhould be, beſides, encouraged by ſome marks of approbation.

If

If his excuſe be ſuch at any time, that you cannot prove it to have any falſhood in it, let it paſs for true, and be ſure not to ſhew any ſuſpicion of it. Let him keep up his reputation with you as high as is poſſible; for, when once he finds he has loſt that, you have loſt a great and your beſt hold upon him. Therefore let him not think he has the character of a lyar with you, as long as you can avoid it without flattering him in it. Thus ſome ſlips in truth may be overlooked. But, after he has once been corrected for a lye, you muſt be ſure never after to pardon it in him, whenever you find, and take notice to him, that he is guilty of it: for it being a fault, which he has been forbid, and may, unleſs he be wilful, avoid, the repeating of it is perfect perverſeneſs, and muſt have the chaſtiſement due to that offence. Excuſes.

§ 133. THIS is what I have thought, concerning the general method of educating a young gentleman; which, though I am apt to ſuppoſe may have ſome influence on the whole courſe of his education, yet I am far from imagining it contains all thoſe particulars which his growing years, or peculiar temper, may require. But this being premiſed in general, we ſhall, in the next place, deſcend to a more particular conſideration of the ſeveral parts of his education.

§ 134. THAT which every gentleman (that takes any care of his education) deſires for his ſon, beſides the eſtate he leaves him, is contained (I ſuppoſe) in theſe four things, Virtue, Wiſdom, Breeding, and Learning. I will not trouble myſelf whether theſe names do not ſome of them ſometimes ſtand for the ſame thing, or really include one another. It ſerves my turn here to follow the popular uſe of theſe words, which, I preſume, is clear enough to make me be underſtood, and I hope there will be no difficulty to comprehend my meaning.

§ 135. I PLACE Virtue as the firſt and moſt neceſſary of thoſe endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman, as abſolutely requiſite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himſelf. Without that, I think, he will be happy neither in this, nor the other world.

§ 136. As the foundation of this, there ought very early to be imprinted on his mind a true notion of God, as of the independent Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things: and, conſequent to this, inſtil into him a love and reverence of this Supreme Being. This is enough to begin with, without going to explain this matter any farther, for fear, leſt by talking too early to him of ſpirits, and being unſeaſonably forward to make him underſtand the incomprehenſible nature of that Infinite Being, his head be either filled with falſe, or perplexed with unintelligible notions of him. Let him only be told upon occaſion, that God made and governs all things, hears and ſees every thing, and does all manner of good to thoſe that love and obey him. You will find, that, being told of ſuch a God, other thoughts will be apt to riſe up faſt enough in his mind about him; which, as you obſerve them to have any miſtakes, you muſt God.

God. ſet right. And I think it would be better, if men generally reſted in ſuch an idea of God, without being too curious in their notions about a Being, which all muſt acknowledge incomprehenſible; whereby many, who have not ſtrength and clearneſs of thought to diſtinguiſh between what they can, and what they cannot know, run themſelves into ſuperſtition or atheiſm, making God like themſelves, or (becauſe they cannot comprehend any thing elſe) none at all. And I am apt to think the keeping children conſtantly morning and evening to acts of devotion to God, as to their Maker, Preſerver, and Benefactor, in ſome plain and ſhort form of prayer, ſuitable to their age and capacity, will be of much more uſe to them in religion, knowledge, and virtue, than to diſtract their thoughts with curious inquiries into his inſcrutable eſſence and being.

Spirits. § 137. HAVING by gentle degrees, as you find him capable of it, ſettled ſuch an idea of God in his mind, and taught him to pray to him, and praiſe him as the Author of his being, and of all the good he does or can enjoy, forbear any diſcourſe of other ſpirits, till the mention of them coming in his way, upon occaſion hereafter to be ſet down, and his reading the ſcripture-hiſtory, put him upon that inquiry.

Goblins. § 138. BUT even then, and always whilſt he is young, be ſure to preſerve his tender mind from all impreſſions and notions of ſpirits and goblins, or any fearful apprehenſions in the dark. This he will be in danger of from the indiſcretion of ſervants, whoſe uſual method is to awe children, and keep them in ſubjection, by telling them of raw-head and bloody-bones, and ſuch other names, as carry with them the ideas of ſomething terrible and hurtful, which they have reaſon to be afraid of, when alone, eſpecially in the dark. This muſt be carefully prevented; for though by this fooliſh way they may keep them from little faults, yet the remedy is much worſe than the diſeaſe; and there are ſtamped upon their imaginations, ideas that follow them with terror and affrightment. Such bug-bear thoughts, once got into the tender minds of children, and being ſet on with a ſtrong impreſſion from the dread that accompanies ſuch apprehenſions, ſink deep, and faſten themſelves ſo, as not eaſily, if ever, to be got out again; and, whilſt they are there, frequently haunt them with ſtrange viſions, making children daſtards when alone, and afraid of their ſhadows and darkneſs all their lives after. I have had thoſe complain to me, when men, who had been thus uſed when young; that, though their reaſon corrected the wrong ideas they had taken in, and they were ſatisfied, that there was no cauſe to fear inviſible beings more in the dark, than in the light; yet that theſe notions were apt ſtill, upon any occaſion, to ſtart up firſt in their prepoſſeſſed fancies, and not to be removed without ſome pains. And, to let you ſee how laſting frightful images are, that take place in the mind early, I ſhall here tell you a pretty remarkable, but true ſtory: There was in a town in the Weſt a man of a diſturbed brain, whom the boys uſed to teize, when he came in their way: this fellow one day, ſeeing in the ſtreet one of thoſe lads that uſed to vex him, ſtepped into a cutler's ſhop

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he was near, and, there ſeizing on a naked ſword, made after the boy, who, ſeeing him coming ſo armed, betook himſelf to his feet, and ran for his life, and by good luck had ſtrength and heels enough to reach his father's houſe, before the madman could get up to him: the door was only latched; and, when he had the latch in his hand, he turned about his head to ſee how near his purſuer was, who was at the entrance of the porch, with his ſword up ready to ſtrike; and he had juſt time to get in and clap-to the door, to avoid the blow, which, though his body eſcaped, his mind did not. This frightening idea made ſo deep an impreſſion there, that it laſted many years, if not all his life after; for telling this ſtory when he was a man, he ſaid, that after that time till then, he never went in at that door (that he could remember) at any time, without looking back, whatever buſineſs he had in his head, or how little ſoever, before he came thither, he thought of this madman. Goblins.

If children were let alone, they would be no more afraid in the dark, than in broad ſun-ſhine; they would in their turns as much welcome the one for ſleep, as the other to play in: there ſhould be no diſtinction made to them, by any diſcourſe, of more danger, or terrible things in the one than the other. But, if the folly of any one about them ſhould do them this harm, and make them think there is any difference between being in the dark and winking, you muſt get it out of their minds as ſoon as you can; and let them know, that God, who made all things good for them, made the night, that they might ſleep the better and the quieter; and that they being under his protection, there is nothing in the dark to hurt them. What is to be known more of God and good ſpirits, is to be deferred till the time we ſhall hereafter mention; and of evil ſpirits, it will be well if you can keep him from wrong fancies about them, till he is ripe for that ſort of knowledge.

§ 139. Having laid the foundations of virtue in a true notion of a God, ſuch as the creed wiſely teaches, as far as his age is capable, and by accuſtoming him to pray to him; the next thing to be taken care of, is to keep him exactly to ſpeaking of truth, and by all the ways imaginable inclining him to be good-natured. Let him know, that twenty faults are ſooner to be forgiven, than the ſtraining of truth, to cover any one by an excuſe: and to teach him betimes to love and be good-natured to others, is to lay early the true foundation of an honeſt man; all injuſtice generally ſpringing from too great love of ourſelves, and too little of others. Truth. Good-nature.

This is all I ſhall ſay of this matter in general, and is enough for laying the firſt foundations of virtue in a child. As he grows up, the tendency of his natural inclination muſt be obſerved; which, as it inclines him, more than is convenient, on one or the other ſide, from the right path of virtue, ought to have proper remedies applied; for few of Adam's children are ſo happy, as not to be born with ſome biaſs in their natural temper, which it is the buſineſs of education either to take off, or counterbalance: but to enter into particulars of this, would be beyond

God-nature. beyond the deſign of this ſhort treatiſe of education. I intend not a diſcourſe of all the virtues and vices, and how each virtue is to be attained, and every particular vice by its peculiar remedies cured; though I have mentioned ſome of the moſt ordinary faults, and the ways to be uſed in correcting them.

Wiſdom. § 140. WISDOM I take, in the popular acceptation, for a man's managing his buſineſs ably, and with fore-ſight, in this world. This is the product of a good natural temper, application of mind and experience together, and ſo above the reach of children. The greateſt thing that in them can be done towards it, is to hinder them, as much as may be, from being cunning; which, being the ape of wiſdom, is the moſt diſtant from it that can be: and, as an ape, for the likeneſs it has to a man, wanting what really ſhould make him ſo, is by ſo much the uglier; cunning is only the want of underſtanding; which, becauſe it cannot compaſs its ends by direct ways, would do it by a trick and circumvention; and the miſchief of it is, a cunning trick helps but once, but hinders ever after. No cover was ever made either ſo big, or ſo fine, as to hide itſelf. Nobody was ever ſo cunning, as to conceal their being ſo: and, when they are once diſcovered, every body is ſhy, every body diſtruſtful of crafty men; and all the world forwardly join to oppoſe and defeat them: whilſt the open, fair, wiſe man has every body to make way for him, and goes directly to his buſineſs. To accuſtom a child to have true notions of things, and not to be ſatisfied till he has them; to raiſe his mind to great and worthy thoughts; and to keep him at a diſtance from falſhood, and cunning, which has always a broad mixture of falſhood in it; is the fitteſt preparation of a child for wiſdom. The reſt, which is to be learned from time, experience, and obſervation, and an acquaintance with men, their tempers and deſigns, is not to be expected in the ignorance and inadvertency of childhood, or the inconſiderate heat and unwarineſs of youth: all that can be done towards it, during this unripe age, is, as I have ſaid, to accuſtom them to truth and ſincerity; to a ſubmiſſion to reaſon; and, as much as may be, to reflection on their own actions.

Breeding. § 141. THE next good quality belonging to a gentleman, is good breeding. There are two ſorts of ill breeding; the one, a ſheepiſh baſhfulneſs; and the other, a miſbecoming negligence and direſpect in our carriage; both which are avoided, by duly obſerving this one rule, Not to think meanly of ourſelves, and not to think meanly of others.

§ 142. THE firſt part of this rule muſt not be underſtood in oppoſition to humility, but to aſſurance. We ought not to think ſo well of ourſelves, as to ſtand upon our own value; and aſſume to ourſelves a preference before others, becauſe of any advantage we may imagine we have over them; but modeſtly to take what is offered, when it is our due. But yet we ought to think ſo well of ourſelves, as to perform thoſe actions which are incumbent on, and expected of us, without diſcompoſure or diſorder, in whoſe preſence ſoever we are, keeping that reſpect and diſtance which is due to every one's rank and quality. There is often in

people, eſpecially children, a clowniſh ſhamefacedneſs before ſtrangers, or thoſe above them; they are confounded in their thoughts, words, and looks, and ſo loſe themſelves in that confuſion, as not to be able to do any thing, or at leaſt not to do it with that freedom and gracefulneſs which pleaſes and makes them acceptable. The only cure for this, as for any other miſcarriage, is by uſe to introduce the contrary habit. But ſince we cannot accuſtom ourſelves to converſe with ſtrangers, and perſons of quality, without being in their company, nothing can cure this part of ill-breeding, but change and variety of company, and that of perſons above us. Breeding.

§ 143. As the before-mentioned conſiſts in too great a concern how to behave ourſelves towards others, ſo the other part of ill-breeding lies in the appearance of too little care of pleaſing or ſhewing reſpect to thoſe we have to do with. To avoid this theſe two things are requiſite: firſt, a diſpoſition of the mind not to offend others; and, ſecondly, the moſt acceptable and agreeable way of expreſſing that diſpoſition. From the one, men are called civil; from the other, well-faſhioned. The latter of theſe is that decency and gracefulneſs of looks, voice, words, motions, geſtures, and of all the whole outward demeanour, which takes in company, and makes thoſe with whom we may converſe eaſy and well-pleaſed. This is, as it were, the language, whereby that internal civility of the mind is expreſſed; which, as other languages are, being very much governed by the faſhion and cuſtom of every country, muſt, in the rules and practice of it, be learned chiefly from obſervation, and the carriage of thoſe who are allowed to be exactly well-bred. The other part, which lies deeper than the out-ſide, is that general good-will and regard for all people, which makes any one have a care not to ſhew, in his carriage, any contempt, diſreſpect, or neglect of them; but to expreſs, according to the faſhion and way of that country, a reſpect and value for them, according to their rank and condition. It is a diſpoſition of the mind that ſhews itſelf in the carriage, whereby a man avoids making any one uneaſy in converſation.

I SHALL take notice of four qualities, that are moſt directly oppoſite to this firſt and moſt taking of all the ſocial virtues. And from ſome one of theſe four it is, that incivility commonly has its riſe. I ſhall ſet them down, that children may be preſerved or recovered from their ill influence.

1. THE firſt is, a natural roughneſs, which makes a man uncomplaiſant to others, ſo that he has no deference for their inclinations, tempers, or conditions. It is the ſure badge of a clown, not to mind what pleaſes or diſpleaſes thoſe he is with; and yet one may often find a man, in faſhionable cloaths, give an unbounded ſwing to his own humour, and ſuffer it to juſtle or over-run any one that ſtands in its way, with a perfect indifferency how they take it. This is a brutality that every one ſees and abhors, and no-body can be eaſy with: and therefore this finds no place in any one, who would be thought to have the leaſt tincture of good- Roughneſs.

Roughneſs. good-breeding. For the very end and buſineſs of good-breeding is to ſupple the natural ſtiffneſs, and ſo ſoften men's tempers, that they may bend to a compliance, and accommodate themſelves to thoſe they have to do with.

Contempt. 2. CONTEMPT, or want of due reſpect, diſcovered either in looks, words, or geſture: this, from whomſoever it comes, brings always uneaſineſs with it; for no-body can contentedly bear being ſlighted.

Cenſoriouſneſs. 3. CENSORIOUSNESS, and finding fault with others, has a direct oppoſition to civility. Men, whatever they are, or are not guilty of, would not have their faults diſplayed, and ſet in open view and broad day-light, before their own, or other people's eyes. Blemiſhes affixed to any one, always carry ſhame with them: and the diſcovery, or even bare imputation of any defect, is not borne without ſome uneaſineſs. Raillery. Raillery is the moſt refined way of expoſing the faults of others; but, becauſe it is uſually done with wit and good language, and gives entertainment to the company, people are led into a miſtake, and, where it keeps within fair bounds, there is no incivility in it: and ſo the pleaſantry of this ſort of converſation often introduces it amongſt people of the better rank; and ſuch talkers are favourably heard, and generally applauded by the laughter of the by-ſtanders on their ſide: but they ought to conſider, that the entertainment of the reſt of the company is at the coſt of that one, who is ſet out in their burleſque colours, who therefore is not without uneaſineſs, unleſs the ſubject, for which he is rallied, be really in itſelf matter of commendation; for then the pleaſant images and repreſentations, which make the raillery, carrying praiſe as well as ſport with them, the rallied perſon alſo finds his account, and takes part in the diverſion. But, becauſe the nice management of ſo nice and tickliſh a buſineſs, wherein a little ſlip may ſpoil all, is not every body's talent, I think thoſe, who would ſecure themſelves from provoking others, eſpecially all young people, ſhould carefully abſtain from raillery; which, by a ſmall miſtake, or any wrong turn, may leave upon the mind of thoſe, who are made uneaſy by it, the laſting memory of having been piquantly, though wittily, taunted for ſomething cenſurable in them.

Contradiction. BESIDES raillery, contradiction is a kind of cenſorioufneſs, wherein ill-breeding often ſhews itſelf. Complaiſance does not require that we ſhould always admit all the reaſonings or relations that the company is entertained with; no, nor ſilently to let paſs all that is vented in our hearing. The oppoſing the opinions, and rectifying the miſtakes of others, is what truth and charity ſometimes require of us, and civility does not oppoſe, if it be done with due caution and care of circumſtances. But there are ſome people, that one may obſerve poſſeſſed, as it were, with the ſpirit of contradiction, that ſteadily, and without regard to right or wrong, oppoſe ſome one, or perhaps every one of the company, whatever they ſay. This is ſo viſible and outrageous a way of cenſuring, that no-body can avoid thinking himſelf injured by it. All oppoſition to what another man has ſaid, is ſo apt to be ſuſpected of cenſorioufneſs, and is ſo ſeldom received

without ſome ſort of humiliation, that it ought to be made in the gentleſt manner, and ſofteſt words can be found; and ſuch as, with the whole deportment, may expreſs no forwardneſs to contradict. All marks of reſpect and good-will ought to accompany it, that, whilſt we gain the argument, we may not loſe the eſteem of thoſe that hear us. Contradiction.

4. CAPTIOUSNESS is another fault oppoſite to civility, not only becauſe it often produces miſbecoming and provoking expreſſions and carriage, but becauſe it is a tacit accuſation and reproach of ſome incivility, taken notice of in thoſe whom we are angry with. Such a ſuſpicion, or intimation, cannot be borne by any one without uneaſineſs. Beſides, one angry body diſcompoſes the whole company, and the harmony ceaſes upon any ſuch jarring. Captiouſneſs.

THE happineſs, that all men ſo ſteadily purſue, conſiſting in pleaſure, it is eaſy to ſee why the civil are more acceptable than the uſeful. The ability, ſincerity, and good intention, of a man of weight and worth, or a real friend, ſeldom atones for the uneaſineſs, that is produced by his grave and ſolid repreſentations. Power and riches, nay virtue itſelf, are valued only as conducing to our happineſs; and therefore he recommends himſelf ill to another, as aiming at his happineſs, who, in the ſervices he does him, makes him uneaſy in the manner of doing them. He that knows how to make thoſe he converſes with eaſy, without debaſing himſelf to low and ſervile flattery, has found the true art of living in the world, and being both welcome and valued every-where. Civility therefore is what, in the firſt place, ſhould with great care be made habitual to children and young people.

§ 144. THERE is another fault in good manners, and that is, exceſs of ceremony, and an obſtinate perſiſting to force upon another what is not his due, and what he cannot take without folly or ſhame. This ſeems rather a deſign to expoſe, than oblige; or, at leaſt, looks like a conteſt for maſtery; and, at beſt, is but troubleſome, and ſo can be no part of good breeding, which has no other uſe or end, but to make people eaſy and ſatisfied in their converſation with us. This is a fault few young people are apt to fall into; but yet, if they are ever guilty of it, or are ſuſpected to incline that way, they ſhould be told of it, and warned of this miſtaken civility. The thing they ſhould endeavour and aim at in converſation, ſhould be to ſhew reſpect, eſteem, and good-will, by paying to every one that common ceremony and regard, which is in civility due to them. To do this, without a ſuſpicion of flattery, diſſimulation, or meanneſs, is a great ſkill, which good ſenſe, reaſon, and good company, can only teach; but is of ſo much uſe in civil life, that it is well worth the ſtudying. Breeding.

§ 145. THOUGH the managing ourſelves well in this part of our behaviour has the name of good breeding, as if peculiarly the effect of education; yet, as I have ſaid, young children ſhould not be much perplexed about it; I mean, about putting off their hats, and making legs modiſhly. Teach them humility, and to be good-natured, if you can, and

Breeding. this ſort of manners will not be wanting: civility being, in truth, nothing but a care not to ſhew any ſlighting, or contempt, of any one in converſation. What are the moſt allowed and eſteemed ways of expreſſing this, we have above obſerved. It is as peculiar and different, in ſeveral countries of the world, as their languages; and therefore, if it be rightly conſidered, rules and diſcourſes, made to children about it, are as uſeleſs and impertinent, as it would be, now and then, to give a rule or two of the Spaniſh tongue, to one that converſes only with Engliſhmen. Be as buſy as you pleaſe with diſcourſes of civility to your ſon; ſuch as is his company, ſuch will be his manners. A ploughman of your neighbourhood, that has never been out of his pariſh, read what lectures you pleaſe to him, will be as ſoon in his language, as his carriage, a courtier; that is, in neither will be more polite, than thoſe he uſes to converſe with: and therefore of this no other care can be taken, till he be of an age to have a tutor put to him, who muſt not fail to be a well-bred man. And, in good earneſt, if I were to ſpeak my mind freely, ſo children do nothing out of obſtinacy, pride, and ill-nature, it is no great matter how they put off their hats, or make legs. If you can teach them to love and reſpect other people, they will, as their age requires it, find ways to expreſs it acceptably to every one, according to the faſhions they have been uſed to: and, as to their motions, and carriage of their bodies, a dancing-maſter, as has been ſaid, when it is fit, will teach them what is moſt becoming. In the mean time, when they are young, people expect not that children ſhould be over-mindful of theſe ceremonies; careleſſneſs is allowed to that age, and becomes them as well as compliments do grown people: or, at leaſt, if ſome very nice people will think it a fault, I am ſure it is a fault that ſhould be over-looked, and left to time, a tutor, and converſation, to cure: and therefore I think it not worth your while to have your ſon (as I often ſee children are) moleſted or chid about it; but where there is pride, or ill-nature, appearing in his carriage, there he muſt be perſuaded, or ſhamed, out of it.

Though children, when little, ſhould not be much perplexed with rules and ceremonious parts of breeding; yet there is a ſort of unmannerlineſs very apt to grow up with young people, if not early reſtrained; and that is a forwardneſs to interrupt others that are ſpeaking, and to ſtop them with ſome contradiction. Whether the cuſtom of diſputing, and the reputation of parts and learning uſually given to it, as if it were the only ſtandard and evidence of knowledge, make young men ſo forward to watch occaſions to correct others in their diſcourſe, and not to ſlip any opportunity of ſhewing their talents; ſo it is, that I have found ſcholars moſt blamed in this point. There cannot be a greater rudeneſs, than to interrupt another in the current of his diſcourſe; for, if there be not impertinent folly in anſwering a man before we know what he will ſay, yet it is a plain declaration, that we are weary to hear him talk any longer; and have a diſeſteem of what he ſays; which we, judging not fit to entertain the company, deſire them to give audience to us, who

Interruption.

have ſomething to produce worth their attention. This ſhews a very great diſreſpect, and cannot but be offenſive; and yet, this is what almoſt all interruption conſtantly carries with it. To which, if there be added, as is uſual, a correcting of any miſtake, or a contradiction of what has been ſaid, it is a mark of yet greater pride and ſelf-conceitedneſs, when we thus intrude ourſelves for teachers, and take upon us, either to ſet another right in his ſtory, or ſhew the miſtakes of his judgment. Interruption.

I DO not ſay this, that I think there ſhould be no difference of opinions in converſation, nor oppoſition in men's diſcourſes: this would be to take away the greateſt advantage of ſociety, and the improvements that are to be made by ingenious company; where the light is to be got from the oppoſite arguings of men of parts, ſhewing the different ſides of things, and their various aſpects and probabilities, would be quite loſt, if every one were obliged to aſſent to, and ſay after the firſt ſpeaker. It is not the owning one's diſſent from another that I ſpeak againſt, but the manner of doing it. Young men ſhould be taught not to be forward to interpoſe their opinions, unleſs aſked, or when others have done, and are ſilent; and then only by way of inquiry, not inſtruction. The poſitive aſſerting, and the magiſterial air, ſhould be avoided; and when a general pauſe of the whole company affords an opportunity, they may modeſtly put in their queſtion as learners.

THIS becoming decency will not cloud their parts, nor weaken the ſtrength of their reaſon; but beſpeak the more favourable attention, and give what they ſay the greater advantage. An ill argument, or ordinary obſervation, thus introduced, with ſome civil preface of deference and reſpect to the opinions of others, will procure them more credit and eſteem, than the ſharpeſt wit, or profoundeſt ſcience, with a rough, inſolent, or noiſy management; which always ſhocks the hearers, and leaves an ill opinion of the man, though he get the better of it in the argument.

THIS therefore ſhould be carefully watched in young people, ſtopped in the beginning, and the contrary habit introduced in all their converſation: and the rather, becauſe forwardneſs to talk, frequent interruptions in arguing, and loud wrangling, are too often obſervable amongſt grown people, even of rank amongſt us. The Indians, whom we call barbarous, obſerve much more decency and civility in their diſcourſes and converſation, giving one another a fair ſilent hearing, till they have quite done; and then anſwering them calmly, and without noiſe or paſſion. And if it be not ſo in this civilized part of the world, we muſt impute it to a neglect in education, which has not yet reformed this antient piece of barbarity amongſt us. Was it not, think you, an entertaining ſpectacle, to ſee two ladies of quality accidentally ſeated on the oppoſite ſides of a room, ſet round with company, fall into a diſpute, and grow ſo eager in it, that in the heat of their controverſy, edging by degrees their chairs forwards, they were in a little time got up cloſe to one another in the middle of the room; where they for a good while managed

Diſpute. the diſpute as fiercely as two game-cocks in the pit, without minding or taking any notice of the circle, which could not all the while forbear ſmiling? This I was told by a perſon of quality, who was preſent at the combat, and did not omit to reflect upon the indecencies, that warmth in diſpute often runs people into; which, ſince cuſtom makes too frequent, education ſhould take the more care of. There is no-body but condemns this in others, though they overlook it in themſelves: and many, who are ſenſible of it in themſelves, and reſolve againſt it, cannot yet get rid of an ill cuſtom, which neglect in their education has ſuffered to ſettle into an habit.

Company. § 146. WHAT has been above ſaid concerning company, would, perhaps, if it were well reflected on, give us a larger proſpect, and let us ſee how much farther its influence reaches. It is not the modes of civility alone, that are imprinted by converſation; the tincture of company ſinks deeper than the outſide; and poſſibly, if a true eſtimate were made of the morality and religions of the world, we ſhould find, that the far greater part of mankind received even thoſe opinions and ceremonies they would die for, rather from the faſhions of their countries, and the conſtant practice of thoſe about them, than from any conviction of their reaſons. I mention this only to let you ſee of what moment I think company is to your ſon in all the parts of his life, and therefore how much that one part is to be weighed and provided for, it being of greater force to work upon him, than all you can do beſides.

Learning. § 147. YOU will wonder, perhaps, that I put learning laſt, eſpecially if I tell you I think it the leaſt part. This may ſeem ſtrange in the mouth of a bookiſh man: and this making uſually the chief, if not only buſtle and ſtir about children, this being almoſt that alone, which is thought on, when people talk of education, makes it the greater paradox. When I conſider what a-ado is made about a little Latin and Greek, how many years are ſpent in it, and what a noiſe and buſineſs it makes to no purpoſe, I can hardly forbear thinking, that the parents of children ſtill live in fear of the ſchoolmaſter's rod, which they look on as the only inſtrument of education; as if a language or two were its whole buſineſs. How elſe is it poſſible, that a child ſhould be chained to the oar ſeven, eight, or ten of the beſt years of his life, to get a language or two, which I think might be had at a great deal cheaper rate of pains and time, and be learned almoſt in playing?

FORGIVE me therefore, if I ſay, I cannot with patience think, that a young gentleman ſhould be put into the herd, and be driven with a whip and ſcourge, as if he were to run the gantlet through the ſeveral claſſes, "ad capiendum ingenii cultum." "What then, ſay you, would "you not have him write and read? Shall he be more ignorant than "the clerk of our pariſh, who takes Hopkins and Sternhold for the beſt "poets in the world, whom yet he makes worſe than they are, by his ill "reading?" Not ſo, not ſo faſt, I beſeech you. Reading, and writing, and learning, I allow to be neceſſary, but yet not the chief buſineſs. I imagine

imagine you would think him a very fooliſh fellow, that ſhould not value a virtuous, or a wiſe man, infinitely before a great ſcholar. Not but that I think learning a great help to both, in well-diſpoſed minds; but yet it muſt be confeſſed alſo, that in others not ſo diſpoſed, it helps them only to be the more fooliſh, or worſe men. I ſay this, that, when you conſider of the breeding of your ſon, and are looking out for a ſchool-maſter, or a tutor, you would not have (as is uſual) Latin and logic only in your thoughts. Learning muſt be had, but in the ſecond place, as ſubſervient only to greater qualities. Seek out ſome-body, that may know how diſcreetly to frame his manners: place him in hands, where you may, as much as poſſible, ſecure his innocence, cheriſh and nurſe up the good, and gently correct and weed out any bad inclinations, and ſettle in him good habits. This is the main point; and this being provided for, learning may be had into the bargain; and that, as I think, at a very eaſy rate, by methods that may be thought on. Learning.

§ 148. When he can talk, it is time he ſhould begin to learn to read. But as to this, give me leave here to inculcate again what is very apt to be forgotten, viz. that a great care is to be taken, that it be never made as a buſineſs to him, nor he look on it as a taſk. We naturally, as I ſaid, even from our cradles, love liberty, and have therefore an averſion to many things, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they are injoined us. I have always had a fancy, that learning might be made a play and recreation to children; and that they might be brought to deſire to be taught, if it were propoſed to them as a thing of honour, credit, delight, and recreation, or as a reward for doing ſomething elſe, and if they were never chid or corrected for the neglect of it. That which confirms me in this opinion, is, that amongſt the Portugueſe, it is ſo much a faſhion and emulation amongſt their children to learn to read and write, that they cannot hinder them from it: they will learn it one from another, and are as intent on it as if it were forbid them. I remember, that being at a friend's houſe, whoſe younger ſon, a child in coats, was not eaſily brought to his book (being taught to read at home by his mother); I adviſed to try another way, than requiring it of him as his duty. We therefore, in a diſcourſe on purpoſe amongſt ourſelves, in his hearing, but without taking any notice of him, declared, that it was the privilege and advantage of heirs and elder brothers, to be ſcholars; that this made them fine gentlemen, and beloved by every body: and that for younger brothers, it was a favour to admit them to breeding; to be taught to read and write, was more than came to their ſhare; they might be ignorant bumpkins and clowns, if they pleaſed. This ſo wrought upon the child, that afterwards he deſired to be taught; would come himſelf to his mother to learn; and would not let his maid be quiet, till ſhe heard him his leſſon. I doubt not but ſome way like this might be taken with other children; and, when their tempers are found, ſome thoughts be inſtilled into them, that might ſet them upon deſiring of learning themſelves, and make them ſeek it, as another ſort of play or recreation. Reading.

But

Reading. But then, as I ſaid before, it muſt never be impoſed as a taſk, nor made a trouble to them. There may be dice, and play-things, with the letters on them, to teach children the alphabet by playing; and twenty other ways may be found, ſuitable to their particular tempers, to make this kind of learning a ſport to them.

§ 149. THUS children may be cozened into a knowledge of the letters; be taught to read, without perceiving it to be any thing but a ſport, and play themſelves into that which others are whipped for. Children ſhould not have any-thing like work, or ſerious, laid on them; neither their minds nor bodies will bear it. It injures their healths; and their being forced and tied down to their books, in an age at enmity with all ſuch reſtraint, has, I doubt not, been the reaſon why a great many have hated books and learning all their lives after: it is like a ſurfeit, that leaves an averſion behind, not to be removed.

§ 150. I HAVE therefore thought, that if play-things were fitted to this purpoſe, as they are uſually to none, contrivances might be made to teach children to read, whilſt they thought they were only playing. For example; What if an ivory-ball were made like that of the royal-oak lottery, with thirty-two ſides, or one rather of twenty-four or twenty-five ſides; and upon ſeveral of thoſe ſides paſted on an A, upon ſeveral others B, on others C, and on others D? I would have you begin with but theſe four letters, or perhaps only two at firſt; and when he is perfect in them, then add another; and ſo on, till each ſide having one letter, there be on it the whole alphabet. This I would have others play with before him, it being as good a ſort of play to lay a ſtake who ſhall firſt throw an A or B, as who upon dice ſhall throw ſix or ſeven. This being a play amongſt you, tempt him not to it, leſt you make it buſineſs; for I would not have him underſtand it is any thing but a play of older people, and I doubt not but he will take to it of himſelf. And that he may have the more reaſon to think it is a play, that he is ſometimes in favour admitted to; when the play is done, the ball ſhould be laid up ſafe out of his reach, that ſo it may not, by his having it in his keeping at any time, grow ſtale to him.

§ 151. To keep up his eagerneſs to it, let him think it a game belonging to thoſe above him: and when by this means he knows the letters, by changing them into ſyllables, he may learn to read, without knowing how he did ſo, and never have any chiding or trouble about it, nor fall out with books, becauſe of the hard uſage and vexation they have cauſed him. Children, if you obſerve them, take abundance of pains to learn ſeveral games, which, if they ſhould be enjoined them, they would abhor as a taſk, and buſineſs. I know a perſon of great quality (more yet to be honoured for his learning and virtue, than for his rank and high place) who, by paſting on the ſix vowels, (for in our language Y is one) on the ſix ſides of a die, and the remaining eighteen conſonants on the ſides of three other dice, has made this a play for his children, that he ſhall win, who, at one caſt, throws moſt words on theſe four dice; whereby

whereby his eldeſt ſon, yet in coats, has played himſelf into ſpelling, with great eagerneſs, and without once having been chid for it, or forced to it. Reading.

§ 152. I HAVE ſeen little girls exerciſe whole hours together, and take abundance of pains to be expert at dibſtones, as they call it. Whilſt I have been looking on, I have thought it wanted only ſome good contrivance to make them employ all that induſtry about ſomething that might be more uſeful to them; and methinks it is only the fault and negligence of elder people, that it is not ſo. Children are much leſs apt to be idle than men; and men are to be blamed, if ſome part of that buſy humour be not turned to uſeful things; which might be made uſually as delightful to them as thoſe they are employed in, if men would be but half ſo forward to lead the way, as theſe little apes would be to follow. I imagine ſome wiſe Portugueſe heretofore began this faſhion amongſt the children of his country, where I have been told, as I ſaid, it is impoſſible to hinder the children from learning to read and write: and in ſome parts of France they teach one another to ſing and dance from the cradle.

§ 153. THE letters paſted upon the ſides of the dice, or polygon, were beſt to be of the ſize of thoſe of the folio bible to begin with, and none of them capital letters; when once he can read what is printed in ſuch letters, he will not long be ignorant of the great ones: and in the beginning he ſhould not be perplexed with variety. With this die alſo, you might have a play juſt like the royal-oak, which would be another variety; and play for cherries, or apples, &c.

§ 154 BESIDES theſe, twenty other plays might be invented, depending on letters, which thoſe, who like this way, may eaſily contrive, and get made to this uſe, if they will. But the four dice above-mentioned I think ſo eaſy and uſeful, that it will be hard to find any better, and there will be ſcarce need of any other.

§ 155 THUS much for learning to read, which let him never be driven to, nor chid for; cheat him into it if you can, but make it not a buſineſs for him. It is better it be a year later before he can read, than that he ſhould this way get an averſion to learning. If you have any conteſts with him, let it be in matters of moment, of truth, and good-nature; but lay no taſk on him about A B C. Uſe your ſkill to make his will ſupple and pliant to reaſon: teach him to love credit and commendation; to abhor being thought ill or meanly of, eſpecially by you and his mother; and then the reſt will come all eaſily. But, I think, if you will do that, you muſt not ſhackle and tie him up with rules about indifferent matters, nor rebuke him for every little fault, or perhaps ſome, that to others would ſeem great ones. But of this I have ſaid enough already.

§ 156. WHEN by theſe gentle ways he begins to be able to read, ſome eaſy pleaſant book, ſuited to his capacity, ſhould be put into his hands, wherein the entertainment, that he finds, might draw him on, and reward his pains in reading; and yet not ſuch as ſhould fill his head with perfectly uſeleſs

Reading. uſeleſs trumpery, or lay the principles of vice and folly. To this purpoſe I think Æſop's fables the beſt, which being ſtories apt to delight and entertain a child, may yet afford uſeful reflections to a grown man; and if his memory retain them all his life after, he will not repent to find them there, amongſt his manly thoughts, and ſerious buſineſs. If his Æſop has pictures in it, it will entertain him much the better, and encourage him to read, when it carries the increaſe of knowledge with it: for ſuch viſible objects children hear talked of in vain, and without any ſatisfaction, whilſt they have no ideas of them; thoſe ideas being not to be had from ſounds, but from the things themſelves, or their pictures. And therefore, I think, as ſoon as he begins to ſpell, as many pictures of animals ſhould be got him as can be found, with the printed names to them, which at the ſame time will invite him to read, and afford him matter of inquiry and knowledge. Reynard the fox is another book, I think, may be made uſe of to the ſame purpoſe. And if thoſe about him will talk to him often about the ſtories he has read, and hear him tell them, it will, beſides other advantages, add encouragement and delight to his reading, when he finds there is ſome uſe and pleaſure in it. Theſe baits ſeem wholly neglected in the ordinary method; and it is uſually long before learners find any uſe or pleaſure in reading, which may tempt them to it, and ſo take books only for faſhionable amuſements, or impertinent troubles, good for nothing.

§ 157. The Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and Ten Commandments, it is neceſſary he ſhould learn perfectly by heart; but, I think, not by reading them himſelf in his primer, but by ſomebody's repeating them to him, even before he can read. But learning by heart, and learning to read, ſhould not, I think, be mixed, and ſo one made to clog the other. But his learning to read ſhould be made as little trouble or buſineſs to him as might be.

What other books there are in Engliſh of the kind of thoſe abovementioned, fit to engage the liking of children, and tempt them to read, I do not know; but am apt to think, that children, being generally delivered over to the method of ſchools, where the fear of the rod is to inforce, and not any pleaſure of the employment to invite, them to learn; this ſort of uſeful books, amongſt the number of ſilly ones that are of all ſorts, have yet had the fate to be neglected; and nothing that I know has been conſidered of this kind out of the ordinary road of the horn-book, primer, pſalter, Teſtament, and Bible.

§ 158. As for the Bible, which children are uſually employed in, to exerciſe and improve their talent in reading, I think the promiſcuous reading of it, though by chapters as they lie in order, is ſo far from being of any advantage to children, either for the perfecting their reading, or principling their religion, that perhaps a worſe could not be found. For what pleaſure or encouragement can it be to a child, to exerciſe himſelf in reading thoſe parts of a book where he underſtands nothing? And how little are the law of Moſes, the Song of Solomon, the prophecies in

the Old, and the Epiſtles and Apocalypſe in the New Teſtament, ſuited to a child's capacity? And though the hiſtory of the Evangeliſts, and the Acts, have ſomething eaſier; yet, taken all together, it is very diſproportional to the underſtanding of childhood. I grant, that the principles of religion are to be drawn from thence, and in the words of the ſcripture; yet none ſhould be propoſed to a child, but ſuch as are ſuited to a child's capacity and notions. But it is far from this to read through the whole Bible, and that for reading's ſake. And what an odd jumble of thoughts muſt a child have in his head, if he have any at all, ſuch as he ſhould have concerning religion, who in his tender age reads all the parts of the Bible indifferently, as the word of God, without any other diſtinction! I am apt to think, that this, in ſome men, has been the very reaſon why they never had clear and diſtinct thoughts of it all their life-time. Reading.

§ 159. And now I am by chance fallen on this ſubject, give me leave to ſay, that there are ſome parts of the ſcripture, which may be proper to be put into the hands of a child to engage him to read; ſuch as are the ſtory of Joſeph and his brethren, of David and Goliath, of David and Jonathan, &c. and others, that he ſhould be made to read for his inſtruction; as that, "What you would have others do unto you, do you "the ſame unto them;" and ſuch other eaſy and plain moral rules, which, being fitly choſen, might often be made uſe of, both for reading and inſtruction together; and ſo often read, till they are thoroughly fixed in his memory; and then afterwards, as he grows ripe for them, may in their turns, on fit occaſions, be inculcated as the ſtanding and ſacred rules of his life and actions. But the reading of the whole ſcripture indifferently, is what I think very inconvenient for children, till, after having been made acquainted with the plaineſt fundamental parts of it, they haye got ſome kind of general view of what they ought principally to believe and practiſe, which yet, I think, they ought to receive in the very words of the ſcripture, and not in ſuch as men, prepoſſeſſed by ſyſtems and analogies, are apt in this caſe to make uſe of, and force upon them. Dr. Worthington, to avoid this, has made a catechiſm, which has all its anſwers in the preciſe words of the ſcripture, a thing of good example, and ſuch a ſound form of words, as no chriſtian can except againſt, as not fit for his child to learn. Of this, as ſoon as he can ſay the Lord's prayer, creed, and ten commandments by heart, it may be fit for him to learn a queſtion every day, or every week, as his underſtanding is able to receive, and his memory to retain them. And, when he has this catechiſm perfectly by heart, ſo as readily and roundly to anſwer to any queſtion in the whole book, it may be convenient to lodge in his mind the remaining moral rules, ſcattered up and down in the Bible, as the beſt exerciſe of his memory, and that which may be always a rule to him, ready at hand, in the whole conduct of his life.

§ 160. When he can read Engliſh well, it will be ſeaſonable to enter him in writing. And here the firſt thing ſhould be taught him, is to hold his pen right; and this he ſhould be perfect in, before he ſhould Writing.

Writing. be ſuffered to put it to paper: for not only children, but any body elſe, that would do any thing well, ſhould never be put upon too much of it at once, or be ſet to perfect themſelves in two parts of an action at the ſame time, if they can poſſibly be ſeparated. I think the Italian way of holding the pen between the thumb and the fore-finger alone may be beſt; but in this you ſhould conſult ſome good-writing maſter, or any other perſon who writes well, and quick. When he has learned to hold his pen right, in the next place he ſhould learn how to lay his paper, and place his arm and body to it. Theſe practices being got over, the way to teach him to write without much trouble, is to get a plate graved with the characters of ſuch a hand as you like beſt: but you muſt remember to have them a pretty deal bigger than he ſhould ordinarily write; for every one naturally comes by degrees to write a leſs hand than he at firſt was taught, but never a bigger. Such a plate being graved, let ſeveral ſheets of good writing-paper be printed off with red ink, which he has nothing to do but to go over with a good pen filled with black ink, which will quickly bring his hand to the formation of thoſe characters, being at firſt ſhewed where to begin, and how to form every letter. And when he can do that well, he muſt then exerciſe on fair paper; and ſo may eaſily be brought to write the hand you deſire.

Drawing. § 161. WHEN he can write well, and quick, I think it may be convenient, not only to continue the exerciſe of his hand in writing, but alſo to improve the uſe of it farther in drawing, a thing very uſeful to a gentleman on ſeveral occaſions, but eſpecially if he travel, as that which helps a man often to expreſs, in a few lines well put together, what a whole ſheet of paper in writing would not be able to repreſent and make intelligible. How many buildings may a man ſee, how many machines and habits meet with, the ideas whereof would be eaſily retained and communicated by a little ſkill in drawing; which, being committed to words, are in danger to be loſt, or at beſt but ill retained in the moſt exact deſcriptions? I do not mean that I would have your ſon a perfect painter; to be that to any tolerable degree, will require more time than a young gentleman can ſpare from his other improvements of greater moment; but ſo much inſight into perſpective, and ſkill in drawing, as will enable him to repreſent tolerably on paper any thing he ſees, except faces, may, I think, be got in a little time, eſpecially if he have a genius to it: but where that is wanting, unleſs it be in the things abſolutely neceſſary, it is better to let him paſs them by quietly, than to vex him about them to no purpoſe: and therefore in this, as in all other things not abſolutely neceſſary, the rule holds, "Nihil invitâ Minervâ."

Short-hand. ¶ 1. SHORT-HAND, an art, as I have been told, known only in England, may perhaps be thought worth the learning, both for diſpatch in what men write for their own memory, and concealment of what they would not have lie open to every eye. For he that has once learned any ſort of character, may eaſily vary it to his own private uſe or fancy, and with more contraction ſuit it to the buſineſs he would employ it in.

Mr.

Mr. Rich's, the beſt contrived of any I have ſeen, may, as I think, by one who knows and conſiders grammar well, be made much eaſier and ſhorter. But, for the learning this compendious way of writing, there will be no need haſtily to look out a maſter; it will be early enough, when any convenient opportunity offers itſelf, at any time after his hand is well ſettled in fair and quick writing. For boys have but little uſe of ſhort-hand, and ſhould by no means practiſe it, till they write perfectly well, and have thoroughly fixed the habit of doing ſo. Short-hand.

§ 162. As ſoon as he can ſpeak Engliſh, it is time for him to learn ſome other language: this no-body doubts of, when French is propoſed. And the reaſon is, becauſe people are accuſtomed to the right way of teaching that language, which is by talking it into children in conſtant converſation, and not by grammatical rules. The Latin tongue would eaſily be taught the ſame way, if his tutor, being conſtantly with him, would talk nothing elſe to him, and make him anſwer ſtill in the ſame language. But becauſe French is a living language, and to be uſed more in ſpeaking, that ſhould be firſt learned, that the yet pliant organs of ſpeech might be accuſtomed to a due formation of thoſe ſounds, and he get the habit of pronouncing French well, which is the harder to be done, the longer it is delayed. French.

§ 163. When he can ſpeak and read French well, which in this method is uſually in a year or two, he ſhould proceed to Latin, which it is a wonder parents, when they have had the experiment in French, ſhould not think ought to be learned the ſame way, by talking and reading. Only care is to be taken, whilſt he is learning theſe foreign languages, by ſpeaking and reading nothing elſe with his tutor, that he do not forget to read Engliſh, which may be preſerved by his mother, or ſome body elſe, hearing him read ſome choſen parts of the ſcripture or other Engliſh book, every day. Latin.

§ 164. Latin I look upon as abſolutely neceſſary to a gentleman; and indeed cuſtom, which prevails over every thing, has made it ſo much a part of education, that even thoſe children are whipped to it, and made ſpend many hours of their precious time uneaſily in Latin, who, after they are once gone from ſchool, are never to have more to do with it, as long as they live. Can there be any thing more ridiculous, than that a father ſhould waſte his own money, and his ſon's time, in ſetting him to learn the Roman language, when, at the ſame time, he deſigns him for a trade, wherein he, having no uſe of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from ſchool, and which it is ten to one he abhors for the ill uſage it procured him? Could it be believed, unleſs we had everywhere amongſt us examples of it, that a child ſhould be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which he is never to uſe in the courſe of life that he is deſigned to, and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and caſting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to moſt trades indiſpenſably neceſſary? But though theſe qualifications, requiſite to trade and commerce, and the buſineſs of the world,

Latin. are ſeldom or never to be had at grammar-ſchools; yet thither not only gentlemen ſend their younger ſons intended for trades, but even tradeſmen and farmers fail not to ſend their children, though they have neither intention nor ability to make them ſcholars. If you aſk them, why they do this? they think it as ſtrange a queſtion, as if you ſhould aſk them why they go to church? Cuſtom ſerves for reaſon, and has, to thoſe that take it for reaſon, ſo conſecrated this method, that it is almoſt religiouſly obſerved by them; and they ſtick to it, as if their children had ſcarce an orthodox education, unleſs they learned Lilly's grammar.

§ 165. But how neceſſary ſoever Latin be to ſome, and is thought to be to others, to whom it is of no manner of uſe or ſervice, yet the ordinary way of learning it in a grammar-ſchool, is that, which having had thoughts about, I cannot be forward to encourage. The reaſons againſt it are ſo evident and cogent, that they have prevailed with ſome intelligent perſons to quit the ordinary road, not without ſucceſs, though the method made uſe of was not exactly that which I imagine the eaſieſt, and in ſhort is this: to trouble the child with no grammar at all, but to have Latin, as Engliſh has been, without the perplexity of rules, talked into him; for, if you will conſider it, Latin is no more unknown to a child, when he comes into the world, than Engliſh: and yet he learns Engliſh without maſter, rule, or grammar; and ſo might he Latin too, as Tully did, if he had ſome-body always to talk to him in this language. And when we ſo often ſee a Frenchwoman teach an Engliſh girl to ſpeak and read French perfectly, in a year or two, without any rule of grammar, or any thing elſe, but prattling to her; I cannot but wonder, how gentlemen have been overſeen this way for their ſons, and thought them more dull or incapable than their daughters.

§ 166. If therefore a man could be got, who, himſelf ſpeaking good Latin, would always be about your ſon, talk conſtantly to him, and ſuffer him to ſpeak or read nothing elſe, this will be the true and genuine way, and that which I would propoſe, not only as the eaſieſt and beſt, wherein a child might, without pains or chiding, get a language, which others are wont to be whipped for at ſchool, ſix or ſeven years together; but alſo as that, wherein at the ſame time he might have his mind and manners formed, and he be inſtructed to boot in ſeveral ſciences, ſuch as are a good part of geography, aſtronomy, chronology, anatomy, beſides ſome parts of hiſtory, and all other parts of knowledge of things, that fall under the ſenſes, and require little more than memory. For there, if we would take the true way, our knowledge ſhould begin, and in thoſe things be laid the foundation; and not in the abſtract notions of logick and metaphyſicks, which are fitter to amuſe, than inform the underſtanding, in its firſt ſetting out towards knowledge. When young men have had their heads employed a while in thoſe abſtract ſpeculations, without finding the ſucceſs and improvement, or that uſe of them which they expected, they are apt to have mean thoughts, either of learning, or themſelves; they are tempted to quit their ſtudies, and throw away their books,

books, as containing nothing but hard words, and empty ſounds; or elſe to conclude, that if there be any real knowledge in them, they themſelves have not underſtandings capable of it. That this is ſo, perhaps I could aſſure you upon my own experience. Amongſt other things to be learned by a young gentleman in this method, whilſt others of his age are wholly taken up with Latin and languages, I may alſo ſet down geometry for one, having known a young gentleman, bred ſomething after this way, able to demonſtrate ſeveral propoſitions in Euclid, before he was thirteen. Latin.

§ 167. But if ſuch a man cannot be got, who ſpeaks good Latin, and, being able to inſtruct your ſon in all theſe parts of knowledge, will undertake it by this method; the next beſt is to have him taught as near this way as may be, which is by taking ſome eaſy and pleaſant book, ſuch as Æſop's Fables, and writing the Engliſh tranſlation (made as literal as it can be) in one line, and the Latin words, which anſwer each of them, juſt over it in another. Theſe let him read every day over and over again, till he perfectly underſtands the Latin; and then go on to another fable, till he be alſo perfect in that, not omitting what he is already perfect in, but ſometimes reviewing that, to keep it in his memory. And when he comes to write, let theſe be ſet him for copies; which, with the exerciſe of his hand, will alſo advance him in Latin. This being a more imperfect way than by talking Latin unto him, the formation of the verbs firſt, and afterwards the declenſions of the nouns and pronouns perfectly learned by heart, may facilitate his acquaintance with the genius and manner of the Latin tongue, which varies the ſignification of verbs and nouns, not as the modern languages do, by particles prefixed, but by changing the laſt ſyllables. More than this of grammar I think he need not have, till he can read himſelf "Sanctii Minerva," with Scioppius and Perizonius's notes.

In teaching of children this too, I think, it is to be obſerved, that in moſt caſes, where they ſtick, they are not to be farther puzzled, by putting them upon finding it out themſelves; as by aſking ſuch queſtions as theſe, viz. Which is the nominative caſe in the ſentence they are to conſtrue? or demanding what "aufero" ſignifies, to lead them to the knowledge what "abſtulere" ſignifies, &c. when they cannot readily tell. This waſtes time only in diſturbing them; for whilſt they are learning, and applying themſelves with attention, they are to be kept in good humour, and every thing made eaſy to them, and as pleaſant as poſſible. Therefore, where-ever they are at a ſtand, and are willing to go forwards, help them preſently over the difficulty without any rebuke or chiding: remembering that, where harſher ways are taken, they are the effect only of pride and peeviſhneſs in the teacher, who expects children ſhould inſtantly be maſters of as much as he knows: whereas he ſhould rather conſider, that his buſineſs is to ſettle in them habits, not angrily to inculcate rules, which ſerve for little in the conduct of our lives; at leaſt are of no uſe to children, who forget them as ſoon as given. In ſciences where

Latin. where their reaſon is to be exerciſed, I will not deny, but this method may ſometimes be varied, and difficulties propoſed on purpoſe to excite induſtry, and accuſtom the mind to employ its whole ſtrength and ſagacity in reaſoning. But yet, I gueſs, this is not to be done to children whilſt very young; nor at their entrance upon any ſort of knowledge: then every thing of itſelf is difficult, and the great uſe and ſkill of a teacher is to make all as eaſy as he can. But particularly in learning of languages there is leaſt occaſion for poſing of children. For languages being to be learned by rote, cuſtom, and memory, are then ſpoken in greateſt perfection, when all rules of grammar are utterly forgotten. I grant the grammar of a language is ſometimes very carefully to be ſtudied: but it is only to be ſtudied by a grown man, when he applies himſelf to the underſtanding of any language critically, which is ſeldom the buſineſs of any but profeſſed ſcholars. This, I think, will be agreed to, that, if a gentleman be to ſtudy any language, it ought to be that of his own country, that he may underſtand the language, which he has conſtant uſe of, with the utmoſt accuracy.

THERE is yet a farther reaſon, why maſters and teachers ſhould raiſe no difficulties to their ſcholars; but, on the contrary, ſhould ſmooth their way, and readily help them forwards, where they find them ſtop. Children's minds are narrow and weak, and uſually ſuſceptible but of one thought at once. Whatever is in a child's head, fills it for the time, eſpecially if ſet on with any paſſion. It ſhould therefore be the ſkill and art of the teacher, to clear their heads of all other thoughts, whilſt they are learning of any thing, the better to make room for what he would inſtil into them, that it may be received with attention and application, without which it leaves no impreſſion. The natural temper of children diſpoſes their minds to wander. Novelty alone takes them; whatever that preſents, they are preſently eager to have a taſte of, and are as ſoon ſatiated with it. They quickly grow weary of the ſame thing, and ſo have almoſt their whole delight in change and variety. It is a contradiction to the natural ſtate of childhood, for them to fix their fleeting thoughts. Whether this be owing to the temper of their brains, or the quickneſs or inſtability of their animal ſpirits, over which the mind has not yet got a full command; this is viſible, that it is a pain to children to keep their thoughts ſteady to any thing. A laſting continued attention is one of the hardeſt taſks can be impoſed on them: and therefore, he that requires their application, ſhould endeavour to make what he propoſes as grateful and agreeable as poſſible; at leaſt, he ought to take care not to join any diſpleaſing or frightful idea with it. If they come not to their books with ſome kind of liking and reliſh, it is no wonder their thoughts ſhould be perpetually ſhifting from what diſguſts them, and ſeek better entertainment in more pleaſing objects, after which they will unavoidably be gadding.

IT is, I know, the uſual method of tutors, to endeavour to procure attention in their ſcholars, and to fix their minds to the buſineſs in hand,

by rebukes and corrections, if they find them ever ſo little wandering. Latin.
But ſuch treatment is ſure to produce the quite contrary effect. Paſſionate words or blows from the tutor fill the child's mind with terror and affrightment, which immediately takes it wholly up, and leaves no room for other impreſſions. I believe there is no-body, that reads this, but may recollect, what diſorder haſty or imperious words from his parents or teachers have cauſed in his thoughts; how for the time it has turned his brains, ſo that he ſcarce knew what was ſaid by, or to him: he preſently loſt the ſight of what he was upon; his mind was filled with diſorder and confuſion, and in that ſtate was no longer capable of attention to any thing elſe.

It is true, parents and governors ought to ſettle and eſtabliſh their authority, by an awe over the minds of thoſe under their tuition; and to rule them by that: but when they have got an aſcendant over them, they ſhould uſe it with great moderation, and not make themſelves ſuch ſcarecrows, that their ſcholars ſhould always tremble in their ſight. Such an auſterity may make their government eaſy to themſelves, but of very little uſe to their pupils. It is impoſſible children ſhould learn any thing, whilſt their thoughts are poſſeſſed and diſturbed with any paſſion, eſpecially fear, which makes the ſtrongeſt impreſſion on their yet tender and weak ſpirits. Keep the mind in an eaſy calm temper, when you would have it receive your inſtructions, or any increaſe of knowledge. It is as impoſſible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling mind, as on a ſhaking paper.

The great ſkill of a teacher is to get and keep the attention of his ſcholar: whilſt he has that, he is ſure to advance as faſt as the learner's abilities will carry him; and without that, all his buſtle and pother will be to little or no purpoſe. To attain this, he ſhould make the child comprehend (as much as may be) the uſefulneſs of what he teaches him; and let him ſee, by what he has learned, that he can do ſomething which he could not do before; ſomething which gives him ſome power and real advantage above others, who are ignorant of it. To this he ſhould add ſweetneſs in all his inſtructions; and by a certain tenderneſs in his whole carriage, make the child ſenſible that he loves him, and deſigns nothing but his good; the only way to beget love in the child, which will make him hearken to his leſſons, and reliſh what he teaches him.

Nothing but obſtinacy ſhould meet with any imperiouſneſs or rough uſage. All other faults ſhould be corrected with a gentle hand; and kind encouraging words will work better and more effectually upon a willing mind, and even prevent a good deal of that perverſeneſs, which rough and imperious uſage often produces in well-diſpoſed and generous minds. It is true, obſtinacy and wilful neglects muſt be maſtered, even though it coſt blows to do it: but I am apt to think perverſeneſs in the pupils is often the effect of frowardneſs in the tutor; and that moſt children would ſeldom have deſerved blows, if needleſs and miſapplied roughneſs had

Latin. had not taught them ill-nature, and given them an averſion to their teacher, and all that comes from him.

INADVERTENCY, forgetfulneſs, unſteadineſs, and wandering of thought, are the natural faults of childhood: and therefore, when they are not obſerved to be wilful, are to be mentioned ſoftly, and gained upon by time. If every ſlip of this kind produces anger and rating, the occaſions of rebuke and corrections will return ſo often, that the tutor will be a conſtant terror and uneaſineſs to his pupils; which one thing is enough to hinder their profiting by his leſſons, and to defeat all his methods of inſtructions.

LET the awe he has got upon their minds be ſo tempered with the conſtant marks of tenderneſs and good-will, that affection may ſpur them to their duty, and make them find a pleaſure in complying with his dictates. This will bring them with ſatisfaction to their tutor; make them hearken to him, as to one who is their friend, that cheriſhes them, and takes pains for their good: this will keep their thoughts eaſy and free, whilſt they are with him, the only temper wherein the mind is capable of receiving new informations, and of admitting into itſelf thoſe impreſſions, which if not taken and retained, all that they and their teacher do together is loſt labour; there is much uneaſineſs, and little learning.

§ 168. WHEN, by this way of interlining Latin and Engliſh one with another, he has got a moderate knowledge of the Latin tongue, he may then be advanced a little farther to the reading of ſome other eaſy Latin book, ſuch as Juſtin, or Eutropius; and to make the reading and underſtanding of it the leſs tedious, and difficult to him, let him help himſelf, if he pleaſe, with the Engliſh tranſlation. Nor let the objection, that he will then know it only by rote, fright any one. This, when well conſidered, is not of any moment againſt, but plainly for, this way of learning a language; for languages are only to be learned by rote; and a man, who does not ſpeak Engliſh or Latin perfectly by rote, ſo that having thought of the thing he would ſpeak of, his tongue of courſe, without thought of rule of grammar, falls into the proper expreſſion and idiom of that language, does not ſpeak it well, nor is maſter of it. And I would fain have any one name to me that tongue, that any one can learn or ſpeak as he ſhould do, by the rules of grammar. Languages were made not by rules or art, but by accident, and the common uſe of the people. And he that will ſpeak them well, has no other rule but that; nor any thing to truſt to but his memory, and the habit of ſpeaking after the faſhion learned from thoſe that are allowed to ſpeak properly, which, in other words, is only to ſpeak by rote.

Grammar. IT will poſſibly be aſked here, Is grammar then of no uſe? And have thoſe who have taken ſo much pains in reducing ſeveral languages to rules and obſervations, who have writ ſo much about declenſions and conjugations, about concords and ſyntaxis, loſt their labour, and been learned to no purpoſe? I ſay not ſo; grammar has its place too. But

this I think I may ſay, There is more ſtir a great deal made with it than there needs, and thoſe are tormented about it, to whom it does not at all belong; I mean children, at the age wherein they are uſually perplexed with it in grammar-ſchools. Grammar.

THERE is nothing more evident, than that languages learned by rote ſerve well enough for the common affairs of life, and ordinary commerce. Nay, perſons of quality of the ſofter ſex, and ſuch of them as have ſpent their time in well-bred company, ſhew us, that this plain natural way, without the leaſt ſtudy or knowledge of grammar, can carry them to a great degree of elegancy and politeneſs in their language: and there are ladies who, without knowing what tenſes and participles, adverbs and prepoſitions are, ſpeak as properly, and as correctly, (they might take it for an ill compliment, if I ſaid as any country ſchool-maſter) as moſt gentlemen who have been bred up in the ordinary methods of grammar-ſchools. Grammar therefore we ſee may be ſpared in ſome caſes. The queſtion then will be, To whom ſhould it be taught, and when? To this I anſwer,

1. MEN learn languages for the ordinary intercourſe of ſociety, and communication of thoughts in common life, without any farther deſign in their uſe of them. And for this purpoſe the original way of learning a language by converſation not only ſerves well enough, but is to be preferred, as the moſt expedite, proper, and natural. Therefore to this uſe of language one may anſwer, That grammar is not neceſſary. This ſo many of my readers muſt be forced to allow, as underſtand what I here ſay, and who, converſing with others, underſtand them without having ever been taught the grammar of the Engliſh tongue: which I ſuppoſe is the caſe of incomparably the greateſt part of Engliſhmen; of whom I have never yet known any one who learned his mother-tongue by rules.

2. OTHERS there are, the greateſt part of whoſe buſineſs in this world is to be done with their tongues, and with their pens; and to thoſe it is convenient, if not neceſſary, that they ſhould ſpeak properly and correctly, whereby they may let their thoughts into other men's minds, the more eaſily, and with the greater impreſſion. Upon this account it is, that any ſort of ſpeaking, ſo as will make him be underſtood, is not thought enough for a gentleman. He ought to ſtudy grammar, amongſt the other helps of ſpeaking well; but it muſt be the grammar of his own tongue, of the language he uſes, that he may underſtand his own country ſpeech nicely, and ſpeak it properly, without ſhocking the ears of thoſe it is addreſſed to with ſoleciſms and offenſive irregularities. And to this purpoſe grammar is neceſſary: but it is the grammar only of their own proper tongues, and to thoſe only who would take pains in cultivating their language, and in perfecting their ſtyles. Whether all gentlemen ſhould not do this, I leave to be conſidered, ſince the want of propriety, and grammatical exactneſs, is thought very miſbecoming one of that rank, and uſually draws on one guilty of ſuch faults the cenſure of having had a lower breeding, and worſe company, than ſuits with his quality. If

Grammar. this be ſo, (as I ſuppoſe it is) it will be matter of wonder, why young gentlemen are forced to learn the grammars of foreign and dead languages, and are never once told of the grammar of their own tongues: they do not ſo much as know there is any ſuch thing, much leſs is it made their buſineſs to be inſtructed in it. Nor is their own language ever propoſed to them as worthy their care and cultivating, though they have daily uſe of it, and are not ſeldom in the future courſe of their lives judged of, by their handſome or aukward way of expreſſing themſelves in it. Whereas the languages whoſe grammars they have been ſo much employed in, are ſuch as probably they ſhall ſcarce ever ſpeak or write; or, if upon occaſion this ſhould happen, they ſhall be excuſed for the miſtakes and faults they make in it. Would not a Chineſe, who took notice of this way of breeding, be apt to imagine, that all our young gentlemen were deſigned to be teachers and profeſſors of the dead languages of foreign countries, and not to be men of buſineſs in their own?

3. THERE is a third ſort of men, who apply themſelves to two or three foreign, dead (and which amongſt us are called the learned) languages, make them their ſtudy, and pique themſelves upon their ſkill in them. No doubt thoſe who propoſe to themſelves the learning of any language with this view, and would be critically exact in it, ought carefully to ſtudy the grammar of it. I would not be miſtaken here, as if this were to undervalue Greek and Latin: I grant theſe are languages of great uſe and excellency; and a man can have no place amongſt the learned, in this part of the world, who is a ſtranger to them. But the knowledge a gentleman would ordinarily draw for his uſe, out of the Roman and Greek writers, I think he may attain without ſtudying the grammars of thoſe tongues, and, by bare reading, may come to underſtand them ſufficiently for all his purpoſes. How much farther he ſhall at any time be concerned to look into the grammar and critical niceties of either of theſe tongues, he himſelf will be able to determine, when he comes to propoſe to himſelf the ſtudy of any thing that ſhall require it. Which brings me to the other part of the enquiry, viz.

"When grammar ſhould be taught?"

To which, upon the premiſed grounds, the anſwer is obvious, viz.

THAT, if grammar ought to be taught at any time, it muſt be to one that can ſpeak the language already: how elſe can he be taught the grammar of it? This, at leaſt, is evident from the practice of the wiſe and learned nations amongſt the antients. They made it a part of education to cultivate their own, not foreign tongues. The Greeks counted all other nations barbarous, and had a contempt for their languages. And, though the Greek learning grew in credit amongſt the Romans, towards the end of their commonwealth, yet it was the Roman tongue that was made the ſtudy of their youth: their own language they were to make uſe of, and therefore it was their own language they were inſtructed and exerciſed in.

BUT more particularly to determine the proper ſeaſon for grammar; I

do not ſee how it can reaſonably be made any one's ſtudy, but as an introduction to rhetoric: when it is thought time to put any one upon the care of poliſhing his tongue, and of ſpeaking better than the illiterate, then is the time for him to be inſtructed in the rules of grammar, and not before. For grammar being to teach men not to ſpeak, but to ſpeak correctly, and according to the exact rules of the tongue, which is one part of elegancy, there is little uſe of the one to him that has no need of the other; where rhetorick is not neceſſary, grammar may be ſpared. I know not why any one ſhould waſte his time, and beat his head about the Latin grammar, who does not intend to be a critick, or make ſpeeches, and write diſpatches in it. When any one finds in himſelf a neceſſity or diſpoſition to ſtudy any foreign language to the bottom, and to be nicely exact in the knowledge of it, it will be time enough to take a grammatical ſurvey of it. If his uſe of it be only to underſtand ſome books writ in it, without a critical knowledge of the tongue itſelf, reading alone, as I have ſaid, will attain this end, without charging the mind with the multiplied rules and intricacies of grammar. Grammar.

§ 169. For the exerciſe of his writing, let him ſometimes tranſlate Latin into Engliſh: but the learning of Latin being nothing but the learning of words, a very unpleaſant buſineſs both to young and old, join as much other real knowledge with it as you can, beginning ſtill with that which lies moſt obvious to the ſenſes; ſuch as is the knowledge of minerals, plants, and animals, and particularly timber and fruit-trees, their parts and ways of propagation, wherein a great deal may be taught a child, which will not be uſeleſs to the man. But more eſpecially geography, aſtronomy, and anatomy. But, whatever you are teaching him, have a care ſtill, that you do not clog him with too much at once; or make any thing his buſineſs but downright virtue, or reprove him for any thing but vice, or ſome apparent tendency to it.

§ 170. But, if, after all, his fate be to go to ſchool to get the Latin tongue, it will be in vain to talk to you concerning the method I think beſt to be obſerved in ſchools. You muſt ſubmit to that you find there, not expect to have it changed for your ſon; but yet by all means obtain, if you can, that he be not employed in making Latin themes and declamations, and, leaſt of all, verſes of any kind. You may inſiſt on in it, if it will do any good, that you have no deſign to make him either a Latin orator or poet, but barely would have him underſtand perfectly a Latin author; and that you obſerve thoſe who teach any of the modern languages, and that with ſucceſs, never amuſe their ſcholars to make ſpeeches or verſes either in Freneh or Italian, their buſineſs being language barely, and not invention. Themes.

§ 171. But to tell you, a little more fully, why I would not have him exerciſed in making of themes and verſes: 1. As to themes, they have, I confeſs, the pretence of ſomething uſeful, which is to teach people to ſpeak handſomely and well on any ſubject; which, if it could be attained this way, I own, would be a great advantage; there being no-

Themes. thing more becoming a gentleman, nor more uſeful in all the occurrences of life, than to be able, on any occaſion, to ſpeak well, and to the purpoſe. But this I ſay, that the making of themes, as is uſual in ſchools, helps not one jot towards it: for do but conſider what it is in making a theme that a young lad is employed about; it is to make a ſpeech on ſome Latin ſaying, as "Omnia vincit amor," or "Non licet in bello "bis peccare," &c. And here the poor lad, who wants knowledge of thoſe things he is to ſpeak of, which is to be had only from time and obſervation, muſt ſet his invention on the rack, to ſay ſomething where he knows nothing, which is a ſort of Ægyptian tyranny, to bid them make bricks who have not yet any of the materials. And therefore it is uſual, in ſuch caſes, for the poor children to go to thoſe of higher forms with this petition, "Pray give me a little ſenſe;" which, whether it be more reaſonable or more ridiculous, is not eaſy to determine. Before a man can be in any capacity to ſpeak on any ſubject, it is neceſſary he be acquainted with it; or elſe it is as fooliſh to ſet him to diſcourſe of it, as to ſet a blind man to talk of colours, or a deaf man of muſick. And would you not think him a little cracked who would require another to make an argument on a moot-point, who underſtands nothing of our laws? And what, I pray, do ſchool-boys underſtand concerning thoſe matters, which are uſed to be propoſed to them in their themes, as ſubjects to diſcourſe on, to whet and exerciſe their fancies?

§ 172. In the next place, conſider the language that their themes are made in: It is Latin, a language foreign in their country, and long ſince dead every-where; a language which your ſon, it is a thouſand to one, ſhall never have an occaſion once to make a ſpeech in as long as he lives, after he comes to be a man; and a language, wherein the manner of expreſſing one's ſelf is ſo far different from our's, that to be perfect in that, would very little improve the purity and facility of his Engliſh ſtyle. Beſides that, there is now ſo little room or uſe for ſet ſpeeches in our own language in any part of our Engliſh buſineſs, that I can ſee no pretence for this ſort of exerciſe in our ſchools; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that the making of ſet Latin ſpeeches ſhould be the way to teach men to ſpeak well in Engliſh extempore. The way to that I ſhould think rather to be this: that there ſhould be propoſed to young gentlemen rational and uſeful queſtions, ſuited to their age and capacities, and on ſubjects not wholly unknown to them, nor out of their way: ſuch as theſe, when they are ripe for exerciſes of this nature, they ſhould, extempore or after a little meditation upon the ſpot, ſpeak to, without penning of any thing. For I aſk, if we will examine the effects of this way of learning to ſpeak well, who ſpeak beſt in any buſineſs, when occaſion calls them to it upon any debate; either thoſe who have accuſtomed themſelves to compoſe and write down before-hand what they would ſay; or thoſe, who thinking only of the matter, to underſtand that as well as they can, uſe themſelves only to ſpeak extempore? And he that ſhall judge by this, will be little

little apt to think, that the accuſtoming him to ſtudied ſpeeches, and ſet compoſitions, is the way to fit a young gentleman for buſineſs. Themes.

§ 173. But perhaps we ſhall be told, It is to improve and perfect them in the Latin tongue. It is true, that is their proper buſineſs at ſchool; but the making of themes is not the way to it: that perplexes their brains, about invention of things to be ſaid, not about the ſignification of words to be learnt; and, when they are making a theme, it is thoughts they ſearch and ſweat for, and not language. But the learning and maſtery of a tongue, being uneaſy and unpleaſant enough in itſelf, ſhould not be cumbered with any other difficulties, as is done in this way of proceeding. In fine, if boys invention be to be quickened by ſuch exerciſe, let them make themes in Engliſh, where they have facility, and a command of words, and will better ſee what kind of thoughts they have, when put into their own language: and, if the Latin tongue be to be learned, let it be done in the eaſieſt way, without toiling and diſguſting the mind by ſo uneaſy an employment as that of making ſpeeches joined to it.

§ 174. If theſe may be any reaſons againſt children's making Latin themes at ſchool, I have much more to ſay, and of more weight, againſt their making verſes of any ſort: for, if he has no genius to poetry, it is the moſt unreaſonable thing in the world to torment a child, and waſte his time about that which can never ſucceed; and, if he have a poetick vein, it is to me the ſtrangeſt thing in the world, that the father ſhould deſire or ſuffer it to be cheriſhed or improved. Methinks the parents ſhould labour to have it ſtifled and ſuppreſſed as much as may be; and I know not what reaſon a father can have to wiſh his ſon a poet, who does not deſire to have him bid defiance to all other callings and buſineſs: which is not yet the worſt of the caſe; for if he proves a ſucceſsful rhymer, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I deſire it may be conſidered, what company and places he is like to ſpend his time in, nay, and eſtate too: for it is very ſeldom ſeen, that any one diſcovers mines of gold or ſilver in Parnaſſus. It is a pleaſant air, but a barren ſoil; and there are very few inſtances of thoſe who have added to their patrimony by any thing they have reaped from thence. Poetry and gaming, which uſually go together, are alike in this too, that they ſeldom bring any advantage, but to thoſe who have nothing elſe to live on. Men of eſtates almoſt conſtantly go away loſers; and it is well if they eſcape at a cheaper rate than their whole eſtates, or the greateſt part of them. If therefore you would not have your ſon the fiddle to every jovial company, without whom the ſparks could not reliſh their wine, nor know how to paſs an afternoon idly; if you would not have him waſte his time and eſtate to divert others, and condemn the dirty acres left him by his anceſtors, I do not think you will much care he ſhould be a poet, or that his ſchool-maſter ſhould enter him in verſifying. But yet, if any one will think poetry a deſireable quality in his ſon, and that the ſtudy of it would raiſe his fancy and parts, he muſt needs yet confeſs, that, to that end, Verſes.

end, reading the excellent Greek and Roman poets, is of more uſe than making bad verſes of his own, in a language that is not his own. And he, whoſe deſign it is to excel in Engliſh poetry, would not, I gueſs, think the way to it were to make his firſt eſſays in Latin verſes.

Memoriter. § 175. ANOTHER thing, very ordinary in the vulgar method of grammar-ſchools, there is, of which I ſee no uſe at all, unleſs it be to baulk young lads in the way to learning languages, which, in my opinion, ſhould be made as eaſy and pleaſant as may be; and that which was painful in it, as much as poſſible, quite removed. That which I mean, and here complain of, is, their being forced to learn by heart great parcels of the authors which are taught them; wherein I can diſcover no advantage at all, eſpecially to the buſineſs they are upon. Languages are to be learnt only by reading and talking, and not by ſcraps of authors got by heart; which when a man's head is ſtuffed with, he has got the juſt furniture of a pedant, and it is the ready way to make him one, than which there is nothing leſs becoming a gentleman. For what can be more ridiculous, than to mix the rich and handſome thoughts and ſayings of others with a deal of poor ſtuff of his own; which is thereby the more expoſed; and has no other grace in it, nor will otherwiſe recommend the ſpeaker, than a thread-bare ruſſet-coat would, that was ſet off with large patches of ſcarlet and glittering brocade? Indeed, where a paſſage comes in the way, whoſe matter is worth remembrance, and the expreſſion of it very cloſe and excellent, (as there are many ſuch in the antient authors) it may not be amiſs to lodge it in the minds of young ſcholars, and with ſuch admirable ſtrokes of thoſe great maſters ſometimes exerciſe the memories of ſchool-boys: but their learning of their leſſons by heart, as they happen to fall out in their books without choice or diſtinction, I know not what it ſerves for, but to miſpend their time and pains, and give them a diſguſt and averſion to their books, wherein they find nothing but uſeleſs trouble.

§ 176. I HEAR it is ſaid, That children ſhould be employed in getting things by heart, to exerciſe and improve their memories. I could wiſh this were ſaid with as much authority of reaſon, as it is with forwardneſs of aſſurance; and that this practice were eſtabliſhed upon good obſervation, more than old cuſtom; for it is evident, that ſtrength of memory is owing to an happy conſtitution, and not to any habitual improvement got by exerciſe. It is true, what the mind is intent upon, and for fear of letting it ſlip, often imprints afreſh on itſelf by frequent reflection, that it is apt to retain, but ſtill according to its own natural ſtrength of retention. An impreſſion made on bees-wax or lead will not laſt ſo long as on braſs or ſteel. Indeed, if it be renewed often, it may laſt the longer; but every new reflecting on it is a new impreſſion, and it is from thence one is to reckon, if one would know how long the mind retains it. But the learning pages of Latin by heart, no more fits the memory for retention of any thing elſe, than the graving of one ſentence in lead, makes it the more capable of retaining firmly any other characters.

characters. If ſuch a ſort of exerciſe of the memory were able to give it ſtrength, and improve our parts, players of all other people muſt needs have the beſt memories, and be the beſt company: but whether the ſcraps they have got into their head this way, make them remember other things the better; and whether their parts be improved proportionably to the pains they have taken in getting by heart other ſayings; experience will ſhew. Memory is ſo neceſſary to all parts and conditions of life, and ſo little is to be done without it, that we are not to fear it ſhould grow dull and uſeleſs for want of exerciſe, if exerciſe would make it grow ſtronger. But I fear this faculty of the mind is not capable of much help and amendment in general, by any exerciſe or endeavour of ours, at leaſt not by that uſed upon this pretence in grammar-ſchools. And if Xerxes was able to call every common ſoldier by his name, in his army, that conſiſted of no leſs than an hundred thouſand men, I think it may be gueſſed, he got not this wonderful ability by learning his leſſons by heart, when he was a boy. This method of exerciſing and improving the memory by toilſome repetitions, without book, of what they read, is, I think, little uſed in the education of princes; which, if it had that advantage is talked of, ſhould be as little neglected in them, as in the meaneſt ſchool-boys: princes having as much need of good memories as any men living, and have generally an equal ſhare in this faculty with other men: though it has never been taken care of this way. What the mind is intent upon, and careful of, that it remembers beſt, and for the reaſon above-mentioned: to which if method and order be joined, all is done, I think, that can be, for the help of a weak memory; and he that will take any other way to do it, eſpecially that of charging it with a train of other people's words, which he that learns cares not for; will, I gueſs, ſcarce find the profit anſwer half the time and pains employed in it. Memoriter.

I DO not mean hereby, that there ſhould be no exerciſe given to children's memories. I think their memories ſhould be employed, but not in learning by rote whole pages out of books, which, the leſſon being once ſaid, and that taſk over, are delivered up again to oblivion, and neglected for ever. This mends neither the memory nor the mind. What they ſhould learn by heart out of authors, I have above mentioned: and ſuch wiſe and uſeful ſentences being once given in charge to their memories, they ſhould never be ſuffered to forget again, but be often called to account for them: whereby, beſides the uſe thoſe ſayings may be to them in their future life, as ſo many good rules and obſervations; they will be taught to reflect often, and bethink themſelves what they have to remember, which is the only way to make the memory quick and uſeful. The cuſtom of frequent reflection will keep their minds from running adrift, and call their thoughts home from uſeleſs inattentive roving: and therefore, I think, it may do well to give them ſomething every day to remember; but ſomething ſtill, that is in itſelf worth the remembering, and what you would never have out of mind, whenever you

you call, or they themſelves ſearch for it. This will oblige them often to turn their thoughts inwards, than which you cannot wiſh them a better intellectual habit.

Latin. § 177. BUT under whoſe care ſoever a child is put to be taught, during the tender and flexible years of his life, this is certain, it ſhould be one who thinks Latin and language the leaſt part of education; one, who knowing how much virtue, and a well-tempered ſoul, is to be preferred to any ſort of learning or language, makes it his chief buſineſs to form the mind of his ſcholars, and give that a right diſpoſition: which, if once got, though all the reſt ſhould be neglected, would, in due time, produce all the reſt; and which if it be not got, and ſettled, ſo as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages and ſciences, and all the other accompliſhments of education, will be to no purpoſe, but to make the worſe or more dangerous man. And indeed, whatever ſtir there is made about getting of Latin, as the great and difficult buſineſs; his mother may teach it him herſelf, if ſhe will but ſpend two or three hours in a day with him, and make him read the evangeliſts in Latin to her: for ſhe need but buy a Latin teſtament, and having got ſomebody to mark the laſt ſyllable but one, where it is long, in words above two ſyllables, (which is enough to regulate her pronunciation, and accenting the words) read daily in the goſpels; and then let her avoid underſtanding them in Latin, if ſhe can. And when ſhe underſtands the evangeliſts in Latin, let her, in the ſame manner, read Æſop's fables, and ſo proceed on to Eutropius, Juſtin, and other ſuch books. I do not mention this, as an imagination of what I fancy may do, but as of a thing I have known done, and the Latin tongue, with eaſe, got this way.

BUT to return to what I was ſaying: he that takes on him the charge of bringing up young men, eſpecially young gentlemen, ſhould have ſomething more in him than Latin, more than even a knowledge in the liberal ſciences; he ſhould be a perſon of eminent virtue and prudence, and with good ſenſe have good humour, and the ſkill to carry himſelf with gravity, eaſe, and kindneſs, in a conſtant converſation with his pupils. But of this I have ſpoken at large in another place.

Geography. § 178. AT the ſame time that he is learning French and Latin, a child, as has been ſaid, may alſo be entered in arithmetick, geography, chronology, hiſtory, and geometry too. For if theſe be taught him in French or Latin, when he begins once to underſtand either of theſe tongues, he will get a knowledge in theſe ſciences, and the language to-boot.

GEOGRAPHY, I think, ſhould be begun with; for the learning of the figure of the globe, the ſituation and boundaries of the four parts of the world, and that of particular kingdoms and countries, being only an exerciſe of the eyes and memory, a child with pleaſure will learn and retain them: and this is ſo certain, that I now live in the houſe with a child, whom his mother has ſo well inſtructed this way in geography, that he knew the limits of the four parts of the world, could readily point,

being aſked, to any country upon the globe, or any county in the map of England; knew all the great rivers, promontories, ſtraits, and bays in the world, and could find the longitude and latitude of any place, before he was ſix years old. Theſe things, that he will thus learn by ſight, and have by rote in his memory, are not all, I confeſs, that he is to learn upon the globes. But yet it is a good ſtep and preparation to it, and will make the remainder much eaſier, when his judgment is grown ripe enough for it: beſides that, it gets ſo much time now, and by the pleaſure of knowing things, leads him on inſenſibly to the gaining of languages. Geography.

§ 179. When he has the natural parts of the globe well fixed in his memory, it may then be time to begin arithmetick. By the natural parts of the globe, I mean ſeveral poſitions of the parts of the earth and ſea, under different names and diſtinctions of countries; not coming yet to thoſe artificial and imaginary lines, which have been invented, and are only ſuppoſed, for the better improvement of that ſcience.

§ 180. Arithmetick is the eaſieſt, and conſequently the firſt ſort of abſtract reaſoning, which the mind commonly bears, or accuſtoms itſelf to: and is of ſo general uſe in all parts of life and buſineſs, that ſcarce any thing is to be done without it. This is certain, a man cannot have too much of it, nor too perfectly; he ſhould therefore begin to be exerciſed in counting, as ſoon, and as far, as he is capable of it; and do ſomething in it every day, till he is maſter of the art of numbers. When he underſtands addition and ſubtraction, he may then be advanced farther in geography, and after he is acquainted with the poles, zones, parallel circles, and meridians, be taught longitude and latitude, and by them be made to underſtand the uſe of maps, and by the numbers placed on their ſides, to know the reſpective ſituation of countries, and how to find them out on the terreſtrial globe. Which when he can readily do, he may then be entered in the celeſtial: and there going over all the circles again, with a more particular obſervation of the ecliptick or zodiack, to fix them all very clearly and diſtinctly in his mind, he may be taught the figure and poſition of the ſeveral conſtellations, which may be ſhewed him firſt upon the globe, and then in the heavens. Arithmetick. Aſtronomy.

When that is done, and he knows pretty well the conſtellations of this our hemiſphere, it may be time to give him ſome notions of this our planetary world, and to that purpoſe it may not be amiſs to make him a draught of the Copernican ſyſtem; and therein explain to him the ſituation of the planets, their reſpective diſtances from the ſun, the center of their revolutions. This will prepare him to underſtand the motion and theory of the planets, the moſt eaſy and natural way. For, ſince aſtronomers no longer doubt of the motion of the planets about the ſun, it is fit he ſhould proceed upon that hypotheſis, which is not only the ſimpleſt and leaſt perplexed for a learner, but alſo the likelieſt to be true in itſelf. But in this, as in all other parts of inſtruction, great care muſt be taken with children, to begin with that which is plain and ſimple,

Aſtronomy. and to teach them as little as can be at once, and ſettle that well in their heads, before you proceed to the next, or any thing new in that ſcience. Give them firſt one ſimple idea, and ſee that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it, before you go any farther; and then add ſome other ſimple idea, which lies next in your way to what you aim it; and, ſo proceeding by gentle and inſenſible ſteps, children, without confuſion and amazement, will have their underſtandings opened, and their thoughts extended, farther than could have been expected. And when any one has learned any thing himſelf, there is no ſuch way to fix it in his memory, and to encourage him to go on, as to ſet him to teach it others.

Geometry. § 181. When he has once got ſuch an acquaintance with the globes, as is above mentioned, he may be fit to be tried a little in geometry; wherein I think the ſix firſt books of Euclid enough for him to be taught. For I am in ſome doubt, whether more to a man of buſineſs be neceſſary or uſeful; at leaſt if he have a genius and inclination to it, being entered ſo far by his tutor, he will be able to go on of himſelf without a teacher.

The globes therefore muſt be ſtudied, and that diligently, and, I think, may be begun betimes, if the tutor will but be careful to diſtinguiſh what the child is capable of knowing, and what not; for which this may be a rule, that perhaps will go a pretty way, (viz.) That children may be taught any thing that falls under their ſenſes, eſpecially their ſight, as far as their memories only are exerciſed: and thus a child very young may learn, which is the Æquator, which the Meridian, &c. which Europe, and which England, upon the globes, as ſoon almoſt as he knows the rooms of the houſe he lives in; if care be taken not to teach him too much at once, nor to ſet him upon a new part, till that, which he is upon, be perfectly learned and fixed in his memory.

Chronology. § 182. With geography, chronology ought to go hand in hand; I mean the general part of it, ſo that he may have in his mind a view of the whole current of time, and the ſeveral conſiderable epochs that are made uſe of in hiſtory. Without theſe two, hiſtory, which is the great miſtreſs of prudence and civil knowledge; and ought to be the proper ſtudy of a gentleman, or man of buſineſs in the world; without geography and chronology, I ſay, hiſtory will be very ill retained, and very little uſeful; but be only a jumble of matters of fact, confuſedly heaped together without order or inſtruction. It is by theſe two that the actions of mankind are ranked into their proper places of times and countries; under which circumſtances, they are not only much eaſier kept in the memory, but, in that natural order, are only capable to afford thoſe obſervations, which make a man the better and the abler for reading them.

§ 183. When I ſpeak of chronology as a ſcience he ſhould be perfect in, I do not mean the little controverſies that are in it. Theſe are endleſs, and moſt of them of ſo little importance to a gentleman, as not to deſerve

deſerve to be inquired into, were they capable of an eaſy deciſion. And therefore all that learned noiſe and duſt of the chronologiſt is wholly to be avoided. The moſt uſeful book I have ſeen in that part of learning, is a ſmall treatiſe of Strauchius, which is printed in twelves, under the title of "Breviarium Chronologicum," out of which may be ſelected all that is neceſſary to be taught a young gentleman concerning chronology; for all that is in that treatiſe a learner need not be cumbered with. He has in him the moſt remarkable or uſual epochs reduced all to that of the Julian period, which is the eaſieſt, and plaineſt, and ſureſt method, that can be made uſe of in chronology. To this treatiſe of Strauchius, Helvicus's tables may be added, as a book to be turned to on all occaſions. Chronology.

§ 184. As nothing teaches, ſo nothing delights, more than hiſtory. The firſt of theſe recommends it to the ſtudy of grown men; the latter makes me think it the fitteſt for a young lad, who, as ſoon as he is inſtructed in chronology, and acquainted with the ſeveral epochs in uſe in this part of the world, and can reduce them to the Julian period, ſhould then have ſome Latin hiſtory put into his hand. The choice ſhould be directed by the eaſineſs of the ſtyle; for where-ever he begins, chronology will keep it from confuſion; and the pleaſantneſs of the ſubject inviting him to read, the language will inſenſibly be got, without that terrible vexation and uneaſineſs, which children ſuffer where they are put into books beyond their capacity, ſuch as are the Roman orators and poets, only to learn the Roman language. When he has by reading maſtered the eaſier, ſuch perhaps as Juſtin, Eutropius, Quintus Curtius, &c. the next degree to theſe will give him no great trouble: and thus, by a gradual progreſs from the plaineſt and eaſieſt hiſtorians, he may at laſt come to read the moſt difficult and ſublime of the Latin authors, ſuch as are Tully, Virgil, and Horace. Hiſtory.

§ 185. THE knowledge of virtue, all along from the beginning, in all the inſtances he is capable of, being taught him, more by practice than rules; and the love of reputation, inſtead of ſatisfying his appetite, being made habitual in him; I know not whether he ſhould read any other diſcourſes of morality, but what he finds in the Bible; or have any ſyſtem of ethicks put into his hand, till he can read Tully's Offices, not as a ſchool-boy to learn Latin, but as one that would be informed in the principles and precepts of virtue, for the conduct of his life. Ethicks.

§ 186. WHEN he has pretty well digeſted Tully's Offices, and added to it "Puffendorf de officio hominis & civis," it may be ſeaſonable to ſet him upon "Grotius de jure belli & pacis," or, which perhaps is the better of the two, "Puffendorf de jure naturali & gentium," wherein he will be inſtructed in the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations of ſociety, and the duties reſulting from thence. This general part of civil law and hiſtory are ſtudies which a gentleman ſhould not barely touch at, but conſtantly dwell upon, and never have done with. A virtuous and well behaved young man, that is well verſed in the general part of the civil law, (which concerns not the chicane of private Civil law.

Civil Law. caſes, but the affairs and intercourſe of civilized nations in general, grounded upon principles of reaſon) underſtands Latin well, and can write a good hand, one may turn looſe into the world, with great aſſurance that he will find employment and eſteem every-where.

Law. § 187. It would be ſtrange to ſuppoſe an Engliſh gentleman ſhould be ignorant of the law of his country. This, whatever ſtation he is in, is ſo requiſite, that, from a juſtice of the peace to a miniſter of ſtate, I know no place he can well fill without it. I do not mean the chicane or wrangling and captious part of the law; a gentleman whoſe buſineſs is to ſeek the true meaſures of right and wrong, and not the arts how to avoid doing the one, and ſecure himſelf in doing the other, ought to be as far from ſuch a ſtudy of the law, as he is concerned diligently to apply himſelf to that wherein he may be ſerviceable to his country. And to that purpoſe I think the right way for a gentleman to ſtudy our law, which he does not deſign for his calling, is to take a view of our Engliſh conſtitution and government, in the antient books of the common law, and ſome more modern writers, who out of them have given an account of this government. And having got a true idea of that, then to read our hiſtory, and with it join in every king's reign the laws then made. This will give an inſight into the reaſon of our ſtatutes, and ſhew the true ground upon which they came to be made, and what weight they ought to have.

Rhetorick. Logick. § 188. Rhetorick and Logick being the arts that in the ordinary method uſually follow immediately after grammar, it may perhaps be wondered, that I have ſaid ſo little of them. The reaſon is, becauſe of the little advantage young people receive by them; for I have ſeldom or never obſerved any one to get the ſkill of reaſoning well, or ſpeaking handſomely, by ſtudying thoſe rules which pretend to teach it: and therefore I would have a young gentleman take a view of them in the ſhorteſt ſyſtems could be found, without dwelling long on the contemplation and ſtudy of thoſe formalities. Right reaſoning is founded on ſomething elſe than the predicaments and predicables, and does not conſiſt in talking in mode and figure itſelf. But it is beſides my preſent buſineſs to enlarge upon this ſpeculation. To come therefore to what we have in hand; if you would have your ſon reaſon well, let him read Chillingworth; and if you would have him ſpeak well, let him be converſant in Tully, to give him the true idea of eloquence; and let him read thoſe things that are well writ in Engliſh, to perfect his ſtyle in the purity of our language.

§ 189. If the uſe and end of right reaſoning be to have right notions, and a right judgment of things; to diſtinguiſh betwixt truth and falſehood, right and wrong, and to act accordingly; be ſure not to let your ſon be bred up in the art and formality of diſputing, either practiſing it himſelf, or admiring it in others; unleſs, inſtead of an able man, you deſire to have him an inſignificant wrangler, opiniater in diſcourſe, and priding himſelf in contradicting others; or, which is worſe, queſtioning every

every thing, and thinking there is no ſuch thing as truth to be ſought, but only victory, in diſputing. There cannot be any thing ſo diſingenuous, ſo miſbecoming a gentleman, or any one who pretends to be a rational creature, as not to yield to plain reaſon, and the conviction of clear arguments. Is there any thing more inconſiſtent with civil converſation, and the end of all debate, than not to take an anſwer, though ever ſo full and ſatisfactory; but ſtill to go on with the diſpute, as long as equivocal ſounds can furniſh [a "medius terminus"] a term to wrangle with on the one ſide, or a diſtinction on the other? Whether pertinent or impertinent, ſenſe or nonſenſe, agreeing with, or contrary to, what he had ſaid before, it matters not. For this, in ſhort, is the way and perfection of logical diſputes, that the opponent never takes any anſwer, nor the reſpondent ever yields to any argument. This neither of them muſt do, whatever becomes of truth or knowledge, unleſs he will paſs for a poor baffled wretch, and lie under the diſgrace of not being able to maintain whatever he has once affirmed, which is the great aim and glory in diſputing. Truth is to be found and ſupported by a mature and due conſideration of things themſelves, and not by artificial terms and ways of arguing: theſe lead not men ſo much into the diſcovery of truth, as into a captious and fallacious uſe of doubtful words, which is the moſt uſeleſs and moſt offenſive way of talking, and ſuch as leaſt ſuits a gentleman or a lover of truth of any thing in the world. Logick.

THERE can ſcarce be a greater defect in a gentleman, than not to expreſs himſelf well, either in writing or ſpeaking. But yet, I think, I may aſk my reader, Whether he doth not know a great many, who live upon their eſtates, and ſo, with the name, ſhould have the qualities of gentlemen, who cannot ſo much as tell a ſtory as they ſhould, much leſs ſpeak clearly and perſuaſively in any buſineſs? This I think not to be ſo much their fault, as the fault of their education; for I muſt, without partiality, do my countrymen this right, that where they apply themſelves, I ſee none of their neighbours outgo them. They have been taught rhetorick, but yet never taught how to expreſs themſelves handſomely with their tongues, or pens, in the language they are always to uſe; as if the names of the figures, that embelliſhed the diſcourſes of thoſe who underſtood the art of ſpeaking, were the very art and ſkill of ſpeaking well. This, as all other things of practice, is to be learned not by a few or a great many rules given, but by exerciſe and application, according to good rules, or rather patterns, till habits are got, and a facility of doing it well. Style.

AGREEABLE hereunto, perhaps it might not be amiſs to make children, as ſoon as they are capable of it, often to tell a ſtory of any thing they know; and to correct at firſt the moſt remarkable fault they are guilty of, in their way of putting it together. When that fault is cured, then to ſhew them the next, and ſo on, till, one after another, all, at leaſt the groſs ones, are mended. When they can tell tales pretty well, then it may be time to make them write them. The fables of Æſop, the only book

Style. book almoſt that I know fit for children, may afford them matter for this exerciſe of writing Engliſh, as well as for reading and tranſlating, to enter them in the Latin tongue. When they are got paſt the faults of grammar, and can join in a continued coherent diſcourſe the ſeveral parts of a ſtory, without bald and unhandſome forms of tranſition (as is uſual) often repeated; he that deſires to perfect them yet farther in this, which is the firſt ſtep to ſpeaking well, and needs no invention, may have recourſe to Tully; and by putting in practice thoſe rules, which that maſter of eloquence gives in his firſt book "De Inventione," § 20. make them know wherein the ſkill and graces of an handſome narrative, according to the ſeveral ſubjects and deſigns of it, lie. Of each of which rules fit examples may be found out, and therein they may be ſhewn how others have practiſed them. The antient claſſic authors afford plenty of ſuch examples, which they ſhould be made not only to tranſlate, but have ſet before them as patterns for their daily imitation.

When they underſtand how to write Engliſh with due connection, propriety, and order, and are pretty well maſters of a tolerable narrative ſtyle, they may be advanced to writing of letters; wherein they ſhould not be put upon any ſtrains of wit or compliment, but taught to expreſs their own plain eaſy ſenſe, without any incoherence, confuſion, or roughneſs. And when they are perfect in this, they may, to raiſe their thoughts, have ſet before them the example of Voiture's, for the entertainment of their friends at a diſtance, with letters of compliment, mirth, raillery, or diverſion; and Tully's epiſtles, as the beſt pattern, whether for buſineſs
Letters. or converſation. The writing of letters has ſo much to do in all the occurrences of human life, that no gentleman can avoid ſhewing himſelf in this kind of writing: occaſions will daily force him to make this uſe of his pen, which, beſides the conſequences, that, in his affairs, his well or ill managing of it often draws after it, always lays him open to a ſeverer examination of his breeding, ſenſe, and abilities, than oral diſcourſes; whoſe tranſient faults, dying for the moſt part with the ſound that gives them life, and ſo not ſubject to a ſtrict review, more eaſily eſcape obſervation and cenſure.

Had the methods of education been directed to their right end, one would have thought this, ſo neceſſary a part, could not have been neglected, whilſt themes and verſes in Latin, of no uſe at all, were ſo conſtantly every-where, preſſed, to the racking of children's inventions beyond their ſtrength, and hindering their chearful progreſs in learning the tongues, by unnatural difficulties. But cuſtom has ſo ordained it, and who dares diſobey? And would it not be very unreaſonable to require of a learned country ſchool-maſter, (who has all the tropes and figures in Farnaby's rhetorick at his fingers ends) to teach his ſcholar to expreſs himſelf hand-
Engliſh. ſomely in Engliſh, when it appears to be ſo little his buſineſs or thought, that the boy's mother (deſpiſed, it is like, as illiterate, for not having read a ſyſtem of logick and rhetorick) outdoes him in it?

To

To write and ſpeak correctly, gives a grace, and gains a favourable attention to what one has to ſay: and, ſince it is Engliſh that an Engliſh gentleman will have conſtant uſe of, that is the language he ſhould chiefly cultivate, and wherein moſt care ſhould be taken to poliſh and perfect his ſtyle. To ſpeak or write better Latin than Engliſh, may make a man be talked of; but he would find it more to his purpoſe to expreſs himſelf well in his own tongue, that he uſes every moment, than to have the vain commendation of others for a very inſignificant quality. This I find univerſally neglected, and no care taken any-where to improve young men in their own language, that they may thoroughly underſtand and be maſters of it. If any one among us have a facility or purity more than ordinary in his mother-tongue, it is owing to chance, or his genius, or any thing, rather than to his education, or any care of his teacher. To mind what Engliſh his pupil ſpeaks or writes, is below the dignity of one bred up amongſt Greek and Latin, though he have but little of them himſelf. Theſe are the learned languages, fit only for learned men to meddle with and teach; Engliſh is the language of the illiterate vulgar; though yet we ſee the policy of ſome of our neighbours hath not thought it beneath the publick care to promote and reward the improvement of their own language. Poliſhing and enriching their tongue, is no ſmall buſineſs amongſt them; it hath colleges and ſtipends appointed it, and there is raiſed amongſt them a great ambition and emulation of writing correctly: and we ſee what they are come to by it, and how far they have ſpread one of the worſt languages, poſſibly, in this part of the world, if we look upon it as it was in ſome few reigns backwards, whatever it be now. The great men amongſt the Romans were daily exerciſing themſelves in their own language; and we find yet upon record the names of orators, who taught ſome of their emperors Latin, though it were their mother-tongue. Engliſh.

It is plain the Greeks were yet more nice in theirs; all other ſpeech was barbarous to them but their own, and no foreign language appears to have been ſtudied or valued amongſt that learned and acute people; though it be paſt doubt, that they borrowed their learning and philoſophy from abroad.

I am not here ſpeaking againſt Greek and Latin; I think they ought to be ſtudied, and the Latin, at leaſt, underſtood well, by every gentleman. But whatever foreign languages a young man meddles with, (and the more he knows, the better) that which he ſhould critically ſtudy, and labour to get a facility, clearneſs, and elegancy to expreſs himſelf in, ſhould be his own, and to this purpoſe he ſhould daily be exerciſed in it.

§ 190. Natural philoſophy, as a ſpeculative ſcience, I imagine, we have none; and perhaps I may think I have reaſon to ſay, we never ſhall be able to make a ſcience of it. The works of nature are contrived by a wiſdom, and operate by ways, too far ſurpaſſing our faculties to diſcover, or capacities to conceive, for us ever to be able to reduce them into a ſcience. Natural philoſophy being the knowledge of the principles, Natural Philoſophy.

Natural Philoſophy.

properties, and operations of things, as they are in themſelves, I imagine there are two parts of it, one comprehending ſpirits, with their nature and qualities; and the other bodies. The firſt of theſe is uſually referred to metaphyſicks: but under what title ſoever the conſideration of ſpirits comes, I think it ought to go before the ſtudy of matter and body, not as a ſcience that can be methodized into a ſyſtem, and treated of, upon principles of knowledge; but as an enlargement of our minds towards a truer and fuller comprehenſion of the intellectual world, to which we are led both by reaſon and revelation. And ſince the cleareſt and largeſt diſcoveries we have of other ſpirits, beſides God and our own ſouls, is imparted to us from heaven by revelation, I think the information, that at leaſt young people ſhould have of them, ſhould be taken from that revelation. To this purpoſe, I conclude, it would be well, if there were made a good hiſtory of the Bible for young people to read; wherein if every thing that is fit to be put into it, were laid down in its due order of time, and ſeveral things omitted, which are ſuited only to riper age; that confuſion, which is uſually produced by promiſcuous reading of the ſcripture, as it lies now bound up in our Bibles, would be avoided; and alſo this other good obtained, that by reading of it conſtantly, there would be inſtilled into the minds of children a notion and belief of ſpirits, they having ſo much to do, in all the tranſactions of that hiſtory, which will be a good preparation to the ſtudy of bodies. For, without the notion and allowance of ſpirit, our philoſophy will be lame and defective in one main part of it, when it leaves out the contemplation of the moſt excellent and powerful part of the creation.

§ 191. Of this hiſtory of the Bible, I think too it would be well, if there were a ſhort and plain epitome made, containing the chief and moſt material heads for children to be converſant in, as ſoon as they can read. This, though it will lead them early into ſome notion of ſpirits, yet is not contrary to what I ſaid above, that I would not have children troubled, whilſt young, with notions of ſpirits; whereby my meaning was, that I think it inconvenient, that their yet tender minds ſhould receive early impreſſions of goblins, ſpectres, and apparitions, wherewith their maids, and thoſe about them, are apt to fright them into a compliance with their orders, which often proves a great inconvenience to them all their lives after, by ſubjecting their minds to frights, fearful apprehenſions, weakneſs, and ſuperſtition; which, when coming abroad into the world and converſation, they grow weary and aſhamed of; it not ſeldom happens, that to make, as they think, a thorough cure, and eaſe themſelves of a load, which has ſat ſo heavy on them, they throw away the thoughts of all ſpirits together, and ſo run into the other, but worſe extreme.

§ 192. The reaſon why I would have this premiſed to the ſtudy of bodies, and the doctrine of the ſcriptures well imbibed, before young men be entered in natural philoſophy, is, becauſe matter being a thing that all our ſenſes are conſtantly converſant with, it is ſo apt to poſſeſs

the mind, and exclude all other beings but matter, that prejudice, grounded on ſuch principles, often leaves no room for the admittance of ſpirits, or the allowing any ſuch things as immaterial beings, "in rerum "naturâ;" when yet it is evident, that by mere matter and motion, none of the great phænomena of nature can be reſolved: to inſtance but in that common one of gravity, which I think impoſſible to be explained by any natural operation of matter, or any other law of motion, but the poſitive will of a ſuperior Being ſo ordering it. And therefore ſince the deluge cannot be well explained, without admitting ſomething out of the ordinary courſe of nature, I propoſe it to be conſidered, whether God's altering the centre of gravity in the earth for a time, (a thing as intelligible as gravity itſelf, which perhaps a little variation of cauſes, unknown to us, would produce) will not more eaſily account for Noah's flood, than any hypotheſis yet made uſe of, to ſolve it. I hear the great objection to this is, that it would produce but a partial deluge. But the alteration of the centre of gravity once allowed, it is no hard matter to conceive, that the divine power might make the centre of gravity, placed at a due diſtance from the centre of the earth, move round it in a convenient ſpace of time; whereby the flood would become univerſal, and, as I think, anſwer all the phænomena of the deluge, as delivered by Moſes, at an eaſier rate than thoſe many hard ſuppoſitions that are made uſe of, to explain it. But this is not a place for that argument, which is here only mentioned by the bye, to ſhew the neceſſity of having recourſe to ſomething beyond bare matter, and its motion, in the explication of nature; to which the notions of ſpirits, and their power, as delivered in the Bible, where ſo much is attributed to their operation, may be a fit preparative; reſerving to a fitter opportunity a fuller explication of this hypotheſis, and the application of it to all the parts of the deluge, and any difficulties that can be ſuppoſed in the hiſtory of the flood, as recorded in the ſcripture.

Natural Philoſophy.

§ 193. But to return to the ſtudy of natural philoſophy: though the world be full of ſyſtems of it, yet I cannot ſay, I know any one which can be taught a young man as a ſcience, wherein he may be ſure to find truth and certainty, which is what all ſciences give an expectation of. I do not hence conclude, that none of them are to be read; it is neceſſary for a gentleman, in this learned age, to look into ſome of them to fit himſelf for converſation: but whether that of Des Cartes be put into his hands, as that which is moſt in faſhion, or it be thought fit to give him a ſhort view of that and ſeveral others alſo; I think the ſyſtems of natural philoſophy, that have obtained in this part of the world, are to be read more to know the hypotheſes, and to underſtand the terms and ways of talking of the ſeveral ſects, than with hopes to gain thereby a comprehenſive ſcientifical and ſatisfactory knowledge of the works of nature: only this may be ſaid, that the modern Corpuſcularians talk, in moſt things, more intelligibly than the Peripateticks, who poſſeſſed the ſchools immediately before them. He that would look farther back, and

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acquaint himſelf with the ſeveral opinions of the ancients, may conſult Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem; wherein that very learned author hath, with ſuch accurateneſs and judgment, collected and explained the opinions of the Greek philoſophers, that what principles they built on, and what were the chief hypotheſes that divided them, is better to be ſeen in him, than any where elſe that I know. But I would not deter any one from the ſtudy of nature, becauſe all the knowledge we have, or poſſibly can have of it, cannot be brought into a ſcience. There are very many things in it, that are convenient and neceſſary to be known to a gentleman; and a great many other, that will abundantly reward the pains of the curious with delight and advantage. But theſe, I think, are rather to be found amongſt ſuch writers, as have employed themſelves in making rational experiments and obſervations, than in ſtarting barely ſpeculative ſyſtems. Such writings, therefore, as many of Mr. Boyle's are, with others that have writ of huſbandry, planting, gardening, and the like, may be fit for a gentleman, when he has a little acquainted himſelf with ſome of the ſyſtems of the natural philoſophy in faſhion.

§ 194. THOUGH the ſyſtems of phyſics, that I have met with, afford little encouragement to look for certainty, or ſcience, in any treatiſe, which ſhall pretend to give us a body of natural philoſophy from the firſt principles of bodies in general; yet the incomparable Mr. Newton has ſhewn, how far mathematicks, applied to ſome parts of nature, may, upon principles that matter of fact juſtify, carry us in the knowledge of ſome, as I may ſo call them, particular provinces of the incomprehenſible univerſe. And if others could give us ſo good and clear an account of other parts of nature, as he has of this our planetary world, and the moſt conſiderable phænomena obſervable in it, in his admirable book "Philoſophiæ naturalis Principia mathematica," we might in time hope to be furniſhed with more true and certain knowledge in ſeveral parts of this ſtupendous machine, than hitherto we could have expected. And though there are very few that have mathematicks enough to underſtand his demonſtrations; yet the moſt accurate mathematicians, who have examined them, allowing them to be ſuch, his book will deſerve to be read, and give no ſmall light and pleaſure to thoſe, who, willing to underſtand the motions, properties, and operations of the great maſſes of matter in this our ſolar ſyſtem, will but carefully mind his concluſions, which may be depended on as propoſitions well proved.

Greek.

§ 195. THIS is, in ſhort, what I have thought concerning a young gentleman's ſtudies; wherein it will poſſibly be wondered, that I ſhould omit Greek, ſince amongſt the Grecians is to be found the original, as it were, and foundation of all that learning which we have in this part of the world. I grant it ſo; and will add, that no man can paſs for a ſcholar, that is ignorant of the Greek tongue. But I am not here conſidering the education of a profeſſed ſcholar, but of a gentleman, to whom Latin and French, as the world now goes, is by every one acknowledged to be neceſſary. When he comes to be a man, if he hae a mind to carry

his ſtudies farther, and look into the Greek learning, he will then eaſily get that tongue himſelf; and if he has not that inclination, his learning of it under a tutor, will be but loſt labour, and much of his time and pains ſpent in that, which will be neglected and thrown away as ſoon as he is at liberty. For how many are there of an hundred, even amongſt ſcholars themſelves, who retain the Greek they carried from ſchool; or ever improve it to a familiar reading, and perfect underſtanding of Greek authors? Greek.

To conclude this part, which concerns a young gentleman's ſtudies; his tutor ſhould remember, that his buſineſs is not ſo much to teach him all that is knowable, as to raiſe in him a love and eſteem of knowledge; and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himſelf, when he has a mind to it.

THE thoughts of a judicious author on the ſubject of languages, I ſhall here give the reader, as near as I can, in his own way of expreſſing them. He ſays * "One can ſcarce burden children too much with the "knowledge of languages. They are uſeful to men of all conditions, "and they equally open them the entrance, either to the moſt profound, "or the more eaſy and entertaining parts of learning. If this irkſome "ſtudy be put off to a little more advanced age, young men either have "not reſolution enough to apply to it out of choice, or ſteadineſs to "carry it on. And if any one has the gift of perſeverance, it is not "without the inconvenience of ſpending that time upon languages, "which is deſtined to other uſes: and he confines to the ſtudy of words "that age of his life that is above it, and requires things; at leaſt, it is "the loſing the beſt and beautifulleſt ſeaſon of one's life. This large "foundation of languages cannot be well laid, but when every thing "makes an eaſy and deep impreſſion on the mind; when the memory is "freſh, ready, and tenacious; when the head and heart are as yet free "from cares, paſſions and deſigns; and thoſe, on whom the child de-"pends, have authority enough to keep him cloſe to a long-continued "application. I am perſuaded that the ſmall number of truly learned, "and the multitude of ſuperficial pretenders, is owing to the neglect of "this." * La Bruyere Mœurs de ce Siecle, p. 577, 662.

I THINK every body will agree with this obſerving gentleman, that languages are the proper ſtudy of our firſt years. But it is to be conſidered by the parents and tutors, what tongues it is fit the child ſhould learn. For it muſt be confeſſed, that it is fruitleſs pains, and loſs of time, to learn a language, which, in the courſe of life that he is deſigned to, he is never like to make uſe of; or which one may gueſs by his temper, he will wholly neglect and loſe again, as ſoon as an approach to manhood, ſetting him free from a governor, ſhall put him into the hands of his own inclination; which is not likely to allot any of his time to the cultivating the learned tongues; or diſpoſe him to mind any other language, but what daily uſe, or ſome particular neceſſity, ſhall force upon him.

Greek. BUT yet for the ſake of thoſe who are deſigned to be ſcholars, I will add, what the ſame author ſubjoins, to make good his foregoing remark. It will deſerve to be conſidered by all who deſire to be truly learned, and therefore may be a fit rule for tutors to inculcate, and leave with their pupils, to guide their future ſtudies:

"The ſtudy, ſays he, of the original text can never be ſufficiently recommended. It is the ſhorteſt, ſureſt, and moſt agreeable way to all ſorts of learning. Draw from the ſpring-head, and take not things at ſecond-hand. Let the writings of the great maſters be never laid aſide; dwell upon them, ſettle them in your mind, and cite them upon occaſion; make it your buſineſs thoroughly to underſtand them in their full extent, and all their circumſtances: acquaint yourſelf fully with the principles of original authors; bring them to a conſiſtency, and then do you yourſelf make your deductions. In this ſtate were the firſt commentators, and do not you reſt till you bring yourſelf to the ſame. Content not yourſelf with thoſe borrowed lights, nor guide yourſelf by their views, but where your own fails you, and leaves you in the dark. Their explications are not yours, and will give you the ſlip. On the contrary, your own obſervations are the product of your own mind, where they will abide, and be ready at hand upon all occaſions in converſe, conſultation, and diſpute. Loſe not the pleaſure it is to ſee that you were not ſtopped in your reading, but by difficulties that are invincible; where the commentators and ſcholiaſts themſelves are at a ſtand, and have nothing to ſay; thoſe copious expoſitors of other places, who, with a vain and pompous overflow of learning, poured out on paſſages plain and eaſy in themſelves, are very free of their words and pains, where there is no need. Convince yourſelf fully by thus ordering your ſtudies, that it is nothing but men's lazineſs, which hath encouraged pedantry to cram, rather than enrich libraries, and to bury good authors under heaps of notes and commentaries; and you will perceive, that ſloth herein hath acted againſt itſelf, and its own intereſt, by multiplying reading and inquiries, and increaſing the pains it endeavoured to avoid."

THIS, though it may ſeem to concern none but direct ſcholars, is of ſo great moment for the right ordering of their education and ſtudies, that I hope I ſhall not be blamed for inſerting of it here, eſpecially if it be conſidered, that it may be of uſe to gentlemen too, when at any time they have a mind to go deeper than the ſurface, and get to themſelves a ſolid, ſatisfactory, and maſterly inſight in any part of learning.

Method. ORDER and conſtancy are ſaid to make the great difference between one man and another; this I am ſure, nothing ſo much clears a learner's way, helps him ſo much on in it, and makes him go ſo eaſy and ſo far in any inquiry, as a good method. His governor ſhould take pains to make him ſenſible of this, accuſtom him to order, and teach him method in all the applications of his thoughts; ſhew him wherein it lies, and the advantages of it; acquaint him with the ſeveral ſorts of it, either from

from general to particulars, or from particulars to what is more general; exerciſe him in both of them; and make him ſee, in what caſes each different method is moſt proper, and to what ends it beſt ſerves. Method.

In hiſtory the order of time ſhould govern; in philoſophical inquiries, that of nature, which in all progreſſion is to go from the place one is then in, to that which joins and lies next to it; and ſo it is in the mind, from the knowledge it ſtands poſſeſſed of already, to that which lies next, and is coherent to it; and ſo on to what it aims at, by the ſimpleſt and moſt uncompounded parts it can divide the matter into. To this purpoſe, it will be of great uſe to his pupil to accuſtom him to diſtinguiſh well, that is, to have diſtinct notions, where-ever the mind can find any real difference; but as carefully to avoid diſtinctions in terms, where he has not diſtinct and different clear ideas.

§ 196. Beſides what is to be had from ſtudy and books, there are other accompliſhments neceſſary for a gentleman, to be got by exerciſe, and to which time is to be allowed, and for which maſters muſt be had.

Dancing being that which gives graceful motions all the life, and, above all things, manlineſs and a becoming confidence to young children, I think it cannot be learned too early, after they are once of an age and ſtrength capable of it. But you muſt be ſure to have a good maſter, that knows, and can teach, what is graceful and becoming, and what gives a freedom and eaſineſs to all the motions of the body. One that teaches not this, is worſe than none at all; natural unfaſhionableneſs being much better than apiſh, affected poſtures; and I think it much more paſſable to put off the hat, and make a leg, like an honeſt country gentleman, than like an ill-faſhioned dancing-maſter. For, as for the jigging part, and the figures of dances, I count that little or nothing, farther than as it tends to perfect graceful carriage. Dancing.

§ 197. Musick is thought to have ſome affinity with dancing, and a good hand, upon ſome inſtruments, is by many people mightily valued. But it waſtes ſo much of a young man's time, to gain but a moderate ſkill in it; and engages often in ſuch odd company, that many think it much better ſpared: and I have, amongſt men of parts and buſineſs, ſo ſeldom heard any one commended or eſteemed for having an excellency in muſick, that amongſt all thoſe things, that ever came into the liſt of accompliſhments, I think I may give it the laſt place. Our ſhort lives will not ſerve us for the attainment of all things; nor can our minds be always intent on ſomething to be learned. The weakneſs of our conſtitutions, both of mind and body, requires that we ſhould be often unbent: and he that will make a good uſe of any part of his life, muſt allow a large portion of it to recreation. At leaſt this muſt not be denied to young people, unleſs, whilſt you with too much haſte make them old, you have the diſpleaſure to ſet them in their graves, or a ſecond childhood, ſooner than you could wiſh. And therefore I think, that the time and pains allotted to ſerious improvements, ſhould be employed about things of moſt uſe and conſequence, and that too in the methods the moſt eaſy and Muſick.

Muſick. and ſhort, that could be at any rate obtained; and perhaps, as I have above ſaid, it would be none of the leaſt ſecrets of education, to make the exerciſes in the body and the mind, the recreation one to another. I doubt not but that ſomething might be done in it, by a prudent man, that would well conſider the temper and inclination of his pupil. For he that is wearied either with ſtudy or dancing, does not deſire preſently to go to ſleep; but to do ſomething elſe which may divert and delight him. But this muſt be always remembered, that nothing can come into the account of recreation, that is not done with delight.

§ 198. FENCING, and riding the great horſe, are looked upon as ſo neceſſary parts of breeding, that it would be thought a great omiſſion to neglect them: the latter of the two being for the moſt part to be learned only in great towns, is one of the beſt exerciſes for health, which is to be had in thoſe places of eaſe and luxury; and, upon that account, makes a fit part of a young gentleman's employment, during his abode there. And, as far as it conduces to give a man a firm and graceful ſeat on horſeback, and to make him able to teach his horſe to ſtop, and turn quick, and to reſt on his haunches, is of uſe to a gentleman both in peace and war. But, whether it be of moment enough to be made a buſineſs of, and deſerve to take up more of his time, than ſhould barely for his health be employed, at due intervals, in ſome ſuch vigorous exerciſe, I ſhall leave to the diſcretion of parents and tutors; who will do well to remember, in all the parts of education, that moſt time and application is to be beſtowed on that, which is like to be of greateſt conſequence, and frequenteſt uſe, in the ordinary courſe and occurrences of that life the young man is deſigned for.

Fencing. § 199. As for fencing, it ſeems to me a good exerciſe for health, but dangerous to the life, the confidence of their ſkill being apt to engage in quarrels thoſe that think they have learned to uſe their ſwords. This preſumption makes them often more touchy than needs, on points of honour, and ſlight or no provocations. Young men in their warm blood are forward to think they have in vain learned to fence, if they never ſhew their ſkill and courage in a duel; and they ſeem to have reaſon. But how many ſad tragedies that reaſon has been the occaſion of, the tears of many a mother can witneſs. A man that cannot fence, will be more careful to keep out of bullies and gameſters company, and will not be half ſo apt to ſtand upon punctilios, nor to give affronts, or fiercely juſtify them when given, which is that which uſually makes the quarrel. And when a man is in the field, a moderate ſkill in fencing rather expoſes him to the ſword of his enemy, than ſecures him from it. And certainly a man of courage, who cannot fence at all, and therefore will put all upon one thruſt, and not ſtand parrying, has the odds againſt a moderate fencer, eſpecially if he has ſkill in wreſtling. And therefore, if any proviſion be to be made againſt ſuch accidents, and a man be to prepare his ſon for duels, I had much rather mine ſhould be a good wreſtler, than an ordinary fencer; which is the moſt a gentleman can attain

attain to in it, unleſs he will be conſtantly in the fencing ſchool, and every day exerciſing. But ſince fencing, and riding the great-horſe, are ſo generally looked upon as neceſſary qualifications in the breeding of a gentleman, it will be hard wholly to deny any one of that rank theſe marks of diſtinction. I ſhall leave it therefore to the father, to conſider, how far the temper of his ſon, and the ſtation he is like to be in, will allow or encourage him to comply with faſhions, which, having very little to do with civil life, were yet formerly unknown to the moſt warlike nations; and ſeem to have added little of force or courage to thoſe who have received them: unleſs we will think martial ſkill or proweſs have been improved by duelling, with which fencing came into, and with which, I preſume, it will go out of the world. Fencing.

§ 200. THESE are my preſent thoughts concerning learning and accompliſhments. The great buſineſs of all is virtue and wiſdom.

"Nullum numen abeſt, ſi ſit prudentia."

Teach him to get a maſtery over his inclinations, and ſubmit his appetite to reaſon. This being obtained, and by conſtant practice ſettled into habit, the hardeſt part of the taſk is over. To bring a young man to this, I know nothing which ſo much contributes, as the love of praiſe and commendation, which ſhould therefore be inſtilled into him by all arts imaginable. Make his mind as ſenſible of credit and ſhame as may be: and when you have done that, you have put a principle into him, which will influence his actions, when you are not by; to which the fear of a little ſmart of a rod is not comparable; and which will be the proper ſtock, whereon afterwards to graft the true principles of morality and religion.

§ 201 I HAVE one thing more to add, which as ſoon as I mention, I ſhall run the danger of being ſuſpected to have forgot what I am about, and what I have above written concerning education, all tending towards a gentleman's calling, with which a trade ſeems wholly to be inconſiſtent. And yet, I cannot forbear to ſay, I would have him learn a trade, a manual trade; nay, two or three, but one more particularly. Trade.

§ 202 THE buſy inclination of children being always to be directed to ſomething that may be uſeful to them, the advantages propoſed from what they are ſet about may be conſidered of two kinds; 1. Where the ſkill itſelf, that is got by exerciſe, is worth the having. Thus ſkill not only in languages, and learned ſciences, but in painting, turning, gardening, tempering and working in iron, and all other uſeful arts, is worth the having. 2. Where the exerciſe itſelf, without any conſideration, is neceſſary or uſeful for health. Knowledge in ſome things is ſo neceſſary to be got by children, whilſt they are young, that ſome part of their time is to be allotted to their improvement in them, though thoſe employments contribute nothing at all to their health: ſuch are reading, and writing, and all other ſedentary ſtudies, for the cultivating of the mind,

Trade. mind, which unavoidably take up a great part of gentlemen's time, quite from their cradles. Other manual arts, which are both got and exerciſed by labour, do many of them, by that exerciſe, not only increaſe our dexterity and ſkill, but contribute to our health too; eſpecially ſuch as employ us in the open air. In theſe, then, health and improvement may be joined together; and of theſe ſhould ſome fit ones be choſen, to be made the recreations of one, whoſe chief buſineſs is with books and ſtudy. In this choice, the age and inclination of the perſon is to be conſidered, and conſtraint always to be avoided in bringing him to it. For command and force may often create, but can never cure an averſion; and whatever any one is brought to by compulſion, he will leave as ſoon as he can, and be little profited, and leſs recreated by, whilſt he is at it.

Painting. § 203. THAT which of all others would pleaſe me beſt, would be a painter, were there not an argument or two againſt it, not eaſy to be anſwered. Firſt, ill painting is one of the worſt things in the world; and to attain a tolerable degree of ſkill in it, requires too much of a man's time. If he has a natural inclination to it, it will endanger the neglect of all other more uſeful ſtudies, to give way to that; and if he have no inclination to it, all the time, pains, and money ſhall be employed in it, will be thrown away to no purpoſe. Another reaſon why I am not for painting in a gentleman, is, becauſe it is a ſedentary recreation, which more employs the mind than the body. A gentleman's more ſerious employment, I look on to be ſtudy; and when that demands relaxation and refreſhment, it ſhould be in ſome exerciſe of the body, which unbends the thought, and confirms the health and ſtrength. For theſe two reaſons I am not for painting.

Gardening. § 204. IN the next place, for a country gentleman, I ſhould propoſe one, or rather both theſe; viz. gardening or huſbandry in general, and working in wood, as a carpenter, joyner, or turner; theſe being fit and
Joyner. healthy recreations for a man of ſtudy or buſineſs. For ſince the mind endures not to be conſtantly employed in the ſame thing or way; and ſedentary or ſtudious men ſhould have ſome exerciſe, that at the ſame time might divert their minds, and employ their bodies; I know none that could do it better for a country gentleman, than theſe two, the one of them affording him exerciſe, when the weather or ſeaſon keeps him from the other. Beſides that, by being ſkilled in the one of them, he will be able to govern and teach his gardener; by the other, contrive and make a great many things both of delight and uſe: though theſe I propoſe not as the chief ends of his labour, but as temptations to it; diverſion from his other more ſerious thoughts and employments, by uſeful and healthy manual exerciſe, being what I chiefly aim at in it.

§ 205. THE great men among the antients underſtood very well how to reconcile manual labour with affairs of ſtate, and thought it no leſſening to their dignity, to make the one the recreation to the other. That indeed which ſeems moſt generally to have employed and diverted their ſpare hours, was agriculture. Gideon amongſt the Jews was taken from

threſhing, as well as Cincinnatus amongſt the Romans, from the plough, to command the armies of their countries againſt their enemies; and it is plain their dexterous handling of the flail, or the plough, and being good workmen with theſe tools, did not hinder their ſkill in arms, nor make them leſs able in the arts of war or government. They were great captains and ſtateſmen, as well as huſbandmen. Cato major, who had with great reputation born all the great offices of the commonwealth, has left us an evidence under his own hand, how much he was verſed in country affairs; and, as I remember, Cyrus thought gardening ſo little beneath the dignity and grandeur of a throne, that he ſhewed Xenophon a large field of fruit-trees, all of his own planting. The records of antiquity, both amongſt Jews and Gentiles, are full of inſtances of this kind, if it were neceſſary to recommend uſeful recreations by examples.

Recreation.

§ 206. NOR let it be thought, that I miſtake, when I call theſe or the like exerciſes of manual arts, diverſions or recreations: for recreation is not being idle, (as every one may obſerve) but eaſing the wearied part by change of buſineſs: and he that thinks diverſion may not lie in hard and painful labour, forgets the early riſing, hard riding, heat, cold and hunger of huntſmen, which is yet known to be the conſtant recreation of men of the greateſt condition. Delving, planting, inoculating, or any the like profitable employments, would be no leſs a diverſion, than any of the idle ſports in faſhion, if men could but be brought to delight in them, which cuſtom and ſkill in a trade will quickly bring any one to do. And I doubt not but there are to be found thoſe, who, being frequently called to cards, or any other play, by thoſe they could not refuſe, have been more tired with theſe recreations, than with any the moſt ſerious employment of life; though the play has been ſuch as they have naturally had no averſion to, and with which they could willingly ſometimes divert themſelves.

§ 207. PLAY, wherein perſons of condition, eſpecially ladies, waſte ſo much of their time, is a plain inſtance to me, that men cannot be perfectly idle; they muſt be doing ſomething. For how elſe could they ſit ſo many hours toiling at that, which generally gives more vexation than delight to people, whilſt they are actually engaged in it? It is certain, gaming leaves no ſatisfaction behind it to thoſe who reflect when it is over; and it no way profits either body or mind: as to their eſtates, if it ſtrike ſo deep as to concern them, it is a trade then, and not a recreation, wherein few, that have any thing elſe to live on, thrive; and, at beſt, a thriving gameſter has but a poor trade on it, who fills his pockets at the price of his reputation.

RECREATION belongs not to people who are ſtrangers to buſineſs, and are not waſted and wearied with the employment of their calling. The ſkill ſhould be, ſo to order their time of recreation, that it may relax and refreſh the part that has been exerciſed, and is tired; and yet do ſomething, which, beſides the preſent delight and eaſe, may produce what will afterwards be profitable. It has been nothing but the vanity and

Recreation. pride of greatneſs and riches, that has brought unprofitable and dangerous paſtimes (as they are called) into faſhion, and perſuaded people into a belief, that the learning or putting their hands to any thing that was uſeful, could not be a diverſion fit for a gentleman. This has been that which has given cards, dice, and drinking, ſo much credit in the world; and a great many throw away their ſpare hours in them, through the prevalency of cuſtom, and want of ſome better employment to fill up the vacancy of leiſure, more than from any real delight is to be found in them. They cannot bear the dead weight of unemployed time lying upon their hands, nor the uneaſineſs it is to do nothing at all; and having never learned any laudable manual art, wherewith to divert themſelves, they have recourſe to thoſe fooliſh or ill ways in uſe, to help off their time, which a rational man, till corrupted by cuſtom, could find very little pleaſure in.

§ 208. I SAY not this, that I would never have a young gentleman accommodate himſelf to the innocent diverſions in faſhion, amongſt thoſe of his age and condition. I am ſo far from having him auſtere and moroſe to that degree, that I would perſuade him to more than ordinary complaiſance for all the gaieties and diverſions of thoſe he converſes with, and be averſe or teſty in nothing they ſhould deſire of him, that might become a gentleman, and an honeſt man: though, as to cards and dice, I think the ſafeſt and beſt way is never to learn any play upon them, and ſo to be incapacitated for thoſe dangerous temptations, and incroaching waſters of uſeful time. But allowance being made for idle and jovial converſation, and all faſhionable becoming recreations; I ſay, a young man will have time enough, from his ſerious and main buſineſs, to learn almoſt any trade.

Trade. It is for want of application, and not of leiſure, that men are not ſkilful in more arts than one; and an hour in a day, conſtantly employed in ſuch a way of diverſion, will carry a man in a ſhort time a great deal farther than he can imagine: which, if it were of no other uſe but to drive the common, vicious, uſeleſs, and dangerous paſtimes out of faſhion, and to ſhew there was no need of them, would deſerve to be encouraged. If men from their youth were weaned from that ſauntering humour, wherein ſome, out of cuſtom, let a good part of their lives run uſeleſly away, without either buſineſs or recreation; they would find time enough to acquire dexterity and ſkill in hundreds of things, which, though remote from their proper callings, would not at all interfere with them. And therefore, I think, for this, as well as other reaſons before-mentioned, a lazy, liſtleſs humour, that idly dreams away the days, is of all others the leaſt to be indulged, or permitted in young people. It is the proper ſtate of one ſick, and out of order in his health, and is tolerable in no-body elſe, of what age or condition ſoever.

§ 209. To the arts above mentioned may be added perfuming, varniſhing, graving, and ſeveral ſorts of working in iron, braſs, and ſilver: and if, as it happens to moſt young gentlemen, that a conſiderable part

of his time be ſpent in a great town, he may learn to cut, poliſh, and ſet precious ſtones, or employ himſelf in grinding and poliſhing optical glaſſes. Amongſt the great variety there is of ingenious manual arts, it will be impoſſible that no one ſhould be found to pleaſe and delight him, unleſs he be either idle or debauched, which is not to be ſuppoſed in a right way of education. And ſince he cannot be always employed in ſtudy, reading, and converſation, there will be many an hour, beſides what his exerciſes will take up, which, if not ſpent this way, will be ſpent worſe. For, I conclude, a young man will ſeldom deſire to ſit perfectly ſtill and idle; or if he does, it is a fault that ought to be mended. Trade.

§ 210. BUT if his miſtaken parents, frightened with the diſgraceful names of mechanick and trade, ſhall have an averſion to any thing of this kind in their children; yet there is one thing relating to trade, which, when they conſider, they will think abſolutely neceſſary for their ſons to learn.

MERCHANTS accounts, though a ſcience not likely to help a gentleman to get an eſtate, yet poſſibly there is not any thing of more uſe and efficacy to make him preſerve the eſtate he has. It is ſeldom obſerved, that he who keeps an account of his income and expences, and thereby has conſtantly under view the courſe of his domeſtic affairs, lets them run to ruin; and I doubt not but many a man gets behind-hand, before he is aware, or runs further on, when he is once in, for want of this care, or the ſkill to do it. I would therefore adviſe all gentlemen to learn perfectly merchants accounts, and not to think it is a ſkill that belongs not to them, becauſe it has received its name from, and has been chiefly practiſed by, men of traffick. Merchants accounts.

§ 211. WHEN my young maſter has once got the ſkill of keeping accounts, (which is a buſineſs of reaſon more than arithmetick) perhaps it will not be amiſs, that his father from thenceforth require him to do it in all his concernments. Not that I would have him ſet down every pint of wine, or play, that coſts him money; the general name of expences will ſerve for ſuch things well enough: nor would I have his father look ſo narrowly into theſe accounts, as to take occaſion from thence to criticiſe on his expences. He muſt remember, that he himſelf was once a young man, and not forget the thoughts he had then, nor the right his ſon has to have the ſame, and to have allowance made for them. If therefore I would have the young gentleman obliged to keep an account, it is not at all to have that way a check upon his expences, (for what the father allows him, he ought to let him be fully maſter of) but only, that he might be brought early into the cuſtom of doing it, and that it might be made familiar and habitual to him betimes, which will be ſo uſeful and neceſſary to be conſtantly practiſed through the whole courſe of his life. A noble Venetian, whoſe ſon wallowed in the plenty of his father's riches, finding his ſon's expences grow very high and extravagant, ordered his caſhier to let him have, for the future, no more

Merchants accounts.

money than what he ſhould count when he received it. This one would think no great reſtraint to a young gentleman's expences, who could freely have as much money as he would tell. But yet this, to one, who was uſed to nothing but the purſuit of his pleaſures, proved a very great trouble, which at laſt ended in this ſober and advantageous reflection: "If it be ſo much pains to me, barely to count the money I would "ſpend; what labour and pains did it coſt my anceſtors, not only to "count, but get it?" This rational thought, ſuggeſted by this little pains impoſed upon him, wrought ſo effectually upon his mind, that it made him take up, and from that time forwards prove a good huſband. This at leaſt every body muſt allow, that nothing is likelier to keep a man within compaſs, than the having conſtantly before his eyes the ſtate of his affairs, in a regular courſe of account.

Travel.

§ 212. THE laſt part uſually in education, is travel, which is commonly thought to finiſh the work, and complete the gentleman. I confeſs, travel into foreign countries has great advantages; but the time uſually choſen to ſend young men abroad, is, I think, of all other, that which renders them leaſt capable of reaping thoſe advantages. Thoſe which are propoſed, as to the main of them, may be reduced to theſe two: firſt, language; ſecondly, an improvement in wiſdom and prudence, by ſeeing men, and converſing with people of tempers, cuſtoms, and ways of living, different from one another, and eſpecially from thoſe of his pariſh and neigbourhood. But from ſixteen to one and twenty, which is the ordinary time of travel, men are, of all their lives, the leaſt ſuited to theſe improvements. The firſt ſeaſon to get foreign languages, and form the tongue to their true accents, I ſhould think, ſhould be from ſeven to fourteen or ſixteen; and then too a tutor with them is uſeful and neceſſary, who may, with thoſe languages, teach them other things. But to put them out of their parents view, at a great diſtance, under a governor, when they think themſelves too much men to be governed by others, and yet have not prudence and experience enough to govern themſelves: what is it but to expoſe them to all the greateſt dangers of their whole life, when they have the leaſt fence and guard againſt them? Till that boiling boiſterous part of life comes in, it may be hoped the tutor may have ſome authority; neither the ſtubbornneſs of age, nor the temptation or examples of others can take him from his tutor's conduct, till fifteen or ſixteen: but then, when he begins to conſort himſelf with men, and thinks himſelf one; when he comes to reliſh, and pride himſelf in, manly vices, and thinks it a ſhame to be any longer under the controul and conduct of another: what can be hoped from even the moſt careful and diſcreet governor, when neither he has power to compel, nor his pupil a diſpoſition to be perſuaded; but, on the contrary, has the advice of warm blood, and prevailing faſhion, to hearken to the temptations of his companions, juſt as wiſe as himſelf, rather than to the perſuaſions of his tutor, who is now looked on as the enemy to his freedom? And when is a man ſo like to miſcarry, as when at the ſame time he is

both raw and unruly? This is the ſeaſon of all his life, that moſt requires the eye and authority of his parents and friends, to govern it. The flexibleneſs of the former part of a man's age, not yet grown up to be headſtrong, makes it more governable and ſafe; and, in the after-part, reaſon and foreſight begin a little to take place, and mind a man of his ſafety and improvement. The time therefore I ſhould think the fitteſt for a young gentleman to be ſent abroad, would be, either when he is younger, under a tutor, whom he might be the better for; or when he is ſome years older, without a governor; when he is of age to govern himſelf, and make obſervations of what he finds in other countries worthy his notice, and that might be of uſe to him after his return: and when too, being thoroughly acquainted with the laws and faſhions, the natural and moral advantages and defects of his own country, he has ſomething to exchange with thoſe abroad, from whoſe converſation he hoped to reap any knowledge. Travel.

§ 213. The ordering of travel otherwiſe, is that, I imagine, which makes ſo many young gentlemen come back ſo little improved by it. And if they do bring home with them any knowledge of the places and people they have ſeen, it is often an admiration of the worſt and vaineſt practices they met with abroad; retaining a reliſh and memory of thoſe things, wherein their liberty took its firſt ſwing, rather than of what ſhould make them better and wiſer after their return. And indeed, how can it be otherwiſe, going abroad at the age they do, under the care of another, who is to provide their neceſſaries, and make their obſervations for them? Thus, under the ſhelter and pretence of a governor, thinking themſelves excuſed from ſtanding upon their own legs, or being accountable for their own conduct, they very ſeldom trouble themſelves with inquiries, or making uſeful obſervations of their own. Their thoughts run after play and pleaſure, wherein they take it as a leſſening to be controuled; but ſeldom trouble themſelves to examine the deſigns, obſerve the addreſs, and conſider the arts, tempers, and inclinations of men they meet with; that ſo they may know how to comport themſelves towards them. Here he that travels with them, is to ſkreen them, get them out, when they have run themſelves into the briars; and in all their miſcarriages be anſwerable for them.

§ 214. I confess, the knowledge of men is ſo great a ſkill, that it is not to be expected a young man ſhould preſently be perfect in it. But yet his going abroad is to little purpoſe, if travel does not ſometimes open his eyes, make him cautious and wary, and accuſtom him to look beyond the outſide, and, under the inoffenſive guard of a civil and obliging carriage, keep himſelf free and ſafe in his converſation with ſtrangers, and all ſorts of people, without forfeiting their good opinion. He that is ſent out to travel at the age, and with the thoughts, of a man deſigning to improve himſelf, may get into the converſation and acquaintance of perſons of condition where he comes: which, though a thing of moſt advantage to a gentleman that travels; yet I aſk, amongſt our young men that

Travel. that go abroad under tutors, What one is there of an hundred, that ever viſits any perſon of quality? much leſs makes an acquaintance with ſuch, from whoſe converſation he may learn what is good breeding in that country, and what is worth obſervation in it; though from ſuch perſons it is, one may learn more in one day, than in a year's rambling from one inn to another. Nor indeed is it to be wondered; for men of worth and parts will not eaſily admit the familiarity of boys, who yet need the care of a tutor: though a young gentleman and ſtranger, appearing like a man, and ſhewing a deſire to inform himſelf in the cuſtoms, manners, laws, and government of the country he is in, will find welcome aſſiſtance and entertainment amongſt the beſt and moſt knowing perſons every-where, who will be ready to receive, encourage, and countenance any ingenious and inquiſitive foreigner.

§ 215. THIS, how true ſoever it be, will not, I fear, alter the cuſtom, which has caſt the time of travel upon the worſt part of a man's life; but for reaſons not taken from their improvement. The young lad muſt not be ventured abroad at eight or ten, for fear of what may happen to the tender child, though he then runs ten times leſs riſque than at ſixteen or eighteen. Nor muſt he ſtay at home till that dangerous heady age be over, becauſe he muſt be back again by one and twenty, to marry and propagate. The father cannot ſtay any longer for the portion, nor the mother for a new ſet of babies to play with: and ſo my young maſter, whatever comes on it, muſt have a wife looked out for him, by that time he is of age; though it would be no prejudice to his ſtrength, his parts, or his iſſue, if it were reſpited for ſome time, and he had leave to get, in years and knowledge, the ſtart a little of his children, who are often found to tread too near upon the heels of their fathers, to the no great ſatisfaction either of ſon or father. But the young gentleman being got within view of matrimony, it is time to leave him to his miſtreſs.

Concluſion. § 216. THOUGH I am now come to a concluſion of what obvious remarks have ſuggeſted to me concerning education, I would not have it thought, that I look on it as a juſt treatiſe on this ſubject. There are a thouſand other things that may need conſideration; eſpecially if one ſhould take in the various tempers, different inclinations, and particular defaults, that are to be found in children; and preſcribe proper remedies. The variety is ſo great, that it would require a volume; nor would that reach it. Each man's mind has ſome peculiarity, as well as his face, that diſtinguiſhes him from all others; and there are poſſibly ſcarce two children, who can be conducted by exactly the ſame method. Beſides that, I think a prince, a nobleman, and an ordinary gentleman's ſon, ſhould have different ways of breeding. But having had here only ſome general views, in reference to the main end and aims in education, and thoſe deſigned for a gentleman's ſon, whom, being then very little, I conſidered only as white paper, or wax, to be moulded and faſhioned as one pleaſes; I have touched little more than thoſe heads, which I judged neceſſary

neceſſary for the breeding of a young gentleman of his condition in general; and have now publiſhed theſe my occaſional thoughts, with this hope, that, though this be far from being a complete treatiſe on this ſubject, or ſuch as that every one may find what will juſt fit his child in it; yet it may give ſome ſmall light to thoſe, whoſe concern for their dear little ones makes them ſo irregularly bold, that they dare venture to conſult their own reaſon, in the education of their children, rather than wholly to rely upon old cuſtom. Concluſion.

POSTHUMOUS

POSTHUMOUS

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE, Esq.

VIZ.

I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding.

II. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all Things in God.

III. A Discourse of Miracles.

IV.* Part of a fourth Letter for Toleration.

V. Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony, first Earl of Shaftesbury.

To which is added,

VI. His new Method of a Common-place-book, written originally in French, and now translated into English.

* This letter, to preserve a connexion of the subject, is in this edition carried to the former three letters on Toleration, in the second volume.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER.

THE enſuing treatiſes are true and genuine remains of the deceaſed author, whoſe name they bear; but, for the greateſt part, received not his laſt hand, being in a great meaſure, little more than ſudden views, intended to be afterwards reviſed and farther looked into; but by ſickneſs, intervention of buſineſs, or preferable enquiries, happened to be thruſt aſide, and ſo lay neglected.

THE "conduct of the underſtanding" he always thought to be a ſubject very well worth conſideration. As any miſcarriages, in that point, accidentally came into his mind, he uſed ſometimes to ſet them down in writing, with thoſe remedies, that he could then think of. This method, though it makes not that haſte to the end, which one could wiſh, yet perhaps is the only one, that can be followed in the caſe; it being here, as in phyſick, impoſſible for a phyſician to deſcribe a diſeaſe, or ſeek remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it. Such particulars of this kind, as occurred to the author, at a time of leiſure, he, as is before ſaid, ſet down in writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduced them into order and method, and to have made a complete treatiſe; whereas now it is only a collection of caſual obſervations, ſufficient to make men ſee ſome faults in the conduct of their underſtanding, and ſuſpect there may be more, and may, perhaps, ſerve to excite others to enquire farther into it, than the author hath done.

"THE examination of P. Malebranche's opinion, of ſeeing "all things in God," ſhews it to be a very groundleſs notion, and was not publiſhed by the author, becauſe he looked upon it to be an opinion that would not ſpread, but was like to die of its ſelf, or at leaſt to do no great harm.

"THE diſcourſe of miracles" was writ for his own ſatisfaction, and never went beyond the firſt draught, and was occaſioned by his reading "Mr. Fleetwood's eſſay on miracles," and the letter writ to him on that ſubject.

"THE fourth letter for toleration" is imperfect, was begun by the author, a little before his death, but never finiſhed. It was deſigned for an anſwer to a book intitled, "A ſecond letter "to the author of the three letters for toleration" &c. which was writ againſt the author's third letter for toleration, about twelve years after the ſaid third letter had been publiſhed.

"THE memoirs of the late Earl of Shafteſbury" are only certain particular facts, ſet down in writing by the author, as they occurred to his memory; if time and health would have permitted him, he had gone on farther, and from ſuch materials have collected and compiled an hiſtory of that noble Peer.

OF THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

UNDERSTANDING.

Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum ſapientis gravitate atque conſtantiâ, quam aut falſum ſentire, aut quod non ſatis exploratè perceptum ſit, & cognitum, ſine ullâ dubitatione defendere?

Cic. de Natura Deorum, lib. 1.

INTRODUCTION.

§. 1. THE laſt reſort a man has recourſe to, in the conduct of himſelf, is his underſtanding: for though we diſtinguiſh the faculties of the mind, and give the ſupreme command to the will, as to an agent; yet the truth is, the man, who is the agent, determines himſelf to this, or that, voluntary action, upon ſome precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge in the underſtanding. No man ever ſets himſelf about any thing, but upon ſome view, or other, which ſerves him for a reaſon for what he does: and whatſoever faculties he employs, the underſtanding, with ſuch light as it has, well or ill informed, conſtantly leads; and by that light, true or falſe, all his operative powers are directed. The will itſelf, how abſolute and uncontroulable ſoever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the underſtanding. Temples have their ſacred images, and we ſee what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But, in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are the inviſible powers, that conſtantly govern them; and to theſe they all univerſally pay a ready ſubmiſſion. It is, therefore, of the higheſt concernment, that great care Introduction.

Introduction. ſhould be taken of the underſtanding, to conduct it right, in the ſearch of knowledge, and in the judgments it makes.

THE Logick, now in uſe, has ſo long poſſeſſed the chair, as the only art taught in the ſchools, for the direction of the mind, in the ſtudy of the arts and ſciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of novelty to ſuſpect, that rules, that have ſerved the learned world theſe two or three thouſand years, and which, without any complaint of defects, the learned have reſted in, are not ſufficient to guide the underſtanding. And I ſhould not doubt, but this attempt would be cenſured as vanity, or preſumption, did not the great Lord Verulam's authority juſtify it; who, not ſervilely thinking learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, becauſe for many ages it had not been, did not reſt in the lazy approbation and applauſe of what was, becauſe it was; but enlarged his mind to what it might be. In his preface to his Novum Organum, concerning Logick, he pronounces thus, "Qui ſummas dialecticæ partes tri-
"buerunt, atque inde fidiſſima ſcientiis præſidia comparari putârunt, ve-
"riſſimè et optimè viderunt intellectum humanum, ſibi permiſſum, me-
"ritò ſuſpectum eſſe debere. Verum infirmior omninò eſt malo medi-
"cina; nec ipſa mali expers. Siquidem dialectica, quæ recepta eſt, licet
"ad civilia et artes, quæ in ſermone et opinione poſitæ ſunt, rectiſſimè
"adhibeatur; naturæ tamen ſubtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit,
"et prenſando quod non capit, ad errores potius ſtabiliendos et quaſi fi-
"gendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit."

"THEY, ſays he, who attributed ſo much to logick, perceived very
"well and truly, that it was not ſafe to truſt the underſtanding to itſelf
"without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil,
"but became a part of it: for the logick, which took place, though it
"might do well enough in civil affairs, and the arts, which conſiſted in
"talk and opinion; yet comes very far ſhort of ſubtlety, in the real per-
"formances of nature; and, catching at what it cannot reach, has ſerved
"to confirm and eſtabliſh errors, rather than to open a way to truth."
And therefore a little after he ſays, "That it is abſolutely neceſſary, that
"a better and perfecter uſe and employment of the mind and underſtand-
"ing ſhould be introduced." "Neceſſariò requiritur ut melior et per-
"fectior mentis et intellectûs humani uſus et adoperatio introducatur."

Parts. § 2. THERE is, it is viſible, great variety in men's underſtandings, and their natural conſtitutions put ſo wide a difference between ſome men, in this reſpect, that art and induſtry would never be able to maſter; and their very natures ſeem to want a foundation to raiſe on it that which other men eaſily attain unto.—Amongſt men of equal education there is great inequality of parts. And the woods of America, as well as the ſchools of Athens, produce men of ſeveral abilities in the ſame kind. Though this be ſo, yet I imagine moſt men come very ſhort of what they might attain unto, in their ſeveral degrees, by a neglect of their underſtandings. A few rules of logick are thought ſufficient, in this caſe, for thoſe who

pretend to the higheſt improvement; whereas I think there are a great many natural defects in the underſtanding, capable of amendment; which are overlooked and wholly neglected. And it is eaſy to perceive, that men are guilty of a great many faults, in the exerciſe and improvement of this faculty of the mind, which hinder them in their progreſs, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives. Some of them I ſhall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for, in the following diſcourſe, Parts.

§ 3. BESIDES the want of determined ideas, and of ſagacity, and exerciſe in finding out, and laying in order, intermediate ideas; there are three miſcarriages, that men are guilty of, in reference to their reaſon, whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that ſervice it might do, and was deſigned for. And he, that reflects upon the actions and diſcourſes of mankind, will find their defects in this kind very frequent, and very obſervable. Reaſonings.

1. THE firſt is of thoſe who ſeldom reaſon at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbours, miniſters, or who elſe they are pleaſed to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for the ſaving of themſelves the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themſelves.

2. THE ſecond is of thoſe who put paſſion in the place of reaſon, and, being reſolved that ſhall govern their actions and arguments, neither uſe their own, nor hearken to other people's reaſon, any farther than it ſuits their humour, intereſt, or party; and theſe one may obſerve commonly content themſelves with words, which have no diſtinct ideas to them, though, in other matters, that they come with an unbiaſſed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talk and hear reaſon, where they have no ſecret inclination, that hinders them from being intractable to it.

3. THE third ſort is of thoſe who readily and ſincerely follow reaſon; but, for want of having that, which one may call large, ſound, round-about ſenſe, have not a full view of all that relates to the queſtion, and may be of moment to decide it. We are all ſhort-ſighted, and very often ſee but one ſide of a matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connexion with it. From this defect I think no man is free. We ſee but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might inſtruct the proudeſt eſteemer of his own parts, how uſeful it is to talk and conſult with others, even ſuch as come ſhort of him in capacity, quickneſs, and penetration: for, ſince no one ſees all, and we generally have different proſpects of the ſame thing, according to our different, as I may ſay, poſitions to it; it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things, which have eſcaped him, and which his reaſon would make uſe of, if they came into his mind. The faculty of reaſoning ſeldom or never deceives thoſe who truſt to it; its conſequences, from what it builds on, are evident and certain; but

Reaſoning. but that, which it oftener, if not only, miſleads us in, is, that the principles from which we conclude, the grounds upon which we bottom our reaſoning, are but a part, ſomething is left out, which ſhould go into the reckoning, to make it juſt and exact. Here we may imagine a vaſt and almoſt infinite advantage, that angels and ſeparate ſpirits may have over us; who, in their ſeveral degrees of elevation above us, may be endowed with more comprehenſive faculties: and ſome of them, perhaps, having perfect and exact views of all finite beings, that come under their conſideration, can, as it were, in the twinkling of an eye, collect together all their ſcattered and almoſt boundleſs relations. A mind ſo furniſhed, what reaſon has it to acquieſce in the certainty of its concluſions!

In this we may ſee the reaſon, why ſome men of ſtudy and thought, that reaſon right, and are lovers of truth, do make no great advances in their diſcoveries of it. Error and truth are uncertainly blended in their minds; their deciſions are lame and defective, and they are very often miſtaken in their judgments: the reaſon whereof is, they converſe but with one ſort of men, they read but one ſort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of one ſort of notions: the truth is, they canton out to themſelves a little Goſhen, in the intellectual world, where light ſhines, and, as they conclude, day bleſſes them; but the reſt of that vaſt expanſum they give up to night and darkneſs, and ſo avoid coming near it. They have a pretty traffick with known correſpondents, in ſome little creek; within that they confine themſelves, and are dexterous managers enough of the wares and products of that corner, with which they content themſelves, but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge, to ſurvey the riches that nature hath ſtored other parts with, no leſs genuine, no leſs ſolid, no leſs uſeful, than what has fallen to their lot, in the admired plenty and ſufficiency of their own little ſpot, which to them contains whatſoever is good in the univerſe. Thoſe who live thus mewed up, within their own contracted territories, and will not look abroad beyond the boundaries that chance, conceit, or lazineſs, has ſet to their enquiries; but live ſeparate from the notions, diſcourſes, and attainments of the reſt of mankind; may not amiſs be repreſented by the inhabitants of the Marian iſlands; who, being ſeparated, by a large tract of ſea, from all communion with the habitable parts of the earth, thought themſelves the only people of the world. And though the ſtraitneſs of the conveniencies of life amongſt them, had never reached ſo far as to the uſe of fire, till the Spaniards, not many years ſince, in their voyages from Acapulco to Manilla, brought it amongſt them; yet, in the want and ignorance of almoſt all things, they looked upon themſelves, even after that the Spaniards had brought, amongſt them, the notice of variety of nations, abounding in ſciences, arts, and conveniencies of life, of which they knew nothing; they looked upon themſelves, I ſay, as the happieſt and wiſeſt people of the univerſe. But, for all that, no-body, I think, will imagine them deep naturaliſts, or ſolid metaphyſicians; no-body

will

will deem the quickeſt-ſighted amongſt them to have very enlarged views in ethicks, or politicks; nor can any one allow the moſt capable amongſt them to be advanced ſo far in his underſtanding, as to have any other knowledge, but of the few little things of his and the neighbouring iſlands, within his commerce; but far enough from that comprehenſive enlargement of mind, which adorns a ſoul devoted to truth, aſſiſted with letters, and a free generation of the ſeveral views and ſentiments of thinking men of all ſides. Let not men, therefore, that would have a ſight of what every one pretends to be deſirous to have a ſight of, truth in its full extent, narrow and blind their own proſpect. Let not men think there is no truth, but in the ſciences that they ſtudy, or books that they read. To prejudge other men's notions, before we have looked into them, is not to ſhew their darkneſs, but to put out our own eyes. "Try all things, hold faſt that which is good," is a divine rule, coming from the Father of light and truth; and it is hard to know, what other way men can come at truth, to lay hold of it, if they do not dig and ſearch for it as for gold and hid treaſure; but he that does ſo, muſt have much earth and rubbiſh, before he gets the pure metal; ſand, and pebbles, and droſs uſually lie blended with it, but the gold is never the leſs gold, and will enrich the man that employs his pains to ſeek and ſeparate it. Neither is there any danger he ſhould be deceived by the mixture. Every man carries about him a touch-ſtone, if he will make uſe of it, to diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial gold from ſuperficial glitterings, truth from appearances. And, indeed, the uſe and benefit of this touch-ſtone, which is natural reaſon, is ſpoiled and loſt only by aſſumed prejudices, overweening preſumption, and narrowing our minds. The want of exerciſing it, in the full extent of things intelligible, is that which weakens and extinguiſhes this noble faculty in us. Trace it, and ſee whether it be not ſo. The day-labourer in a country-village has commonly but a ſmall pittance of knowledge, becauſe his ideas and notions have been confined to the narrow bounds of a poor converſation and employment: the low mechanick of a country-town does ſome-what out-do him; porters and coblers of great cities ſurpaſs them. A country gentleman who, leaving Latin and learning in the univerſity, removes thence to his manſion-houſe, and aſſociates with neighbours of the ſame ſtrain, who reliſh nothing but hunting and a bottle; with thoſe alone he ſpends his time, with thoſe alone he converſes, and can away with no company, whoſe diſcourſe goes beyond what claret and diſſoluteneſs inſpire. Such a patriot, formed in this happy way of improvement, cannot fail, as we ſee, to give notable deciſions upon the bench, at quarter-ſeſſions, and eminent proofs of his ſkill in politicks, when the ſtrength of his purſe and party have advanced him to a more conſpicuous ſtation. To ſuch a one, truly, an ordinary coffee-houſe gleaner of the city is an arrant ſtateſman, and as much ſuperior too, as a man converſant about Whitehall and the court, is to an ordinary ſhop-keeper. To carry this a little farther: Here is one muffled up in the zeal and infallibility of his own

Reaſoning.

Reaſoning.

ſect, and will not touch a book, or enter into debate with a perſon that will queſtion any of thoſe things, which to him are ſacred. Another ſurveys our differences in religion with an equitable and fair indifference, and ſo finds, probably, that none of them are in every thing unexceptionable. Theſe diviſions and ſyſtems were made by men, and carry the mark of fallible on them; and in thoſe, whom he differs from, and till he opened his eyes, had a general prejudice againſt, he meets with more to be ſaid for a great many things, than before he was aware of, or could have imagined. Which of theſe two, now, is moſt likely to judge right, in our religious controverſies, and to be moſt ſtored with truth, the mark all pretend to aim at? All theſe men, that I have inſtanced in, thus unequally furniſhed with truth, and advanced in knowledge, I ſuppoſe of equal natural parts; all the odds between them has been the different ſcope that has been given to their underſtandings to range in, for the gathering up of information, and furniſhing their heads with ideas, and notions and obſervations, whereon to employ their mind, and form their underſtandings.

IT will, poſſibly, be objected, "who is ſufficient for all this?" I anſwer, more than can be imagined. Every one knows what his proper buſineſs is, and what, according to the character he makes of himſelf, the world may juſtly expect of him; and, to anſwer that, he will find he will have time and opportunity enough to furniſh himſelf, if he will not deprive himſelf, by a narrowneſs of ſpirit, of thoſe helps that are at hand. I do not ſay to be a good geographer, that a man ſhould viſit every mountain, river, promontory, and creek, upon the face of the earth, view the buildings, and ſurvey the land every-where, as if he were going to make a purchaſe; but yet every one muſt allow that he ſhall know a country better, that makes often ſallies into it, and traverſes up and down, than he that, like a mill-horſe, goes ſtill round in the ſame track, or keeps within the narrow bounds of a field, or two, that delight him. He that will enquire out the beſt books, in every ſcience, and inform himſelf of the moſt material authors of the ſeveral ſects of philoſophy and religion, will not find it an infinite work to acquaint himſelf with the ſentiments of mankind, concerning the moſt weighty and comprehenſive ſubjects. Let him exerciſe the freedom of his reaſon and underſtanding in ſuch a latitude as this, and his mind will be ſtrengthened, his capacity enlarged, his faculties improved; and the light, which the remote and ſcattered parts of truth will give to one another, will ſo aſſiſt his judgment, that he will ſeldom be widely out, or miſs giving proof of a clear head, and a comprehenſive knowledge. At leaſt, this is the only way I know, to give the underſtanding its due improvement to the full extent of its capacity, and to diſtinguiſh the two moſt different things I know in the world, a logical chicaner from a man of reaſon. Only he, that would thus give the mind its flight, and ſend abroad his enquiries into all parts after truth, muſt be ſure to ſettle in his head determined ideas of all that he employs his thoughts about, and never fail to judge himſelf, and

judge unbiaſſedly, of all that he receives from others, either in their writeings or diſcourſes. Reverence, or prejudice, muſt not be ſuffered to give beauty, or deformity, to any of their opinions. Reaſoning.

§ 4. We are born with faculties and powers capable almoſt of any thing, ſuch at leaſt as would carry us farther than can eaſily be imagined: but it is only the exerciſe of thoſe powers, which gives us ability and ſkill in any thing, and leads us towards perfection. Of practice and habits.

A middle-aged ploughman will ſcarce ever be brought to the carriage and language of a gentleman, though his body be as well proportioned, and his joints as ſupple, and his natural parts not any way inferior. The legs of a dancing-maſter, and the fingers of a muſician, fall as it were naturally, without thought, or pains, into regular and admirable motions. Bid them change their parts, and they will in vain endeavour to produce like motions in the members not uſed to them, and it will require length of time and long practice to attain but ſome degrees of a like ability. What incredible and aſtoniſhing actions do we find rope-dancers and tumblers bring their bodies to! Not but that ſundry, in almoſt all manual arts, are as wonderful; but I name thoſe which the world takes notice of for ſuch, becauſe, on that very account, they give money to ſee them. All theſe admired motions, beyond the reach and almoſt conception of unpractiſed ſpectators, are nothing but the mere effects of the uſe and induſtry in men, whoſe bodies have nothing peculiar in them from thoſe of the amazed lookers-on.

As it is in the body, ſo it is in the mind; practice makes it what it is, and moſt even of thoſe excellencies, which are looked on as natural endowments, will be found, when examined into more narrowly, to be the product of exerciſe, and to be raiſed to that pitch, only by repeated actions. Some men are remarked for pleaſantneſs in raillery; others for apologues and appoſite diverting ſtories. This is apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature, and that the rather, becauſe it is not got by rules, and thoſe who excel in either of them, never purpoſely ſet themſelves to the ſtudy of it, as an art to be learnt. But yet it is true, that at firſt ſome lucky hit, which took with ſome-body, and gained him commendation, encouraged him to try again, inclined his thoughts and endeavours that way, till at laſt he inſenſibly got a facility in it, without perceiving how; and that is attributed wholly to nature, which was much more the effect of uſe and practice. I do not deny, that natural diſpoſition may often give the firſt riſe to it, but that never carries a man far, without uſe and exerciſe; and it is practice alone, that brings the powers of the mind, as well as thoſe of the body, to their perfection. Many a good poetick vein is buried under a trade, and never produces any thing for want of improvement. We ſee the ways of diſcourſe and reaſoning are very different, even concerning the ſame matter, at court and in the univerſity. And he that will go but from Weſtminſter-Hall to the Exchange, will find a different genius and turn in their ways of talking; and yet one cannot think that all whoſe lot fell in in the city,

Of practice and habits.

were born with different parts from thoſe who were bred at the univerſity, or inns of court.

To what purpoſe all this, but to ſhew that the difference, ſo obſervable in men's underſtandings and parts, does not ariſe ſo much from their natural faculties, as acquired habits. He would be laughed at, that ſhould go about to make a fine dancer out of a country hedger, at paſt fifty. And he will not have much better ſucceſs, who ſhall endeavour, at that age, to make a man reaſon well, or ſpeak handſomely, who has never been uſed to it, though you ſhould lay before him a collection of all the beſt precepts of logick or oratory. No-body is made any thing by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory; practice muſt ſettle the habit of doing, without reflecting on the rule; and you may as well hope to make a good painter, or muſician, extempore, by a lecture and inſtruction in the arts of muſick and painting, as a coherent thinker, or a ſtrict reaſoner, by a ſet of rules, ſhewing him wherein right reaſoning conſiſts.

THIS being ſo, that defects and weakneſs in men's underſtandings, as well as other faculties, come from want of a right uſe of their own minds; I am apt to think, the fault is generally miſlaid upon nature, and there is often a complaint of want of parts, when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. We ſee men frequently dexterous and ſharp enough in making a bargain, who, if you reaſon with them about matters of religion, appear perfectly ſtupid.

Ideas.

§ 5. I WILL not here, in what relates to the right conduct and improvement of the underſtanding, repeat again the getting clear and determined ideas, and the employing our thoughts rather about them, than about ſounds put for them; nor of ſettling the ſignification of words, which we uſe with ourſelves, in the ſearch of truth, or with others, in diſcourſing about it. Thoſe hindrances of our underſtandings in the purſuit of knowledge I have ſufficiently enlarged upon, in another place; ſo that nothing more needs here to be ſaid of thoſe matters.

Principles.

§ 6. THERE is another fault, that ſtops, or miſleads, men in their knowledge, which I have alſo ſpoken ſomething of, but yet is neceſſary to mention here again, that we may examine it to the bottom, and ſee the root it ſprings from; and that is a cuſtom of taking up with principles that are not ſelf-evident, and very often not ſo much as true. It is not unuſual to ſee men reſt their opinions upon foundations that have no more certainty and ſolidity than the propoſitions built on them, and embraced for their ſake. Such foundations are theſe and the like, viz.—the founders, or leaders, of my party are good men, and therefore their tenets are true;—it is the opinion of a ſect that is erroneous, therefore it is falſe:—it hath been long received in the world, therefore it is true; or—it is new, and therefore falſe.

THESE, and many the like, which are by no means the meaſures of truth and falſhood, the generality of men make the ſtandards by which they accuſtom their underſtanding to judge. And thus, they falling into

into a habit of determining of truth, and falſhood, by ſuch wrong meaſures, it is no wonder they ſhould embrace error for certainty, and be very poſitive in things they have no ground for. Principles.

THERE is not any, who pretends to the leaſt reaſon, but, when any of theſe his falſe maxims are brought to the teſt, muſt acknowledge them to be fallible, and ſuch as he will not allow in thoſe that differ from him; and yet, after he is convinced of this, you ſhall ſee him go on in the uſe of them, and, the very next occaſion that offers, argue again upon the ſame grounds. Would one not be ready to think that men are willing to impoſe upon themſelves and miſlead their own underſtandings, who conduct them by ſuch wrong meaſures, even after they ſee they cannot be relied on? But yet they will not appear ſo blameable, as may be thought at firſt ſight: for I think there are a great many, that argue thus in earneſt, and do it not to impoſe on themſelves, or others. They are perſuaded of what they ſay, and think there is weight in it, though in a like caſe they have been convinced there is none; but men would be intolerable to themſelves, and contemptible to others, if they ſhould embrace opinions without any ground, and hold what they could give no manner of reaſon for. True or falſe, ſolid or ſandy, the mind muſt have ſome foundation to reſt itſelf upon; and, as I have remarked in another place, it no ſooner entertains any propoſition, but it preſently haſtens to ſome hypotheſis to bottom it on; till then it is unquiet and unſettled. So much do our own very tempers diſpoſe us to a right uſe of our underſtandings, if we would follow, as we ſhould, the inclinations of our nature.

IN ſome matters of concernment, eſpecially thoſe of religion, men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain; they muſt embrace and profeſs ſome tenets or other; and it would be a ſhame, nay a contradiction too heavy for any one's mind to lie conſtantly under, for him to pretend ſeriouſly to be perſuaded of the truth of any religion, and yet not to be able to give any reaſon of his belief, or to ſay any thing for his preference of this to any other opinion: and therefore they muſt make uſe of ſome principles or other, and thoſe can be no other than ſuch as they have and can manage; and to ſay they are not in earneſt perſuaded by them, and do not reſt upon thoſe they make uſe of, is contrary to experience, and to alledge that they are not miſled, when we complain they are.

IF this be ſo, it will be urged, why then do they not make uſe of ſure and unqueſtionable principles, rather than reſt on ſuch grounds as may deceive them, and will, as is viſible, ſerve to ſupport error, as well as truth?

To this I anſwer, the reaſon why they do not make uſe of better and ſurer principles, is becauſe they cannot: But this inability proceeds not from want of natural parts (for thoſe few, whoſe caſe that is, are to be excuſed) but for want of uſe and exerciſe. Few men are, from their youth, accuſtomed to ſtrict reaſoning, and to trace the dependence of any

Principles. any truth, in a long train of conſequences, to its remote principles, and to obſerve its connexion; and he that by frequent practice has not been uſed to this employment of his underſtanding, it is no more wonder, that he ſhould not, when he is grown into years, be able to bring his mind to it, than that he ſhould not be, on a ſudden, able to grave, or deſign, dance on the ropes, or write a good hand, who has never practiſed either of them.

NAY, the moſt of men are ſo wholly ſtrangers to this, that they do not ſo much as perceive their want of it; they diſpatch the ordinary buſineſs of their callings by rote, as we ſay, as they have learnt it; and if at any time they miſs ſucceſs, they impute it to any thing, rather than want of thought or ſkill; that they conclude (becauſe they know no better) they have in perfection: or, if there be any ſubject that intereſt, or fancy, has recommended to their thoughts, their reaſoning about it is ſtill after their own faſhion; be it better or worſe, it ſerves their turns, and is the beſt they are acquainted with; and, therefore, when they are led by it into miſtakes, and their buſineſs ſucceeds accordingly, they impute it to any croſs accident, or default of others, rather than to their own want of underſtanding; that is what no-body diſcovers, or complains of, in himſelf. Whatſoever made his buſineſs to miſcarry, it was not want of right thought and judgment in himſelf: he ſees no ſuch defect in himſelf, but is ſatisfied that he carries on his deſigns well enough by his own reaſoning, or at leaſt ſhould have done, had it not been for unlucky traverſes not in his power. Thus, being content with this ſhort and very imperfect uſe of his underſtanding, he never troubles himſelf to ſeek out methods of improving his mind, and lives all his life without any notion of cloſe reaſoning, in a continued connexion of a long train of conſequences, from ſure foundations; ſuch as is requiſite for the making out and clearing moſt of the ſpeculative truths moſt men own to believe, and are moſt concerned in. Not to mention here, what I ſhall have occaſion to inſiſt on, by and by, more fully, viz. that in many caſes it is not one ſeries of conſequences will ſerve the turn, but many different and oppoſite deductions muſt be examined and laid together, before a man can come to make a right judgment of the point in queſtion. What then can be expected from men, that neither ſee the want of any ſuch kind of reaſoning, as this; nor, if they do, know how to ſet about it, or could perform it? You may as well ſet a country-man, who ſcarce knows the figures, and never caſt up a ſum of three particulars, to ſtate a merchant's long account, and find the true balance of it.

WHAT then ſhould be done in the caſe? I anſwer, we ſhould always remember what I ſaid above, that the faculties of our ſouls are improved and made uſeful to us, juſt after the ſame manner as our bodies are. Would you have a man write or paint, dance or fence well, or perform any other manual operation dexterouſly and with eaſe; let him have ever ſo much vigour and activity, ſuppleneſs and addreſs naturally, yet no-body expects this from him, unleſs he has been uſed to it, and has employed

employed time and pains in faſhioning and forming his hand, or outward parts, to theſe motions. Juſt ſo it is in the mind; would you have a man reaſon well, you muſt uſe him to it betimes, exerciſe his mind in obſerving the connexion of ideas, and following them in train. Nothing does this better than mathematicks; which, therefore, I think ſhould be taught all thoſe who have the time and opportunity; not ſo much to make them mathematicians, as to make them reaſonable creatures; for though we all call our ſelves ſo, becauſe we are born to it, if we pleaſe; yet we may truly ſay, nature gives us but the ſeeds of it; we are born to be, if we pleaſe, rational creatures, but it is uſe and exerciſe only that makes us ſo, and we are, indeed, ſo no farther than induſtry and application has carried us. And, therefore, in ways of reaſoning, which men have not been uſed to, he that will obſerve the concluſions they take up, muſt be ſatisfied they are not all rational. Principles.

THIS has been the leſs taken notice of, becauſe every one, in his private affairs, uſes ſome ſort of reaſoning or other, enough to denominate him reaſonable. But the miſtake is, that he that is found reaſonable in one thing, is concluded to be ſo in all, and to think, or to ſay otherwiſe, is thought ſo unjuſt an affront, and ſo ſenſeleſs a cenſure, that no-body ventures to do it. It looks like the degradation of a man below the dignity of his nature. It is true, that he that reaſons well in any one thing, has a mind naturally capable of reaſoning well in others, and to the ſame degree of ſtrength and clearneſs, and poſſibly much greater, had his underſtanding been ſo employed. But it is as true that he who can reaſon well to-day, about one ſort of matters, cannot at all reaſon to-day about others, though perhaps a year hence he may. But wherever a man's rational faculty fails him, and will not ſerve him to reaſon, there we cannot ſay he is rational, how capable ſoever he may be, by time and exerciſe, to become ſo.

TRY in men of low and mean education, who have never elevated their thoughts above the ſpade and the plough, nor looked beyond the ordinary drudgery of a day-labourer. Take the thoughts of ſuch an one, uſed for many years to one track, out of that narrow compaſs he has been, all his life, confined to, you will find him no more capable of reaſoning than almoſt a perfect natural. Some one or two rules, on which their concluſions immediately depend, you will find in moſt men have governed all their thoughts; theſe, true or falſe, have been the maxims they have been guided by: take theſe from them, and they are perfectly at a loſs, their compaſs and pole-ſtar then are gone, and their underſtanding is perfectly at a nonplus; and therefore they either immediately return to their old maxims again, as the foundations of all truth to them, notwithſtanding all that can be ſaid to ſhew their weakneſs; or if they give them up to their reaſons, they, with them, give up all truth and farther enquiry, and think there is no ſuch thing as certainty. For if you would enlarge their thoughts, and ſettle them upon more remote

Principles.

mote and ſurer principles, they either cannot eaſily apprehend them; or, if they can, know not what uſe to make of them; for long deductions from remote principles are what they have not been uſed to, and cannot manage.

WHAT then, can grown men never be improved, or enlarged in their underſtandings? I ſay not ſo; but this I think I may ſay, that it will not be done without induſtry and application, which will require more time and pains than grown men, ſettled in their courſe of life, will allow to it, and therefore very ſeldom is done. And this very capacity of attaining it, by uſe and exerciſe only, brings us back to that which I laid down before, that it is only practice that improves our minds as well as bodies, and we muſt expect nothing from our underſtandings, any farther than they are perfected by habits.

THE Americans are not all born with worſe underſtandings than the Europeans, though we ſee none of them have ſuch reaches in the arts and ſciences. And, among the children of a poor country-man, the lucky chance of education, and getting into the world, gives one infinitely the ſuperiority in parts over the reſt, who, continuing at home, had continued alſo juſt of the ſame ſize with his brethren.

HE that has to do with young ſcholars, eſpecially in mathematicks, may perceive how their minds open by degrees, and how it is exerciſe alone that opens them. Sometimes they will ſtick a long time at a part of a demonſtration, not for want of will and application, but really for want of perceiving the connexion of two ideas, that, to one whoſe underſtanding is more exerciſed, is as viſible as any thing can be. The ſame would be with a grown man beginning to ſtudy mathematicks, the underſtanding, for want of uſe, often ſticks in every plain way, and he himſelf that is ſo puzzled, when he comes to ſee the connexion, wonders what it was he ſtuck at, in a caſe ſo plain.

Mathematicks.

§ 7. I HAVE mentioned mathematicks as a way to ſettle in the mind an habit of reaſoning cloſely and in train; not that I think it neceſſary that all men ſhould be deep mathematicians, but that, having got the way of reaſoning, which that ſtudy neceſſarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge, as they ſhall have occaſion. For, in all ſorts of reaſoning, every ſingle argument ſhould be managed as a mathematical demonſtration; the connexion and dependence of ideas ſhould be followed, till the mind is brought to the ſource on which it bottoms, and obſerves the coherence all along, though in proofs of probability one ſuch train is not enough to ſettle the judgment, as in demonſtrative knowledge.

WHERE a truth is made out by one demonſtration, there needs no farther enquiry: but in probabilities, where there wants demonſtration to eſtabliſh the truth beyond doubt, there it is not enough to trace one argument to its ſource, and obſerve its ſtrength and weakneſs, but all the arguments, after having been ſo examined on both ſides, muſt be laid in

balance one againſt another, and, upon the whole, the underſtanding determine its aſſent. Mathematicks.

THIS is a way of reaſoning the underſtanding ſhould be accuſtomed to, which is ſo different from what the illiterate are uſed to, that even learned men oftentimes ſeem to have very little or no notion of it. Nor is it to be wondered, ſince the way of diſputing, in the ſchools, leads them quite away from it, by inſiſting on one topical argument, by the ſucceſs of which the truth, or falſhood, of the queſtion is to be determined, and victory adjudged to the opponent, or defendant; which is all one as if one ſhould balance an account by one ſum, charged and diſcharged, when there are an hundred others to be taken into conſideration.

THIS, therefore, it would be well if men's minds were accuſtomed to, and that early; that they might not erect their opinions upon one ſingle view, when ſo many other are requiſite to make up the account, and muſt come into the reckoning, before a man can form a right judgment. This would enlarge their minds, and give a due freedom to their underſtandings, that they might not be led into error by preſumption, lazineſs, or precipitancy; for I think no-body can approve ſuch a conduct of the underſtanding, as ſhould miſlead it from truth, though it be ever ſo much in faſhion to make uſe of it.

To this perhaps it will be objected, that to manage the underſtanding as I propoſe, would require every man to be a ſcholar, and to be furniſhed with all the materials of knowledge, and exerciſed in all the ways of reaſoning. To which I anſwer, that it is a ſhame for thoſe that have time, and the means to attain knowledge, to want any helps, or aſſiſtance, for the improvement of their underſtandings, that are to be got; and to ſuch I would be thought here chiefly to ſpeak. Thoſe methinks, who, by the induſtry and parts of their anceſtors, have been ſet free from a conſtant drudgery to their backs and their bellies, ſhould beſtow ſome of their ſpare time on their heads, and open their minds, by ſome trials and eſſays, in all the ſorts and matters of reaſoning. I have before mentioned mathematicks, wherein algebra gives new helps and views to the underſtanding. If I propoſe theſe, it is not, as I ſaid, to make every man a thorough mathematician, or a deep algebraiſt; but yet I think the ſtudy of them is of infinite uſe, even to grown men; firſt, by experimentally convincing them, that to make any one reaſon well, it is not enough to have parts wherewith he is ſatisfied, and that ſerve him well enough in his ordinary courſe. A man in thoſe ſtudies will ſee, that however good he may think his underſtanding, yet in many things, and thoſe very viſible, it may fail him. This would take off that preſumption that moſt men have of themſelves in this part; and they would not be ſo apt to think their minds wanted no helps to enlarge them, that there could be nothing added to the acuteneſs and penetration of their underſtandings.

SECONDLY, The ſtudy of mathematicks would ſhew them the neceſſity there is in reaſoning, to ſeparate all the diſtinct ideas, and ſee the habitudes that all thoſe concerned in the preſent enquiry have to one another,

Mathematicks.

ther, and to lay by thoſe which relate not to the propoſition in hand, and wholly to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that which, in other ſubjects, beſides quantity, is what is abſolutely requiſite to juſt reaſoning, though in them it is not ſo eaſily obſerved, nor ſo carefully practiſed. In thoſe parts of knowledge where it is thought demonſtration has nothing to do, men reaſon as it were in the lump; and if, upon a ſummary and confuſed view, or upon a partial conſideration, they can raiſe the appearance of a probability, they uſually reſt content; eſpecially if it be in a diſpute where every little ſtraw is laid hold on, and every thing that can but be drawn-in any way to give colour to the argument, is advanced with oſtentation. But that mind is not in a poſture to find the truth, that does not diſtinctly take all the parts aſunder, and, omitting what is not at all to the point, draw a concluſion from the reſult of all the particulars, which any way influence it. There is another no leſs uſeful habit to be got by an application to mathematical demonſtrations, and that is, of uſing the mind to a long train of conſequences: but having mentioned that already, I ſhall not again here repeat it.

As to men whoſe fortunes and time are narrower, what may ſuffice them is not of that vaſt extent as may be imagined, and ſo comes not within the objection.

NO-BODY is under an obligation to know every thing. Knowledge and ſcience in general, is the buſineſs only of thoſe who are at eaſe and leiſure. Thoſe who have particular callings ought to underſtand them; and it is no unreaſonable propoſal, nor impoſſible to be compaſſed, that they ſhould think and reaſon right about what is their daily employment. This one cannot think them incapable of, without levelling them with the brutes, and charging them with a ſtupidity below the rank of rational creatures.

Religion.

§ 8. BESIDES his particular calling for the ſupport of this life, every one has a concern in a future life, which he is bound to look after. This engages his thoughts in religion; and here it mightily lies upon him to underſtand and reaſon right. Men, therefore, cannot be excuſed from underſtanding the words, and framing the general notions relating to religion, right. The one day of ſeven, beſides other days of reſt, allows in the Chriſtian world time enough for this (had they no other idle hours) if they would but make uſe of theſe vacancies from their daily labour, and apply themſelves to an improvement of knowledge with as much diligence as they often do to a great many other things that are uſeleſs, and had but thoſe that would enter them according to their ſeveral capacities in a right way to this knowledge. The original make of their minds is like that of other men, and they would be found not to want underſtanding fit to receive the knowledge of religion, if they were a little encouraged and helped in it, as they ſhould be. For there are inſtances of very mean people, who have raiſed their minds to a great ſenſe and underſtanding of religion: and though theſe have not been ſo frequent

quent as could be wiſhed; yet they are enough to clear that condition of life from a neceſſity of groſs ignorance, and to ſhew that more might be brought to be rational creatures and Chriſtians (for they can hardly be thought really to be ſo, who, wearing the name, know not ſo much as the very principles of that religion) if due care were taken of them. For, if I miſtake not, the peaſantry lately in France (a rank of people under a much heavier preſſure of want and poverty, than the day-labourers in England) of the reformed religion underſtood it much better, and could ſay more for it, than thoſe of a higher condition among us. Religion.

But if it ſhall be concluded that the meaner ſort of people muſt give themſelves up to brutiſh ſtupidity in the things of their neareſt concernment, which I ſee no reaſon for, this excuſes not thoſe of a freer fortune and education, if they neglect their underſtandings, and take no care to employ them as they ought, and ſet them right in the knowledge of thoſe things for which principally they were given them. At leaſt thoſe, whoſe plentiful fortunes allow them the opportunities and helps of improvements, are not ſo few, but that it might be hoped great advancements might be made in knowledge of all kinds, eſpecially in that of the greateſt concern and largeſt views, if men would make a right uſe of their faculties, and ſtudy their own underſtandings.

§ 9. Outward corporeal objects, that conſtantly importune our ſenſes and captivate our appetites, fail not to fill our heads with lively and laſting ideas of that kind. Here the mind needs not to be ſet upon getting greater ſtore; they offer themſelves faſt enough, and are uſually entertained in ſuch plenty, and lodged ſo carefully, that the mind wants room, or attention, for others that it has more uſe and need of. To fit the underſtanding, therefore, for ſuch reaſoning as I have been above ſpeaking of, care ſhould be taken to fill it with moral and more abſtract ideas; for theſe not offering themſelves to the ſenſes, but being to be framed to the underſtanding, people are generally ſo neglectful of a faculty they are apt to think wants nothing, that I fear moſt men's minds are more unfurniſhed with ſuch ideas than is imagined. They often uſe the words, and how can they be ſuſpected to want the ideas? What I have ſaid in the third book of my Eſſay, will excuſe me from any other anſwer to this queſtion. But to convince people of what moment it is to their underſtandings to be furniſhed with ſuch abſtract ideas, ſteady and ſettled in them, give me leave to aſk, how any one ſhall be able to know whether he be obliged to be juſt, if he has not eſtabliſhed ideas in his mind of obligation and of juſtice; ſince knowledge conſiſts in nothing but the perceived agreement or diſagreement of thoſe ideas? and ſo of all others the like, which concern our lives and manners. And if men do find a difficulty to ſee the agreement or diſagreement of two angles, which lie before their eyes, unalterable in a diagram; how utterly impoſſible will it be to perceive it in ideas that have no other ſenſible objects to repreſent them to the mind but ſounds; with which they have no manner of conformity, and therefore had need to be clearly ſettled Ideas.

in the mind themſelves, if we would make any clear judgment about them? This, therefore, is one of the firſt things the mind ſhould be employed about, in the right conduct of the underſtanding, without which it is impoſſible it ſhould be capable of reaſoning right about thoſe matters. But in theſe, and all other ideas, care muſt be taken that they harbour no inconſiſtencies, and that they have a real exiſtence where real exiſtence is ſuppoſed; and are not mere chimeras with a ſuppoſed exiſtence.

Prejudice.

§ 10. EVERY one is forward to complain of the prejudices that miſlead other men or parties, as if he were free, and had none of his own. This being objected on all ſides, it is agreed, that it is a fault and an hindrance to knowledge. What now is the cure? No other but this, that every man ſhould let alone others prejudices, and examine his own. No-body is convinced of his by the accuſation of another; he recriminates by the ſame rule, and is clear. The only way to remove this great cauſe of ignorance and error out of the world, is, for every one impartially to examine himſelf. If others will not deal fairly with their own minds, does that make my errors truths? or ought it to make me in love with them, and willing to impoſe on myſelf? If others love cataracts on their eyes, ſhould that hinder me from couching of mine as ſoon as I can? Every one declares againſt blindneſs, and yet who almoſt is not fond of that which dims his ſight, and keeps the clear light out of his mind, which ſhould lead him into truth and knowledge? Falſe or doubtful poſitions, relied upon as unqueſtionable maxims, keep thoſe in the dark from truth who build on them. Such are uſually the prejudices imbibed from education, party, reverence, faſhion, intereſt, &c. This is the mote which every one ſees in his brother's eye, but never regards the beam in his own. For who is there almoſt that is ever brought fairly to examine his own principles, and ſee whether they are ſuch as will bear the trial? But yet this ſhould be one of the firſt things every one ſhould ſet about, and be ſcrupulous in, who would rightly conduct his underſtanding in the ſearch of truth and knowledge.

To thoſe who are willing to get rid of this great hindrance of knowledge, (for to ſuch only I write) to thoſe who would ſhake off this great and dangerous impoſtor, prejudice, who dreſſes up falſhood in the likeneſs of truth, and ſo dexterouſly hoodwinks men's minds, as to keep them in the dark, with a belief that they are more in the light than any that do not ſee with their eyes; I ſhall offer this one mark whereby prejudice may be known. He that is ſtrongly of any opinion, muſt ſuppoſe (unleſs he be ſelf-condemned) that his perſuaſion is built upon good grounds; and that his aſſent is no greater than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him to; and that they are arguments, and not inclination, or fancy, that make him ſo confident and poſitive in his tenets. Now if, after all his profeſſion, he cannot bear any oppoſition to his opinion, if he cannot ſo much as give a patient hearing, much leſs examine and weigh the arguments on the other ſide, does he not plainly confeſs it

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is prejudice governs him? and it is not the evidence of truth, but ſome lazy anticipation, ſome beloved preſumption, that he deſires to reſt undiſturbed in. For, if what he holds be, as he gives out, well fenced with evidence, and he ſees it to be true, what need he fear to put it to the proof? If his opinion be ſettled upon a firm foundation, if the arguments that ſupport it, and have obtained his aſſent, be clear, good, and convincing, why ſhould he be ſhy to have it tried whether they be proof or not? He whoſe aſſent goes beyond this evidence, owes this exceſs of his adherence only to prejudice, and does in effect own it, when he refuſes to hear what is offered againſt it; declaring thereby, that it is not evidence he ſeeks, but the quiet enjoyment of the opinion he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may ſtand in oppoſition to it, unheard and unexamined; which, what is it but prejudice? "qui æquum ſta-" tuerit, parte inauditâ alterâ, etiamſi æquum ſtatuerit, haud æquus fuerit." He that would acquit himſelf in this caſe as a lover of truth, not giving way to any pre-occupation, or biaſs, that may miſlead him, muſt do two things that are not very common, nor very eaſy. Prejudice.

§ 11. FIRST, he muſt not be in love with any opinion, or wiſh it to be true, till he knows it to be ſo, and then he will not need to wiſh it: for nothing that is falſe can deſerve our good wiſhes, nor a deſire that it ſhould have the place and force of truth; and yet nothing is more frequent than this. Men are fond of certain tenets upon no other evidence but reſpect and cuſtom, and think they muſt maintain them, or all is gone; though they have never examined the ground they ſtand on, nor have ever made them out to themſelves, or can make them out to others: we ſhould contend earneſtly for the truth, but we ſhould firſt be ſure that it is truth, or elſe we fight againſt God, who is the God of truth, and do the work of the devil, who is the father and propagator of lyes; and our zeal, though ever ſo warm, will not excuſe us, for this is plainly prejudice. Indifferency.

§ 12. SECONDLY, he muſt do that which he will find himſelf very averſe to, as judging the thing unneceſſary, or himſelf incapable of doing it. He muſt try whether his principles be certainly true, or not, and how far he may ſafely rely upon them. This, whether fewer have the heart or the ſkill to do, I ſhall not determine; but this, I am ſure, is that which every one ought to do, who profeſſes to love truth, and would not impoſe upon himſelf; which is a ſurer way to be made a fool of, than by being expoſed to the ſophiſtry of others. The diſpoſition to put any cheat upon ourſelves works conſtantly, and we are pleaſed with it, but are impatient of being bantered or miſled by others. The inability I here ſpeak of, is not any natural defect that makes men incapable of examining their own principles. To ſuch, rules of conducting their underſtandings are uſeleſs; and that is the caſe of very few. The great number is of thoſe whom the ill habit of never exerting their thoughts has diſabled: the powers of their minds are ſtarved by diſuſe, and have loſt that reach and ſtrength which nature fitted them to receive Examine.

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Examine. from exerciſe. Thoſe who are in a condition to learn the firſt rules of plain arithmetick, and could be brought to caſt up an ordinary ſum, are capable of this, if they had but accuſtomed their minds to reaſoning: but they that have wholly neglected the exerciſe of their underſtandings in this way, will be very far, at firſt, from being able to do it, and as unfit for it as one unpractiſed in figures to caſt up a ſhop-book, and, perhaps, think it as ſtrange to be ſet about it. And yet it muſt nevertheleſs be confeſſed to be a wrong uſe of our underſtandings, to build our tenets (in things where we are concerned to hold the truth) upon principles that may lead us into error. We take our principles at hap-hazard, upon truſt, and without ever having examined them, and then believe a whole ſyſtem, upon a preſumption that they are true and ſolid; and what is all this, but childiſh, ſhameful, ſenſeleſs credulity?

IN theſe two things, viz. an equal indifferency for all truth; I mean the receiving it, the love of it, as truth, but not loving it for any other reaſon, before we know it to be true; and in the examination of our principles, and not receiving any for ſuch, nor building on them, till we are fully convinced, as rational creatures, of their ſolidity, truth, and certainty; conſiſts that freedom of the underſtanding which is neceſſary to a rational creature, and without which it is not truly an underſtanding. It is conceit, fancy, extravagance, any thing rather than underſtanding, if it muſt be under the conſtraint of receiving and holding opinions by the authority of any thing but their own, not fancied, but perceived, evidence. This was rightly called impoſition, and is of all other the worſt and moſt dangerous ſort of it. For we impoſe upon ourſelves, which is the ſtrongeſt impoſition of all others; and we impoſe upon ourſelves in that part which ought with the greateſt care to be kept free from all impoſition. The world is apt to caſt great blame on thoſe who have an indifferency for opinions, eſpecially in religion. I fear this is the foundation of great error and worſe conſequences. To be indifferent which of two opinions is true, is the right temper of the mind that preſerves it from being impoſed on, and diſpoſes it to examine with that indifferency, till it has done its beſt to find the truth, and this is the only direct and ſafe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace falſehood or truth, is the great road to error. Thoſe who are not indifferent which opinion is true, are guilty of this; they ſuppoſe, without examining, that what they hold is true, and then think they ought to be zealous for it. Thoſe, it is plain by their warmth and eagerneſs, are not indifferent for their own opinions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they be true or falſe; ſince they cannot endure to have any doubts raiſed, or objections made againſt them; and it is viſible they never have made any themſelves, and ſo, never having examined them, know not, nor are concerned, as they ſhould be, to know whether they be true or falſe.

THESE are the common and moſt general miſcarriages which I think men ſhould avoid, or rectify, in a right conduct of their underſtandings, and

and ſhould be particularly taken care of in education. The buſineſs whereof, in reſpect of knowledge, is not, as I think, to perfect a learner in all or any one of the ſciences, but to give his mind that freedom, that diſpoſition, and thoſe habits, that may enable him to attain any part of knowledge he ſhall apply himſelf to, or ſtand in need of, in the future courſe of his life. Examine.

THIS, and this only, is well principling, and not the inſtilling a reverence and veneration for certain dogma's, under the ſpecious title of principles, which are often ſo remote from that truth and evidence which belongs to principles, that they ought to be rejected, as falſe and erroneous; and often cauſe men ſo educated, when they come abroad into the world, and find they cannot maintain the principles ſo taken up and reſted in, to caſt off all principles, and turn perfect ſcepticks, regardleſs of knowledge and virtue.

THERE are ſeveral weakneſſes and defects in the underſtanding, either from the natural temper of the mind, or ill habits taken up, which hinder it in its progreſs to knowledge. Of theſe, there are as many, poſſibly, to be found, if the mind were thoroughly ſtudied, as there are diſeaſes of the body, each whereof clogs and diſables the underſtanding to ſome degree, and therefore deſerve to be looked after and cured. I ſhall ſet down ſome few to excite men, eſpecially thoſe who make knowledge their buſineſs, to look into themſelves, and obſerve whether they do not indulge ſome weakneſſes, allow ſome miſcarriages in the management of their intellectual faculty, which is prejudicial to them in the ſearch of truth.

§ 13. PARTICULAR matters of fact are the undoubted foundations on which our civil and natural knowledge is built: the benefit the underſtanding makes of them, is to draw from them concluſions, which may be as ſtanding rules of knowledge, and conſequently of practice. The mind often makes not that benefit it ſhould of the information it receives from the accounts of civil or natural hiſtorians, by being too forward or too ſlow in making obſervations on the particular facts recorded in them. Obſervations.

THERE are thoſe who are very aſſiduous in reading, and yet do not much advance their knowledge by it. They are delighted with the ſtories that are told, and perhaps can tell them again, for they make all they read nothing but hiſtory to themſelves; but not reflecting on it, not making to themſelves obſervations from what they read, they are very little improved by all that crowd of particulars, that either paſs through, or lodge themſelves in their underſtandings. They dream on in a conſtant courſe of reading and cramming themſelves; but not digeſting any thing, it produces nothing but an heap of crudities.

IF their memories retain well, one may ſay, they have the materials of knowledge; but, like thoſe for building, they are of no advantage, if there be no other uſe made of them but to let them lie heaped up together. Oppoſite to theſe, there are others who loſe the improvement they ſhould make of matters of fact by a quite contrary conduct. They

Obſervations. are apt to draw general concluſions, and raiſe axioms from every particular they meet with. Theſe make as little true benefit of hiſtory as the other; nay, being of forward and active ſpirits, receive more harm by it; it being of worſe conſequence to ſteer one's thoughts by a wrong rule, than to have none at all; error doing to buſy men much more harm, than ignorance to the ſlow and ſluggiſh. Between theſe, thoſe ſeem to do beſt, who taking material and uſeful hints, ſometimes from ſingle matters of fact, carry them in their minds to be judged of, by what they ſhall find in hiſtory, to confirm or reverſe theſe imperfect obſervations; which may be eſtabliſhed into rules fit to be relied on, when they are juſtified by a ſufficient and wary induction of particulars. He that makes no ſuch reflections on what he reads, only loads his mind with a rhapſody of tales, fit, in winter-nights, for the entertainment of others: and he that will improve every matter of fact into a maxim, will abound in contrary obſervations, that can be of no other uſe but to perplex and pudder him, if he compares them; or elſe to miſguide him, if he gives himſelf up to the authority of that, which for its novelty, or for ſome other fancy, beſt pleaſes him.

Biaſs. § 14. NEXT to theſe, we may place thoſe who ſuffer their own natural tempers and paſſions they are poſſeſſed with, to influence their judgments, eſpecially of men and things, that may any way relate to their preſent circumſtances and intereſt. Truth is all ſimple, all pure, will bear no mixture of any thing elſe with it. It is rigid and inflexible to any bye intereſts; and ſo ſhould the underſtanding be, whoſe uſe and excellency lies in conforming itſelf to it. To think of every thing juſt as it is in itſelf, is the proper buſineſs of the underſtanding, though it be not that which men always employ it to. This all men, at firſt hearing, allow, is the right uſe every one ſhould make of his underſtanding. Nobody will be at ſuch an open defiance with common ſenſe, as to profeſs that we ſhould not endeavour to know, and think of things as they are in themſelves; and yet there is nothing more frequent than to do the contrary; and men are apt to excuſe themſelves; and think they have reaſon to do ſo, if they have but a pretence that it is for God, or a good cauſe; that is, in effect, for themſelves, their own perſuaſion, or party: for to thoſe in their turns the ſeveral ſects of men, eſpecially in matters of religion, intitle God and a good cauſe. But God requires not men to wrong or miſuſe their faculties for him, nor to lye to others, or themſelves, for his ſake; which they purpoſely do, who will not ſuffer their underſtandings to have right conceptions of the things propoſed to them, and deſignedly reſtrain themſelves from having juſt thoughts of every thing, as far as they are concerned to enquire. And as for a good cauſe, that needs not ſuch ill helps; if it be good, truth will ſupport it, and it has no need of fallacy or falſhood.

Arguments. § 15. VERY much of kin to this, is the hunting after arguments to make good one ſide of a queſtion, and wholly to neglect and refuſe thoſe which favour the other ſide. What is this but wilfully to miſguide the

underſtanding, and is ſo far from giving truth its due value, that it wholly debaſes it: eſpouſe opinions that beſt comport with their power, profit, or credit, and then ſeek arguments to ſupport them? Truth light upon this way, is of no more avail to us than error; for what is ſo taken up by us may be falſe as well as true, and he has not done his duty who has thus ſtumbled upon truth in his way to preferment. Arguments.

THERE is another, but more innocent way of collecting arguments, very familiar among bookiſh men, which is to furniſh themſelves with the arguments they meet with pro and con in the queſtions they ſtudy. This helps them not to judge right, nor argue ſtrongly, but only to talk copiouſly on either ſide, without being ſteady and ſettled in their own judgments: For ſuch arguments gathered from other men's thoughts, floating only in the memory, are there ready, indeed, to ſupply copious talk with ſome appearance of reaſon, but are far from helping us to judge right. Such variety of arguments only diſtract the underſtanding that relies on them, unleſs it has gone farther than ſuch a ſuperficial way of examining; this is to quit truth for appearance, only to ſerve our vanity. The ſure and only way to get true knowledge, is to form in our minds clear ſettled notions of things, with names annexed to thoſe determined ideas. Theſe we are to conſider, with their ſeveral relations and habitudes, and not amuſe ourſelves with floating names, and words of indetermined ſignification, which we can uſe in ſeveral ſenſes to ſerve a turn. It is in the perception of the habitudes and reſpects our ideas have one to another, that real knowledge conſiſts; and when a man once perceives how far they agree or diſagree one with another, he will be able to judge of what other people ſay, and will not need to be led by the arguments of others, which are many of them nothing but plauſible ſophiſtry. This will teach him to ſtate the queſtion right, and ſee whereon it turns; and thus he will ſtand upon his own legs, and know by his own underſtanding. Whereas by collecting and learning arguments by heart, he will be but a retainer to others; and when any one queſtions the foundations they are built upon, he will be at a nonplus, and be fain to give up his implicit knowledge.

§ 16. LABOUR for labour-ſake is againſt nature. The underſtanding, as well as all the other faculties, chooſes always the ſhorteſt way to its end, would preſently obtain the knowledge it is about, and then ſet upon ſome new enquiry. But this, whether lazineſs or haſte, often miſleads it, and makes it content itſelf with improper ways of ſearch, and ſuch as will not ſerve the turn: ſometimes it reſts upon teſtimony, when teſtimony of right has nothing to do, becauſe it is eaſier to believe than to be ſcientifically inſtructed: ſometimes it contents itſelf with one argument, and reſts ſatisfied with that, as it were a demonſtration, whereas the thing under proof is not capable of demonſtration, and therefore muſt be ſubmitted to the trial of probabilities, and all the material arguments pro and con be examined and brought to a balance. In ſome caſes the mind is determined by probable topicks in enquiries where demonſtration may be had. Haſte.

Haſte. had. All theſe, and ſeveral others, which lazineſs, impatience, cuſtom, and want of uſe and attention lead men into, are miſapplications of the underſtanding in the ſearch of truth. In every queſtion the nature and manner of the proof it is capable of ſhould be conſidered, to make our enquiry ſuch as it ſhould be. This would ſave a great deal of frequently miſemployed pains, and lead us ſooner to that diſcovery and poſſeſſion of truth we are capable of. The multiplying variety of arguments, eſpecially frivolous ones, ſuch as are all that are merely verbal, is not only loſt labour, but cumbers the memory to no purpoſe, and ſerves only to hinder it from ſeizing and holding of the truth in all thoſe caſes which are capable of demonſtration. In ſuch a way of proof the truth and certainty is ſeen, and the mind fully poſſeſſes itſelf of it; when in the other way of aſſent it only hovers about it, is amuſed with uncertainties. In this ſuperficial way, indeed, the mind is capable of more variety of plauſible talk, but is not enlarged, as it ſhould be, in its knowledge. It is to this ſame haſte and impatience of the mind alſo, that a not due tracing of the arguments to their true foundation is owing; men ſee a little, preſume a great deal, and ſo jump to the concluſion. This is a ſhort way to fancy and conceit, and (if firmly embraced) to opinionatry, but is certainly the fartheſt way about to knowledge. For he that will know, muſt by the connexion of the proofs ſee the truth, and the ground it ſtands on; and therefore, if he has for haſte ſkipt over what he ſhould have examined, he muſt begin and go over all again, or elſe he will never come to knowledge.

Deſultory. § 17. ANOTHER fault of as ill conſequence as this, which proceeds alſo from lazineſs, with a mixture of vanity, is the ſkipping from one ſort of knowledge to another. Some men's tempers are quickly weary of any one thing. Conſtancy and aſſiduity is what they cannot bear: the ſame ſtudy long continued in, is as intolerable to them, as the appearing long in the ſame clothes, or faſhion, is to a court-lady.

Smattering. § 18. OTHERS, that they may ſeem univerſally knowing, get a little ſmattering in every thing. Both theſe may fill their heads with ſuperficial notions of things, but are very much out of the way of attaining truth or knowledge.

Univerſality. § 19. I DO not here ſpeak againſt the taking a taſte of every ſort of knowledge; it is certainly very uſeful and neceſſary to form the mind; but then it muſt be done in a different way, and to a different end. Not for talk and vanity to fill the head with ſhreds of all kinds, that he who is poſſeſſed of ſuch a frippery, may be able to match the diſcourſes of all he ſhall meet with, as if nothing could come amiſs to him; and his head was ſo well ſtored a magazine, that nothing could be propoſed which he was not maſter of, and was readily furniſhed to entertain any one on. This is an excellency, indeed, and a great one too, to have a real and true knowledge in all, or moſt of the objects of contemplation. But it is what the mind of one and the ſame man can hardly attain unto; and the inſtances are ſo few of thoſe who have, in any meaſure, approached towards it,

that I know not whether they are to be propoſed as examples in the ordinary conduct of the underſtanding. For a man to underſtand fully the buſineſs of his particular calling in the commonwealth, and of religion, which is his calling as he is a man in the world, is uſually enough to take up his whole time; and there are few that inform themſelves in theſe, which is every man's proper and peculiar buſineſs, ſo to the bottom as they ſhould do. But though this be ſo, and there are very few men that extend their thoughts towards univerſal knowledge; yet I do not doubt, but if the right way were taken, and the methods of enquiry were ordered as they ſhould be, men of little buſineſs and great leiſure might go a great deal farther in it than is uſually done. To return to the buſineſs in hand; the end and uſe of a little inſight in thoſe parts of knowledge, which are not a man's proper buſineſs, is to accuſtom our minds to all ſorts of ideas, and the proper ways of examining their habitudes and relations. This gives the mind a freedom, and the exerciſing the underſtanding in the ſeveral ways of enquiry and reaſoning, which the moſt ſkilful have made uſe of, teaches the mind ſagacity and warineſs, and a ſuppleneſs to apply itſelf more cloſely and dexterouſly to the bents and turns of the matter in all its reſearches. Beſides, this univerſal taſte of all the ſciences, with an indifferency before the mind is poſſeſſed with any one in particular, and grown into love and admiration of what is made its darling, will prevent another evil, very commonly to be obſerved in thoſe who have from the beginning been ſeaſoned only by one part of knowledge. Let a man be given up to the contemplation of one ſort of knowledge, and that will become every thing. The mind will take ſuch a tincture from a familiarity with that object, that every thing elſe, how remote ſoever, will be brought under the ſame view. A metaphyſician will bring plowing and gardening immediately to abſtract notions: the hiſtory of nature ſhall ſignify nothing to him. An alchymiſt, on the contrary, ſhall reduce divinity to the maxims of his laboratory: explain morality by ſal, ſulphur and mercury; and allegoriſe the ſcripture itſelf, and the ſacred myſteries thereof, into the philoſopher's ſtone. And I heard once a man, who had a more than ordinary excellency in muſick, ſeriouſly accommodate Moſes's ſeven days of the firſt week to the notes of muſick, as if from thence had been taken the meaſure and method of the creation. It is of no ſmall conſequence to keep the mind from ſuch a poſſeſſion, which I think is beſt done by giving it a fair and equal view of the whole intellectual world, wherein it may ſee the order, rank, and beauty of the whole, and give a juſt allowance to the diſtinct provinces of the ſeveral ſciences in the due order and uſefulneſs of each of them. Univerſality.

If this be that which old men will not think neceſſary, nor be eaſily brought to; it is fit, at leaſt, that it ſhould be practiſed in the breeding of the young. The buſineſs of education, as I have already obſerved, is not, as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the ſciences, but ſo to open and diſpoſe their minds, as may beſt make them capable of any, when they ſhall apply themſelves to it. If men are, for a long

time, accuſtomed only to one ſort or method of thoughts, their minds grow ſtiff in it, and do not readily turn to another. It is, therefore, to give them this freedom, that I think they ſhould be made to look into all ſorts of knowledge, and exerciſe their underſtandings in ſo wide a variety and ſtock of knowledge. But I do not propoſe it as a variety and ſtock of knowledge, but a variety and freedom of thinking, as an increaſe of the powers and activity of the mind, not as an enlargement of its poſſeſſions.

Reading. § 20. THIS is that which I think great readers are apt to be miſtaken in. Thoſe who have read of every thing, are thought to underſtand every thing too; but it is not always ſo. Reading furniſhes the mind only with materials of knowledge, it is thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourſelves with a great load of collections; unleſs we chew them over again, they will not give us ſtrength and nouriſhment. There are, indeed, in ſome writers viſible inſtances of deep thoughts, cloſe and acute reaſoning, and ideas well purſued. The light theſe would give would be of great uſe, if their reader would obſerve and imitate them; all the reſt at beſt are but particulars fit to be turned into knowledge; but that can be done only by our own meditation, and examining the reach, force and coherence of what is ſaid; and then, as far as we apprehend and ſee the connexion of ideas, ſo far it is ours; without that, it is but ſo much looſe matter floating in our brain. The memory may be ſtored, but the judgment is little better, and the ſtock of knowledge not increaſed, by being able to repeat what others have ſaid, or produce the arguments we have found in them. Such a knowledge as this is but knowledge by hear-ſay, and the oſtentation of it is at beſt but talking by rote, and very often upon weak and wrong principles. For all that is to be found in books, is not built upon true foundations, nor always rightly deduced from the principles it is pretended to be built on. Such an examen as is requiſite to diſcover that, every reader's mind is not forward to make; eſpecially in thoſe who have given themſelves up to a party, and only hunt for what they can ſcrape together, that may favour and ſupport the tenets of it. Such men wilfully exclude themſelves from truth, and from all true benefit to be received by reading. Others of more indifferency often want attention and induſtry. The mind is backward in itſelf to be at the pains to trace every argument to its original, and to ſee upon what baſis it ſtands, and how firmly; but yet it is this that gives ſo much the advantage to one man more than another in reading. The mind ſhould by ſevere rules be tyed down to this, at firſt, uneaſy taſk; uſe and exerciſe will give it facility. So that thoſe who are accuſtomed to it, readily, as it were with one caſt of the eye, take a view of the argument, and preſently, in moſt caſes, ſee where it bottoms. Thoſe who have got this faculty, one may ſay, have got the true key of books, and the clue to lead them through the mizmaze of variety of opinions and authors to truth and certainty. This young

beginners

beginners ſhould be entered in, and ſhewed the uſe of, that they might profit by their reading. Thoſe who are ſtrangers to it, will be apt to think it too great a clog in the way of men's ſtudies, and they will ſuſpect they ſhall make but ſmall progreſs, if, in the books they read, they muſt ſtand to examine and unravel every argument, and follow it ſtep by ſtep up to its original. Reading.

I ANSWER, this is a good objection, and ought to weigh with thoſe whoſe reading is deſigned for much talk and little knowledge, and I have nothing to ſay to it. But I am here enquiring into the conduct of the underſtanding in its progreſs towards knowledge; and to thoſe who aim at that, I may ſay, that he who fair and ſoftly goes ſteadily forward in a courſe that points right, will ſooner be at his journey's end, than he that runs after every one he meets, though he gallop all day full-ſpeed.

To which let me add, that this way of thinking on, and profiting by, what we read, will be a clog and rub to any one only in the beginning: when cuſtom and exerciſe has made it familiar, it will be diſpatched, on moſt occaſions, without reſting or interruption in the courſe of our reading. The motions and views of a mind exerciſed that way, are wonderfully quick; and a man uſed to ſuch ſort of reflections, ſees as much at one glimpſe as would require a long diſcourſe to lay before another, and make out in an entire and gradual deduction. Beſides that, when the firſt diffiulties are over, the delight and ſenſible advantage it brings, mightily encourages and enlivens the mind in reading, which without this is very improperly called ſtudy.

§ 21. As an help to this, I think it may be propoſed, that for the ſaving the long progreſſion of the thoughts to remote and firſt principles in every caſe, the mind ſhould provide it ſeveral ſtages; that is to ſay, intermediate principles, which it might have recourſe to in the examining thoſe poſitions that come in its way. Theſe, though they are not ſelf-evident principles, yet if they have been made out from them by a wary and unqueſtionable deduction, may be depended on as certain and infallible truths, and ſerve as unqueſtionable truths to prove other points depending on them by a nearer and ſhorter view than remote and general maxims. Theſe may ſerve as land-marks to ſhew what lies in the direct way of truth, or is quite beſides it. And thus mathematicians do, who do not in every new problem run it back to the firſt axioms, through all the whole train of intermediate propoſitions. Certain theorems, that they have ſettled to themſelves upon ſure demonſtration, ſerve to reſolve to them multitudes of propoſitions which depend on them, and are as firmly made out from thence, as if the mind went afreſh over every link of the whole chain that ties them to firſt ſelf-evident principles. Only in other ſciences great care is to be taken, that they eſtabliſh thoſe intermediate principles with as much caution, exactneſs, and indifferency, as mathematicians uſe in the ſettling any of their great theorems. When this is not done, but men take up the prin- Intermediate principles.

ciples in this or that ſcience upon credit, inclination, intereſt, &c. in haſte, without due examination, and moſt unqueſtionable proof, they lay a trap for themſelves, and, as much as in them lies, captivate their underſtandings to miſtake, falſhood and error.

Partiality. § 22. As there is a partiality to opinions, which, as we have already obſerved, is apt to miſlead the underſtanding; ſo there is often a partiality to ſtudies, which is prejudicial alſo to knowledge and improvement. Thoſe ſciences which men are particularly verſed in, they are apt to value and extol, as if that part of knowledge which every one has acquainted himſelf with, were that alone which was worth the having, and all the reſt were idle and empty amuſements, comparatively of no uſe or importance. This is the effect of ignorance, and not knowledge, the being vainly puffed up with a flatulency, ariſing from a weak and narrow comprehenſion. It is not amiſs that every one ſhould reliſh the ſcience that he has made his peculiar ſtudy; a view of its beauties, and a ſenſe of its uſefulneſs, carries a man on with the more delight and warmth in the purſuit and improvement of it. But the contempt of all other knowledge, as if it were nothing in compariſon of law or phyſick, of aſtronomy or chymiſtry, or perhaps ſome yet meaner part of knowledge, wherein I have got ſome ſmattering, or am ſomewhat advanced, is not only the mark of a vain or little mind; but does this prejudice in the conduct of the underſtanding, that it coops it up within narrow bounds, and hinders it from looking abroad into other provinces of the intellectual world, more beautiful poſſibly, and more fruitful than that which it had, till then, laboured in; wherein it might find, beſides new knowledge, ways or hints whereby it might be enabled the better to cultivate its own.

Theology. § 23. THERE is, indeed, one ſcience (as they are now diſtinguiſhed) incomparably above all the reſt, where it is not by corruption narrowed into a trade or faction, for mean or ill ends, and ſecular intereſts; I mean theology, which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow-creatures, and a view of our preſent and future ſtate, is the comprehenſion of all other knowledge directed to its true end; i. e. the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happineſs of mankind. This is that noble ſtudy which is every man's duty, and every one that can be called a rational creature is capable of. The works of nature, and the words of revelation, diſplay it to mankind in characters ſo large and viſible, that thoſe who are not quite blind may in them read and ſee the firſt principles and moſt neceſſary parts of it; and from thence, as they have time and induſtry, may be enabled to go on to the more abſtruſe parts of it, and penetrate into thoſe infinite depths filled with the treaſures of wiſdom and knowledge. This is that ſcience which would truly enlarge men's minds, were it ſtudied, or permitted to be ſtudied, every-where, with that freedom, love of truth and charity which it teaches, and were not made, contrary to its nature, the occaſion of ſtrife, faction, malignity, and narrow impoſitions. I

ſhall

ſhall ſay no more here of this, but that it is undoubtedly a wrong uſe of my underſtanding, to make it the rule and meaſure of another man's; a uſe which it is neither fit for, nor capable of.

§ 24. THIS partiality, where it is not permitted an authority to render all other ſtudies inſignificant or contemptible, is often indulged ſo far as to be relied upon, and made uſe of in other parts of knowledge, to which it does not at all belong, and wherewith it has no manner of affinity. Some men have ſo uſed their heads to mathematical figures; that, giving a preference to the methods of that ſcience, they introduce lines and diagrams into their ſtudy of divinity, or politick enquiries, as if nothing could be known without them; and others accuſtomed to retired ſpeculations, run natural philoſophy into metaphyſical notions, and the abſtract generalities of logick; and how often may one meet with religion and morality treated of in the terms of the laboratory, and thought to be improved by the methods and notions of chymiſtry? But he that will take care of the conduct of his underſtanding, to direct it right to the knowledge of things, muſt avoid thoſe undue mixtures, and not, by a fondneſs for what he has found uſeful and neceſſary in one, transfer it to another ſcience, where it ſerves only to perplex and confound the underſtanding. It is a certain truth, that "res nolunt malè adminiſtrari;" it is no leſs certain "res nolunt malè intelligi." Things themſelves are to be conſidered as they are in themſelves, and then they will ſhew us in what way they are to be underſtood. For to have right conceptions about them, we muſt bring our underſtandings to the inflexible natures, and unalterable relations of things, and not endeavour to bring things to any preconceived notions of our own. Partiality.

THERE is another partiality very commonly obſervable in men of ſtudy, no leſs prejudicial, nor ridiculous, than the former; and that is a fantaſtical and wild attributing all knowledge to the ancients alone, or to the moderns. This raving upon antiquity in matter of poetry, Horace has wittily deſcribed and expoſed in one of his ſatires. The ſame ſort of madneſs may be found in reference to all the other ſciences. Some will not admit an opinion not authoriſed by men of old, who were then all giants in knowledge. Nothing is to be put into the treaſury of truth, or knowledge, which has not the ſtamp of Greece, or Rome, upon it; and ſince their days will ſcarce allow, that men have been able to ſee, think or write. Others, with a like extravagancy, contemn all that the ancients have left us, and being taken with the modern inventions and diſcoveries, lay by all that went before, as if whatever is called old muſt have the decay of time upon it, and truth, too, were liable to mould and rottenneſs. Men, I think, have been much the ſame for natural endowments, in all times. Faſhion, diſcipline, and education, have put eminent differences in the ages of ſeveral countries, and made one generation much differ from another in arts and ſciences: but truth is always the ſame; time alters it not, nor is it the better, or worſe, for being of ancient or modern tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world

Partiality.

world for their diſcovery and delivery of it; but though the knowledge they have left us be worth our ſtudy, yet they exhauſted not all its treaſure; they left a great deal for the induſtry and ſagacity of after-ages, and ſo ſhall we. That was once new to them, which any one now receives with veneration for its antiquity, nor was it the worſe for appearing as a novelty; and that which is now embraced for its newneſs, will to poſterity be old, but not thereby be leſs true, or leſs genuine. There is no occaſion, on this account, to oppoſe the ancients and the moderns to one another, or to be ſqueamiſh on either ſide. He that wiſely conducts his mind in the purſuit of knowledge, will gather what lights, and get what helps he can, from either of them, from whom they are beſt to be had, without adoring the errors, or rejecting the truths, which he may find mingled in them.

ANOTHER partiality may be obſerved, in ſome to vulgar, in others, to heterodox tenets: ſome are apt to conclude, that what is the common opinion cannot but be true; ſo many men's eyes they think cannot but ſee right; ſo many men's underſtandings of all ſorts cannot be deceived; and, therefore, will not venture to look beyond the received notions of the place and age, nor have ſo preſumptuous a thought as to be wiſer than their neighbours. They are content to go with the crowd, and ſo go eaſily, which they think is going right, or at leaſt ſerves them as well. But however "vox populi vox Dei" has prevailed as a maxim; yet I do not remember where-ever God delivered his oracles by the multitude; or nature, truths by the herd. On the other ſide, ſome fly all common opinions as either falſe or frivolous. The title of many-headed beaſt is a ſufficient reaſon to them to conclude, that no truths of weight or conſequence can be lodged there. Vulgar opinions are ſuited to vulgar capacities, and adapted to the ends of thoſe that govern. He that will know the truth of things, muſt leave the common and beaten track, which none but weak and ſervile minds are ſatisfied to trudge along continually in. Such nice palates reliſh nothing but ſtrange notions quite out of the way: Whatever is commonly received, has the mark of the beaſt on it; and they think it a leſſening to them to hearken to it, or receive it; their mind runs only after paradoxes; theſe they ſeek, theſe they embrace, theſe alone they vent; and ſo, as they think, diſtinguiſh themſelves from the vulgar. But common or uncommon are not the marks to diſtinguiſh truth or falſhood, and therefore ſhould not be any byaſs to us in our enquiries. We ſhould not judge of things by men's opinions, but of opinions by things. The multitude reaſon but ill, and therefore may be well ſuſpected, and cannot be relied on, nor ſhould be followed, as a ſure guide; but philoſophers, who have quitted the orthodoxy of the community, and the popular doctrines of their countries, have fallen into as extravagant and as abſurd opinions as ever common reception countenanced. It would be madneſs to refuſe to breathe the common air, or quench one's thirſt with water, becauſe the rabble uſe them to theſe purpoſes; and if there are conveniences of life

which

which common uſe reaches not, it is not reaſon to reject them, becauſe they are not grown into the ordinary faſhion of the country, and every villager doth not know them. Partiality.

TRUTH, whether in or out of faſhion, is the meaſure of knowledge, and the buſineſs of the underſtanding; whatſoever is beſides that, however authoriſed by conſent, or recommended by rarity, is nothing but ignorance, or ſomething worſe.

ANOTHER ſort of partiality there is, whereby men impoſe upon themſelves, and by it make their reading little uſeful to themſelves; I mean the making uſe of the opinions of writers, and laying ſtreſs upon their authorities, wherever they find them to favour their own opinions.

THERE is nothing almoſt has done more harm to men dedicated to letters, than giving the name of ſtudy to reading, and making a man of great reading to be the ſame with a man of great knowledge, or at leaſt to be a title of honour. All that can be recorded in writing are only facts or reaſonings. Facts are of three ſorts;

1. MERELY of natural agents, obſervable in the ordinary operations of bodies one upon another, whether in the viſible courſe of things left to themſelves, or in experiments made by them, applying agents and patients to one another, after a peculiar and artificial manner.

2. OF voluntary agents, more eſpecially the actions of men in ſociety, which makes civil and moral hiſtory.

3. OF opinions.

IN theſe three conſiſts, as it ſeems to me, that which commonly has the name of learning; to which perhaps ſome may add a diſtinct head of critical writings, which indeed at bottom is nothing but matter of fact; and reſolves itſelf into this, that ſuch a man, or ſet of men, uſed ſuch a word, or phraſe, in ſuch a ſenſe; i. e. that they made ſuch ſounds the marks of ſuch ideas.

UNDER reaſonings I comprehend all the diſcoveries of general truths made by human reaſon, whether found by intuition, demonſtration, or probable deductions. And this is that which is, if not alone knowledge, (becauſe the truth or probability of particular propoſitions may be known too) yet is, as may be ſuppoſed, moſt properly the buſineſs of thoſe who pretend to improve their underſtandings, and make themſelves knowing by reading.

BOOKS and reading are looked upon to be the great helps of the underſtanding, and inſtruments of knowledge, as it muſt be allowed that they are; and yet I beg leave to queſtion whether theſe do not prove an hindrance to many, and keep ſeveral bookiſh men from attaining to ſolid and true knowledge. This, I think, I may be permitted to ſay, that there is no part wherein the underſtanding needs a more careful and wary conduct than in the uſe of books; without which they will prove rather innocent amuſements, than profitable employments of our time, and bring but ſmall additions to our knowledge.

Partiality.

THERE is not ſeldom to be found, even amongſt thoſe who aim at knowledge, who with an unwearied induſtry employ their whole time in books, who ſcarce allow themſelves time to eat or ſleep, but read, and read, and read on, yet make no great advances in real knowledge, though there be no defect in their intellectual faculties, to which their little progreſs can be imputed. The miſtake here is, that it is uſually ſuppoſed, that by reading, the author's knowledge is transfuſed into the reader's underſtanding; and ſo it is, but not by bare reading, but by reading and underſtanding what he writ. Whereby I mean, not barely comprehending what is affirmed or denied in each propoſition (though that great readers do not always think themſelves concerned preciſely to do) but to ſee and follow the train of his reaſonings, obſerve the ſtrength and clearneſs of their connexion, and examine upon what they bottom. Without this a man may read the diſcourſes of a very rational author, writ in a language, and in propoſitions, that he very well underſtands, and yet acquire not one jot of his knowledge; which conſiſting only in the perceived, certain, or probable connexion of the ideas made uſe of in his reaſonings, the reader's knowledge is no farther increaſed than he perceives that; ſo much as he ſees of this connexion, ſo much he knows of the truth, or probability, of that author's opinions.

ALL that he relies on, without this perception, he takes upon truſt, upon the author's credit, without any knowledge of it at all. This makes me not at all wonder to ſee ſome men ſo abound in citations, and build ſo much upon authorities, it being the ſole foundation on which they bottom moſt of their own tenets; ſo that, in effect, they have but a ſecond-hand, or implicit knowledge; i. e. are in the right, if ſuch an one from whom they borrowed it, were in the right in that opinion which they took from him; which indeed is no knowledge at all. Writers of this or former ages may be good witneſſes of matters of fact which they deliver, which we may do well to take upon their authority; but their credit can go no farther than this; it cannot at all affect the truth and falſhood of opinions, which have no other ſort of trial but reaſon and proof, which they themſelves made uſe of to make themſelves knowing, and ſo muſt others too, that will partake in their knowledge. Indeed it is an advantage that they have been at the pains to find out the proofs, and lay them in that order that may ſhew the truth or probability of their concluſions; and for this we owe them great acknowledgments for ſaving us the pains in ſearching out thoſe proofs which they have collected for us, and which poſſibly, after all our pains, we might not have found, nor been able to have ſet them in ſo good a light as that which they left them us in. Upon this account we are mightily beholden to judicious writers of all ages, for thoſe diſcoveries and diſcourſes they have left behind them for our inſtruction, if we know how to make a right uſe of them; which is not to run them over in an haſty peruſal, and perhaps lodge their opinions, or ſome remarkable paſſages in our memories; but

to enter into their reaſonings, examine their proofs, and then judge of the truth or falſhood, probability or improbability, of what they advance; not by any opinion we have entertained of the author; but by the evidence he produces, and the conviction he affords us, drawn from things themſelves. Knowing is ſeeing, and if it be ſo, it is madneſs to perſuade ourſelves that we do ſo by another man's eyes, let him uſe ever ſo many words to tell us, that what he aſſerts is very viſible. Till we ourſelves ſee it with our own eyes, and perceive it by our own underſtandings, we are as much in the dark, and as void of knowledge as before, let us believe any learned author as much as we will. Partiality.

EUCLID and Archimedes are allowed to be knowing, and to have demonſtrated what they ſay; and yet whoever ſhall read over their writings without perceiving the connexion of their proofs, and ſeeing what they ſhew, though he may underſtand all their words, yet he is not the more knowing: he may believe, indeed, but does not know what they ſay; and ſo is not advanced one jot in mathematical knowledge, by all his reading of thoſe approved mathematicians.

§ 25. THE eagerneſs and ſtrong bent of the mind after knowledge, if not warily regulated, is often an hindrance to it. It ſtill preſſes into farther diſcoveries and new objects, and catches at the variety of knowledge; and therefore often ſtays not long enough on what is before it, to look into it as it ſhould, for haſte to purſue what is yet out of ſight. He that rides poſt through a country, may be able, from the tranſient view, to tell how in general the parts lie, and may be able to give ſome looſe deſcription of here a mountain, and there a plain; here a moraſs, and there a river; woodland in one part, and ſavannahs in another. Such ſuperficial ideas and obſervations as theſe he may collect in gallopping over it: but the more uſeful obſervations of the ſoil, plants, animals, and inhabitants, with their ſeveral ſorts and properties, muſt neceſſarily eſcape him; and it is ſeldom men ever diſcover the rich mines without ſome digging. Nature commonly lodges her treaſure and jewels in rocky ground. If the matter be knotty, and the ſenſe lies deep, the mind muſt ſtop and buckle to it, and ſtick upon it with labour and thought, and cloſe contemplation; and not leave it till it has maſtered the difficulty, and got poſſeſſion of truth. But here care muſt be taken to avoid the other extreme: a man muſt not ſtick at every uſeleſs nicety, and expect myſteries of ſcience in every trivial queſtion, or ſcruple, that he may raiſe. He that will ſtand to pick up and examine every pebble that comes in his way, is as unlikely to return enriched and loaden with jewels, as the other that travelled full ſpeed. Truths are not the better nor the worſe for their obviouſneſs or difficulty, but their value is to be meaſured by their uſefulneſs and tendency. Inſignificant obſervations ſhould not take up any of our minutes, and thoſe that enlarge our view, and give light towards farther and uſeful diſcoveries, ſhould not be neglected, though they ſtop our courſe, and ſpend ſome of our time in a fixed attention. Haſte.

Haſte. THERE is another haſte that does often, and will miſlead the mind if it be left to itſelf, and its own conduct. The underſtanding is naturally forward, not only to learn its knowledge by variety (which makes it ſkip over one to get ſpeedily to another part of knowledge) but alſo eager to enlarge its views, by running too faſt into general obſervations and concluſions, without a due examination of particulars enough whereon to found thoſe general axioms. This ſeems to enlarge their ſtock, but it is of fancies, not realities; ſuch theories built upon narrow foundations ſtand but weakly, and, if they fall not of themſelves, are at leaſt very hardly to be ſupported againſt the aſſaults of oppoſition. And thus men being too haſty to erect to themſelves general notions and ill-grounded theories, find themſelves deceived in their ſtock of knowledge, when they come to examine their haſtily aſſumed maxims themſelves, or to have them attacked by others. General obſervations drawn from particulars, are the jewels of knowledge, comprehending great ſtore in a little room; but they are therefore to be made with the greater care and caution, leſt, if we take counterfeit for true, our loſs and ſhame be the greater when our ſtock comes to a ſevere ſcrutiny. One or two particulars may ſuggeſt hints of enquiry, and they do well to take thoſe hints; but if they turn them into concluſions, and make them preſently general rules, they are forward indeed, but it is only to impoſe on themſelves by propoſitions aſſumed for truths without ſufficient warrant. To make ſuch obſervations is, as has been already remarked, to make the head a magazine of materials, which can hardly be called knowledge; or at leaſt it is but like a collection of lumber not reduced to uſe or order; and he that makes every thing an obſervation, has the ſame uſeleſs plenty and much more falſhood mixed with it. The extremes on both ſides are to be avoided, and he will be able to give the beſt account of his ſtudies who keeps his underſtanding in the right mean between them.

Anticipation. § 26. WHETHER it be a love of that which brings the firſt light and information to their minds, and want of vigour and induſtry to enquire; or elſe that men content themſelves with any appearance of knowledge, right or wrong; which, when they have once got, they will hold faſt: this is viſible, that many men give themſelves up to the firſt anticipations of their minds, and are very tenacious of the opinions that firſt poſſeſs them; they are often as fond of their firſt conceptions as of their firſt-born, and will by no means recede from the judgment they have once made, or any conjecture or conceit which they have once entertained. This is a fault in the conduct of the underſtanding, ſince this firmneſs or rather ſtiffneſs of the mind is not from an adherence to truth, but a ſubmiſſion to prejudice. It is an unreaſonable homage paid to prepoſſeſſion, whereby we ſhew a reverence, not to (what we pretend to ſeek) truth, but what by hap-hazard we chance to light on, be it what it will. This is viſibly a prepoſterous uſe of our faculties, and is a downright proſtituting of the mind to reſign it thus, and put it under the power of the firſt comer. This can never be allowed, or ought to be followed, as a right

a right way to knowledge, till the underſtanding (whoſe buſineſs it is to conform itſelf to what it finds in the objects without) can, by its own opinionatry, change that, and make the unalterable nature of things comply with its own haſty determinations, which will never be. Whatever we fancy, things keep their courſe; and the habitudes, correſpondencies, and relations, keep the ſame to one another.

Reſignation.

§ 27. CONTRARY to theſe, but by a like dangerous exceſs, on the other ſide, are thoſe who always reſign their judgment to the laſt man they heard or read. Truth never ſinks into theſe men's minds, nor gives any tincture to them; but, cameleon-like, they take the colour of what is laid before them, and as ſoon loſe and reſign it to the next that happens to come in their way. The order wherein opinions are propoſed, or received by us, is no rule of their rectitude, nor ought to be a cauſe of their preference. Firſt or laſt in this caſe, is the effect of chance, and not the meaſure of truth or falſhood. This every one muſt confeſs, and therefore ſhould, in the purſuit of truth, keep his mind free from the influence of any ſuch accidents. A man may as reaſonably draw cuts for his tenets, regulate his perſuaſion by the caſt of a dye, as take it up for its novelty, or retain it becauſe it had his firſt aſſent, and he was never of another mind. Well-weighed reaſons are to determine the judgment; thoſe the mind ſhould be always ready to hearken and ſubmit to, and by their teſtimony and ſuffrage, entertain or reject any tenet indifferently, whether it be a perfect ſtranger, or an old acquaintance.

Practice.

§ 28. THOUGH the faculties of the mind are improved by exerciſe, yet they muſt not be put to a ſtreſs beyond their ſtrength. "Quid va- "leant humeri, quid ferre recuſent," muſt be made the meaſure of every one's underſtanding, who has a deſire not only to perform well, but to keep up the vigour of his faculties; and not to baulk his underſtanding by what is too hard for it. The mind, by being engaged in a taſk beyond its ſtrength, like the body, ſtrained by lifting at a weight too heavy, has often its force broken, and thereby gets an unaptneſs, or an averſion, to any vigorous attempt ever after. A ſinew cracked ſeldom recovers its former ſtrength, or at leaſt the tenderneſs of the ſprain remains a good while after, and the memory of it longer, and leaves a laſting caution in the man, not to put the part quickly again to any robuſt employment. So it fares in the mind once jaded by an attempt above its power; it either is diſabled for the future; or elſe checks at any vigorous undertaking ever after; at leaſt is very hardly brought to exert its force again on any ſubject that requires thought and meditation. The underſtanding ſhould be brought to the difficult and knotty parts of knowledge, that try the ſtrength of thought, and a full bent of the mind, by inſenſible degrees; and in ſuch a gradual proceeding nothing is too hard for it. Nor let it be objected, that ſuch a ſlow progreſs will never reach the extent of ſome ſciences. It is not to be imagined how far conſtancy will carry a man; however, it is better walking ſlowly in a rugged way, than

to

Practice. to break a leg and be a cripple. He that begins with the calf may carry the ox; but he that will at firſt go to take up an ox, may ſo diſable himſelf, as not to be able to lift a calf after that. When the mind, by inſenſible degrees, has brought itſelf to attention and cloſe thinking, it will be able to cope with difficulties, and maſter them without any prejudice to itſelf, and then it may go on roundly. Every abſtruſe problem, every intricate queſtion, will not baffle, diſcourage, or break it. But though putting the mind unprepared upon an unuſual ſtreſs, that may diſcourage or damp it for the future, ought to be avoided; yet this muſt not run it, by an over-great ſhyneſs of difficulties, into a lazy ſauntering about ordinary and obvious things, that demand no thought or application. This debaſes and enervates the underſtanding, makes it weak and unfit for labour. This is a ſort of hovering about the ſurface of things, without any inſight into them or penetration; and when the mind has been once habituated to this lazy recumbency and ſatisfaction on the obvious ſurface of things, it is in danger to reſt ſatisfied there, and go no deeper; ſince it it cannot do it without pains and digging. He that has for ſome time accuſtomed himſelf to take up with what eaſily offers itſelf at firſt view, has reaſon to fear he ſhall never reconcile himſelf to the fatigue of turning and tumbling things in his mind, to diſcover their more retired and more valuable ſecrets.

IT is not ſtrange that methods of learning which ſcholars have been accuſtomed to in their beginning and entrance upon the ſciences, ſhould influence them all their lives, and be ſettled in their minds by an over-ruling reverence; eſpecially if they be ſuch as univerſal uſe has eſtabliſhed. Learners muſt at firſt be believers, and their maſter's rules having been once made axioms to them, it is no wonder they ſhould keep that dignity, and by the authority they have once got, miſlead thoſe who think it ſufficient to excuſe them, if they go out of their way in a well-beaten track.

Words. § 29. I HAVE copiouſly enough ſpoken of the abuſe of words in another place, and therefore ſhall upon this reflection, that the ſciences are full of them, warn thoſe that would conduct their underſtandings right, not to take any term, howſoever authoriſed by the language of the ſchools, to ſtand for any thing till they have an idea of it. A word may be of frequent uſe, and great credit, with ſeveral authors, and be by them made uſe of as if it ſtood for ſome real being; but yet, if he that reads cannot frame any diſtinct idea of that being, it is certainly to him a mere empty ſound without a meaning; and he learns no more by all that is ſaid of it, or attributed to it, than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty ſound. They who would advance in knowledge, and not deceive and ſwell themſelves with a little articulated air, ſhould lay down this as a fundamental rule, not to take words for things, nor ſuppoſe that names in books ſignify real entities in nature, till they can frame clear and diſtinct ideas of thoſe entities. It will not perhaps be allowed, if I ſhould ſet down "ſubſtantial forms" and "intentional ſpecies," as ſuch

that

that may juſtly be ſuſpected to be of this kind of inſignificant terms. But this I am ſure, to one that can form no determined ideas of what they ſtand for, they ſignify nothing at all; and all that he thinks he knows about them, is to him ſo much knowledge about nothing, and amounts at moſt but to a learned ignorance. It is not without all reaſon ſuppoſed, that there are many ſuch empty terms to be found in ſome learned writers, to which they had recourſe to etch out their ſyſtems, where their underſtandings could not furniſh them with conceptions from things. But yet I believe the ſuppoſing of ſome realities in nature, anſwering thoſe and the like words, have much perplexed ſome, and quite miſled others in the ſtudy of nature. That which in any diſcourſe ſignifies, "I know not what," ſhould be conſidered "I know not when." Where men have any conceptions, they can, if they are never ſo abſtruſe or abſtracted, explain them, and the terms they uſe for them. For our conceptions being nothing but ideas, which are all made up of ſimple ones: if they cannot give us the ideas their words ſtand for, it is plain they have none. To what purpoſe can it be, to hunt after his conceptions, who has none, or none diſtinct? He that knew not what he himſelf meant by a learned term, cannot make us know any thing by his uſe of it, let us beat our heads about it never ſo long. Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature, and the manners of them, it matters not to enquire; but this is certain, that we can comprehend no more of them, than we can diſtinctly conceive; and therefore to obtrude terms where we have no diſtinct conceptions, as if they did contain, or rather conceal ſomething; is but an artifice of learned vanity to cover a defect in an hypotheſis or our underſtandings. Words are not made to conceal, but to declare and ſhew ſomething; where they are by thoſe, who pretend to inſtruct, otherwiſe uſed, they conceal indeed ſomething; but that that they conceal is nothing but the ignorance, error, or ſophiſtry of the talker; for there is, in truth, nothing elſe under them. Words.

§ 30. THAT there is a conſtant ſucceſſion and flux of ideas in our minds, I have obſerved in the former part of this Eſſay; and every one may take notice of it in himſelf. This, I ſuppoſe, may deſerve ſome part of our care in the conduct of our underſtandings; and I think it may be of great advantage, if we can by uſe get that power over our minds, as to be able to direct that train of ideas, that ſo, ſince there will new ones perpetually come into our thoughts by a conſtant ſucceſſion, we may be able by choice ſo to direct them, that none may come in view, but ſuch as are pertinent to our preſent enquiry, and in ſuch order as may be moſt uſeful to the diſcovery we are upon; or at leaſt, if ſome foreign and unſought ideas will offer themſelves, that yet we might be able to reject them, and keep them from taking off our minds from its preſent purſuit, and hinder them from running away with our thoughts quite from the ſubject in hand. This is not, I ſuſpect, ſo eaſy to be done, as perhaps, Wandering.

Wandering. haps may be imagined; and yet, for aught I know, this may be, if not the chief, yet one of the great differences that carry ſome men in their reaſoning ſo far beyond others, where they ſeem to be naturally of equal parts. A proper and effectual remedy for this wandering of thoughts I would be glad to find. He that ſhall propoſe ſuch an one, would do great ſervice to the ſtudious and contemplative part of mankind, and perhaps help unthinking men to become thinking. I muſt acknowledge that hitherto I have diſcovered no other way to keep our thoughts cloſe to their buſineſs, but the endeavouring as much as we can, and by frequent attention and application, getting the habit of attention and application. He that will obſerve children, will find, that even when they endeavour their utmoſt, they cannot keep their minds from ſtraggling. The way to cure it, I am ſatisfied, is not angry chiding or beating, for that preſently fills their heads with all the ideas that fear, dread, or confuſion can offer to them. To bring back gently their wandering thoughts, by leading them into the path, and going before them in the train they ſhould purſue, without any rebuke, or ſo much as taking notice (where it can be avoided) of their roving, I ſuppoſe would ſooner reconcile and inure them to attention, than all thoſe rougher methods which more diſtract their thought, and hindering the application they would promote, introduce a contrary habit.

Diſtinction. § 31. DISTINCTION and diviſion are (if I miſtake not the import of the words) very different things; the one being the perception of a difference that nature has placed in things; the other, our making a diviſion where there is yet none; at leaſt, if I may be permitted to conſider them in this ſenſe, I think I may ſay of them, that one of them is the moſt neceſſary and conducive to true knowledge that can be; the other, when too much made uſe of, ſerves only to puzzle and confound the underſtanding. To obſerve every the leaſt difference that is in things argues a quick and clear ſight; and this keeps the underſtanding ſteady, and right in its way to knowledge. But though it be uſeful to diſcern every variety that is to be found in nature, yet it is not convenient to conſider every difference that is in things, and divide them into diſtinct claſſes under every ſuch difference. This will run us, if followed, into particulars, (for every individual has ſomething that differences it from another) and we ſhall be able to eſtabliſh no general truths, or elſe at leaſt ſhall be apt to perplex the mind about them. The collection of ſeveral things into ſeveral claſſes, gives the mind more general and larger views; but we muſt take care to unite them only in that; and ſo far as they do agree, for ſo far they may be united under the conſideration: for entity itſelf, that comprehends all things, as general as it is, may afford us clear and rational conceptions. If we would weigh and keep in our minds what it is we are conſidering, that would beſt inſtruct us when we ſhould, or ſhould not branch into farther diſtinctions, which are to be taken only from a due contemplation of things; to which there is nothing more oppoſite than the art of verbal diſtinctions, made at pleaſure

ſure in learned and arbitrarily invented terms, to be applied at a venture, without comprehending or conveying any diſtinct notions; and ſo altogether fitted to artificial talk, or empty noiſe in diſpute, without any clearing of difficulties, or advance in knowledge. Whatſoever ſubject we examine and would get knowledge in, we ſhould, I think, make as general and as large as it will bear; nor can there be any danger of this, if the idea of it be ſettled and determined: For if that be ſo, we ſhall eaſily diſtinguiſh it from any other idea, though comprehended under the ſame name. For it is to fence againſt the intanglements of equivocal words, and the great art of ſophiſtry which lies in them, that diſtinctions have been multiplied, and their uſe thought ſo neceſſary. But had every diſtinct abſtract idea a diſtinct known name, there would be little need of theſe multiplied ſcholaſtick diſtinctions, though there would be nevertheleſs as much need ſtill of the mind's obſerving the differences that are in things, and diſcriminating them thereby one from another. It is not therefore the right way to knowledge, to hunt after, and fill the head with abundance of artificial and ſcholaſtick diſtinctions, wherewith learned men's writings are often filled: we ſometimes find what they treat of ſo divided and ſubdivided, that the mind of the moſt attentive reader loſes the ſight of it, as it is more than probable the writer himſelf did; for in things crumbled into duſt, it is in vain to affect or pretend order, or expect clearneſs. To avoid confuſion by too few or too many diviſions, is a great ſkill in thinking as well as writing, which is but the copying our thoughts; but what are the boundaries of the mean between the two vicious exceſſes on both hands, I think is hard to ſet down in words: clear and diſtinct ideas is all that I yet know able to regulate it. But as to verbal diſtinctions received and applied to common terms, i. e. equivocal words, they are more properly, I think, the buſineſs of criticiſms and dictionaries than of real knowledge and philoſophy; ſince they, for the moſt part, explain the meaning of words, and give us their ſeveral ſignifications. The dexterous management of terms, and being able to fend and prove with them, I know has and does paſs in the world for a great part of learning; but it is learning diſtinct from knowledge; for knowledge conſiſts only in perceiving the habitudes and relations of ideas one to another, which is done without words; the intervention of a ſound helps nothing to it. And hence we ſee that there is leaſt uſe of diſtinctions where there is moſt knowledge; I mean in mathematicks, where men have determined ideas with known names to them; and ſo there being no room for equivocations, there is no need of diſtinctions. In arguing, the opponent uſes as comprehenſive and equivocal terms as he can, to involve his adverſary in the doubtfulneſs of his expreſſions: this is expected, and therefore the anſwerer on his ſide makes it his play to diſtinguiſh as much as he can, and thinks he can never do it too much; nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had without truth and without knowledge. This ſeems to me to be the art of diſputing. Uſe your words as captiouſly as you can in your argu-

Diſtinctions.

Diſtinctions. ing on one ſide, and apply diſtinctions as much as you can on the other ſide to every term, to nonplus your opponent; ſo that in this ſort of ſcholarſhip, there being no bounds ſet to diſtinguiſhing, ſome men have thought all acuteneſs to have lain in it; and therefore in all they have read or thought on, their great buſineſs has been to amuſe themſelves with diſtinctions, and multiply to themſelves diviſions; at leaſt, more than the nature of the thing required. There ſeems to me, as I ſaid, to be no other rule for this, but a due and right conſideration of things as they are in themſelves. He that has ſettled in his mind determined ideas, with names affixed to them, will be able both to diſcern their differences one from another; which is really diſtinguiſhing: and, where the penury of words affords not terms anſwering every diſtinct idea, will be able to apply proper diſtinguiſhing terms to the comprehenſive and equivocal names he is forced to make uſe of. This is all the need I know of diſtinguiſhing terms; and in ſuch verbal diſtinctions, each term of the diſtinction, joined to that whoſe ſignification it diſtinguiſhes, is but a diſtinct name for a diſtinct idea. Where they are ſo, and men have clear and diſtinct conceptions that anſwer their verbal diſtinctions, they are right, and are pertinent as far as they ſerve to clear any thing in the ſubject under conſideration. And this is that which ſeems to me the proper and only meaſure of diſtinctions and diviſions; which he that will conduct his underſtanding right, muſt not look for in the acuteneſs of invention, nor the authority of writers, but will find only in the conſideration of things themſelves, whether they are led into it by their own meditations, or the information of books.

AN aptneſs to jumble things together, wherein can be found any likeneſs, is a fault in the underſtanding on the other ſide, which will not fail to miſlead it, and by thus lumping of things, hinder the mind from diſtinct and accurate conceptions of them.

Similies. § 32. To which let me here add another near of kin to this, at leaſt in name, and that is letting the mind, upon the ſuggeſtion of any new notion, run immediately after ſimilies to make it the clearer to itſelf; which, though it may be a good way, and uſeful in the explaining our thoughts to others; yet it is by no means a right method to ſettle true notions of any thing in ourſelves, becauſe ſimilies always fail in ſome part, and come ſhort of that exactneſs which our conceptions ſhould have to things, if we would think aright. This indeed makes men plauſible talkers; for thoſe are always moſt acceptable in diſcourſe who have the way to let their thoughts into other men's minds with the greateſt eaſe and facility; whether thoſe thoughts are well formed and correſpond with things, matters not; few men care to be inſtructed but at an eaſy rate. They, who in their diſcourſe ſtrike the fancy, and take the hearers conceptions along with them as faſt as their words flow, are the applauded talkers, and go for the only men of clear thoughts. Nothing contributes ſo much to this as ſimilies, whereby men think they themſelves underſtand better, becauſe they are the better underſtood. But it

is one thing to think right, and another thing to know the right way to lay our thoughts before others with advantage and clearneſs, be they right or wrong. Well-choſen ſimilies, metaphors, and allegories, with method and order, do this the beſt of any thing, becauſe being taken from objects already known, and familiar to the underſtanding, they are conceived as faſt as ſpoken; and the correſpondence being concluded, the thing they are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be underſtood too. Thus fancy paſſes for knowledge, and what is prettily ſaid is miſtaken for ſolid. I ſay not this to decry metaphor, or with deſign to take away that ornament of ſpeech; my buſineſs here is not with rhetoricians and orators, but with philoſophers and lovers of truth; to whom I would beg leave to give this one rule whereby to try whether, in the application of their thoughts to any thing for the improvement of their knowledge, they do in truth comprehend the matter before them really ſuch as it is in itſelf. The way to diſcover this is to obſerve whether, in the laying it before themſelves or others, they make uſe only of borrowed repreſentations, and ideas foreign to the things, which are applied to it by way of accommodation, as bearing ſome proportion or imagined likeneſs to the ſubject under conſideration. Figured and metaphorical expreſſions do well to illuſtrate more abſtruſe and unfamiliar ideas which the mind is not yet thoroughly accuſtomed to; but then they muſt be made uſe of to illuſtrate ideas that we already have, not to paint to us thoſe which we yet have not. Such borrowed and alluſive ideas may follow real and ſolid truth, to ſet it off when found; but muſt by no means be ſet in its place, and taken for it. If all our ſearch has yet reached no farther than ſimilie and metaphor, we may aſſure ourſelves we rather fancy than know, and have not yet penetrated into the inſide and reality of the thing, be it what it will, but content ourſelves with what our imaginations, not things themſelves, furniſh us with. Similies.

§ 33. In the whole conduct of the underſtanding, there is nothing of more moment than to know when and where, and how far to give aſſent; and poſſibly there is nothing harder. It is very eaſily ſaid, and no body queſtions it, that giving and with-holding our aſſent, and the degrees of it, ſhould be regulated by the evidence which things carry with them; and yet we ſee men are not the better for this rule; ſome firmly embrace doctrines upon ſlight grounds, ſome upon no grounds, and ſome contrary to appearance: ſome admit of certainty, and are not to be moved in what they hold: others waver in every thing, and there want not thoſe that reject all as uncertain. What then ſhall a novice, an enquirer, a ſtranger do in the caſe? I anſwer, uſe his eyes. There is a correſpondence in things, and agreement and diſagreement in ideas, diſcernible in very different degrees, and there are eyes in men to ſee them, if they pleaſe: only their eyes may be dimmed or dazzled, and the diſcerning ſight in them impaired or loſt. Intereſt and paſſion dazzles; the cuſtom of arguing on any ſide, even againſt our perſuaſions, dims the underſtanding, and makes it by degrees loſe the faculty of diſcerning clearly between truth Aſſent.

Aſſent. and falſhood, and ſo of adhering to the right ſide. It is not ſafe to play with error, and dreſs it up to ourſelves or others in the ſhape of truth. The mind by degrees loſes its natural reliſh of real ſolid truth, is reconciled inſenſibly to any thing that can but be dreſſed up into any feint appearance of it; and if the fancy be allowed the place of judgment at firſt in ſport, it afterwards comes by uſe to uſurp it; and what is recommended by this flatterer (that ſtudies but to pleaſe) is received for good. There are ſo many ways of fallacy, ſuch arts of giving colours, appearances and reſemblances by this court-dreſſer, the fancy, that he who is not wary to admit nothing but truth itſelf, very careful not to make his mind ſubſervient to any thing elſe, cannot but be caught. He that has a mind to believe, has half aſſented already; and he that by often arguing againſt his own ſenſe, impoſes falſhoods on others, is not far from believing himſelf. This takes away the great diſtance there is betwixt truth and falſhood; it brings them almoſt together, and makes it no great odds, in things that approach ſo near, which you take; and when things are brought to that paſs, paſſion, or intereſt, &c. eaſily, and without being perceived, determine which ſhall be the right.

Indifferency. § 34. I HAVE ſaid above, that we ſhould keep a perfect indifferency for all opinions, not wiſh any of them true, or try to make them appear ſo; but being indifferent, receive and embrace them according as evidence, and that alone, gives the atteſtation of truth. They that do thus, i. e. keep their minds indifferent to opinions, to be determined only by evidence, will always find the underſtanding has perception enough to diſtinguiſh between evidence and no evidence, betwixt plain and doubtful; and if they neither give nor refuſe their aſſent but by that meaſure, they will be ſafe in the opinions they have. Which being perhaps but few, this caution will have alſo this good in it, that it will put them upon conſidering, and teach them the neceſſity of examining more than they do; without which the mind is but a receptacle of inconſiſtencies, not the ſtore-houſe of truths. They that do not keep up this indifferency in themſelves for all but truth, not ſuppoſed, but evidenced in themſelves, put coloured ſpectacles before their eyes, and look on things through falſe glaſſes, and then think themſelves excuſed in following the falſe appearances, which they themſelves put upon them. I do not expect that by this way the aſſent ſhould in every one be proportioned to the grounds and clearneſs wherewith every truth is capable to be made out; or that men ſhould be perfectly kept from error: that is more than human nature can by any means be advanced to; I aim at no ſuch unattainable privilege; I am only ſpeaking of what they ſhould do, who would deal fairly with their own minds, and make a right uſe of their faculties in the purſuit of truth; we fail them a great deal more than they fail us. It is miſmanagement more than want of abilities that men have reaſon to complain of, and which they actually do complain of in thoſe that differ from them. He that by indifferency for all but truth, ſuffers not his aſſent to go faſter than his evidence, nor beyond it; will learn to examine,

and examine fairly inſtead of preſuming, and no-body will be at a loſs, or in danger for want of embracing thoſe truths which are neceſſary in his ſtation and circumſtances. In any other way but this, all the world are born to orthodoxy; they imbibe at firſt the allowed opinions of their country and party, and ſo never queſtioning their truth, not one of an hundred ever examines. They are applauded for preſuming they are in the right. He that conſiders is a foe to orthodoxy, becauſe poſſibly he may deviate from ſome of the received doctrines there. And thus men, without any induſtry or acquiſition of their own, inherit local truths (for it is not the ſame every-where) and are inured to aſſent without evidence. This influences farther than is thought; for what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all parties, ever examined the tenets he is ſo ſtiff in; or ever thought it his buſineſs or duty ſo to do? It is ſuſpected of luke-warmneſs to ſuppoſe it neceſſary, and a tendency to apoſtacy to go about it. And if a man can bring his mind once to be poſitive and fierce for poſitions, whoſe evidence he has never once examined, and that in matters of greateſt concernment to him; what ſhall keep him from this ſhort and eaſy way of being in the right in caſes of leſs moment? Thus we are taught to clothe our minds as we do our bodies, after the faſhion in vogue, and it is accounted fantaſticalneſs, or ſomething worſe, not to do ſo. This cuſtom (which who dares oppoſe?) makes the ſhort-ſighted bigots, and the warier ſcepticks, as far as it prevails: and thoſe that break from it are in danger of hereſy: for taking the whole world, how much of it doth truth and orthodoxy poſſeſs together? Though it is by the laſt alone (which has the good luck to be every-where) that error and hereſy are judged of: for argument and evidence ſignify nothing in the caſe, and excuſe no-where, but are ſure to be borne down in all ſocieties by the infallible orthodoxy of the place. Whether this be the way to truth and right aſſent, let the opinions, that take place and preſcribe in the ſeveral habitable parts of the earth, declare. I never ſaw any reaſon yet why truth might not be truſted on its own evidence: I am ſure if that be not able to ſupport it, there is no fence againſt error; and then truth and falſhood are but names that ſtand for the ſame things. Evidence therefore is that by which alone every man is (and ſhould be) taught to regulate his aſſent, who is then, and then only, in the right way, when he follows it. Indifferency.

Men deficient in knowledge are uſually in one of theſe three ſtates; either wholly ignorant, or as doubting of ſome propoſition they have either embraced formerly, or are at preſent inclined to; or laſtly, they do with aſſurance hold and profeſs without ever having examined, and being convinced by well-grounded arguments.

The firſt of theſe are in the beſt ſtate of the three, by having their minds yet in their perfect freedom and indifferency; the likelier to purſue truth the better, having no biaſs yet clapped on to miſlead them.

§ 35. For ignorance, with an indifferency for truth, is nearer to it than opinion with ungrounded inclination, which is the great ſource of error;

Indifferency. error; and they are more in danger to go out of the way, who are marching under the conduct of a guide, that it is an hundred to one will miſlead them, than he that has not yet taken a ſtep, and is likelier to be prevailed on to enquire after the right way. The laſt of the three ſorts are in the worſt condition of all; for if a man can be perſuaded and fully aſſured of any thing for a truth, without having examined, what is there that he may not embrace for truth? and if he has given himſelf up to believe a lye, what means is there left to recover one who can be aſſured without examining? To the other two this I crave leave to ſay, that as he that is ignorant is in the beſt ſtate of the two, ſo he ſhould purſue truth in a method ſuitable to that ſtate; i. e. by enquiring directly into the nature of the thing itſelf, without minding the opinions of others, or troubling himſelf with their queſtions or diſputes about it; but to ſee what he himſelf can, ſincerely ſearching after truth, find out. He that proceeds upon other principles in his enquiry into any ſciences, though he be reſolved to examine them and judge of them freely, does yet at leaſt put himſelf on that ſide, and poſt himſelf in a party which he will not quit till he be beaten out; by which the mind is inſenſibly engaged to make what defence it can, and ſo is unawares biaſſed. I do not ſay but a man ſhould embrace ſome opinion when he has examined, elſe he examines to no purpoſe; but the ſureſt and ſafeſt way is to have no opinion at all till he has examined, and that without any the leaſt regard to the opinions or ſyſtems of other men about it. For example, were it my buſineſs to underſtand phyſick, would not the ſafer and readier way be to conſult nature herſelf, and inform myſelf in the hiſtory of diſeaſes and their cures; than eſpouſing the principles of the dogmatiſts, methodiſts, or chymiſts, to engage in all the diſputes concerning either of thoſe ſyſtems, and ſuppoſe it to be true, till I have tried what they can ſay to beat me out of it? Or, ſuppoſing that Hippocrates, or any other book, infallibly contains the whole art of phyſick; would not the direct way be to ſtudy, read, and conſider that book, weigh and compare the parts of it to find the truth, rather than eſpouſe the doctrines of any party? who, though they acknowledge his authority, have already interpreted and wire-drawn all his text to their own ſenſe; the tincture whereof, when I have imbibed, I am more in danger to miſunderſtand his true meaning, than if I had come to him with a mind unprepoſſeſſed by doctors and commentators of my ſect; whoſe reaſonings, interpretation, and language, which I have been uſed to, will of courſe make all chime that way, and make another, and perhaps the genuine meaning of the author ſeem harſh, ſtrained, and uncouth to me. For words having naturally none of their own, carry that ſignification to the hearer, that he is uſed to put upon them, whatever be the ſenſe of him that uſes them. This, I think, is viſibly ſo; and if it be, he that begins to have any doubt of any of his tenets, which he received without examination, ought, as much as he can, to put himſelf wholly into this ſtate of ignorance in reference to that queſtion; and throwing wholly by all his former notions, and the opi-

opinions of others, examine, with a perfect indifferency, the queſtion in its ſource; without any inclination to either ſide, or any regard to his or others unexamined opinions. This I own is no eaſy thing to do; but I am not enquiring the eaſy way to opinion, but the right way to truth; which they muſt follow who will deal fairly with their own underſtandings and their own ſouls. Indifferency.

§ 36. THE indifferency that I here propoſe will alſo enable them to ſtate the queſtion right, which they are in doubt about, without which they can never come to a fair and clear deciſion of it. Queſtion.

§ 37. ANOTHER fruit from this indifferency, and the conſidering things in themſelves abſtract from our own opinions and other men's notions and diſcourſes on them, will be, that each man will purſue his thoughts in that method which will be moſt agreeable to the nature of the thing, and to his apprehenſion of what it ſuggeſts to him; in which he ought to proceed with regularity and conſtancy, until he come to a well-grounded reſolution wherein he may acquieſce. If it be objected that this will require every man to be a ſcholar, and quit all his other buſineſs, and betake himſelf wholly to ſtudy; I anſwer, I propoſe no more to any one than he has time for. Some men's ſtate and condition requires no great extent of knowledge; the neceſſary proviſion for life ſwallows the greateſt part of their time. But one man's want of leiſure is no excuſe for the oſcitancy and ignorance of thoſe who have time to ſpare; and every one has enough to get as much knowledge as is required and expected of him, and he that does not that, is in love with ignorance, and is accountable for it. Perſeverance.

§ 38. THE variety of diſtempers in men's minds is as great as of thoſe in their bodies; ſome are epidemick, few ſcape them; and every one too, if he would look into himſelf, would find ſome defect of his particular genius. There is ſcarce any one without ſome idioſyncriſy that he ſuffers by. This man preſumes upon his parts, that they will not fail him at time of need; and ſo thinks it ſuperfluous labour to make any proviſion before-hand. His underſtanding is to him like Fortunatus's purſe, which is always to furniſh him, without ever putting any thing into it before-hand; and ſo he ſits ſtill ſatisfied, without endeavouring to ſtore his underſtanding with knowledge. It is the ſpontaneous product of the country, and what need of labour in tillage? Such men may ſpread their native riches before the ignorant; but they were beſt not come to ſtreſs and trial with the ſkilful. We are born ignorant of every thing. The ſuperficies of things that ſurround them, make impreſſions on the negligent, but no-body penetrates into the inſide without labour, attention, and induſtry. Stones and timber grow of themſelves, but yet there is no uniform pile with ſymmetry and convenience to lodge in without toil and pains. God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beautiful without us; but it will never come into our heads all at once; we muſt bring it home piece-meal, and there ſet it up by our own Preſumption.

Deſpondency

own induſtry, or elſe we ſhall have nothing but darkneſs and a chaos within, whatever order and light there be in things without us.

§ 39. ON the other ſide, there are others that depreſs their own minds, deſpond at the firſt difficulty, and conclude that the getting an inſight in any of the ſciences, or making any progreſs in knowledge farther than ſerves their ordinary buſineſs, is above their capacities. Theſe ſit ſtill, becauſe they think they have not legs to go; as the others I laſt mentioned do, becauſe they think they have wings to fly, and can ſoar on high when they pleaſe. To theſe latter one may for anſwer apply the proverb, "Uſe legs and have legs." No-body knows what ſtrength of parts he has till he has tried them. And of the underſtanding one may moſt truly ſay, that its force is greater generally than it thinks, till it is put to it. "Vireſque acquirit eundo."

AND therefore the proper remedy here is but to ſet the mind to work, and apply the thoughts vigorouſly to the buſineſs; for it holds in the ſtruggles of the mind as in thoſe of war, "Dum putant ſe vincere vicêre;" A perſuaſion that we ſhall overcome any difficulties that we meet with in the ſciences, ſeldom fails to carry us through them. No-body knows the ſtrength of his mind, and the force of ſteady and regular application, till he has tried. This is certain, he that ſets out upon weak legs, will not only go farther, but grow ſtronger too than one, who with a vigorous conſtitution and firm limbs, only ſits ſtill.

SOMETHING of kin to this, men may obſerve in themſelves, when the mind frights itſelf (as it often does) with any thing reflected on in groſs, and tranſiently viewed confuſedly, and at a diſtance. Things thus offered to the mind, carry the ſhew of nothing but difficulty in them, and are thought to be wrapt up in impenetrable obſcurity. But the truth is, theſe are nothing but ſpectres that the underſtanding raiſes to itſelf to flatter its own lazineſs. It ſees nothing diſtinctly in things remote, and in a huddle; and therefore concludes too faintly, that there is nothing more clear to be diſcovered in them. It is but to approach nearer, and that miſt of our own raiſing that inveloped them will remove; and thoſe that in that miſt appeared hideous giants not to be grappled with, will be found to be of the ordinary and natural ſize and ſhape. Things, that in a remote and confuſed view ſeem very obſcure, muſt be approached by gentle and regular ſteps; and what is moſt viſible, eaſy and obvious in them firſt conſidered. Reduce them into their diſtinct parts; and then in their due order bring all that ſhould be known concerning every one of thoſe parts into plain and ſimple queſtions; and then what was thought obſcure, perplexed, and too hard for our weak parts, will lay itſelf open to the underſtanding in a fair view, and let the mind into that which before it was awed with, and kept at a diſtance from, as wholly myſterious. I appeal to my reader's experience, whether this has never happened to him, eſpecially when, buſy on one thing, he has occaſionally reflected on another. I aſk him whether he has never thus been

ſcared

ſcared with a ſudden opinion of mighty difficulties, which yet have vaniſhed, when he has ſeriouſly and methodically applied himſelf to the conſideration of this ſeeming terrible ſubject; and there has been no other matter of aſtoniſhment left, but that he amuſed himſelf with ſo diſcouraging a proſpect of his own raiſing, about a matter, which in the handling was found to have nothing in it more ſtrange nor intricate than ſeveral other things which he had long ſince, and with eaſe maſtered. This experience would teach us how to deal with ſuch bugbears another time, which ſhould rather ſerve to excite our vigour than enervate our induſtry. The ſureſt way for a learner in this, as in all other caſes, is not to advance by jumps and large ſtrides; let that which he ſets himſelf to learn next, be indeed the next; i. e. as nearly conjoined with what he knows already as is poſſible; let it be diſtinct but not remote from it: Let it be new, and what he did not know before, that the underſtanding may advance; but let it be as little at once as may be, that its advances may be clear and ſure. All the ground that it gets this way it will hold. This diſtinct gradual growth in knowledge is firm and ſure; it carries its own light with it in every ſtep of its progreſſion in an eaſy and orderly train; than which there is nothing of more uſe to the underſtanding. And though this perhaps may be ſeem a very ſlow and lingering way to knowledge; yet I dare confidently affirm, that whoever will try it in himſelf, or any one he will teach, ſhall find the advances greater in this method, than they would in the ſame ſpace of time have been in any other he could have taken. The greateſt part of true knowledge lies in a diſtinct perception of things in themſelves diſtinct. And ſome men give more clear light and knowledge by the bare diſtinct ſtating of a queſtion, than others by talking of it in groſs, whole hours together. In this, they who ſo ſtate a queſtion, do no more but ſeparate and diſintangle the parts of it one from another, and lay them, when ſo diſintangled, in their due order. This often, without any more ado, reſolves the doubt, and ſhews the mind where the truth lies. The agreement or diſagreement of the ideas in queſtion, when they are once ſeparated and diſtinctly conſidered, is, in many caſes, preſently perceived, and thereby clear and laſting knowledge gained; whereas things in groſs taken up together, and ſo lying together in confuſion, can produce in the mind but a confuſed, which in effect is no, knowledge; or at leaſt, when it comes to be examined and made uſe of, will prove little better than none. I therefore take the liberty to repeat here again what I have ſaid elſewhere, that in learning any thing as little ſhould be propoſed to the mind at once as is poſſible; and, that being underſtood and fully maſtered, to proceed to the next adjoining part yet unknown; ſimple, unperplexed propoſition belonging to the matter in hand, and tending to the clearing what is principally deſigned.

Deſpondency.

§ 40. ANALOGY is of great uſe to the mind in many caſes, eſpecially in natural philoſophy; and that part of it chiefly which conſiſts in happy and ſucceſsful experiments. But here we muſt take care that we keep our-

Analogy.

ourſelves within that wherein the analogy conſiſts. For example, the acid oil of vitriol is found to be good in ſuch a caſe, therefore the ſpirit of nitre or vinegar may be uſed in the like caſe. If the good effect of it be owing wholly to the acidity of it, the trial may be juſtified; but if there be ſomething elſe beſides the acidity in the oil of vitriol, which produces the good we deſire in the caſe; we miſtake that for analogy, which is not, and ſuffer our underſtanding to be miſguided by a wrong ſuppoſition of analogy where there is none.

Aſſociation. § 41. THOUGH I have, in the ſecond book of my Eſſay concerning human underſtanding, treated of the aſſociation of ideas; yet having done it there hiſtorically, as giving a view of the underſtanding in this as well as its ſeveral other ways of operating, rather than deſigning there to inquire into the remedies that ought to be applied to it; it will, under this latter conſideration, afford other matter of thought to thoſe who have a mind to inſtruct themſelves thoroughly in the right way of conducting their underſtandings; and that the rather, becauſe this, if I miſtake not, is as frequent a cauſe of miſtake and error in us, as perhaps any thing elſe that can be named; and is a diſeaſe of the mind as hard to be cured as any; it being a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not ſo, and naturally ſo, as they conſtantly appear to him.

BY this one eaſy and unheeded miſcarriage of the underſtanding, ſandy and looſe foundations become infallible principles, and will not ſuffer themſelves to be touched or queſtioned: Such unnatural connections become by cuſtom as natural to the mind as ſun and light. Fire and warmth go together, and ſo ſeem to carry with them as natural an evidence as ſelf-evident truths themſelves. And where then ſhall one with hopes of ſucceſs begin the cure? Many men firmly embrace falſhood for truth; not only becauſe they never thought otherwiſe; but alſo becauſe, thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think otherwiſe; at leaſt without a vigour of mind able to conteſt the empire of habit, and look into its own principles; a freedom which few men have the notion of in themſelves, and fewer are allowed the practice of by others; it being the great art and buſineſs of the teachers and guides in moſt ſects to ſuppreſs, as much as they can, this fundamental duty which every man owes himſelf, and is the firſt ſteady ſtep towards right and truth in the whole train of his actions and opinions. This would give one reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſuch teachers are conſcious to themſelves of the falſhood or weakneſs of the tenets they profeſs, ſince they will not ſuffer the grounds whereon they are built to be examined; whereas thoſe who ſeek truth only, and deſire to own and propagate nothing elſe, freely expoſe their principles to the teſt; are pleaſed to have them examined; give men leave to reject them if they can; and if there be any thing weak and unſound in them, are willing to have it detected, that they themſelves, as well as others, may not lay any ſtreſs upon any received propoſition beyond what the evidence of its truths will warrant and allow.

THERE

Association.

THERE is, I know, a great fault among all ſorts of people of principling their children and ſcholars; which at laſt, when looked into, amounts to no more, but making them imbibe their teacher's notions and tenets by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere to them whether true or falſe. What colours may be given to this, or of what uſe it may be when practiſed upon the vulgar, deſtined to labour, and given up to the ſervice of their bellies, I will not here enquire. But as to the ingenuous part of mankind, whoſe condition allows them leiſure, and letters, and enquiry after truth; I can ſee no other right way of principling them, but to take heed, as much as may be, that in their tender years, ideas, that have no natural coheſion, come not to be united in their heads; and that this rule be often inculcated to them to be their guide in the whole courſe of their lives and ſtudies, viz. that they never ſuffer any ideas to be joined in their underſtandings, in any other or ſtronger combination than what their own nature and correſpondence give them; and that they often examine thoſe that they find linked together in their minds; whether this aſſociation of ideas be from the viſible agreement that is in the ideas themſelves, or from the habitual and prevailing cuſtom of the mind joining them thus together in thinking.

THIS is for caution againſt this evil, before it be thoroughly riveted by cuſtom in the underſtanding; but he, that would cure it when habit has eſtabliſhed it, muſt nicely obſerve the very quick and almoſt imperceptible motions of the mind in its habitual actions. What I have ſaid in another place about the change of the ideas of ſenſe into thoſe of judgment, may be proof of this. Let any one not ſkilled in painting be told when he ſees bottles and tobacco-pipes, and other things ſo painted, as they are in ſome places ſhewn; that he does not ſee protuberances, and you will not convince him but by the touch: He will not believe that by an inſtantaneous legerdemain of his own thoughts, one idea is ſubſtituted for the other. How frequent inſtances may one meet with of this in the arguings of the learned, who not ſeldom, in two ideas that they have been accuſtomed to join in their minds, ſubſtitute one for the other; and, I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themſelves? This, whilſt they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themſelves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error. And the confuſion of two different ideas, which a cuſtomary connection of them in their minds hath made to them almoſt one, fills their head with falſe views, and their reaſonings with falſe conſequences.

Fallacies.

§ 42. RIGHT underſtanding conſiſts in the diſcovery and adherence to truth, and that in the perception of the viſible or probable agreement or diſagreement of ideas, as they are affirmed and denied one of another. From whence it is evident, that the right uſe and conduct of the underſtanding, whoſe buſineſs is purely truth and nothing elſe, is, that the mind ſhould be kept in a perfect indifferency, not inclining to either ſide, any farther than evidence ſettles it by knowledge, or the overbalance of

Fallacies. probability gives it the turn of aſſent and belief; but yet it is very hard to meet with any diſcourſe wherein one may not perceive the author not only maintain (for that is reaſonable and fit) but inclined and biaſſed to one ſide of the queſtion, with marks of a deſire that that ſhould be true. If it be aſked me, how authors who have ſuch a biaſs and lean to it may be diſcovered? I anſwer, by obſerving how in their writings or arguings they are often led by their inclinations to change the ideas of the queſtion, either by changing the terms, or by adding and joining others to them, whereby the ideas under conſideration are ſo varied, as to be more ſerviceable to their purpoſe, and to be thereby brought to an eaſier and nearer agreement, or more viſible and remoter diſagreement one with another. This is plain and direct ſophiſtry; but I am far from thinking, that wherever it is found it is made uſe of with deſign to deceive and miſlead the readers. It is viſible that men's prejudices and inclinations by this way impoſe often upon themſelves; and their affection for truth, under their prepoſſeſſion in favour of one ſide, is the very thing that leads them from it. Inclination ſuggeſts and ſlides into their diſcourſe favourable terms, which introduce favourable ideas; till at laſt by this means that is concluded clear and evident, thus dreſſed up, which, taken in its native ſtate, by making uſe of none but the preciſe determined ideas, would find no admittance at all. The putting theſe gloſſes on what they affirm, theſe, as they are thought, handſome, eaſy and graceful explications of what they are diſcourſing on, is ſo much the character of what is called and eſteemed writing well, that it is very hard to think that authors will ever be perſuaded to leave what ſerves ſo well to propagate their opinions, and procure themſelves credit in the world, for a more jejune and dry way of writing, by keeping to the ſame terms preciſely annexed to the ſame ideas; a ſour and blunt ſtiffneſs tolerable in mathematicians only, who force their way, and make truth prevail by irreſiſtible demonſtration.

BUT yet if authors cannot be prevailed with to quit the looſer, though more inſinuating ways of writing; if they will not think fit to keep cloſe to truth and inſtruction by unvaried terms, and plain unſophiſticated arguments; yet it concerns readers not to be impoſed on by fallacies, and the prevailing ways of inſinuation. To do this, the ſureſt and moſt effectual remedy is to fix in the mind the clear and diſtinct ideas of the queſtion ſtripped of words; and ſo likewiſe in the train of argumentation, to take up the author's ideas, neglecting his words, obſerving how they connect or ſeparate thoſe in the queſtion. He that does this will be able to caſt off all that is ſuperfluous; he will ſee what is pertinent, what coherent, what is direct to, what ſlides by, the queſtion. This will readily ſhew him all the foreign ideas in the diſcourſe, and where they were brought in; and though they perhaps dazzled the writer; yet he will perceive that they give no light nor ſtrength to his reaſonings.

THIS, though it be the ſhorteſt and eaſieſt way of reading books with profit, and keeping one's ſelf from being miſled by great names or plauſible

ſible diſcourſes; yet it being hard and tedious to thoſe who have not accuſtomed themſelves to it; it is not to be expected that every one (amongſt thoſe few who really purſue truth) ſhould this way guard his underſtanding from being impoſed on by the wilful, or at leaſt undeſigned ſophiſtry, which creeps into moſt of the books of argument. They, that write againſt their conviction, or that, next to them, are reſolved to maintain the tenets of a party they are engaged in, cannot be ſuppoſed to reject any arms that may help to defend their cauſe, and therefore ſuch ſhould be read with the greateſt caution. And they, who write for opinions they are ſincerely perſuaded of, and believe to be true, think they may ſo far allow themſelves to indulge their laudable affection to truth, as to permit their eſteem of it to give it the beſt colours, and ſet it off with the beſt expreſſions and dreſs they can, thereby to gain it the eaſieſt entrance into the minds of their readers, and fix it deepeſt there. Fallacies.

One of thoſe being the ſtate of mind we may juſtly ſuppoſe moſt writers to be in, it is fit their readers, who apply to them for inſtruction, ſhould not lay by that caution which becomes a ſincere purſuit of truth, and ſhould make them always watchful againſt whatever might conceal or miſrepreſent it. If they have not the ſkill of repreſenting to themſelves the author's ſenſe by pure ideas ſeparated from ſounds, and thereby diveſted of the falſe lights and deceitful ornaments of ſpeech; this yet they ſhould do, they ſhould keep the preciſe queſtion ſteadily in their minds, carry it along with them through the whole diſcourſe, and ſuffer not the leaſt alteration in the terms, either by addition, ſubtraction, or ſubſtituting any other. This every one can do who has a mind to it; and he that has not a mind to it, it is plain, makes his underſtanding only the warehouſe of other men's lumber; I mean falſe and unconcluding reaſonings, rather than a repoſitory of truth for his own uſe; which will prove ſubſtantial, and ſtand him in ſtead, when he has occaſion for it. And whether ſuch an one deals fairly by his own mind, and conducts his own underſtanding right, I leave to his own underſtanding to judge.

§ 43. The mind of man being very narrow, and ſo ſlow in making acquaintance with things, and taking in new truths, that no one man is capable, in a much longer life than ours, to know all truths; it becomes our prudence, in our ſearch after knowledge, to employ our thoughts about fundamental and material queſtions, carefully avoiding thoſe that are trifling, and not ſuffering ourſelves to be diverted from our main even purpoſe, by thoſe that are merely incidental. How much of many young men's time is thrown away in purely logical enquiries, I need not mention. This is no better than if a man, who was to be a painter, ſhould ſpend all his time in examining the threads of the ſeveral cloths he is to paint upon, and counting the hairs of each pencil and bruſh he intends to uſe in the laying on of his colours. Nay, it is much worſe than for a young painter to ſpend his apprenticeſhip in ſuch uſeleſs niceties; for he, at the end of all his pains to no purpoſe, finds that it is not painting, nor any help to it, and ſo is really to no purpoſe: whereas men Fundamental Verities.

Fundamental Verities.

men deſigned for ſcholars have often their heads ſo filled and warmed with diſputes on logical queſtions, that they take thoſe airy uſeleſs notions for real and ſubſtantial knowledge, and think their underſtandings ſo well furniſhed with ſcience, that they need not look any farther into the nature of things, or deſcend to the mechanical drudgery of experiment and enquiry. This is ſo obvious a miſmanagement of the underſtanding, and that in the profeſſed way to knowledge, that it could not be paſſed by; to which might be joined abundance of queſtions, and the way of handling of them in the ſchools. What faults in particular of this kind, every man is, or may be guilty of, would be infinite to enumerate; it ſuffices to have ſhewn that ſuperficial and ſlight diſcoveries and obſervations that contain nothing of moment in themſelves, nor ſerve as clues to lead us into farther knowledge, ſhould not be thought worth our ſearching after.

THERE are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom, the baſis upon which a great many others reſt, and in which they have their conſiſtency. Theſe are teeming truths, rich in ſtore, with which they furniſh the mind, and, like the lights of heaven, are not only beautiful and entertaining in themſelves, but give light and evidence to other things, that without them could not be ſeen or known. Such is that admirable diſcovery of Mr. Newton, that all bodies gravitate to one another, which may be counted as the baſis of natural philoſophy; which, of what uſe it is to the underſtanding of the great frame of our ſolar ſyſtem, he has to the aſtoniſhment of the learned world ſhewn; and how much farther it would guide us in other things, if rightly purſued, is not yet known. Our Saviour's great rule, that "we ſhould love our neighbour as ourſelves," is ſuch a fundamental truth for the regulating human ſociety, that, I think, by that alone, one might without difficulty determine all the caſes and doubts in ſocial morality. Theſe and ſuch as theſe are the truths we ſhould endeavour to find out, and ſtore our minds with. Which leads me to another thing in the conduct of the underſtanding that is no leſs neceſſary, viz.

Bottoming.

§ 44. To accuſtom ourſelves, in any queſtion propoſed, to examine and find out upon what it bottoms. Moſt of the difficulties that come in our way, when well conſidered and traced, lead us to ſome propoſition, which, known to be true, clears the doubt, and gives an eaſy ſolution of the queſtion; whilſt topical and ſuperficial arguments, of which there is ſtore to be found on both ſides, filling the head with variety of thoughts, and the mouth with copious diſcourſe, ſerve only to amuſe the underſtanding, and entertain company without coming to the bottom of the queſtion, the only place of reſt and ſtability for an inquiſitive mind, whoſe tendency is only to truth and knowledge.

FOR example, if it be demanded, whether the grand ſeignior can lawfully take what he will from any of his people? This queſtion cannot be reſolved without coming to a certainty, whether all men are naturally equal; for upon that it turns; and that truth well ſettled in the underſtanding, and carried in the mind through the various debates concern-

ing the various rights of men in ſociety, will go a great way in putting an end to them, and ſhewing on which ſide the truth is.

§ 45. THERE is ſcarce any thing more for the improvement of knowledge, for the eaſe of life, and the diſpatch of buſineſs, than for a man to be able to diſpoſe of his own thoughts; and there is ſcarce any thing harder in the whole conduct of the underſtanding than to get a full maſtery over it. The mind, in a waking man, has always ſome object that it applies itſelf to; which, when we are lazy or unconcerned, we can eaſily change, and at pleaſure transfer our thoughts to another, and from thence to a third, which has no relation to either of the former. Hence men forwardly conclude, and frequently ſay, nothing is ſo free as thought, and it were well it were ſo; but the contrary will be found true in ſeveral inſtances; and there are many caſes wherein there is nothing more reſty and ungovernable than our thoughts: They will not be directed what objects to purſue, nor be taken off from thoſe they have once fixed on; but run away with a man in purſuit of thoſe ideas they have in view, let him do what he can. Transferring of thoughts.

I WILL not here mention again what I have above taken notice of, how hard it is to get the mind, narrowed by a cuſtom of thirty or forty years ſtanding to a ſcanty collection of obvious and common ideas, to enlarge itſelf to a more copious ſtock, and grow into an acquaintance with thoſe that would afford more abundant matter of uſeful contemplation; it is not of this I am here ſpeaking. The inconvenience I would here repreſent, and find a remedy for, is the difficulty there is ſometimes to tranſfer our minds from one ſubject to another, in caſes where the ideas are equally familiar to us.

MATTERS, that are recommended to our thoughts by any of our paſſions, take poſſeſſion of our minds with a kind of authority, and will not be kept out or diſlodged; but, as if the paſſion that rules were, for the time, the ſheriff of the place, and came with all the poſſe, the underſtanding is ſeized and taken with the object it introduces, as if it had a legal right to be alone conſidered there. There is ſcarce any body, I think, of ſo calm a temper who hath not ſome time found this tyranny on his underſtanding, and ſuffered under the inconvenience of it. Who is there almoſt, whoſe mind, at ſome time or other, love or anger, fear or grief, has not ſo faſtened to ſome clog, that it could not turn itſelf to any other object? I call it a clog, for it hangs upon the mind ſo as to hinder its vigour and activity in the purſuit of other contemplations; and advances itſelf little or not at all in the knowledge of the thing which it ſo cloſely hugs and conſtantly pores on. Men thus poſſeſſed, are ſometimes as if they were ſo in the worſt ſenſe, and lay under the power of an inchantment. They ſee not what paſſes before their eyes; hear not the audible diſcourſe of the company; and when by any ſtrong application to them they are rouſed a little, they are like men brought to themſelves from ſome remote region; whereas in truth they come no farther than their ſecret cabinet within, where they have been wholly taken up with

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with the puppet, which is for that time appointed for their entertainment. The ſhame that ſuch dumps cauſe to well-bred people, when it carries them away from the company, where they ſhould bear a part in the converſation, is a ſufficient argument, that it is a fault in the conduct of our underſtanding, not to have that power over it as to make uſe of it to thoſe purpoſes, and on thoſe occaſions wherein we have need of its aſſiſtance. The mind ſhould be always free and ready to turn itſelf to the variety of objects that occur, and allow them as much conſideration as ſhall for that time be thought fit. To be engroſſed ſo by one object, as not to be prevailed on to leave it for another that we judge fitter for our contemplation, is to make it of no uſe to us. Did this ſtate of mind remain always ſo, every one would, without ſcruple, give it the name of perfect madneſs; and whilſt it does laſt, at whatever intervals it returns, ſuch a rotation of thoughts about the ſame object no more carries us forward towards the attainment of knowledge, than getting upon a mill-horſe whilſt he jogs on in his circular track would carry a man a journey.

I GRANT ſomething muſt be allowed to legitimate paſſions, and to natural inclinations. Every man, beſides occaſional affections, has beloved ſtudies, and thoſe the mind will more cloſely ſtick to; but yet it is beſt that it ſhould be always at liberty, and under the free diſpoſal of the man, and to act how and upon what he directs. This we ſhould endeavour to obtain, unleſs we would be content with ſuch a flaw in our underſtanding, that ſometimes we ſhould be as it were without it; for it is very little better than ſo in caſes where we cannot make uſe of it to thoſe purpoſes we would, and which ſtand in preſent need of it.

BUT before fit remedies can be thought on for this diſeaſe, we muſt know the ſeveral cauſes of it, and thereby regulate the cure, if we will hope to labour with ſucceſs.

ONE we have already inſtanced in, whereof all men that reflect have ſo general a knowledge, and ſo often an experience in themſelves, that nobody doubts of it. A prevailing paſſion ſo pins down our thoughts to the object and concern of it, that a man paſſionately in love cannot bring himſelf to think of his ordinary affairs, or a kind mother, drooping under the loſs of a child, is not able to bear a part as ſhe was wont in the diſcourſe of the company or converſation of her friends.

BUT though paſſion be the moſt obvious and general, yet it is not the only cauſe that binds up the underſtanding, and confines it for the time to one object, from which it will not be taken off.

BESIDES this, we may often find that the underſtanding, when it has a while employed itſelf upon a ſubject which either chance, or ſome ſlight accident, offered to it, without the intereſt or recommendation of any paſſion; works itſelf into a warmth, and by degrees gets into a career, wherein, like a bowl down a hill, it increaſes its motion by going, and will not be ſtopped or diverted; though, when the heat is over, it ſees all this earneſt application was about a trifle not worth a thought, and all the pains employed about it loſt labour.

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THERE is a third ſort, if I miſtake not, yet lower than this; it is a ſort of childiſhneſs, if I may ſo ſay, of the underſtanding, wherein, during the fit, it plays with and dandles ſome inſignificant puppet to no end, nor with any deſign at all, and yet cannot eaſily be got off from it. Thus ſome trivial ſentence, or a ſcrap of poetry, will ſometimes get into men's heads, and make ſuch a chiming there, that there is no ſtilling of it; no peace to be obtained, nor attention to any thing elſe, but this impertinent gueſt will take up the mind and poſſeſs the thoughts in ſpight of all endeavours to get rid of it. Whether every one hath experimented in themſelves this troubleſome intruſion of ſome friſking ideas which thus importune the underſtanding, and hinder it from being better employed, I know not. But perſons of very good parts, and thoſe more than one, I have heard ſpeak and complain of it themſelves. The reaſon I have to make this doubt, is from what I have known in a caſe ſomething of kin to this, though much odder, and that is of a ſort of viſions that ſome people have lying quiet, but perfectly awake, in the dark, or with their eyes ſhut. It is a great variety of faces, moſt commonly very odd ones, that appear to them in a train one after another; ſo that having had juſt the ſight of the one, it immediately paſſes away to give place to another, that the ſame inſtant ſucceeds, and has as quick an exit as its leader; and ſo they march on in a conſtant ſucceſſion; nor can any one of them by any endeavour be ſtopped or retained beyond the inſtant of its appearance, but is thruſt out by its follower, which will have its turn. Concerning this fantaſtical phænomenon I have talked with ſeveral people, whereof ſome have been perfectly acquainted with it, and others have been ſo wholly ſtrangers to it, that they could hardly be brought to conceive or believe it. I knew a lady of excellent parts, who had got paſt thirty without having ever had the leaſt notice of any ſuch thing; ſhe was ſo great a ſtranger to it, that when ſhe heard me and another talking of it, could ſcarce forbear thinking we bantered her; but ſome time after drinking a large doſe of dilute tea, (as ſhe was ordered by a phyſician) going to bed, ſhe told us at next meeting, that ſhe had now experimented what our diſcourſe had much a-do to perſuade her of. She had ſeen a great variety of faces in a long train, ſucceeding one another, as we had deſcribed; they were all ſtrangers and intruders, ſuch as ſhe had no acquaintance with before, nor ſought after then; and as they came of themſelves they went too; none of them ſtayed a moment, nor could be detained by all the endeavours ſhe could uſe, but went on in their ſolemn proceſſion, juſt appeared and then vaniſhed. This odd phænomenon ſeems to have a mechanical cauſe, and to depend upon the matter and motion of the blood or animal ſpirits.

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WHEN the fancy is bound by paſſion, I know no way to ſet the mind free and at liberty, to proſecute what thoughts the man would make choice of, but to allay the preſent paſſion, or counter-balance it with another; which is an art to be got by ſtudy, and acquaintance with the paſſions.

Transferring of thoughts.

THOSE who find themſelves apt to be carried away with the ſpontaneous current of their own thoughts, not excited by any paſſion or intereſt, muſt be very wary and careful in all the inſtances of it to ſtop it, and never humour their minds in being thus triflingly buſy. Men know the value of their corporal liberty, and therefore ſuffer not willingly fetters and chains to be put upon them. To have the mind captivated is, for the time, certainly the greater evil of the two, and deſerves our utmoſt care and endeavours to preſerve the freedom of our better part. In this caſe our pains will not be loſt; ſtriving and ſtruggling will prevail, if we conſtantly, on all ſuch occaſions, make uſe of it. We muſt never indulge theſe trivial attentions of thought; as ſoon as we find the mind makes itſelf a buſineſs of nothing, we ſhould immediately diſturb and check it, introduce new and more ſerious conſiderations, and not leave till we have beaten it off from the purſuit it was upon. This, at firſt, if we have let the contrary practice grow to an habit, will perhaps be difficult; but conſtant endeavours will by degrees prevail, and at laſt make it eaſy. And when a man is pretty well advanced, and can command his mind off at pleaſure from incidental and undeſigned purſuits, it may not be amiſs for him to go on farther, and make attempts upon meditations of greater moment, that at the laſt he may have a full power over his own mind, and be ſo fully maſter of his own thoughts, as to be able to tranſfer them from one ſubject to another, with the ſame eaſe that he can lay by any thing he has in his hand, and take ſomething elſe that he has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of mind is of great uſe both in buſineſs and ſtudy, and he that has got it will have no ſmall advantage of eaſe and diſpatch in all that is the choſen and uſeful employment of his underſtanding.

THE third and laſt way which I mentioned the mind to be ſometimes taken up with, I mean the chiming of ſome particular words or ſentence in the memory, and, as it were, making a noiſe in the head, and the like, ſeldom happens but when the mind is lazy, or very looſely and negligently employed. It were better indeed to be without ſuch impertinent and uſeleſs repetitions: any obvious idea, when it is roving careleſsly at a venture, being of more uſe, and apter to ſuggeſt ſomething worth conſideration, than the inſignificant buzz of purely empty ſounds. But ſince the rouſing of the mind, and ſetting the underſtanding on work with ſome degrees of vigour, does for the moſt part preſently ſet it free from theſe idle companions; it may not be amiſs, whenever we find ourſelves troubled with them, to make uſe of ſo profitable a remedy that is always at hand.

AN EXAMINATION OF P. MALEBRANCHE'S OPINION OF SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD.

1. THE acute and ingenious author of the Recherche de la Verité, among a great many very fine thoughts, judicious reaſonings, and uncommon reflections, has in that treatiſe ſtarted the notion of "ſeeing all things in God," as the beſt way to explain the nature and manner of the ideas in our underſtanding. The deſire I had to have my unaffected ignorance removed, has made it neceſſary for me to ſee whether this hypotheſis, when examined, and the parts of it put together, can be thought to cure our ignorance, or is intelligible and ſatisfactory to one who would not deceive himſelf, take words for things, and think he knows what he knows not.

2. THIS I obſerve at the entrance, that P. Malebranche having enumerated, and in the following chapters ſhewed the difficulties of the other ways, whereby he thinks human underſtanding may be attempted to be explained, and how inſufficient they are to give a ſatisfactory account of the ideas we have, erects this of "ſeeing all things in God" upon their ruin, as the true, becauſe it is impoſſible to find a better. Which argument, ſo far being only "argumentum ad ignorantiam," loſes all its force as ſoon as we conſider the weakneſs of our minds, and the narrowneſs of our capacities, and have but humility enough to allow, that there may be many things which we cannot fully comprehend, and that God is not bound in all he does to ſubject his ways of operation to the ſcru-

Recherche de la Verité, l. 3. p. 2. c. 1.

tiny of our thoughts, and confine himſelf to do nothing but what we muſt comprehend. And it will very little help to cure my ignorance, that this is the beſt of four or five hypotheſes propoſed, which are all defective; if this too has in it what is inconſiſtent with itſelf, or unintelligible to me.

3. THE P. Malebranche's Recherche de la Verité, l. 3. p. 2. c. 1, tells us, that whatever the mind perceives "muſt be actually preſent and intimately united to it." That the things that the mind perceives are its own ſenſations, imaginations, or notions; which, being in the ſoul the modifications of it, need no ideas to repreſent them. But all things exterior to the ſoul we cannot perceive but by the intervention of ideas, ſuppoſing that the things themſelves cannot be intimately united to the ſoul. But becauſe ſpiritual things may poſſibly be united to the ſoul, therefore he thinks it probable that they can diſcover themſelves immediately without ideas; though of this he doubts, becauſe he believes not there is any ſubſtance purely intelligible but that of God; and that though ſpirits can poſſibly unite themſelves to our minds; yet at preſent we cannot entirely know them. But he ſpeaks here principally of material things, which he ſays certainly cannot unite themſelves to our ſouls in ſuch a manner, as is neceſſary that it ſhould perceive them; becauſe, being extended, the ſoul not being ſo, there is no proportion between them.

4. THIS is the ſum of his doctrine contained in the firſt chapter of the ſecond part of the third book, as far as I can comprehend it; wherein, I confeſs, there are many expreſſions, which carrying with them, to my mind, no clear ideas, are like to remove but little of my ignorance by their ſounds. v. g. "What it is to be intimately united to the ſoul;" what it is for two ſouls or ſpirits to be intimately united: for intimate union being an idea taken from bodies, when the parts of one get within the ſurface of the other, and touch their inward parts; what is the idea of intimate union, I muſt have, between two beings that have neither of them any extenſion or ſurface? And if it be not ſo explained as to give me a clear idea of that union, it will make me underſtand very little more of the nature of the ideas in my mind, when it is ſaid I ſee them in God, who being "intimately united to the ſoul" exhibits them to it; than when it is only ſaid they are by the appointment of God produced in the mind by certain motions of our bodies, to which our minds are united. Which, however imperfect a way of explaining this matter, will ſtill be as good as any other that does not by clear ideas remove my ignorance of the manner of my perception.

5. BUT he ſays that "certainly material things cannot unite themſelves to our ſouls." Our bodies are united to our ſouls, yes; but, ſays he, not after "a manner which is neceſſary that the ſoul may perceive them." Explain this manner of union, and ſhew wherein the difference conſiſts betwixt the union neceſſary and not neceſſary to perception, and then I ſhall confeſs this difficulty removed.

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THE reaſon that he gives why "material things cannot be united "to our ſouls after a manner" that is neceſſary to the ſoul's perceiving them, is this; viz. That "material things being extended, and the ſoul "not, there is no proportion between them." This, if it ſhews any thing, ſhews only that a ſoul and a body cannot be united, becauſe one has ſurface to be united by, and the other none. But it ſhews not why ſoul, united to a body as ours is, cannot, by that body, have the idea of a triangle excited in it, as well as by being united to God (between whom and the ſoul there is as little proportion, as between any creature immaterial or material and the ſoul) ſee in God the idea of a triangle that is in him, ſince we cannot conceive a triangle, whether ſeen in matter, or in God, to be without extenſion.

6. HE ſays, "There is no ſubſtance purely intelligible but that of "God." Here again I muſt confeſs myſelf in the dark, having no notion at all of the "ſubſtance of God;" nor being able to conceive how his is more intelligible than any other ſubſtance.

7. ONE thing more there is, which, I confeſs, ſtumbles me in the very foundation of this hypotheſis, which ſtands thus: we cannot "per-"ceive" any thing but what is "intimately united to the ſoul." The reaſon why ſome things (viz. material) cannot be "intimately united "to the ſoul," is, becauſe "there is no proportion between the ſoul "and them." If this be a good reaſon, it follows, that the greater the proportion there is between the ſoul and any other being, the better and more intimately they can be united. Now then I aſk, whether there be a greater proportion between God, an infinite Being, and the ſoul, or between finite created ſpirits and the ſoul? And yet the author ſays, that "he believes that there is no ſubſtance purely intelligible but that "of God," and that "we cannot entirely know created ſpirits at pre-"ſent." Make this out upon your principles of "intimate union" and "proportion," and then they will be of ſome uſe to the clearing of your hypotheſis, otherwiſe "intimate union" and "proportion" are only ſounds ſerving to amuſe, not inſtruct us.

8. IN the cloſe of this chapter he enumerates the ſeveral ways whereby he thinks we come by ideas, and compares them ſeverally with his own way. Which how much more intelligible it is than either of thoſe, the following chapters will ſhew; to which I ſhall proceed, when I have obſerved that it ſeems a bold determination, when he ſays, that it muſt be one of theſe ways, and we can ſee objects no other. Which aſſertion muſt be built on this good opinion of our capacities, that God cannot make the creatures operate, but in ways conceivable to us. That we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about them farther than we conceive, is a great truth: and it would be well if we would not, but would ingenuouſly own the ſhortneſs of our ſight where we do not ſee. To ſay there can be no other, becauſe we conceive no other, does not, I confeſs, much inſtruct. And if I ſhould ſay, that it is poſſible God has made our

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ſouls ſo, and ſo united them to our bodies, that, upon certain motions made in our bodies by external objects, the ſoul ſhould have ſuch or ſuch perceptions or ideas, though in a way inconceivable to us; this perhaps would appear as true and as inſtructive a propoſition as what is ſo poſitively laid down.

Recherche de la Verité, l. 3. pt. 2. c. 2.

9. THOUGH the Peripatetick doctrine of the ſpecies does not at all ſatisfy me, yet I think it were not hard to ſhew, that it is as eaſy to account for the difficulties he charges on it, as for thoſe his own hypotheſis is laden with. But it being not my buſineſs to defend what I do not underſtand, nor to prefer the learned gibberiſh of the ſchools, to what is yet unintelligible to me in P. M. I ſhall only take notice of ſo much of his objections, as concerns what I gueſs to be the truth. Though I do not think any material ſpecies, carrying the reſemblance of things by a continual flux from the body we perceive, bring the perception of them to our ſenſes; yet I think the perception we have of bodies at a diſtance from ours, may be accounted for, as far as we are capable of underſtanding it, by the motion of particles of matter coming from them and ſtriking on our organs. In feeling and taſting there is immediate contact. Sound is not unintelligibly explained by a vibrating motion communicated to the medium, and the effluvia of odorous bodies will, without any great difficulties, account for ſmells. And therefore P. M. makes his objections only againſt viſible ſpecies, as the moſt difficult to be explained by material cauſes, as indeed they are. But he that ſhall allow extreme ſmallneſs in the particles of light, and exceeding ſwiftneſs in their motion; and the great poroſity that muſt be granted in bodies, if we compare gold, which wants them not, with air, the medium wherein the rays of light come to our eyes, and that of a million of rays that rebound from any viſible area of any body, perhaps the $\frac{1}{1000}$ or $\frac{1}{10000}$ part coming to the eye, are enough to move the retina ſufficiently to cauſe a ſenſation in the mind; will not find any great difficulty in the objections which are brought from the impenetrability of matter, and theſe rays ruffling and breaking one another in the medium which is full of them. As to what is ſaid, that from one point we can ſee a great number of objects, that is no objection againſt the ſpecies, or viſible appearances of bodies, being brought into the eye by the rays of light; for the bottom of the eye or retina, which, in regard of theſe rays, is the place of viſion, is far from being a point. Nor is it true, that though the eye be in any one place; yet that the ſight is performed in one point; i. e. that the rays that bring thoſe viſible ſpecies do all meet in a point; for they cauſe their diſtinct ſenſations, by ſtriking on diſtinct parts of the retina, as is plain in opticks; and the figure they paint there muſt be of ſome conſiderable bigneſs, ſince it takes up on the retina an area whoſe diameter is at leaſt thirty ſeconds of a circle, whereof the circumference is in the retina, and the center ſomewhere in the cryſtalline; as a little ſkill in opticks will manifeſt to any one that conſiders, that few eyes can perceive an object leſs than thirty minutes of a circle,

whereof the eye is the center. And he that will but reflect on that ſeeming odd experiment of ſeeing only the two outward ones of three bits of paper ſtuck up againſt a wall, at about half a foot, or a foot one from another, without ſeeing the middle one at all, whilſt his eye remains fixed in the ſame poſture, muſt confeſs that viſion is not made in a point, when it is plain, that looking with one eye there is always one part between the extreams of the area that we ſee, which is not ſeen at the ſame time that we perceive the extreams of it; though the looking with two eyes, or the quick turning of the axis of the eye to the part we would diſtinctly view, when we look but with one, does not let us take notice of it.

10. WHAT I have here ſaid I think ſufficient to make intelligible, how by material rays of light viſible ſpecies may be brought into the eye, notwithſtanding any of P. M's objections againſt ſo much of material cauſes, as my hypotheſis is concerned in. But when by this means an image is made on the retina, how we ſee it, I conceive no more than when I am told we ſee it in God. How we ſee it, is, I confeſs, what I underſtand not in the one or in the other, only it appears to me more difficult to conceive a diſtinct viſible image in the uniform invariable eſſence of God, than in variouſly modifiable matter; but the manner how I ſee either, ſtill eſcapes my comprehenſion. Impreſſions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I underſtand; and motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that theſe produce ideas in our minds, I am perſuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehenſible. This I can reſolve only into the good pleaſure of God, whoſe ways are paſt finding out. And, I think, I know it as well when I am told theſe are ideas that the motion of the animal ſpirits, by a law eſtabliſhed by God, produces in me; as when I am told they are ideas I ſee in God. The ideas it is certain I have, and God both ways is the original cauſe of my having them; but the manner how I come by them, how it is that I perceive, I confeſs I underſtand not; though it be plain motion has to do in the producing of them: And motion ſo modified, is appointed to be the cauſe of our having them; as appears by the curious and artificial ſtructure of the eye, accommodated to all the rules of refraction and dioptricks, that ſo viſible objects might be exactly and regularly painted on the bottom of the eye.

11. THE change of bigneſs in the ideas of viſible objects, by diſtance and optick-glaſſes, which is the next argument he uſes againſt viſible ſpecies, is a good argument againſt them, as ſuppoſed by the Peripateticks; but when conſidered, would perſuade one that we ſee the figures and magnitudes of things rather in the bottom of our eyes than in God: the idea we have of them and their grandeur being ſtill proportioned to the bigneſs of the area, on the bottom of our eyes, that is affected by the rays which paint the image there; and we may be ſaid to ſee the picture in the retina, as, when it is pricked, we are truly ſaid to feel the pain in our finger.

12. IN

12. In the next place where he ſays, that when we look on a cube "we ſee all its ſides equal." This, I think, is a miſtake; and I have in another place ſhewn, how the idea we have from a regular ſolid, is not the true idea of that ſolid, but ſuch an one as by cuſtom (as the name of it does) ſerves to excite our judgment to form ſuch an one.

13. What he ſays of ſeeing an object ſeveral millions of leagues, the very ſame inſtant that it is uncovered, I think may be ſhewn to be a miſtake in matter of fact. For by obſervations made on the ſatellites of Jupiter, it is diſcovered that light is ſucceſſively propagated, and is about ten minutes coming from the ſun to us.

14. By what I have ſaid, I think it may be underſtood how we may conceive, that from remote objects material cauſes may reach our ſenſes, and therein produce ſeveral motions that may be the cauſes of ideas in us; notwithſtanding what P. M. has ſaid in this ſecond chapter againſt material ſpecies. I confeſs his arguments are good againſt thoſe ſpecies as uſually underſtood by the Peripateticks: But, ſince my principles have been ſaid to be conformable to the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, I have endeavoured to remove the difficulties it is charged with, as far as my opinion is concerned in them.

15. His third chapter is to confute the "opinion of thoſe who think "our minds have a power to produce the ideas of things on which they "would think, and that they are excited to produce them by the impreſſions which objects make on the body." One who thinks ideas are nothing but perceptions of the mind annexed to certain motions of the body by the will of God, who hath ordered ſuch perceptions always to accompany ſuch motions, though we know not how they are produced; does in effect conceive thoſe ideas or perceptions to be only paſſions of the mind, when produced in it, whether we will or no, by external objects. But he conceives them to be a mixture of action and paſſion when the mind attends to them, or revives them in the memory. Whether the ſoul has ſuch a power as this, we ſhall perhaps have occaſion to conſider hereafter; and this power our author does not deny, ſince in this very chapter he ſays, "When we conceive a ſquare by pure underſtanding, we "can yet imagine it; i. e. perceive it in ourſelves by tracing an image of "it on the brain." Here then he allows the ſoul power to trace images on the brain, and perceive them. This, to me, is matter of new perplexity in his hypotheſis; for if the ſoul be ſo united to the brain as to trace images on it, and perceive them, I do not ſee how this conſiſts with what he ſays a little before in the firſt chapter, viz. "That certainly material things "cannot be united to our ſouls after a manner neceſſary to its perceiving "them."

16. That which is ſaid about objects exciting ideas in us by motion; and our reviving the ideas we have once got in our memories, does not, I confeſs, fully explain the manner how it is done. In this I frankly avow my ignorance, and ſhould be glad to find in him any thing that would

would clear it to me; but in his explications I find theſe difficulties which I cannot get over.

17. THE mind cannot produce ideas, ſays he, becauſe they are "real "ſpiritual beings," i. e. ſubſtances; for ſo is the concluſion of that paragraph, where he mentions it as an abſurdity to think they are "annihi- "lated when they are not preſent to the mind." And the whole force of this argument would perſuade one to underſtand him ſo; though I do not remember that he any where ſpeaks it out, or in direct terms calls them ſubſtances.

18. I ſhall here only take notice how inconceivable it is to me, that a ſpiritual, i. e. an unextended ſubſtance ſhould repreſent to the mind an extended figure, v. g. a triangle of unequal ſides, or two triangles of different magnitudes. Next, ſuppoſing I could conceive an unextended ſubſtance to repreſent a figure, or be the idea of a figure, the difficulty ſtill remains to conceive how it is my ſoul ſees it. Let this ſubſtantial being be ever ſo ſure, and the picture ever ſo clear; yet how we ſee it, is to me inconceivable. Intimate union, were it as intelligible of two unextended ſubſtances, as of two bodies, would not yet reach perception, which is ſomething beyond union. But yet a little lower he agrees, that an idea "is not a ſubſtance," but yet affirms, it is "a "ſpiritual thing:" This "ſpiritual thing" therefore muſt either be a "ſpiritual ſubſtance," or a mode of a ſpiritual ſubſtance, or a relation; for beſides theſe I have no conception of any thing. And if any ſhall tell me it is a "mode," it muſt be a mode of the ſubſtance of God; which, beſides that it will be ſtrange to mention any modes in the ſimple eſſence of God; whoſoever ſhall propoſe any ſuch modes, as a way to explain the nature of our ideas, propoſes to me ſomething inconceivable, as a means to conceive what I do not yet know; and ſo bating a new phraſe, teaches me nothing, but leaves me as much in the dark as one can be where he conceives nothing. So that ſuppoſing ideas real ſpiritual things ever ſo much, if they are neither ſubſtances nor modes, let them be what they will, I am no more inſtructed in their nature, than when I am told they are perceptions, ſuch as I find them. And I appeal to my reader, whether that hypotheſis be to be preferred for its eaſineſs to be underſtood, which is explained by real beings, that are neither ſubſtances nor modes.

19. IN the fourth chapter he proves, that we do not ſee objects by ideas that are created with us; becauſe the ideas we have even of one very ſimple figure, v. g. a triangle, are not infinite, though there may be infinite triangles. What this proves I will not here examine; but the reaſon he gives being built on his hypotheſes, I cannot get over, and that is, that, "it is not for want of ideas, or that infinite is not preſent to us, "but it is only for want of capacity and extenſion of our ſouls, becauſe "the extenſion of our ſpirits is very narrow and limited." To have a limited extenſion, is to have ſome extenſion which agrees but ill with what is before ſaid of our ſouls, that they "have no extenſion." By what

he ſays here and in other places, one would think he were to be underſtood, as if the ſoul, being but a ſmall extenſion, could not at once receive all the ideas conceivable in infinite ſpace, becauſe but a little part of that infinite ſpace can be applied to the ſoul at once. To conceive thus of the ſoul's intimate union with an infinite being, and by that union receiving of ideas, leads one as naturally into as groſs thoughts, as a country maid would have of an infinite butter-print, in which was ingraven figures of all ſorts and ſizes, the ſeveral parts whereof being, as there was occaſion, applied to her lump of butter, left on it the figure or idea there was preſent need of. But whether any one would thus explain our ideas, I will not ſay, only I know not well how to underſtand what he ſays here, with what he ſays before of union, in a better ſenſe.

20. HE farther ſays, that had we a magazine of all ideas that are neceſſary for ſeeing things, they would be of no uſe, ſince the mind could not know which to chooſe, and ſet before itſelf to ſee the ſun. What he here means by the ſun is hard to conceive, and according to his hypotheſis of "ſeeing all things in God," how can he know that there is any ſuch real being in the world as the ſun? Did he ever ſee the ſun? No, but on occaſion of the preſence of the ſun to his eyes, he has ſeen the idea of the ſun in God, which God has exhibited to him; but the ſun, becauſe it cannot be united to his ſoul, he cannot ſee. How then does he know that there is a ſun which he never ſaw? And ſince God does all things by the moſt compendious ways, what need is there that God ſhould make a ſun that we might ſee its idea in him when he pleaſed to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without any real ſun at all.

21. HE farther ſays, that God does not actually produce in us as many new ideas as we every moment perceive different things. Whether he has proved this or no, I will not examine.

22. BUT he ſays, that "we have at all times actually in ourſelves the "ideas of all things." Then we have always actually in ourſelves the ideas of all triangles, which was but now denied, "but we have them "confuſedly." If we ſee them in God, and they are not in him confuſedly, I do not underſtand how we can ſee them in God confuſedly.

23. IN the fifth chapter he tells us "all things are in God," even the moſt corporeal and earthly, but "after a manner altogether ſpiritual, "and which we cannot comprehend." Here therefore he and I are alike ignorant of theſe good words; "material things are in God after a "ſpiritual manner," ſignify nothing to either of us; and "ſpiritual "manner," ſignifies no more but this, that material things are in God immaterially. This and the like are ways of ſpeaking, which our vanity has found out to cover, not remove our ignorance. But "material "things are in God," becauſe "their ideas are in God, and thoſe ideas "which God had of them before the world was created, are not at all "different from himſelf." This ſeems to me to come very near ſaying, not only that there is variety in God, ſince we ſee variety in what "is not "different from himſelf;" but that material things are God, or a part

of

of him; which, though I do not think to be what our author deſigns; yet thus I fear he muſt be forced to talk, who thinks he knows God's underſtanding ſo much better than his own, that he will make uſe of the divine intellect to explain the human.

24. IN the ſixth chapter he comes more particularly to explain his own doctrine, where firſt he ſays, "the ideas of all beings are in God." Let it be ſo, God has the idea of a triangle, of a horſe, of a river, juſt as we have; for hitherto this ſignifies no more, for we ſee them as they are in him; and ſo the ideas that are in him, are the ideas we perceive. Thus far I then underſtand God hath the ſame ideas we have. This tells us indeed that there are ideas, which was agreed before, and I think no-body denies, but tells me not yet what they are.

25. HAVING ſaid that they are in God, the next thing he tells us is, that we "can ſee them in God." His proof, that "our ſouls can ſee "them in God, is becauſe God is moſt ſtraitly united to our ſouls by "his preſence, inſomuch that one may ſay, God is the place of ſpirits, "as ſpaces are the places of bodies;" in which there is not, I confeſs, one word that I can underſtand. For, firſt, in what ſenſe can he ſay, that "ſpaces are the places of bodies;" when he makes body and ſpace, or extenſion, to be the ſame thing. So that I do no more underſtand what he means, when he ſays, "ſpaces are the places of bodies," than if he had ſaid, bodies are the places of bodies. But when this ſimile is applied to God and ſpirits, it makes this ſaying, that "God is the place "of ſpirits," either to be merely metaphorical, and ſo ſignifies literally nothing, or elſe being literal, makes us conceive that ſpirits move up and down, and have their diſtances and intervals in God, as bodies have in ſpace. When I am told in which of theſe ſenſes he is to be underſtood, I ſhall be able to ſee how far it helps us to underſtand the nature of ideas. But is not God as ſtraitly united to bodies as to ſpirits? For he is alſo preſent, even where they are, but yet they ſee not theſe ideas in him. He therefore adds, "that the ſoul can ſee in God the works of God, "ſuppoſing God would diſcover to it what there is in him to repreſent "them," viz. the ideas that are in him. Union therefore is not the cauſe of this ſeeing; for the ſoul may be united to God, and yet not ſee the ideas are in him, till he "diſcover" them to it; ſo that, after all, I am but where I was. I have ideas, that I know; but I would know what they are; and to that I am yet only told, that "I ſee them in God." I aſk how "I ſee them in God? And it is anſwered, by my "intimate union" with God, for he is every-where preſent. I anſwer, if that were enough, bodies are alſo intimately united with God, for he is every where preſent; beſides, if that were enough, I ſhould ſee all the ideas that are in God. No, but only thoſe that he pleaſes to "diſcover." Tell me wherein this diſcovery lies, beſides barely making me ſee them, and you explain the manner of my having ideas: otherwiſe all that has been ſaid amounts to no more but this, that I have thoſe ideas that it pleaſes God I ſhould have, but by ways that I know not; and of this mind I was before, and am not got one jot farther.

26. In the next paragraph he calls them "beings, repreſentative be-
"ings." But whether theſe beings are ſubſtances, modes, or relations, I am not told; and ſo by beings told they are ſpiritual beings, I know no more but that they are ſomething, I know not what, and that I knew before.

27. To explain this matter a little farther, he adds, "It muſt be ob-
"ſerved, that it cannot be concluded, that ſouls ſee the eſſence of God,
"in that they ſee all things in God; becauſe what they ſee is very im-
"perfect, and God is very perfect. They ſee matter diviſible, figured,
"&c. and in God there is nothing diviſible and figured: for God is all
"being, becauſe he is infinite, and comprehends all things; but he is
"not any being in particular. Whereas what we ſee is but ſome one or
"more beings in particular; and we do not at all comprehend that perfect
"ſimplicity of God which contains all beings. Moreover, one may ſay,
"that we do not ſo much ſee the ideas of things, as the things them-
"ſelves, which the ideas repreſent. For when, for example, one ſees a
"ſquare, one ſays not that one ſees the idea of a ſquare, which is united
"to the ſoul, but only the ſquare that is without." I do not pretend not to be ſhort-ſighted; but if I am not duller than ordinary, this paragraph ſhews, that P. M. himſelf is at a ſtand in this matter, and comprehends not what it is we ſee in God, or how. Chap. fourth, he ſays, in expreſs words, that "it is neceſſary that all times we ſhould have actually in ourſelves the ideas of all things." And in this very chapter, a little lower, he ſays, that "all beings are preſent to our minds," and that we have "general ideas antecedent to particular." And, chap. 8th. that we are never without the "general idea of being:" and yet here he ſays, "that
"which we ſee" is but "one or more beings in particular." And after having taken a great deal of pains to prove, that "we cannot poſſibly ſee
"things themſelves, but only ideas;" here he tells us "we do not ſo much
"ſee the ideas of things as the things themſelves." In this uncertainty of the author what it is we ſee, I am to be excuſed if my eyes ſee not more clearly in his hypotheſis than he himſelf does.

28. He farther tells us, in this ſixth chapter, that "we ſee all beings,
"becauſe God wills that that which is in him that repreſents them ſhould
"be diſcovered to us." This tells us only, that there are ideas of things in God, and that we ſee them when he pleaſes to diſcover them; but what does this ſhew us more of the nature of thoſe ideas, or of the diſcovery of them, wherein that conſiſts, than he that ſays, without pretending to know what they are, or how they are made, that ideas are in our minds when God pleaſes to produce them there, by ſuch motions as he has appointed to do it? The next argument for our "ſeeing all things in God," is in theſe words; "but the ſtrongeſt of all the reaſons is the manner in
"which the mind perceives all things: it is evident, and all the world
"knows it by experience, that when we would think of any thing in
"particular, we at firſt caſt our view upon all beings, and afterwards we
"apply ourſelves to the conſideration of the object which we deſire to
"think

" think on." This argument has no other effect on me, but to make me doubt the more of the truth of this doctrine. Firſt, becauſe this, which he calls the " ſtrongeſt reaſon of all," is built upon matter of fact, which I cannot find to be ſo in myſelf. I do not obſerve, that when I would think of a triangle, I firſt think of " all beings;" whether theſe words " all beings" be to be taken here in their proper ſenſe, or very improperly for " being" in general. Nor do I think my country neighbours do ſo, when they firſt wake in the morning, who, I imagine, do not find it impoſſible to think of a lame horſe they have, or their blighted corn, till they have run over in their minds " all beings" that are, and then pitch on dapple; or elſe begin to think of " being" in general, which is " being" abſtracted from all its inferior ſpecies, before they come to think of the fly in their ſheep, or the tares in their corn. For I am apt to think that the greateſt part of mankind very ſeldom, if ever at all, think of " being" in general, i. e. abſtracted from all its inferior ſpecies and individuals. But taking it to be ſo, that a carrier when he would think of a remedy for his galled horſe, or a foot-boy for an excuſe for ſome fault he has committed, begins with caſting his eye upon all things; how does this make out the concluſion? Therefore " we can deſire to ſee all objects, " whence it follows that all beings are preſent to our minds." Which preſence ſignifies that we ſee them, or elſe it ſignifies nothing at all. They are all actually always ſeen by us; which, how true, let every one judge.

29. THE words wherein he purſues this argument ſtand thus, " Now " it is indubitable that we cannot deſire to ſee any particular object without ſeeing it already, although confuſedly, and in general. So that be- " ing able to deſire to ſee all beings, ſometimes one, ſometimes another, " it is certain that all beings are preſent to our ſpirits; and it ſeems all " beings could not be preſent to our ſpirits, but becauſe God is preſent " to them, i. e. he that contains all things in the ſimplicity of his being." I muſt leave it to others to judge how far it is blameable in me; but ſo it is, that I cannot make to myſelf the links of this chain to hang together; and methinks if a man would have ſtudied obſcurity, he could not have writ more unintelligibly than this. " We can deſire to ſee all " beings, ſometimes one, ſometimes another; therefore we do already " ſee all things, becauſe we cannot deſire to ſee any particular object, " but what we ſee already confuſedly and in general." The diſcourſe here is about ideas, which he ſays are real things, and we ſee in God. In taking this along with me, to make it prove any thing to his purpoſe, the argument muſt, as it ſeems to me, ſtand thus: we can deſire to have all ideas, ſometimes one, ſometimes another; therefore we have already all ideas, becauſe we cannot deſire to have any particular idea, but what we have already " confuſedly" and " in general." What can be meant here by having any " particular" idea " confuſedly and in general," I confeſs I cannot conceive, unleſs it be a capacity in us to have them; and in that ſenſe the whole argument amounts to no more but this: we have all ideas, becauſe we are capable of having all ideas; and ſo proves not at all

that

that we actually have them by being united to God, who " contains them " all in the ſimplicity of his being." That any thing elſe is, or can be meant by it, I do not ſee; for that which we deſire to ſee, being nothing but what we ſee already, (for if it can be any elſe, the argument falls and proves nothing) and that which we deſire to ſee, being, as we are told here, ſomething particular, " ſometimes one thing, ſometimes another;" that which we do ſee muſt be particular too; but how to ſee a particular thing in general, is paſt my comprehenſion. I cannot conceive how a blind man has the particular idea of ſcarlet confuſedly or in general, when he has it not at all; and yet that he might deſire to have it, I cannot doubt, no more than I doubt that I can deſire to perceive, or to have the ideas of thoſe things that God has prepared for thoſe that love him, " though they be ſuch as eye hath not ſeen, nor ear hath not heard, nor " hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive," ſuch as I have yet no idea of. He who deſires to know what creatures are in Jupiter, or what God hath prepared for them that love him, hath, it is true, a ſuppoſition that there is ſomething in Jupiter, or in the place of the bleſſed; but if that be to have the particular ideas of things there, enough to ſay that we ſee them already, no-body can be ignorant of any thing. He that has ſeen one thing hath ſeen all things; for he has got the general idea of ſomething. But this is not, I confeſs, ſufficient to convince me, that hereby we ſee all things " in the ſimplicity of God's being," which comprehends all things. For if the ideas I ſee are all, as our author tells us, real beings in him, it is plain they muſt be ſo many real diſtinct beings in him; and if we ſee them in him, we muſt ſee them as they are, diſtinct particular things, and ſo ſhall not ſee them confuſedly and in general. And what it is to ſee any idea (to which I do not give a name) confuſedly, is what I do not well underſtand. What I ſee I ſee, and the idea I ſee is diſtinct from all others that are not the ſame with it: beſides, I ſee them as they are in God, and as he ſhews them me. Are they in God confuſedly? Or does he ſhew them me confuſedly?

30. SECONDLY, This " ſeeing of all things," becauſe we " can deſire " to ſee all things," he makes a proof that " they are preſent" to our minds; and if they " be preſent, they can no ways be preſent but by the " preſence of God, who contains them in all the ſimplicity of his being." This reaſoning ſeems to be founded on this, that the reaſon of ſeeing all things, is their being preſent to our minds; becauſe God, in whom they are, is preſent. This, though the foundation he ſeems to build on, is liable to a very natural objection, which is, that then we ſhould actually always ſee all things, becauſe in God, who is preſent, they are all actually preſent to the mind. This he has endeavoured to obviate, by ſaying we ſee all the ideas in God, which he is pleaſed " to diſcover to us;" which indeed is an anſwer to this objection; but ſuch an one as over-turns his whole hypotheſis, and renders it uſeleſs, and as unintelligible as any of thoſe he has for that reaſon laid aſide. He pretends to explain to us how we come to perceive any thing, and that is by having the ideas of

them preſent in our minds; for the ſoul cannot perceive things at a diſtance, or remote from it. And thoſe ideas are preſent to the mind, only becauſe God, in whom they are, is preſent to the mind. This ſo far hangs together, and is of a piece. But when after this I am told, that their preſence is not enough to make them be ſeen, but God muſt do ſomething farther to diſcover them to me, I am as much in the dark as I was at firſt: and all this talk of their preſence in my mind explains nothing of the way wherein I perceive them, nor ever will, till he alſo makes me underſtand, what God does more than make them preſent to my mind, when he diſcovers them to me. For I think no-body denies, I am ſure I affirm, that the ideas we have, are in our minds by the will and power of God, though in a way that we conceive not, nor are able to comprehend. God, ſays our author, is ſtrictly united to the ſoul, and ſo the ideas of things too. But yet that preſence or union of theirs is not enough to make them ſeen, but God muſt ſhew or exhibit them; and what does God do more than make them preſent to the mind when he ſhews them? Of that there is nothing ſaid to help me over this difficulty, but that when God ſhews them, we ſee them; which in ſhort ſeems to me to ſay only thus much, that when we have theſe ideas we have them, and we owe the having of them to our Maker; which is to ſay no more than I do with my ignorance. We have the ideas of figures and colours by the operation of exterior objects on our ſenſes, when the ſun ſhews them us; but how the ſun ſhews them us, or how the light of the ſun produces them in us; what, and how the alteration is made in our ſouls; I know not: nor does it appear, by any thing our author ſays, that he knows any more what God does when he ſhews them us, or what it is that is done upon our minds, ſince the preſence of them to our minds, he confeſſes, does it not.

31. THIRDLY, One thing more is incomprehenſible to me in this matter, and that is, how the "ſimplicity of God's being" ſhould contain in it a variety of real beings, ſo that the ſoul can diſcern them in him diſtinctly one from another? it being ſaid, chap, 5th. That the ideas in God "are not different from God himſelf." This ſeems to me to expreſs a ſimplicity made up of variety, a thing I cannot underſtand. God I believe to be a ſimple Being, that by his wiſdom knows all things, and by his power can do all things; but how He does it, I think myſelf leſs able to comprehend, than to contain the ocean in my hand, or graſp the univerſe with my ſpan. "Ideas are real beings," you ſay; if ſo, it is evident they muſt be diſtinct "real beings;" for there is nothing more certain than that there are diſtinct ideas; and they are in God, in whom we ſee them. There they are then actually diſtinct, or elſe we could not ſee them diſtinct in him. Now theſe diſtinct real beings that are in God, are they either parts, or modifications of the Deity, or comprehended in him as things in a place? For beſides theſe three, I think we can ſcarce think of another way wherein we can conceive them to be in him, ſo that we can ſee them. For to ſay they are in him "eminentèr," is to ſay they

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are not in him actually and really to be ſeen; but only if they are in him "eminentèr", and we ſee them only in him, we can be ſaid to ſee them only "eminentèr" too. So that though it cannot be denied that God ſees and knows all things; yet when we ſay we ſee all things in him, it is but a metaphorical expreſſion to cover our ignorance, in a way that pretends to explain our knowledge; ſeeing things in God ſignifying no more than that we perceive them we know not how.

32. He farther adds, That he "does not believe that one can well give "an account of the manner wherein the mind knows many abſtract and "general truths, but by the preſence of him who can enlighten the mind "after a thouſand different faſhions." It is not to be denied that God can enlighten our minds after a thouſand different faſhions; and it cannot alſo be denied, that thoſe thouſand different faſhions may be ſuch, as we comprehend not one of them. The queſtion is, whether this talk of ſeeing all things in God does make us clearly, or at all, comprehend one of them; if it did ſo to me, I ſhould gratefully acknowledge that then I was ignorant of nine hundred and ninety-nine of the thouſand, whereas I muſt yet confeſs myſelf ignorant of them all.

33. The next paragraph, if it proves any thing, ſeems to me to prove that the idea we have of God is God himſelf, it being ſomething, as he ſays, "uncreated." The ideas that men have of God are ſo very different, that it would be very hard to ſay it was God himſelf. Nor does it avail to ſay they would all have the ſame, if they would apply their minds to the contemplation of him; for this being brought here to prove that God is preſent in all men's minds, and that therefore they ſee Him, it muſt alſo, in my apprehenſion, prove that He being immutably the ſame, and they ſeeing Him, muſt needs ſee him all alike.

34. In the next ſection we are told that we have "not only the idea "of infinite, but before that of finite." This being a thing of experience, every one muſt examine himſelf; and it being my misfortune to find it otherwiſe in myſelf, this argument, of courſe, is like to have the leſs effect on me, who therefore cannot ſo eaſily admit the inference, viz. "That the mind perceives not one thing, but in the idea it has of in-"finite." And I cannot but believe many a child can tell twenty, have the idea of a ſquare trencher, or a round plate, and have the diſtinct clear ideas of two and three, long-before he has any idea of "infinite" at all.

40. The laſt argument which he tells us is a demonſtration that we ſee all things in God, is this; "God has made all things for himſelf; "but if God made a ſpirit or mind, and gave it the ſun for its idea, or "the immediate object of its knowledge, God would have made that "ſpirit or mind for the ſun, and not for himſelf." The natural inference from this argument ſeems to me to be this, therefore God has given himſelf for the idea, or immediate object of the knowledge of all human minds. But experience too manifeſtly contradicting this, our author hath made another concluſion, and ſays thus, "It is neceſſary then that "the light which he gives the mind, ſhould make us know ſomething

" that is in him," v. g. Becauſe " all things that come from God can-
" not be but for God." Therefore a covetous man ſees in God the money, and a Perſian the ſun that he worſhips; and thus God is the " immediate object" of the minds, both of the one and the other. I confeſs this demonſtration is loſt on me, and I cannot ſee the force of it. All things, it is true, are made for God, i. e. for his glory; and he will be glorified even by thoſe rational beings, who would not apply their faculties to the knowledge of him.

36. BUT the next paragraph explains this: " God could not then
" make a ſoul for to know his works, were it not that that ſoul ſees
" God after a faſhion in ſeeing his works:" juſt " after ſuch a faſhion," that if he never ſaw more of him, he would never know any thing of a God, nor believe there was any ſuch being. A child, as ſoon as he is born, ſees a candle, or before he can ſpeak, the ball he plays with; theſe he " ſees in God" whom he has yet no notion of. Whether this be enough to make us ſay that the mind is made for God, and this be the proof of it, other people muſt judge for themſelves. I muſt own that if this were the knowledge of God, which intelligent beings were made for, I do not ſee but they might be made for the knowledge of God without knowing any thing of him; and thoſe that deny him, were made for the knowledge of him. Therefore I am not convinced of the truth of what follows, that " we do not ſee any one thing, but by the
" natural knowledge which we have of God." Which ſeems to me a quite contrary way of arguing to what the apoſtle uſes, where he ſays, that " the inviſible things of God are ſeen by the viſible things he has made." For it ſeems to me a quite contrary way of arguing, to ſay we ſee the Creator in, or by the creatures, and we ſee the creatures in the Creator. The apoſtle begins our knowledge in the creatures, which lead us to the knowledge of God, if we will make uſe of our reaſon: Our author begins our knowledge in God, and by that leads us to the creatures.

37. BUT to confirm his argument, he ſays, " all the particular ideas
" we have of the creatures are but limitations of the idea of the Creator." As for example, I have the idea of the ſolidity of matter, and of the motion of body, what is the idea of God that either of theſe limits? And, when I think of the number ten, I do not ſee how that any way concerns or limits the idea of God.

38. THE diſtinction he makes a little lower between " ſentiment" and " idea," does not at all clear to me, but cloud, his doctrine. His words are, " It muſt be obſerved, that I do not ſay that we have the ſentiment
" of material things in God, but that it is from God that acts in us; for
" God knows ſenſible things, but feels them not. When we perceive
" any ſenſible thing, there is in our perception ſentiment and pure idea." If by " ſentiment," which is the word he uſes in French, he means the act of ſenſation, or the operation of the ſoul in perceiving; and by " pure idea," the immediate object of that perception, which is the definition of ideas he gives us here in the firſt chapter; there is ſome foun-

dation for it, taking ideas for real beings or ſubſtances. But, taken thus, I cannot ſee how it can be avoided, but that we muſt be ſaid to ſmell a roſe in God, as well as to ſee a roſe in God; and the ſcent of the roſe that we ſmell, as well as the colour and figure of the roſe that we ſee, muſt be in God; which ſeems not to be his ſenſe here, and does not well agree with what he ſays concerning the ideas we ſee in God, which I ſhall conſider in its due place. If by "ſentiment" here he means ſomething that is neither the act of perception nor the idea perceived, I confeſs I know not what it is, nor have any conception at all of it. When we ſee and ſmell a violet, we perceive the figure, colour, and ſcent of that flower. Here I cannot but aſk whether all theſe three are "pure ideas," or all "ſentiments?" If they are all "ideas," then according to his doctrine they are all in God; and then it will follow, that as I ſee the figure of the violet in God; ſo alſo I ſee the colour of it, and ſmell the ſcent of it in God, which way of ſpeaking he does not allow, nor can I blame him. For it ſhews a little too plainly the abſurdity of that doctrine, if he ſhould ſay we ſmell a violet, taſte wormwood, or feel cold in God; and yet I can find no reaſon why the action of one of our ſenſes is applied only to God, when we uſe them all as well as our eyes in receiving ideas. If the figure, colour, and ſmell are all of them "ſenti-"ments," then they are none of them in God, and ſo this whole buſineſs of ſeeing in God is out of doors. If (as by what he ſays in his Eclairciſſements it appears to me to be his meaning) the figure of the violet be to be taken for an "idea," but its "colour" and "ſmell" for ſentiments: I confeſs it puzzles me to know by what rule it is, that in a violet the purple colour, whereof whilſt I write this I ſeem to have as clear an idea in my mind as of its figure, is not as much an idea as the figure of it; eſpecially, ſince he tells me in the firſt chapter here, which is concerning the nature of ideas, that "by this word idea he under-"ſtands here nothing elſe, but what is the immediate or neareſt object of "the mind when it perceives any thing."

39. THE "ſentiment," ſays he in the next words, "is a modification "of our ſoul." This word "modification" here, that comes in for explication, ſeems to me to ſignify nothing more than the word to be explained by it; v. g. I ſee the purple colour of a violet, this, ſays he, is "ſentiment:" I deſire to know what "ſentiment" is; that, ſays he, is a "modification of the ſoul." I take the word, and deſire to ſee what I can conceive by it concerning my ſoul; and here, I confeſs, I can conceive nothing more, but that I have the idea of purple in my mind, which I had not before, without being able to apprehend any thing the mind does or ſuffers in this, beſides barely having the idea of purple; and ſo the good word "modification" ſignifies nothing to me more than I knew before; v. g. that I have now the idea of purple in it, which I had not ſome minutes ſince. So that though they ſay ſenſations are modifications of the mind; yet having no manner of idea what that modification of the mind is, diſtinct from that very ſenſation, v. g. the ſenſa-

tion of a red colour or a bitter taſte: it is plain this explication amounts to no more than that a ſenſation is a ſenſation, and the ſenſation of red or bitter is the ſenſation of "red" or "bitter;" for if I have no other idea, when I ſay it is a modification of the mind, than when I ſay it is the ſenſation of "red" or "bitter," it is plain ſenſation and modification ſtand both for the ſame idea, and ſo are but two names of one and the ſame thing. But to examine their doctrine of modification a little farther. Different ſentiments are different modifications of the mind. The mind or ſoul that perceives, is one immaterial indiviſible ſubſtance. Now I ſee the white and black on this paper, I hear one ſinging in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I ſit by, and I taſte an apple I am eating, and all this at the ſame time. Now I aſk, take "modification" for what you pleaſe, can the ſame unextended indiviſible ſubſtance have different, nay inconſiſtent and oppoſite (as theſe of white and black muſt be) modifications at the ſame time? Or muſt we ſuppoſe diſtinct parts in an indiviſible ſubſtance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas, and ſo of the reſt of thoſe infinite ſenſations which we have in ſorts and degrees; all which we can diſtinctly perceive, and ſo are diſtinct ideas, ſome whereof are oppoſite, as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at the ſame time? I was ignorant before how ſenſation was performed in us, this they call an explanation of it. Muſt I ſay now I underſtand it better? If this be to cure one's ignorance, it is a very ſlight diſeaſe, and the charm of two or three inſignificant words will at any time remove it; "probatum eſt." But let it ſignify what it will, when I recollect the figure of one of the leaves of a violet, is not that a new modification of my ſoul, as well as when I think of its purple colour? Does my mind do or ſuffer nothing anew when I ſee that figure in God?

40. THE idea of that figure, you ſay, is in God; let it be ſo, but it may be there, and I not ſee it, that is allowed; when I come to ſee it, which I did not before, is there no new modification, as you call it, of my mind? If there be, then ſeeing of figure in God, as well as having the idea of purple, is "a modification of the mind," and this diſtinction ſignifies nothing. If ſeeing that figure in God now, which a minute or two ſince I did not ſee at all, be no new modification or alteration in my mind, no different action or paſſion from what was before, there is no difference made in my apprehenſions between ſeeing and not ſeeing. The ideas of figures, our author ſays, are in God, and are real beings in God; and God being united to the mind, theſe are alſo united to it. This all ſeems to me to have ſomething very obſcure and inconceivable in it, when I come to examine particulars; but let it be granted to be as clear as any one would ſuppoſe it; yet it reaches not the main difficulty, which is in "ſeeing." How after all do I ſee? The ideas are in God, they are real things, they are intimately united to my mind, becauſe God is ſo, but yet I do not ſee them. How at laſt after all this preparation, which hitherto is ineffectual, do I come to ſee them? And to that I am told, "when God is pleaſed to diſcover them to me." This in good earneſt

ſeems to me to be nothing but going a great way about to come to the ſame place, and this learned circuit, thus ſet out, brings me at laſt no farther than this, that I ſee or perceive, or have ideas when it pleaſes God I ſhould, but in a way I cannot comprehend; and this I thought without all this ado.

41. THIS "ſentiment" he tells us in the next words, "it is God "cauſes in us, and he can cauſe it in us, although he has it not, becauſe "he ſees in the idea that he has of our ſoul, that it is capable of them." This I take to be ſaid to ſhew the difference between "ſentiments" and "ideas" in us. V. g. "figures" and "numbers" are ideas, and they are in God. "Colours" and "ſmells," &c. are "ſentiments" in us, and not ideas in God. Firſt, as to ourſelves I aſk, why, when I recollect in my memory a violet, the purple colour as well as figure is not an idea in me? The making then the picture of any viſible thing in my mind, as of a landſcape I have ſeen, compoſed of figure and colour, the colour is not an idea, but the figure is an idea, and the colour a "ſentiment." Every one I allow may uſe his words as he pleaſes; but if it be to inſtruct others, he muſt, when he uſes two words where others uſe but one, ſhew ſome ground of the diſtinction. And I do not find but the colour of the marigold I now think of, is as much "the immediate object of my mind," as its figure; and ſo according to his definition is an "idea." Next as to God, I aſk, whether, before the creation of the world, the idea of the whole marigold colour as well as figure was not in God? "God," ſays he, "can cauſe thoſe ſentiments in us, becauſe he ſees in the idea that "he has of our ſoul, that it is capable of them." God, before he created any ſoul, knew all that he would make it capable of. He reſolved to make it capable of having the perception of the colour as well as figure of a marigold; he had then the idea of that colour that he reſolved to make it capable of, or elſe he made it capable (with reverence let it be ſpoken) of he knew not what: And if he knew what it ſhould be capable of, he had the idea of what he knew; for before the creation there was nothing but God, and the ideas he had. It is true, the colour of that flower is not actually in God, no more is its figure actually in God; but we that can conſider no other underſtanding, but in analogy to our own, cannot conceive otherwiſe but as the ideas of the figure, colour, and ſituation of the leaves of a marigold are in our minds, when we think of that flower in the night when we ſee it not; ſo it was in the thoughts of God before he made that flower. And thus we conceive him to have the idea of the ſmell of a violet, of the taſte of ſugar, the ſound of a lute or trumpet, and of the pain and pleaſure that accompany any of theſe or other ſenſations which he deſigned we ſhould feel, though he never felt any of them, as we have the ideas of the taſte of a cherry in winter, or of the pain of a burn when it is over. This is what I think we conceive of the ideas of God, which we muſt allow to have diſtinctly repreſented to him all that was to be in time, and conſequently the colours, odours, and other ideas they were to produce in us. I cannot be ſo bold as to pretend to ſay what thoſe ideas are in God, or to determine that they are

real

real beings; but this I think I may ſay, that the idea of the colour of a marigold, or the motion of a ſtone, are as much real beings in God, as the idea of the figure or number of its leaves.

42. THE reader muſt not blame me for making uſe here all along of the word "ſentiment," which is our author's own, and I underſtood it ſo little, that I knew not how to tranſlate it to any other. He concludes, "that he believes there is no appearance of truth in any other ways of "explaining theſe things, and that this of ſeeing all things in God, is "more than probable." I have conſidered with as much indifferency and attention as is poſſible; and I muſt own it appears to me as little or leſs intelligible than any of the reſt; and the ſummary of his doctrine, which he here ſubjoins, is to me wholly incomprehenſible. His words are, "Thus our ſouls depend on God all manner of ways: For as it is he "which makes them feel pleaſure and pain, and all other ſenſations, by "the natural union which he has made between them and our bodies, "which is nothing elſe but his decree and general will: ſo it is he, who "by the natural union which he has made betwixt the will of man and "the repreſentation of ideas, which the immenſity of the divine being "contains, makes them know all that they know; and this natural uni-"on is alſo nothing but his general will." This phraſe of the union of our wills to the ideas contained in God's immenſity, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one; and what light it gives to his doctrine I truly cannot find. It ſeemed ſo unintelligible to me, that I gueſſed it an error in the print of the edition I uſed, which was the 4to. printed at Paris, 78, and therefore conſulted the 8vo. printed alſo at Paris, and found it "will" in both of them. Here again the "immenſity of the divine being" is mentioned as that which contains in it the ideas to which our wills are united; which ideas being only thoſe of quantity, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter, ſeems to me to carry with it a very groſs notion of this matter, as we have above remarked. But that which I take notice of principally here, is, that this union of our wills to the ideas contained in God's immenſity, does not at all explain our ſeeing of them. This union of our wills to the ideas, or, as in other places, of our ſouls to God, is, ſays he, nothing but the will of God. And, after this union, our ſeeing them is only when God diſcovers them, i. e. our having them in our minds, is nothing but the will of God; all which is brought about in a way we comprehend not. And what then does this explain more than when one ſays, four ouls are united to our bodies by the will of God, and by the motion of ſome parts of our bodies? V. g. the nerves or animal ſpirits have ideas or perceptions produced in them, and this is the will of God. Why is not this as intelligible and as clear as the other? Here is by the will of God given union and perception in both caſes; but how that perception is made in both ways, ſeems to me equally incomprehenſible. In one, God diſcovers ideas in himſelf to the ſoul united to him when he pleaſes; and in the other, he diſcovers ideas to the ſoul, or produces perception in the ſoul united to the body by motion, according to laws eſtabliſhed by the good

pleaſure of his will; but how it is done in the one or the other I confeſs my incapacity to comprehend. So that I agree perfectly with him in his concluſion, that "there is nothing but God that can enlighten us:" but a clear comprehenſion of the manner how he does it, I doubt I ſhall not have, till I know a great deal more of him and myſelf, than in this ſtate of darkneſs and ignorance our ſouls are capable of.

43. IN the next, chap. 7. he tells us, "there are four ways of know-"ing; the firſt is to know things by themſelves;" and thus, he ſays, "we "know God alone;" and the reaſon he gives of it is this, becauſe "at "preſent he alone penetrates the mind, and diſcovers himſelf to it."

FIRST, I would know what it is to penetrate a thing that is unextended? Theſe are ways of ſpeaking, which taken from body, when they are applied to ſpirit, ſignify nothing, nor ſhew us any thing but our ignorance. To God's penetrating our ſpirits, he joins his diſcovering himſelf; as if one were the cauſe of the other, and explained it: But I not conceiving any thing of the penetration of an unextended thing, it is loſt upon me. But, next God penetrates our ſouls, and therefore we "ſee him by a direct and immediate view," as he ſays in the following words. The ideas of all things which are in God, he elſewhere tells us, are not at all different from God himſelf; and if God's penetrating our minds be the cauſe of our direct and immediate ſeeing God, we have a direct and immediate view of all that we ſee; for we ſee nothing but God and ideas; and it is impoſſible for us to know that there is any thing elſe in the univerſe; for ſince we ſee, and can ſee nothing but God and ideas, how can we know there is any thing elſe which we neither do nor can ſee? But if there be any thing to be underſtood by this penetration of our ſouls, and we have a direct view of God by this penetration, why have we not alſo a direct and immediate view of other ſeparate ſpirits beſides God? To this he ſays, that there is none but God alone who at preſent penetrates our ſpirits. This he ſays, but I do not ſee for what reaſon, but becauſe it ſuits with his hypotheſis: But he proves it not, nor goes about to do it, unleſs the direct and immediate view, he ſays, we have of God, be to be taken as a proof of it. But what is that direct and immediate view we have of God that we have not of a cherubim? The ideas of being, power, knowledge, goodneſs, duration, make up the complex idea we have of one and of the other; but only that in the one we join the idea of infinite to each ſimple idea, that makes our complex one; but to the other that of finite. But how have we a more direct or immediate view of the idea of power, knowledge, or duration, when we conſider them in God, than when we conſider them in an angel? The view of theſe ideas ſeems to be the ſame. Indeed we have a clearer proof of the exiſtence of God than of a cherubim; but the idea of either, when we have it in our minds, ſeems to me to be there by an equally direct and immediate view. And it is about the ideas which are in our minds that I think our author's enquiry here is, and not about the real exiſtence of thoſe things whereof we have ideas, which are two very remote things.

45. PERHAPS

44. PERHAPS it is God alone, ſays our author, "who can enlighten our "minds by his ſubſtance." When I know what the ſubſtance of God is, and what it is to be enlightened by that ſubſtance, I ſhall know what I alſo ſhall think of it; but at preſent I confeſs myſelf in the dark as to this matter; nor do theſe good words of ſubſtance and enlightening, in the way they are here uſed, help me one jot out of it.

45. HE goes on, "one cannot conceive, ſays he, that any thing crea-"ted can repreſent what is infinite." And I cannot conceive that there is any poſitive comprehenſive idea in any finite mind that does repreſent it fully and clearly as it is. I do not find that the mind of man has infinity poſitively and fully repreſented to it, or comprehended by it; which muſt be, if his argument were true, that therefore God enlightens our minds by his proper ſubſtance: becauſe no created thing is big enough to repreſent what is infinite; and therefore what makes us conceive his infinity, is the preſence of his own infinite ſubſtance in our minds: Which to me manifeſtly ſuppoſes, that we comprehend in our minds God's infinite ſubſtance, which is preſent to our minds; for if this be not the force of his argument, where he ſays, "nothing created "can repreſent what is infinite; the being that is without bounds, the "being immenſe, the being univerſal, cannot be perceived by an idea, "i. e. by a particular being, by a being different from the univerſal in-"finite being itſelf." It ſeems to me that this argument is founded on a ſuppoſition of our comprehending the infinite ſubſtance of God in our minds, or elſe I ſee not any force in it, as I have already ſaid. I ſhall take notice of one or two things in it that confound me, and that is, that he calls God here the univerſal being; which muſt either ſignify that being which contains, and is made up as one comprehenſive aggregate of all the reſt, in which ſenſe the univerſe may be called the univerſal being; or elſe it muſt mean being in general, which is nothing but the idea of being, abſtracted from all inferior diviſions of that general notion, and from all particular exiſtence. But in neither of theſe ſenſes can I conceive God to be the univerſal being, ſince I cannot think the creatures either to be a part or a ſpecies of him. Next he calls the ideas that are in God particular beings. I grant whatever exiſts is particular, it cannot be otherwiſe; but that which is particular in exiſtence, may be univerſal in repreſentation, which I take to be all the univerſal beings we know, or can conceive to be. But let univerſal or particular beings be what they will, I do not ſee how our author can ſay, that God is an univerſal being, and the ideas we ſee in him particular beings; ſince he in another place tells us, that the ideas we ſee in God are not at all different from God. But, ſays he, "as to particular beings it is not hard "to conceive that they can be repreſented by the infinite being which "contains them, and contains them after a very ſpiritual manner, and "conſequently very intelligible." It ſeems as impoſſible to me, that an infinite ſimple being, in whom there is no variety, nor ſhadow of variety, ſhould repreſent a finite thing, as that a finite thing ſhould repre-

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ſent an infinite: nor do I ſee how its "containing all things in it after a "very ſpiritual manner makes it ſo very intelligible;" ſince I underſtand not what it is to contain a material thing ſpiritually, nor the manner how God contains any thing in himſelf, but either as an aggregate contains all things which it is made up of; and ſo indeed that part of him may be ſeen, which comes within the reach of our view. But this way of containing all things can by no means belong to God, and to make things thus viſible in him, is to make the material world a part of him, or elſe as having a power to produce all things; and in this way, it is true, God contains all things in himſelf, but in a way not proper to make the being of God a repreſentative of thoſe things to us; for then his being, being the repreſentative of the effects of that power, it muſt repreſent to us all that he is capable of producing, which I do not find in myſelf that it does.

SECONDLY, "the ſecond way of knowing things, he tells us, is by ideas, "that is, by ſomething that is different from them; and thus we know "things when they are not intelligible by themſelves, either becauſe "they are corporeal, or becauſe they cannot penetrate the mind, or diſ-"cover themſelves to it; and this is the way we know corporeal things." This reaſoning I do not underſtand: Firſt, becauſe I do not underſtand why a line or a triangle is not as intelligible as any thing that can be named; for we muſt ſtill carry along with us, that the diſcourſe here is about our perception, or what we have any idea or conception of in our own minds. Secondly, becauſe I do not underſtand what is meant by the penetrating a ſpirit; and till I can comprehend theſe, upon which this reaſoning is built, this reaſoning cannot work on me. But from theſe reaſons he concludes, "thus it is in God, and by their ideas that we ſee bodies "and their properties; and it is for this reaſon that the knowledge we have "of them is moſt perfect." Whether others will think that what we ſee of bodies, is ſeen in God, by ſeeing the ideas of them that are in God, muſt be left to them. Why I cannot think ſo, I have ſhewn; but the inference he makes here from it, I think, few will aſſent to, that we know bodies and their properties moſt perfectly. For who is there that can ſay, he knows the properties either of body in general, or of any one particular body perfectly? One property of body in general is to have parts cohering and united together; for where-ever there is body, there is coheſion of parts; but who is there that perfectly underſtands that coheſion? And as for particular bodies, who can ſay that he perfectly underſtands gold or a loadſtone, and all its properties? But to explain himſelf, he ſays, "that the idea we have of extenſion, ſuffices to make us know all the pro-"perties whereof extenſion is capable, and that we cannot deſire to have "an idea more diſtinct, and more fruitful of extenſion, of figures, and of "motions, than that which God has given us of them." This ſeems to me a ſtrange proof that we ſee bodies and their properties in God, and know them perfectly, becauſe God hath given us diſtinct and fruitful ideas of extenſion, figure, and motion; for this had been the ſame, whether

ther God had given theſe ideas by ſhewing them in himſelf, or by any other way; and his ſaying, that God has given us as diſtinct and fruitful ideas of them as we can deſire, ſeems as if our author himſelf had ſome other thoughts of them. If he thought we ſee them in God, he muſt think we ſee them as they are in themſelves, and there would be no room for ſaying, God hath given them us as diſtinct as we could deſire: The calling them fruitful, ſhews this yet more; for one that thinks he ſees the ideas of figures in God, and can ſee no idea of a figure but in God, with what thought can he call any one of them feconde, which is ſaid only of ſuch things as produce others? Which expreſſion of his ſeems to proceed only from this thought in him, that when I have once got the idea of extenſion, I can frame the ideas of what figures, and of what bigneſs I pleaſe. And in this I agree with him, as appears in what I have ſaid L. 2. C. 13. But then this can by no means proceed from a ſuppoſition, that I ſee theſe figures only in God; for there they do not produce one another, but are there, as it were, in their firſt pattern to be ſeen, juſt ſuch, and ſo many as God is pleaſed to ſhew them to us. But it will be ſaid, our deſire to ſee them is the occaſional cauſe of God's ſhewing them us, and ſo we ſee whatever figure we deſire. Let it be ſo, this does not make any idea feconde, for here is no production of one out of another: But as to the occaſional cauſe, can any one ſay that it is ſo? I, or our author, deſire to ſee an angle next in greatneſs to a right angle; did upon this God ever ſhew him or me ſuch an angle? That God knows, or has in himſelf the idea of ſuch an angle, I think will not be denied; but that he ever ſhewed it to any man, how much ſoever he deſired it, I think may be doubted. But after all, how comes it by this means that we have a perfect knowledge of bodies and their properties, when ſeveral men in the world have not the ſame idea of body, and this very author and I differ in it? He thinks bare extenſion to be body, and I think extenſion alone makes not body, but extenſion and ſolidity; thus either he, or I, one of us, has a wrong and imperfect knowledge of bodies and their properties. For if bodies be extenſion alone, and nothing elſe, I cannot conceive how they can move and hit one againſt another, or what can make diſtinct ſurfaces in an uniform ſimple extenſion. A ſolid extended thing I can conceive moveable; but then, if I have a clear view of bodies and their properties in God, I muſt ſee the idea of ſolidity in God, which yet I think, by what our author has ſaid in his Eclairciſſements, he does not allow that we do. He ſays farther, "that whereas "the ideas of things that are in God contain all their properties, he "that ſees their ideas may ſee ſucceſſively all their properties." This ſeems to me not to concern our ideas more, whether we ſee them in God, or have them otherwiſe. Any idea that we have, whenceſoever we have it, contains in it all the properties it has, which are nothing but the relations it has to other ideas, which are always the ſame. What he ſays concerning the properties, that we may ſucceſſively know them, is equally true, whether we ſee them in God, or have them by any other

means. They that apply them as they ought to the conſideration of their ideas, may ſucceſſively come to the knowledge of ſome of their properties; but that they may know all their properties, is more than I think the reaſon proves, which he ſubjoins in theſe words, "for when one ſees "the things as they are in God, one ſees them always in a moſt perfect "manner." We ſee, for example, in God, the idea of a triangle, or a circle; does it hence follow, that we can know all the properties of either of them? He adds, that the manner of ſeeing them "would be "infinitely perfect, if the mind which ſees them in God was infinite." I confeſs myſelf here not well to comprehend his diſtinction between ſeeing after a manner "[tres-parfait] moſt perfect and infinitely perfect;" he adds, "that which is wanting to the knowledge that we have of ex-"tenſion, figures, and motion, is not a defect of the idea which repre-"ſents it, but of our mind which conſiders it." If by ideas be meant here the real objects of our knowledge, I eaſily agree, that the want of knowledge in us is a defect in our minds, and not in the things to be known. But if by ideas be here meant the perception or repreſentation of things in the mind, that I cannot but obſerve in myſelf to be very imperfect and defective, as when I deſire to perceive what is the ſubſtance of body or ſpirit, the idea thereof fails me. To conclude, I ſee not what there is in this paragraph that makes any thing for the doctrine of ſeeing all things in God.

46. "THE third way of knowing is by conſciouſneſs or interior ſenti-"ments; and thus," he ſays, "we know our ſouls; and it is for this reaſon "that the knowledge we have of them is imperfect, we know nothing of "our ſouls but what we feel within ourſelves." This confeſſion of our author brings me back, do what I can, to that original of all our ideas which my thoughts led me to when I writ my book, viz. ſenſation and reflection; and therefore I am forced to aſk any one who is of our author's principles, whether God had not the idea of mine, or of an human ſoul, before he created it? Next, whether that idea of an human ſoul be not as much a real being in God as the idea of a triangle? If ſo, why does not my ſoul, being intimately united to God, as well ſee the idea of my ſoul which is in him, as the idea of a triangle which is in him? And what reaſon can there be given, why God ſhews the idea of a triangle to us, and not the idea of our ſouls, but this, that God has given us external ſenſation to perceive the one, and none to perceive the other, but only internal ſenſation to perceive the operation of the latter? He that pleaſes may read what our author ſays in the remainder of this, and the two or three next paragraphs, and ſee whether it carries him beyond where my ignorance ſtopped; I muſt own that me it does not.

47. THIS (i. e. the ignorance we are in of our own ſouls,) ſays he, "may ſerve to prove that the ideas that repreſent any thing to us that "is without us are not modifications of our ſouls; for if the ſoul ſaw all "things by conſidering its own proper modifications, it ſhould know "more clearly its own eſſence, or its own nature, than that of bodies;

" and all the ſenſations or modifications whereof it is capable, than the " figures or modifications of which bodies are capable. In the mean " time, it knows not that it is capable of any ſuch ſenſation by ſight, as " it has of itſelf, but only by experience; inſtead of that, it knows that " extenſion is capable of an infinite number of figures by the ideas that it " has of extenſion. There are, moreover, certain ſenſations, as colours " and ſounds, which the greateſt part of men cannot diſcover whether " they are modifications of the ſoul; and there are figures which all " men do not diſcover by the idea of extenſion to be modifications of " bodies." This paragraph is, as he tells us, to prove, " That the ideas " that repreſent to us ſomething without us, are not modifications of the " ſoul;" but inſtead of that, it ſeems to prove that figure is the modification of ſpace, and not of our ſouls. For if this argument had tended to prove, " That the ideas that repreſent any thing without us were not " modifications of the ſoul," he ſhould not have put the mind's not knowing what modifications itſelf was capable of, and knowing what figures ſpace was capable of, in oppoſition one to another: but the antitheſis muſt have lain in this, that the mind knew it was capable of the perception or figure or motion without any modification of itſelf, but was not capable of the perception of ſound or colour without a modification of itſelf. For the queſtion here is not whether ſpace be capable of figure, and the ſoul not; but whether the ſoul be capable of perceiving, or having the idea of figure, without a modification of itſelf, and not capable of having the idea of colour without a modification of itſelf. I think now of the figure, colour, and hardneſs, of a diamond that I ſaw ſome time ſince: in this caſe I deſire to be informed how my mind knows that the thinking on, or the idea of the figure, is not a modification of the mind; but the thinking on, or having an idea of the colour or hardneſs, is a modification of the mind? It is certain there is ſome alteration in my mind when I think of a figure which I did not think of before, as well as when I think of a colour that I did not think of before. But one, I am told, is ſeeing it in God, and the other a modification of my mind. But ſuppoſing one is ſeeing in God, is there no alteration in my mind between ſeeing and not ſeeing? And is that to be called a modification or no? For when he ſays ſeeing a colour, and hearing a ſound, is a modification of the mind, what does it ſignify but an alteration of the mind from not perceiving to perceiving that ſound or colour? And ſo when the mind ſees a triangle, which it did not ſee before, what is this but an alteration of the mind from not ſeeing to ſeeing, whether that figure be ſeen in God or no? And why is not this alteration of the mind to be called a modification, as well as the other? Or indeed what ſervice does that word do us in the one caſe or the other, when it is only a new ſound brought in without any new conception at all? For my mind, when it ſees a colour or figure, is altered, I know, from the not having ſuch or ſuch a perception to the having it; but when, to explain this, I am told that either of theſe perceptions is a modification of the mind, what do I conceive more

than that from not having ſuch a perception my mind is come to have ſuch a perception? Which is what I as well knew before the word modification was made uſe of, which, by its uſe, has made me conceive nothing more than what I conceived before.

48. ONE thing I cannot but take notice of here by the bye, that he ſays, that "the ſoul knows that extenſion is capable of an infinite num-"ber of figures by the idea it has of extenſion," which is true. And afterwards he ſays, that "there are no figures, which all men do not diſ-"cover by the idea they have of extenſion to be modifications of body." One would wonder why he did not ſay modifications of extenſion, rather than as he does the modifications of body, they being diſcovered by the idea of extenſion; but the truth would not bear ſuch an expreſſion. For it is certain that in pure ſpace or extenſion, which is not terminated, there is truly no diſtinction of figures; but in diſtinct bodies that are terminated there are diſtinct figures, becauſe ſimple ſpace or extenſion, being in itſelf uniform, inſeparable, immoveable, has in it no ſuch modification or diſtinction of figures. But it is capable, as he ſays; but of what? Of bodies of all ſorts of figures and magnitudes, without which there is no diſtinction of figures in ſpace. Bodies that are ſolid, ſeparable, terminated, and moveable, have all ſorts of figures, and they are bodies alone that have them: And ſo figures are properly modifications of bodies, for pure ſpace is not any where terminated, nor can be; whether there be or be not body in it, it is uniformly continued on. This that he plainly ſaid there, to me plainly ſhews that body and extenſion are two things, though much of our author's doctrine be built upon their being one and the ſame.

49. THE next paragraph is to ſhew us the difference between ideas and ſentiments in this, that "ſentiments are not tied to words; ſo that "he that never had ſeen a colour, or felt heat, could never be made to "have thoſe ſenſations by all the definitions one could give him of them." This is true of what he calls ſentiments; and as true alſo of what he calls ideas. Shew me one who has not got by experience, i. e. by ſeeing or feeling, the idea of ſpace or motion, and I will as ſoon by words make one, who never felt what heat is, have a conception of heat, as he, that has not by his ſenſes perceived what ſpace or motion is, can by words be made to conceive either of them. The reaſon why we are apt to think theſe ideas belonging to extenſion got another way than other ideas, is becauſe, our bodies being extended, we cannot avoid the diſtinction of parts in ourſelves; and all that is for the ſupport of our lives, being by motion applied to us, it is impoſſible to find any one who has not by experience got thoſe ideas; and ſo by the uſe of language learnt what words ſtand for them, which by cuſtom came to excite them in his mind; as the names of heat and pleaſure do excite in the mind of thoſe who have by experience got them the ideas they are by uſe annexed to. Not that words or definitions can teach or bring into the mind one more than another of thoſe I call ſimple ideas; but can by uſe excite them in thoſe who,

who, having got them by experience, know certain ſounds to be by uſe annexed to them as the ſigns of them.

50. FOURTHLY, "The fourth way of knowing, he tells us, is by "conjecture, and thus only we know the ſouls of other men and pure "intelligences," i. e. We know them not at all: but we probably think there are ſuch beings really exiſting in "rerum naturâ. But this looks to me beſide our author's buſineſs here, which ſeems to be to examine what ideas we have, and how we came by them. So that the thing here conſidered, ſhould in my opinion be, not whether there were any ſouls of men or pure intelligences any where exiſting, but what ideas we have of them, and how we came by them. For when he ſays, we know not angels, either "in themſelves, or by their ideas, or by conſciouſneſs," what in that place does angel ſignify? What idea in him does it ſtand for? Or is it the ſign of no idea at all, and ſo a bare ſound without ſignification? He that reads this ſeventh chapter of his with attention, will find that we have ſimple ideas as far as our experience reaches, and no farther. And beyond that we know nothing at all, no not even what thoſe ideas are that are in us, but only that they are perceptions in the mind, but how made we cannot comprehend.

51. IN his Eclairciſſements on the nature of ideas, p. 535. of the quarto edition, he ſays, that "he is certain that the ideas of things are un-"changeable." This I cannot comprehend; for how can I know that the picture of any thing is like that thing, when I never ſee that which it repreſents? For if theſe words do not mean that ideas are true unchangeable repreſentations of things, I know not to what purpoſe they are. And if that be not their meaning, then they can only ſignify, that the idea I have once had will be unchangeably the ſame as long as it recurs the ſame in my memory; but when another different from that comes into my mind, it will not be that. Thus the idea of an horſe, and the idea of a centaur, will, as often as they recur in my mind, be unchangeably the ſame; which is no more than this, the ſame idea will be always the ſame idea; but whether the one or the other be the true repreſentation of any thing that exiſts, that, upon his principles, neither our author nor any body elſe can know.

52. WHAT he ſays here of univerſal reaſon, which enlightens every one, whereof all men partake, ſeems to me nothing elſe but the power men have to conſider the ideas they have one with another, and by thus comparing them, find out the relations that are between them; and therefore if an intelligent being at one end of the world, and another at the other end of the world, will conſider twice two and four together, he cannot but find them to be equal, i. e. to be the ſame number. Theſe relations, it is true, are infinite, and God, who knows all things and their relations as they are, knows them all, and ſo his knowledge is infinite. But men are able to diſcover more or leſs of theſe relations, only as they apply their minds to conſider any ſort of ideas, and to find out intermediate ones, which can ſhew the relation of thoſe ideas, which cannot be immediately compared by juxta-poſition. But then what he means by

that

that infinite reaſon which men conſult; I confeſs myſelf not well to underſtand. For if he means that they conſider a part of thoſe relations of things which are infinite, that is true; but then this is a very improper way of ſpeaking, and I cannot think that a man of his parts would uſe it to mean nothing elſe by it. If he means, as he ſays, p. 536, that this infinite and univerſal reaſon, whereof men partake, and which they conſult, is the reaſon of God himſelf; I can by no means aſſent to it. Firſt, becauſe I think we cannot ſay God reaſons at all; for he has at once a view of all things. But reaſon is very far from ſuch an intuition; it is a laborious and gradual progreſs in the knowledge of things, by comparing one idea with a ſecond, and a ſecond with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. to find the relation between the firſt and the laſt of theſe in this train, and in ſearch for ſuch intermediate ideas, as may ſhew us the relation we deſire to know, which ſometimes we find, and ſometimes not. This way therefore of finding truth, ſo painful, uncertain, and limited, is proper only to men or finite underſtandings, but can by no means be ſuppoſed in God; it is therefore in God underſtanding or knowledge. But then to ſay that we partake in the knowledge of God, or conſult his underſtanding, is what I cannot receive for true. God has given me an underſtanding of my own; and I ſhould think it preſumption in me to ſuppoſe I apprehended any thing by God's underſtanding, ſaw with his eyes, or ſhared of his knowledge. I think it more poſſible for me to ſee with other men's eyes, and underſtand with another man's underſtanding, than with God's; there being ſome proportion between mine and another man's underſtanding, but none between mine and God's. But if this infinite reaſon which we conſult, be at laſt nothing but thoſe infinite unchangeable relations which are in things, ſome of which we make a ſhift to diſcover; this indeed is true, but ſeems to me to make little to our author's purpoſe of ſeeing all things in God; and that, "if we ſee not all things by the natural union of our minds with the "univerſal and infinite reaſon, we ſhould not have the liberty to think "on all things," as he expreſſeth it, p. 538. To explain himſelf farther concerning this univerſal reaſon, or, as he there calls it by another name, Order, p. 539, he ſays, that "God contains in himſelf the per-"fections of all the creatures that he has created, or can create, after an "intelligible manner." Intelligible to himſelf, it is true; but intelligible to men, at leaſt to me, that I do not find, unleſs, "by containing "in himſelf the perfections of all the creatures," be meant, that there is no perfection in any creature, but there is a greater in God, or that there is in God greater perfection than all the perfections in the creatures taken together. And therefore though it be true what follows in the next words, "that it is by theſe intelligible perfections that God knows "the eſſence of every thing;" yet it will not follow from hence, or from any thing elſe that he has ſaid, that thoſe perfections in God, which contain in them the perfections of all the creatures, are "the immediate "objects of the mind of man;" or that they are ſo the objects of the mind

"of

" of man," that he can in them ſee the eſſences of the creatures. For I aſk in which of the perfections of God does a man ſee the eſſence of an horſe or an aſs, of a ſerpent or a dove, of hemlock or parſley? I for my part, I confeſs, ſee not the eſſence of any of theſe things in any of the perfections of God, which I have any notion of. For indeed I ſee not the diſtinct eſſence either of theſe things at all, or know wherein it conſiſts. And therefore I cannot comprehend the force of the inference, which follows in theſe words, " then the intelligible ideas or perfections that are in God, which " repreſent to us what is out of God, are abſolutely neceſſary and un- " changeable." That the perfections that are in God are neceſſary and unchangeable, I readily grant: But that the ideas that are intelligible to God, or are in the underſtanding of God (for ſo we muſt ſpeak of him whilſt we conceive of him after the manner of men) can be ſeen by us; or, that the perfections that are in God repreſent to us the eſſences of things that are out of God, that I cannot conceive. The eſſence of matter, as much as I can ſee of it, is extenſion, ſolidity, diviſibility, and mobility; but in which of the perfections of God do I ſee this eſſence? To another man, as to our author perhaps, the eſſence of body is quite another thing; and when he has told us what to him is the eſſence of body, it will be then to be conſidered in which of the perfections of God he ſees it. For example, let it be pure extenſion alone, the idea then that God had in himſelf of the eſſence of body, before body was created, was the idea of pure extenſion; when God then created body he created extenſion, and then ſpace, which exiſted not before, began to exiſt. This, I confeſs, I cannot conceive; but we ſee in the perfections of God the neceſſary and unchangeable eſſences of things. He ſees one eſſence of body in God, and I another: which is that neceſſary and unchangeable eſſence of body which is contained in the perfections of God, his or mine? Or indeed how do or can we know there is any ſuch thing exiſting as body at all? For we ſee nothing but the ideas that are in God; but body itſelf we neither do nor can poſſibly ſee at all; and how then can we know that there is any ſuch thing exiſting as body, ſince we can by no means ſee or perceive it by our ſenſes, which is all the way we can have of knowing any corporeal thing to exiſt? But it is ſaid, God ſhews us the ideas in himſelf, on occaſion of the preſence of thoſe bodies to our ſenſes. This is gratis dictum, and begs the thing in queſtion; and therefore I deſire to have it proved to me that they are preſent. I ſee the ſun, or an horſe; no, ſays our author, that is impoſſible, they cannot be ſeen, becauſe being bodies they cannot be united to my mind, and be preſent to it. But the ſun being riſen, and the horſe brought within convenient diſtance, and ſo being preſent to my eyes, God ſhews me their ideas in himſelf: And I ſay God ſhews me theſe ideas when he pleaſes, without the preſence of any ſuch bodies to my eyes. For when I think I ſee a ſtar at ſuch a diſtance from me; which truly I do not ſee, but the idea of it which God ſhews me; I would have it proved to me that there is ſuch a ſtar exiſting a million of million of miles from me when I think I ſee it, more than when I dream of ſuch a ſtar. For until

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it be proved that there is a candle in the room by which I write this, the ſuppoſition of my ſeeing in God the pyramidical idea of its flame, upon occaſion of the candle's being there, is begging what is in queſtion. And to prove to me that God exhibits to me that idea, upon occaſion of the preſence of the candle, it muſt firſt be proved to me that there is a candle there, which upon theſe principles can never be done.

FARTHER, We ſee the "neceſſary and unchangeable eſſences of things" in the perfections of God. Water, a roſe, and a lion, have their diſtinct eſſences one from another, and all other things; what I deſire to know are theſe diſtinct eſſences, I confeſs I neither ſee them in nor out of God, and in which of the perfections of God do we ſee each of them?

PAGE 504, I find theſe words, "It is evident that the perfections that "are in God which repreſent created or poſſible beings, are not at all "equal: that thoſe for example that repreſent bodies, are not ſo noble "as thoſe for example that repreſent ſpirits; and amongſt thoſe them-"ſelves, which repreſent nothing but body, or nothing but ſpirits, there "are more perfect one than another to infinity. This is conceivable "clearly, and without pain, though one finds ſome difficulty to reconcile "the ſimplicity of the Divine Being with this variety of intelligible ideas "which he contains in his wiſdom." This difficulty is to me inſur-mountable; and I conclude it always ſhall be ſo, till I can find a way to make ſimplicity and variety the ſame. And this difficulty muſt always cumber this doctrine, which ſuppoſes that the perfections of God are the repreſentatives to us of whatever we perceive of the creatures; for then thoſe perfections muſt be many, and diverſe, and diſtinct one from another, as thoſe ideas are that repreſent the different creatures to us. And this ſeems to me to make God formally to contain in him all the diſtinct ideas of all the creatures, and that ſo, that they might be ſeen one after another. Which ſeems to me after all the talk of abſtraction to be but a little leſs groſs conception than of the ſketches of all the pictures that ever a painter draws, kept by him in his cloſet, which are there all to be ſeen one after another, as he pleaſes to ſhew them. But whilſt theſe ab-ſtract thoughts produce nothing better than this, I the eaſier content myſelf with my ignorance which roundly thinks thus: God is a ſimple being, omniſcient, that knows all things poſſible; and omnipotent, that can do or make all things poſſible. But how he knows, or how he makes, I do not conceive: His ways of knowing as well as his ways of creating, are to me incomprehenſible; and, if they were not ſo, I ſhould not think him to be God, or to be perfecter in knowledge than I am. To which our author's thoughts ſeem in the cloſe of what is above-cited ſomewhat to incline, when he ſays, "the variety of intelligible ideas which God "contains in his wiſdom;" whereby he ſeems to place this variety of ideas in the mind or thoughts of God, as we may ſo ſay, whereby it is hard to conceive how we can ſee them; and not in the being of God, where they are to be ſeen as ſo many diſtinct things in it.

A

DISCOURSE

OF

MIRACLES.

TO diſcourſe of miracles without defining what one means by the word miracle, is to make a ſhew, but in effect to talk of nothing.

A miracle then I take to be a ſenſible operation, which, being above the comprehenſion of the ſpectator, and in his opinion contrary to the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature, is taken by him to be divine.

He that is preſent at the fact, is a ſpectator: He that believes the hiſtory of the fact, puts himſelf in the place of a ſpectator.

This definition, it is probable, will not eſcape theſe two exceptions.

1. That hereby what is a miracle is made very uncertain; for it depending on the opinion of the ſpectator, that will be a miracle to one which will not be ſo to another.

In anſwer to which, it is enough to ſay, that this objection is of no force, but in the mouth of one who can produce a definition of a miracle not liable to the ſame exception, which I think not eaſy to do; for it being agreed, that a miracle muſt be that which ſurpaſſes the force of nature in the eſtabliſhed, ſteady laws of cauſes and effects, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged to exceed thoſe laws. Now every one being able to judge of thoſe laws only by his own acquaintance with nature, and notions of its force (which are different in different men) it is unavoidable that that ſhould be a miracle to one, which is not ſo to another.

2. Another objection to this definition, will be, that the notion of a miracle thus enlarged, may come ſometimes to take in operations that have nothing extraordinary or ſupernatural in them, and thereby invalidate the uſe of miracles for the atteſting of divine revelation.

To which I anſwer, not at all, if the teſtimony which divine revelation receives from miracles be rightly conſidered.

To know that any revelation is from God, it is neceſſary to know that the meſſenger that delivers it is ſent from God, and that cannot be known but by ſome credentials given him by God himſelf. Let us ſee then whether miracles, in my ſenſe, be not ſuch credentials, and will not infallibly direct us right in the ſearch of divine revelation.

It is to be conſidered, that divine revelation receives teſtimony from no other miracles, but ſuch as are wrought to witneſs his miſſion from God who delivers the revelation. All other miracles that are done in the world, how many or great ſoever, revelation is not concerned in. Caſes wherein there has been, or can be need of miracles for the confirmation of revelation, are fewer than perhaps is imagined. The heathen world, amidſt an infinite and uncertain jumble of deities, fables, and worſhips, had no room for a divine atteſtation of any one againſt the reſt. Thoſe owners of many gods were at liberty in their worſhip; and no one of their divinities pretending to be the one only true God, no one of them could be ſuppoſed in the Pagan ſcheme to make uſe of miracles to eſtabliſh his worſhip alone, or to aboliſh that of the other; much leſs was there any uſe of miracles to confirm any articles of faith, ſince no one of them had any ſuch to propoſe as neceſſary to be believed by their votaries. And therefore I do not remember any miracles recorded in the Greek or Roman writers, as done to confirm any one's miſſion and doctrine. Conformable hereunto we find St. Paul, 1 Cor. i. 22. takes notice that the Jews (it is true) required miracles, but as for the Greeks they looked after ſomething elſe; they knew no need or uſe there was of miracles to recommend any religion to them. And indeed it is an aſtoniſhing mark how far the God of this world had blinded men's minds, if we conſider that the Gentile world received and ſtuck to a religion, which, not being derived from reaſon, had no ſure foundation in revelation. They knew not its original, nor the authors of it, nor ſeemed concerned to know from whence it came, or by whoſe authority delivered; and ſo had no mention or uſe of miracles for its confirmation. For though there were here and there ſome pretences to revelation, yet there were not ſo much as pretences to miracles that atteſted it.

If we will direct our thoughts by what has been, we muſt conclude that miracles, as the credentials of a meſſenger delivering a divine religion, have no place but upon a ſuppoſition of one only true God; and that it is ſo in the nature of the thing, and cannot be otherwiſe, I think will be made appear in the ſequel of this diſcourſe. Of ſuch who have come in the name of the one only true God, profeſſing to bring a law from him, we have in hiſtory a clear account but of three, viz. Moſes, Jeſus, and Mahomet. For what the Perſees ſay of their Zoroaſter, or the Indians of their Brama (not to mention all the wild ſtories of the religions farther eaſt) is ſo obſcure, or ſo manifeſtly fabulous, that no account can be made of it. Now of the three before-mentioned, Mahomet having none to produce, pretends to no miracles for the vouching his miſſion; ſo that the only revelations that come atteſted by miracles, being

being thoſe of Moſes and Chriſt, and they confirming each other; the buſineſs of miracles, as it ſtands really in matter of fact, has no manner of difficulty in it; and I think the moſt ſcrupulous or ſceptical cannot from miracles raiſe the leaſt doubt againſt the divine revelation of the goſpel.

But ſince the ſpeculative and learned will be putting of caſes which never were, and it may be preſumed never will be; ſince ſcholars and diſputants will be raiſing of queſtions where there are none, and enter upon debates, whereof there is no need; I crave leave to ſay, that he who comes with a meſſage from God to be delivered to the world, cannot be refuſed belief if he vouches his miſſion by a miracle, becauſe his credentials have a right to it. For every rational thinking man muſt conclude as Nicodemus did, "we know that thou art a teacher come from "God, for no man can do theſe ſigns which thou doeſt, except God be "with him."

For example, Jeſus of Nazareth profeſſes himſelf ſent from God: he with a word calms a tempeſt at ſea. This one looks on as a miracle, and conſequently cannot but receive his doctrine. Another thinks this might be the effect of chance, or ſkill in the weather, and no miracle, and ſo ſtands out; but afterwards ſeeing him walk on the ſea, owns that for a miracle and believes: which yet upon another has not that force, who ſuſpects it may poſſibly be done by the aſſiſtance of a ſpirit. But yet the ſame perſon, ſeeing afterwards our Saviour cure an inveterate palſy by a word, admits that for a miracle, and becomes a convert. Another overlooking it in this inſtance, afterwards finds a miracle in his giving ſight to one born blind, or in raiſing the dead, or his raiſing himſelf from the dead, and ſo receives his doctrine as a revelation coming from God. By all which it is plain, that where the miracle is admitted, the doctrine cannot be rejected; it comes with the aſſurance of a divine atteſtation to him that allows the miracle, and he cannot queſtion its truth.

The next thing then is, what ſhall be a ſufficient inducement to take any extraordinary operation to be a miracle, i. e. wrought by God himſelf for the atteſtation of a revelation from him?

And To this I anſwer, the carrying with it the marks of a greater power than appears in oppoſition to it. For,

1. First, this removes the main difficulty where it preſſes hardeſt, and clears the matter from doubt, when extraordinary and ſupernatural operations are brought to ſupport oppoſite miſſions, about which methinks more duſt has been raiſed by men of leiſure than ſo plain a matter needed. For ſince God's power is paramount to all, and no oppoſition can be made againſt him with an equal force to his; and ſince his honour and goodneſs can never be ſuppoſed to ſuffer his meſſenger and his truth to be borne down by the appearance of a greater power on the ſide of an impoſtor, and in favour of a lye; wherever there is an oppoſition, and two pretending to be ſent from heaven claſh, the ſigns, which carry with them the evident marks of a greater power, will always be a certain

and unqueſtionable evidence, that the truth and divine miſſion are on that ſide on which they appear. For though the diſcovery, how the lying wonders are or can be produced, be beyond the capacity of the ignorant, and often beyond the conception of the moſt knowing ſpectator, who is therefore forced to allow them in his apprehenſion to be above the force of natural cauſes and effects; yet he cannot but know they are not ſeals ſet by God to his truth for the atteſting of it, ſince they are oppoſed by miracles that carry the evident marks of a greater and ſuperior power, and therefore they cannot at all ſhake the authority of one ſo ſupported. God can never be thought to ſuffer that a lye, ſet up in oppoſition to a truth coming from him, ſhould be backed with a greater power than he will ſhew for the confirmation and propagation of a doctrine which he has revealed, to the end it might be believed. The producing of ſerpents, blood and frogs, by the Egyptian ſorcerers and by Moſes, could not to the ſpectators but appear equally miraculous: which of the pretenders then had their miſſion from God, and the truth on their ſide, could not have been determined, if the matter had reſted there. But when Moſes's ſerpent eat up theirs, when he produced lice which they could not, the deciſion was eaſy. It was plain Jannes and Jambres acted by an inferior power, and their operations, how marvellous and extraordinary ſoever, could not in the leaſt bring in queſtion Moſes's miſſion; that ſtood the firmer for this oppoſition, and remained the more unqueſtionable after this, than if no ſuch ſigns had been brought againſt it.

So likewiſe the number, variety and greatneſs of the miracles wrought for the confirmation of the doctrine delivered by Jeſus Chriſt, carry with them ſuch ſtrong marks of an extraordinary divine power, that the truth of his miſſion will ſtand firm and unqueſtionable, till any one riſing up in oppoſition to him ſhall do greater miracles than he and his apoſtles did. For any thing leſs will not be of weight to turn the ſcales in the opinion of any one, whether of an inferior or more exalted underſtanding. This is one of thoſe palpable truths and trials, of which all mankind are judges; and there needs no aſſiſtance of learning, no deep thought, to come to a certainty in it. Such care has God taken that no pretended revelation ſhould ſtand in competition with what is truly divine, that we need but open our eyes to ſee and be ſure which came from him. The marks of his over-ruling power accompany it; and therefore to this day we find, that where-ever the goſpel comes, it prevails to the beating down the ſtrong-holds of Satan, and the diſlodging the prince of the power of darkneſs, driving him away with all his lying wonders; which is a ſtanding miracle, carrying with it the teſtimony of ſuperiority.

WHAT is the uttermoſt power of natural agents or created beings, men of the greateſt reach cannot diſcover; but that it is not equal to God's omnipotency, is obvious to every one's underſtanding; ſo that the ſuperior power is an eaſy, as well as ſure guide to divine revelation, at-

teſted by miracles, where they are brought as credentials to an embaſſy from God.

AND thus upon the ſame grounds of ſuperiority of power, unconteſted revelation will ſtand too.

FOR the explaining of which, it may be neceſſary to premiſe,

1. THAT no miſſion can be looked on to be divine, that delivers any thing derogating from the honour of the one, only, true, inviſible God, or inconſiſtent with natural religion and the rules of morality: becauſe God having diſcovered to men the unity and majeſty of his eternal godhead, and the truths of natural religion and morality by the light of reaſon, he cannot be ſuppoſed to back the contrary by revelation; for that would be to deſtroy the evidence and the uſe of reaſon, without which men cannot be able to diſtinguiſh divine revelation from diabolical impoſture.

2. THAT it cannot be expected that God ſhould ſend any one into the world on purpoſe to inform men of things indifferent, and of ſmall moment, or that are knowable by the uſe of their natural faculties. This would be to leſſen the dignity of his majeſty in favour of our ſloth, and in prejudice to our reaſon.

3. THE only caſe then wherein a miſſion of any one from heaven can be reconciled to the high and awful thoughts men ought to have of the Deity, muſt be the revelation of ſome ſupernatural truths relating to the glory of God, and ſome great concern of men. Supernatural operations atteſting ſuch a revelation may with reaſon be taken to be miracles, as carrying the marks of a ſuperior and over-ruling power, as long as no revelation accompanied with marks of a greater power appears againſt it. Such ſupernatural ſigns may juſtly ſtand good, and be received for divine, i. e. wrought by a power ſuperior to all, till a miſſion atteſted by operations of a greater force ſhall diſprove them: becauſe it cannot be ſuppoſed, God ſhould ſuffer his prerogative to be ſo far uſurped by any inferior being, as to permit any creature, depending on him, to ſet his ſeals, the marks of his divine authority, to a miſſion coming from him. For theſe ſupernatural ſigns being the only means God is conceived to have to ſatisfy men as rational creatures of the certainty of any thing he would reveal, as coming from himſelf, can never conſent that it ſhould be wreſted out of his hands, to ſerve the ends and eſtabliſh the authority of an inferior agent that rivals him. His power being known to have no equal, always will, and always may be ſafely depended on, to ſhew its ſuperiority in vindicating his authority, and maintaining every truth that he hath revealed. So that the marks of a ſuperior power accompanying it, always have been, and always will be, a viſible and ſure guide to divine revelation; by which men may conduct themſelves in their examining of revealed religions, and be ſatisfied which they ought to receive as coming from God; though they have by no means ability preciſely to determine what is, or is not above the force of any created being; or what operations can be performed by none but a divine power, and require the immediate hand of the Almighty. And therefore we ſee it is

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by that our Saviour meaſures the great unbelief of the Jews, John xv. 24. ſaying, " If I had not done among them the works which no other man " did, they had not had ſin; but now have they both ſeen and hated " both me and my father;" declaring, that they could not but ſee the power and preſence of God in thoſe many miracles he did, which were greater than ever any other man had done. When God ſent Moſes to the children of Iſrael with a meſſage, that now according to his promiſe he would redeem them by his hand out of Egypt, and furniſhed him with ſigns and credentials of his miſſion; it is very remarkable what God himſelf ſays of thoſe ſigns, Exod. iv. 8. " And it ſhall come to " paſs, if they will not believe thee, nor hearken to the voice of the firſt " ſign" (which was turning his rod into a ſerpent) that " they will be- " lieve the voice of the latter ſign" (which was the making his hand leprous by putting it in his boſom). God farther adds, v. 9. " And " it ſhall come to paſs, if they will not believe alſo theſe two ſigns, nei- " ther hearken unto thy voice, that thou ſhalt take of the water of the " river and pour upon the dry land: And the water which thou takeſt " out of the river ſhall become blood upon the dry land." Which of thoſe operations was or was not above the force of all created beings, will, I ſuppoſe, be hard for any man, too hard for a poor brick-maker, to determine; and therefore the credit and certain reception of the miſſion, was annexed to neither of them, but the prevailing of their atteſtation was heightened by the increaſe of their number; two ſupernatural operations ſhewing more power than one, and three more than two. God allowed that it was natural, that the marks of greater power ſhould have a greater impreſſion on the minds and belief of the ſpectators. Accordingly the Jews, by this eſtimate, judged of the miracles of our Saviour, John vii. 31. where we have this account, " And many of the peo- " ple believed on him, and ſaid, When Chriſt cometh, will he do more " miracles than theſe which this man hath done?" This, perhaps, as it is the plaineſt, ſo it is alſo the ſureſt way to preſerve the teſtimony of miracles in its due force to all ſorts and degrees of people. For miracles being the baſis on which divine miſſion is always eſtabliſhed, and conſequently that foundation on which the believers of any divine revelation muſt ultimately bottom their faith, this uſe of them would be loſt, if not to all mankind, yet at leaſt to the ſimple and illiterate (which is the far greateſt part) if miracles be defined to be none but ſuch divine operations as are in themſelves beyond the power of all created beings, or at leaſt operations contrary to the fixed and eſtabliſhed laws of nature. For as to the latter of thoſe, what are the fixed and eſtabliſhed laws of nature, philoſophers alone, if at leaſt they, can pretend to determine. And if they are to be operations performable only by divine power, I doubt whether any man, learned or unlearned, can in moſt caſes be able to ſay of any particular operation, that can fall under his ſenſes, that it is certainly a miracle. Before he can come to that certainty, he muſt know that no created being has a power to perform it. We know good and bad angels

have abilities and excellencies exceedingly beyond all our poor performances or narrow comprehenſions. But to define what is the utmoſt extent of power that any of them has, is a bold undertaking of a man in the dark, that pronounces without ſeeing, and ſets bounds in his narrow cell to things at an infinite diſtance from his model and comprehenſion.

SUCH definitions therefore of miracles, however ſpecious in diſcourſe and theory, fail us when we come to uſe, and an application of them in particular caſes. 170½.

" Theſe thoughts concerning miracles, were occaſioned by my reading " Mr. Fleetwood's Eſſay on Miracles, and the letter writ to him on that " ſubject. The one of them defining a miracle to be an extraordinary " operation performable by God alone: and the other writing of miracles " without any definition of a miracle at all."

J. LOCKE.

MEMOIRS

RELATING TO THE

LIFE

OF

ANTHONY First Earl of SHAFTESBURY.

To which are added,

Three LETTERS writ by the Earl of Shafteſbury while Priſoner in the Tower; one to King Charles II, another to the Duke of York, a Third to a noble Lord: found with Mr. LOCKE's MEMOIRS, &c.

BEING at Oxford in the beginning of the civil war (for he was on that ſide as long as he had any hopes to ſerve his country there) he was brought one day to king Charles I. by the lord Falkland, his friend, then ſecretary of ſtate, and preſented to him as having ſomething to offer to his majeſty worth his conſideration. At this audience he told the king that he thought he could put an end to the war if his majeſty pleaſed, and would aſſiſt him in it. The king anſwered, that he was a very young man for ſo great an undertaking. Sir, replied he, that will not be the worſe for your affairs, provided I do the buſineſs; whereupon the king ſhewing a willingneſs to hear him, he diſcourſed to him to this purpoſe:

THE gentlemen and men of eſtates, who firſt engaged in this war, ſeeing now after a year or two that it ſeems to be no nearer the end than it was at firſt, and beginning to be weary of it, I am very well ſatisfied would be glad to be at quiet at home again, if they could be aſſured of a redreſs of their grievances, and have their rights and liberties ſecured to them. This I am ſatisfied is the preſent temper generally through all England, and particularly in thoſe parts where my eſtate and concerns lie; if therefore your majeſty will empower me to treat with the parliament garriſons to grant them a full and general pardon, with an aſſurance that a general

amneſty (arms being laid down on both ſides) ſhould re-inſtate all things in the ſame poſture they were before the war, and then a free parliament ſhould do what more remained to be done for the ſettlement of the nation:—

THAT he would begin and try the experiment firſt in his own country; and doubted not but the good ſucceſs he ſhould have there would open him the gates of other adjoining garriſons, bringing them the news of peace and ſecurity in laying down their arms.

BEING furniſhed with full power according to his deſire, away he goes to Dorcheſter, where he managed a treaty with the garriſons of Pool, Weymouth, Dorcheſter, and others; and was ſo ſucceſsful in it, that one of them was actually put into his hands, as the other were to have been ſome few days after. But prince Maurice, who commanded ſome of the king's forces, being with his army then in thoſe parts, no ſooner heard that the town was ſurrendered, but he preſently marched into it, and gave the pillage of it to his ſoldiers. This Sir A. ſaw with the utmoſt diſpleaſure, and could not forbear to expreſs his reſentments to the prince; ſo that there paſſed ſome pretty hot words between them; but the violence was committed, and thereby his deſign broken. All that he could do was, that he ſent to the other garriſons, he was in treaty with, to ſtand upon their guard, for that he could not ſecure his articles to them; and ſo this deſign proved abortive and died in ſilence.

Prince Maurice.

THIS project of his for putting an end to a civil war, which had ſufficiently harraſſed the kingdom, and no-body could tell what fatal conſequences it might have, being thus fruſtrated, it was not long before his active thoughts, always intent upon ſaving his country (the good of that being that by which he ſteered his counſels and actions through the whole courſe of his life) it was not long before he ſet his head upon framing another deſign to the ſame purpoſe. The firſt project of it took its riſe in a debate between him and ſerjeant Fountain, in an inn at Hungerford, where they accidentally met: and both diſliking the continuance of the war, and deploring the ruin it threatened, it was ſtarted between them, that the countries all through England ſhould arm and endeavour to ſuppreſs the armies on both ſides. This propoſal, which, in one night's debate, looked more like a well-meant wiſh than a formed deſign, he afterwards conſidered more at leiſure, framed and faſhioned into a well-ordered and practical contrivance, and never left working in it till he had brought moſt of the ſober and well-intentioned gentlemen of both ſides all through England into it. This was that which gave riſe to that third ſort of army, which of a ſudden ſtarted up in ſeveral parts of England, with ſo much terror to the armies both of king and parliament; and had not ſome of thoſe who had engaged in it, and had undertaken to riſe at the time appointed, failed, the Clubmen, for ſo they were called, had been ſtrong enough to carry their point, which was to make both ſides lay down their arms, and if they would not do it, to force them to it; to declare for a general amneſty; to have the then parliament diſſolved;

Clubmen.

and to have a new one called for redreſſing the grievances, and ſettling the nation. This undertaking was not a romantic fancy, but had very promiſing grounds of ſucceſs; for the yeomanry and body of the people had ſuffered already very much by the war; and the gentry and men of eſtates had abated much of their fierceneſs, and wiſhed to return to their former eaſe, ſecurity, and plenty; eſpecially perceiving that the game, particularly on the king's ſide, began to be played out of their hands, and that it was the ſoldiers of fortune who were beſt looked upon at court, and had the commands and power put into their hands.

He had been for ſome time before in Dorſetſhire, forming and combining the parts of this great machine, till at length he got it to begin to move. But thoſe, who had been forward to enter into the deſign, not being ſo vigorous and reſolute, when the time was to appear and act; and the court, who had learnt or ſuſpected that it had its riſe and life from him, having ſo ſtrict an eye upon him that he could not maintain correſpondence with diſtant countries, and animate the ſeveral parts as it was neceſſary, before it was his time to ſtir; he received a very civil and more than ordinary letter from the king to come to him at Oxford: but he wanted not friends there to inform him of the danger it would be to him to appear there, and to confirm him in the ſuſpicion that the king's letter put him in, that there was ſomething elſe meant him, and not ſo much kindneſs as that expreſſed. Beſides, the lord Goring, who lay with an army in thoſe parts, had orders from court to ſeize him, and had civilly ſent him word, that he would come ſuch a day and dine with him. All this together made him ſee that he could be no longer ſafe at home, nor in the king's quarters; he therefore went, whither he was driven, into the parliament quarters; and took ſhelter in Portſmouth. Thus, for endeavouring to ſave his king and country, he was baniſhed from the ſide he had choſen. And the court, that was then in high hopes of nothing leſs than perfect conqueſt, and being maſters of all, had a great averſion to moderate counſels, and to thoſe of the nobility and gentry of their party, who were authors or favourers of any ſuch propoſals as might bring things to a compoſition. Such well-wiſhers to their country, though they had ſpent much, and ventured all on the king's ſide, when they appeared for any other end of the war but dint of arms, and a total reduction of the parliament by force, were counted enemies; and any contrivance carried on to that end was interpreted treaſon.

A person of his conſideration, thus rejected and caſt off by the king, and taking ſanctuary with them, was received by the parliament with open arms; and though he came in from the other ſide, and put himſelf into their hands without any terms; yet there were thoſe among them that ſo well knew his worth, and what value they ought to put upon it, that he was ſoon after offered conſiderable employments under them, and was actually truſted with command without ſo much as ever being queſtioned concerning what he knew of perſons or counſels on the other ſide, where they knew that his great penetration and forward mind would not

let him live in ignorance among the great men, who were moſt of them his friends, and all his acquaintance.

But though he was not ſuffered to ſtay among thoſe with whom he had embarked, and had lived in confidence with, and was forced to go over to the parliament, he carried thither himſelf only, and nothing of any body's elſe; he left them and all their concerns, actions, purpoſes, counſels, perfectly behind him; and no-body of the king's ſide could complain of him after the day he went from his houſe, where he could be no longer ſafe, that he had any memory of what he had known when one of them.

This forgetfulneſs, ſo becoming a gentleman, and a man of honour, he had eſtabliſhed ſo firmly in his own mind, that his reſolution to perſiſt in it was like afterwards to coſt him no little trouble. Mr. Denzil Hollis (afterwards the lord Hollis) had been one of the commiſſioners employed by the parliament in the treaty at Uxbridge; he had there had ſome ſecret and ſeparate tranſactions with the king; this could not be kept ſo ſecret, but that it got ſome vent, and ſome of the parliament had ſome notice of it. Mr. Hollis being afterwards attacked in parliament by a contrary party, there wanted nothing perfectly to ruin him, but ſome witneſs to give credit to ſuch an accuſation againſt him. Sir A. Aſhley Cooper they thought fit for their purpoſe; they doubted not but he knew enough of it; and they made ſure that he would not fail to embrace ſuch a fair and unſought-for opportunity of ruining Mr. Hollis, who had been long his enemy upon a family-quarrel, which he had carried ſo far, as, by his power in the houſe, to hinder him from ſitting in the parliament, upon a fair election for that parliament. Upon this preſumption he was ſummoned to the houſe; and being called in, was there aſked, whether when he was at Oxford he knew not, or had not heard ſomething concerning Mr. Hollis's ſecret tranſaction with the king at the treaty at Uxbridge. To this queſtion he told them he could anſwer nothing at all; for though, poſſibly, what he had to ſay would be to the clearing of Mr. Hollis; yet he could not allow himſelf to ſay any thing in the caſe, ſince, whatever anſwer he made, it would be a confeſſion that, if he had known any thing to the diſadvantage of Mr. Hollis, he would have taken that diſhonourable way of doing him a prejudice, and wreak his revenge on a man that was his enemy.

Those who had brought him there preſſed him mightily to declare, but in vain, though threats were added of ſending him to the Tower. He perſiſting obſtinately ſilent, was bid to withdraw; and thoſe who had depended upon his diſcovery being defeated, and conſequently very much diſpleaſed, moved warmly for his commitment; of which he, waiting in the lobby, having notice, unmoved expected his doom, though ſeveral of his friends coming out, were earneſt with him to ſatisfy the houſe; but he kept firm to his reſolution, and found friends enough among the great men of the party that oppoſed Mr. Hollis to bring him off; who very much applauded the generoſity of his carriage, and ſhewed that action ſo much

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to deſerve the commendation, rather than the cenſure of that aſſembly, that the angry men were aſhamed to inſiſt farther on it, and ſo dropt the debate.

SOME days after Mr. Hollis came to his lodging, and having, in terms of great acknowledgment and eſteem, expreſſed his thanks for his late behaviour in the houſe, with reſpect to him; he replied, that he pretended not thereby to merit any thing of him, or to lay an obligation on him; that what he had done was not out of any conſideration of him, but what was due to himſelf, and he ſhould equally have done, had any other man been concerned in it; and therefore he was perfectly as much at liberty as before to live with him as he pleaſed. But with all that he was not ſo ignorant of Mr. Hollis's worth, nor knew ſo little how to put a juſt value on his friendſhip, as not to receive it as a very great and ſenſible favour, if he thought him a perſon worthy on whom to beſtow it. Mr. Hollis, not leſs taken with his diſcourſe than what had occaſioned it, gave him freſh and repeated aſſurances of his ſincere and hearty friendſhip, which were received with ſuitable expreſſions. And thus an old quarrel between two men of high ſpirits and great eſtates, neighbours in the ſame county, ended in a ſound and firm friendſhip, which laſted as long as they lived.

THIS paſſage brings to my mind what I remember to have often heard him ſay concerning a man's obligation to ſilence, in regard of diſcourſe made to him or in his preſence: that it was not enough to keep cloſe and uncommunicated what had been committed to him with that caution, but there was a general and tacit truſt in converſation, whereby a man was obliged not to report again any thing that might be any way to the ſpeaker's prejudice, though no intimation had been given of a deſire not to have it ſpoken again.

HE was wont to ſay, that wiſdom lay in the heart, and not in the head; and that it was not the want of knowledge, but the perverſeneſs of the will that filled men's actions with folly, and their lives with diſorder.

THAT there were in every one, two men, the wiſe and the fooliſh, and that each of them muſt be allowed his turn. If you would have the wiſe, the grave, and the ſerious, always to rule and have the ſway, the fool would grow ſo peeviſh and troubleſome, that he would put the wiſe man out of order, and make him fit for nothing: he muſt have his times of being let looſe to follow his fancies, and play his gambols, if you would have your buſineſs go on ſmoothly.

I HAVE heard him alſo ſay, that he deſired no more of any man but that he would talk: If he would but talk, ſaid he, let him talk as he pleaſes. And indeed I never knew any one penetrate ſo quick into men's breaſts, and from a ſmall opening ſurvey that dark cabinet, as he would. He would underſtand men's true errand as ſoon as they had opened their mouths, and begun their ſtory in appearance to another purpoſe.

SIR Richard Onſlow and he were invited by Sir J. D. to dine with him

at Chelſea, and deſired to come early, becauſe he had an affair of concernment to communicate to them. They came at the time, and being ſat, he told them he had made choice of them both for their known abilities, and particular friendſhip to him, for their advice in a matter of the greateſt moment to him that could be. He had, he ſaid, been a widower for many years, and began to want ſome-body that might eaſe him of the trouble of houſe-keeping, and take ſome care of him under the growing infirmities of old age; and to that purpoſe had pitched upon a woman very well known to him by the experience of many years, in fine, his houſe-keeper. Theſe gentlemen, who were not ſtrangers to his family, and knew the woman very well, and were beſides very great friends to his ſon and daughter, grown up, and both fit for marriage, to whom they thought this would be a very prejudicial match, were both in their minds oppoſite to it; and to that purpoſe Sir Richard Onſlow began the diſcourſe; wherein, when he came to that part, he was entering upon the deſcription of the woman, and going to ſet her out in her own colours, which were ſuch as could not have pleaſed any man in his wife. Sir Anthony ſeeing whither he was going, to prevent any miſchief, begged leave to interrupt him, by aſking Sir J. a queſtion, which in ſhort was this, "whether he were not already married?" Sir J. after a little demur, anſwered, "Yes truly, he was married the day before." Well then, replied Sir Anthony, there is no more need of our advice; pray let us have the honour to ſee my lady and wiſh her joy, and ſo to dinner. As they were returning to London in their coach, I am obliged to you, ſaid Sir Richard, for preventing my running into a diſcourſe which could never have been forgiven me, if I had ſpoke out what I was going to ſay. But as for Sir J. he, methinks, ought to cut your throat for your civil queſtion. How could it poſſibly enter into your head to aſk a man, who had ſolemnly invited us on purpoſe to have our advice about a marriage he intended, had gravely propoſed the woman to us, and ſuffered us ſeriouſly to enter into the debate, "whether he were already married or no?" The man, and the manner, replied Sir Anthony, gave me a ſuſpicion that, having done a fooliſh thing, he was deſirous to cover himſelf with the authority of our advice. I thought it good to be ſure before you went any farther, and you ſee what came of it. This afforded them entertainment till they came to town, and ſo they parted.

Soon after the reſtoration of king Charles II, the earl of Southampton and he having dined together at the chancellor's, as they were returning home, he ſaid to my lord Southampton, "Yonder Mrs. Anne Hyde (for ſo, as I remember, he ſtyled her) is certainly married to one of the brothers." The earl, who was a friend to the chancellor, treated this as a chimæra, and aſked him how ſo wild a fancy could get into his head. Aſſure yourſelf, Sir, replied he, it is ſo. A concealed reſpect, however ſuppreſſed, ſhewed itſelf ſo plainly in the looks, voice, and manner, wherewith her mother carved to her, or offered her of every diſh, that it is impoſſible but

but it muſt be ſo. My lord S. who thought it a groundleſs conceit then, was not long after convinced by the duke of York's owning of her, that lord Aſhley was no bad gueſſer.

I SHALL give one inſtance more of his great ſagacity, wherein it proved of great uſe to him in a caſe of mighty conſequence. Having reaſon to apprehend what tyranny the uſurpation of the government by the officers of the army, under the title of the Committee of Safety, might end in; he thought the firſt ſtep to ſettlement was the breaking of them, which could not be done with any pretence of authority, but that of the long parliament. Meeting therefore ſecretly with Sir Arthur Haſelrig, and ſome others of the members, they gave commiſſions in the name of the parliament to be major-generals, one of the forces about London, another of the weſt, &c. and this when they had not one ſoldier. Nay, he often would tell it laughing, that when he had his commiſſion his great care was where to hide it. Before this he had ſecured Portſmouth; for the governor of it, col. Metham, being his old acquaintance and friend, he aſked him one day, meeting him by chance in Weſtminſter-Hall, whether he would put Portſmouth into his hands if he ſhould happen to have an occaſion for it? Metham promiſed it ſhould be at his devotion. Theſe tranſactions, though no part of them were known in particular, yet cauſing ſome remote preparations, alarmed Wallingford-houſe, where the Committee of Safety ſat, and made them ſo attentive to all actions and diſcoveries that might give them any light, that at laſt they were fully perſuaded there was ſomething a brewing againſt them, and that matter for commotions in ſeveral parts was gathering. They knew the vigour and activity of Sir A. Aſhley, and how well he ſtood affectionated to them, and therefore ſuſpected that he was at the bottom of the matter. To find what they could, and ſecure the man they moſt apprehended, he was ſent for to Wallingford-houſe, where Fleetwood examined him according to the ſuſpicions he had of him; that he was laying deſigns in the weſt againſt them, and was working the people to an inſurrection that he intended to head there. He told them, he knew no obligation he was under to give them an account of his actions, nor to make them any promiſes; but to ſhew them how ill grounded their ſuſpicions were, he promiſed that he would not go out of town without coming firſt and giving him an account of it. Fleetwood knowing his word might be relied on, ſatisfied with the promiſe he had made, let him go upon his parole. That which deceived them in the caſe, was, that knowing his eſtate and intereſt lay in the weſt, they preſumed, that that was his poſt, and there certainly, if any ſtir was, he would appear, ſince there lay his great ſtrength, and they had no-body elſe in view who could ſupply his room, and manage that part. But they were miſtaken: Haſelrig, upon the knowledge that they ſhould have Portſmouth, forwardly took that province; and he, who had inſtruments at work in the army quartered in and about London, and knew that muſt be the place of moſt buſineſs and management, and where the turn of affairs would be, had choſen that.

LAMBERT,

LAMBERT, who was one of the rulers at Wallingford-houſe, happened to be away when he was there, and came not in till he was gone: when they told him that Sir A. Aſhley had been there, and what had paſſed, he blamed Fleetwood for letting him go, and told him they ſhould have ſecured him, for that certainly there was ſomething in it that they were deceived in, and they ſhould not have parted ſo eaſily with ſo buſy and dangerous a man as he was. Lambert was of a quicker ſight, and a deeper reach than Fleetwood, and the reſt of that gang; and knowing of what moment it was to their ſecurity to fruſtrate the contrivances of that working and able head, was reſolved, if poſſibly he could, to get him into his clutches.

SIR A. A. coming home to his houſe in ſtreet in Covent-Garden one evening, found a man knocking at his door. He aſked his buſineſs; the man anſwered, it was with him, and fell a diſcourſing with him. Sir A. A. heard him out, and gave him ſuch an anſwer as he thought proper, and ſo they parted; the ſtranger out of the entry where they ſtood into the ſtreet, and ſir A. A. along the entry into the houſe: but gueſſing by the ſtory the other told him, that the buſineſs was but a pretence, and that his real errand he came about was ſomething elſe; when he parted from the fellow he went inwards, as if he intended to go into the houſe; but as ſoon as the fellow was gone, turned ſhort, and went out, and went to his barber's, which was but juſt by; where he was no ſooner got in, and got up ſtairs into a chamber, but his door was beſet with muſketeers, and the officer went in too with others to ſeize him: but not finding him, they ſearched every corner and cranny of the houſe diligently, the officer declaring he was ſure he was in the houſe, for he had left him there juſt now; as was true, for he had gone no farther than the corner of the Half-moon-tavern, which was juſt by, to fetch a file of ſoldiers that he had left there in the Strand out of ſight, whilſt he went to diſcover whether the gentleman he ſought were within or no; where doubting not to find him ſafely lodged, he returned with his myrmidons to his houſe, ſure, as he thought, of his prey; but ſir A. A. ſaw through his made ſtory, and gave him the ſlip. After this he was fain to get out of the way and conceal himſelf under a diſguiſe; but he hid himſelf not lazily in a hole; he made war upon them at Wallingford-houſe, incognito as he was, and made them feel him, though he kept out of ſight. ***\

excluded members in their former adminiſtration. This was the firſt open ſtep he made towards the wreſting the civil power out of the hands of the army; who, having thought Richard, Oliver's ſon, unworthy of it, had taken it to themſelves, executed by a committee of their own officers, where Lambert, who had the chief command and influence in the army, had placed it, till he had modelled things among them, ſo as might make way for his taking the ſole adminiſtration into his own hands; but Sir A. A. found a way to ſtrip him of that as ſoon as the parliament was reſtored.

THE firſt thing he did was to get from them a commiſſion to himſelf, and two or three more of the moſt weighty and popular members of the houſe, to have the power of general of all the forces in England, which they were to execute jointly. This was no ſooner done but he got them together, where he had provided abundance of clerks, who were immediately ſet to work to tranſcribe a great many copies of the form of a letter, wherein they reciting, that it had pleaſed God to reſtore the parliament to the exerciſe of their power, and that the parliament had given to them a commiſſion to command the army, they therefore commanded him (viz. the officer to whom the letter was directed) immediately with his troop, company, or regiment, as it happened, to march to N. Theſe letters were directed to the chief officer of any part of the army who had their quarters together in any part of England. Theſe letters were diſpatched away by particular meſſengers that very night, and coming to the ſeveral officers ſo peremptorily to march immediately, they had not time to aſſemble and debate among themſelves what to do; and having no other intelligence but that the parliament was reſtored, and that the city and Portſmouth, and other parts of England, had declared for them; the officers durſt not diſobey, but all, according to their ſeveral orders, marched ſome one way, and ſome another; ſo that this army, which was the great ſtrength of the gentlemen of Wallingford-houſe, was by this means quite ſcattered, and rendered perfectly uſeleſs to the Committee of Safety, who were hereby perfectly reduced under the power of the parliament, as ſo many diſarmed men to be diſpoſed of as they thought fit.

IT is known, that, whilſt the Long Parliament remained entire, Mr. Denzil Hollis was the man of the greateſt ſway in it, and might have continued it on, if he would have followed Sir A. A's advice. But he was a haughty ſtiff man, and ſo by ſtraining it a little too much loſt all.

FROM the time of their reconcilement already mentioned, they had been very hearty friends; it happened one morning that Sir A. A. calling upon Mr. Hollis in his way to the houſe, as he often did; he found him in a great heat againſt Cromwell, who had then the command of the army, and a great intereſt in it. The provocation may be read at large in the pamphlets of that time, for which Mr. Hollis was reſolved, he ſaid, to bring him to puniſhment. Sir A. A. diſſuaded him all he could from any ſuch attempt, ſhewing him the danger of it, and told him it would be ſufficient to remove him out of the way, by ſending him

with a command into Ireland. This Cromwell, as things ſtood, would be glad to accept; but this would not ſatisfy Mr. Hollis. When he came to the houſe the matter was brought into debate, and it was moved, that Cromwell, and thoſe guilty with him, ſhould be puniſhed. Cromwell, who was in the houſe, no ſooner heard this, but he ſtole out, took horſe, and rode immediately to the army, which, as I remember, was at Triplow-Heath; there he acquainted them what the Preſbyterian party was a doing in the houſe, and made ſuch uſe of it to them, that they, who were before in the power of the parliament, now united together under Cromwell, who immediately led them away to London, giving out menaces againſt Hollis and his party as they march, who with Stapleton and ſome others were fain to fly; and thereby the Independent party becoming the ſtronger, they, as they called it, purged the houſe, and turned out all the Preſbyterian party. Cromwell, ſome time after, meeting Sir A. A. told him, I am beholden to you for your kindneſs to me; for you, I hear, were for letting me go without puniſhment; but your friend, God be thanked, was not wiſe enough to take your advice.

Monk, after the death of Oliver Cromwell, and the removal of Richard, marching with the army he had with him into England, gave fair promiſes all along in his way to London to the Rump that were then ſitting, who had ſent commiſſioners to him that accompanied him. When he was come to town, though he had promiſed fair to the Rump and commonwealth party on one hand, and gave hopes to the royaliſts on the other; yet at laſt agreed with the French ambaſſador to take the government on himſelf, by whom he had promiſe from Mazarine of aſſiſtance from France to ſupport him in his undertaking. This bargain was ſtruck up between them late at night, but not ſo ſecretly but that his wife, who had poſted herſelf conveniently behind the hangings, where ſhe could hear all that paſſed, finding what was reſolved, ſent her brother Clarges away immediately with notice of it to Sir A. A. She was zealous for the reſtoration of the king, and had therefore promiſed Sir A. to watch her huſband, and inform him from time to time how matters went. Upon this notice Sir A. cauſed the council of ſtate, whereof he was one, to be ſummoned; and when they were met, he deſired the clerks might withdraw, he having matter of great importance to communicate to them. The doors of the council-chamber being locked, and the keys laid upon the table, he began to charge Monk, not in a direct and open accuſation, but in obſcure intimations, and doubtful expreſſions, giving ground of ſuſpicion, that he was playing falſe with them, and not doing as he promiſed. This he did ſo ſkilfully and intelligibly to Monk, that he perceived he was diſcovered, and therefore in his anſwer to him fumbled and ſeemed out of order; ſo that the reſt of the council perceived there was ſomething in it, though they knew not what the matter was; and the general at laſt averring that what had been ſuggeſted was upon groundleſs ſuſpicions, and that he was true to his principles,

ciples, and ſtood firm to what he had profeſſed to them, and had no ſecret deſigns that ought to diſturb them, and that he was ready to give them all manner of ſatisfaction; whereupon Sir A. A. cloſing with him, and making a farther uſe of what he had ſaid than he intended: for he meant no more than ſo far as to get away from them upon this aſſurance which he gave them. But Sir A. A. told him, that if he was ſincere in what he had ſaid, he might preſently remove all ſcruples, if he would take away their commiſſions from ſuch and ſuch officers in his army, and give them to thoſe whom he named; and that preſently before he went out of the room. Monk was in himſelf no quick man; he was guilty alone among a company of men who he knew not what they would do with him; for they all ſtruck in with Sir A. A. and plainly perceived that Monk had deſigned ſome foul play. In theſe ſtraits being thus cloſe preſſed, and knowing not how elſe to extricate himſelf, he conſented to what was propoſed; and ſo immediately, before he ſtirred, a great part of the commiſſions of his officers were changed; and Sir Edward Harley, amongſt the reſt, who was a member of the council, and there preſent, was made governor of Dunkirk in the room of Sir William Lockhart, and was ſent away immediately to take poſſeſſion of it. By which means the army ceaſed to be at Monk's devotion, and was put into hands that would not ſerve him in the deſign he had undertaken. The French ambaſſador, who had the night before ſent away an expreſs to Mazarine, poſitively to aſſure him that things went here as he deſired, and that Monk was fixed by him in his reſolution to take on himſelf the government, was not a little aſtoniſhed the next day to find things taking another turn; and indeed this ſo much diſgraced him in the French court, that he was preſently called home, and ſoon after broke his heart.

THIS was that which gave the great turn to the reſtoration of king Charles II, whereof Sir A. had laid the plan in his head a long time before, and carried it on, ***************************************

Quantus hîc ſitus eſt ex titulis, quod rarò, diſcas.
Baro ASHLEY de Winborne St. Giles,
Deinde Comes Shafteſburienſis,
Cancellarius Scaccarij, Ærarij Triumvir,
Magnus Angliæ Cancellarius,
CAROLO Secundo à Sanctioribus & Secretioribus Conciliis, &c.
Hæc non Sepulchri ornamenta, ſed Viri.
Quippe quæ nec Majoribus debuit nec favori.
Comitate, acumine, ſuadelâ, conſilio, animo, conſtantia, fide,
Vix Parem alibi invenias, Superiorem certè nullibi.
Libertatis Civilis, Eccleſiaſticæ,
Propugnator ſtrenuus, indefeſſus.
Vitæ publicis commodis impenſæ memoriam & laudes,
Stante libertate, nunquam obliterabit
Tempus edax, nec edacior Invidia.
Servo pecori inutilia, inviſa magna exempla.

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THREE LETTERS writ by the E. of SHAFTESBURY whilſt Priſoner in the Tower; one to King Charles II, another to the D. of York, a third to a Noble Lord: found with Mr. LOCKE's MEMOIRS relating to the Life of Anthony, Firſt Earl of Shafteſbury.

To King CHARLES II.

SIR,

THE Almighty God, the king of kings, permitted Job to diſpute with him, and to order his cauſe before him; give me leave therefore, Great Sir, to lay my caſe before your majeſty, and to plead not only my innocence but my merits towards your majeſty; for "my integrity "will I hold faſt, and will not let it go; my heart ſhall not reproach me "ſo long as I live."

I HAD the honour to have a principal hand in your reſtoration; neither did I act in it, but on a principle of piety and honour: I never betrayed (as your majeſty knows) the party or councils I was of. I kept no correſpondence with, nor I made no ſecret addreſſes to your majeſty; neither did I endeavour or obtain any private terms or articles for myſelf, or reward for what I had or ſhould do. In whatever I did toward the ſervice of your majeſty, I was ſolely acted by the ſenſe of that duty I owed to God, the Engliſh nation, and your majeſty's juſt right and title. I ſaw the hand of Providence that had led us through various forms of government, and had given power into the hands of ſeveral ſorts of men, but he had given none of them a heart to uſe it as they ſhould; they all fell to the prey, ſought not the good or ſettlement of the nation, endeavoured only the enlargement and continuance of their own authority, and graſped at thoſe very powers they had complained of ſo much, and for which ſo bloody and ſo fatal a war had been raiſed and continued in the bowels of the nation. I obſerved the leaders of the great parties of religion, both laity and clergy, ready and forward to deliver up the rights and liberties of the people, and to introduce an abſolute dominion; ſo that tyranny might be eſtabliſhed in the hands of thoſe that favoured their way, and with whom they might have hopes to divide the preſent ſpoil, having no eye to poſterity, or thought of future things. One of the laſt ſcenes of this confuſion was general Lambert's ſeizing of the government in a morning by force of arms, turning out the parliament and their council of ſtate, and in their room erecting a Committee of Safety. The news of this gives a great ſurprize to general Monk, who commanded the army in Scotland.*******

To the D. of York.

SIR,

I Humbly confeſs I never thought my perſon or my principles acceptable to your royal highneſs; but at that juncture of time and occaſion when I was committed, I had no reaſon to expect you ſhould be my ſevere enemy. Reputation is the greateſt concern of great dealers in the world; great princes are the greateſt dealers; no reputation more their intereſt than to be thought merciful, relievers of the diſtreſſed, and maintainers of the ancient laws and rights of their country. This I ever wiſh may attend your royal highneſs, and that I may be one inſtance of it.

To the Lord ——

My Lord,

I Had prepared this for your meeting in December; but that being adjourned to the 3d of April, an age to an old infirm man, eſpecially ſhut up in a winter's priſon; forgive me if I ſay you owe yourſelf and your poſterity, as well as me, the endeavouring to remove ſo ſevere a precedent on one of your members; ſuch as I may truly ſay is the firſt of the kind, and I pray heartily may be the laſt. Your interceſſion to his majeſty, if it be general, is not like to be refuſed; if you are ſingle, yet you have done honourably, and what I ſhould have done for you.

Eſther, c. iv. v. 13, 14.

A NEW

METHOD

OF A

COMMON-PLACE-BOOK.

Tranſlated out of the FRENCH from the ſecond Volume of the Bibliotheque Univerſelle.

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	o		o
	u		u
B	a	G	a
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C	a	H	a 16. 20.
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EPISTOLA.] A letter from 2. Mr. Locke to Mr. Toignard, containing a new and eaſy method of a common-place-book, to which an index of two pages is ſufficient.

AT length, ſir, in obedience to you, I publiſh my "method "of a common-place-book." I am aſhamed that I deferred ſo long complying with your requeſt; but I eſteemed it ſo mean a thing, as not to deſerve publiſhing, in an age ſo full of uſeful inventions, as ours is. You may remember, that I freely communicated it to you, and ſeveral others, to whom I imagined it would not be unacceptable: ſo that it was not to reſerve the ſole uſe of it to myſelf, that I declined publiſhing it. But the regard I had to the publick diſcouraged me from preſenting it with ſuch a trifle. Yet my obligations to you, and the friendſhip between us, compel me now to follow your advice. Your laſt letter has perfectly determined me to it, and I am convinced that I ought not to delay publiſhing it, when you tell me, that an experience of ſeveral years has ſhewed 3. its uſefulneſs, and ſeveral of your friends, to whom you have communicated it. There is no need I ſhould tell you, how uſeful it has been to me, after five and twenty years experience, as I told you, eight years ſince, when I had the honour to wait on you at Paris, and when I might have been inſtructed, by your learned and agreeable diſcourſe. What I aim at now, by this letter, is to teſtify publickly the eſteem and reſpect I have for you, and to convince you how much I am, ſir, your, &c.

BEFORE I enter on my ſubject, it is fit to acquaint the reader, that this tract is diſpoſed in the ſame manner that the common-place-book ought to be diſpoſed. It will be underſtood by reading what follows, what is the meaning of the Latin titles on the top of the backſide of each leaf, and at the bottom of this page.

EBIONITÆ.] In eorum evangelio, quod ſecundum Hebræos dicebatur, hiſtoria quæ habetur Matth. xix. 16. et alia quædam, erat interpolata in hunc modum: "Dixit ad eum alter divitum, ma- "giſter, quid bonum faciens vi- "vam? Dixit ei Dominus, le- "gem & prophetas, fac. Re- "ſpondit ad eum, feci. Dixit ei:

 "vade,

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.]

4. I take a paper book of what ſize I pleaſe. I divide the two firſt pages that face one another by parallel lines into five and twenty equal parts, every fifth line black, the other red. I then cut them perpendicularly by other lines that I draw from the top to the bottom of the page, as you may ſee in the table prefixed. I put about the middle of each five ſpaces one of the twenty letters I deſign to make uſe of, and, a little forward in each ſpace, the five vowels, one below another, in their natural order. This is the index to the whole volume, how big ſoever it may be.

THE index being made after this manner, I leave a margin, in all the other pages of the book, of about the largeneſs of an inch, in a volume in folio, or a little larger; and, in a leſs volume, ſmaller in proportion.

IF I would put any thing in my Common-Place-Book, I find out a head to which I may refer it. Each head ought to be ſome important and eſſential word to the matter in hand, and

5. and in that word regard is to be had to the firſt letter, and the vowel that follows it; for upon theſe two letters depends all the uſe of the index.

I omit three letters of the alphabet as of no uſe to me, viz. K. Y. W. which are ſupplied by C. I. U. that are equivalent to them. I put the letter Q. that is always followed with an U. in the fifth ſpace of Z. By throwing Q. laſt in my index, I preſerve the regularity of my index, and diminiſh not in the leaſt its extent; for it ſeldom happens that there is any head begins with Z. U. I have found none in the five and twenty years I have uſed this method. If nevertheleſs it be neceſſary, nothing hinders but that one may make a reference after Q. U. provided it be done with any kind of diſtinction; but for more exactneſs a place may be aſſigned for Q. U. below the index, as I have formerly done. When I meet with any thing, that I think fit to put into my Common-place-book, I firſt find a proper head. Suppoſe, for example, that the head be EPISTOLA, I look unto the index for the

V. firſt

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.]

V. first letter and the following
6. vowel, which in this inſtance are E. I. if in the ſpace marked E. I. there is any number that directs me to the page deſigned for words that begin with an E. and whoſe firſt vowel, after the initial letter, is I; I muſt then write under the word Epiſtola, in that page, what I have to remark. I write the head in large letters, and begin a little way out into the margin, and I continue on the line, in writing what I have to ſay. I obſerve conſtantly this rule, that only the head appears in the margin, and that it be continued on, without ever doubling the line in the margin, by which means the heads will be obvious at firſt ſight.

IF I find no number in the index, in the ſpace E. I. I look into my book for the firſt back-ſide of a leaf that is not written in, which, in a book where there is yet nothing but the index, muſt be p. 2. I write then, in my index after E. I. the number 2. and the head Epiſtola at the top of the margin of the ſecond page, and all that I put under that head, in the ſame page, as you ſee I have done in the ſecond page of this method. From that time the claſs E I. is wholly in poſſeſſion of the ſecond and third pages.

THEY

7. THEY are to be employed only on words that begin with an E, and whoſe neareſt vowel is an I, as Ebionitæ (ſee the bottom of the third page) Epiſcopus, Echinus, Edictum, Efficacia, &c. The reaſon, why I begin always at the top of the back-ſide of a leaf, and aſſign to one claſs two pages, that face one another, rather than an entire leaf, is, becauſe the heads of the claſs appear all at once, without the trouble of turning over a leaf.

EVERY time, that I would write a new head, I look firſt in my index for the characteriſtick letters of the words, and I ſee, by the number that follows, what the page is that is aſſigned to the claſs of that head. If there is no number, I muſt look for the firſt back-ſide of a page that is blank. I then ſet down the number in the index, and deſign that page, with that of the right ſide of the following leaf, to this new claſs. Let it be, for example, the word Adverſaria; if I ſee no number in the ſpace A. E. I ſeek for the firſt back-ſide of a leaf, which being at p. 4. I ſet down in the ſpace A. E. the number 4. and in the fourth page the head ADVERSARIA, with all that I write under it, as I have already informed you. From this time the fourth page

V. with

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.] V. with the fifth that follows is re-
8. ſerved for the claſs A. E. that is to ſay, for the heads that begin with an A, and whoſe next vowel is an E; as for inſtance, Aer, Aera, Ageſilaus, Acheron, &c.

WHEN the two pages deſigned for one claſs are full, I look forwards for the next back-ſide of a leaf, that is blank. If it be that which immediately follows, I write at the bottom of the margin, in the page that I have filled, the letter V, that is to ſay, Verte, turn over; as likewiſe the ſame at the top of the next page. If the pages, that immediately follow, are already filled by other claſſes, I write, at the bottom of the page laſt filled, V, and the number of the next empty back-ſide of a page. At the beginning of that page I write down the head, under which I go on, with what I had to put in my Common-Place-book, as if it had been in the ſame page. At the top of this new back-ſide of a leaf, I ſet down the number of the page I filled laſt. By theſe numbers which refer to one another, the firſt whereof is at the bottom of one page, and the ſecond is at the beginning of another, one joins matter that is ſeparated, as if there was nothing between them. For, by this reciprocal reference of numbers, one may turn, as one leaf, all thoſe that are between the two, even as if they
9. they were paſted together. You have an example of this in the third and fourteenth pages.

EVERY time I put a number at the bottom of a page, I put it alſo into the index; but when I put only an V, I make no addition in the index; the reaſon whereof is plain.

IF the head is a monoſyllable and begins with a vowel, that vowel is at the ſame time both the firſt letter of the word, and the characteriſtick vowel. Therefore I write the word Ars in A a and Os in O o.

YOU may ſee by what I have ſaid, that one is to begin to write each claſs of words, on the back-ſide of a page. It may happen, upon that account, that the back-ſide of all the pages may be full, and yet there may remain ſeveral pages, on the right hand, which are empty. Now if you have a mind to fill your book, you may aſſign theſe right ſides, which are wholly blank, to new claſſes.

IF any one imagines that theſe hundred claſſes are not ſufficient to comprehend all ſorts of ſubjects without confuſion, he may follow the ſame method, and yet augment the number to five hundred, in adding a vowel. But having experienced both the one and the other method, I prefer the firſt; and uſage will convince thoſe, who ſhall try it, how well it will ſerve the purpoſe aimed at; eſpecially if one has a book for each ſcience,

V. upon

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.]

V. upon which one makes collec-
10. tions, or at leaſt two for the two heads, to which one may refer all our knowledge, viz. moral philoſophy, and natural.

You may add a third, which may be called the knowledge of ſigns, which relates to the uſe of words, and is of much more extent than mere criticiſm.

As to the language, in which one ought to expreſs the heads, I eſteem the Latin tongue moſt commodious, provided the nominative caſe be always kept to, for fear leſt in words of two ſyllables, or in monoſyllables that begin with the vowel, the change, which happens in oblique caſes, ſhould occaſion confuſion. But it is not of much conſequence what language is made uſe of, provided there be no mixture in the heads, of different languages.

To take notice of a place in an author, from whom I quote ſomething, I make uſe of this method: before I write any thing, I put the name of the author in my common-place-book, and under that name the title of the treatiſe, the ſize of the volume, the time and place of its edition, and (what ought never to be omitted) the number of pages that the whole book contains. For example, I put into the claſs

11. claſs M. A. "Marſhami Ca-
"non Chronicus Ægyptiacus,
"Græcus, & diſquiſitiones fol."
London 1672. p. 626. This number of pages ſerves me for the future to mark the particular treatiſe of this author, and the edition I make uſe of. I have no need to mark the place, otherwiſe than in ſetting down the number of the page from whence I have drawn what I have wrote, juſt above the number of pages contained in the whole volume. You will ſee an example in Acheruſia, where the number 259 is juſt above the number 626, that is to ſay, the number of the page, where I take my matter, is juſt above the number of pages of the whole volume. By this means I not only ſave myſelf the trouble of writing Canon Chronicus Ægyptiacus, &c. but am able by the rule of three to find out the ſame paſſage in any other edition, by looking for the number of its pages; ſince the edition I have uſed, which contains 626, gives me 259. You will not indeed always light on the very page you want, becauſe of the breaches, that are made in different editions of books, and that are not always equal in proportion; but you are never very far from the place you want, and it is better to be able to find a paſſage, in turning over a few pages, than to be obliged to turn over a whole book to find

V. it,

ADVERSARIORUM METHODUS.] it,
V. as it happens, when the book
12. has no index, or when the index is not exact.

ACHERON.] "Pratum, ficta, mortu-
"orum habitatio, eſt locus pro-
"pe Memphin, juxta paludem,
"quam vocant Acheruſiam,&c."
This is a paſſage out of D. Siculus, the ſenſe whereof is this: the fields, where they feign that the dead inhabit, are only a place near Memphis, near a marſh called Acheruſia, about which is a moſt delightful country, where one may behold lakes and foreſts of Lotus and Calamus. It is with reaſon, that Orpheus ſaid, the dead inhabit theſe places, becauſe there the Egyptians celebrate the greateſt part, and the moſt auguſt, of their funeral ſolemnities. They carry the dead over the Nile, and through the marſh of Acheruſia, and there put them into ſubterraneous vaults. There are a great many other fables, among the Greeks, touching the ſtate of the dead, which very well agree with what is at this day practiſed in Egypt. For they call the boat, in which the dead are tranſported, Baris; and a certain piece of money is given to the ferry-man for a paſſage, who, in their language, is
V. called
13. called Charon. Near this place is a temple of Hecate in the ſhades, &c. and the gates of Cocytus and Lethe, ſhut up with bars of braſs. There are other gates, which are called the gates of truth, with the ſtatue of juſtice before them, which has no head. Marſham. $\frac{2}{6}\frac{5}{1}\frac{2}{6}^{0}$.

EBIONITÆ.] vade, vende omnia quæ
V.3. " possides, & divide pauperibus,
14. " & veni, sequere me. Cœpit
" autem dives scalpere caput
" suum, & non placuit ei. Et
" dixit ad eum Dominus: quo-
" modo dicis, legem feci &
" prophetas? cùm scriptum sit
" in lege, diliges proximum
" tuum sicut teipsum: & ecce
" multi fratres tui filii Abrahæ
" amicti sunt stercore, morien-
" tes præ fame, & domus tua
" plena est bonis multis, & non
" egreditur omnino aliquid ex
" eâ ad eos. Et conversus,
" dixit Simoni, discipulo suo,
" sedenti apud se: Simon, fili
" Johannæ, facilius est camelum
" intrare per foramen acûs,
" quam divitem in regnum
" cœlorum." Nimirum hæc ideo immutavit Ebion, quia Christum nec Dei filium, nec νομοθέτην, sed nudum interpretem legis per Mosem datæ agnoscebat.

IN the Gospel of the Ebionites, which they called the Gospel according to the Hebrews, the story, that is in the XIXth of St. Matth. and in the 16th and following verses, was changed after this manner: " One of
" the rich men said to him:
" Master, what shall I do that I
" may have life? Jesus said
" to him: Obey the law and
" the prophets. He answered,
" I have done so. Jesus said
" unto him, Go, sell what thou
" hast, divide it among the
" poor, and then come and fol-
" low me. Upon which the rich

15. " rich man began to scratch his
" head, and to dislike the ad-
" vice of Jesus: and the Lord
" said unto him, How can you
" say you have done as the law
" and the prophets direct you?
" since it is written in the law,
" Thou shalt love thy neighbour
" as thyself; and there are many
" of thy brethren, children of
" Abraham, who are almost
" naked, and who are ready to
" die with hunger, while thy
" house is full of good things,
" and yet thou givest them no
" help nor assistance. And
" turning himself towards Si-
" mon, his disciple, who sat
" near him: Simon, son of
" Johanna, said he, it is easier
" for a camel to go through
" the eye of a needle, than for
" a rich man to enter into the
" kingdom of heaven." Ebion changed this passage, because he did not believe Jesus Christ to be the son of God, nor a law-giver, but a mere interpreter of the law of Moses. Grotius $\frac{336}{1000}$.

HÆRETICI.] " Noſtrum igitur fuit
16. " eligere & optare meliora, ut
" ad veſtram correctionem audi-
" tum haberemus, non in con-
" tentione & æmulatione &
" perſecutionibus, ſed manſuetè
" conſolando, benevolè hortan-
" do, leniter diſputando, ſicut
" ſcriptum eſt, ſervum autem
" Domini not oportet litigare,
" ſed mitem eſſe ad omnes, doci-
" bilem, patientem, in modeſtia
" corripientem diverſa ſentien-
" tes. Noſtrum ergo fuit velle
" has partes expetere: Dei eſt
" volentibus & petentibus do-
" nare quod bonum eſt. Illi in
" vos ſæviant qui neſciunt cum
" quo labore verum inveniatur,
" & quam difficile caveantur er-
" rores. Illi in vos ſæviant, qui
" neſciunt quam rarum & ar-
" duum ſit carnalia phantaſmata
" piæ mentis ſerenitate ſuperare.
" Illi in vos ſæviant, qui ne-
" ſciunt cum quantâ difficul-
" tate ſanetur oculus interioris
" hominis, ut poſſit intueri ſo-
" lem ſuum; —— Illi in vos ſæ-
" viant, qui neſciunt quibus ſuſ-
" piriis & gemitibus fiat, ut ex
" quantulacunque parte poſſit
" intelligi Deus. Poſtremo, illi
" in vos ſæviant, qui nullo tali
" errore decepti ſunt, quali vos
" deceptos vident. In catholicâ
" enim eccleſiâ, ut omittam ſin-
" ceriſſimam ſapientiam, ad cu-
" jus cognitionem pauci ſpiritu-
" ales in hâc vitâ perveniunt,
" ut eam ex minimâ quidem
" parte, quia homines ſunt, ſed
" tamen ſine dubitatione, cog-
" noſcant: cæterum quippe tur-
" bam non intelligendi vivaci-
" tas, ſed credendi ſimplicitas
VOL. IV. " tutiſ-

17. " tutiſſimam facit." Auguſtinus, Tom. vi. col. 116. fol. Baſiliæ 1542, contra Epiſt. Manichæi, quam vocant fundamenti.

" We were of opinion, that
" other methods were to be
" made choice of, and that,
" to recover you from your
" errors, we ought not to per-
" ſecute you with injuries
" and invectives, or any ill
" treatment, but endeavour to
" procure your attention, by
" ſoft words and exhortations,
" which would ſhew the tender-
" neſs we have for you: accord-
" ing to that paſſage of holy
" writ, " the ſervant of the Lord
" ought not to love ſtrife and
" quarrels, but to be gentle,
" affable, and patient towards
" all mankind, and to reprove
" with modeſty thoſe who dif-
" fer from him in opinion."—
" Let them only treat you with
" rigour, who know not how
" difficult it is to find out the
" truth, and avoid error. Let
" thoſe treat you with rigour,
" who are ignorant how rare
" and painful a work it is calm-
" ly to diſſipate the carnal phan-
" toms, that diſturb even a pious
" mind. Let thoſe treat you
" with rigour, who are igno-
" rant of the extreme difficulty
" that there is to purify the
" eye of the inward man, to
" render him capable of ſee-
" ing the truth, which is the
" ſun, or light of the ſoul. Let
" thoſe treat you with rigour,
" who have never felt the
" ſighs and groans that
" a ſoul muſt have before

V. 20. " it

CONFESSIO FIDEI.] " Periculoſum
18. " nobis admodum atque etiam
" miſerabile eſt, tot nunc fi-
" des exiſtere, quot voluntates:
" & tot nobis doctrinas eſſe,
" quot mores: & tot cauſas blaſ-
" phemiarum pullulare, quot vi-
" tia ſunt: dum aut ita fides
" ſcribuntur, ut volumus, aut,
" ita ut volumus, intelligun-
" tur. Et cum ſecundum
" unum Deum & unum Do-
" minum, & unum baptiſma,
" etiam fides una ſit, excidimus
" ab eâ fide, quæ ſola eſt: &
" dum plures fiant, id eſſe cœ-
" perunt, ne ulla ſit; conſcii
" enim nobis invicem ſumus,
" poſt Nicæni conventûs ſyno-
" dum, nihil aliud quam fidem
" ſcribi. Dum in verbis pugna
" eſt, dum de novitatibus quæſ-
" tio eſt, dum de ambiguis oc-
" caſio eſt, dum de autoribus
" querela eſt, dum de ſtudiis
" certamen eſt, dum in conſen-
" ſu difficultas eſt, dum alter
" alteri anathema eſſe cœpit,
" prope jam nemo eſt Chriſti,
" &c. Jam vero proximi anni
" fides, quid jam de immuta-
" tione in ſe habet? Primum,
" quæ homouſion decernit ta-
" ceri: ſequens rurſum, quæ
" homouſion decernit & prædi-
" cat. Tertium deinceps, quæ
" uſiam ſimpliciter à patribus
" præſumptam, per indulgen-
" tiam excuſat. Poſtremum
" quartum, quæ non excuſat,
" ſed condemnat, &c. De ſimi-
" litudine autem filii Dei ad
" Deum patrem, quod miſerabi-
" lis noſtri temporis eſt fides, ne
" non ex toto, ſed tantum ex
7 " por-

19. " portione ſit ſimilis? Egregii
" ſcilicet arbitri cœleſtium ſa-
" cramentorum conquiſitores,
" inviſibilium myſteriorum pro-
" feſſionibus de fide Dei calum-
" niamur, annuas atque menſ-
" truas de Deo fides decernimus,
" decretis pœnitemus, pœniten-
" tes defendimus, defenſos ana-
" thematizamus, aut in noſtri
" aliena aut in alienis noſtra dam-
" namus; & mordentes invicem,
" jam abſumpti ſumus invicem."
Hilarius, p. 211. in lib. ad Conſtantium Auguſtum. Baſil. 1550, fol.

" It is a thing equally deplo-
" rable and dangerous, that there
" are at preſent as many creeds
" as there are opinions among
" men, as many doctrines as in-
" clinations; and as many ſour-
" ces of blaſphemy, as there are
" faults among us; becauſe we
" make creeds arbitrarily, and
" explain them as arbitrarily.
" And as there is but one faith;
" ſo there is but one only God,
" one Lord, and one baptiſm.
" We renounce this one faith,
" when we make ſo many diffe-
" rent creeds; and that diverſity
" is the reaſon why we have
" no true faith among us. We
" cannot be ignorant that,
" ſince the council of Nice,
" we have done nothing but
" made creeds. And while we
" fight againſt words, litigate
" about new queſtions, diſpute
" about equivocal terms, com-
" plain of authors, that every one
" may make his own party tri-
" umph; while we cannot agree,
V. 24. " while

HÆRETICI.] " it can obtain any
V. 17." knowledge of the divine Be-
20." ing. To conclude, let thoſe
" treat you with rigour who
" never have been ſeduced into
" errors, near a-kin to thoſe
" you are engaged in. I paſs
" over in ſilence that pure wiſ-
" dom, which but a few ſpiri-
" tual men attain to in this life;
" ſo that tho' they know but in
" part, becauſe they are men; yet
" nevertheleſs they know what
" they do know with certainty:
" for, in the catholick church,
" it is not penetration of mind,
" nor profound knowledge, but
" ſimplicity of faith, which puts
" men in a ſtate of ſafety.
" Barbari quippe homines Ro-
" manæ, imo potius humanæ
" eruditionis expertes, qui nihil
" omnino ſciunt, niſi quod à
" doctoribus ſuis audiunt: quod
" audiunt hoc ſequuntur, ac ſic
" neceſſe eſt eos qui totius litera-
" turæ ac ſcientiæ ignari, ſacra-
" mentum divinæ legis doctrina,
" magis quam lectione, cognoſ-
" cunt, doctrinam potius retine-
" re, quam legem. Itaque eis tra-
" ditio magiſtrorum ſuorum &
" doctrina inveterata, quaſi lex
" eſt, qui hoc ſciunt, quod do-
" centur. Hæretici ergo ſunt,
" ſed non ſcientes. Denique
" apud nos ſunt hæretici, apud
" ſe non ſunt. Nam in tantum
" ſe catholicos eſſe judicant, ut
" nos ipſos titulo hæreticæ ap-
" pellationis infament. Quod
" ergo illi nobis ſunt & hoc nos
" illis. Nos eos injuriam divinæ
" generationi facere certi ſumus,
" quod
21. " quod minorem patre filium
" dicant. Illi nos injurioſos pa-
" tri exiſtimant, quia æquales
" eſſe credamus veritas apud nos
" eſt; ſed illi apud ſe eſſe præ-
" ſumunt. Honor Dei apud
" nos eſt: ſed illi hoc arbi-
" trantur, honorem divinitatis
" eſſe quod credunt. Inofficioſi
" ſunt, ſed illis hoc eſt ſum-
" mum religionis officium. Im-
" pii ſunt, ſed hoc putant eſſe
" veram pietatem. Errant er-
" go, ſed bono animo errant,
" non odio ſed affectu Dei, ho-
" norare ſe dominum atque a-
" mare credentes. Quamvis non
" habeant rectam fidem, illi ta-
" men hoc perfectam Dei æſti-
" mant caritatem. Qualiter pro
" hoc ipſo falſæ opinionis errore
" in die judicii puniendi ſunt,
" nullus ſcire poteſt niſi judex.
" Interim idcirco eis, ut reor,
" patientiam Deus commodat,
" quia videt eos, etſi non rectè
" credere, affectu tamen piæ opi-
" nionis errare. Salvinus. $\frac{162}{339}$.

THIS biſhop ſpeaks here of the Arian Goths and Vandals: "They
" are, ſays he, Barbarians, who
" have no tincture of the Ro-
" man politeneſs, and who are
" ignorant of what is very com-
" monly known among other
" men, and only know what their
" doctors have taught them,
" and follow what they have
" heard them ſay. Men ſo ig-
" norant as theſe find themſelves
" under a neceſſity of learning the
" myſteries of the Goſpel, rather
" by the inſtructions that are
" given them, than by books."

V. " THE

HÆRETICI.] "THE tradition of
22. "their doctors and the received
"doctrines are the only rule they
"follow, becauſe they know
"nothing but what they have
"taught them. They are then
"hereticks, but they know it
"not. They are ſo in our ac-
"count, but they believe it not;
"and think themſelves ſo good
"catholicks, that they treat us
"as hereticks, judging of us as
"we do of them. We are
"perſuaded that they believe
"amiſs concerning the divine
"generation, when they main-
"tain the ſon is inferior to the
"Father; and they imagine that
"we rob the Father of his glo-
"ry who believe them both to
"be equal. We have the truth
"on our ſide, and they pretend
"it is on theirs. We give to
"God his due honour, and they
"think they honour him better.
"They fail in their duty, but
"they imagine they perform
"perfectly well; and they make
"true piety to conſiſt in what
"we call impious. They are
"in a miſtake, but with a great
"deal of ſincerity; and it is ſo
"far from being an effect of
"their hatred, that it is a mark
"of their love of God, ſince,
"by what they do, they ima-
"gine they ſhew the greateſt
"reſpect for the Lord, and zeal
"for his glory. Therefore,
"though they have not true
23. "faith, they nevertheleſs look
"upon that which they have
"as a perfect love of God. It
"belongs only to the judge of
"the univerſe to know how
"theſe men will be puniſhed
"for their errors at the laſt
"day. Yet I believe God will
"ſhew compaſſion towards
"them, becauſe he ſees their
"heart is more right than their
"belief, and that, if they are
"miſtaken, it is their piety
"made them err.

CONFESSIO FIDEI.] "while we ana-
V.19. "thematiſe one another, there
24. "is hardly one that adheres to
"Jeſus Chriſt. What change
"was there not in the creed laſt
"year! The firſt council or-
"dained a ſilence upon the ho-
"mouſion; the ſecond eſtabliſh-
"ed it, and would have us ſpeak;
"the third excuſes the fathers
"of the council, and pretends
"they took the word ouſia
"ſimply; the fourth condemns
"them, inſtead of excuſing
"them. With reſpect to the
"likeneſs of the Son of God to
"the Father, which is the faith
"of our deplorable times,
"they diſpute whether he is
"like in whole, or in part.
"Theſe are rare folks to un-
"ravel the ſecrets of heaven.
"Nevertheleſs it is for theſe
"creeds, about inviſible myſte-
"ries, that we calumniate one
"another, and for our belief in
"God. We make creeds
"every year, nay every moon
"we repent of what we have
"done, we defend thoſe that
"repent, we anathematiſe thoſe
"we defended. So we con-
"demn either the doctrine of
"others in ourſelves, or our
"own in that of others, and,
"reciprocally tearing one an-
"other to pieces, we have been
"the cauſe of each other's ruin.

The END of the COMMON-PLACE-BOOK.

HÆRETICI.] " THE tradition of
22. " their doctors and the received
" doctrines are the only rule they
" follow, becauſe they know
" nothing but what they have
" taught them. They are then
" hereticks, but they know it
" not. They are ſo in our ac-
" count, but they believe it not;
" and think themſelves ſo good
" catholicks, that they treat us
" as hereticks, judging of us as
" we do of them. We are
" perſuaded that they believe
" amiſs concerning the divine
" generation, when they main-
" tain the ſon is inferior to the
" Father; and they imagine that
" we rob the Father of his glo-
" ry who believe them both to
" be equal. We have the truth
" on our ſide, and they pretend
" it is on theirs. We give to
" God his due honour, and they
" think they honour him better.
" They fail in their duty, but
" they imagine they perform
" perfectly well; and they make
" true piety to conſiſt in what
" we call impious. They are
" in a miſtake, but with a great
" deal of ſincerity; and it is ſo
" far from being an effect of
" their hatred, that it is a mark
" of their love of God, ſince,
" by what they do, they ima-
" gine they ſhew the greateſt
" reſpect for the Lord, and zeal
" for his glory. Therefore,
" though they have not true
23. " faith, they nevertheleſs look
" upon that which they have
" as a perfect love of God. It
" belongs only to the judge of
" the univerſe to know how
" theſe men will be puniſhed
" for their errors at the laſt
" day. Yet I believe God will
" ſhew compaſſion towards
" them, becauſe he ſees their
" heart is more right than their
" belief, and that, if they are
" miſtaken, it is their piety
" made them err.

CONFESSIO FIDEI.] "while we ana-
V.19. "thematiſe one another, there
24. "is hardly one that adheres to
"Jeſus Chriſt. What change
"was there not in the creed laſt
"year! The firſt council or-
"dained a ſilence upon the ho-
"mouſion; the ſecond eſtabliſh-
"ed it, and would have us ſpeak;
"the third excuſes the fathers
"of the council, and pretends
"they took the word ouſia
"ſimply; the fourth condemns
"them, inſtead of excuſing
"them. With reſpect to the
"likeneſs of the Son of God to
"the Father, which is the faith
"of our deplorable times,
"they diſpute whether he is
"like in whole, or in part.
"Theſe are rare folks to un-
"ravel the ſecrets of heaven.
"Nevertheleſs it is for theſe
"creeds, about inviſible myſte-
"ries, that we calumniate one
"another, and for our belief in
"God. We make creeds
"every year, nay every moon
"we repent of what we have
"done, we defend thoſe that
"repent, we anathematiſe thoſe
"we defended. So we con-
"demn either the doctrine of
"others in ourſelves, or our
"own in that of others, and,
"reciprocally tearing one an-
"other to pieces, we have been
"the cauſe of each other's ruin.

The END of the COMMON-PLACE-BOOK.

SOME

FAMILIAR LETTERS

BETWEEN

Mr. LOCKE,

AND

SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS.

TO THE

READER.

THE following letters, offered to your peruſal, are the genuine productions of thoſe gentlemen, to whom they are attributed.

THEY contain not only ſuch civil and polite converſation, as friendſhip produces among men of parts, learning, and candor; but ſeveral matters relating to literature, and more particularly to Mr. Locke's notions, in his "Eſſay concerning "human underſtanding," and in ſome of his other works: and therefore I cannot doubt of your thanks for the preſent I make you. For, though the curioſity of ſome, to ſee whatever drops from the pens of great men, and to inform themſelves in their private characters, their tempers, diſpoſitions, and manner of converſing with their friends, would perhaps have juſtified me, in publiſhing any letters of Mr. Locke's, and of his friends to him, that were not letters of mere buſineſs; yet my regard to what I take to be the more general judgment of the publick, has determined me to publiſh ſuch only, as have relation to this twofold view, and ſhall determine me hereafter, if gentlemen, that have any letters of Mr. Locke's by them, think fit to communicate them to me.

K E A D E R'

FAMILIAR LETTERS, &c.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, July 16, 1692.

THOUGH the extraordinary compliment you were pleaſed to make me, in the epiſtle dedicatory *, eaſily perſuaded me, from whom that preſent was likely to come; when, at my coming to town, I found your book left for me, by Mr. Tooke, at my bookſeller's; yet my conſciouſneſs, how little I could deſerve the one, or the other, from you, made me fear ſome miſtake, till enquiring of Mr. Tooke himſelf, he aſſured me of the favour you had done me. I will not pretend to return you ſuch thanks as I ought, till I can write ſuch a book as your's is. Only give me leave to ſay, that if my trifle could poſſibly be an occaſion of vanity to me, you have done moſt to make it ſo, ſince I could ſcarce forbear to applaud myſelf, upon ſuch a teſtimony from one who ſo well underſtands demonſtration, did I not ſee that thoſe, who can be extreme rigorous and exact in the ſearch of truth, can be as civil and as complaiſant in their dealing with thoſe whom they take to be lovers of it. But this cannot keep me from being out of countenance at the receipt of ſuch obligations, without the hopes of making ſuch returns as I ought. Inſtead of that, give me leave to do what is next to it, and let you ſee that I am not ſorry I am obliged to you. The bearer hereof, Dr. Sibelius, is a friend of mine, who comes to Dublin with a deſign to ſettle there, and I beg your aſſiſtance of him, in what lies in your way. I ſhall take it as a favour done to me. And methinks I have reaſon now to expect it of you, ſince you have done me, more than once, very great ones, when I had no reaſon to expect any at all. Sir, you have made great advances of friendſhip towards me, and you ſee they are not loſt upon me. I am very ſenſible of them, and would make ſuch an uſe of them as might

* Before A Treatiſe of Dioptricks, printed at London 1692, wherein it is ſaid, "that to none do "we owe, for a greater advancement in this part of philoſophy, (viz. logick) than to the incomparable "Mr. Locke, who, in his Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, hath rectified more received miſtakes, and "delivered more profound truths, eſtabliſhed on experience and obſervation, for the direction of man's "mind in the proſecution of knowledge, (which I think may be properly termed logick) than are to "be met with in all the volumes of the ancients. He has clearly overthrown all thoſe metaphyſical "whimſies, which infected men's brains with a ſpice of madneſs, whereby they feigned a knowledge "where they had none, by making a noiſe with ſounds, without clear and diſtinct ſignifications."

aſſure you I ſhould take it for a new favour, if you would afford me an occaſion wherein I might, by any ſervice, tell you how much I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt obliged ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

I HAD the honour to know one of your name at Leyden about ſeven or eight years ſince. If he be any relation of your's, and now in Dublin, I beg the favour of you to preſent my humble ſervice to him.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR,

UPON the arrival of our lord lieutenant in this place (which was on the 25th inſtant) I had the favour of a letter from you, by the hands of Dr. Sibelius. I cannot eaſily tell you how grateful it was to me, having the higheſt eſteem for him that ſent it, from the firſt moment that I was ſo happy as to ſee any of his writings; and therefore it was, that I was ſo ambitious of making a friendſhip with you, by preſenting you one of my trifles, which I ordered my bookſeller to lay before you, under this character, "as a mean teſtimony of the great reſpect I had for the author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding." And ſince I find, by your's to me, that my ambition is not fallen ſhort of its deſign; but that you are pleaſed to encourage me, by aſſuring me that I have made great advances of friendſhip towards you; give me leave to embrace the favour with all joy imaginable. And that you may judge of ſincerity by my open heart, I will plainly confeſs to you, that I have not in my life read any book with more ſatisfaction than your eſſay; inſomuch, that a repeated peruſal of it is ſtill more pleaſant to me.

AND I have endeavoured, with great ſucceſs, to recommend it to the conſideration of the ingenious, in this place. Dr. King, biſhop of Derry, when he read it, made ſome ſlight remarks on the foremoſt parts of the book; but his buſineſs would not permit him to go through it all. What he did, rough as it was, he gave to me, and they are at your commands, when you pleaſe.

ONE thing I muſt needs inſiſt on to you, which is, that you would think of obliging the world with "A Treatiſe of Morals," drawn up according to the hints you frequently give in your eſſay, of being demonſtrable, according to the mathematical method. This is moſt certainly true. But then the taſk muſt be undertaken, only by ſo clear and diſtinct a thinker as you are. This were an attempt worthy your conſideration. And there is nothing I ſhould more ardently wiſh for than to ſee it. And therefore, good Sir, let me beg of you to turn your thoughts this way; and if ſo young a friendſhip as mine have any force, let me prevail upon you.

UPON

UPON my reading your eſſay, I was ſo taken with it, that when I was in London, in Auguſt 1690, I made enquiry amongſt ſome of my learned friends, for any other of your writings, if perhaps they knew any: I was recommended, by ſome, to "Two Diſcourſes concerning Government," and a little "Treatiſe concerning Toleration." There is neither of them carries your name; and I will not venture to aſk you, whether they are your's or not? This only I think, no name need be aſhamed of either.

DR. SIBELIUS, I find, is your friend, and therefore I aſſure him of all ſervice I can poſſibly do him. I will make it my buſineſs to get him acquaintance in this place; and I dare promiſe him ſome of the beſt.

THE incloſed from my brother will tell you that he was your acquaintance in Leyden. I myſelf have been there, anno 1685, but had not the good fortune of being kown to you. But from this time I ſhall reckon myſelf happy in your friendſhip, and ſhall ever ſubſcribe myſelf

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, Sept. 20, 1692.

THERE being nothing, that I think of ſo much value, as the acquaintance and friendſhip of knowing and worthy men, you may eaſily gueſs how much I find myſelf obliged, I will not ſay by the offer, but by the gift you have made me, of your's. That which confirms me in the aſſurance of it, is the little pretence I have to it. For, knowing myſelf, as I do, I cannot think ſo vainly of myſelf, as to imagine that you ſhould make ſuch overtures and expreſſions of kindneſs to me, for any other end, but merely as the pledges and exerciſe of it. I return you therefore my thanks, as for the greateſt and moſt acceptable preſent you could have made me; and deſire you to believe, that ſince I cannot hope that the returns, which I made you of mine, ſhould be of any great uſe to you, I ſhall endeavour to make it up, as well as I can, with an high eſteem, and perfect ſincerity. You muſt, therefore, expect to have me live with you hereafter, with all the liberty and aſſurance of a ſettled friendſhip. For meeting with but few men in the world, whoſe acquaintance I find much reaſon to covet, I make more than ordinary haſte into the familiarity of a rational enquirer after, and lover of truth, whenever I can light on any ſuch. There are beauties of the mind, as well as of the body, that take and prevail at firſt ſight: and wherever I have met with this, I have readily ſurrendered myſelf, and have never yet been deceived in my expectation. Wonder not therefore, if, having been thus wrought on, I begin to converſe with you, with as much freedom, as if we had begun our acquaintance when you were in Holland; and deſire your advice and aſſiſtance about a ſecond edition of my Eſſay, the former being now diſperſed. You have, I perceive, read it over ſo

carefully, more than once, that I know no-body I can more reaſonably conſult, about the miſtakes and defects of it. And I expect a great deal more, from any objections you ſhall make, who comprehend the whole deſign and compaſs of it, than from one who has read but a part of it, or meaſures it, upon a ſlight reading, by his own prejudices. You will find, by my epiſtle to the reader, that I was not inſenſible of the fault I committed, by being too long upon ſome points; and the repetitions, that by my way of writing of it, had got in, I let it paſs with, but not without advice ſo to do. But now, that my notions are got into the world, and have in ſome meaſure buſtled through the oppoſition and difficulty they were like to meet with from the received opinion, and that prepoſſeſſion, which might hinder them from being underſtood upon a ſhort propoſal; I aſk you, whether it would not be better now to pare off, in a ſecond edition, a great part of that, which cannot but appear ſuperfluous to an intelligent and attentive reader? If you are of that mind, I ſhall beg the favour of you to mark to me theſe paſſages, which you would think fitteſt to be left out. If there be any thing, wherein you think me miſtaken, I beg you to deal freely with me, that either I may clear it up to you, or reform it in the next edition. For I flatter myſelf that I am ſo ſincere a lover of truth, that it is very indifferent to me, ſo I am poſſeſſed of it, whether it be by my own, or any other's diſcovery. For I count any parcel of this gold not the leſs to be valued, nor not the leſs enriching, becauſe I wrought it not out of the mine myſelf. I think every one ought to contribute to the common ſtock, and to have no other ſcruple, or ſhyneſs, about the receiving of truth, but that he be not impoſed on, and take counterfeit, and what will not bear the touch, for genuine and real truth. I doubt not but, to one of your largeneſs of thought, that, in the reading of my book, you miſs ſeveral things, that perhaps belong to my ſubject, and you would think belongs to the ſyſtem: If, in this part too, you will communicate your thoughts, you will do me a favour. For though I will not ſo far flatter myſelf, as to undertake to fill up the gaps, which you may obſerve in it; yet it may be of uſe, where mine is at a ſtand, to ſuggeſt to others matter of farther contemplation. This I often find, that what men by thinking have made clear to themſelves, they are apt to think, that upon the firſt ſuggeſtion it ſhould be ſo to others, and ſo let it go, not ſufficiently explained; not conſidering what may be very clear to themſelves, may be very obſcure to others. Your penetration and quickneſs hinders me from expecting from you many complaints of this kind. But, if you have met with any thing, in your reading of my book, which at firſt ſight you ſtuck at, I ſhall think it a ſufficient reaſon, in the next edition, to amend it, for the benefit of meaner readers.

THE remarks of that learned gentleman you mention, which you ſay you have in your hands, I ſhall receive as a favour from you.

THOUGH by the view I had of moral ideas, whilſt I was conſidering that ſubject, I thought I ſaw that morality might be demonſtratively made

made out; yet whether I am able ſo to make it out, is another queſtion. Every one could not have demonſtrated what Mr. Newton's book hath ſhewn to be demonſtrable; but to ſhew my readineſs to obey your commands, I ſhall not decline the firſt leiſure I can get, to employ ſome thoughts that way; unleſs I find what I have ſaid in my Eſſay ſhall have ſtirred up ſome abler man to prevent me, and effectually do that ſervice to the world.

WE had here, the 8th inſtant, a very ſenſible earthquake, there being ſcarce an houſe, wherein it was not by ſome body or other felt. We have news of it at ſeveral places, from Cologn as far as Briſtol. Whether it reached you I have not heard. If it did, I would be glad to know, what was the exact time it was felt, if any body obſerved it. By the queen's pendulum at Kenſington, which the ſhake ſtopped from going, it was 2 h. poſt m. At Whitehall, where I obſerved it, it was by my watch 2 h. 5 m. poſt m. Which, ſuppoſing the queen's pendulum went exact, and adding the æquation of that day, will fall near the time marked by my watch, or a little later. If there could be found people, that in the whole extent of it, did by well-adjuſted clocks exactly obſerve the time, one might ſee whether it were all one ſhock, or proceeded gradually from one place to another.

I THANK you for having taken Dr. Sibelius into your protection. I deſire you, with my ſervice, to preſent my moſt humble thanks to your brother, for the favour of his letter; to which, though I have not time this poſt to return an anſwer, I ſhall not long delay my acknowledgments.

I HOPE you will ſee, by the freedom I have here taken with you, that I begin to reckon myſelf amongſt your acquaintance. Uſe me ſo, I beſeech you. If there be any ſervice I can do you here, employ me, with an aſſurance that I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Oct. 15,—92.

I Do moſt heartily beg your pardon for my long ſilence to yours of the 20th laſt. Our then approaching parliament was the occaſion of my not returning you an immediate anſwer; and I expected withal to give you a more large account of ſome things, you deſire from me. But, ſeeing no immediate hopes of leiſure, by reaſon of our parliamentary buſineſs, I venture at preſent to ſend you only the incloſed rough papers. And till I can have an opportunity myſelf of reviſing your book, have put it into the hands of a very ingenious and learned perſon, who promiſes me to give his obſervations in writing; which, as ſoon as obtained, I

ſhall tranſmit to you.—The earthquake was not at all felt here.—I am wonderfully pleaſed that you give me hopes of ſeeing a moral Eſſay from your hand; which I aſſure you, ſir, with all ſincerity, is highly reſpected by

Your moſt humble ſervant,
WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 22, 1692.

I Now ſit down to anſwer your's of September 20, concerning the ſecond edition of your book, wherein you deſire my opinion and advice. And, after ſo long conſideration of the matter, as between that and this; and conſulting ſome ingenious heads here about it, I can ſay but little; only that the ſame judicious hand, that firſt formed it, is beſt able to reform it, where he ſees convenient. I never quarrelled with a book for being too prolix, eſpecially where the prolixity is pleaſant, and tends to the illuſtration of the matter in hand, as I am ſure your's always does. And, after I received your letter on this ſubject, I communicated the contents thereof to two very ingenious perſons here; and, at the ſame time, I lent them your book, deſiring them to examine it ſtrictly; and to find out, and note, whatever might be changed, added, or ſubſtracted. And after a diligent peruſal, they agreed with me in the ſame concluſion, viz. That the work, in all its parts, was ſo wonderfully curious and inſtructive, that they would not venture to alter any thing in it. But however, that I may in ſome meaſure anſwer your expectations, I ſhall briefly note to you, what I conceive on this ſubject.

AND, 1ſt, the errata typographica (beſides thoſe mentioned in the table) are many and great; theſe therefore, in your next edition, are diligently to be corrected.

2dly, pag. 270. IT is aſſerted, "that, without a particular revelation, "we cannot be certain, that matter cannot think, or that omnipotency "may not endow matter with a power of thinking."

And pag. 314, 315. "the immateriality of God is evinced from the "abſolute impoſſibility of matter's thinking." Theſe two places, I know, have been ſtumbled at by ſome, as not conſiſtent. To me indeed they appear, and are, very agreeable; and I have clearly evinced their conſiſtency to thoſe that have ſcrupled them. But I thought fit to give you this hint, that in your next edition you may prevent any ſuch doubt. My ſenſe of theſe two places is this. In the firſt it is ſaid, "that we "cannot tell (without a particular revelation to the contrary) but an al-"mighty God can make matter think." In the other it is aſſerted, "that unthinking matter cannot be this almighty God." The next place I take notice of, as requiring ſome farther explication, is your diſcourſe

courſe about man's liberty and neceſſity. This thread ſeems ſo wonderfully fine ſpun in your book, that, at laſt, the great queſtion of liberty and neceſſity ſeems to vaniſh. And herein you ſeem to make all ſins to proceed from our underſtandings, or to be againſt conſcience, and not at all from the depravity of our wills. Now it ſeems harſh to you, that a man will be damned, becauſe he underſtands no better than he does. What you ſay concerning genera and ſpecies is unqueſtionably true; and yet it ſeems hard to aſſert, that there is no ſuch ſort of creatures in nature, as birds: for though we may be ignorant of the particular eſſence, that makes a bird to be a bird, or that determines and diſtinguiſhes a bird from a beaſt; or the juſt limits and boundaries between each; yet we can no more doubt of a ſparrow's being a bird, and an horſe's being a beaſt, than we can of this colour being black, and the other white: though, by ſhades, they may be made ſo gradually to vaniſh into each other, that we cannot tell where either determines.

BUT all this I write more in deference to your deſires from me, than to ſatisfy myſelf, that I have given you any material hints, or have offered any conſiderable objection, that is worth your notice and removal. Mr. Norris's unfortunate attempts on your book ſufficiently teſtify its validity; and truly I think he trifles ſo egregiouſly, that he ſhould forewarn all men how far they venture to criticiſe on your work. But thus far, after all, I'll venture to intimate to you, that if you are for another work of this kind, I ſhould adviſe you to let this ſtand as it does. And your next ſhould be of a model wholly new, and that is by way of logick; ſomething accommodated to the uſual forms, together with the conſideration of extenſion, ſolidity, mobility, thinking, exiſtence, duration, number, &c. and of the mind of man and its powers; as may make up a complete body of what the ſchools call logick and metaphyſicks. This I am the more inclinable to adviſe on two accounts; firſt, becauſe I have lately ſeen Johannis Clerici Logica, Ontologia, and Pneumatologia, in all which he has little extraordinary, but what he borrows from you; and in the alteration he gives them, he robs them of their native beauties; which can only be preſerved to them by the ſame incomparable art that firſt framed them. Secondly, I was the firſt that recommended and lent to the reverend provoſt of our univerſity, Dr. Aſhe, a moſt learned and ingenious man, your Eſſay, with which he was ſo wonderfully pleaſed and ſatisfied, that he has ordered it to be read by the batchelors in the college, and ſtrictly examines them in their progreſs therein. Now a large diſcourſe, in the way of a logick, would be much more taking in the univerſities, wherein youths do not ſatisfy themſelves to have the breeding or buſineſs of the place, unleſs they are engaged in ſomething that bears the name and form of logick.

THIS, Sir, is in ſhort what offers itſelf to me, at preſent, concerning your work. There remains only, that I again put you in mind of the ſecond member of your diviſion of ſciences, the ars practica, or ethicks; you cannot imagine what an earneſt deſire and expectation I have raiſed,

in thoſe that are acquainted with your writings, by the hopes I have given them from your promiſe of endeavouring ſomething on that ſubject. Good Sir, let me renew my requeſts to you therein; for believe me, Sir, it will be one of the moſt uſeful and glorious undertakings that can employ you. The touches you give, in many places of your book, on this ſubject, are wonderfully curious, and do largely teſtify your great abilities that way; and I am ſure the pravity of men's morals does mightily require the moſt powerful means to reform them. Be as large as it is poſſible on this ſubject, and by all means let it be in Engliſh. He that reads the 45th ſection, in your 129th page, will be inflamed to read more of the ſame kind, from the ſame incomparable pen. Look, therefore, on yourſelf as obliged by God Almighty to undertake this taſk (pardon me, Sir, that I am ſo free with you, as to inſiſt to yourſelf on your duty, who, doubtleſs, underſtand it better than I can tell you) ſuffer not therefore your thoughts to reſt, till you have finiſhed it; and that God Almighty may ſucceed your labours, is, and ſhall be the prayer of,

Worthy Sir,

Your entirely affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Dec. 26, 1692.

WHATEVER has happened to give you leiſure ſooner than was expected, I hope to receive ſome advantage by it. And that now you will be able to ſend me your own thoughts on my book, together with the obſervations of your friend, into whoſe hands you have put it with that deſign. I return you my humble thanks for the papers you did me the favour to ſend me in your laſt: but am apt to think you agree with me that there is very little in thoſe papers, wherein either my ſenſe is not miſtaken, or very little, wherein the argument is directly againſt me. I ſuppoſe that learned gentleman, if he had had the leiſure to read my Eſſay quite through, would have found ſeveral of his objections might have been ſpared. And I can eaſily forgive thoſe who have not been at the pains to read the third book of my Eſſay, if they make uſe of expreſſions that, when examined, ſignify nothing at all, in defence of hypotheſes, that have long poſſeſſed their minds. I am far from imagining myſelf infallible; but yet I ſhould be loth to differ from any thinking man, being fully perſuaded there are very few things of pure ſpeculation, wherein two thinking men, who impartially ſeek truth, can differ, if they give themſelves the leiſure to examine their hypotheſes, and underſtand one another. I, preſuming you to be of this make, whereof ſo few are to be found (for it is not every one that thinks himſelf a lover, or ſeeker of truth, who ſincerely does it) took the liberty to deſire your objections, that

that in the next edition I might correct my miſtakes. For I am not fond of any thing in my book, becauſe I have once thought or ſaid it. And therefore I beg you, if you will give yourſelf the pains to look over my book again with this deſign, to oblige me, that you would uſe all manner of freedom, both as to matter, ſtyle, diſpoſition, and every thing wherein, in your own thoughts, any thing appears to you fit, in the leaſt, to be altered, omitted, explained, or added. I find none ſo fit, nor ſo fair judges, as thoſe whoſe minds the ſtudy of mathematicks has opened, and diſ-entangled from the cheat of words, which has too great an influence in all the other, which go for ſciences: and I think (were it not for the doubtful and fallacious uſe that is made of thoſe ſigns) might be made much more ſciences than they are.

I SENT order, ſome time ſince, that a poſthumous piece of Mr. Boyle's ſhould be given to your bookſeller in London, to be conveyed to you. It is "A General Hiſtory of the Air;" which, though left by him very imperfect, yet I think the very deſign of it will pleaſe you; and it is caſt into a method that any one who pleaſes may add to it, under any of the ſeveral titles, as his reading or obſervation ſhall furniſh him with matter of fact. If ſuch men as you are, curious and knowing, would join to what Mr. Boyle had collected and prepared what comes in their way, we might hope, in ſome time, to have a conſiderable hiſtory of the air, than which I ſcarce know any part of natural philoſophy would yield more variety and uſe; but it is a ſubject too large for the attempts of any one man, and will require the aſſiſtance of many hands to make it a hiſtory very ſhort of complete.

SINCE I did myſelf the honour to write to your brother, I have been very ill, to which you muſt pardon ſome part of the length of my ſilence. But my eſteem and reſpect for you is founded upon ſomething ſo much beyond compliment and ceremony, that I hope you will not think me the leſs ſo, though I do not every poſt importune you with repeated profeſſions that I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 20, 1692-3.

HAD I known I ſhould, within ſo few days, have received the favour of ſuch a letter as your's of Dec. 22, I ſhould not have troubled you with mine, that went hence but a little before the receipt of your's. I was afraid, in reading the beginning of your's, that I had not ſo great an intereſt in you as I flattered myſelf, and upon a preſumption whereof it was, that I took the liberty ſo confidently to aſk your advice,

concerning the ſecond edition of my book. But what followed ſatisfied me, that it was your civility, and not reſervedneſs, made you tell me, that the ſame hand, which firſt formed it, is beſt able to reform it. Could I flatter myſelf ſo, as to think I deſerved all that you ſay of me, in your obliging letter, I ſhould yet think you a better judge of what is to be reformed in my book, than I myſelf. You have given the world proofs of your great penetration, and I have received great marks of your candour. But were the inequality between us as much to my advantage, as it is on the other ſide, I ſhould nevertheleſs beg your opinion. Whatſoever is our own, let us do what we can, ſtands a little too near us to be viewed as it ſhould: and, though we ever ſo ſincerely aim at truth, yet our own thoughts, judging ſtill of our own thoughts, may be ſuſpected to overlook errors and miſtakes. And I ſhould think he valued himſelf more than truth, and preſumed too much on his own abilities, who would not be willing to have all the exceptions could be made, by any ingenious friend, before he ventured any thing into the publick. I therefore heartily thank you, for thoſe you have ſent me, and for conſulting ſome of your friends, to the ſame purpoſe: and beg the favour, if any thing more occurs from your own thoughts, or from them, you will be pleaſed to communicate it to me, if it be but thoſe errata typographica you meet with, not taken notice of in the table. I confeſs, I thought ſome of the explications in my book too long, though turned ſeveral ways, to make thoſe abſtract notions the eaſier ſink into minds prejudiced in the ordinary way of education; and therefore I was of a mind to contract it. But finding you, and ſome other friends of mine, whom I conſulted in the caſe, of a contrary opinion, and that you judge the redundancy in it a pardonable fault, I ſhall take very little pains to reform it.

I CONFESS what I ſay, page 270, compared with 314, 315, may, to an unwary reader, ſeem to contain a contradiction: but you, conſidering right, perceive that there is none. But it not being reaſonable for me to expect, that every body ſhould read me with that judgment you do, and obſerve the deſign and foundation of what I ſay, rather than ſtick barely in the words, it is fit, as far as may be, that I accommodate myſelf to ordinary readers, and avoid the appearances of contradiction, even in their thoughts. P. 314, I ſuppoſe matter, in its own natural ſtate, void of thought; a ſuppoſition I concluded would not be denied me, or not hard to be proved, if it ſhould: and thence I inferred, matter could not be the firſt eternal being. But, p. 270, I thought it no abſurdity, or contradiction, to ſuppoſe, "that, a thinking, omnipotent being once "granted, ſuch a being might annex to ſome ſyſtems of matter ordered "in a way, that he thought fit, a capacity of ſome degrees of ſenſe and "thinking." To avoid this appearance of a contradiction, in my two ſuppoſitions, and clear it up to leſs attentive readers, I intend in the ſecond edition to alter it thus, if you think it will do:

P. 270. l. 20. READ, "For I ſee no contradiction in it, that the firſt, "eternal, thinking being, or omnipotent ſpirit, ſhould, if he pleaſed, "give to certain ſyſtems of created, ſenſeleſs matter, put together as he "thinks fit, ſome degrees of ſenſe, perception, and thought; though I "judge it no leſs than a contradiction, to ſuppoſe matter (which is evi- "dently, in its own nature, without ſenſe and thought) ſhould be the "eternal, firſt, thinking being. What certainty of knowledge can any one "have, that ſome perceptions, ſuch as, v. g. pleaſure and pain, ſhould "not be in ſome bodies themſelves after"——

P. 315. l. 5. READ, "Thought can never begin to be: for it is impoſ- "ſible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could "have originally, in and from itſelf, ſenſe, perception, and knowledge; "as is evident from hence, that ſenſe, perception, and knowledge muſt "then be a property eternally inſeparable from matter, and every parti- "cle of it. Not to add, that though our general or ſpecifick concep- "tion of matter makes us ſpeak of it as one thing; yet really all matter "is not one individual thing, neither is there any ſuch thing exiſting "as one material being, or one body, that we know or can conceive. "And therefore, if matter were the eternal, firſt, cogitative being, there "would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being: but an infinite "number of finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of li- "mited force and diſtinct thoughts, which could never produce that "order, harmony, and beauty, is to be found in nature. Since, there- "fore, whatſoever is the firſt, eternal being muſt neceſſarily be cogita- "tive: and whatſoever is firſt of all things——higher degree, it neceſ- "ſarily follows, that the eternal, firſt being cannot be matter." Pray give me your opinion, whether, if I print it thus, it will not remove the appearance of any contradiction.

I DO not wonder to find you think my diſcourſe about liberty a little too fine ſpun; I had ſo much that thought of it myſelf, that I ſaid the ſame thing of it to ſome of my friends, before it was printed; and told them, that upon that account I judged it beſt to leave it out; but they perſuaded me to the contrary. When the connexion of the parts of my ſubject brought me to the conſideration of power, I had no deſign to meddle with the queſtion of liberty; but barely purſued my thoughts in the contemplation of that power in man of chuſing, or preferring, which we call the will, as far as they would lead me, without any the leaſt biaſs to one ſide, or other; or, if there was any leaning in my mind, it was rather to the contrary ſide of that, where I found myſelf at the end of my purſuit. But doubting that it bore a little too hard upon man's liberty, I ſhewed it to a very ingenious but profeſſed Arminian, and de- ſired him, after he had conſidered it, to tell me his objections, if he had any, who frankly confeſſed he could carry it no farther. I confeſs, I think there might be ſomething ſaid, which with a great many men would paſs for a ſatisfactory anſwer to your objection; but it not ſatiſ- fying me, I neither put it into my book, nor ſhall now into my letter.

If

If I have put any fallacy on myſelf, in all that deduction, as it may be, and I have been ready to ſuſpect it myſelf, you will do me a very acceptable kindneſs to ſhew it me, that I may reform it. But if you will argue for, or againſt, liberty from conſequences, I will not undertake to anſwer you. For I own freely to you the weakneſs of my underſtanding, that though it be unqueſtionable, that there is omnipotence and omniſcience in God, our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing, than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man conſiſtent with omnipotence and omniſcience in God, though I am as fully perſuaded of both, as of any truths I moſt firmly aſſent to. And, therefore, I have long ſince given off the conſideration of that queſtion, reſolving all into this ſhort concluſion, that if it be poſſible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I ſee not the way of it.

IN the objection you raiſe about ſpecies, I fear you are fallen into the ſame difficulty I often found myſelf under, when I was writing on that ſubject, where I was very apt to ſuppoſe diſtinct ſpecies I could talk of, without names. For pray, ſir, conſider what it is you mean, when you ſay, that, "we can no more doubt of a ſparrow's being a bird, and a "horſe's being a beaſt, than we can of this colour being black, and "the other white," &c. but this, that the combination of ſimple ideas, which the word, bird, ſtands for, is to be found in that particular thing we call a ſparrow. And therefore I hope I have no-where ſaid, "there "is no ſuch ſort of creatures in nature, as birds;" if I have, it is both contrary to truth and to my opinion. This I do ſay, that there are real conſtitutions in things, from whence theſe ſimple ideas flow, which we obſerve combined in them. And this I farther ſay, that there are real diſtinctions and differences in thoſe real conſtitutions, one from another; whereby they are diſtinguiſhed one from another, whether we think of them, or name them, or no: But that that whereby we diſtinguiſh and rank particular ſubſtances into ſorts, or genera and ſpecies, is not thoſe real eſſences, or internal conſtitutions, but ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as we obſerve in them. This I deſigned to ſhew, in lib. iii. c. 6. If, upon your peruſal of that chapter again, you find any thing contrary to this, I beg the favour of you to mark it to me, that I may correct it; for it is not what I think true. Some parts of that third book, concerning words, though the thoughts were eaſy and clear enough, yet coſt me more pains to expreſs, than all the reſt of my Eſſay. And therefore I ſhall not much wonder, if there be in ſome places of it obſcurity and doubtfulneſs. It would be a great kindneſs from my readers to oblige me, as you have done, by telling me any thing they find amiſs; for the printed book being more for others uſe than my own, it is fit I ſhould accommodate it to that, as much as I can; which truly is my intention.

THAT which you propoſe, of turning my Eſſay into a body of logick and metaphyſicks, accommodated to the uſual forms, though I thank you very kindly for it, and plainly ſee in it the care you have of the education of young ſcholars, which is a thing of no ſmall moment;

yet I fear I ſhall ſcarce find time to do it: you have cut out other work for me, more to my liking, and I think of more uſe. Beſides that, if they have, in this book of mine, what you think the matter of theſe two ſciences, or what you will call them; I like the method it is in, better than that of the ſchools, where I think it is no ſmall prejudice to knowledge, that predicaments, predicables, &c. being univerſally, in all their ſyſtems, come to be looked on as neceſſary principles, or unqueſtionable parts of knowledge, juſt as they are ſet down there. If logick be the firſt thing to be taught young men, after grammar, as is the uſual method, I think yet it ſhould be nothing but propoſition and ſyllogiſm. But that being in order to their diſputing exerciſes in the univerſity, perhaps I may think thoſe may be ſpared too: Diſputing being but an ill (not to ſay the worſt) way to knowledge. I ſay this not as pretending to change, or find fault with, what publick allowance and eſtabliſhed practice has ſettled in univerſities; but to excuſe myſelf to you, from whom I cannot allow myſelf to differ, without telling you the true reaſons of it. For I ſee ſo much knowledge, candour, and the marks of ſo much good-will to mankind in you, that there are few men, whoſe opinion I think ought to have ſo much authority with me as yours. But, as to the method of learning, perhaps I may entertain you more at large hereafter; only now let me aſk you, ſince you mention logick and metaphyſicks in relation to my book, whether either of thoſe ſciences may ſuggeſt to you any new heads, fit to be inſerted into my Eſſay, in a ſecond edition?

You have done too much honour to me in the recommendation I ſee you have given to my book; and I am the more pleaſed with it, becauſe I think it was not done out of kindneſs to one ſo much a ſtranger to you as I then was. But yet, pray do not think me ſo vain that I dare aſſume to myſelf almoſt any part of what you ſay of me in your laſt letter. Could I find in myſelf any reaſon you could have to flatter me, I ſhould ſuſpect you reſolved to play the courtier a little. But I know what latitude civil and well-bred men allow themſelves with great ſincerity, where they are pleaſed, and kindneſs warms them. I am ſenſible of the obligation, and in return ſhall only tell you, that I ſhall ſpeedily ſet myſelf to obey your commands in the laſt part of your letter. I beg your pardon for treſpaſſing ſo much on your patience, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt obliged ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, March 2, 169⅔.

YOURS of Jan. 20. came to my hands, juſt as I lay down on a bed of ſickneſs, being a ſevere cholick, that held me nigh five weeks, and brought me very weak; this was the more grievous to me, in that it hindered me from giving that ready anſwer to your letters, which I deſired; being very covetous, on all opportunities, of keeping up a correſpondence with one, for whom I had ſo great a reſpect. I am now, God be thanked, pretty well recovered; but yet weak, and have not yet ſtirred abroad. I know the bare ſignifying this to you is ſufficient in my excuſe; ſo that, relying on your pardon, I proceed to anſwer your laſt.

AND firſt, ſir, believe me, that whatever reſpect I have at any time uſed to you, has been the ſincere thoughts of my heart, and not the vain compliments that uſually paſs between courtiers, and, how extravagant ſoever, are looked upon as the effects of good breeding, and paſs only as ſuch, by licence. I think I know a worthy man when I meet him, and they are ſo rare in the world, that no honour is too great for thoſe that are ſuch. And I muſt plainly ſay it to yourſelf, that ſo much humanity, candour, condeſcenſion, and good-nature, joined with ſo great judgment, learning, and parts, I have not met with in any man living, as in the author of the "Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding." You ſo favourably entertain all men's objections, you are ſo deſirous to hear the ſenſe of others, you are ſo tender in differing from any man, that you have captivated me beyond reſiſtance. What you propoſe to add in thoſe places, which I intimated to you, as ſeemingly repugnant to unwary readers, p. 270 and 314, 315, is abundantly ſufficient; unleſs you may think it convenient (for the prevention of all manner of ſcruple, and to ſhew your readers, that you are aware of the objection that may be raiſed againſt theſe paſſages) to add in the margin a little note to that purpoſe, ſpecifying the ſeeming repugnancy that was in the firſt edition, and that, for the clearing thereof, you have thus farther illuſtrated it in this. But this, as every thing elſe, I propoſe with all ſubmiſſion to your better judgment. Mentioning the marginal note to you minds me to intimate, that I ſhould think it convenient, in your next edition, to expreſs the abſtract or content of each ſection in the margin, and to ſpare (if you think fit) the table of contents at the latter end of the book, though I think both may do beſt. I can aſſure you, for my own reading, and conſulting your book, I have put the table of contents to their reſpective ſections throughout the whole.

I AM fully convinced, by the arguments you give me, for not turning your book into the ſcholaſtick form of logick and metaphyſicks; and I had no other reaſon to adviſe the other, but merely to get it promoted the eaſier in our univerſity; one of the buſineſſes of which places is to learn according to the old forms. And this minds me to let you know the

the great joy and ſatisfaction of mind I conceived, on your promiſe of the method of learning; there could be nothing more acceptable to me, than the hopes thereof, and that on this account: I have but one child in the world, who is now nigh four years old, and promiſes well; his mother left him to me very young, and my affections (I muſt confeſs) are ſtrongly placed on him: it has pleaſed God, by the liberal proviſions of our anceſtors, to free me from the toiling cares of providing a fortune for him; ſo that my whole ſtudy ſhall be to lay up a treaſure of knowledge in his mind, for his happineſs both in this life and the next. And I have been often thinking of ſome method for his inſtruction, that may beſt obtain the end I propoſe. And now, to my great joy, I hope to be abundantly ſupplied by your method. And my brother has ſometimes told me, that, whilſt he had the happineſs of your acquaintance at Leyden, you were upon ſuch a work, as this I deſire; and that too, at the requeſt of a tender father, for the uſe of his only ſon. Wherefore, good ſir, let me moſt earneſtly intreat you, by no means to lay aſide this infinitely uſeful work, till you have finiſhed it; for it will be of vaſt advantage to all mankind, as well as particularly to me, your entire friend. And, on this conſideration of uſefulneſs to mankind, I will preſume again to remind you of your "diſcourſe of morality;" and I ſhall think myſelf very happy, if, by putting you on the thought, I ſhould be the leaſt occaſion of ſo great good to the world. What I have more to ſay, relating to your book, is of little or no moment; however, you ſo readily entertain all men's thoughts of your works, that futile as mine are, you ſhall have a remark or two more from me.

BUT firſt to your query, whether I know any new heads from logick or metaphyſicks to be inſerted in the ſecond edition of your Eſſay: I anſwer, I know none, unleſs you think it may not do well to inſiſt more particularly, and at large, on "æternæ veritates, and the principium in-"dividuationis." Concerning the firſt, you have ſome touches, pag. 281. § 31. p. 323. § 14. p. 345. § 14. and concerning the latter, p. 28. § 4. p. 40. § 12.

PAG. 96. ſect. 9. you aſſert, what I conceive is an error in fact, viz. "That a man's eye can diſtinguiſh a ſecond of a circle, whereof its ſelf "is the center." Whereas it is certain, that few men's eyes can diſtinguiſh leſs than 30 ſeconds, and moſt not under a minute, or 60 ſeconds, as is manifeſt from what Mr. Hook lays down in his animadverſions, on the firſt part of Hevelii machina cœleſtis, p. 8, 9, &c. but this, as I ſaid before, is only an error in fact, and affects not the doctrine laid down in the ſaid ſection.

PAG. 341. ſect. 2. you ſay, "The exiſtence of all things without us "(except only of God) is had by our ſenſes." And p. 147. ſect. 33, 34, 35, 36, you ſhew how the idea we have of God, is made up of the ideas we have gotten by our ſenſes. Now this, though no repugnancy; yet, to unwary readers, may ſeem one, and therefore perhaps may deſerve a fuller expreſſion. To me it is plain, that in pag. 341. you ſpeak barely

of the exiſtence of a God; and in p. 147. you ſpeak of the ideas that are ingredient in the complex idea of God; that is, p. 147, you ſay, "that "all the ideas ingredient in the idea of a God, are had from ſenſe;" and p. 341, you only aſſert, "that the exiſtence of this God, or that really "there are united in one being all theſe ideas, is had, not from ſenſe, "but demonſtration." This to me ſeems your ſenſe; yet perhaps every reader may not ſo readily conceive it; and, therefore, poſſibly you may think this paſſage, p. 341, worth your farther conſideration and addition.

I WILL conclude my tedious lines with a jocoſe problem, that, upon diſcourſe with ſeveral, concerning your book and notions, I have propoſed to divers very ingenious men, and could hardly ever meet with one, that, at firſt daſh, would give me the anſwer to it which I think true, till by hearing my reaſons they were convinced. It is this: "Suppoſe a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch "to diſtinguiſh between a cube and a ſphere (ſuppoſe) of ivory, nighly "of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell when he felt one and t'other, which "is the cube, which the ſphere. Suppoſe then the cube and ſphere "placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to ſee; query," "Whether by his ſight, before he touched them, he could now diſtin-"guiſh and tell, which is the globe, which the cube?" I anſwer, not; "for though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, and how a "cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that "what affects his touch ſo or ſo, muſt affect his ſight ſo or ſo; or that a "protuberant angle in the cube, that preſſed his hand unequally, ſhall "appear to his eye as it does in the cube." But of this enough; perhaps you may find ſome place in your Eſſay, wherein you may not think it amiſs to ſay ſomething of this problem.

I AM extremely obliged to you for Mr. Boyle's book of the air, which lately came to my hands. It is a vaſt deſign, and not to be finiſhed but by the united labours of many heads, and indefatigably proſecuted for many years; ſo that I deſpair of ſeeing any thing complete therein. However, if many will lend the ſame helping hands that you have done, I ſhould be in hopes: and certainly there is not a chapter in all natural philoſophy of greater uſe to mankind than what is here propoſed. I am,

Worthy Sir,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 28 Mar. 1693.

YOUR ſilence, that ſpared me a great deal of fear and uneaſineſs, by concealing from me your ſickneſs, 'till it was well over, is abundantly made amends for, by the joy it brings me, in the news of your recovery. You have given me thoſe marks of your kindneſs to me, that you will not think it ſtrange, that I count you amongſt my friends; and with thoſe, deſiring to live with the eaſe and freedom of a perfect confidence, I never accuſe them to myſelf of neglect, or coldneſs, when I fail to hear from them, ſo ſoon as I expected or deſired: though had I known you ſo well before as I do now, ſince your laſt letter, I ſhould not have avoided being in pain upon account of your health.

I CANNOT at all doubt the ſincerity of any thing you ſay to me; but yet give me leave to think, that it is an exceſs of kindneſs alone could excuſe it from looking like compliment. But I am convinced you love your friends extremely, where you have made choice of them, and then believe you can never think nor ſpeak too well of them. I know not whether it belongs to a man, who gets once in print, to read in his book, that it is perfect, and that the author is infallible. Had I had ſuch an opinion of my own ſufficiency before I writ, my Eſſay would have brought me to another, and given me ſuch a ſight of the weakneſs of my underſtanding, that I could not fail to ſuſpect myſelf of error and miſtake, in many things I had writ, and to deſire all the light I could get from others to ſet me right. I have found you one of the likelieſt to afford it me; your clearneſs and candour gave me the confidence to aſk your judgment; and I take it for no ſmall aſſurance of your friendſhip that you have given it me, and have condeſcended to adviſe me of the printer's faults, which gives me hopes you have not concealed any you have obſerved in the work itſelf. The marginal ſummaries you deſire, of the paragraphs, I ſhall take care to have added, were it only for your ſake; but I think too it will make the book the more uſeful.

THAT requeſt of your's, you preſs ſo earneſtly upon me, makes me bemoan the diſtance you are from me, which deprives me of the aſſiſtance I might have from your opinion and judgment, before I ventured any thing into the publick. It is ſo hard to find impartial freedom in one's friends, or an unbiaſſed judgment any-where, that amongſt all the helps of converſation and acquaintance, I know none more wanted, nor more uſeful, than ſpeaking freely and candidly one's opinion upon the thoughts and compoſitions of another intended for the preſs. Experience has taught me, that you are a friend of this rank, and therefore I cannot but heartily wiſh that a ſea between us did not hinder me from the advantage of this good office. Had you been within reach, I ſhould have begged your ſevere examination of what is now gone to the printer, at your inſtance; I had rather I could have ſaid upon your peruſal,

and with your correction. I am not in my nature a lover of novelty, nor contradiction; but my notions in this treatiſe have run me ſo far out of the common road and practice, that I could have been glad to have had them allowed by ſo ſober a judgment as yours, or ſtopped, if they had appeared impracticable or extravagant, from going any farther. That which your brother tells you, on this occaſion, is not wholly beſides the matter. The main of what I now publiſh, is but what was contained in ſeveral letters to a friend of mine, the greateſt part whereof were writ out of Holland. How your brother came to know of it, I have clearly forgot, and do not remember that ever I communicated it to any body there. Theſe letters, or at leaſt ſome of them, have been ſeen by ſome of my acquaintance here, who would needs perſuade me it would be of uſe to publiſh them; your impatience to ſee them has not, I aſſure you, ſlackened my hand, or kept me in ſuſpence: and I wiſh now they were out, that you might the ſooner ſee them, and I the ſooner have your opinion of them. I know not yet whether I ſhall ſet my name to this diſcourſe, and therefore ſhall deſire you to conceal it. You ſee I make you my confeſſor, for you have made yourſelf my friend.

THE faults of the preſs are, I find, upon a ſedate reading over my book, infinitely more than I could have thought; thoſe that you have obſerved, I have corrected, and return you my thanks; and, as far as I have gone in my review, have added and altered ſeveral things; but am not yet got ſo far as thoſe places you mark for the "æternæ veritates, and "principium individuationis," which I ſhall conſider, when I come to them, and endeavour to ſatisfy your deſire. "Malebranche's hypotheſis "of ſeeing all things in God," being that from whence I find ſome men would derive our ideas, I have ſome thoughts of adding a new chapter, wherein I will examine it, having, as I think, ſomething to ſay againſt it, that will ſhew the weakneſs of it very clearly. But I have ſo little love to controverſy, that I am not fully reſolved. Some other additions I have made, I hope, will not diſpleaſe you, but I wiſh I could ſhew them you, before they are in print; for I would not make my book bigger, unleſs it it were to make it better.

I THANK you for adviſing me of the error about ſight, for indeed it was a great one in matter of fact, but it was in the expreſſion; for I meant a minute, but by miſtake called $\frac{1}{60}$ of a degree a ſecond. Your ingenious problem will deſerve to be publiſhed to the world.

THE ſeeming contradiction between what is ſaid p. 147. and p. 341. is juſt as you take it, and I hope ſo clearly expreſſed, that it cannot be miſtaken, but by a very unwary reader, who cannot diſtinguiſh between an idea in the mind, and the real exiſtence of ſomething out of the mind anſwering that idea. But I heartily thank you for your caution, and ſhall take care how to prevent any ſuch miſtake, when I come to that place. My humble ſervice to your brother. I am,

SIR, Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, April 18, 1693.

I HAVE lately received farther teſtimonies of your kindneſs and friendſhip to me, in your laſt of March 28; which brings withal the welcome news of your having committed your work of Education to the preſs; than which, I know not any thing, that I ever expected with a more earneſt deſire. What my brother told me, relating to that treatiſe, he had from yourſelf in Holland; but perhaps you might have forgot what paſſed between you on that occaſion. I perceive you fear the novelty of ſome notions therein may ſeem extravagant; but, if I may venture to judge of the author, I fear no ſuch thing from him. I doubt not but the work will be new and peculiar, as his other performances; and this it is that renders them eſtimable and pleaſant. He that travels the beaten roads may chance, indeed, to have company; but he that takes his liberty, and manages it with judgment, is the man that makes uſeful diſcoveries, and moſt beneficial to thoſe that follow him. Had Columbus never ventured farther than his predeceſſors, we had yet been ignorant of a vaſt part of our earth, preferable (as ſome ſay) to all the other three. And, if none may be allowed to try the the ocean of philoſophy farther than our anceſtors, we ſhall have but little advancements, or diſcoveries, made in the "mundus intellectualis;" wherein, I believe, there is much more unknown, than what we have yet found out.

I SHOULD very much approve of your adding a chapter in your Eſſay, concerning Malebranche's hypotheſis. As there are enthuſiaſms in divinity, ſo there are in philoſophy; and as one proceeds from not conſulting or miſapprehending the book of God; ſo the other from not reading and conſidering the book of nature. I look upon Malebranche's notions, or rather Plato's, in this particular, as perfectly unintelligible. And if you will engage in a philoſophick controverſy, you cannot do it with more advantage, than in this matter. What you lay down, concerning our ideas and knowledge, is founded and confirmed by experiment and obſervation, that any man may make in himſelf, or the children he converſes with, wherein he may note the gradual ſteps that we may make in knowledge. But Plato's fancy has no foundation in nature, but is merely the product of his own brain.

I KNOW it is none of your buſineſs to engage in controverſy, or remove objections, ſave only ſuch as ſeem immediately to ſtrike at your own poſitions; and therefore I cannot inſiſt upon what I am now going to mention to you. However, I will give you the hint, and leave the conſideration thereof to your own breaſt. The 10th chapter of your ivth book, is a moſt exact demonſtration of the exiſtence of God. But perhaps it might be more full, by an addition againſt the eternity of the world, and that all things have not been going on in the ſame manner, as we now ſee them, "ab æterno." I have known a pack of philoſophical

atheiſts, that rely much on this hypotheſis; and even Hobbes himſelf does ſomewhere alledge (if I am not forgetful, it is his book "De corpore," in the chapter "de univerſo") "that the ſame arguments, which are brought "againſt the eternity of the world, may ſerve as well againſt the eternity "of the Creator of the world." I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, devoted ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 15 July, 1693.

I HAD not been ſo long, before I had acknowledged the favour of your laſt, had not I a deſign to give you, at large, an account of ſome alterations I intended to make, in the chapter of Power, wherein I ſhould have been very glad you had ſhewed me any miſtake. I myſelf, not being very well ſatisfied, by the concluſion I was led to, that my reaſonings were perfectly right, reviewed that chapter again with great care, and by obſerving only the miſtake of one word (viz. having put "things" for "actions," which was very eaſy to be done in the place where it is, viz. p. 123, as I remember, for I have not my book by me, here in town) I got into a new view of things, which, if I miſtake not, will ſatisfy you, and give a clearer account of human freedom than hitherto I have done, as you will perceive by the ſummaries of the following ſections of that chapter.

§. 28. Volition is the ordering of ſome action by thought.
§. 29. Uneaſineſs determines the will.
§. 30. Will muſt be diſtinguiſhed from deſire.
§. 31. The greater good in view, barely conſidered, determines not the will. The joys of heaven are often neglected.
§. 32. Deſire determines the will.
§. 33. Deſire is an uneaſineſs.
§. 34. The greateſt preſent uneaſineſs uſually determines the will, as is evident in experience. The reaſons.
§. 35. Becauſe uneaſineſs being a part of unhappineſs, which is firſt to be removed in our way to happineſs.
§. 36. Becauſe uneaſineſs alone is preſent.
§. 37. The uneaſineſs of other paſſions have their ſhare with deſire.
§. 38. Happineſs alone moves the deſire.
§. 39. All abſent good not deſired, becauſe not neceſſary to our happineſs.
§. 40. The greateſt uneaſineſs does not always determine the will, becauſe we can ſuſpend the execution of our deſires.

THIS

THIS ſhort ſcheme may perhaps give you ſo much light into my preſent hypotheſis, that you will be able to judge of the truth of it, which I beg you to examine by your own mind. I wiſh you were ſo near, that I could communicate it to you at large, before it goes to the preſs. But it is ſo much too long for a letter, and the preſs will be ſo ready to ſtay for it, before it is finiſhed, that I fear I ſhould not be able to have the advantage of your thoughts, upon the whole thread of my deduction. For I had much rather have your corrections, whilſt they might contribute to make it receive your approbation, than flatter myſelf before-hand that you will be pleaſed with it.

I HOPE, ere this, you have received from Mr. —— that which I promiſed you, the beginning of the ſpring. I muſt deſire your opinion of it without reſerve, for I ſhould not have ventured, upon any other condition, to have owned and preſented to you ſuch a trifle. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Auguſt 12, 1693.

YOURS of July 15. came to my hands about a fortnight ſince; and I had, ere this, acknowledged the favour thereof, but that I waited the arrival of your much deſired piece, of Education, which came not to me 'till about three days ago. I immediately ſet myſelf to read it, as all things from its author, with the utmoſt attention; and I find it anſwerable to the higheſt expectations I had of it. And ſince, with your uſual modeſty, you are pleaſed to require my thoughts more particularly concerning it, I ſhall with all freedom, but at the ſame time with all deference, propoſe them to you, not doubting of your favourable interpretation and pardon, where you ſee it needful. And firſt, in general, I think you propoſe nothing in your whole book, but what is very reaſonable, and very practicable, except only in one particular, which ſeems to bear hard on the tender ſpirits of children, and the natural affections of parents: it is pag. 117, 118, where you adviſe, "that a "child ſhould never be ſuffered to have what he craves, or ſo much as "ſpeaks for, much leſs if he cries for it." I acknowledge what you ſay in explaining this rule, ſect. 101, in relation to natural wants, eſpecially that of hunger, may be well enough allowed: but in ſect. 102, where you come to apply it to "wants of fancy and affectation," you ſeem too ſtrict and ſevere. You ſay indeed, "this will teach them to ſtifle their "deſires, and to practiſe modeſty and temperance;" but for teaching theſe virtues I conceive we ſhall have occaſions enough, in relation to their hurtful deſires, without abridging them ſo wholly, in matters in-

different and innocent, that tend only to divert and pleaſe their buſy ſpirits. You allow indeed, "that it would be inhumanity to deny them "thoſe things one perceives would delight them;" if ſo, I ſee no reaſon why, in a modeſt way, and with ſubmiſſion to the wills of their ſuperiors, they may not be allowed to declare what will delight them. No, ſay you; "but in all wants of fancy and affectation they ſhould never, "if once declared, be hearkened to, or complied with." This I can never agree to, it being to deny that liberty between a child and its parents, as we deſire, and have granted us, between man and his Creator. And as, in this caſe, man is allowed to declare his wants, and with ſubmiſſion to recommend his requeſts to God; ſo I think children may be allowed by their parents, or governors. And as between the creature and Creator all manner of repining upon denial, or diſappointment, is forbidden; ſo, in the caſe of children, all frowardneſs or diſcontent, upon a refuſal, is ſeverely to be reprimanded. But thus far I agree with you, in the whole, that whether it be in wants natural, or fanciful, that they expreſs their deſires in a froward, humourſome manner, there they ſhould be ſurely denied them. A farther reaſon for my allowing children a liberty of expreſſing their innocent deſires, is, that the contrary is impracticable; and you muſt have the children almoſt moped for want of diverſion and recreation; or elſe you muſt have thoſe about them ſtudy nothing all day, but how to find employment for them; and how this would rack the invention of any man alive, I leave you to judge. And beſides, were it an eaſy taſk for any adult perſon to ſtudy the fancy, the unaccountable fancy, and diverſion of children, the whole year round; yet it would not prove delightful to a child, being not his own choice. But this, you will ſay, is what you would have imprinted on them, that they are not to chuſe for themſelves; but why not, in harmleſs things, and plays or ſports, I ſee no reaſon. In all things of moment let them live by the conduct of others wiſer than themſelves.

THIS, ſir, is all that in your whole book I ſtick at; to all the reſt I could ſubſcribe. And I am not a little pleaſed, when I conſider that my own management of my only little one has hitherto been agreeable, in the main, to your rules, ſave only in what relates to his hardy breeding, which I was cautious in, becauſe he is come from a tender and ſickly mother; but the child himſelf is hitherto (God be thanked) very healthful, though not very ſtrong.

THE rules you give for the correcting of children, and implanting in their minds an early ſenſe of praiſe or diſpraiſe, of repute and diſhonour, are certainly very juſt.

THE contrivances you propoſe for teaching them to read and write, are very ingenious. And becauſe I have practiſed one much of the ſame nature, I will venture to deſcribe it: "It is by writing ſyllables and words "in print-hand, on the face of a pack of cards, with figures or cyphers "adjoined to each word; by which I can form twenty ſeveral ſorts of "games, that ſhall teach children both tor ead and count at the ſame time;

time; and this with great variety." One thing more I ſhall venture to add to what you direct concerning writing; that is, I will have my ſon taught ſhort-hand; I do not mean to that perfection as to copy a ſpeech from the mouth of a ready ſpeaker, but to be able to write it readily, for his own private buſineſs. Believe me, ſir, it is as uſeful a knack as a man of buſineſs, or any ſcholar, can be maſter of, and I have found the want of it myſelf, and ſeen the advantage of it in others, frequently.

YOU are certainly in the right of it, relating to the manner of acquiring languages, French, Latin, &c. and in what you lay down concerning grammar-ſchools, themes, verſes, and other learning. But above all, what you direct, in every particular, for the forming of children's minds, and giving them an early turn to morality, virtue, religion, &c. is moſt excellent.

AND I can only ſay in general, that I can give no better proof of my liking your book in all theſe precepts, than by a ſtrict obſervance of them, in the education of my own ſon; which I ſhall purſue (God willing) as exactly as I can. One thing I fear I ſhall be at a loſs in, that is, a tutor agreeable to the character you preſcribe. But in this neither ſhall my endeavours be wanting, though I leave him the worſe eſtate, to leave him the better mind.

I COULD heartily have wiſhed you had been more particular in naming the authors you would adviſe gentlemen to read, and be converſant in, in the ſeveral parts of learning you recommend to their ſtudy. Had you done this, I know no logick, that deſerves to be named, but the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding. So that I fear you would rather have left that head open, than recommended your own work.

THE laſt thing I ſhall take notice of, is what mightily pleaſes me, it being the very thought of my own mind, theſe many years; which is, "your recommending a manual trade to all gentlemen." This I have ever been for, and have wondered how it comes to paſs, that it is ſo generally neglected; but the lazy, effeminate luxurioufneſs that over-runs the nation, occaſions the neglect thereof. Painting I have ever deſigned for my ſon; but you have raiſed two objections againſt it, that are not eaſily anſwered, eſpecially its taking up ſo much time to attain a maſtery in it.

I HAVE now given you my opinion of your book, and now I am obliged to thank you for ſending me a preſent, which I ſo highly value.

As to that part of your letter, relating to the alterations you have made, in your Eſſay, concerning man's liberty, I dare not venture, upon thoſe ſhort hints you give me, to paſs my opinion. But now, that you have diſcovered it to me, I plainly perceive the miſtake of ſect 28. p. 123. where you put "thing" for "action." And I doubt not, but in your next edition, you will fully rectify this matter. And I would adviſe you to haſten that edition with what ſpeed you can, leſt foreigners undertake a tranſlation of your firſt, without your ſecond thoughts. Thus they have ſerved me, by tranſlating into Latin, and printing my Dioptricks

in Holland, when I have now by me a tranſlation of my own of that work, with many amendments and large additions.

PRAY, Sir, let me beg the favour of your correſpondence as frequently as you can; for nothing is more acceptable to

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Aug. 23, 1693.

YOURS of Auguſt 12, which I received laſt night, eaſed me of a great deal of pain, your ſilence had for ſome time put me in; for you muſt allow me to be concerned for your health, as for a friend that I could not think in danger, or a diſeaſe, without a concern and trouble ſuitable to that great eſteem and love I have for you. But you have made me amends plentifully, by the length and kindneſs, and, let me add too, the freedom of your letter. For the approbation you ſo largely give to my book, is the more welcome to me, and gives me the better opinion of my method, becauſe it has joined with it your exception to one rule of it; which I am apt to think you yourſelf, upon ſecond thoughts, will have removed before I ſay any thing to your objections. It confirms to me that you are the good-natured man I took you for: and I do not at all wonder that the affection of a kind father ſhould ſtartle at it at firſt reading, and think it very ſevere that children ſhould not be ſuffered to expreſs their deſires; for ſo you ſeem to underſtand me. And ſuch a reſtraint, you fear, "would be "apt to mope them, and hinder their diverſion." But if you pleaſe to look upon the place, and obſerve my drift, you will find that they ſhould not be indulged, or complied with, in any thing, their conceits have made a want to them, as neceſſary to be ſupplied. What you ſay, "that children "would be moped for want of diverſion and recreation, or elſe we muſt "have thoſe about them ſtudy nothing all day, but how to find employ-"ment for them; and how this would rack the invention of any man "living, you leave me to judge;" ſeems to intimate, as if you underſtood that children ſhould do nothing but by the preſcription of their parents or tutors, chalking out each action of the whole day in train to them. I hope my words expreſs no ſuch thing; for it is quite contrary to my ſenſe, and I think would be uſeleſs tyranny in their governors, and certain ruin to the children. I am ſo much for recreation, that I would, as much as poſſible, have all they do be made ſo. I think recreation as neceſſary to them as their food, and that nothing can be recreation which does not delight. This, I think, I have ſo expreſſed; and when you have put that together, judge whether I would not have them have the greateſt part of their time left to them, without reſtraint, to divert themſelves any way they think beſt, ſo it be free from vicious actions, or ſuch as may introduce

duce vicious habits. And therefore, if they ſhould aſk to play, it could be no more interpreted a want of fancy, than if they aſked for victuals when hungry; though, where the matter is well ordered, they will never need to do that. For when they have either done what their governor thinks enough, in any application to what is uſually made their buſineſs, or are perceived to be tired with it, they ſhould of courſe be diſmiſſed to their innocent diverſions, without ever being put to aſk for it. So that I am for the full liberty of diverſion as much as you can be; and, upon a ſecond peruſal of my book, I do not doubt but you will find me ſo. But being allowed that, as one of their natural wants, they ſhould not yet be permitted to let looſe their deſires, in importunities for what they fancy. Children are very apt to covet what they ſee thoſe above them in age have or do, to have or do the like; eſpecially if it be their elder brothers and ſiſters. Does one go abroad? The other ſtrait has a mind to it too. Has ſuch an one new, or fine clothes, or play-things? They, if you once allow it them, will be impatient for the like; and think themſelves ill dealt with, if they have it not. This being indulged when they are little, grows up with their age, and with that enlarges itſelf to things of greater conſequence, and has ruined more families than one in the world. This ſhould be ſuppreſſed in its very firſt riſe, and the deſires you would not have encouraged, you ſhould not permit to be ſpoken, which is the beſt way for them to ſilence them to themſelves. Children ſhould, by conſtant uſe, learn to be very modeſt in owning their deſires; and careful not to aſk any thing of their parents, but what they have reaſon to think their parents will approve of. And a reprimand upon their ill-bearing a refuſal comes too late, the fault is committed and allowed, and if you allow them to aſk, you can ſcarce think it ſtrange they ſhould be troubled to be denied; ſo that you ſuffer them to engage themſelves in the diſorder, and then think the fitteſt time for a cure, and I think the ſureſt and eaſieſt way is prevention. For we muſt take the ſame nature to be in children that is in grown men; and how often do we find men take ill to be denied what they would not have been concerned for, if they had not aſked? But I ſhall not enlarge any farther in this, believing you and I ſhall agree in the matter; and indeed it is very hard, and almoſt impoſſible to give general rules of education, when there is ſcarce any one child which, in ſome caſes, ſhould not be treated differently from another. All that we can do, in general, is only to ſhew what parents and tutors ſhould aim at, and leave to them the ordering of particular circumſtances as the caſe ſhall require.

ONE thing give me leave to be importunate with you about: you ſay, your ſon is not very ſtrong; to make him ſtrong, you muſt uſe him hardly, as I have directed; but you muſt be ſure to do it by very inſenſible degrees, and begin an hardſhip you would bring him to only in the ſpring. This is all the caution needs be uſed. I have an example of it in the houſe I live in, where the only ſon of a very tender mother was almoſt deſtroyed by a too tender keeping. He is now, by a contrary uſage, come to bear

wind and weather, and wet in his feet; and the cough which threatened him, under that warm and cautious management, has left him, and is now no longer his parents conſtant apprehenſion, as it was.

I AM of your mind, as to ſhort-hand. I myſelf learned it, ſince I was a man; but had forgot to put it in when I writ, as I have, I doubt not, overſeen a thouſand other things, which might have been ſaid on this ſubject. But it was only, at firſt, a ſhort ſcheme for a friend, and is publiſhed to excite others to treat it more fully.

I KNOW not whether it would be uſeful to make a catalogue of authors to be read by a young man, or whether it could be done, unleſs one knew the child's temper, and what he was deſigned to.

MY Eſſay is now very near ready for another edition; and upon review of my alterations, concerning what determines the will, in my cool thoughts, I am apt to think them to be right, as far as my thoughts can reach in ſo nice a point, and in ſhort is this. Liberty is a power to act, or not to act, accordingly as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or reſt, in particular inſtances, is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is ſome preſent uneaſineſs, which is, or at leaſt is always accompanied with that of deſire. Deſire is always moved by evil to fly it; becauſe a total freedom from pain always makes a neceſſary part of our happineſs. But every good, nay every greater good, does not conſtantly move deſire, becauſe it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any neceſſary part of our happineſs; for all that we deſire is only to be happy. But though this general deſire of happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably in us; yet the ſatisfaction of any particular deſire, can be ſuſpended from determining the will to any ſubſervient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good we then deſire, make a part of our real happineſs, or be conſiſtent, or inconſiſtent with it. The reſult of our judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by any thing but his own deſire, guided by his own judgment. This, in ſhort, is what I think of this matter; I deſire you to examine it by your own thoughts. I think I have ſo well made out the ſeveral particulars, where I treat them at large, that they have convinced ſome I have ſhewn them to here, who were of another mind: and therefore how much ſoever contrary to the received opinion, I think I may publiſh them; but I would firſt have your judicious and free thoughts, which I much rely on; for you love truth for itſelf, and me ſo well, as to tell it me without diſguiſe.

YOU will herewith receive a new chapter "Of identity and diverſity," which, having writ only at your inſtance, it is fit you ſhould ſee and judge of, before it goes to the preſs. Pray ſend me your opinion of every part of it. You need not ſend back the papers, but your remarks on the paragraphs you ſhall think fit; for I have a copy here.

You deſired me too to enlarge more particularly about eternal verities, which, to obey you, I ſet about; but upon examination, find all general truths are eternal verities, and ſo there is no entering into particulars; though, by miſtake, ſome men have ſelected ſome, as if they alone were eternal verities. I never, but with regret, reflect on the diſtance you are from me, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Sept. 16, 1693.

I HAVE your's from Oates of Aug. 23. with your chapter "of iden-"tity and diverſity;" and I acknowledge myſelf extremely obliged to you, for being at all that thought, on my account. However, I repent not of the trouble I gave you therein, ſeeing the effects thereof, ſuch clear reaſoning, and profound judgment, that convinces and delights at once. And I proteſt, Sir, it is to me the hardeſt taſk in the world, to add any thing to, or make any remarks upon, what you deliver therein; every thing you write therein is delivered with ſuch convincing reaſon, that I fully aſſent to all. And to make remarks where I have no room to ſay any thing, would pleaſe neither you nor myſelf. And to ſhew you that I would not wholly rely on my own examination of your chapter, I imparted it to others, deſiring their cenſure of it; but ſtill with the ſame event, all acknowledged the clearneſs of the reaſoning, and that nothing more was left to be ſaid on the ſubject.

THE anſwer you make to what I writ on your Thoughts of Education, does fully ſatisfy me. But I aſſure you, Sir, I was not the only perſon ſhocked at that paſſage. I find ſeveral ſtumble at it, as taking little play-things, that children are very apt to deſire and aſk for, to be matters of fancy and affectation within your rule. But ſeeing in your laſt letter, you confine deſires of affectation and fancy to other matters, I am ſatisfied in this buſineſs.

I CAN ſay no more to the ſcheme you lay down of man's liberty, but that I believe it very juſt, and will anſwer in all things. I long to ſee the ſecond edition of your Eſſay; and then, if any thing offer, I will give my thoughts more fully.

I AM very ſenſible how cloſely you are engaged, till you have diſcharged this work off your hands; and therefore I will not venture, till it be over, to preſs you again to what you have promiſed in the buſineſs of man's life, morality. But you muſt expect that I ſhall never be forgetful of that, from which I propoſe ſo great good to the world, and ſo much ſatisfaction to

Your moſt entirely affectionate, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 23, 1693.

I HAVE now read over your Eſſay of Human Underſtanding a third time, and always make new diſcoveries therein, of ſomething profound. I ſhould ſet upon it again, but that I will wait for your next edition, which I hope, by this time, is almoſt finiſhed. The uſual ſatisfaction I take in reading all things that come from you, made me lately again run over your chapter "of identity and diverſity;" concerning the juſtneſs whereof, I have yet the ſame opinion as formerly. But one thought ſuggeſted itſelf to me, which on my firſt reading did not occur. It relates to ſect. 22, wherein the reaſon you give, why the law may juſtly puniſh a ſober man, for what he did when drunk, or a waking man, for what he did when walking in his ſleep, though it be true and full in the caſe of the night-walker: yet I conceive it not ſo full in the caſe of the drunken man. For drunkenneſs is itſelf a crime, and therefore no one ſhall alledge it an excuſe of another crime. And in the law we find, "that killing a man by chance-medley is not capital;" yet if I am doing an unlawful act, as ſhooting at a deer in a park, to ſteal it, and by chance-medley I kill a man unawares, this is capital; becauſe the act wherein I was engaged, and which was the occaſion of this miſchief, was in itſelf unlawful, and I cannot plead it in excuſe. In the caſe of the night-walker, your anſwer is true, full, and ſatisfactory; but that in the drunkard's caſe is ſomewhat ſhort. The night-walking is a ſort of diſtemper, not to be helped, or prevented, by the patient. But drunkenneſs is a deliberate act, which a man may eaſily avoid and prevent. Moreover, whatever the law appoints in this caſe, I think, were I on the jury of one, who walking in his ſleep had killed another, I ſhould not violate a good conſcience, if I acquitted him; for he is certainly, during thoſe fits, "non compos mentis;" and it were eaſy to diſtinguiſh, by circumſtances, how far he counterfeited, or not.

You will very much oblige me, by a line or two, to let me know how forward your work is, and what other things you have on the anvil before you; amongſt which, I hope you will not forget your "Thoughts "on Morality." For I am obliged to proſecute this requeſt to you, being the firſt, I preſume, that moved you in it.

THERE is a gentleman in this town, one captain Henry Monk, a nigh relation of the Albemarles, who tells me he has been known to you long ago; and on all occaſions mentions you with the higheſt reſpects. He deſired me, the other day, to give you his moſt humble ſervice. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt obedient ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Honoured SIR, Oates, 19 Jan.—93-4.

I CAN take it for no other, than a great mark of your kindneſs to me, that you ſpend ſo much of your time, in the peruſal of my thoughts, when you have ſo much better of your own to improve it. To which you add this farther obligation, that you read my book for my inſtruction, ſtill taking notice to me of what you judge amiſs in it. This is a good office that ſo few in the world perform in the way that you do, that it deſerves my particular acknowledgment. And I own myſelf no leſs beholden to you, when I differ from you, than when, convinced by your better judgment, you give me opportunity to mend what before was amiſs; your intention being that, to which I equally, in both caſes, owe my gratitude.

You doubt, whether my anſwer be full in the caſe of the drunkard. To try whether it be or no, we muſt conſider what I am there doing. As I remember (for I have not that chapter here by me) I am there ſhewing that puniſhment is annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs: how then can a drunkard be puniſhed for what he did, whereof he is not conſcious? To this I anſwer, human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him; but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. This you think not ſufficient, but would have me add the common reaſon, that drunkenneſs being a crime, one crime cannot be alledged in excuſe for another. This reaſon, how good ſoever, cannot, I think, be uſed by me, as not reaching my caſe; for what has this to do with conſciouſneſs? Nay, it is an argument againſt me, for if a man may be puniſhed for any crime which he committed when drunk, whereof he is allowed not to be conſcious, it overturns my hypotheſis. Your caſe of ſhooting a man by chance, when ſtealing a deer, being made capital, and the like, I allow to be juſt; but then, pray conſider, it concerns not my argument; there being no doubt of conſciouſneſs in that caſe, but only ſhews, that any criminal action infects the conſequences of it. But drunkenneſs has ſomething peculiar in it, when it deſtroys conſciouſneſs; and ſo the inſtances you bring, juſtify not the puniſhing of a drunken fact, that was totally and irrecoverably forgotten; which the reaſon that I give being ſufficient to do, it well enough removed the objection, without entering into the true foundation of the thing, and ſhewing how far it was reaſonable for human juſtice to puniſh a crime of a drunkard, which he could be ſuppoſed not conſcious of, which would have uſeleſly engaged me in a very large diſcourſe, and an impertinent digreſſion. For I aſk you, if a man, by intemperate drinking, ſhould get a fever, and in the frenzy of his diſeaſe (which laſted not, perhaps, above an hour) committed ſome crime, would you puniſh him for it? If you would not think this juſt, how can you think it juſt to puniſh him for any fact committed in a drunken frenzy, with-

out a fever? Both had the ſame criminal cauſe, drunkenneſs, and both committed without conſciouſneſs. I ſhall not enlarge any farther into other particular inſtances, that might raiſe difficulties about the puniſhing, or not puniſhing, the crime of an unconſcious, drunken man; which would not eaſily be reſolved, without enquiring into the reaſon upon which human juſtice ought to proceed in ſuch caſes, which was beyond my preſent buſineſs to do. Thus, Sir, I have laid before you the reaſons, why I have let that paſſage go, without any addition made to it. I deſire you to lay by your friendſhip to me, and only to make uſe of your judgment in conſidering them. And if you are ſtill of opinion, that I need give the reaſon too, that one crime cannot be alledged in excuſe of another, I beg the favour of you to let me know it as ſoon as you can, that I may add what is neceſſary in this place, amongſt the Errata, before my book comes out, which advances now apace, and I believe there are by this time, near 150 pages of it printed. And now, Sir, though I have not agreed with your opinion in this point; yet I beſeech you, believe I am as much obliged to your kindneſs in it as if you had ſhewn me what, upon your reaſon, had appeared to me the groſſeſt miſtake; and I beg the favour of you, whenever you caſt your eye upon any of my writings, to continue and communicate to me your remarks.

YOU write to me, as if ink had the ſame ſpell upon me, that mortar, as the Italians ſay, has upon others, that when I had once got my fingers into it, I could never afterwards keep them out. I grant, that methinks I ſee ſubjects enough, which way ever I caſt my eyes, that deſerve to be otherwiſe handled, than I imagine they have been; but they require abler heads, and ſtronger bodies than I have, to manage them. Beſides, when I reflect on what I have done, I wonder at my own bold folly, that has ſo far expoſed me, in this nice and critical, as well as quick-ſighted and learned age. I ſay not this to excuſe a lazy idleneſs, to which I intend to give up the reſt of my few days. I think every one, according to what way Providence has placed him in, is bound to labour for the publick good, as far as he is able, or elſe he has no right to eat. Under this obligation of doing ſomething, I cannot have a ſtronger to determine me what I ſhall do, than what your deſires ſhall engage me in. I know not whether the attempt will exceed my ſtrength. But there being ſeveral here, who join with you to preſs me to it; (I received a letter with the ſame inſtance, from two of my friends at London, the laſt poſt) I think, the firſt leiſure I can get to myſelf, I ſhall apply my thoughts to it; and however I may miſs my aim, will juſtify myſelf in my obedience to you, and ſome others of my ingenious friends.

I AM exceedingly obliged to captain Monk, for his kind remembrance, and to you for ſending it me, and letting me know he is alive. I have, as I ought, all the eſteem for him, that you know ſo modeſt and good a man deſerves. Pray, when you ſee him, preſent my humble ſervice to him, and let him know that I am extremely glad to hear that he

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is well, and that he has not forgot me, and ſhould be much more ſo, to ſee him here again in England. Pray, give my humble ſervice to your brother. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Feb. 17, 1693-4.

I AM ſo very ſenſible of the great caution, and deep conſideration you uſe, before you write any thing, that I wonder at my own hardineſs, when I venture to object any thing againſt your poſitions. And when I read your anſwers to any ſuch of my objections, I much more admire at my own weakneſs in making them. I have a new inſtance of this in your laſt of January 18th, which came not to this place before yeſterday. This has moſt abundantly ſatisfied me, in the doubt I lay under, concerning the caſe of a drunken man; which you have cleared up to me, in three words, moſt convincingly. So that I think you have no reaſon in the leaſt to alter that paragraph, unleſs you may think it convenient to expreſs that matter a little plainer. Which, I think, indeed, your laſt letter to me does better than your twenty-ſecond ſection of that chapter. That ſection runs thus:

22. "BUT is not a man, drunk and ſober, the ſame perſon? Why elſe "is he puniſhed for the fact he commits, when drunk, though he be "never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame perſon as a "man that walks and does other things in his ſleep, is the ſame perſon, "and is anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human laws "puniſh both with a juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge; becauſe, "in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, what "counterfeit. And ſo the ignorance in drunkenneſs, or ſleep, is not ad-"mitted as a plea," &c.

Now I conceive that which makes the expreſſion herein not ſo very clear, is, "ſuitable to their way of knowledge;" ſome will be apt to miſtake the word, their, to refer to the drunken, or ſleeping man, whereas it refers to the laws, as if you had ſaid, "ſuitable to that way of knowledge, "or information, which the laws have eſtabliſhed to proceed by."

THIS, in your letter, is very manifeſt in a few words. There you ſay, "puniſhment is annexed to perſonality, perſonality to conſciouſneſs. "How then can a drunkard be puniſhed for what he did, whereof he is "not conſcious? To this I anſwer, human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, "becauſe the fact is proved againſt him, but want of conſciouſneſs can-"not be proved for him." This, Sir, is moſt full in the caſe you are there treating of. So I have nothing more to offer in that matter.

ONLY give me leave to propoſe one queſtion more to you, though it be foreign to the buſineſs you are upon, in your chapter of identity. How comes it to paſs, that want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for a drunkard as well as for a frantick? One, methinks, is as manifeſt as the other; and if drunkenneſs may be counterfeit, ſo may a frenzy. Wherefore to me it ſeems, that the law has made a difference in theſe two caſes, on this account, viz. "That drunkenneſs is commonly incurred voluntarily and premeditately; whereas a frenzy is commonly without our "conſent, or impoſſible to be prevented." But enough of this.

I SHOULD not have troubled you with this, but that, according to your uſual candour and goodneſs, you ſeemed to deſire my farther thoughts thereon, as ſpeedily as I could. I am,

Moſt worthy SIR,

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, May 26, 1694.

THE ſlowneſs of the preſs has ſo long retarded my anſwer to your laſt obliging letter, that my book, which is now printed and bound, and ready to be ſent to you, muſt be an excuſe for my long ſilence. By the obedience I have paid to you in the index and ſummaries, ordered according to your deſires, you will ſee it is not want of deference to you, or eſteem of you, that has cauſed this neglect. And the profit I have made by your reflections, on ſeveral paſſages of my book, will, I hope, encourage you to the continuance of that freedom, to a man who can diſtinguiſh between the cenſures of a judicious friend, and the wrangling of a peeviſh critic. There is nothing more acceptable to me than the one, nor more, I think, to be ſlighted than the other. If therefore, as you ſeem to reſolve, you ſhall throw away any more of your time in a peruſal of my Eſſay; judge, I beſeech you, as ſeverely as you can, of what you read. I know you will not forſake truth to quarrel with me; and, whilſt you follow her, you will always oblige me, by ſhewing me my miſtakes, or what ſeems to you to be ſo. You will find in this ſecond edition, that your advice, at any time, has not been thrown away upon me. And you will ſee by the errata, that, though your laſt came a little too late, yet that could not hinder me from following what you ſo kindly, and with ſo much reaſon, ſuggeſted.

I AGREE with you, that, drunkenneſs being a voluntary defect, want of conſciouſneſs ought not to be preſumed in favour of the drunkard. But frenzy being involuntary, and a misfortune, not a fault, has a right to that excuſe, which certainly is a juſt one, where it is truly a frenzy.

And

And all that lies upon human juſtice is to diſtinguiſh carefully between what is real, and what counterfeit in the caſe.

MY book, which I deſire you to accept from me, is put into Mr. Churchill the bookſeller's hand, who has told me he will ſend it in a bale of books, the next week, to Mr. Dobſon, a bookſeller in Caſtle-ſtreet, Dublin; and I have ordered him to ſend with it a copy of the additions and alterations which are printed by themſelves, and will help to make your former book uſeful to any young man, as you will ſee (is deſigned) by the concluſion of the epiſtle to the reader. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, June 2, 1694.

I AM highly obliged to you for the favour of your laſt, of May 26, which I received yeſterday. It brought me the welcome news of the ſecond edition of your Eſſay being publiſhed; and that you have favoured me with a copy, which I ſhall expect with ſome impatience; and when I have peruſed it, I ſhall, with all freedom, give you my thoughts of it.

AND now that you have cleared your hands of your ſecond edition, I hope you may have leiſure to turn your thoughts to the ſubject I have ſo often propoſed to you; but this, you will ſay, is a cruelty in me, that no ſooner you are rid of one trouble, but I ſet you on another. Truly, Sir, were I ſenſible it could be a trouble to you, I ſhould hardly preſume ſo far on your goodneſs; but I know thoſe things are ſo eaſy and natural to your mind, that they give you no pain in the production. And I know alſo, ſuch is your univerſal love of mankind, that you count nothing troubleſome that tends to their good, in a matter of ſo great concernment as morality.

I HAVE formerly told you what care I propoſed to take in the education of my only child. I muſt now beg your pardon, if I trouble you in a matter wherein I ſhall be at a loſs without your aſſiſtance. He is now five years old, of a moſt towardly and promiſing diſpoſition; bred exactly, as far as his age permits, to the rules you preſcribe, I mean as to forming his mind, and maſtering his paſſions. He reads very well, and I think it time now to put him forward to ſome other learning. In order to this, I ſhall want a tutor for him, and indeed this place can hardly afford me one to my mind. If, therefore, you know any ingenious man that may be proper for my purpoſe, you would highly oblige me, by procuring him for me. I confeſs the encouragement I can propoſe to ſuch an one is but moderate, yet, perhaps, there may be ſome found that may not deſpiſe it. He ſhould eat at my own table, and have his lodging, waſhing,

firing, and candlelight, in my houſe, in a good handſome apartment; and beſides this, I ſhould allow him 20l. per annum. His work for this ſhould be only to inſtruct three or four boys in Latin, and ſuch other learning as you recommend in your book; I ſay three or four boys, becauſe, perhaps, I may have a relation's child or two; one, who is my ſiſter's ſon, I have always, and do intend to keep, as a companion to my own ſon; and of more I am uncertain. But if there be one or two, that will be no great addition to his trouble, conſidering that perhaps their parents may recompenſe that by their gratuities. I mention to you, of the languages, only Latin, but, if I could obtain it, I ſhould be glad he were alſo maſter of the French. As to his other qualifications, I ſhall only ſay, in general, I could wiſh them ſuch as you would deſire in a tutor to inſtruct a young gentleman, as you propoſe in your book. I would have him indeed a good man, and a good ſcholar; and I propoſe very much ſatisfaction to myſelf, in the converſation of ſuch a one. And becauſe a man may be cautious of leaving his native ſoil, and coming into a ſtrange country, without ſome certainty of being acceptable to thoſe that ſend for him, and of ſome continuance and ſettlement, I can ſay that I deſign him to ſtay with my ſon to his ſtate of manhood; whether he go into the univerſity, or travel, or whatever other ſtate of life he may take to. And if perhaps on trial for ſome time, he or I may not like each other, I do promiſe to bear his charges both to and from me, ſo that he ſhall be no loſer by his journey.

I BEG your anſwer to this at your leiſure; and if any ſuch preſent, be pleaſed to let me know of him what particulars you can, as his parentage, education, qualifications, diſpoſition, &c. with what other particulars you pleaſe to mention; and accordingly I ſhall write to you farther about it.

IN the mean time, I beſeech you to pardon this trouble given you by,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, June 28, 1694.

SINCE the receipt of your's of the ſecond inſtant, I have made what enquiry I can for a tutor for your ſon; the moſt likely, and the beſt recommended that I have met with, you will have an account of from himſelf in the incloſed, to which I need add little but theſe two things; 1ſt. That Mr. Fletcher, who is a good judge, and a perſon whoſe word I can rely on, gave me a very good character of him, both as to his manners and abilities, and ſaid he would be anſwerable for him: the other

is, that, however it comes to paſs, the Scotch have now here a far greater reputation for this ſort of employment than our own countrymen. I am ſorry it is ſo, but I have of late found it in ſeveral inſtances.

I HOPE, by this time, the ſecond edition of my book, which I ordered for you, and a printed copy of the additions, are come to your hands. I wiſh it were more anſwerable to the value you place in it, and better worth your acceptation. But, as I order the matter, methinks I make it a hard bargain to you, to pay ſo much time and pains as muſt go to the reading it over, though it were more ſlightly than we ſeem agreed, when you promiſe, and I expect, your obſervations on it. There appears to me ſo little material, in the objections that I have ſeen in print againſt me, that I have paſſed them all by but one gentleman's, whoſe book not coming to my hand till thoſe parts of mine were printed that he queſtions, I was fain to put my anſwer in the latter end of the epiſtle.

I WISH the endeavours I have uſed to procure you a tutor for your ſon may be as ſucceſsful as I deſire. It is a buſineſs of great concernment to both you and your ſon; but governors, that have right thoughts concerning education, are hard to be found. It is happy for your ſon that a good part of it is to be under your eye. I ſhall be very glad, if on this, or any other occaſion, I may be able to do you any ſervice; for with great ſincerity and reſpect, I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

My moſt Honoured Friend, Dublin, July 28, 1694.

FOR ſo you have publickly allowed me to call * you; and it is a title wherein I boaſt more than in maces or parliament-robes. By this you may find I have received the ſecond edition of your Eſſay, which I prize as an ineſtimable treaſure of knowledge. It is but a week ſince it came to me; and I have yet only looked over thoſe parts which are newly added, particularly that of liberty, the alterations wherein I take to be moſt judiciouſly made; and now I think that whole chapter ſtands ſo well put together, and the argumentation ſo legitimate, that nothing can ſhake it. I was mightily pleaſed to find therein a rational account of what I have often wondered at, viz. "why men ſhould content themſelves to "ſtay in this life for ever, though at the ſame time they will grant, that "in the next life they expect to be infinitely happy?" Of this you give ſo clear an account in the 44th ſection of your xxi. chapter, book II, that my wonder no longer remains. That candid receſſion from your

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* See Mr. Locke's Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, 2d Edit. p. 68.

former

former hypotheſis, which you ſhew in this chapter, where truth required it, raiſes in me a greater opinion (if poſſible) of your worth than ever. This is rarely to be found amongſt men, and they ſeem to have ſomething angelical, that are ſo far raiſed above the common pitch.

IN time, I ſhall give you my farther thoughts of the other parts of your book, where any thing occurs to me. But, at preſent, I can only pour out my thanks to you for the favourable character under which you have tranſmitted me to poſterity, page 67. My only concern is, that I can pretend to none of it, but that of your friend; and this I ſet up for in the higheſt degree. I ſhould think myſelf happy, had I but half the title to the reſt.

I AM extremely obliged to you for the trouble you took on you in my laſt requeſt, about a tutor for my ſon. I received your letter with Mr. Gibbs's incloſed; to which I returned an anſwer, addreſſed to himſelf. The import whereof was, "That I had ſome offers made to me in this "place, relating to that matter, to which I thought I ſhould hearken, "at leaſt, ſo far as to make ſome trial. That I was loth to divert him "from his good intentions to the miniſtry, and therefore I could not en-"courage him to undertake ſo long a journey, on ſuch uncertainties on "both ſides, &c." I am,

My moſt highly eſteemed friend,
Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,
WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Sept. 3, 1694.

I HAVE ſo much the advantage in the bargain, if friendſhip may be called one, that whatſoever ſatisfaction you find in yourſelf, on that account, you muſt allow in me with a large over-plus. The only riches I have valued, or laboured to acquire, has been the friendſhip of ingenious and worthy men, and therefore you cannot blame me, if I ſo forwardly laid hold of the firſt occaſion that opened me a way to your's. That I have ſo well ſucceeded in it I count one of my greateſt happineſſes, and a ſufficient reward for writing my book, had I no other benefit by it. The opinion you have of it gives me farther hopes, for it is no ſmall reward to one who loves truth, to be perſuaded that he has made ſome diſcoveries of it, and any ways helped to propagate it to others. I depend ſo much upon your judgment and candour, that I think myſelf ſecure in you from peeviſh criticiſm or flattery; only give me leave to ſuſpect, that kindneſs and friendſhip do ſometimes carry your expreſſions a little too far on the favourable ſide. This, however, makes me not apprehend you will ſilently paſs by any thing you are not thoroughly ſatisfied of in it. The uſe I have made of the advertiſements

I have

I have received from you of this kind, will ſatisfy you that I deſire this office of friendſhip from you, not out of compliment, but for the uſe of truth, and that your animadverſions will not be loſt upon me. Any faults you ſhall meet with in reaſoning, in perſpicuity, in expreſſion, or of the preſs, I deſire you to take notice of, and ſend me word of. Eſpecially if you have any where any doubt; for I am perſuaded that, upon debate, you and I cannot be of two opinions; nor, I think, any two men uſed to think with freedom, who really prefer truth to opiniatrety, and a little fooliſh vain-glory, of not having made a miſtake.

I SHALL not need to juſtify what I have ſaid of you in my book: the learned world will be vouchers for me; and that in an age not very free from envy and cenſure. But you are very kind to me, ſince for my ſake you allow yourſelf to own that part which I am more particularly concerned in, and permit me to call you my friend, whilſt your modeſty checks at the other part of your character. But, aſſure yourſelf, I am as well perſuaded of the truth of it, as of any thing elſe in my book; it had not elſe been put down in it. It only wants a great deal more I had to ſay, had that been a place to draw your picture at large. Herein I pretend not to any peculiar obligation above others that know you. For though perhaps I may love you better than many others; yet, I conclude, I cannot think better of you than others do.

I AM very glad you were provided of a tutor nearer home, and it had this particular good luck in it, that otherwiſe you had been diſappointed, if you had depended on Mr. Gibbs; as a letter I wrote to you from London about it, I hope, acquainted you. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Nov. 23, 1694.

YOU ſpeak of my book in ſuch terms, that had I not convincing arguments that you are not a man of compliments, I ſhould a little ſuſpect your civility bordered very much on them in this caſe. But there are ſo few of them to be found, that you think you cannot ſpeak too highly of the endeavours of one who purſues truth unbiaſſedly, and chuſes not his opinions firſt, and then ſeeks arguments to ſupport them. Upon that account I admit of whatever you pleaſe to ſay; but withal give me leave to aſſure you, that in the performance itſelf, I ſee nothing but what any one might have done, who would have ſat down to it with the ſame love of truth and indifferency that I did. However, I cannot but be pleaſed that you think ſo well of it: for whether your friendſhip to me bribes

your judgment, or whether your good opinion of my Eſſay adds to your kind thoughts of the author; I find my account both ways, and ſhould think myſelf well rewarded for my pains in this ſingle purchaſe. But, Sir, will you not pardon ſo lawful a deſire, in one that loves you, if I aſk, ſhall I never have the happineſs to ſee you in England?

MR. Churchill, my bookſeller, ſends me word by the laſt poſt, that he has ſent you the ſix copies that you ſent for, and advice of it. I ſent to him a project of a new reduction of the year by Dr. Wood, to be ſent with the copy of my Eſſay to you. The author gave it me himſelf, and I thought it might poſſibly pleaſe you, if you had not ſeen it before. This, with the ſupernumerary cuts I ordered him to ſend you, will, with the books, I hope, come ſafe to your hands. The mentioning of thoſe cuts puts me in mind again of your civility, which I ſee ſtudies all manner of ways of expreſſing itſelf.

YOU ſee, by this liberty I take with you, that I am paſt terms of compliment with you, that is, I uſe you as one I look upon to be my friend, with a freedom of good offices, either to receive or do them, as it happens. Look upon me as ſuch, I beſeech you, and believe that I am, with the utmoſt ſincerity,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate friend, and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 18, 1694.

YOURS, of November 23, found me labouring under a ſharp fever, which has held me this month paſt; but I am now, God be thanked, pretty well recovered. I am obliged to you for the earneſt deſire you expreſs of ſeeing me in England. But as to that particular, the truth is thus: laſt ſummer I deſigned to make a journey, on purpoſe to pay my reſpects to you, and for no other errand; but my reſolutions were not ſo fixed as to give you any intimations thereof. For indeed the ſtate of my health was ſo very uncertain, that I was very miſtruſtful whether I ſhould be able to undertake the journey. However, I thought to make an eſſay of my ſtrength in our own country; ſo that ſome buſineſs calling me about threeſcore miles from this city, the fatigue was ſo troubleſome to me, that I was quite diſcouraged from thinking of England that ſeaſon. I have now had another pull-back by my preſent ſickneſs, ſo that I cannot yet well tell how to think of the other ſide of the water. This only I will aſſure you, that the firſt entire health God is pleaſed to beſtow on me ſhall be employed in a journey towards you; there being nothing I ſo earneſtly covet as the perſonal acquaintance of one for whom I have

ſo great a reſpect and veneration, to whom I am ſo highly obliged for many favours.

THERE is a very worthy perſon, Dr. St. George Aſhe, provoſt of the college here, lately gone from hence to London; he is a great admirer, and zealous promoter, of your writings in his college. He deſired from me a letter of recommendation to you; but I fear your being in the country will hinder his deſigned happineſs in your converſation. He ſtays in London theſe three or four months to come, in which time, if your buſineſs call you to the city, you will hear of him either at your lodgings at Mr. Pawlin's, (where perhaps he will leave the place of his reſidence) or at Mr. Tucker's, in the ſecretary's office at Whitehall, where a penny-poſt letter will find him out.

I THANK you for the care you have taken to ſend me the books and ſculptures, which I hope to receive in good time, having advice thereof already from Mr. Churchill. I am,

Worthy SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, January 15, 169⅘.

I HAVE received the ſix copies of your book, and thank you for the care you have taken about them. I acknowledge myſelf likewiſe obliged to you for your preſent of Dr. Wood's almanack, though it was not new to me, having received the favour of one from the author himſelf, when accomptant-general here in Ireland, many years ago. It is a very pretty project, but, I believe, it will hardly ever be practiſed; becauſe men think what they have already ſufficiently accurate for the common uſes of life, and are hardly brought from what they have uſed, ſo long as they have done the common Julian account, unleſs prevailed upon by ſome ſuch potent authority as the church, which abrogated the Julian, and eſtabliſhed the Gregorian kalendar.

THE ſculptures alſo I received, and thank you for them. I ſhall do them all the honour that outward ornament can give them. And I heartily wiſh I had more effectual ways of ſhewing my reſpects, which I think I can never do ſufficiently.

I HAVE ever thought that an elegant tranſlation of your Eſſay into Latin would be highly acceptable to foreigners, and of great uſe in thoſe countries, whoſe minds lie yet captivated in verboſe, diſputative philoſophy, and falſe reaſoning; I therefore preſume to mention it to you, that though your own leiſure may not permit you to perform it yourſelf, you may think of putting ſome one on it, that under your eye may

do it correctly. And were I not perſuaded that your own eye and correction were abſolutely requiſite herein, I would venture to make a bold propoſal to have it done by ſome one in this place, whom I ſhould reward for his labour herein. And this I do, not that I think you may not with a great deal of eaſe employ one yourſelf in this matter, but merely that herein I may have an opportunity of doing ſo much good in the world. You ſee, Sir, what a veneration I have for your writings, and therefore you will pardon me, if I deſire from you, "ſub amicitiæ "teſſerâ," the names of what books you have publiſhed. I remember, once I propoſed to you the like requeſt, and you were ſilent to it. If it were, that you deſignedly conceal them, I acquieſce; but perhaps it proceeded from your curſory paſſing over that part of my letter, which makes me venture again on the ſame requeſt. And now that your thoughts are at liberty from that Eſſay, you will give me leave, with all ſubmiſſion, to mind you of what you once told me you would think of, viz. of demonſtrating morals. I am ſure, as no hand could perform it better; ſo no age ever required it more than ours.

I DO heartily wiſh you an happy ſucceeding year; and may it end with us happier than the laſt paſt. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt obliged, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, 8 Mar. 169⅘.

YOU will, I fear, think me frozen up with this long winter, or elſe with a negligence colder than that, having two very obliging letters of yours by me, the one ever ſince January, the other February laſt, I make you no anſwer to either, till thus far in March. The truth is, expecting ever ſince I received your laſt letter an account from London, concerning ſomething I had a mind to put into my letter, and after writing four times about it, being yet delayed, I can forbear no longer to return you my thanks, and to beg your pardon that I have been ſo ſlow in it. If you interpret it right, you will look upon it as the effect of a friendſhip got paſt formalities, and that has confidence enough to make bold with you, where it is without neglect of you, or prejudice to either. I was not a little rejoiced with the news you ſent me in the firſt of your letters, of your ſafe recovery of a fever. Had I known it before the danger was over, that you had been ill, it would have been no ſmall fright and pain to me. For I muſt aſſure you that, amongſt all the friends your kindneſs or worth has procured you, there is not any one who values you more than I do, or does more intereſt himſelf in all your concerns. This makes me, that though I have a long time extremely deſired

ſired to ſee you, and propoſe to myſelf an infinite ſatisfaction in a free converſation with you; yet what you tell me, that you were coming laſt ſummer into England, to make me a viſit, makes me dread the ſatisfaction of my own wiſhes. And methinks I ought not to purchaſe one of the greateſt happineſſes I can propoſe to myſelf at ſo dear and dangerous a rate. I have received many and great obligations from you before; but they were ſuch as, though I had no title to, I thought I might accept from one whom I love, and therefore was glad to find kind to me. But when I reflect on the length of the way, and the ſea between us, the danger of the one, and the fatigue of both, and your no very robuſt conſtitution, as I imagine, I cannot conſent you ſhould venture ſo much for my ſake. If any harm ſhould happen to you in the journey, I could never forgive it myſelf, to be the occaſion of ſo great a loſs to the world and myſelf. And if you ſhould come ſafe, the greatneſs of the hazard, and an obligation out of all proportion to what I either ought to receive, or was capable to return, would overwhelm me with ſhame, and hinder my enjoyment. And yet, if I may confeſs my ſecret thoughts, there is not any thing which I would not give, that ſome other unavoidable occaſion would draw you into England. A rational free-minded man, tied to nothing but truth, is ſo rare a thing, that I almoſt worſhip ſuch a friend; but when friendſhip is joined to it, and theſe are brought into a free converſation, where they meet, and can be together; what is there can have equal charms? I cannot but exceedingly wiſh for that happy day, when I may ſee a man I have ſo often longed to have in my embraces. But yet, though it would endear the gift to receive it from his kindneſs, I cannot but wiſh rather that fortune alone would throw him into my arms.

THIS cold winter has kept me ſo cloſe a priſoner within doors, that, 'till yeſterday, I have been abroad but once theſe three months, and that only a mile in a coach. And the inability I am in to breathe London air in cold weather has hindered me yet from the happineſs of waiting on Dr. Aſhe; but I hope to get to London before he leaves it, that I may, to a perſon whom you have an eſteem for, pay ſome part of the reſpects I owe you. I had laſt week the honour of a viſit from an ingenious gentleman, a member of your college at Dublin, lately returned from Turky. He told me he was a kinſman of yours; and though his other good qualities might have made him welcome any where, he was not, you may be ſure, the leſs welcome to me, for being known and related to you. He ſeems to me to have been very diligent and curious in making obſervations whilſt he has been abroad, and more inquiſitive than moſt of our people that go into thoſe parts. And, by the diſcourſe I had with him the little time we were together, I promiſe myſelf we ſhall have a more exact account of thoſe parts, in what I hope he intends to publiſh, than hitherto is extant. Dr. Huntington, who was formerly at Aleppo, and is my old acquaintance, and now my neighbour in this country, brought Mr. Smith hither with him from his

houſe. But yet I muſt acknowledge the favour to you, and deſire you to thank him for it when he returns to Dublin. For the friendſhip he knew you had for me, was, I take it, the great inducement that made him give himſelf the trouble of coming ſix or ſeven miles in a dirty country.

You do ſo attack me on every ſide with your kindneſs to my book, to me, to my ſhadow, that I cannot but be aſhamed I am not in a capacity to make you any other acknoweledgment, but in a very full and deep ſenſe of it. I return you my thanks for the corrections you have ſent me, which I will take all the care of I can in the next edition, which, my bookſeller tells me, he thinks, will be this ſummer. And if any other fall under your obſervation, I ſhall deſire the continuance of your favour in communicating them.

I MUST own to you, that I have been ſolicited from beyond ſea to put my Eſſay into Latin; but you gueſs right, I have not the leiſure to do it. It was once tranſlated by a young man in Holland into Latin; but he was ſo little maſter of the Engliſh or Latin tongue, that when it was ſhewed me, which he did not till he had quite done it, I ſatisfied him that it would be very little for his credit to publiſh it; and ſo that was laid by. Since that, my bookſeller was, and had been for ſome time, ſeeking for a tranſlator, whom he would have treated with to have undertaken it, and have ſatisfied for his pains. But a little before the coming of your letter, he writ me word he had been diſappointed, where he expected to have found one who would have done it, and was now at a loſs. So that what you call a bold, is not only the kindeſt, but the moſt ſeaſonable propoſal you could have made. You underſtand my thoughts as well as I do myſelf, and can be a fit judge, whether the tranſlator has expreſſed them well in Latin or no; and can direct him, where to omit or contract any thing where you think I have been more large than needed. And though in this I know you intend, as you ſay, ſome good to the world; yet I cannot but take it as a very particular obligation to myſelf, and ſhall not be a little ſatisfied to have my book go abroad into the world with ſtrokes of your judicious hand to it. For, as to omitting, adding, altering, tranſpoſing any thing in it, I permit it wholly to your judgment. And if there be any thing in it defective, or which you think may be added with advantage to the deſign of the whole work, if you will let me know, I ſhall endeavour to ſupply that defect the beſt I can. The chapter "of Identity and Diverſity," which owes its birth wholly to your putting me upon it, will be an encouragement to you to lay any the like commands upon me. I have had ſome thoughts myſelf, that it would not be poſſibly amiſs to add, in lib. iv. cap. 18, ſomething about enthuſiaſm, or to make a chapter of it by itſelf. If you are of the ſame mind, and that it will not be foreign to the buſineſs of my Eſſay, I promiſe you, before the tranſlator you ſhall employ ſhall be got ſo far, I will ſend you my thoughts on that ſubject, ſo that it may be put into the Latin edition. I have alſo examined P. Malebranche's opinion concerning "ſee-

" ing all things in God," and to my own ſatisfaction laid open the vanity, inconſiſtency, and unintelligibleneſs of that way of explaining Human Underſtanding. I have gone almoſt, but not quite through it, and know not whether I now ever ſhall finiſh it, being fully ſatisfied myſelf about it. You cannot think how often I regret the diſtance that is between us; I envy Dublin for what I every day want in London. Were you in my neighbourhood, you would every day be troubled with the propoſal of ſome of my thoughts to you. I find mine generally ſo much out of the way of the books I meet with, or men led by books, that, were I not conſcious to myſelf that I impartially ſeek truth, I ſhould be diſcouraged from letting my thoughts looſe, which commonly lead me out of the beaten track. However, I want ſome body near me, to whom I could freely communicate them, and without reſerve lay them open. I ſhould find ſecurity and eaſe in ſuch a friend as you, were you within diſtance. For your judgment would confirm and ſet me at reſt, where it approved; and your candour would excuſe what your judgment corrected, and ſet me right in. As to your requeſt you now repeat to me, I deſire you to believe that there is nothing in your letters which I paſs over ſlightly, or without taking notice of; and if I formerly ſaid nothing to it, think it to be, that I thought it the beſt way of anſwering a friend, whom I was reſolved to deny nothing that was in my power. There are ſome particular obligations that tie me up in the point, and which have drawn on me ſome diſpleaſure for a time, from ſome of my friends, who made me a ſomewhat like demand. But I expect to find you more reaſonable, and give you this aſſurance, that you ſhall be the firſt that ſhall be ſatisfied in that point. I am not forgetful of what you ſo kindly put me upon. I think no-body ought to live only to eat and drink, and count the days he ſpends idly. The ſmall remainder of a crazy life I ſhall, as much as my health will permit, apply to the ſearch of truth, and ſhall not neglect to propoſe to myſelf thoſe that may be moſt uſeful. My paper is more than done, and, I ſuppoſe, you tired, and yet I can ſcarce give off. I am,

Dear S I R,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

S I R, Dublin, March 26, 1695.

THE concern you expreſs for my welfare is extremely obliging, and I never prized my health ſo much, as ſince thereby I am enabled to enjoy your correſpondence and friendſhip. But whatever becomes of me and my carcaſe, I can heartily wiſh you had one more eaſy, healthful, and ſtrong. For I know mankind in general is intereſted in you;

you; whereas I am ſure to fall unlamented to all, ſave a few particular friends.

I UNDERSTAND my kinſman has enjoyed that which I have earneſtly longed for. He tells me, by letter, the great obligations he bears you, for the civilities you ſhewed him, and deſires me to acknowledge them.

I AM very glad to find your Eſſay like to ſuffer a third impreſſion; it is a good ſign, and ſhews the world not ſo averſe to truth, when fairly laid open. To have truth prevail, the only way is calmly and meekly to publiſh it, and let it ſhift for itſelf; "magna res eſt veritas & præ- "valebit:" It will make its own party good without fire and faggot, which never promoted, but, I am ſure, has often ſtifled it.

THIS encourages me, with more vigour, to promote the tranſlation of your work; and to own myſelf infinitely obliged to you, that you are pleaſed ſo readily to comply with the offer I made you in my laſt. Yeſterday I ſent for an ingenious young man of the college here, to diſcourſe with him about it. The reſult was, he would make an eſſay, and ſhew it me, and accordingly would proceed or deſiſt. But then, he tells me, that he cannot ſet himſelf fully to it till towards the latter end of May; for he deſigns to ſtand candidate for a fellowſhip in the college, which, by the removal of the provoſt, is to be diſpoſed of about next Trinity-ſunday; and, in the mean time, he is to prepare himſelf for the examination they undergo on that occaſion. I ſhall ſee his firſt attempt the next week, and ſhall give you an account. As to any alterations to be made by me, I ſhould be very cautions of meddling therein; I know the whole work has already undergone ſo exact a judgment, that there is no room left for amendments. However, if any ſuch offer, after your approbation of them, I ſhould venture to inſert them.

I MUST freely confeſs, that if my notion of enthuſiaſm agrees with yours, there is no neceſſity of adding any thing concerning it, more than by the bye, and in a ſingle ſection in chap. 18. lib. iv. I conceive it to be no other than a religious ſort of madneſs, and compriſes not in it any mode of thinking, or operation of the mind, different from what you have treated of in your Eſſay. It is true indeed, the abſurdities men embrace on account of religion are moſt aſtoniſhing; and if in a chapter of enthuſiaſm you endeavour to give an account of them, it would be very acceptable. So that (on ſecond thoughts) I do very well approve of what you propoſe therein, being very deſirous of having your ſentiments on any ſubject.

"PERE MALEBRANCHE's chapter "of ſeeing all things in God," was ever to me abſolutely unintelligible; and unleſs you think a polemick diſcourſe in your Eſſay (which you have hitherto avoided therein) may not be of a piece with the reſt, I am ſure it highly deſerves to be expoſed, and is very agreeable to the buſineſs of your work. I would therefore humbly propoſe it to you, to conſider of doing ſomething therein. Pere Malebranche has many curious notions, and ſome as erroneous and abſurd. It is a good while ſince I read him; but I am now

turning

turning him over a ſecond time: he is moſtly Platonick, and, in ſome things, almoſt enthuſiaſtical. I am,

Honoured dear SIR,

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

M. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, April 26, 1695.

YOU look with the eyes, and ſpeak the language of friendſhip, when you make my life of much more concern to the world than your own. I take it, as it is, for an effect of your kindneſs, and ſo ſhall not accuſe you of compliment; the miſtakes and over-valuings of good-will being always ſincere, even when they exceed what common truth allows. This on my ſide, I muſt beg you to believe, that my life would be much more pleaſant and uſeful to me, if you were within my reach, that I might ſometimes enjoy your converſation, and, upon twenty occaſions, lay my thoughts before you, and have the advantage of your judgment. I cannot complain that I have not my ſhare of friends of all ranks, and ſuch, whoſe intereſt, aſſiſtance, affection, and opinions too, in fit caſes, I can rely on. But methinks, for all this, there is one place vacant, that I know nobody that would ſo well fill as yourſelf; I want one near me to talk freely with, "de quolibet ente;" to propoſe to the extravagancies that riſe in my mind; one with whom I would debate ſeveral doubts and queſtions, to ſee what was in them. Meditating by one's ſelf is like digging in the mine; it often, perhaps, brings up maiden earth, which never came near the light before; but whether it contains any metal in it, is never ſo well tried as in converſation with a knowing judicious friend, who carries about with him the true touch-ſtone, which is love of truth in a clear-thinking head. Men of parts and judgment the world uſually gets hold of, and by a great miſtake (that their abilities of mind are loſt, if not employed in the purſuit of wealth or power) engages them in the ways of fortune and intereſt, which uſually leave but little freedom or leiſure of thought for pure diſintereſted truth. And ſuch who give themſelves up frankly, and in earneſt, to the full latitude of real knowledge, are not every-where to be met with. Wonder not, therefore, that I wiſh ſo much for you in my neighbourhood; I ſhould be too happy in a friend of your make, were you within my reach. But yet I cannot but wiſh that ſome buſineſs would once bring you within diſtance; and it is a pain to me to think of leaving the world, without the happineſs of ſeeing you.

I DO not wonder that a kinſman of yours ſhould magnify civilities that ſcarce deſerve the name; I know not wherein they conſiſted, but in being glad to ſee one that was any way related to you, and was himſelf a very

ingenious man; either of thoſe was a title to more than I did, or could ſhew him. I am ſorry I have not yet had an opportunity to wait on him in London, and I fear he ſhould be gone before I am able to get thither. This long winter, and cold ſpring, has hung very heavy upon my lungs, and they are not yet in a caſe to be ventured in London air, which muſt be my excuſe for not waiting upon him and Dr. Aſhe yet.

THE third edition of my Eſſay has already, or will be ſpeedily in the preſs. But what perhaps will ſeem ſtranger, and poſſibly pleaſe you better, an abridgment is now making (if it be not already done) by one of the univerſity of Oxford, for the uſe of young ſcholars, in the place of an ordinary ſyſtem of logick. From the acquaintance I had of the temper of that place, I did not expect to have it get much footing there. But ſo it is, I ſome time ſince received a very civil letter from one, wholly a ſtranger to me there, concerning ſuch a deſign; and, by another from him ſince, I conclude it near done. He ſeems to be an ingenious man, and he writes ſenſibly about it, but I can ſay nothing of it till I ſee it; and he, of his own accord, has offered that it ſhall wholly be ſubmitted to my opinion, and diſpoſal of it. And thus, Sir, poſſibly that which you once propoſed may be attained to, and I was pleaſed with the gentleman's deſign for your ſake.

YOU are a ſtrange man, you oblige me very much by the care you take to have it well tranſlated, and you thank me for complying with your offer. In my laſt, as I remember, I told you the reaſon why it was ſo long before I writ, was an expectation of an anſwer from London, concerning ſomething I had to communicate to you: it was in ſhort this; I was willing to know what my bookſeller would give for a good Latin copy; he told me, at laſt, twenty pounds. His delay was, becauſe he would firſt have known what the tranſlator demanded. But I forced him to make his propoſal, and ſo I ſend it to you, to make what uſe of it you pleaſe. He ſince writ me word, that a friend of his at Oxford would, in ſome time, be at leiſure to do it, and would undertake it. I bid him excuſe himſelf to him, for that it was in hands I approved of, and ſome part of it now actually done. For I hope the eſſay (he was to ſhew you the next week after you writ to me laſt) pleaſed you. Think it not a compliment, that I deſire you to make what alterations you think fit. One thing particularly you will oblige me and the world in, and that is, in paring off ſome of the ſuperfluous repetitions, which I left in for the ſake of illiterate men, and the ſofter ſex, not uſed to abſtract notions and reaſonings. But much of this reaſoning will be out of doors in a Latin tranſlation. I refer all to your judgment, and ſo am ſecure it will be done as is beſt.

WHAT I ſhall add concerning enthuſiaſm, I gueſs, will very much agree with your thoughts, ſince yours jump ſo right with mine, about the place where it is to come in, I having deſigned it for chap. 18. lib. iv, as a falſe principle of reaſoning often made uſe of. But, to give an hiſtorical

hiſtorical account of the various ravings men have embraced for religion, would, I fear, be beſides my purpoſe, and be enough to make an huge volume.

MY opinion of P. Malebranche agrees perfectly with yours. What I have writ concerning "ſeeing all things in God," would make a little treatiſe of itſelf. But I have not quite gone through it, for fear I ſhould by ſomebody or other be tempted to print it. For I love not controverſies, and have a perſonal kindneſs for the author. When I have the happineſs to ſee you, we will conſider it together, and you ſhall diſpoſe of it.

I think I ſhall make ſome other additions to be put into your Latin tranſlation, and particularly concerning the "connexion of ideas," which has not, that I know, been hitherto conſidered, and has, I gueſs, a greater influence upon our minds, than is uſually taken notice of. Thus, you ſee, I make you the confident of my reveries; you would be troubled with a great many more of them, were you nearer. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, May 7, 1695.

I AM extremely pleaſed to underſtand by yours of April 26, that we are to expect an abridgment of your work from a judicious hand in Oxford; it is what I always thought might be of good uſe in the univerſities, where we yet want another ſort of language, than what has hitherto prevailed there, to the great hindrance of ſcience.

As to the tranſlation that is going on here, it is undertaken by one Mr. William Mullart, a ſenior batchelor in the College. He has the repute of an ingenious and learned young man, and I hope he may perform it well. I here incloſe a ſpecimen of his performance, concerning which I deſire you would give me your thoughts, before he proceed much farther. This only may be hinted, that when he is better acquainted with the work, and your language, and has entered farther into it, it is probable his tranſlation may be better, more eaſy and natural. He propoſes to finiſh it in half a year, or nine months at fartheſt; for he cannot wholly diſengage himſelf from ſome other ſtudies. I perceive your bookſeller is reſolved to ſhare with me in the good I thought to do the world, by beſtowing on it this tranſlation. And ſince he is ſo generous as to have it ſo, I will, by no means, be the tranſlator's hindrance in partaking of the bookſeller's proffer; and, at the ſame time, to engage his diligence the more, I will increaſe the reward conſiderably, that I may not wholly miſs of the good deſign I firſt propoſed to myſelf. If

you encourage the tranſlator to go forward, you may be pleaſed to tranſmit to me the additions you deſign; as that of "enthuſiaſm, connexion of ideas," and what elſe you have.

AND now, with redoubled force, I ſend back to you the complaints you make for our diſtance. I cannot but hope, that Providence has yet in ſtore for me ſo much happineſs on this ſide the grave; and if it have not, I ſhall think I have miſſed the greateſt temporal good my mind was ever ſet on. But I ſtill ſay, I live in hopes, the accompliſhment whereof would be the greateſt ſatisfaction to

Your moſt cordially affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

WERE it not too nigh approaching to vanity, I could tell you of the extraordinary effects your method of education has had on my little boy.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, 2 July, 1695.

DID I not aſſure myſelf that our friendſhip were grown beyond ſuſpicion or compliment, I ſhould think I ſhould have need to make excuſes to you for my long ſilence; but I know you will credit me, when I tell you it has been neither forgetfulneſs nor negligence. The ſpecimen of the tranſlation you ſent me, gave me ſome reaſon to apprehend, that Mr. Mullart's ſtile would lay too great a burthen on your kindneſs, by often needing the correction of your hand, to make it expreſs my ſenſe with that clearneſs and eaſineſs, which I know you deſire. My bookſeller therefore having before told me of one who had offered to undertake the tranſlation of my Eſſay, I have been ever ſince endeavouring to get from him a ſpecimen, that I might ſend it you, and have your opinion, which is like to do beſt; that ſo if this man had a talent that way, you might be eaſed of the trouble, which your friendſhip to me, and zeal to the work, I foreſee, is likely to lay upon you. But, having the laſt poſt received this account from Mr. Churchill, that the gentleman propoſed is in the country, and muſt have a book ſent him down, on purpoſe, before we can expect to ſee any thing from him, and this being all to be managed by a third hand, who is not every day to be met with; I have reſolved to loſe no more time on that thought, but accepting of your kind offer, put that whole matter into your hands, to be ordered as you ſhall think beſt, and ſhall ſpend no more time in other enquiries, ſince the gentleman you propoſe will (as I remember you told me) be about this time at leiſure to ſet himſelf in earneſt to it. There is one thing I would offer, which may be of advantage to him and the work too, and that is, that he would conſtantly and ſedulouſly read Tully, eſpecially his philoſophical works, which will inſenſibly

work him into a good Latin ſtile. I have heard it reported of Biſhop Sanderſon, that being aſked how he came to write Latin ſo well, as appears in the treatiſes he publiſhed in that tongue? he anſwered, "By "ordering his ſtudies ſo, that he read over all Tully's works every year." I leave it to you, whether you will think fit to mention this to Mr. Mullart.

THE abridgment of my Eſſay is quite finiſhed. It is done by a very ingenious man of Oxford, a maſter of arts, very conſiderable for his learning and virtue, who has a great many pupils. It is done with the ſame deſign you had in view, when you mentioned it. He has generally (as far as I could remember) made uſe of my words; he very civilly ſent it me when it was done, and, upon looking it over, I gueſs you will approve of it, and think it well done. It is in Mr. Churchill's hands, and will be printed as ſoon as the third edition of my Eſſay, which is now in the preſs, is printed off.

I AM extremely glad to hear that you have found any good effects of my method on your ſon. I ſhould be glad to know the particulars; for though I have ſeen the ſucceſs of it in a child of the lady, in whoſe houſe I am, (whoſe mother has taught him Latin without knowing it herſelf when ſhe began) yet I would be glad to have other inſtances; becauſe ſome men, who cannot endure any thing ſhould be mended in the world by a new method, object, I hear, that my way of education is impracticable. But this I can aſſure you, that the child above-mentioned, but nine years old in June laſt, has learned to read and write very well; is now reading Quintus Curtius with his mother, underſtands geography and chronology very well, and the Copernican ſyſtem of our vortex; is able to multiply well, and divide a little; and all this without ever having had one blow for his book. The third edition is now out: I have ordered Mr. Churchill to ſend you one of them, which I hope he has done before this. I expect your opinion of the additions, which have much increaſed the bulk of the book. And though I think all that I have ſaid right; yet you are the man I depend on for a fair and free cenſure, not inclined either to flatter, or quarrel. You know not of what value a knowing man, that is a ſincere lover of truth, is, nor how hard to be found; wonder not, therefore, if I place a great part of my happineſs in your friendſhip, and wiſh every day you were my neighbour; you would then find what uſe I ſhould make of it. But, not to complain of what cannot be remedied, pray let me have all the advantage I can at this diſtance. Read the additions, and examine them ſtrictly, for I would not willingly miſlead the world. Pray let me know whether the Doctor, your brother, has any children; when he has, I count I owe him one of my books of Education.

WITH my treatiſe of Education, I believe you will receive another little one concerning intereſt and coinage. It is one of the fatherleſs children, which the world lay at my door; but, whoever be the author, I ſhall be glad to know your opinion of it.

AND now I muſt mightily bemoan the loſs of an happineſs which you deſigned me, and I through great misfortune miſſed. The impreſſions of the laſt ſevere winter on my weak lungs, and the ſlow return of warm weather this ſpring, confined me ſo long to the country, that I concluded Dr. Aſhe would be gone before I ſhould get to town, and I ſhould loſe the honour of ſo deſired an acquaintance. However, as ſoon as I was got to London, I enquired of Mr. Churchill, who told me Dr. Aſhe was lately in town, and he promiſed me, as I deſired him, that he would enquire whether he was ſtill there, and where he lodged. He returned me no anſwer, and I (through a multitude of buſineſs) forgot to enquire again, for ſome few days. Upon the firſt thought of it again, I went to the ſecretary's office at Whitehall, and not finding Mr. Tucker there, I went to his houſe, who told me that Dr. Aſhe was that very morning gone out of town. The miſſing of him thus unluckily, when he had been within my reach, very much vexed me; and it looked, as if fortune had a mind ſenſibly to croſs me, in what ſhe knew I was extremely deſirous of. I enquired too for Mr. Smith; but he, I heard, was gone to Flanders before I came to town. It would have been more than ordinary ſatisfaction to me, to have converſed and made an acquaintance with ſo eſteemed a friend of yours as Dr. Aſhe. I ſhall not be at quiet, till ſome buſineſs brings you into England to repair this loſs, and brings me a ſatisfaction to the moſt earneſt of all my deſires. My decaying health does not promiſe me any long ſtay in this world; you are the only perſon in it, that I deſire to ſee once, and to converſe ſome time with, before I leave it. I wiſh your other occaſions might draw you into England, and then let me alone to huſband our time together; I have laid all that in my head already. But I talk my deſires and fancies as if they were in view. I wiſh you all manner of happineſs, and am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Pray preſent my humble ſervice to Dr. Aſhe, and excuſe my misfortunate loſs to him.

WHEN you conſider the length of this, you will find my late ſilence was not from a ſparingneſs of ſpeech, or backwardneſs to talk with you; I have more reaſon now to beg your pardon for my talkativeneſs than ſilence.

THE additions I intend to make, ſhall be ſent time enough for the tranſlator.

Mr.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Aug. 24, 1695.

I Deferred my anſwer all this while to yours of July 2, (which I received ſome weeks ago) in expectation of the books you have been pleaſed to order for me; but hitherto they are not arrived, and I would not omit my duty any longer, leſt the buſineſs of our enſuing parliament ſhould give me a farther hinderance. The univerſity has done me the honour to chooſe me as one of their repreſentatives; and though I cannot pretend to do them any great ſervice, yet it ſhall not be for want of conſtant attendance on their buſineſs, which will take up moſt of my time, till the ſeſſion is ended.

I AM now at a great loſs what apology to make you, for the diſappointment you are at laſt like to receive in the tranſlation of your Eſſay. But, to a candid and ingenuous man, the beſt excuſe is a plain narrative of the matter of fact.

THE gentleman whom I formerly mentioned to you, Mr. Mullart, went into the country about the middle of laſt June, and returned about a fortnight ago. When he went away, he aſſured me, he would make a conſiderable progreſs in the work, in a month or ſix weeks time; but he was taken ill for about a fortnight, and, at his return, I found he had ſcarce done four pages of the book. I found alſo, (as you rightly ſurmiſed) that his ſtile will hardly anſwer expectation; but this difficulty, I thought, might be overcome by time and application. But what to ſay to his very ſlow performance I cannot tell, or whether it may anſwer your, or your bookſeller's deſigns. But that which moſt of all diſcourages me, is, that the young man himſelf ſeems not very fond of the undertaking, but has fixed his thoughts on another purſuit. I formerly told you how he deſigned for a fellowſhip, had any at that time happened vacant, as there did none. But very lately there are two fellowſhips become void, and a third like to be ſo, before the time of ſitting for them, which is next June 1696, and he tells me plainly, he muſt endeavour to get one of them; and that there will be at leaſt five competitors, if not ſix, who are all his ſeniors; and therefore, he muſt uſe his utmoſt diligence, application and ſtudy in the intermediate time, to fit himſelf for the examination they undergo; and this, he ſays, will take up ſo much of his time, that he knows not whether he ſhall have any to ſpare for the tranſlation.

I CANNOT well tell which way next to turn myſelf in this affair. I have but one anchor more, and that is not at hand immediately to uſe. There is a gentleman of my acquaintance, the greateſt maſter of ſtile of any I have known, who, I am confident, would perform this work to your utmoſt ſatisfaction; but he is not, at preſent, in town; and when he comes, (which, I expect, may be about Michaelmas next, as I have it from himſelf) I make ſome doubt, whether his other avocations will

permit him to undertake this. He is chancellor of the dioceſe of Down and Connor, and has alſo a private work of his own, in Latin, now fitting for the preſs, which he permits to run through my hands, as he goes on with it. When he comes to town, I will move him in it, if you will give me leave, and you ſhall know the event.

I AM mightily pleaſed that your Eſſay is abridged, though, for my own reading, I would not part with a ſyllable of it. However, others may not have ſo much leiſure as to ſet on a large book, and for ſuch the abridgment may be uſeful. It is to me no ſmall argument of the curious genius of the Engliſh nation, that a work ſo abſtract as yours, ſhould now ſuffer three impreſſions in ſo ſhort a time.

I HAVE already ſo much experience of your method of education, that I long to ſee your third edition. And ſince you put me upon it, (to whom I can refuſe nothing in my power) I will give you a ſhort account of my little boy's progreſs under it.

HE was ſix years old about the middle of laſt July. When he was but juſt turned five, he could read perfectly well; and on the globes could have traced out, and pointed at all the noted parts, countries, and cities of the world, both land and ſea. And by five and an half could perform many of the plaineſt problems on the globe, as the longitude and latitude, the antipodes, the time with them and other countries, &c. and this by way of play and diverſion, ſeldom called to it, never chid or beaten for it. About the ſame age he could read any number of figures, not exceeding ſix places, break it as you pleaſe by cyphers or zeros. By the time he was ſix, he could manage a compaſs, ruler and pencil, very prettily, and perform many little geometrical tricks, and advanced to writing and arithmetick; and has been about three months at Latin, wherein his tutor obſerves, as nigh as he can, the method preſcribed by you. He can read a Gazette, and, in the large maps of Sanſon, ſhews moſt of the remarkable places as he goes along, and turn to the proper maps. He has been ſhewn ſome dogs diſſected, and can give ſome little account of the grand traces of anatomy. And as to the formation of his mind, which you rightly obſerve to be the moſt valuable part of education; I do not believe that any child had ever his paſſions more perfectly at command. He is obedient and obſervant to the niceſt particular, and at the ſame time ſprightly, playful, and active.

BUT I will ſay no more; this may be tireſome to others, however pleaſing to myſelf.

I HAVE ſome thoughts of ſeeing England next ſpring, or ſummer; but the time I cannot prefix as yet, till I ſee how our affairs are like to go in parliament, and whether we are like to have another ſeſſion, and when. The other day I chanced to mention your name accidentally to his excellency my lord Capel, who thereupon expreſſed himſelf with the utmoſt reſpect and eſteem for you. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 16 Nov. 1695.

THOUGH there be no man in the world that I ſo much long to ſee as you; yet your laſt letter, of the ſecond inſtant, makes me afraid of your coming. Your kindneſs and expreſſion in my favour, has painted me ſo in your fancy, that I ſhall unavoidably fall many degrees in your eſteem, when you find me come ſo much ſhort of what you expected; "Paratus eſt mihi magnus adverſarius, expectatio," as I remember, Tully ſomewhere ſays. One thing only I have to ſatisfy myſelf, viz. That, whatever I may want of thoſe qualities you aſcribe to me, I have one that helps mightily to cover defects, and make one acceptable, without the recommendation of great perfections; I mean friendſhip, true and ſincere. This I can boaſt of to you, this I can bid you expect, and tell you, you ſhall not be deceived. Come then, but come with this reſolution, that you will be content, that ſhall make up to you all thoſe fine things which you imagine before-hand, in a man whom you will really find a plain, honeſt, well-meaning man, who unbiaſſedly ſeeks truth, though it be but a very ſmall part of it he has yet diſcovered.

I am very glad you approve of the additions to the third edition of my Education; you are a father, and are concerned not to be deceived, and therefore I expect you will not flatter me in this point. You ſpeak ſo well of that you have, that I ſhall take care to have another of thoſe treatiſes of Intereſt and Coinage ſent to you. The affair of our money, which is in a lamentable ſtate, is now under debate here: what the iſſue will be, I know not; I pray for a good one. I find every body almoſt looks on it as a myſtery; to me there appears to be none at all in it. It is but ſtripping it of the cant which all men that talk of it involve it in, and there is nothing eaſier: lay by the arbitrary names of pence and ſhillings, and conſider and ſpeak of it as grains and ounces of ſilver, and it is as eaſy as telling of twenty.

I HAD a great deal more to ſay to you, in anſwer to this, and two other obliging letters, I am indebted to you for: But I am ſent for into the country by an expreſs. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt affectionate ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, 20 Nov. 1695.

BEFORE I left London, I gave order that the book you desired about Interest and Money, should be sent you by the first opportunity. But it is to you I send it, and not to any body else; you may give it to whom you please, for it is yours as soon as you receive it; but pray do not give it to any body in my name, or as a present from me. And however you are pleased to make me a compliment, in making me the author of a book you think well of; yet you may be sure I do not own it to be mine, till you see my name to it.

YOU, I see, are troubled there about your money, as well as we are here; though, I hope, you are not so deep in that disease, as we are. A little before his majesty's return, the lords justices here had this matter under consideration; and amongst others, were pleased to send to me, for my thoughts about it. This is too publickly known here, to make the mentioning of it to you appear as vanity in me. The paper I here inclose, would seem a strange thing, did I not tell you the occasion of my writing it. And since some of my friends here persuade me, it gives some light to that which the statesman you mention, thinks so profound a mystery, I have taken the liberty to send it to you, either to open that matter a little farther to you, or that you may shew me the mistakes and defects of it. But pray, whatever use you make of it, conceal my name.

I WRIT to you from London, just as I was leaving the town in haste, in answer to yours of the second instant. You must impute the faults of that, to the hurry and disturbance I was then in. I am not much more at leisure or at quiet now; but shame will not suffer me to be silent any longer, under the obligation of two other letters I have by me of yours, unanswered.

I CANNOT read yours of the 24th of August last, without finding new marks of your kindness to me, in the concern you therein express to get a good hand for the translating my Essay. I think, at last, you have got a better than I could have expected. I designed to have brought Mr. Churchill and him together, and settled that matter, before I left London; but I was so unexpectedly called thence, that I left that, and several other businesses, undone. But I took order with Mr. Churchill, my bookseller, to go to him; he is a reasonable man, and I doubt not but it will be taken care of, as well as if I were there. I think the abridgment is near, if not quite printed; but I had not the time, or memory, to enquire, after my hasty summons into the country. I was told too, when I was in town, that some-body is printing against it; if it be a fair enquirer, I shall be glad; if a wrangling disputant, I shall not mind him.

Mr. BURRIDGE is the man you speak him to be, in yours of September 19. Had I staid in London, I think I should have been able to have procured

procured him ſome particulars would have been of uſe to him, in his deſign. Some of them I have taken care he ſhould receive, notwithſtanding my abſence. But perhaps they might have been more, could I have ſtayed till more of my acquaintance were come to town. I am now in an houſe of ſorrow and buſineſs, which hinders me from that freedom I would be in, when I write to you. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 24, 1695.

I AM aſhamed to ſay, that I have two of yours before me unanſwered.

YOURS of Nov. 20. brought me a paper, which, of all things I have ever ſeen on that ſubject, I moſt highly admire. You have therein revealed the whole myſtery of money, exchange, trade, &c. which have hitherto been wrapped up in unintelligible cant, I believe, partly out of knavery, partly out of ignorance. You gave me liberty to make what uſe of it I pleaſed, and therefore I ventured to give a copy of it to his excellency, my lord deputy Capel, rather than the book of Intereſt and Coinage, which I thought might be too long for his preſent peruſal, in his multitude of buſineſs. But I can tell you, that your admirable perſpicuity of writing is ſo clearly different from all the world, and almoſt peculiar to yourſelf; that in vain you expect to be concealed, in any thing that comes from you. For I aſſure you, in ſome diſcourſe I had with his excellency, no longer ago than yeſterday, concerning the buſineſs of money; he aſked me (without any occaſion given him from me) whether I had ever ſeen Mr. Locke's book of Intereſt, &c.? for he has formerly known (as I think I have told you) that I had the happineſs of your acquaintance; I replied to his lordſhip, that I had ſeen ſuch a book, but that it did not bear your name in it: he anſwered me: The printer preſented it to him as yours; and beſides (ſays he) all the world knows Mr. Locke's way of writing; and, if I may gueſs, I believe the paper you gave me a few days ago, came from Mr. Locke; pray, did it not? I told his excellency I was under ſome obligation to conceal the author. That's enough (ſays he) I am ſure it is his, and will put his name to it, and lay it up amongſt my choiceſt papers.

I HAVE lately received three ſmall prints from London, concerning the ſubject of money. They were incloſed in a blank wrapper, and franked to me by Sir Walter Yonge, Bart. a gentleman whom I never ſaw, and have no manner of acquaintance with. I wonder how he comes to confer

an obligation on me ſo ſuitable and agreeable to my preſent thoughts. If you have any hand in this favour to me, be pleaſed to accept of my thanks, and to expreſs the ſame to Sir Walter. The titles of thoſe papers are,

" Sir W. PETTY's Quantulumcunque, concerning money."
" A LETTER from an Engliſh merchant at Amſterdam to his friend " at London, concerning the trade and coin of England."
" SOME queſtions anſwered, relating to the badneſs of the now ſilver " coin of England."

I HEAR Mr. Lowndes of the Treaſury has publiſhed ſomething on that ſubject, and that Mr. Flamſtead has anſwered him, in a tract he calls Five, not Six.

I WISH I could ſee them both, and ſhall beg the favour of you, if this letter finds you at London, to get them beaten pretty cloſe, and wrapped up in folds, and directed to me, unleſs they be much too bulky for the poſt. You need not have them franked, for our letters come to us ſo, as we are of the parliament here.

I HEREWITH ſend you incloſed the copy of a letter from an ingenious man, on the problem which you have honoured with a place in pag. 67. of your Eſſay. You will find thereby, that what I ſay, of its puzzling ſome ingenious men is true: and you will eaſily diſcover by what falſe ſteps this gentleman is led into his error. The letter was communicated to me by the party to whom it was writ, Dr. Quayl. And the writer of the letter, Mr. Edw. Synge, is the author of a little book called The Gentleman's Religion, which is vended as yours. The gentleman is on a ſecond part, which he will ſhew me, before he ſends it to the preſs. But this is only between ourſelves and the bookſeller, who has been lately informed of thus much already. For though the book ſhews not that freedom of thought, as you or I, perhaps, may expect; yet it ſhews enough to incenſe his own herd againſt him; for there is little of myſtery or enthuſiaſtick in it, and yet the author is a clergyman. And you know that, in a writer on a religious ſubject, it is an high offence, even to be ſilent on thoſe abſtruſe points. The clergy are not diſſatisfied only with thoſe that plainly oppoſe them, but are enraged alſo, even at thoſe that omit zealouſly to advance them; as we have had a late inſtance in him, that writes againſt the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity.

I SHOULD be mighty glad to hear that Mr. Burridge had ſet upon tranſlating your Eſſay: I believe he will do it well.

I SHALL alſo be very much obliged by any information you give me of whatſoever is done, or doing by yourſelf, or others, relating to your works, of which there is none a more devoted admirer, than the excellent author's

Moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,
WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. SYNGE to Dr. QUAYL.

Dear SIR, Cork, Septemb. 6, 1695.

MR. MOLYNEUX's ingenious queſtion, of which you gave me an account at Mr. Lukey's yeſterday, has run ſo much in my mind ever ſince, that I could ſcarce drive it out of my thoughts. To be revenged on you therefore for putting my brains in ſuch a ferment, I have reſolved to be ſo impertinent, as to ſend you the reſult of my meditations upon the ſubject.

THE caſe is this: A man born perfectly blind has a globe and a cube given into his hands, and inſtructed, as much as he is capable of, in the notion of each of theſe figures, and the difference between them. Let us now ſuppoſe this man ſuddenly to be endowed with the ſenſe of ſeeing, and the queſtion is, "Whether, the globe and the cube being "placed before his eyes, he would be able, by his ſight alone, and "without touching them, to tell which was the globe, and which the "cube?"

FOR the better underſtanding of what I ſhall ſay on this queſtion, I deſire you to take notice, that I call every notion of any thing, which a man entertains, an idea; but that notion only, which a man entertains of a viſible thing, as it is viſible, I call an image.

THIS being premiſed, I lay down theſe propoſitions.

1. A MAN born blind may have a true (though perhaps not a perfect) idea of a globe and of a cube, and of ſome difference, which is between them.

THIS evidently appears, becauſe he will certainly be able, by his touch, to diſtinguiſh them one from the other.

2. A MAN who has ever been perfectly blind, and whilſt he ſo remains, can have no image in his mind, either of a cube, or a globe.

THIS, in my opinion, is very evident, becauſe there is no paſſage but the organs of ſight (of which we ſuppoſe him to be deprived) for ſuch an image to enter: and I take it for granted, that ſuch images are not innate in men's apprehenſions.

3. SUCH a man, as ſoon as he is endowed with the ſenſe of ſeeing, will immediately have a different image in his mind, of a globe, and of a cube, as they are expoſed to his ſight.

THIS muſt needs be ſo, if his ſight and the organs thereof be ſuch as ours, which we ſuppoſe.

4. AND if immediately, upon the ſight of the globe and cube, there be grounds enough for ſuch a perſon clearly to perceive the agreement, and the difference, between his pre-conceived ideas, and newly conceived images of thoſe figures, then may he be able to know which is the globe, and which the cube, without touching them again after he has ſeen them.

FOR the agreement which he may find between his idea and his image of a globe, and the difference of the idea of a globe from the image of a cube (" & ſic vice verſâ") will be a ſufficient direction to him. (If, I ſay, there be ſufficient ground immediately to perceive the ſaid agreement and difference.)

5. THE idea which ſuch a blind man muſt needs, by his touch alone, form of a globe, will be this, that it is a body which is exactly alike on all ſides.

FOR let him roll it, as often as he will, between his hands, and he can find no manner of difference between the one ſide and the other.

6. PART of the idea which ſuch a man muſt needs, by his touch, conceive of a cube, will be, that it is a body which is not alike in every part of its ſuperficies.

FOR in one part he feels a ſmooth flat, in another the ſharp point of an angle, and in a third a long ridge, which reaches from one angle to another.

7. THE image, which at the firſt ſight ſuch a man will form of a globe, muſt needs repreſent it as a body which is alike on all ſides, which conſequently muſt be agreeable to the idea which he before had of it, and different from that idea which he had of a cube.

FOR turn a globe ten thouſand ways, and it ſtill carries the ſame aſpect, if it be all of the ſame colour, which we now ſuppoſe.

8. THE image, which upon the firſt view ſuch a man will frame of a cube, muſt needs be this, that it is a body, which is not alike in all the parts of its ſuperficies, which conſequently muſt be agreeable to the idea which before he had of it, and different from that idea which he had of a globe.

FOR a cube does not carry the ſame aſpect, when it is expoſed to our ſight in different poſitions.

SINCE then the image, which ſuch a man would have of a globe, would be agreeable to the idea which before he had conceived of it, and different from that idea which before he had entertained of a cube (" & ſic vice verſa") it follows, that by his ſight alone he might be able to know, which was the globe, and which the cube.

I HAVE no more, but to wiſh you a good journey, and tell you, that if you call me impertinent for ſending you my thoughts upon ſuch a ſpeculation, I will retort, and tell that it was yourſelf who put the queſtion to

Your moſt affectionate friend, and faithful ſervant,

EDW. SYNGE.

Mr.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, March 14, 169⅝.

AS nothing is more pleaſing to me than a letter from you; ſo my concern is not little, when in ſo long a time I have wanted that ſatisfaction; and more eſpecially ſo, when I have reaſon to fear it may proceed from your indiſpoſition in health. The laſt letter I had from Mr. Churchill intimated to me, that you were not well, and I have not yet received any account to the contrary; ſo that my fears daily increaſe upon me, and I ſhall be very uneaſy, 'till I receive the glad tidings of your recovery and ſafety.

MR. LOWNDES's book about our coin, and yours againſt him (which I underſtand you have ſent me, and for which I moſt heartily thank you) are not yet arrived; when they come, you ſhall hear farther from me concerning them.

I HAVE lately received a letter from Mr. Burridge, who is gone down to his cure in the country; he takes all opportunities of thanking you for the civil reception you gave him; and as it was upon my recommendation, I muſt alſo thank you for my ſhare in the favour. He tells me he has read over your Eſſay carefully, and has juſt ſet upon the tranſlation thereof; but he has not yet ſent me any ſpecimen thereof: when he does, you ſhall receive it forthwith from me. I doubt not but he will perform it to your ſatisfaction; there is not a man in Ireland, but himſelf, for whom I dare promiſe ſo boldly in this matter. One thing he intimates to me, which I muſt needs mention to you, as being ſo agreeable to the apprehenſions I have always had of the excellent author of the Eſſay, to whom I have ſometimes preſumed to propoſe it, viz. that he would write a book of offices, or moral philoſophy. I give you Mr. Burridge's own words, who goes on, "The fine ſtrokes which he has frequently in his "Eſſay, make me think he would perform it admirably. I wiſh you "would try his inclinations; you may aſſure him, I will chearfully un-"dertake the tranſlation of it afterwards."

THUS you ſee, ſir, how you are attacked on all ſides; I doubt not but you have as frequent ſolicitations from your friends in England. I will, at this time, add nothing more to the troubleſome importunity. Only on this occaſion I will venture to tell you, that I have a deſign on Mr. Burridge, to get him, by degrees, to tranſlate all the books you have written, and will give leave for. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, March 30, 1696.

THOUGH I have been very ill this winter, not without ſome apprehenſions of my life, yet I am aſhamed that either that, or buſineſs, that has taken up more of my time than my health could well allow, ſhould keep me ſo long ſilent, to a man ſo kindly concerned to hear from me. It was more than once that I reſolved on the next poſt, but ſtill ſomething or other came between; and I more readily yielded to delays, in hopes to hear ſomething from you, concerning my anſwer to Mr. Lowndes. If this be a fault in me, it is ſuch an one that I am guilty of to no-body but my friends. Perhaps the running from ceremony, or punctuality, towards thoſe whom I look on as my ſure friends, that is, myſelf, may ſometimes carry me a little too far to the other ſide. But if you diſapprove of it, I ſhall only ſay, it is an ill effect of a very good cauſe; and beg you to believe, that I ſhall never be tardy in writing, ſpeaking, or doing, whenever I ſhall think it may be of any moment to the leaſt intereſt of yours.

THE buſineſs of our money has ſo near brought us to ruin, that, 'till the plot broke out, it was every body's talk, every body's uneaſineſs. And, becauſe I had played the fool to print about it, there was ſcarce a poſt wherein ſome body or other did not give me freſh trouble about it. But now the parliament has reduced guineas to two-and-twenty ſhillings a-piece after the 10th inſtant, and prohibited the receipt of clipped money, after the 4th of May next. The bill has paſſed both houſes, and, I believe, will ſpeedily receive the royal aſſent. Though I can never bethink any pains, or time of mine, in the ſervice of my country, as far as I may be of any uſe; yet I muſt own to you, this, and the like ſubjects, are not thoſe which I now reliſh, or that do, with moſt pleaſure, employ my thoughts; and therefore ſhall not be ſorry, if I eſcape a very honourable employment, with a thouſand pounds a year ſalary annexed to it, to which the king was pleaſed to nominate me ſome time ſince. May I have but quiet and leiſure, and a competency of health to perfect ſome thoughts my mind is ſometimes upon, I ſhould deſire no more for myſelf in this world, if one thing were added to it, viz. you in my neighbourhood. You cannot imagine, how much I want ſuch a friend within diſtance, with whom I could confer freely "de quolibet ente," and have his ſenſe of my reveries, and his judgment to guide me.

I AM aſhamed to receive ſo many thanks for having done ſo little for a man who came recommended to me by you. I had ſo little opportunity to ſhew the civility I would have done to Mr. Burridge, that I ſhould not know how to excuſe it to you, or him, were not he himſelf a witneſs of the perpetual hurry I was in, all the time I was then in town. I doubt not at all of his performance in the tranſlation of my book he has undertaken. He has underſtanding, and Latin, much beyond thoſe who

who uſually meddle with ſuch works. And I am ſo well ſatisfied, both of his ability and your care, that the ſending me a ſpecimen I ſhall look on as more than needs. As to a "treatiſe of morals," I muſt own to you that you are not the only perſons (you and Mr. Burridge, I mean) who have been for putting me upon it; neither have I wholly laid by the thoughts of it. Nay, I ſo far incline to comply with your deſires, that I, every now and then, lay by ſome materials for it, as they occaſionally occur, in the rovings of my mind. But when I conſider, that a book of offices, as you call it, ought not to be ſlightly done, eſpecially by me, after what I have ſaid of that ſcience in my Eſſay; and that "nonumque prematur in annum," is a rule more neceſſary to be obſerved in a ſubject of that conſequence, than in any thing Horace ſpeaks of; I am in doubt, whether it would be prudent, in one of my age and health, not to mention other diſabilities in me, to ſet about it. Did the world want a rule, I confeſs there could be no work ſo neceſſary, nor ſo commendable. But the Goſpel contains ſo perfect a body of ethicks, that Reaſon may be excuſed from that enquiry, ſince ſhe may find man's duty clearer and eaſier in revelation, than in herſelf. Think not this the excuſe of a lazy man, though it be, perhaps, of one who, having a ſufficient rule for his actions, is content therewith, and thinks he may, perhaps, with more profit to himſelf, employ the little time and ſtrength he has, in other reſearches, wherein he finds himſelf more in the dark.

You put too great a value on my writings, by the deſign you own on Mr. Burridge, in reference to them. I am not to flatter myſelf, that, becauſe they had the good luck to paſs pretty well here, amongſt Engliſh readers, that therefore they will ſatisfy the learned world, and be fit to appear in the learned language. Mr. Wynne's abſtract of my Eſſay is now publiſhed, and I have ſent order to Mr. Churchill to ſend you one of them. Thus far in anſwer to yours of the 14th of March. I come now to that of the 24th of December.

MY lord deputy and you did too great honour to the paper I ſent you, and to me, upon that account. I know too well the deficiency of my ſtyle, to think it deſerves the commendations you give it. That which makes my writings tolerable, if any thing, is only this, that I never write for any thing but truth, and never publiſh any thing to others, which I am not fully perſuaded of myſelf, and do not think that I underſtand. So that I never have need of falſe colours to ſet off the weak parts of an hypotheſis, or of obſcure expreſſions, or the aſſiſtance of artificial jargon, to cover an error of my ſyſtem, or party. Where I am ignorant (for what is our knowledge) I own it. And though I am not proud of my errors; yet I am always ready and glad to be convinced of any of them. I think there wants nothing, but ſuch a preference of truth to party-intereſt and vain-glory, to make any body out-do me, in what you ſeem ſo much to admire.

THOUGH Sir Walter Yonge be an intimate friend of mine, yet I can aſſure you, I know nothing of thoſe three prints he franked you, and ſo have no title to any part of your thanks.

I SEE

I SEE by Mr. S.'s anſwer to that which was originally your queſtion, how hard it is for even ingenious men to free themſelves from the anticipations of ſenſe. The firſt ſtep towards knowledge is to have clear and diſtinct ideas; which I have juſt reaſon, every day more and more, to think few men ever have, or think themſelves to want; which is one great cauſe of that infinite jargon and nonſenſe which ſo peſters the world. You have a good ſubject to work on; and therefore, pray let this be your chief care, to fill your ſon's head with clear and diſtinct ideas, and teach him on all occaſions, both by practice and rule, how to get them, and the neceſſity of it. This, together with a mind active and ſet upon the attaining of reputation and truth, is the true principling of a young man. But to give him a reverence for our opinions, becauſe we taught them, is not to make knowing men, but prattling parrots. I beg your pardon for this liberty; it is an expreſſion of good-will, and not the leſs ſo, becauſe not within the preciſe forms of good breeding. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, June 6, 1696.

IT is a melancholy thought to me, that ſince I have had the happineſs of your correſpondence, there has hardly happened a year, when both you and I have not made it an apology for our long ſilence, that we have been indiſpoſed in our health; yet it has pleaſed God, that ſo it has been, and ſo it is on my ſide at preſent. About four years and an half ago I was firſt ſeized by a violent cholick, which then ſo weakened me, that, to this time, I lie ſo far under the effects thereof, as upon any cold to be very apt to relapſe into the ſame. And ſo it has been with me, for a while paſt; but now, God be thanked, I am again well recovered. I had not otherwiſe ſo long deferred my anſwer to yours of March the 30th, which, after a long ſilence, brought me the aſſurance of your health, and therewith no ſmall ſatisfaction; having, before that, entertained ſome painful thoughts of your indiſpoſition, from ſome rumours I had heard. But, I find, Heaven is not yet ſo angry with us, as to take you from amongſt us.

AND now I moſt heartily congratulate you, both on the recovery of your health, and on the honourable preferment you have lately received from his majeſty. In your writings concerning money, you have given ſuch demonſtrative proofs of your reach, even in the buſineſs of the world, that I ſhould have wondered, had the king overlooked you. And I do

I do as much wonder, that, after what you have publiſhed on that ſubject, there ſhould remain the leaſt doubt with any man, concerning that matter. But, I fancy, it is only thoſe who are prejudiced by their intereſt, that ſeem to be diſſatisfied; ſuch as bankers, &c. who made a prey of the people's ignorance in this great affair. But, I think, you have cleared up the myſtery, and made it ſo plain to all men's capacities, that England will never again fall into the like inconveniencies. 'Till you writ, we uſed money as the Indians do their wampompeek; it ſerved us well enough for buying and ſelling, and we were content and heeded it no farther; but for the intimate nature, affections, and properties thereof, we did no more underſtand them than the Indians their ſhells.

I HAVE read over Mr. Wynne's abridgment of your Eſſay. But I muſt confeſs to you, I was never more ſatisfied with the length of your Eſſay, than ſince I have ſeen this abridgment; which, though done juſtly enough, yet falls ſo ſhort of that ſpirit, which every-where ſhews itſelf in the original, that nothing can be more different. To one already verſed in the Eſſay, the abridgment ſerves as a good remembrancer; but, I believe, let a man, wholly unacquainted with the former, begin to read the latter, and he will not ſo well reliſh it. So that, how deſirous ſoever I might have formerly been, of ſeeing your Eſſay put into the form of a logick for the ſchools, I am now fully ſatisfied I was in an error; and muſt freely confeſs to you, that I wiſh Mr. Wynne's abridgment had been yet undone. That ſtrength of thought and expreſſion, that every-where reigns throughout your works, makes me ſometimes wiſh them twice as long.

I FIND, by ſome little pieces I have lately met with, that you are the reputed author of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity; whether it be really ſo, or not, I will not preſume to enquire, becauſe there is no name to the book; this only I will venture to ſay, on that head, that whoever is the author, or vindicator thereof, he has gotten as weak an adverſary in Mr. Edwards to deal with, as a man could wiſh; ſo much unmannerly paſſion, and Billingſgate language, I have not ſeen any man uſe. In ſo much, that were Mr. Edwards to defend the beſt cauſe in the world, ſhould he do it in that manner, he would ſpoil it. Were an angel of heaven to juſtify a truth, with virulence and heat, he would not prevail.

AND now, my ever honoured friend, with much reluctance, I am to tell you, that I cannot be ſo happy this ſummer as to ſee you in England. It is needleſs to trouble you with a long detail of the reaſons hereof; but what between my own private affairs, and a little place I have in the publick, ſo it is, and I cannot help it. But, as a ſmall repair to myſelf of this diſappointment, I ſhall beg the favour of you to admit a young gentleman, whom I ſhall ſend to you within a while, only to look on you, and afterwards look on a picture of yours, which I hear is at Mr. Churchill's. The young gentleman's name is Howard, a modeſt and

ingenious youth, and excellently ſkilled both in the judicious and practical part of painting; for his advancement wherein, he is now kept at London, and deſigns ſoon for Italy. He is the eldeſt brother to my brother's wife, of a good fortune and family. If, by his report, I underſtand that that picture of yours at Mr. Churchill's be an excellent piece, and like you, he will procure it to be finely copied for me, and I may ſave you the trouble of ſitting; but if it prove otherwiſe, and be not worth copying, I will then make it my requeſt to you, that, at your leiſure, you would ſpare me ſo many hours time, as to ſit for ſuch a hand as Mr. Howard ſhall procure to take your picture. This I thought fit to intimate to you before-hand, that when he waits on you, you may be forewarned of his buſineſs.

I DOUBT not but, by this time, you have heard of our lord deputy Capel's death. We are now under a moſt unſettled government, and our eyes are fixed on England for relief. Some here wiſh for your noble patron, my lord Pembroke; and go ſo far as to ſay, that he will be the man. I am confident we ſhould be happy under one that favoured you; and if there be any thing in this report, you would highly favour me, by letting his lordſhip know, that here he will find me, amongſt ſeveral others, that are your admirers; for that I reckon the moſt advantageous character I can come, recommended under, to his lordſhip.

Mr. BURRIDGE has been lately ſo taken up with his eccleſiaſtick affairs in the country, that (as he writes me word) he has hitherto made but little farther progreſs in the tranſlation of the Eſſay, but he promiſes now to ſet about it earneſtly. I wiſh you would give me your free opinion of what I have already ſent you thereof.

I FEAR your publick buſineſs will, in ſome meaſure, take you off from your more retired thoughts, by which the world were gainers every day. But, good Sir, let me intreat you, that, at your leiſure hours, you would think on, and ſend a line to

Your moſt affectionate, and humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, July 2, 1696.

I CANNOT, without great trouble, hear of any indiſpoſition of yours: your friendſhip, which Heaven has beſtowed on me, as one of the greateſt bleſſings I can enjoy, for the remainder of my life, is what I value at ſo high a rate, that I cannot conſider myſelf within danger of loſing a perſon, every way ſo dear to me, without very great uneaſineſs of mind.

THUS far I got, when I ſat down to write to you, about a month ſince, as you will ſee, by the date at the top; buſineſs, and a little excurſion into the country, has hindered me ever ſince. Were you a man I only

cared to talk with, out of civility, I ſhould ſooner anſwer your letters. But, not contenting myſelf with ſuch a formal correſpondence with you, I cannot find in my heart to begin writing to you, 'till I think I ſhall have time to talk a great deal, and pour out my mind to a man, to whom I make ſure I can do it with freedom; his candour and friendſhip allow that, and I find I know not what pleaſure in doing it. I promiſed myſelf abundance of pleaſure this ſummer, in ſeeing you here, and the diſappointment is one of the moſt ſenſible I could have met with, in my private concerns: and the occaſion, that robbed me of that ſatisfaction, frights me. I have, I thank God, now as much health, as my conſtitution will allow me to expect. But yet, if I will think like a reaſonable man, the flattery of my ſummer vigour ought not to make me count beyond the next winter, at any time for the future. The laſt ſat ſo heavy upon me, that it was with difficulty I got through it; and you will not blame me, if I have a longing to ſee and embrace a man I eſteem and love ſo much, before I leave this ſilly earth; which, when the conveniencies of life are moderately provided for, has nothing of value in it equal to the converſation of a knowing, ingenious, and large-minded friend, who ſincerely loves and ſeeks truth.

WHEN I took pen in hand to continue this letter, I had yours of March and June laſt before me, with a deſign to anſwer them. But my pen run on, as you ſee, before I could get leave of my forward thoughts, to come to what was my chief buſineſs, viz. to read again, and anſwer thoſe kind letters of yours.

THAT of March 28. brought me a ſample of Mr. Burridge's tranſlation: upon my reading of it, I began to correct it after my faſhion, and intended to have gone through that, and ſo all the reſt of the ſheets, as they came to my hand: but ſome other more preſſing occaſion interrupted me, and now I am paſt all hopes to have any leiſure at all to do any thing more to it in that kind, and muſt wholly leave it to his and your care. When I ſay your care, I do not make ſo ill an uſe of your kindneſs, as to expect you ſhould look it over and correct it; but I doubt not but you have ſuch an intereſt in your college, that you can have the aſſiſtance of ſome able man there to do it. The ſubject itſelf, and my way of expreſſing my thoughts upon them, may, I doubt not, but be very different from the genius of the Latin tongue, and therefore I ſhould not think it amiſs, if Mr. Burridge would take more liberty to quit the ſcheme and phraſe of my ſtyle, and ſo he takes but my ſenſe, to comply more with the turn and manner of Tully's philoſophical language. For ſo he has but my ſenſe, I care not how much he neglects my words; and whether he expreſſes my thoughts, you are as good a judge as I, for I think you as much maſter of them. I ſay this to excuſe you from the trouble of ſending his papers over to me, as he diſpatches them; for in my preſent circumſtances I ſhall hardly have time ſo much as to peruſe them. Pray, when you ſee, or ſend to him, give him my humble ſervice.

THOUGH your colick has done me no ſmall prejudice, yet I am much more angry with it, upon the account of thoſe inconveniencies it has made you ſuffer. I know you are in ſkilful, as well as careful hands, under the care of your brother, and it could not be adviſeable in any one to draw you from them. The colick is ſo general a name for pains in the lower belly, that I cannot from thence pretend to make any judgment of your caſe; but it can be no harm to adviſe you to aſk him, whether he does not think that the drinking of our Bath waters may be uſeful to you in your caſe. I know thoſe waters mightily ſtrengthen thoſe parts.

YOUR congratulation to me I take, as you meant, kindly and ſeriouſly, and it may be it is what another would rejoice in: but, if you would give me leave to whiſper truth without vanity, in the ear of a friend, it is a preferment which I ſhall get nothing by, and I know not whether my country will, though that I ſhall aim at, with all my endeavours.

RICHES may be inſtrumental to ſo many good purpoſes, that it is, I think, vanity, rather than religion or philoſophy, to pretend to contemn them. But yet they may be purchaſed too dear. My age and health demand a retreat from buſtle and buſineſs, and the purſuit of ſome enquiries, I have in my thoughts, makes it more deſirable than any of thoſe rewards, which publick employments tempt people with. I think the little I have enough, and do not deſire to live higher, or die richer than I am. And therefore you have reaſon rather to pity the folly, than congratulate the fortune, that engages me in the whirlpool.

IT is your pre-occupation, in favour of me, that makes you ſay what you do of Mr. Wynne's abridgment; I know not, whether it be that, or any thing elſe, that has occaſioned it; but I was told ſome time ſince, that my Eſſay began to get ſome credit in Cambridge, where I think, for ſome years after it was publiſhed, it was ſcarce ſo much as looked into. But now I have ſome reaſon to think it is a little more favourably received there, by theſe two queſtions held there this laſt commencement; viz. "Probabile eſt animam non ſemper cogitare:" and, "Idea Dei non "eſt innata."

WHAT you ſay of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, gives me occaſion to aſk your thoughts of that treatiſe, and alſo how it paſſes amongſt you there; for here, at its firſt coming out, it was received with no indifferency, ſome ſpeaking of it with great commendation, but moſt cenſuring it, as a very bad book. What you ſay of Mr. Edwards is ſo viſible, that I find all the world of your mind.

THIS is now a third ſitting before I finiſh this letter, whereby, I fear, I ſhall give you an ill picture of myſelf. By the reading of the next paragraph of your obliging letter of June 6, I am mightily comforted to find that it is not want of health (as it run in my head by a ſtrong impreſſion, I found remained in my mind, from the colick mentioned in the beginning of your letter) but buſineſs, that keeps me this year from the happineſs of your company. This is much more tolerable to me than

the other, and though I ſuffer by it, yet I can bear it the better, whilſt there is room to hope it may be ſuch, that both you and your country may receive advantage by it. Mr. Howard, whom I was reſolving yeſterday morning to enquire after, prevented me by a viſit he made me, wherein he gave me an account he had received a letter from you, ſince his return from Cambridge. That which you deſire of me, as the chief reaſon of affording me his acquaintance, is what I cannot refuſe, and yet it cauſes in me ſome confuſion to grant. If the original could do you any ſervice, I ſhall be glad; but to think my picture worth your having, would carry too much vanity with it, to allow my conſent, did not the ſkill of the painter often make amends for the meanneſs of the ſubject, and a good pencil frequently make the painted repreſentation of more value than the real ſubſtance. This may probably be my caſe. Mr. Howard is a very pretty young gentleman, and I thank you for his acquaintance. I wiſh it lay in my power to do him any ſervice, whilſt he is here. If the length of my letter could be an excuſe for the ſlowneſs of its coming, I have certainly made a very ample apology; though I ſatisfy myſelf neither in being ſilent ſo long, nor in tiring you with talking ſo much now; but it is from an heart wholly devoted to you. I am,

Aug. 4, 1696. SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 12 Sept. 1696.

COULD the painter have made a picture of me, capable of your converſation, I ſhould have ſat to him with more delight, than ever I did any thing in my life. The honour you do me, in giving me thus a place in your houſe, I look upon as the effect of having a place already in your eſteem and affection; and that made me more eaſily ſubmit to what methought looked too much like vanity in me. Painting was deſigned to repreſent the gods, or the great men that ſtood next to them. But friendſhip, I ſee, takes no meaſure of any thing, but by itſelf; and where it is great and high, will make its object ſo, and raiſe it above its level. This is that which has deceived you into my picture, and made you put ſo great a compliment upon me; and I do not know what you will find to juſtify yourſelf to thoſe who ſhall ſee it in your poſſeſſion. You may, indeed, tell them the original is as much yours as the picture; but this will be no great boaſt, when the man is not more conſiderable than his ſhadow. When I looked upon it, after it was done, methought it had not that countenance I ought to accoſt you with. I know not whether the ſecret diſpleaſure I felt whilſt I was ſitting, from the

the conſideration that the going of my picture brought us no nearer together, made me look grave: but this I muſt own, that it was not without regret, that I remembered that this counterfeit would be before me, with the man, that I ſo much deſired to be with, and could not tell him, how much I longed to put myſelf into his hands, and to have him in my arms. One thing pray let it mind you of, and when you look on it at any time, pray believe, that the colours of that face on the cloth, are more fading and changeable than thoſe thoughts, which will always repreſent you to my mind, as the moſt valuable perſon in the world, whoſe face I do not know, and one whoſe company is ſo deſirable to me, that I ſhall not be happy 'till I do.

THOUGH I know how little ſervice I am able to do; yet my conſcience will never reproach me, for not wiſhing well to my country, by which I mean Engliſhmen, and their intereſt every-where. There has been, of late years, a manufacture of linen, carried on in Ireland, if I miſtake not; I would be glad to learn from you the condition it is in; and, if it thrives not, what are the rubs and hindrances that ſtop it. I ſuppoſe you have land very proper to produce flax and hemp, why could there not be enough, eſpecially of the latter, produced there to ſupply his majeſty's navy? I ſhould be obliged by your thoughts about it, and how it might be brought about. I have heard there is a law requiring a certain quantity of hemp to be ſown every year: If it be ſo, how comes it to be neglected? I know you have the ſame publick aims for the good of your country that I have, and therefore, without any apology, I take this liberty with you. I received an account of your health, and your remembrance of me, not long ſince by Mr. Howard, for which I return you my thanks. I troubled you with a long letter about the beginning of the laſt month, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Sept. 26, 1696.

I HAVE now before me two of yours, one of Auguſt the 4th, and t'other of the 12th inſtant. I had ſooner anſwered the former, but that I waited to give you an account of the farther progreſs of the tranſlation, which Mr. Burridge faithfully promiſed me; and I lately underſtand from him, that he has gone through the three firſt chapters of the firſt book. I muſt confeſs, his avocations are many, and therefore his progreſs is not ſo quick as I could deſire. But I am ſure he will accompliſh it, and that well too; and Mr. Churchill has told him that you ſay,

ſay, "ſat cito, ſi ſat bene:" and he is very well pleaſed, that you give him time.

I DO not wonder that your Eſſay is received in the univerſities. I ſhould indeed have wondered with indignation at the contrary; "magna eſt "veritas & prævalebit." We may expect a liberty of philoſophizing in the ſchools; but that your doctrine ſhould be ſoon heard out of our pulpits, is what is much more remarkable. He that, even ten years ago, ſhould have preached, that "idea Dei non eſt innata," had certainly drawn on him the character of an atheiſt; yet now we find Mr. Bentley very large upon it, in his ſermons at Mr. Boyle's lecture's, ſerm. 1. p. 4. and ſerm. 3. p. 5. and Mr. Whiſton, in his new theory of the earth, p. 128.

MENTIONING theſe books minds me to intimate to you, that theſe ingenious authors agree exactly with you, in a paſſage you have in your thoughts of education, p. 337. 3d. edit. § 192. "That the phænome-"non of gravitation cannot be accounted for, by mere matter and mo-"tion, but ſeems an immediate law of the divine will ſo ordering it." And you conclude that ſection thus, "reſerving to a fitter opportunity, a "fuller explication of this hypotheſis, and the application of it to all the "parts of the deluge, and any difficulties can be ſuppoſed in the hiſtory "of the flood." This ſeems to imply, that you have ſome thoughts of writing on that ſubject; it would be a mighty ſatisfaction to me, to know from you the certainty thereof. I ſhould be very glad alſo to hear what the opinion of the ingenious is concerning Mr. Whiſton's book.

As to the "Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity," I do not find but it is very well approved of here, amongſt candid, unprejudiced men, that dare ſpeak their thoughts. I'll tell you what a very learned and ingenious prelate ſaid to me on that occaſion: I aſked him whether he had read that book, and how he liked it? He told me, very well; and that if my friend Mr. Locke writ it, it was the beſt book he ever laboured at; but, ſays he, if I ſhould be known to think ſo, I ſhould have my lawns torn from my ſhoulders. But he knew my opinion aforehand, and was, therefore, the freer to commit his ſecret thoughts in that matter to me.

I AM very ſorry I can give you no better an account of the linen manufactures of late years ſet up in Ireland, than what follows:

ABOUT the year 1692 (I think) one Monſ. Du Pin came to Dublin from England, and here, by the king and queen's letter and patents thereon, he ſet up a royal corporation for carrying on the linen manufacture in Ireland. Into this corporation many of the nobility and gentry were admitted, more for their countenance and favour to the project, than for any great help could be expected, either from their purſes, or heads, to carry on the work. Du Pin himſelf was nominated under-governor, and a great buſtle was made about the buſineſs; many meetings were held, and conſiderable ſums advanced to forward the work, and

and the members promiſed themſelves prodigious gains; and this expectation prevailed ſo far (by what artifices I cannot tell) as to raiſe the value of each ſhare to 40 or 50 pounds, though but five pounds was paid by each member at firſt, for every ſhare he had. At length artificers began to be ſet at work, and ſome parcels of cloth were made, when on a ſudden there happened ſome controverſy between the corporation here in Ireland, and ſuch another corporation eſtabliſhed in England by London undertakers, and in which Du Pin was alſo a chief member. Much time was ſpent in managing this diſpute, and the work began in the mean time to flag, and the price of the ſhares to lower mightily.

"BUT, ſome little time before this controverſy happened, ſome private gentlemen and merchants, on their own ſtock, without the authority of an incorporating patent, ſet up a linen manufacture at Drogheda, which promiſed, and thrived very well at firſt; and the corporation of Dublin, perceiving this, began to quarrel with them alſo, and would never let them alone till they embodied with them. Theſe quarrels and controverſies (the particulars whereof I can give you no account of, for I was not engaged amongſt them, and I can get no one that was, who can give any tolerable account of them; I ſay, they) grew ſo high, and Du Pin began to play ſuch tricks, that all were diſcouraged, and withdrew as faſt as they could. So that now all is blown up, and nothing of this kind is carried on, but by ſuch as out of their own private purſes ſet up looms and bleaching-yards. We have many of theſe in many parts of Ireland; and I believe no country in the world is better adapted for it, eſpecially the north. I have as good diaper, made by ſome of my tenants, nigh Armagh, as can come to a table, and all other cloth for houſhold uſes.

As to the law for the encouraging the linen manufacture, it is this: In the the 17th and 18th of Car. II. there was an act of parliament made, "obliging all landlords and tenants to ſow ſuch a certain proportion of "their holdings with flax, under a great penalty on both, on failure; "and impowering the ſheriffs to levy 20 pounds, in each of their re-"ſpective counties, to be diſtributed at the quarter-ſeſſions, yearly, to "the three perſons who ſhould bring in the three beſt webs of linen "cloth, of ſuch a length and breadth, 10l. to the firſt, 6l. to the ſe-"cond, and 4l. to the third." This, whilſt it laſted, was a great encouragement to the country people, to ſtrive to out-do each other, and it produced excellent cloth all over the kingdom; but then it was but temporary, only for twenty years from paſſing the act, and is now expired. But that part of the act, "ordaining landlords and tenants to ſow "flax," is perpetual; and I can give no reaſon why it is not executed; only this I can ſay, that the tranſgreſſion is ſo univerſal, and the forfeiture thereon to the king is ſo ſevere, that, if it were enquired into, I believe all the eſtates in Ireland would be forfeited to his majeſty. So that now the multitude of ſinners is their ſecurity. This ſtatute you will find amongſt the Iriſh acts, 17 & 18 Car. II. chap. 9.

ENGLAND,

ENGLAND, moſt certainly, will never let us thrive by the woollen trade; this is their darling miſtreſs, and they are jealous of any rival. But I ſee not that we interfere with them, in the leaſt, by the linen trade. So that that is yet left open to us to grow rich by, if it were well eſtabliſhed and managed; but by what means this ſhould be, truly I dare not venture to give my thoughts. There is no country has better land, or water, for flax and hemp, and I do verily believe the navy may be provided here, with ſailing and cordage, cheaper by far than in England. Our land is cheaper, victuals for workmen is cheaper, and labour is cheaper, together with other neceſſaries for artificers.

I KNOW not in what manner to thank you for the trouble you have been at, in ſitting for your picture, on my account. It is a favour of that value, that I acknowledge myſelf extremely obliged to you for; and therefore I could not think that the expreſſions concerning it in your laſt belonged to me, did they come from one leſs ſincere than yourſelf. "Painting, it it "true, was deſigned to repreſent the gods, and the great men, that ſtand "next them;" and therefore it was, that I deſired your picture. This, ſir, is the real and ſincere thought of

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Jan. 5, 169$\frac{6}{7}$.

IT is now three months ſince I ventured to trouble you with a letter; you may ſee thereby that I have a regard to the publick buſineſs you are engaged in; but I have not been all this while without the ſatisfaction of hearing that you are well; for, as all my friends know, that I have the moſt reſpectful concern for you in the world; ſo they are not wanting, on all opportunities, from t'other ſide the water, to give me the acceptable tidings of your welfare. I have lately received a letter from Mr. Howard, that obliges me to make his acknowledgments for the favours he has received from you. This I can hardly do, without complaining of him at the ſame time, for not yet ſending me your picture; but I ſuppoſe, by this time, it is on the road hither, and I forgive him; and, with all gratitude imaginable, return you my thanks on his account.

THE incloſed piece of natural hiſtory I am deſired by my brother to preſent to you, with his moſt affectionate humble ſervice. If, upon peruſing it, you think it may deſerve it, you may ſend it by the penny-poſt to the Royal Society, to fill up an empty page in the Tranſactions. There is nothing to recommend it but its being exactly true, and an account of a non-deſcript animal. Formerly I had a conſtant correſpondence with the ſecretary of the Society, but of late it has failed; and therefore we take the liberty of ſending this through your hands.

I HAVE lately met with a book here of Monſ. Le Clerc's, called The Cauſes of Incredulity, done out of French. It is the ſame Le Clerc that writes Ontologia, and dedicates it to you. I find thereby you are his acquaintance and friend; I ſhould be very glad you would be pleaſed to give me ſome account of that gentleman, and his circumſtances in the world, if you know them. To me he ſeems an impartial and candid enquirer after truth, and to have the true ſpirit of Chriſtianity in that his book. The reaſon why I enquire after him, is, becauſe I ſuppoſe him one of the refugees from France, and perhaps he may receive ſome encouragement to come into this kingdom. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Feb. 3, $169\frac{6}{7}$.

AS I had reaſon to rejoice on the nation's account, when you were firſt put on publick buſineſs; ſo I find, on my own particular, I had cauſe to lament; for ſince that time (to my great concern) your letters have been leſs frequent, and the ſatisfaction I had in them abundantly diminiſhed. Were I aſſured of the confirmed ſtate of your health, I could more patiently ſubmit to this; but knowing your ſickly diſpoſition, a month's ſilence puts me in pain for you; and I am very uneaſy under the apprehenſions of any danger that may attend you. Favour me therefore, good ſir, though it were but a line or two, in the croud of your buſineſs; for that itſelf would be ſome contentment to me, in the want of thoſe noble philoſophical thoughts which ſometimes you were pleaſed to communicate to me.

AND now, ſir, I ſhall beg a favour of you a little out of our common road of correſpondence. We have here lately received the certainty of Mr. Methwin's being declared our lord Chancellor; and truly, ſir, all moderate and good men, I find, are very well pleaſed at it. I ſuppoſe, by your intereſt and acquaintance with my lord keeper of England, you have an acquaintance likewiſe with Mr. Methwin; and I beg the favour of you to mention me to him as your devoted friend and ſervant. I am ſure, if he knows you rightly, I cannot be repreſented to him under a more advantageous character; and I know this will give me admittance to his graces, which I deſire more, as I hear he is a good, than a great man; and, being one of the maſters in chancery here, it is natural to covet the favour of him under whom I am to act.

I HAVE lately met with a book of the biſhop of Worceſter's concerning the Trinity. He takes occaſion therein to reflect on ſome things in your Eſſay;

Eſſay; but truly, I think, with no great ſtrength of reaſon. However, he being a man of great name, I humbly propoſe it to you, whether you may not judge it worth your while to take notice of what he ſays, and give ſome anſwer to it, which will be no difficult taſk. I do not intend hereby, that an anſwer, on purpoſe for that end only, ſhould be framed by you; I think it not of that moment; but perhaps you may find ſome accidental occaſion of taking notice thereof, either in the next edition of your Eſſay, or ſome other diſcourſe you may publiſh hereafter.

I HAVE not yet received the ſatisfaction of having your likeneſs before me, and have therefore lately writ a very diſcontented letter about it to Mr. Howard. A great man here told me, I ſomething reſembled you in countenance; could he but aſſure me of being like you in mind too, it would have been the eternal honour and boaſt of

Your moſt devoted humble ſervant,

and entirely affectionate friend,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

I FIND, by a book I lately light on, of Mr. Norris's, that Mr. Maſham and my ſon agree in one odd circumſtance of life, of having both their mothers blind; for my wife loſt her ſight above twelve years before ſhe died, and I find my lady Maſham is in the ſame condition.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, 22 Feb. $169\frac{6}{7}$.

I FEAR you will be of an opinion, that I take my picture for myſelf, and think you ought to look no farther, ſince that is coming to you, or is already with you. Indeed we are ſhadows much alike, and there is not much difference in our ſtrength and uſefulneſs. Yet I cannot but remember, that I cannot expect my picture ſhould anſwer your letters to me, pay the acknowledgments I owe you, and excuſe a ſilence as great as if I were nothing but a piece of cloth overlayed with colours. I could lay a great deal of the blame on buſineſs, and a great deal on want of health. Between theſe two I have had little leiſure ſince I writ to you laſt. But all that will bear no excuſe to myſelf, for being three letters in arrear to a perſon whom I the willingſieſt hear from of any man in the world, and with whom I had rather entertain myſelf, and paſs my hours in converſation, than with any one that I know. I ſhould take it amiſs if you were not angry with me for not writing to you all this while; for I ſhould ſuſpect you loved me not ſo well as I love you, if you could patiently bear my ſilence. I hope it is your civility makes you not chide me. I promiſe you, I ſhould have grumbled cruelly at you, if you had

been half ſo guilty as I have been. But if you are angry a little, pray be not ſo very much; for if you ſhould provoke me any way, I know the firſt ſight of a letter from you, would allay all my choler immediately; and the joy of hearing you were well, and that you continued your kindneſs to me, would fill my mind, and leave me no other paſſion. For I tell you truly, that ſince the receipt of your letter in September laſt, there has ſcarce a day paſſed, I am ſure not a poſt, wherein I have not thought of my obligation and debt to you, and reſolved to acknowledge it to you, though ſomething or other has ſtill come between to hinder me. For you would have pitied me, to ſee how much of my time was forced from me this winter in the country (where my illneſs confined me within doors,) by crouds of letters, which were therefore indiſpenſably to be anſwered, becauſe they were from people whom either I knew not, or cared not for, or was not willing to make bold with; and ſo you, and another friend I have in Holland, have been delayed, and put laſt, becauſe you are my friends beyond ceremony and formality. And I reſerved myſelf for you when I was at leiſure, in the eaſe of thoughts to enjoy. For, that you may not think you have been paſſed over by a peculiar neglect, I mention to you another very good friend of mine, of whom I have now by me a letter, of an ancienter date than the firſt of your three, yet unanſwered.

HOWEVER you are pleaſed, out of kindneſs to me, to rejoice in yours of September 26, that my notions have had the good luck to be vented from the pulpit, and particularly by Mr. Bentley; yet that matter goes not ſo clear as you imagine. For a man of no ſmall name, as you know Dr. S—— is, has been pleaſed to declare againſt my doctrine of no innate ideas, from the pulpit in the Temple, and, as I have been told, charged it with little leſs than Atheiſm. Though the Doctor be a great man, yet that would not much fright me, becauſe I am told, that he is not always obſtinate againſt opinions which he has condemned more publickly, than in an harangue to a Sunday's auditory. But that it is poſſible he may be firm here, becauſe it is alſo ſaid, he never quits his averſion to any tenet he has once declared againſt, 'till change of times, bringing change of intereſt, and faſhionable opinions open his eyes and his heart, and then he kindly embraces what before deſerved his averſion and cenſure. My book crept into the world about ſix or ſeven years ago, without any oppoſition, and has ſince paſſed amongſt ſome for uſeful, and, the leaſt favourable, for innocent. But, as it ſeems to me, it is agreed by ſome men that it ſhould no longer do ſo. Something, I know not what, is at laſt ſpied out in it, that is like to be troubleſome, and therefore it muſt be an ill book, and be treated accordingly. It is not that I know any thing in particular, but ſome things that have happened at the ſame time together, ſeem to me to ſuggeſt this: What it will produce, time will ſhew. But, as you ſay in that kind letter, "Magna eſt veritas & prævalebit;" that keeps me at perfect eaſe in this,

and whatever I write; for as ſoon as I ſhall diſcover it not to be truth, my hand ſhall be the forwardeſt to throw it in the fire.

YOU deſire to know, what the opinion of the ingenious is, concerning Mr. Whiſton's book. I have not heard any one of my acquaintance ſpeak of it, but with great commendation, as I think it deſerves. And truly I think he is more to be admired, that he has laid down an hypotheſis, whereby he has explained ſo many wonderful, and, before, inexplicable things in the great changes of this globe, than that ſome of them ſhould not go eaſily down with ſome men, when the whole was entirely new to all. He is one of thoſe ſort of writers, that I always fancy ſhould be moſt eſteemed and encouraged. I am always for the builders who bring ſome addition to our knowledge, or, at leaſt, ſome new thing to our thoughts. The finders of faults, the confuters and pullers down, do not only erect a barren and uſeleſs triumph upon human ignorance, but advance us nothing in the acquiſition of truth. Of all the motto's I ever met with, this, writ over a water-work at Cleve, beſt pleaſed me, "Natura omnes fecit judices, paucos artifices."

I THANK you for the account you gave me of your linen manufacture. Private knavery, I perceive, does there as well as here deſtroy all publick good works, and forbid the hope of any advantages by them, where nature plentifully offers what induſtry would improve, were it but rightly directed, and duly cheriſhed. The corruption of the age gives me ſo ill a proſpect of any ſucceſs in deſigns of this kind, ever ſo well laid, that I am not ſorry my ill health gives me ſo juſt a reaſon to deſire to be eaſed of the employment I am in.

YOURS of the 5th of January, which brought with it that curious and exact deſcription of that non-deſcript animal, found me here under the confinement of my ill lungs; but knowing buſineſs of ſeveral kinds would make it neceſſary for me to go to London as ſoon as poſſible, I thought it better to carry it thither myſelf, than ſend it at random to the Royal Society. Accordingly when I went up to town, about a fortnight ſince, I ſhewed it to Dr. Sloane, and put it into his hands to be communicated to the Royal Society; which he willingly undertook; and I promiſe myſelf it will be publiſhed in their next Tranſactions. Dr. Sloane is a very ingenious man, and a very good friend of mine; and, upon my telling him that your correſpondence with the ſecretary of the Society had been of late interrupted, he readily told me, that, if you pleaſed, he would take it up, and be very glad if you would allow him the honour of a conſtant correſpondence with you.

YOU ſhew your charitable and generous temper, in what you ſay concerning a friend of mine in Holland, who is truly all that you think of him. He is married there, and has ſome kind of ſettlement; but I could be glad, if you in Ireland, or I here (though of the latter ſay nothing to others) could get him a prebendary of 100 or 200l. per annum, to bring him over into our church, and to give him eaſe, and a ſure retreat to write in, where, I think, he might be of great uſe to the Chriſtian

tian world. If you could do this, you would offer him a temptation would ſettle him amongſt us; if you think you cannot, I am nevertheleſs obliged to you, for offering to one, whom you take to be a friend of mine, what you are able. If he ſhould miſs the effect, yet I have ſtill the obligation to you.

WHEN yours of the 3d inſtant met me in London, when I was there lately, I was rejoiced at my journey, though I was uneaſy in town, becauſe I thought my being there, might give me an opportunity to do you ſome little ſervice, or at leaſt ſhew you my willingneſs to do it. To that purpoſe I went twice or thrice to wait upon Mr. Methwin, though he be a perſon, in whoſe company I remember not that I was ever but once in my life. I miſſed him, by good luck, both times; and my diſtemper increaſed ſo faſt upon me, that though I went to London with an intention to make ſome ſtay there, yet I was forced away in eight days, and had not an opportunity to ſee Mr. Methwin at all. You will, perhaps, wonder to hear me call my miſſing of him, good luck; but ſo I muſt always call that which any way favours my deſign of ſerving you, as this did. For hereupon I applied myſelf to a friend of mine, who has an intereſt in him, and one to whom your worth and friendſhip to me are not unknown, who readily undertook all I deſired on your behalf. And I promiſe myſelf, from thence, that you will find Mr. Methwin will be as deſirous of your acquaintance, as you are of his.

YOU will, in a little time, ſee that I have obeyed, or rather anticipated a command of yours, towards the latter end of your laſt letter. What ſentiments I have of the uſage I have received from the perſon you there mention, I ſhall ſhortly more at large acquaint you. What he ſays, is, as you obſerve, not of that moment much to need an anſwer; but the ſly deſign of it I think neceſſary to oppoſe; for I cannot allow any one's great name a right to uſe me ill. All fair contenders for the opinions they have, I like mightily; but there are ſo few that have opinions, or at leaſt ſeem, by their way of defending them, to be really perſuaded of the opinions they profeſs, that I am apt to think there is in the world a great deal more ſcepticiſm, or at leaſt want of concern for truth, than is imagined. When I was in town I had the happineſs to ſee Mr. Burridge; he is, he ſays, ſpeedily returning to you, where I hope his book, which is received with great applauſe, will procure him ſomething more ſolid than the name it has got him here; which I look upon as a good forerunner of greater things to come. He ſpoke ſomething of his intention to ſet about my book, but that I muſt leave to you and him. There is lately fallen into my hand a paper of Monſ. L——, writ to a gentleman here in England, concerning ſeveral things in my Eſſay. I was told, when I was in London, that he had lately ordered his correſpondent to communicate them to me, and ſomething elſe he has ſince writ hither. He treats me all along with great civility, and more compliment than I can deſerve. And being, as he is, a very great man, it is not for me to ſay there appears to me no great weight in the exceptions he makes to

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ſome paſſages in my book; but his great name and knowledge in all parts of learning, ought to make me think, that a man of his parts ſays nothing but what has great weight in it; only I ſuſpect he has, in ſome places, a little miſtaken my ſenſe, which is eaſy for a ſtranger, who has (as I think) learned Engliſh out of England. The ſervant I have now cannot copy French, or elſe you ſhould ſee what he ſays: When I have all his papers you ſhall hear farther from me. I repine, as often as I think of the diſtance between this and Dublin.

I READ that paſſage of your letter to my lady Maſham which concerned her ſight; ſhe bid me tell you, that ſhe hopes to ſee you here this ſummer. You will, poſſibly, wonder at the miracle, but that you muſt find in Mr. Norris's book. She has, it is true, but weak eyes, which Mr. Norris, for reaſons he knew beſt, was reſolved to make blind ones. And having fitted his epiſtle to that ſuppoſition, could not be hindered from publiſhing it ſo; though my lady, to prevent it, writ him word that ſhe was not blind, and hoped ſhe never ſhould be. It is a ſtrange power, you ſee, we authors take to ourſelves; but there is nothing more ordinary, than for us to make whomſoever we will blind, and give them out to the world for ſuch, as boldly as Bayard himſelf. But it is time to ſpare you and your eyes. I am, with the utmoſt reſpect and ſincerity,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt affectionate ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, March 16, $169\frac{6}{7}$.

I MUST confeſs, dear ſir, I have not lately (if ever in my life) been under a greater concern, than at your long ſilence. Sometimes I was angry with myſelf, but I could not well tell why; and then I was apt to blame you, but I could leſs tell why. As your ſilence continued, my diſtraction increaſed; till, at laſt, I was happily relieved by yours of the 22d of February, which came not to my hands till the 10th inſtant. I then perceived I was to charge ſome part of my troubled time to the conveyance of your letter, which was almoſt three weeks on its way hither; and that which added to my concern, was the want of even your ſhadow before me; for to this moment I have not received that, which will be apt, on its appearance, to make me an idolater. Mr. Howard writes me word, he has ſent it from London above five weeks ago; but I hear nothing of it from our correſpondent, to whom it is conſigned in Cheſter. However, ſeeing I know the ſubſtance to be in ſafety, and well, I can bear the hazard of the ſhadow with ſome patience, and doubt not but my expectation will be ſatisfied in due time.

BOTH Whiſton and Bentley are poſitive againſt the idea of God being innate; and I had rather rely on them (if I would rely on any man) than

on Dr. S——. It is true, the latter has a great name; but that, I am ſure, weighs not with you or me. Beſides, you rightly obſerve, the Doctor is no obſtinate heretick, but may veer about when another opinion comes in faſhion; for ſome men alter their notions as they do their cloaths, in compliance to the mode. I have heard of a maſter of the Temple, who, during the ſiege of Limerick, writ over hither to a certain prelate, to be ſure to let him know, by the firſt opportunity, whenever it came to be ſurrendered, which was done accordingly; and immediately the good doctor's eyes were opened, and he plainly ſaw the oaths to K. William and Q. Mary were not only expedient but lawful, and our duty. A good roaring train of artillery is not only the "ratio ul-"tima regum," but of other men beſides.

I FANCY I pretty well gueſs what it is that ſome men find miſchievous in your Eſſay: It is opening the eyes of the ignorant, and rectifying the methods of reaſoning, which perhaps may undermine ſome received errors, and ſo abridge the empire of darkneſs; wherein, though the ſubjects wander deplorably, yet the rulers have their profit and advantage. But it is ridiculous, in any man, to ſay in general your book is dangerous; let any fair contender for truth ſit down and ſhew wherein it is erroneous. Dangerous is a word of an uncertain ſignification; every one uſes it in his own ſenſe. A Papiſt ſhall ſay it is dangerous, becauſe, perhaps, it agrees not ſo well with tranſubſtantiation; and a Lutheran, becauſe his conſubſtantiation is in hazard; but neither conſider, whether tranſubſtantiation or conſubſtantiation be true or falſe; but taking it for granted that they are true, or at leaſt gainful, whatever hits not with it, or is againſt it, muſt be dangerous.

I AM extremely obliged to you for your introducing a corrreſpondence between Dr. Sloane and me, and it would be the greateſt ſatisfaction imaginable to me, could I but promiſe myſelf materials, in this place, fit to ſupport it. However, I ſhall ſoon begin it, by ſending him an account of the largeſt quadruped that moves on the earth, except the elephant, with which this country has anciently been plentifully ſtocked, but are now quite periſhed from amongſt us, and is not to be found, for aught as I can learn, any where at preſent, but about New England, Virginia, &c.

AND now I come to that part of your letter relating to Monſ. Le Clerc, which grieves me every time I think on it. There are ſo many difficulties, in what you propoſe concerning him, that I know not how they will be ſurmounted. The clergy here, have given that learned, pious, and candid man, a name that will frighten any biſhop from ſerving him, though otherwiſe inclinable enough in his own breaſt. I know but two or three that are in any poſt in the church capable to help him; on whom I could rely to do it; but, at the ſame time, I know them to be ſuch cautious wary men, and ſo fearful of the cenſure of the reſt of the tribe, that they would hardly be brought to it. I take Monſ. Le Clerc to be one of the greateſt ſcholars in Europe; I look on him as one

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of the moſt judicious, pious, and ſincere Chriſtians that has appeared publickly; and it would be an infinite honour to us, to have him amongſt us; but, I fear, an eccleſiaſtical preferment will be very difficult to be obtained for him. And indeed, when I troubled you to give me ſome account of him, it was in proſpect of bringing him into my own family, could his circumſtances have allowed it; for I took him to be a ſingle man, and one of the refugees in Holland, and wholly unprovided for. On his own account, I am heartily glad he has any ſettlement there; but, for my own ſake, I could wiſh he were in other circumſtances. But, notwithſtanding theſe difficulties, I have ventured to break this matter to a clergyman here in a conſiderable poſt, Dr. . . . . dean of . . . . . ., a gentleman who is happy in your acquaintance, and is a perſon of an extenſive charity, and great candour. He reliſhed the thing extremely, but moved the forementioned difficulties, and raiſed ſome farther ſcruples concerning Mr. Le Clerc's ordination; for ordained he muſt neceſſarily be, to capacitate him for an eccleſiaſtical preferment; and he queſtioned whether he would ſubmit to thoſe oaths, and ſubſcription of aſſent and conſent, that are requiſite thereto. But he promiſed me, that when he attends the king this ſummer into Holland, as his chaplain, he will wait on monſieur Le Clerc at Amſterdam, and diſcourſe with him farther about this matter. This gentleman is the likelieſt eccleſiaſtick in Ireland to effect this buſineſs, for he is a riſing man in the church; and though he be very zealous in his own principles, yet it is with the greateſt charity and deference to others; which, I think, is the true ſpirit of Chriſtianity. I have not mentioned you in the leaſt to him, in all this matter.

I AM extremely obliged to you for the good offices you have done me to Mr. Methwin our lord chancellor. I promiſe myſelf a great deal of ſatisfaction in the honour of his lordſhip's acquaintance. And, I could wiſh, if it were conſiſtent with your convenience, that you would let me know the perſon you deſired to mention my name to his lordſhip.

I AM heartily glad to underſtand, that you have taken notice of what the biſhop of Worceſter ſays, relating to your book. I have been in diſcourſe here, with an ingenious man, upon what the biſhop alledges; and the gentleman obſerved, that the biſhop does not ſo directly object againſt your notions as erroneous, but as miſuſed by others, and particularly by the author of "Chriſtianity not myſterious;" but I think, this is no very juſt obſervation. The biſhop directly oppoſes your doctrine, though, it is true, he does it on the occaſion of the foreſaid book. I am told the author of that diſcourſe is of this country, and that his name is Toland, but he is a ſtranger in theſe parts; I believe, if he belongs to this kingdom, he has been a good while out of it, for I have not heard of any ſuch remarkable man amongſt us.

I SHOULD be very glad to ſee monſ. L's paper concerning your Eſſay. He is certainly an extraordinary perſon, eſpecially in mathematicks; but really, to ſpeak freely of him, in relation to what he may have to ſay to you, I do not expect any great matters from him; for methinks (with all

deference to his great name) he has given the world no extraordinary ſamples of his thoughts this way, as appears by two diſcourſes he has printed, both in the "Acta Erudit. Lipſiæ," the firſt Anno 1694. pag. 110. "De "primæ Philoſophiæ Emendatione, &c." the other Anno 1695. pag. 145. "Specimen Dynamicum," which truly to me is, in many places, unintelligible; but that may be my defect, and not his.

I BEG you would excuſe me to my lady Maſham, for the error I committed relating to her ladyſhip. I ever looked on Mr. Norris as an obſcure enthuſiaſtick man, but I could not think he would knowingly impoſe on the world ſo notorious a falſity in matter of fact. I wiſh authors would take more pains to open than to ſhut men's eyes, and then we ſhould have more ſucceſs in the diſcoveries of truth.——But I have almoſt outrun my paper. I am,

Ever honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and

moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, April 6, 1697.

IN my laſt to you of March 16, there was a paſſage relating to the author of "Chriſtianity not myſterious." I did not then think that he was ſo near me, as within the bounds of this city; but I find ſince, that he is come over hither, and have had the favour of a viſit from him. I now underſtand (as I intimated to you) that he was born in this country; but that he has been a great while abroad, and his education was, for ſome time, under the great Le Clerc. But that for which I can never honour him too much, is his acquaintance and friendſhip to you, and the reſpect, which, on all occaſions, he expreſſes for you. I propoſe a great deal of ſatisfaction in his converſation; I take him to be a candid free-thinker, and a good ſcholar. But there is a violent ſort of ſpirit that reigns here, which begins already to ſhew itſelf againſt him; and, I believe, will increaſe daily; for I find the clergy alarmed to a mighty degree againſt him. And laſt Sunday he had his welcome to this city, by hearing himſelf harangued againſt, out of the pulpit, by a prelate of this country.

I HAVE at laſt received my moſt eſteemed friend's picture; I muſt now make my grateful ackowledgements to you, for the many idle hours you ſpent in ſitting for it, to gratify my deſire. I never look upon it, but with the greateſt veneration. But though the artiſt has ſhewn extraordinary ſkill at his pencil, yet now I have obtained ſome part of my deſire, the greateſt remains unſatisfied; and ſeeing he could not make it ſpeak, and converſe with me, I am ſtill at a loſs. But I find you are reſolved,

ſolved, in ſome meaſure, to ſupply even that too, by the kind preſents you ſend me of your thoughts, both in your letters, and in your books, as you publiſh them. Mr. Churchill tells me, I am obliged to you for one or two of this kind, that you have been pleaſed to favour me with; they are not yet come to hand, but I return you my heartieſt thanks for them. I long, indeed, to ſee your anſwer to the biſhop of Worceſter; but for Edwards, I think him ſuch a poor wretch, he deſerves no notice. I am,

Moſt Worthy SIR,

Your affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, April 10, 1697.

THOUGH I do not ſuſpect that you will think me careleſs or cold in that ſmall buſineſs you deſired of me, and ſo left it in negligent hands, give me leave to ſend you a tranſcript of a paſſage in my friend's letter, which I received laſt poſt.

" It is a great while ſince that Mr. P—— undertook to tell you that " I had ſpoken to Mr. Methwin about Mr. Molyneux, and that he re- " ceived your recommendation very civilly, and anſwered, he ſhould al- " ways have a great regard for any body you thought worthy of your " eſteem; and you gave ſo advantageous a character of Mr. Molyneux, " that he ſhould covet his acquaintance, and therefore he muſt deſire the " favour of you to recommend him to Mr. Molyneux.

THUS, my friend, whoſe words, though in them there be ſomething of compliment to myſelf, I repeat to you juſt as they are in his letter, that you may ſee he had the ſame ſucceſs I promiſed you in my laſt.

IN obedience to your commands, I herewith ſend you a copy of Mr. L—'s paper. The laſt paragraph, which you will find writ in my hand, is a tranſcript of part of a letter, writ lately to his correſpondent here, one Mr. Burnet, who ſent it me lately, with a copy of Mr. L———'s paper. Mr. Burnet has had it this year or two, but never communicated it to me, 'till about a fortnight agone. Indeed Mr. Cunningham procured me a ſight of it laſt ſummer, and he and I read it paragraph by paragraph over together, and he confeſſed to me, that ſome parts of it he did not underſtand; and I ſhewed him in others, that Mr. L———'s opinion would not hold, who was perfectly of my mind. I mention Mr. Cunningham to you, in the caſe, becauſe I think him an extraordinary man of parts and learning, and he is one that is known to Mr.

L———. To anſwer your freedom with the like, I muſt confeſs to you, that Mr. L———'s great name had raiſed in me an expectation which the ſight of his paper did not anſwer, nor that diſcourſe of his in the "Acta "Eruditorum," which he quotes, and I have ſince read, and had juſt the ſame thoughts of it, when I read it, as I find you have. From whence I only draw this inference, that even great parts will not maſter any ſubject without great thinking, and even the largeſt minds have but narrow ſwallows. Upon this occaſion I cannot but again regret the loſs of your company and aſſiſtance, by this great diſtance.

I HAVE lately got a little leiſure to think of ſome additions to my book, againſt the next edition, and within theſe few days have fallen upon a ſubject, that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written ſeveral pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get ſight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be, "Of the Conduct of the Underſtanding," which, if I ſhall purſue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deſerves, will, I conclude, make the largeſt chapter of my Eſſay. It is well for you, you are not near me; I ſhould be always peſtering you with my notions, and papers, and reveries. It would be a great happineſs to have a man of thought to lay them before, and a friend that would deal candidly and freely.

I HOPE, ere this, you and your brother have received printed copies of what the Doctor communicated to the Royal Society. I preſume it is publiſhed before this time, though I have not ſeen it; for Dr. Sloane writ me word, ſome time ſince, that it would be ſpeedily, and told me he would ſend it to you. And, if Mr. Churchill has taken that care he promiſed me, I hope you have alſo received my Letter to the biſhop of Worceſter, and that I ſhall ſoon receive your thoughts of it.

THE buſineſs you propoſed to Dr. S—— is generouſly deſigned, and well managed, and I very much wiſh it ſucceſs. But will not Dr. S—— be perſuaded to communicate to the world the obſervations he made in Turky? The diſcourſe I had with him ſatisfies me, they well deſerve not to be loſt, as all papers laid up in a ſtudy are. Methinks you ſhould prevail with him to oblige his country.

THOUGH my paper be done, yet I cannot cloſe my letter till I have made ſome acknowledgments to you, for the many great marks you give me of a ſincere affection, and an eſteem extremely above what I can deſerve, in yours of the 16th of March. Such a friend, procured me by my Eſſay, makes me more than amends for the many adverſaries it has raiſed me. But, I think, no-body will be able to find any thing miſchievous in it, but what you ſay, which I ſuſpect, troubles ſome men; and I am not ſorry for it, nor like my book the worſe. He that follows truth impartially, ſeldom pleaſes any ſet of men; and I know not how a great many of thoſe, who pretend to be ſpreaders of light and teachers of truth, would yet have men depend upon them for it, and take it rather upon

upon their words than their own knowledge, juſt cooked and ſeaſoned as they think fit. But it is time to releaſe you after ſo long a trouble. I am perfectly,

Dear SIR, Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Réflexions de Mr. L—— ſur "l'éſſai de l'entendement humain" de Monſieur LOCKE.

JE trouve tant de marques d'une penetration peu ordinaire dans ce que Mr. Locke nous a donné ſur l'entendement de l'homme, & ſur l'education, & je juge la matiere ſi importante que j'ai crû ne pas mal employer le tems que je donnerois à une lecture ſi profitable; d'autant que j'ai fort medité moi-même ſur ce qui regarde les fondemens de nos connoiſſances. C'eſt ce qui m'a fait mettre ſur cette feüille quelques unes des remarques qui me ſont venues en liſant ſon "eſſai de l'entendement." De toutes les recherches il n'y en a point de plus importantes, puiſque c'eſt la clef de toutes les autres.

LE premier livre regarde principalement les principes qu'on dit être néz avec nous. Mr. Locke ne les admet pas, non plus que les idées inées. Il a eu ſans doute de grandes raiſons de s'oppoſer en cela aux préjugez ordinaires, car on abuſe extrêmement du nom d'idées & de principes. Les philoſophes vulgaires ſe font des principes à leur phantaſie, & les Carteſiens, qui font profeſſion de plus d'exactitude, ne laiſſent pas de faire leur retrenchement des idées prétenduës, de l'étenduë de la matiere, & de l'ame; voulant s'éxempter par-là de la néceſſité de prouver ce qu'ils avancent; ſous prétexte que ceux qui méditeront les idées, y trouveront la même choſe qu'eux, c'eſt-à-dire, que ceux qui s'accoûtumeront à leur jargon & à leur maniere de penſer, auront les mêmes préventions, ce qui eſt très-véritable. Mon opinion eſt donc qu'on ne doit rien prendre pour principe primitif, ſi non les expériences & l'axiôme de l'identicité ou (ce qui eſt la même choſe) de la contradiction, qui eſt primitif, puiſqu' autrement il n'y auroit point de difference entre la verité & la fauſſeté; & toutes les recherches ceſſeroient d'abord, s'il étoit indifferent de dire oüi ou non. On ne ſauroit donc s'empêcher de ſuppoſer ce principe, dèſqu'on veut raiſonner. Toutes les autres veritez ſont prouvables, & j'eſtime extrêmement la methode d'Euclide qui ſans s'arrêter à ce qu'on croiroit être aſſez prouvé par les prétenduës idées, a demontré (par exemple) que dans une triangle un côté eſt toûjours moindre que les deux autres enſemble. Cependant Euclide a eu raiſon de prendre quelques axiômes pour accordés, non pas comme s'ils étoient véritablement primitifs & indémonſtrables, mais parce qu'il ſe ſeroit trop arrêté, s'il n'avoit voulu venir aux concluſions qu'après une diſcuſſion éxacte des principes: ainſi il a jugé à propos de ſe contenter d'avoir pouſſé les preuves,

ves juſqu'à ce petit nombre de propoſitions, en ſorte qu'on peut dire que ſi elles ſont vraies, tout ce qu'il dit l'eſt auſſi. Il a laiſſé à d'autres le ſoin de démontrer ces principes mêmes qui d'ailleurs ſont déja juſtifiées par les expériences. Mais c'eſt dequoi on ne ſe contente point en ces matieres: c'eſt pourquoi Apollonius, Proclus, & autres, ont pris la peine de démontrer quelques uns des axiômes d'Euclide. Cette maniere doit être imitée des philoſophes, pour venir enfin à quelques établiſſemens, quand ils ne ſeroient que proviſionels; de la maniere que je viens de dire. Quant aux idées j'en ai donné quelque éclairciſſement dans un petit écrit imprimé dans les Actes des ſçavans de Leipzig au mois de Novembre, 1684. p. 537. qui eſt intitulé, " Meditationes de cognitione, " veritate, & ideis," & j'aurois ſouhaité que Mr. Locke l'eut vû & éxaminé, car je ſuis des plus dociles, & rien n'eſt plus propre à avancer nos penſées que les conſiderations & les remarques des perſonnes de mérite, lorſqu'elles ſont faites avec attention & avec ſincerité. Je dirai ſeulement ici, que les idées vraies ou réelles ſont celles dont on eſt aſſûré que l'éxécution eſt poſſible, les autres ſont douteuſes ou (en cas de preuve de l'impoſſibilité) chimériques. Or la poſſibilité des idées ſe prouve tant à priori par des démonſtrations, en ſe ſervant de la poſſibilité d'autres idées plus ſimples, qu'à poſteriori par les expériences, car ce qui eſt ne ſçauroit manquer d'être poſſible: mais les idées primitives ſont celles dont la poſſibilité eſt indémonſtrable, & qui en effet ne ſont autre choſe que les attributs de Dieu. Pour ce qui eſt de la queſtion, " s'il y a des " idées & des véritez crées avec nous;" je ne trouve point abſolument néceſſaire pour les commencemens, ni pour la pratique de l'art de penſer, de la décider, ſoit qu'elles nous viennent toutes de déhors, ou qu'elles viennent de nous, on raiſonnera juſte pourvû qu'on garde ce que j'ai dit ci-deſſus & qu'on procede avec ordre & ſans prévention. La queſtion de " l'origine de nos idées & de nos maximes" n'eſt pas préliminaire en philoſophie & il faut avoir fait de grands progrès pour la bien réſoudre. Je crois cependant pouvoir dire que nos idées (même celles de choſes ſenſibles) viennent de notre propre fonds, dont on pourra mieux juger parce que j'ai publié touchant la nature & la communication des ſubſtances & ce qu'on appelle " l'union de l'ame avec le corps, car j'ai trouvé que ces choſes n'avoient pas été bien priſes. Je ne ſuis nullement pour la tabula raſa d'Ariſtote, & il y a quelque choſe de ſolide dans ce que Platon appelloit la reminiſcence. Il y a même quelque choſe de plus, car nous n'avons pas ſeulement une reminiſcence de toutes nos penſées paſſées, mais encore un preſſentiment de toutes nos penſées futures. Il eſt vrai que c'eſt confuſément & ſans les diſtinguer, à peu près comme lorſque j'entends le bruit de la mer, j'entends celui de toutes les vagues en particulier qui compoſent le bruit total; quoique ce ſoit ſans diſcerner une vague de l'autre. Et il eſt vrai dans un certain ſens que j'ai expliqué, que non ſeulement nos idées, mais encore nos ſentimens naiſſent de nôtre propre fonds, & que l'ame eſt plus indépendante qu'on ne penſe, quoiqu'il ſoit toûjours vrai que rien ne ſe paſſe en elle qui ne ſoit déterminé.

DANS

DANS le livre ii. qui vient au détail des idées, j'avouë que les raiſons de Monſ. Locke pour prouver que l'ame eſt quelquefois ſans penſer à rien, ne me paroiſſent pas convainquantes; ſi ce n'eſt qu'il donne le nom de penſées aux ſeules perceptions aſſez notables pour être diſtinguées & retenuës. Je tiens que l'ame & même le corps n'eſt jamais ſans action, & que l'ame n'eſt jamais ſans quelque perception. Même en dormant on a quelques ſentimens confus & ſombres du lieu où l'on eſt & d'autres choſes. Mais quand l'expérience ne le confirmeroit pas je crois qu'il y en a démonſtration. C'eſt à peu près comme on ne ſçauroit prouver abſolument par les expériences s'il n'y a point de vuide dans l'eſpace & s'il n'y a point de repos dans la matiere. Et cependant ces ſortes de queſtions me paroiſſent décidées démonſtrativement, auſſi bien qu'à Mr. Locke; je demeure d'accord de la différence qu'il met avec beaucoup de raiſon entre la matiere & l'eſpace. Mais pour ce qui eſt du vuide pluſieurs perſonnes habiles l'ont crû. Monſieur Locke eſt de ce nombre, j'en étois preſque perſuadé moi-même, mais j'en ſuis revenu depuis long-tems. Et l'incomparable Monſieur Huygens, qui étoit auſſi pour le vuide, & pour les atômes, commença à faire réflexion ſur mes raiſons, comme ſes lettres le pouvent témoigner. La preuve du vuide priſe du mouvement, dont Mr. Locke ſe ſert, ſuppoſe que le corps eſt originairement dur, & qu'il eſt compoſé d'un certain nombre de parties inflexibles. Car en ce cas il ſeroit vrai, quelque nombre fini d'atômes, qu'on pourroit prendre que le mouvement ne ſauroit avoir lieu ſans vuide; mais toutes les parties de la matiere ſont diviſibles & pliables. Il y a encore quelques autres choſes dans ce ſecond livre qui m'arrêtent, par éxemple, lorſqu'il eſt dit, chap. 17. que l'infinité ne ſe doit attribuer qu'à l'eſpace, au tems, & aux nombres. Je crois avec Mr. Locke qu'à proprement parler on peut dire qu'il n'y a point d'eſpace, de tems, ni de nombre, qui ſoit infini, mais qu'il eſt ſeulement vrai que plus grand que ſoit une eſpace, ou tems, ou bien un nombre, il y a toûjours un autre plus grand que lui ſans fin, & qu'ainſi le véritable infini ne ſe trouve point dans un tout compoſé de parties. Cependant il ne laiſſe pas de ſe trouver ailleurs, ſavoir dans l'abſolu, qui eſt ſans parties & qui a influence ſur les choſes compoſées, parce qu'elles réſultent de la limitation de l'abſolu. Donc l'infini poſitif n'étant autre choſe que l'abſolu, on peut dire qu'il y a en ce ſens une idée poſitive de l'infini, & qu'elle eſt antérieure à celle du fini. Au reſte en rejettant un infini compoſé on ne point ce que les géométres démontrent " de ſeriebus infinitis," & particulierement l'excellent Mr. Newton. Quant à ce qui eſt dit chap. 30. " de ideis adæquatis," il eſt permis de donner aux termes la ſignification qu'on trouve à propos. Cependant ſans blamer le ſens de Mr. Locke je mets un degré dans les idées ſelon lequelle j'appelle adequate celle où il n'y a plus rien à expliquer. Or toutes les idées des qualitez ſenſibles, comme de la lumiere, couleur, chaleur, n'étant point de cette nature, je ne les compte point parmis les adequates, auſſi n'eſt-ce point par elles-mêmes, ni à priori, mais par l'expérience que nous en ſçavons la réalité, ou la poſſibilité.

IL y a encore bien de bonnes choſes dans le livre iii. où il eſt traite des mots ou termes. Il eſt très-vrai qu'on ne ſçauroit tout définir, & que les qualitez ſenſibles n'ont point de définition nominale, & on les peut appeller primitives en ce ſens-là. Mais elles ne laiſſent pas de pouvoir recevoir une définition réelle. J'ai montré la différence de ſes deux ſortes de définitions dans la méditation citée ci-deſſus. La définition nominale explique le nom par les marques de la choſes ; mais la définition réelle fait connoître à priori la poſſibilité du défini. Au reſte j'applaudis fort à la doctrine de Monſ. Locke touchant la demonſtrabilité des veritez morales.

LE iv. ou dernier livre, où il s'agit de la connoiſſance de la verité, montre l'uſage de ce qui vient d'être dit. J'y trouve (auſſi bien que dans les livres précédens) une infinité de belles reflexions. De faire là-deſſus les remarques convenables, ce ſeroit faire un livre auſſi grand que l'ouvrage même. Il me ſemble que les axiômes y ſont un peu moins conſiderés qu'ils ne méritent de l'être. C'eſt apparemment parce qu'excepté ceux des mathematiciens on n'en trouve guere ordinairement, qui ſoient importans & ſolides : tâché de rémedier à ce défaut. Je ne mépriſe pas les propoſitions identiques, & j'ai trouvé qu'elles ont un grand uſage même dans l'analyſe. Il eſt très-vrai, que nous connoiſſons nôtre exiſtence par une intuition immediate & celle de Dieu par démonſtration, & qu'une maſſe de matiere, dont les parties ſont ſans perception, ne ſçauroit faire un tout qui penſe. Je ne mépriſe point l'argument inventé, il y a quelques ſiécles, par Anſelme, qui prouve que l'être parfait doit exiſter ; quoique je trouve qu'il manque quelque choſe à cet argument, parce qu'il ſuppoſe que l'être parfait eſt poſſible. Car ſi ce ſeul point ſe démonſtre encore, la démonſtration toute entiere ſera entierement achevé. Quant à la connoiſſance des autres choſes il eſt fort bien dit, que la ſeule expérience ne ſuffit pas pour avancer aſſez en phyſique. Un eſprit pénétrant tirera plus de conſéquences de quelques expériences aſſez ordinaires qu'un autre ne ſçauroit tirer des plus choiſies, outre qu'il y a un art d'expérimenter & d'interroger, pour ainſi dire, la nature. Cependant il eſt toujours vrai qu'on ne ſçauroit avancer dans le detail de la phyſique qu'à meſure qu'on a des expériences. Monſ. Locke eſt de l'opinion de pluſieurs habiles hommes, qui tiennent que la forme des Logiciens eſt de peu d'uſage. Je ſerois quaſi d'un autre ſentiment ; & j'ai trouvé ſouvent que les paralogiſmes même dans les mathématiques ſont des manquemens de la forme. M. Huygens a fait la même remarque. Il y auroit bien à dire là-deſſus ; & pluſieurs choſes excellentes ſont mépriſées parce qu'on n'en fait pas l'uſage dont elles ſont capables. Nous ſommes portez à mépriſer ce que nous avons appris dans les écoles. Il eſt vrai que nous y apprenons bien des inutilitez, mais il eſt bon de faire la fonction della cruſca, c'eſt à dire de ſéparer le bon du mauvais. Mr. Locke le peut faire autant que qui que ce ſoit ; & de plus il nous donne des penſées conſiderables de ſon propre crû. Il n'eſt pas ſeulement Eſſayeur, mais il eſt encore Tranſmutateur par l'augmentation, qu'il donne du bon mètail. S'il con-

continuoit d'en faire preſent au public, nous lui en ſerions fort redevables.

JE voudrois que Monſ. Locke eut dit ſon ſentiment à Monſ. Cunningham ſur mes Remarques, ou que Monſ. Cunningham voulut nous le dire librement. Car je ne ſuis pas de ceux qui ſont entêtez, & la raiſon peut tout ſur moi. Mais les affaires de négoce détournent Monſ. Locke de ces penſées, car cette matiere de négoce eſt de très grande etendue & même fort ſubtile & demimathematique, &c.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, May 3, 1697.

THOUGH the honour you do me, in the value you put upon my ſhadow, be a freſh mark of that friendſhip which is ſo great an happineſs to me, yet I ſhall never conſider my picture in the ſame houſe with you, without great regret at my ſo far diſtance from you myſelf. But I will not continue to importune you with my complaints of that kind; it is an advantage greater than I could have hoped, to have the converſation of ſuch a friend, though with the ſea between; and the remaining little ſcantling of my life would be too happy, if I had you in my neigbourhood.

I AM glad to hear, that the gentleman you mention, in your's of the 6th of the laſt month, does me the favour to ſpeak well of me on that ſide the water; I never deſerved other of him, but that he ſhould always have done ſo on this. If his exceeding great value of himſelf do not deprive the world of that uſefulneſs, that his parts, if rightly conducted, might be of, I ſhall be very glad. He went from London, as I heard afterwards, ſoon after I left it, the laſt time. But he did me not the favour to give me a viſit whilſt I was there, nor to let me know of his intended journey to you; if he had, it is poſſible I might have writ by him to you, which I am now not ſorry I did not. I always value men of parts and learning, and think I cannot do too much in procuring them friends and aſſiſtance. But there may happen occaſions that may make one ſtop one's hand. And it is the hopes young men give of what uſe they will make of their parts, which is to me the encouragement of being concerned for them. But, if vanity increaſes with age, I always fear whither it will lead a man. I ſay this to you, becauſe you are my friend, for whom I have no reſerves, and think I ought to talk freely where you enquire, and poſſibly may be concerned; but I ſay it to you alone, and deſire it may go no farther. For the man I wiſh very well, and could give you, if it needed, proofs that I do ſo. And therefore I deſire you to be kind to him; but I muſt leave it to your prudence, in what way, and how far. If his carriage with you gives you the promiſes of a ſteady uſeful man, I know you will be forward enough of

yourſelf, and I ſhall be very glad of it. For it will be his fault alone, if he prove not a very valuable man, and have not you for his friend.

BUT I have ſomething to ſay to you of another man. Monſ. Le Clerc, in a letter I received from him, writes thus:

" MONS. C— me diſoit dernierement que s'il trouvoit occaſion d'entrer " dans une maiſon de condition en qualité de precepteur, il ſeroit ravi d'en " profiter. C'eſt un fort honnête homme, & qui ſeroit bien capable de " s'acquiter de cet emploi. Il ne ſçait l'Anglois que par les livres, c'eſt-a- " dire, qu'il l'entend lorſqu'il le lit, mais qu'il ne le ſçauroit parler non " plus que moi faute d'habitude Si quelque un de vos amis auroit be- " ſoin de precepteur, & qu'il lui donnât de quoi s'entretenir, il ne ſçauroit " trover d'homme plus ſage & plus réglé, outre qu'il ſçait beaucoup de " choſes utiles pour un emploi comme celui-là, les belles lettres, l'hiſ- " toire, &c."

THIS Mr. C— is he that tranſlated my book of Education, upon which occaſion I came to have ſome acquaintance with him by letters, and he ſeems a very ingenious man; and Mr. Le Clerc has often, before any thing of this, ſpoken of him to me with commendation and eſteem. He has ſince tranſlated " The Lady's Religion," and " The Reaſonableneſs " of Chriſtianity," into French. You may eaſily gueſs, why I put this into my letter to you, after what you ſaid concerning Mr. Le Clerc in your laſt letter but one.

YOU are willing, I ſee, to make my little preſents to you more and greater than they are. Amongſt the books that Mr. Churchill ſent you, you are beholden to me (ſince you will call it ſo) but for one; and to that the biſhop of Worceſter, I hear, has an anſwer in the preſs, which will be out this week. So that I perceive this controverſy is a matter of ſerious moment beyond what I could have thought. This benefit I ſhall be ſure to get by it, either to be confirmed in my opinion, or be convinced of ſome errors, which I ſhall preſently reform, in my Eſſay, and ſo make it the better for it. For I have no opinions that I am fond of. Truth, I hope, I always ſhall be fond of, and ſo ready to embrace, and with ſo much joy, that I ſhall own it to the world, and thank him that does me the favour. So that I am never afraid of any thing writ againſt me, unleſs it be the waſting of my time, when it is not writ cloſely in purſuit of truth, and truth only.

IN my laſt to you, I ſent you a copy of Mr. L——'s paper; I have this writ me out of Holland concerning it:

" MR. L——, mathématicien de Hannover ayant oüi dire, qu'on tra- " duiſoit vôtre ouvrage, qu'on l'alloit & imprimer, a envoyé ici à un de " mes amis ce jugement qu'il en fait, comme pour la mettre à la tête. " Cependant il a été bien aiſe qu'on vous le communicât. Il m'a été " remis entre les mains pour cela. On m'a dit mille biens de ce mathé- " maticien. Il y a long tems que magna & præclara minatur, ſans rien " produire que quelques démonſtrations détachées. Je crois nean-

" moins

« moins qu'il ne vous entend pas, & je doute qu'il s'entende bien lui-
« même."

I SEE you and I, and this gentleman, agree pretty well concerning the man; and this ſort of fiddling makes me hardly avoid thinking, that he is not that very great man as has been talked of him. His paper was in England a year, or more, before it was communicated to me, and I imagine you will think he need not make ſuch a great ſtir with it.

MY Eſſay, you ſee, is tranſlating into French, and it is by the ſame Mr. Coſte above-mentioned. But this need not hinder Mr. Burridge in what he deſigned; for Mr. Coſte goes on exceedingly ſlowly, as I am told.

YOU ſee how forward I am to importune you with all my little concerns. But this would be nothing to what I ſhould do, if I were nearer you. I ſhould then be talking to you de quolibet ente, and conſulting you about a thouſand whimſies that come ſometimes into my thoughts. But, with all this, I unfeignedly am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

THE poem that was ſent you by Mr. Churchill, amongſt the other books, I believe will pleaſe you: there are ſome noble parts in it.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

My moſt honoured Friend, Dublin, May 15, 1697.

NOTHING could excuſe my keeping your kind letter of April 10th ſo long by me unanſwered, but an unexpected and melancholy accident that has lately befallen a dear ſiſter of mine, who, on the 24th of laſt month, loſt her huſband, the lord Biſhop of Meath, a learned and worthy prelate. Our whole family has ſo deeply partaken in this trouble, that we have been all under a great concern; but more particularly myſelf, who am intruſted by the good biſhop with the diſpoſal of ſome of his affairs. This has, of late, ſo taken me up, that I had not time to take the ſatisfaction of writing to you; but the hurry of that buſineſs being ſomewhat abated, I reſume the pleaſure of kiſſing your hands, and of aſſuring you, with what a deep ſenſe of gratitude I receive the kindneſs you have done me with my lord chancellor Methwin. I hope we ſhall ſee his lordſhip ſoon here, for we underſtand he parts from London the 18th inſtant.

I AM extremely obliged to you for the trouble you have been at in communicating to me Monſ. L——'s paper, and I am now ſorry I ever put the taſk on you: for to ſpeak freely to you, as I formerly did, I find nothing in this paper to make me alter the opinion I had of Monſ. L—'s performances this way. He is either very unhappy in expreſſing, or I

am very dull in apprehending his thoughts. I do not know but ſome of the doubts he raiſes, concerning your Eſſay, may proceed from his unacquaintance with our language; and this makes me yet more earneſt to procure the tranſlation of your Eſſay; but Mr. Burridge, ſince he laſt arrived here, has been wholly employed in overtaking his buſineſs in the country, to which he is run much in arrear. He is chaplain to my lord chancellor Methwin, and, on that account, I hope he will keep much in town, and then I ſhall ply him hard.

I WILL give you a thouſand thanks for the preſent of your Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter; but I need not give you my opinion of it, otherwiſe than as you find it in the following paragraph of a letter which I received concerning it, from a reverend prelate of this kingdom. (The preſent biſhop of .... between ourſelves.)

" I READ Mr. Locke's Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter with great " ſatisfaction, and am wholly of your opinion, that he has fairly laid the " great biſhop on his back; but it is with ſo much gentleneſs, as if he " were afraid not only of hurting him, but even of ſpoiling or tumbling " his cloaths. Indeed I cannot tell which I moſt admire, the great civi- " lity and good manners in his book, or the force and clearneſs of his " reaſonings. And I fancy the biſhop will thank him privately, and " trouble the world no more with this diſpute."

YOU ſee thereby my friend's, and my own, opinion of your book; and I can tell you farther, that all thoſe whom I have yet converſed with in this place, concerning it, agree in the ſame judgment. And another (biſhop too) told me, that " though your words were as ſmooth as oil, " yet they cut like a two-edged ſword."

AT the ſame time that Mr. Churchill ſent me your Letter to the biſhop, he ſent me likewiſe the " Second Vindication of the Reaſonableneſs " of Chriſtianity." If you know the author thereof, (as I am apt to ſurmiſe you may) be pleaſed to let him know, that I think he has done Edwards too much honour in thinking him worth his notice; for ſo vile a poor wretch certainly never appeared in print. But, at the ſame time, tell him, that, as this Vindication contains a farther illuſtration of the divine truths in the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, he has the thanks of me, and of all fair candid men that I converſe with about it.

IN giving you the opinion we have here, of your Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, I have rather choſen to let you know, particularly, that of ſome of our biſhops with whom I converſe; for this rank, if any, might ſeem inclinable to favour their brother, could they do it with any ſhew of juſtice. And yet, after all, I am told from London, that the biſhop is hammering out an anſwer to you. Certainly ſome men think, or hope the world will think, that truth always goes with the laſt word.

YOU never write to me, that you do not raiſe new expectations in my longing mind of partaking your thoughts, on thoſe noble ſubjects you are upon. Your chapter concerning the Conduct of the Underſtanding muſt needs be very ſublime and ſpacious. Oh Sir! never more mention

to

to me our diſtance as your loſs: it is my diſadvantage! it is my unhappineſs! I never before had ſuch reaſon to deplore my hard fate, in being condemned to this priſon of an iſland; but one day or other I will get looſe, in ſpite of all the fetters and clogs that incumber me at preſent. But if you did but know in what a wood of buſineſs I am engaged, (by the greateſt part whereof I reap no other advantage than the ſatisfaction of being ſerviceable to my friends) you would pity me. But I hope ſoon to rid my hands of a great part of this trouble, and then I ſhall be at more liberty. Till which happy time, and for ever, I remain

Your moſt faithful friend,
and moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured dear SIR, Dublin, May 27, 1697.

THE hints you are pleaſed ſo friendly to communicate to me, in your's of the 3d inſtant, concerning Mr. T——, are freſh marks of your kindneſs and confidence in me, and they perfectly agree with the apprehenſions I had conceived of that gentleman. Truly, to be free, and without reſerve to you, I do not think his management, ſince he came into this city, has been ſo prudent. He has raiſed againſt him the clamours of all parties; and this, not ſo much by his difference in opinion, as by his unſeaſonable way of diſcourſing, propagating, and maintaining it. Coffee-houſes, and public tables, are not proper places for ſerious diſcourſes relating to the moſt important truths. But when alſo a tincture of vanity appears in the whole courſe of a man's converſation, it diſguſts many that may otherwiſe have a due value for his parts and learning. I have known a gentleman in this town, that was a moſt ſtrict Socinian, and thought as much out of the common road as any man, and was alſo known ſo to do; but then his behaviour and diſcourſe were attended with ſo much modeſty, goodneſs, and prudence, that I never heard him publickly cenſured or clamoured againſt, neither was any man in danger of cenſure, by receiving his viſits, or keeping him company. I am very loth to tell you how far it is otherwiſe with Mr. T—— in this place; but I am perſuaded it may be for his advantage that you know it, and that you friendly admoniſh him of it, for his conduct hereafter. I do not think that any man can be diſpenſed with to diſſemble the truth, and full perſuaſion of his mind, in religious truths, when duly called to it, and upon fitting occaſions. But, I think, prudence may guide us in the choice of proper opportunities, that we may not run ourſelves againſt rocks to no purpoſe, and inflame men againſt us unneceſſarily. Mr. T—— alſo takes here a great liberty, on all occaſions, to vouch your patronage

patronage and friendſhip, which makes many that rail at him, rail alſo at you. I believe you will not approve of this, as far as I am able to judge, by your ſhaking him off in your Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter. But after all this, I look upon Mr. T—— as a very ingenious man, and I ſhould be very glad of any opportunity of doing him ſervice, to which I think myſelf indiſpenſably bound by your recommendation. One thing more I had almoſt forgot to intimate to you, that all here are mightily at a loſs in gueſſing what might be the occaſion of Mr. T——'s coming, at this time, into Ireland. He is known to be of no fortune or employ, and yet is obſerved to have a ſubſiſtence, but from whence it comes no one can tell certainly. Theſe things, joined with his great forwardneſs in appearing in publick, make people ſurmiſe a thouſand fancies. If you could give me light into theſe matters, as far as it may help me in my own conduct, I ſhould be much obliged to you.

BY the books which Mr. Coſte has tranſlated, I perceive his inclinations would be extremely agreeable to mine, and I ſhould be very happy could I give him, at preſent, any encouragement to come into my poor family. But I have a gentleman with me in the houſe, whoſe dependence is wholly upon me; and I cannot find fault with my little boy's progreſs under him. When I formerly made enquiry from you about Monſ. Le Clerc, I was in ſome proſpect of providing for this gentleman whom I now have, by the favour of a good friend, who is ſince dead. So that, at preſent, having no opportunity of diſpoſing him to his advantage, I cannot conveniently part with him. However, I do not know how ſoon it may be otherwiſe; and therefore be pleaſed, in the mean time, to let me know ſomething farther of Monſ. Coſte; as whether he be a complete maſter of the Latin tongue, or other language; whether a mathematician, or given to experimental philoſophy; what his age, and where educated: As to the belles lettres, l'hiſtoire, &c. Monſ. Le Clerc has mentioned them already in his character.

I AM mightily pleaſed to find that ſome others have the ſame thoughts of Monſ. L—— as you and I. His performances in mathematicks have made all the world miſtaken in him. But certainly, in other attempts, I am of your opinion, he no more underſtands himſelf, than others underſtand him.

MR. Churchill favoured me with the preſent of Sir R. Blackmore's K. Arthur. I had Pr. Arthur before, and read it with admiration, which is not at all leſſened by this ſecond piece. All our Engliſh poets (except Milton) have been mere ballad-makers, in compariſon to him. Upon the publication of his firſt poem, I intimated to him, through Mr. Churchill's hands, how excellently I thought he might perform a philoſophick poem, from many touches he gave in his Pr. Arthur, particularly from Mopas's ſong. And, I perceive by his preface to K. Arthur, he has had the like intimations from others, but rejects them, as being an enemy to all philoſophick hypotheſes. Were I acquainted with Sir R. Blackmore, I could aſſure him, (and, if you be ſo, I beſeech you to tell him)

him) that I am as little an admirer of hypotheſes as any man, and never propoſed that thought to him, with a deſign that a philoſophick poem ſhould run on ſuch a ſtrain. "A natural hiſtory of the great and admirable "phænomena of the univerſe," is a ſubject, I think, may afford ſublime thoughts in a poem; and ſo far, and no farther, would I deſire a poem to extend.

You ſee I am carried beyond my deſigned bounds, by the mark on the other ſide this leaf. But as I am never weary of reading letters from you, ſo, I think, I am never tired of writing to you. However, it is time I relieve you, by ſubſcribing myſelf entirely

Your moſt affectionate and devoted ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, June 15, 1697.

I HAVE the honour of your two obliging letters of the 15th and 27th of May, wherein I find the ſame mind, the ſame affection, and the ſame friendſhip, which you have ſo frankly, and ſo long, made me happy in. And, if I may gueſs by the paragraph which you tranſcribed out of your friend's letter into your's of the 15th of May, I ſhall have reaſon to think your kindneſs to me is grown infectious, and that by it you faſcinate your friends underſtandings, and corrupt their judgments in my favour. It is enough for me, in ſo unequal a match, if mighty truth can keep me from a ſhameful overthrow. If I can maintain my ground, it is enough, againſt ſo redoubtable an adverſary; but victory I muſt not think of. I doubt not but you are convinced of that by this time, and you will ſee how ſilly a thing it is for an unſkilled pigmy to enter the liſts with a man at arms, verſed in the uſe of his weapons.

MY health, and buſineſſes that I like as little as you do thoſe you complain of, make me know what it is to want time. I often reſolve not to trouble you any more with my complaints of the diſtance between us, and as often impertinently break that reſolution. I never have any thoughts working in my head, or any new project ſtart in my mind, but my wiſhes carry me immediately to you, and I deſire to lay them before you. You may juſtly think this carries a pretty ſevere reflection on my country, or myſelf, that in it I have not a friend to communicate my thoughts with. I cannot much complain of want of friends to other purpoſes. But a man with whom one can freely ſeek truth, without any regard to old or new, faſhionable or not faſhionable, but truth merely for truth's ſake, is what is ſcarce to be found in an age; and ſuch an one I take you to be. Do but think then what a pleaſure, what an advantage it would be to me to have you by me, who have ſo much thought, ſo much

much clearneſs, ſo much penetration, all directed to the ſame aim which I propoſe to myſelf, in all the ramblings of my mind. I, on this occaſion, mention only the wants that I daily feel, which make me not ſo often ſpeak of the other advantages I ſhould receive, from the communication of your own notions, as well as from the correction of mine. But, with this repining, I trouble you too much, and, for the favours I receive from you, thank you too little, and rejoice not enough in having ſuch a friend, though at a diſtance.

As to the gentleman, to whom you think my friendly admoniſhments may be of advantage for his conduct hereafter, I muſt tell you, that he is a man to whom I never writ in my life, and, I think, I ſhall not now begin. And, as to his conduct, it is what I never ſo much as ſpoke to him of. This is a liberty to be only taken with friends and intimates, for whoſe conduct one is mightily concerned, and in whoſe affairs one intereſts himſelf. I cannot but wiſh well to all men of parts and learning, and be ready to afford them all the civilities and good offices in my power. But there muſt be other qualities to bring me to a friendſhip, and unite me in thoſe ſtricter ties of concern. For I put a great deal of difference between thoſe whom I thus receive into my heart and affection, and thoſe whom I receive into my chamber, and do not treat there with a perfect ſtrangeneſs. I perceive you think yourſelf under ſome obligation of peculiar reſpect to that perſon, upon the account of my recommendation to you; but certainly this comes from nothing but your over-great tenderneſs to oblige me. For, if I did recommend him, you will find it was only as a man of parts and learning, for his age, but without any intention that that ſhould be of any other conſequence, or lead you any farther, than the other qualities you ſhould find in him, ſhould recommend him to you. And therefore whatſoever you ſhall, or ſhall not do for him, I ſhall no way intereſt myſelf in. I know, of your own ſelf, you are a good friend to thoſe who deſerve it of you; and for thoſe that do not, I ſhall never blame your neglect of them. The occaſion of his coming into Ireland now, I gueſs to be the hopes of ſome employment, now upon this change of hands there. I tell you, I gueſs, for he himſelf never told me any thing of it, nor ſo much as acquainted me with his intentions of going to Ireland, how much ſoever he vouches my patronage and friendſhip, as you are pleaſed to phraſe it. And as to his ſubſiſtence, from whence that comes, I cannot tell. I ſhould not have waſted ſo much of my converſation with you, on this ſubject, had you not told me it would oblige you to give you light in theſe matters, which I have done, as a friend to a friend, with a greater freedom than I ſhould allow myſelf to talk to another.

I SHALL, when I ſee Sir Rich. Blackmore, diſcourſe him as you deſire. There is, I with pleaſure find, a ſtrange harmony throughout between your thoughts and mine. I have always thought that laying down, and building upon hypotheſes, has been one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge; and I ſee your notions agree with mine in it.

it. And, though I have a great value for Sir R. Blackmore, on ſeveral accounts, yet there is nothing has given me a greater eſteem of him, than what he ſays about hypotheſes in medicine, in his preface to King Arthur, which is an argument to me, that he underſtands the right method of practiſing phyſic; and it gives me great hopes he will improve it, ſince he keeps in the only way it is capable to be improved in; and has ſo publicly declared againſt the more eaſy, faſhionable, and pleaſing way of an hypotheſis, which, I think, has done more to hinder the true art of phyſic, which is the curing of diſeaſes, than all other things put together; by making it learned, ſpecious, and talkative, but ineffective to its great end, the health of mankind; as was viſible in the practice of phyſic, in the hands of the illiterate Americans; and the learned phyſicians, that went thither out of Europe, ſtored with their hypotheſes, borrowed from natural philoſophy, which made them indeed great men, and admired in the ſchools; but, in curing diſeaſes, the poor Americans, who had eſcaped thoſe ſplendid clogs, clearly out-went them. You cannot imagine how far a little obſervation, carefully made by a man not tied up to the four humours; or ſal, ſulphur, and mercury; or to acid and alcali, which has of late prevailed, will carry a man in the curing of diſeaſes, though very ſtubborn and dangerous, and that with very little and common things, and almoſt no medicines at all. Of this I could, from my own experience, convince you, were we together but a little while. But my letter is too long already. When I am writing to you, the pleaſure of talking to you makes me forget you are a man of buſineſs, and have your hands full. I beg your pardon for it. It is time to diſmiſs you. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and
moſt faithful humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, July 20, 1697.

THE lateſt favour I received from my ever honoured friend was of the 15th of June, and I have it before me, to acknowledge with all due gratitude. I was mightily ſurpriſed to ſee the "Biſhop of Worceſter's Anſwer to your Letter;" I thought he would have let that matter fall, and have privately thanked you, and have ſaid no more. This was the leaſt I expected from him; for I think, indeed, he might have gone farther, and made his public acknowledgments to you. This had been like a man of ingenuity and candour; and by this he had been more valuable, in the opinion of all I converſe with here, than by the ſhift-

ings, windings, and turnings, he uſes in his laſt piece. You well obſerve the biſhop has ſhewn himſelf a man at his weapon; but I think him "Andabatarum more pugnare," he winks as he fights. However, in the poſtſcript he ſhews a ſample of the old leven, and muſt not let you go without coupling his obſervations on a Socinian book, with his confutation of your's; as if there were ſomething ſo agreeable between them, that they cannot be well ſeparated. This is ſuch an indirect practice, and ſeems ſuch an invidious inſinuation, that I cannot but give it the name of malice.

I AM obliged to you for the confidence you put in me, by communicating your thoughts concerning Mr. T——, more freely than you would do to every one. He has had his oppoſers here, as you will find by a book which I have ſent to you by a gentleman's ſervant, to be left for you at your lodging; wherein you will meet with a paſſage relating to yourſelf, which, though with decency, yet I fear will not redound much to the author's advantage; for, with very great aſſurance, (an uſual companion of ignorance) he undertakes to "demonſtrate the immateriality of the ſoul," and to ſhew the falſity of your argumentation, wherein you aſſert, "that we have no proof, but that God may communicate a power "of thinking to a certain ſyſtem of matter." But this is all but aſſertion and promiſe; we are ſo unhappy as yet to want this demonſtration from this author, and I fear we ſhall ever want it from him; and, I believe, you will be of my opinion, when you read his book. The author is my acquaintance; but two things I ſhall never forgive in his book; the one is the foul language and opprobrious names he gives Mr. T——; the other is, upon ſeveral occaſions, calling in the aid of the civil magiſtrate, and delivering Mr. T—— up to ſecular puniſhment. This, indeed, is a killing argument; but ſome will be apt to ſay, that where the ſtrength of his reaſon failed him, there he flies to the ſtrength of the ſword. And this minds me of a buſineſs that was very ſurpriſing to many, even ſeveral prelates in this place, the preſentment of ſome pernicious books, and their authors, by the grand jury of Middleſex. This is looked upon as a matter of dangerous conſequence, to make our civil courts judges of religious doctrines; and no one knows, upon a change of affairs, whoſe turn it may be next to be condemned. But the example has been followed in our country; and Mr. T—— and his book have been preſented here by a grand jury, not one of which (I am perſuaded) ever read one leaf in "Chriſtianity not myſterious." Let the Sorbonne for ever now be ſilent; a learned grand jury, directed by as learned a judge, does the buſineſs much better. The diſſenters here were the chief promoters of this matter; but, when I aſked one of them, what if a violent church of England jury ſhould preſent Mr. Baxter's books as pernicious, and condemn them to the flames by the common executioner? he was ſenſible of the error, and ſaid, he wiſhed it had never been done.

I MUST not forget to thank you for the countenance I have received from my lord chancellor Methwin, ſince his coming into Ireland. I know

know it is all owing to your, and your friends endeavours. My lord is a perſon from whom the kingdom expects very well, for hitherto his management has been very promiſing. Mr. Burridge is his chaplain, and expects very ſoon to be ſettled in a pariſh here in Dublin, and then he promiſes me to proſecute the Eſſay with vigour.

MY brother gives you his moſt humble ſervice. He is told, by Mr. Burridge, that you had ſent him a book in medicine, but by what hand he could not inform him. He has ſuch a value for every thing that comes from you, that he deſired me to let you know that no ſuch book came to his hands, or elſe he had not all this while deferred his acknowledgments.

I PERCEIVE you are ſo happy as to be acquainted with Sir Richard Blackmore; he is an extraordinary perſon, and I admire his two prefaces as much as I do any parts of his books; the firſt, wherein he expoſes the "licentiouſneſs and immorality of our late poetry," is incomparable; and the ſecond, wherein he proſecutes the ſame ſubject, and delivers his thoughts concerning hypotheſes, is no leſs judicious. And I am wholly of his opinion, relating to the latter. However, the "hiſtory and phæ-"nomena of nature" we may venture at; and this is what I propoſe to be the ſubject of a philoſophic poem. Sir Richard Blackmore has exquiſite touches of this kind diſperſed in many places of his books; (to paſs over Mopas's ſon) I'll inſtance one particular, in the moſt profound ſpeculations of Mr. Newton's philoſophy, thus curiouſly touched in King Arthur, Book IX. p. 243.

The conſtellations ſhine at his command,
He form'd their radiant orbs, and with his hand
He weigh'd, and put them off with ſuch a force,
As might preſerve an everlaſting courſe.

I DOUBT not but Sir R. Blackmore, in theſe lines, had a regard to the proportionment of the projective motion to the "vis centripeta," that keeps the planets in their continued courſes.

I HAVE by me ſome obſervations made by a judicious friend of mine, on both Sir R. Blackmore's poems; if they may be any ways acceptable to Sir R. I ſhall ſend them to you; they are in the compaſs of a ſheet of paper. And, were it proper, I ſhould humbly deſire you to procure for me, from Sir R. the key to the perſons names, in both his poems; moſt of the firſt I have already, and a great many in the ſecond, but many I alſo want, which I ſhould be very glad to underſtand. But if herein I deſire any thing diſagreeable, I beg Sir Richard's pardon, and deſiſt.

EVER ſince you firſt mentioned to me, that Monſ. Le Clerc might be inticed into Ireland by a moderate encouragement, it has ſat grievous on my ſpirit, that it lay not in my power to procure for him what might be worth his acceptance. I ſhould reckon it (next to your friendſhip) one of the greateſt glories of my life, that I could be able any ways to contri-

bute to tranſplanting him hither. The other day I ventured to mention it to a great prelate here, the biſhop of ——. He was pleaſed to favour the propoſal immediately, and gave me directions, that I ſhould enquire whether Monſ. Le Clerc would be willing to take orders in our church, and to ſubmit to the oaths and injunctions thereof; and how far he is maſter of the Engliſh language. He told me, he doubted not but he might procure for him 150, or 200l. per annum, in ſome place of eaſe and retirement. Be pleaſed therefore, dear Sir, to let me be informed in theſe particulars, and in whatever elſe you think requiſite in managing this affair.

I HAVE protracted this letter as if I had a deſign to kill you, by tiring you to death. I beg your excuſe for it. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, London, 11 Sept. 1697.

IF you have received my Reply to the Biſhop, before this comes to your hand, I ſhall need ſay no more to the firſt paragraph of your obliging letter of the 20th of July. Mr. Churchill tells me, he has taken care you ſhould have it with ſpeed. I have ordered another to Mr. Burridge, who has, by his undertaking, ſome concernment now in my Eſſay. I am not delighted at all in controverſy, and think I could ſpend my time to greater advantage to myſelf. But, being attacked, as I am, and in a way that ſufficiently juſtifies your remarks on it, I think every body will judge I had reaſon to defend myſelf; whether I have or no, ſo far as I have gone, the world muſt judge.

I think, with you, the diſſenters were beſt conſider, "that what is "ſauce for a gooſe, is ſauce for a gander." But they are a ſort of men that will always be the ſame.

You thank me for what is owing to your own worth. Every one who knows you, will think (if he judges right) that he receives as much advantage as he gives by the countenance he ſhews you. However, I am obliged by your thanks to me; for, if I do not procure you as much good as you are capable of receiving from any one that comes to you from hence, it is my want of ability, and not want of will. My heart and inclination, wherein the friendſhip lies, will always be ſuch, as I can preſume will not diſpleaſe you, in a man whom I am very ſenſible you love.

HERE was, the laſt year, a book in phyſick publiſhed by a young lad not twenty, who had never ſeen the Univerſity. It was about the motion of the muſcles, with as good an explication of it as any I have yet

ſeen. I believe I might have ſpoke to Mr. Churchill to ſend your brother one of them, for the ſake of the author; (for as to the ſubject itſelf, I fear I ſhall never ſee it explained to my ſatisfaction) whether he did it or no, I have not yet aſked; but the book itſelf is not worth your brother's enquiry or acknowledgment; though being written by ſuch an author, made it a kind of curioſity. I ſhould be very glad if I could do him here any ſervice of greater importance. But I having now wholly laid by the ſtudy of phyſick, I know not what comes out new, or worth the reading, in that faculty. Pray give my humble ſervice to your brother, and let me know whether he hath any children; for then I ſhall think myſelf obliged to ſend him one of the next edition of my book of Education, which, my bookſeller tells me, is out of print; and I had much rather be at leiſure to make ſome additions to that, and my Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, than be employed to defend myſelf againſt the groundleſs, and, as others think, trifling quarrel of the biſhop. But his lordſhip is pleaſed to have it otherwiſe, and I muſt anſwer for myſelf as well as I can, till I have the good luck to be convinced.

I WAS not a little pleaſed to find what thoughts you had concerning hypotheſes in phyſick. Though Sir R. B's vein in poetry be what every body muſt allow him to have an extraordinary talent in, and though with you I exceedingly valued his firſt preface; yet I muſt own to you, there was nothing that I ſo much admired him for, as for what he ſays of hypotheſes in his laſt. It ſeems to me ſo right, and is yet ſo much out of the way of the ordinary writers, and practitioners in that faculty, that it ſhews as great a ſtrength and penetration of judgment, as his poetry has ſhewed flights of fancy; and therefore I was very glad to find in you the ſame thoughts of it. And when he comes luckily in my way, I ſhall not forget your wiſhes, and ſhall acquaint him with the obſervations you mention. And the key you deſire I ſhall ſend you, if it be fit to be aſked of him, which I am at preſent in ſome doubt of.

THOUGH I could myſelf anſwer many of your queſtions concerning Monſ. Le Clerc; yet I have ſent them to him himſelf, with the reaſon of them. I have not yet received his anſwer, the expectation whereof has delayed my writing to you for ſome time. In the mean time, till I hear from him, I thank you in his name and my own.

I SHALL be very glad to hear from you how the linnen manufacture goes on, on that ſide the water, and what aſſiſtance the parliament there is like to give to it; for I wiſh proſperity to your country, and very particularly all manner of happineſs to you. I am unfeignedly,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

WHAT

WHAT I told you formerly of a ſtorm coming againſt my book, proves no fiction. Beſides what you will ſee I have taken notice of in my reply, Mr. Serjeant, a popiſh prieſt, whom you muſt needs have heard of, has beſtowed a thick 8vo upon my Eſſay, and Mr. Norris, as I hear, is writing hard againſt it. Shall I not be quite ſlain, think you, amongſt ſo many notable combatants, and the Lord knows how many more to come?

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Sept. 11, 1697.

MY laſt to you was of July 20, ſince which time I have not had the happineſs of a line from you. But I am ſatisfied you are better employed; and indeed, when I ſee daily what ſwarms of angry waſps do ariſe againſt you (beſides many which reach not our view in this place) I wonder not that you ſhould be ſo far engaged as to have little time to throw away on me. The other day I met with the laſt effort of Mr. Edwards' malice; I do now heartily pity the poor wretch; he is certainly mad, and no more to be taken notice of hereafter, than the railings of Oliver's porter in Bethlem. I have ſeen alſo a philoſophical writer againſt you, of another ſtrain, one J. S. that writes againſt all Ideiſts; this gentleman, though civil, yet to me is abſolutely unintelligible, ſo unfortunate I am. Who he is I know not, but ſhould be glad to learn from you; and what you think, in general, of his book.

Mr. T——— is, at laſt, driven out of our kingdom; the poor gentleman, by his imprudent management, had raiſed ſuch an univerſal outcry, that it was even dangerous for a man to have been known once to converſe with him. This made all wary men of reputation decline ſeeing him; inſomuch that at laſt he wanted a meal's meat (as I am told) and none would admit him to their tables. The little ſtock of money which he brought into this country being exhauſted, he fell to borrowing from any one that would lend him half a crown, and run in debt for his wigs, cloaths, and lodging, (as I am informed,) and laſt of all, to compleat his hardſhips, the parliament fell on his book, voted it to be burnt by the common hangman, and ordered the author to be taken into cuſtody of the ſerjeant at arms, and to be proſecuted by the attorney-general at law. Hereupon he is fled out of this kingdom, and none here knows where he has directed his courſe. I did believe you might be a ſtranger to theſe proceedings a great while, unleſs I had intimated them to you; and that is one of my deſigns in writing this to you.

I AM here very happy in the friendſhip of an honourable perſon, Mr. Moleſworth, who is an hearty admirer and acquaintance of your's. We never meet but we remember you; he ſometimes comes into my houſe, and tells me, it is not to pay a viſit to me, but to pay his devotion to your image that is in my dining room.

I SHOULD

I SHOULD be glad to hear farther from you, concerning Monſ. Le Clerc and Monſ. Coſte, in relation to what I formerly writ to you concerning thoſe gentlemen. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt obliged, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Oct. 4, 1697.

I PERCEIVE we were each of us mindful of the other on the 11th of the laſt month, for of that date was your laſt to me, as you will find mine likewiſe to you bore the ſame.

YOU have already anſwered ſome of my impertinent enquiries in that letter; you tell me therein, who J. S. is that writes againſt you. I do not now wonder at the confuſedneſs of his notions, or that they ſhould be unintelligible to me. I ſhould have much more admired, had they been otherwiſe. I expect nothing from Mr. Serjeant but what is abſtruſe in the higheſt degree.

I LOOK for nothing elſe from Mr. Norris; I thought that gentleman had enough on it, in his firſt attempt on your Eſſay; but he's ſo over-run with father Malebranche, and Plato, that it is in vain to endeavour to ſet him right, and I give him up as an inconvincible enemy.

BUT, above all theſe, I ſhould wonder at the biſhop of Worceſter's obſtinacy, did I not think that I partly know the reaſon thereof. He has been an old ſoldier in controverſies, and has hitherto had the good luck of victory; but now, in the latter end of his wars, to be laid on his back (as he thinks the world would certainly ſay, unleſs he has the laſt word) would wither all his former laurels, and loſe his glory. Your reply to him is not yet come to hand; but I can wait with the more patience, becauſe I am pretty well ſatisfied in the matter already.

I AM very glad to underſtand that we are to expect another edition of your Education, with additions. I never thought you writ too much on any ſubject whatever.

I HAVE formerly written to you, to know farther concerning Monſ. Coſte, who tranſlated ſome of your books into French. I fancy, by that gentleman's inclinations to your works, he and I ſhould agree very well. Pray let me know, whether to his Belles Lettres he has any ſkill in the mathematicks, natural hiſtory, &c. As alſo what his circumſtances are, as to his education, parentage, &c. For, according to theſe, I may judge whether I can give him any encouragement to come hither.

YOU had been troubled with this letter ſooner, but that I waited for the incloſed, to ſatisfy your enquiry concerning our linnen manufacture.

You

You will find thereby, that we have framed a bill to be enacted for the encouragement thereof. This bill is now before the council of England, purſuant to our conſtitution of parliament. What alterations, additions, and amendments it may receive there, we know not; but I am apt to think you will have the conſideration and modelling thereof at your committee of Trade. We are very ſenſible, that the act we have drawn up (whereof the incloſed are the heads) is not ſo perfect and compleat as it may be; but this we thought a fair beginning to ſo great an attempt, and that time muſt be given for a farther progreſs, and carrying it higher, by additional laws, as occaſion may require. The woollen manufacture of England was not eſtabliſhed at that high pitch (to which now it is raiſed) by any one law, or any one generation. It muſt be ſo with us in relation to our linnen; but this, we hope, may be a fair ſtep towards it: "Eſt aliquid prodire tenus, &c."

JAMES HAMILTON of Tullymore, Eſq; is an indefatigable promoter of this deſign, and I may ſay indeed the whole ſcheme is owing to his contrivance. He is an hearty admirer of yours, and communicated to me the incloſed abſtract purpoſely for your ſatisfaction; deſiring me with it to give you his moſt humble ſervice, and to requeſt of you your thoughts concerning this matter, by the firſt leiſure you can ſpare.

WHILST our Houſe of Commons were framing this bill, our lords juſtices communicated to us ſome papers which they had received from the lords juſtices of England, laid before them by your board. But theſe papers coming in a little too late, when we had juſt cloſed the bill, and a very little time before our laſt adjournment for three weeks; all we did with them was to remit them again to our lords juſtices and council, with the houſes deſire, that if their lordſhips ſhould think fit to excerp any thing out of thoſe papers, and add it to our act, whilſt they had it before them, in order to be tranſmitted into England, their lordſhips might do therein as they pleaſed, and the houſe would agree to any ſuch additions, when the act came before us tranſmitted in due form under the ſeal of England. Whether the lords juſtices will make any ſuch additions out of thoſe papers I cannot yet tell; but I am ſure there were many things in thoſe papers that highly deſerved to be put in execution.

MY brother gives you his moſt humble ſervice, and ſhould be very proud of the preſent of your Education. For though he has yet only two daughters, yet he is in hopes of many ſons; and the girls minds require as much framing as the boys, and by the ſame rules: And that I take to be the chief part of education. I am,

Your's moſt ſincerely,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

My moſt honoured Friend, Dublin, Oct. 28, 1697.

IF men could deſtroy by a quill, as they ſay procupines do, I ſhould think your death not very far off. But whatever venom they mix with their ink againſt you, I hope it is not mortal; I am ſure in my opinion it is not the leaſt harmful or dangerous. Your Reply to the Biſhop of Worceſter ſhews how vainly the mightieſt champion ſpends his darts at you, and with what force and ſtrength of reaſon you return them on their own heads. But notwithſtanding this, I verily believe he will offer again at his weak efforts; but he that was ſo fully poſſeſſed of his own ſufficiency, as to think he could deal with the firſt letter to him, will certainly never lay down the cudgels till his blood be about his ears: And if he thought himſelf obliged in honour to juſtify his firſt blunders, much more will he think himſelf ſo now, when he is thrown over head and ears in the mire. To paſs by all the reſt of your Reply (wherein you have given him many a ſevere wound) I think he is no-where ſo clearly and diſgracefully foiled, as by the converſation between you and your friend concerning his notions of nature and perſon. But, above all, the conſequence you draw from thence, of his being obliged to write againſt his own Vindication of the Trinity, muſt needs wound him to the heart; and indeed I do not ſee how it is poſſible for him to avoid the force of that blow, by all his art and cunning. Yet write he will, I am ſure on it, and pour forth abundance of words; but ſo he may for ever. I envy not the place of his amanuenſis.

BUT all this while I have forgot to return you my acknowledgments for the favour of your book. I am extremely obliged to you for remembering me amongſt your other friends, whenever you are pleaſed to oblige the learned world with any of your happy thoughts. I had no ſooner peruſed them, but they were ſnatched out of my hands by my Lord Chancellor, (ſo covetous are all men of whatever comes from you) and he has them yet.

AMONGST the other ſmall craft that appears againſt you, I met with one J. H's State of England, in relation to coin and trade. I hear the author's name is Hodges. He is much of a claſs in this particular, as Mr. Serjeant, in relation to your Eſſay, that is, both to me unintelligible.

THE incloſed is a ſample of what this place produces againſt you: I wiſh you may not ſay, that it reſembles our mountains and bogs, in being barren and uſeleſs. I have ventured to ſend you my ſhort anſwer thereto; for a longer I think it did not deſerve. I have not ſeen the biſhop ſince this has paſſed; but we are ſo good friends that this buſineſs will cauſe no anger between us. I am

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Biſhop of ——'s Letter to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Johnſtown, Oct. 26, 1697.

I HAVE met with Mr. Locke's Reply to the biſhop of Worceſter, and have had leiſure to look it over here. I meddle not with the controverſy between them, but confeſs I am a little ſurprized at what I find p. 95 and 96, where we have theſe words: "To talk of the certainty "of faith, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of the knowledge of be-"lieving:" And, "When it is brought to certainty, faith is de-"ſtroyed:" And, "Bring it to certainty, and it ceaſes to be faith." And he in terms owns, p. 39. "With me to know and to be certain, "is the ſame thing; what I know, that I am certain of; and what I am "certain of, that I know." And, p. 92. "Knowledge I find in myſelf, "and I conceive in others, conſiſts in the perception of the agreement or "diſagreement of the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which "I call ideas." And, p. 38. "Certainty conſiſts in the perception of "the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas." Now to me it ſeems, that according to Mr. Locke I cannot be ſaid to know any thing except there be two ideas in my mind, and all the knowledge I have muſt be concerning the relation theſe two ideas have to one another, and that I can be certain of nothing elſe; which, in my opinion, excludes all certainty of ſenſe and of ſingle ideas, all certainty of conſciouſneſs, ſuch as willing, believing, knowing, &c. and, as he confeſſes, all certainty of faith; and laſtly, all certainty of remembrance, of which I have formerly demonſtrated, as ſoon as I have forgot, or do not actually think of the demonſtration. For I ſuppoſe you are well aware, that in demonſtrating mathematical propoſitions, it is not always from actual perception of the agreement of ideas, that we aſſume other propoſitions formerly demonſtrated to infer the concluſion, but from memory: and yet we do not think ourſelves leſs certain on that account. If this be the importance of Mr. L's words, as it ſeems to me to be, then we are not certain of the acts of our mind; we are not certain of any thing that remains in our minds merely by the ſtrength of our memory; and laſtly, we are not certain of any propoſition, though God and man witneſs the truth of it to us: And then judge how little certainty is left in the world, and how near this laſt comes to Mr. Toland's propoſition, that authority or teſtimony is only "a means of information, "not a ground of perſuaſion." For I muſt own, that I think I am only perſuaded of the truth of a thing, in proportion to the certainty I have of it: And if knowledge and certainty be reciprocally the ſame, and conſiſt in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas; where I do not perceive theſe, though God and man, nay the whole world ſhould teſtify to me that they do agree or diſagree, I cannot be certain of it. I muſt profeſs myſelf of another opinion; and I think I am as certain there was ſuch a man as Mr. L. from the teſtimony of you, and other circumſtances, though I perceive no agreement or diſ-

agreement in this caſe between the two ideas, to convince me of his being; as that the three angles of a ſtrait-lined triangle are equal to two right angles, where I actually perceive the agreement, or rather equality: Or, that the area of a cyclois is equal to triple the generating circle, of which I am certain by memory, though I do not at preſent perceive the demonſtration, or any agreement between the ideas of three circles and a cyclois, only remember that I once perceived it.

LET me farther add, that agreement and diſagreement are metaphorical terms when applied to ideas; for agreement properly, I think, either ſignifies, firſt, a compact between two perſons; or, ſecondly, two things fitting one another, as the two parts of a tally; or, thirdly, the likeneſs of two things, as of a pair of coach-horſes; or, fourthly, the aptitude of two things to ſupport or preſerve one another. So ſeveral meats agree with the ſtomach; but I do not find, that in a propoſition the ideas have an agreement in any of theſe ſenſes; and I rather think the old way of expreſſing this matter ought to be retained. I learned in Smiglecius, that when the "ſpecies intelligibilis" of the predicate was the ſame with the ſpecies of the ſubject, the one might be affirmed of the other: And when the "medius terminus" was the ſame with the one extreme term in one of the premiſſes, and the other extreme the ſame with it in the other of the premiſſes, the one might be affirmed of the other in the concluſion, becauſe of the old axiom: "Quæ ſunt idem uni tertio, ſunt idem inter "ſe." You may uſe the metaphorical term of agreement here inſtead of identity; but Mr. L. has told us, p. 153. That "metaphorical expreſ-"ſions (which ſeldom terminate in truth) ſhould be as much as poſſible "avoided, when men undertake to deliver clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, "and exact notions of things."

I DO find that men's thoughts do not differ ſo much as their words, and that moſt men are of one mind, when they come to underſtand one another, and have the ſame views; and hence many controverſies are only verbal. I doubt not but my difference from Mr. L. in this matter may be of the the ſame nature; and perhaps, if I had carefully read his book of Human Underſtanding, I might perceive it; but I have neither opportunity, leiſure, or inclination to do ſo, and believe a great part of the the world to be in the ſame circumſtances with me; and I verily believe, that the expreſſions I have noted in his Reply, will ſeem unwary to them as well as to me.

I DO find he claims a liberty that will not be allowed him by all, p. 92, "to pleaſe himſelf in his terms," ſo they be uſed conſtantly "in the "ſame and a known ſenſe." I remember others have claimed the ſame liberty under the notion of making their own dictionary; but I reckon the changing a term, though I declare my ſenſe, and forewarn the reader of it, to be a very great injury to the world; and to introduce a new one, where there is one altogether to ſignify the ſame thing, equally injurious; and that a man has only this liberty where he introduces a new thing, that has yet no name. And I believe you ſee my reaſons for

being of this opinion, and therefore ſhall not mention them. Let me only obſerve, that the want of this caution ſeems to me to have brought moſt of Mr. L's trouble on him. Words were indeed arbitrary ſigns of things in thoſe that firſt impoſed them, but they are not to us. When we uſe the beſt caution we can, we are apt to tranſgreſs in changing them; and when we do ſo out of weakneſs, we muſt aſk pardon, but muſt not claim it as liberty, it being really a fault. A few minutes lying on my hands, has given you this trouble; and I know your kindneſs to Mr. L. will not make it ungrateful to you, whilſt it aſſures you that I am

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant.

I COULD never comprehend any neceſſity for a criterion of certainty to the underſtanding, any more than of one to the eye, to teach it when it ſees. Let the eye be rightly diſpoſed, and apply an object to it, if duly applied, it will force it to ſee: and ſo apply an object to an underſtanding duly qualified, and if the arguments or object be as they ought to be, they will force the underſtanding to aſſent, and remove all doubts. And I can no more tell, what is in the object, or arguments, that aſcertains my underſtanding, than I can tell what it is in light, that makes me ſee. I muſt ſay, that the ſame God that ordered light to make me ſee, ordered truth, or rather certain objects, to aſcertain my underſtanding; and I believe Mr. L. can hardly give any other reaſon why his agreement, &c. of ideas ſhould cauſe certainty.

Mr. MOLYNEUX's Anſwer to the BISHOP.

My LORD, Dublin, Oct. 27. 1697.

I AM extremely obliged to your lordſhip, that having a few minutes lying on your hands in your retirement from this town, you are pleaſed to beſtow them on my friend and me. I ſhould have acknowledged the favour more early, had your ſervant ſtaid for an anſwer when he delivered yours to me; but he was gone out of my reach before I was aware of it.

AND now, my lord, all the anſwer I ſhall trouble your lordſhip with at preſent is this, that your lordſhip is much in the right on it, that had you read Mr. Locke's Eſſay of Human Underſtanding more carefully and throughout, you had never made the objections you raiſe againſt him in your letter to me; for your lordſhip would have found his fourth book abundantly ſatisfactory in the difficulties you propoſe, and particularly the 2d and 18th chapters of the fourth book, are a full anſwer to your lordſhip's letter.

BUT your lordſhip ſays, you have neither opportunity, leiſure, or inclination to read the Eſſay. My LORD, I would not then have leiſure or inclination to animadvert on a book, that I had not (if not inclination) at leaſt leiſure to read. This, with ſubmiſſion, I cannot but ſay is great partiality.

partiality. If your lordſhip ſays, your letter relates to his Reply to the Biſhop of Worceſter; neither will this do, in my humble opinion; ſeeing your lordſhip ſeems to ſurmiſe (as indeed you gueſs rightly) that the Eſſay might have ſet you right in this matter. I am,

My LORD,

Your lordſhip's moſt humble ſervant,

W. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dear SIR, Dublin, Dec. 18. 1697.

IT is now above three months ſince I heard from you, your laſt being of Sept. 11. You will therefore excuſe my impatience, if I can forbear no longer, and ſend this merely to know how you do. It is an anguiſhing thought to me, that you ſhould be ſubject to the common frailties and fate of mankind; but it would be ſome alleviation to my trouble, that, if you are ill, I ſhould know the worſt of it. This has ſo wholly taken up my mind at preſent, that I have no inclination to write one word more to you in this, but again to repeat my requeſt to you, that you would let me know how you are; for till I know this, I am diſſatisfied, I am extremely uneaſy; but for ever ſhall be

Your moſt affectionate admirer,

and devoted ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, Jan. 10, 169$\frac{7}{8}$.

YOUR gentle and kind reproof of my ſilence, has greater marks of true friendſhip in it, than can be expreſſed in the moſt elaborate profeſſions, or be ſufficiently acknowledged by a man, who has not the opportunity nor ability to make thoſe returns he would. Though I have had leſs health, and more buſineſs ſince I writ to you laſt than ever I had for ſo long together in my life; yet neither the one nor the other had kept me ſo long a truant, had not the concurrence of other cauſes, drilled me on from day to day, in a neglect of what I frequently purpoſed, and always thought myſelf obliged to do. Perhaps the liſtleſſneſs my indiſpoſition conſtantly kept me in, made me too eaſily hearken to ſuch excuſes; but the expectation of hearing every day from Monſ. Le Clerc, that I might ſend you his anſwer, and the thoughts that I ſhould be able to

to ſend your brother an account, that his curious treatiſe concerning the chafers in Ireland was printed, were at leaſt the pretences that ſerved to humour my lazineſs. Buſineſs kept me in town longer than was convenient for my health: All the day from my riſing was commonly ſpent in that, and when I came home at night, my ſhortneſs of breath, and panting for want of it, made me ordinarily ſo uneaſy, that I had no heart to do any thing; ſo that the uſual diverſion of my vacant hours forſook me, and reading itſelf was a burthen to me. In this eſtate I lingered along in town to December, till I betook myſelf to my wonted refuge, in the more favourable air and retirement of this place. That gave me preſently relief againſt the conſtant oppreſſion of my lungs, whilſt I ſit ſtill: But I find ſuch a weakneſs of them ſtill remain, that if I ſtir ever ſo little, I am immediately out of breath, and the very dreſſing or undreſſing me is a labour that I am fain to reſt after to recover my breath; and I have not been once out of my houſe ſince I came laſt hither. I wiſh nevertheleſs that you were here with me to ſee how well I am: For you would find, that, ſitting by the fire's ſide, I could bear my part in diſcourſing, laughing, and being merry with you, as well as ever I could in my life. If you were here (and, if wiſhes of more than one could bring you, you would be here to-day) you would find three or four in the parlour after dinner, who, you would ſay, paſſed their afternoons as agreeably and as jocundly as any people you have this good while met with. Do not therefore figure to yourſelf, that I am languiſhing away my laſt hours under an unſociable deſpondency and the weight of my infirmity. It is true, I do not count upon years of life to come; but I thank God I have not many uneaſy hours here in the four and twenty; and if I can have the wit to keep myſelf out of the ſtifling air of London, I ſee no reaſon but, by the grace of God, I may get over this winter, and that terrible enemy of mine may uſe me no worſe than the laſt did, which as ſevere, and as long as it was, let me yet ſee another ſummer.

WHAT you ſay to me in yours of the 4th of October, concerning the biſhop of W....., you will, I believe, be confirmed in, if his Anſwer to my Second Letter, of which I ſhall ſay nothing to you yet, be got to you.

MR. COSTE is now in the houſe with me here, and is tutor to my lady Maſham's ſon. I need not, I think, anſwer your queſtions about his ſkill in mathematicks and natural hiſtory: I think it is not much; but he is an ingenious man, and we like him very well for our purpoſe; and I have a particular obligation to you, for the reaſon why you enquired concerning him.

I COME now to yours of the 28th of October, wherein you have found by this time, that you propheſied right concerning the biſhop of W....., and if you can remember what you ſaid therein, concerning abundance of words, you will not, I ſuppoſe, forbear ſmiling, when you read the firſt leaf of his laſt Anſwer.

IF

IF there be not an evidence of ſenſe and truth, which is apt and fitted to prevail on every human underſtanding, as far as it is open and unprejudiced; there is at leaſt a harmony of underſtandings in ſome men, to whom ſenſe and nonſenſe, truth and falſhood, appear equally in the reſpective diſcourſes they meet with. This I find perfectly ſo between you and me, and it ſerves me to no ſmall purpoſe to keep me in countenance. When I ſee a man diſintereſted as you are, a lover of truth as I know you to be, and one that has clearneſs and coherence enough of thought to make long mathematical, i. e. ſure deductions, pronounce of J. H. and J. S's books, that they are unintelligible to you; I do not preſently condemn myſelf of pride, prejudice, or a perfect want of underſtanding, for laying aſide thoſe authors, becauſe I can find neither ſenſe or coherence in them. If I could think that diſcourſes and arguments to the underſtanding were like the ſeveral ſorts of cates to different palates and ſtomachs, ſome nauſeous and deſtructive to one, which are pleaſant and reſtorative to another; I ſhould no more think of books and ſtudy, and ſhould think my time better employed at puſh-pin than in reading or writing. But I am convinced to the contrary: I know there is truth oppoſite to falſhood, that it may be found if people will, and is worth the ſeeking, and is not only the moſt valuable, but the pleaſanteſt thing in the world. And therefore I am no more troubled and diſturbed with all the duſt that is raiſed againſt it, than I ſhould be to ſee from the top of an high ſteeple, where I had clear air and ſun-ſhine, a company of great boys or little boys (for it is all one) throw up duſt in the air, which reached not me, but fell down in their own eyes.

YOUR anſwer to your friend the Biſhop was certainly a very fit and full one to what he had ſaid, and I am obliged to you for it: But he nevertheleſs thought his objections ſo good, that I imagine he communicated them to my antagoniſt; for you will find the very ſame in his Anſwer, and almoſt in the ſame words. But they will receive an anſwer at large in due time.

IT will not be at all neceſſary to ſay any thing to you concerning the linen bill, which made ſo great a part of your letter of Oct. 4th, and was the whole buſineſs of that of Oct. 16th. You know (I believe) as well as I, what became of that bill. Pray return my humble thanks to Mr. Hamilton for his kind expreſſions concerning me, and for the favour he did me in thinking me any ways able to ſerve his country in that matter. I am ſo concerned for it, and zealous in it, that I deſire you to aſſure him, and to believe yourſelf, that I will neglect no pains or intereſt of mine to promote it as far as I am able; and I think it a ſhame, that whilſt Ireland is ſo capable to produce flax and hemp, and able to nouriſh the poor at ſo cheap a rate, and conſequently to have their labour upon ſo eaſy terms, that ſo much money ſhould go yearly out of the king's dominions, to enrich foreigners, for thoſe materials, and the manufactures made out of them, when his people of Ireland, by the advantage of their ſoil, ſituation, and plenty, might have every penny of it,

if

if that buſineſs were but once put in the right way. I perceive by one of your letters, that you have ſeen the propoſals for an act ſent from hence. I would be very glad that you and Mr. Hamilton, or any other man, whom you know able, and a diſintereſted well-wiſher of his country, would conſider them together, and tell me whether you think that project will do, or wherein it is either impracticable or will fail, and what may be added or altered in it to make it effectual to that end. I know, to a man, a ſtranger to your country, as I am, many things may be overſeen, which by reaſon of the circumſtances of the place, or ſtate of the people, may in practice have real difficulties. If there be any ſuch in regard of that project, you will do me a favour to inform me of them. The ſhort is, I mightily have it upon my heart to get the linen manufacture eſtabliſhed in a flouriſhing way in your country. I am ſufficiently ſenſible of the advantages it will be to you, and ſhall be doubly rejoiced in the ſucceſs of it, if I ſhould be ſo happy that you and I could be inſtrumental in it, and have the chief hand in forming any thing that might conduce to it. Employ your thoughts therefore I beſeech you about it, and be aſſured what help I can give to it here ſhall be as readily and as carefully employed, as if you and I alone were to reap all the profit of it.

I HAVE not yet heard a word from Monſ. Le Clerc, in anſwer to my enquiries, and the queſtions you aſked, or elſe you had heard ſooner from me. I muſt beg you to return my acknowledgments to Mr. Moleſworth in the civileſt language you can find, for the great compliment you ſent me from him. If he could ſee my confuſion as often as I read that part of your letter, that would expreſs my ſenſe of it better than any words I am maſter of. I can only ſay that I am his moſt humble ſervant, and I have been not a little troubled, that I could not meet with the opportunities I ſought to improve the advantages I propoſed to myſelf, in an acquaintance with ſo ingenious and extraordinary a man as he is.

I READ your brother's treatiſe, which he did me the honour to put into my hands with great pleaſure, and thought it ſo unreaſonable to rob the publick of ſo grateful a preſent by any delay of mine, that I forthwith put it into Dr. Sloane's hand to be publiſhed, and I expected to have ſeen it in print long ere this time. What has retarded it I have not yet heard from Dr. Sloane, who has not writ to me ſince I came into the country: But I make no doubt but he takes care of ſo curious a piece, and the world will have it ſpeedily. I muſt depend on you, not only for excuſing my ſilence to yourſelf, but I muſt be obliged to you to excuſe me to your brother for not having written to him myſelf to thank him for the favour he did me. I hope ere long to find an opportunity to teſtify my reſpects to him more in form, which he would find I have in reality for him, if any occaſion of that kind ſhould come in my way. In the mean time I believe, if he ſaw the length of this letter, he would think it enough for one of a family to be perſecuted by ſo voluminous a ſcribbler, and would be glad that I ſpared him. I am both his, and,

Dear SIR, Your moſt affectionate and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dear SIR, Dublin, March 15, 1697-8.

IN the midſt of my trouble for your long ſilence, ſoon after I had writ to two or three friends to enquire after your health, I was happily relieved by yours of laſt January the 10th from Oates. I am heartily concerned that you paſſed over the laſt winter with ſo much indiſpoſition; but I rejoice with you that you have eſcaped it, and hope you will yet paſs over many more. I could make to you great complaints likewiſe of my own late illneſs; but they are all drowned in this one, that I am hindered for a while in ſeeking a remedy for them. I fully purpoſed to be at the Bath this ſpring early, but I am diſappointed at preſent, and cannot ſtir from hence till my Lord Chancellor Methwin return to this kingdom. It has pleaſed the young Lord Woodſtock, by directions from his majeſty, to chuſe my Lord Chancellor Methwin, Mr. Van Homrigh, preſent Lord Mayor of this city, and myſelf, to be his guardians, and managers of his affairs in this kingdom. Nothing can be done without two of us; ſo I am tied by the leg. Were it only in my health that I am diſappointed, I could the eaſier bear it; but I am delayed from embracing my dear friend, which is moſt grievous of all. Yet I hope it will be ſo but for a time; for if my Lord Chancellor comes over in any convenient ſeaſon, I will certainly get looſe. But this I cannot hope for till the parliament in England riſes. I ſhould be glad to know from you when that is expected; for indeed they bear very hard upon us in Ireland. How juſtly they can bind us without our conſent and repreſentatives, I leave the author of the Two Treatiſes of Government to conſider. But of this I ſhall trouble you farther another time, for you will hear more hereafter.

I HAVE ſeen the Biſhop of Worceſter's Anſwer to your Second Letter. It is of a piece with the reſt, and you know my thoughts of them already. I begin to be almoſt of old Hobbes's opinion, that, were it men's intereſt, they would queſtion the truth of Euclid's Elements, as now they conteſt almoſt as full evidences.

I AM very glad Monſ. Coſte is ſo well ſettled as you tell me: I deſigned fully to invite him over hither; and if you know any other ingenious Frenchman of that ſort, or any ſuch hereafter comes to your knowledge, I ſhould be very glad you would give me intimation thereof.

I HAD certainly anſwered that part of your letter relating to the linnen manufacture, but that I daily expected to do it more effectually by Mr. Hamilton himſelf, who gave me hopes of his going into England, and was reſolved perſonally to wait on you about it. He is maſter of the whole myſtery (and that I cannot pretend to be) and would have diſcourſed you moſt ſatisfactorily concerning it. I promiſed him a letter to you whenever he goes over, which will now be very ſpeedily, and then

I doubt not but you will concert matters together much for the good of this poor kingdom.

MY brother gives you his moſt humble ſervice, and thanks you for the care you took about his diſcourſe concerning Chafers. We hear from Dr. Sloane that it is printed. I am

Your moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, April 6, 1698.

THERE is none of the letters that ever I received from you gave me ſo much trouble as your laſt of March 15. I was told that you reſolved to come into England early in the ſpring, and lived in the hopes of it more than you can imagine. I do not mean that I had greater hopes of it than you can imagine; but it enlivened me, and contributed to the ſupport of my ſpirits more than you can think. But your letter has quite dejected me again. The thing I above all things long for, is to ſee, and embrace, and have ſome diſcourſe with you before I go out of this world. I meet with ſo few capable of truth, or worthy of a free converſation, ſuch as becomes lovers of truth, that you cannot think it ſtrange if I wiſh for ſome time with you, for the expoſing, ſifting, and rectifying of my thoughts. If they have gone any thing farther in the diſcovery of truth than what I have already publiſhed, it muſt be by your encouragement that I muſt go on to finiſh ſome things that I have already begun; and with you I hoped to diſcourſe my other yet crude and imperfect thoughts, in which if there were any thing uſeful to mankind, if they were opened and depoſited with you, I know them ſafe lodged for the advantage of truth ſome time or other. For I am in doubt whether it be fit for me to trouble the preſs with any new matter; or if I did, I look on my life as ſo near worn out, that it would be folly to hope to finiſh any thing of moment in the ſmall remainder of it. I hoped therefore, as I ſaid, to have ſeen you, and unravelled to you that which, lying in the lump unexplicated in my mind, I ſcarce yet know what it is myſelf; for I have often had experience, that a man cannot well judge of his own notions, till either by ſetting them down in paper, or in diſcourſing them to a friend, he has drawn them out, and as it were ſpread them fairly before himſelf. As for writing, my ill health gives me little heart or opportunity for it; and of ſeeing you I begin now to deſpair. And that which very much adds to my affliction in the caſe is, that you neglect your own health on conſiderations, I am ſure, that are not worth your health; for nothing, if expectations were certainties, can be worth it. I ſee no likelihood of the parliament's riſing yet this good while; and when they are up, who knows whether the man, you expect to relieve you, will come to you preſently, or at all.

You

You muſt therefore lay by that buſineſs for a while which detains you, or get ſome other body into it, if you will take that care of your health this ſummer which you deſigned, and it ſeems to require: And if you defer it till the next, who knows but your care of it may then come too late. There is nothing that we are ſuch ſpendthrifts of as of health; we ſpare every thing ſooner than that, though whatever we ſacrifice it to is worth nothing without it. Pardon me the liberty I take with you: You have given me an intereſt in you; and it is a thing of too much value to me, to look coldly on, whilſt you are running into any inconvenience or danger, and ſay nothing. If that could be any ſpur to you to haſten your journey hither, I would tell you I have an Anſwer ready for the preſs, which I ſhould be glad you ſhould ſee firſt. It is too long: The plenty of matter of all ſorts, which the gentleman affords me, is the cauſe of its too great length, though I have paſſed by many things worthy of remarks: But what may be ſpared of what there is, I would be glad ſhould be blotted out by your hand. But this between us.

AMONGST other things I would be glad to talk with you about before I die, is that which you ſuggeſt at the bottom of the firſt page of your letter. I am mightily concerned for the place meant in the queſtion, you ſay you will aſk the author of the treatiſe you mention, and wiſh extremely well to it; and would be very glad to be informed by you what would be beſt for it, and debate with you the ways to compoſe it. But this cannot be done by letters; the ſubject is of too great extent, the views too large, and the particulars too many to be ſo managed. Come therefore yourſelf, and come as well prepared in that matter as you can. But if you talk with others on that point there, mention not me to any body on that ſubject; only let you and I try what good we can do for thoſe whom we wiſh well to. Great things have ſometimes been brought about from ſmall beginnings well laid together.

PRAY preſent my moſt humble ſervice to your brother; I ſhould be glad of an opportunity to do him ſome ſervice. That which he thanks me for, in my care about his diſcourſe concerning the Chafers, was a ſervice to the publick, and he owes me no thanks for it. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your faithful and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Moſt honoured dear SIR, Dublin, April 19, 1698.

I HAVE formerly had thoughts of coming into England, as I have told you on occaſion of my health. But ſince the receipt of yours of April 6, which came to my hands but this morning, that conſideration weighs but little with me. The deſire of ſeeing and converſing with

you, has drowned all other expectations from my journey, and now I am reſolved to accompliſh it, let what will come on it. Your perſuaſions and arguments I think have ſomething in them of incantation: I am ſure their charms are ſo powerful on me on all occaſions, I can never reſiſt them. I ſhall therefore embrace you, God willing, as ſoon as ever the parliament of England riſes. I fix this period now, not ſo much in expectation of our Chancellor's arrival, as on another account. My dear friend muſt therefore know, that the conſideration of what I mentioned in my laſt, from the incomparable author of the Treatiſe, &c. has moved me to put pen to paper, and commit ſome thoughts of mine on that ſubject to the preſs in a ſmall 8vo, intitled, "The Caſe of Ireland's being "bound by Acts of Parliament in England ſtated." This you'll ſay is a nice ſubject, but I think I have treated it with that caution and ſubmiſſion, that it cannot juſtly give any offence; inſomuch that I ſcruple not to put my name to it, and, by advice of ſome good friends here, have preſumed to dedicate it to his Majeſty. I have ordered ſome of them to Mr. Churchill, to be preſented to you and ſome of your friends; and they are now upon the road towards you. I have been very free in giving you my thoughts on your pieces; I ſhould be extremely obliged to you for the like freedom on your ſide upon mine. I cannot pretend this to be an accompliſhed performance; it was done in haſte, and intended to overtake the proceedings at Weſtminſter; but it comes too late for that: What effect it may poſſibly have in time to come, God and the wiſe council of England only know; but were it again under my hands, I could conſiderably amend and add to it. But till I either ſee how the parliament at Weſtminſter is pleaſed to take it, or till I ſee them riſen, I do not think it adviſeable for me to go on t'other ſide the water. Though I am not apprehenſive of any miſchief from them, yet God only knows what reſentments captious men may take on ſuch occaſions.

MY brother gives you his moſt reſpectful ſervice: He has now ready a diſcourſe on our Giant's Cauſeway, which indeed is a ſtupendous natural rarity: He has addreſſed it to Dr. Liſter; but you will ſoon ſee it in the Tranſactions.

MR. Burridge goes on now with ſome ſpeed: I had lately an occaſion of writing to Mr. Churchill, and I gave him an account of his progreſs. I hope the whole will be finiſhed ſoon after Midſummer; and indeed in my opinion he performs it incomparably. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, London, July 9, 1698.

I AM juſt come to London, where your former promiſe, and what Mr. Churchill ſince tells me, makes me hope to ſee you ſpeedily. I longmightily to welcome you hither, and do remit, to that happy time, abundance that I may ſay to you. For I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured dear SIR, Dublin, Sept. 20, 1698.

I ARRIVED here ſafely the 15th inſtant; and now that the ruffling and fatigue of my journey is a little over, I ſit down to a taſk, which I muſt confeſs is the hardeſt I was ever under in my life; I mean, expreſſing my thanks to you ſuitable to the favours I received from you, and ſuitable to the inward ſenſe I have of them in my mind. Were it poſſible for me to do either, I ſhould in ſome meaſure be ſatisfied; but my inability of paying my debts, makes me aſhamed to appear before my creditor. However, thus much, with the ſtricteſt ſincerity, I will venture to aſſert to you, that I cannot recollect, through the whole courſe of my life, ſuch ſignal inſtances of real friendſhip, as when I had the happineſs of your company for five weeks together in London. It is with the greateſt ſatisfaction imaginable, that I recollect what then paſſed between us, and I reckon it the happieſt ſcene of my whole life. That part thereof, eſpecially, which I paſſed at Oates, has made ſuch an agreeable impreſſion on my mind, that nothing can be more pleaſing. To all in that excellent family, I beſeech you, give my moſt humble reſpects. It is my duty to make my acknowledgments there in a particular letter; but I beg of you to make my excuſe for omitting it at this time, becauſe I am a little preſſed by ſome buſineſs that is thrown upon me ſince my arrival. To which alſo you are obliged for not being troubled at preſent with a more tedious letter from,

SIR,

Your moſt obliged

and entirely affectionate friend and ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, London, Sept. 29, 1698.

YOURS of the 20th has now diſcharged me from my daily employment of looking upon the weather-cock, and hearkening how loud the wind blowed. Though I do not like this diſtance, and ſuch a ditch betwixt us, yet I am glad to hear that you are ſafe and ſound on the other ſide the water. But pray ſpeak not in ſo magnificent and courtly a ſtyle of what you received from me here. I lived with you, and treated you as my friend, and therefore uſed no ceremony, nor can receive any thanks but what I owe you doubly, both for your company, and the pains you were at to beſtow that happineſs on me. If you keep your word, and do me the ſame kindneſs again next year, I ſhall have reaſon to think you value me more than you ſay, though you ſay more than I can with modeſty read.

I FIND you were beſet with buſineſs when you writ your letter to me, and do not wonder at it; but yet, for all that, I cannot forgive your ſilence concerning your health and your ſon. My ſervice to him, your brother, and Mr. Burridge, and do me the juſtice to believe, that I am, with a perfect affection,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. BURRIDGE.

SIR, Oates, October 27, 1698.

YOU gueſſed not amiſs, when you ſaid, in the beginning of yours of the 13th inſtant, that you gave me the trouble of a letter; for I have received few letters in my life, the contents whereof have ſo much troubled and afflicted me, as that of yours. I parted with my excellent friend, when he went from England, with all the hopes and promiſes, to myſelf, of ſeeing him again, and enjoying him longer in the next ſpring. This was a ſatisfaction that helped me to bear our ſeparation; and the ſhort taſte I had of him here, in this our firſt interview, I hoped would be made up in a longer converſation, which he promiſed me the next time: but it has ſerved only to give me a greater ſenſe of my loſs, in an eternal farewel in this world. Your earlier acquaintance may have given you a longer knowledge of his virtue and excellent endowments; a fuller ſight, or greater eſteem of them, you could not have than I. His worth, and his friendſhip to me, made him an ineſtimable treaſure, which I muſt regret the loſs of, the little remainder of my life, without any hopes of

repairing it any way. I ſhould be glad, if what I owed the father could enable me to do any ſervice to his ſon. He deſerves it for his own ſake (his father has more than once talked to me of him) as well as for his father's. I deſire you therefore to aſſure thoſe who have the care of him, that if there be any thing wherein I, at this diſtance, may be any way ſerviceable to young Mr. Molyneux, they cannot do me a greater pleaſure than to give me the opportunity to ſhew, that my friendſhip died not with him.

PRAY give my moſt humble ſervice to Dr. Molyneux, and to his nephew. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful and humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Aug. 27, 1692.

I AM very ſenſible of your great civility in remembering me upon ſo ſhort an acquaintance as I had with you in Holland, ſo long time ſince; and I aſſure you, without any compliment, I reckon it amongſt the moſt fortunate accidents of my life, my ſo luckily falling into your converſation, which was ſo candid, diverting, and inſtructive, that I ſtill reap the benefit and ſatisfaction of it. Some years after I left you in Holland, upon my return for England, I contracted no ſmall intimacy with Dr. Sydenham, on the account of having been known to you his much eſteemed friend; and I found him ſo accurate an obſerver of diſeaſes, ſo thoroughly ſkilled in all uſeful knowledge of his profeſſion, and withal ſo communicative, that his acquaintance was a very great advantage to me: and all this I chiefly owe to you, Sir, beſides the information of many uſeful truths, and a great deal of very pleaſing entertainment I have met with, in the peruſal of your lately publiſhed writings: ſo that, on many accounts, I muſt needs ſay, there are very few men in the world, to whom I can, with the like ſincerity, profeſs myſelf to be, as I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt real friend, and
very humble and obliged ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Nov. 1, 1692.

THE indiſpoſition of my health, which drove me out of London, and keeps me ſtill in the country, muſt be an excuſe for my ſo long ſilence. The very great civility you expreſs to me in your letter, makes me hope your pardon for the ſlowneſs of my anſwer, whereby I hope you will not meaſure the eſteem and reſpect I have for you. That your own diſtinguiſhing merit, amongſt the reſt of my countrymen I met with at Leyden, has ſo ſettled in me, that before the occaſion your brother's favour lately gave me to enquire after you, I often remembered you, and it was not without regret I conſidered you at a diſtance that allowed me not the hopes of renewing and improving my acquaintance with you. There being nothing I value ſo much, as ingenious knowing men, think it not ſtrange that I laid hold on the firſt opportunity to bring myſelf again into your thoughts. You muſt take it as an exerciſe of your goodneſs, drawn on you by your own merit; for, whatever ſatisfaction I gain to myſelf in having recovered you again, I can propoſe no advantage to you, in the offer of a very uſeleſs and infirm acquaintance, who can only boaſt that he very much eſteems you.

THAT which I always thought of Dr. Sydenham living, I find the world allows him now he is dead, and that he deſerved all that you ſay of him. I hope the age has many who will follow his example, and by the way of accurate practical obſervation, as he has ſo happily begun, enlarge the hiſtory of diſeaſes, and improve the art of phyſick, and not by ſpeculative hypotheſes fill the world with uſeleſs, though pleaſing viſions. Something of this kind permit me to promiſe myſelf one day from your judicious pen. I know nothing that has ſo great an encouragement from of mankind as this.

I BEG you to preſent my moſt humble ſervice to your brother, whom I forbear now to interrupt, in the midſt of his parliamentary affairs, whereof I know a great part muſt fall to his ſhare, with my thanks for the favour of his of the 15th of October, which lately found me out ſafe here. Let him know that I am exceedingly ſenſible of the obligation, and ſhall at large make my acknowledgments to him as ſoon as good manners will allow it. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 20, 1692.

I AM much concerned to hear you have your health no better, and on this occaſion cannot but deplore the great loſſes the intellectual world in all ages has ſuffered, by the ſtrongeſt and ſoundeſt minds poſſeſſing the moſt infirm and ſickly bodies. Certainly there muſt be ſome very powerful cauſe for this in nature, or elſe we could not have ſo many inſtances, where the knife cuts the ſheath, as the French materially expreſs it: and if ſo, this muſt be reckoned among the many other inſeparable miſeries that attend human affairs.

I COULD wiſh the phyſician's art were ſo powerful and perfect, as, in ſome meaſure, to prevent ſo great an evil; but we find where once nature, or the "Oeconomia Animalis" of the body, is ſo depraved, as not to co-operate with medicine, all remedies, and the courſes of them, prove wholly ineffectual, or to very little purpoſe. But ſtill the more imperfect phyſick is, ſo much the more is owing to thoſe, who in the leaſt improve ſo difficult a province, which certainly has been conſiderably advanced by ſome late Engliſh authors; and that puts me in mind to deſire of you your thoughts, or what other learned phyſicians you converſe with ſay, concerning Dr. Morton and his late Exercitations on Fevers. As for his general theory of them, I eſteem it, as all others of this kind, a ſort of mere waking dream, that men are ſtrangely apt to fall into, when they think long of a ſubject, beginning quite at the wrong end; for by framing ſuch conceits in their fancies, they vainly think to give their underſtandings light, whilſt the things themſelves are ſtill, and perhaps ever muſt remain, in darkneſs.

IN his firſt Exercitation that treats of Agues, I don't find he has ſaid any thing very material, or worth notice, that the world did not ſufficiently know before, unleſs it were ſome hiſtories of the irregular ſhapes and ſymptoms this diſtemper appears under, which I think may be very inſtructive to the phyſician, and of great eaſe and advantage to the ſick.

BUT his practical remarks in his ſecond Exercitation about continuing and remitting fevers, if they be judiciouſly founded upon many and ſteady obſervations, ſo that they may ſafely paſs into a rule, muſt certainly be of great moment in directing the management and cure of fevers. I confeſs my experience in this diſtemper as yet falls ſomething too ſhort for to determine poſitively, whether all his obſervations be real and well grounded; but, as far as I can judge at preſent, ſeveral of them do hold good.

I REMEMBER to have heard Dr. Morton was once a Preſbyterian preacher; and though he were, this does not make him a jot the leſs capable, in above twenty years practice, to have carefully obſerved the ac-

cidents that naturally occur in the progreſs of a diſeaſe; and if he be but a true and judicious regiſter, it is all I deſire from him.

YOU ſee I have taken great freedom in giving a character according to my apprehenſions of this author, but it is only to encourage you to uſe the ſame liberty; for if, at your leiſure, you would let me know your own thoughts, or what other candid men ſay concerning him and his methods of cure, or any other uſeful tract that comes abroad, you will extremely oblige,

SIR,

Your very obedient humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 20, 1692-3.

I MUST acknowledge the care you take of my health, in a way wherein you ſo kindly apply to my mind; and if I could perſuade myſelf that my weak conſtitution was owing to that ſtrength of mind you aſcribe to me, or accompanied with it, I ſhould find therein, if not a remedy, yet a great relief againſt the infirmities of my body. However, I am not the leſs obliged to you for ſo friendly an application; and if the cordial you preſcribe be not to be had (for I know none equal to a judicious and capacious mind) your kindneſs is not to be blamed, who I am confident wiſh me that ſatisfaction, or any thing elſe that could contribute to my health.

THE Doctor, concerning whom you enquire of me, had, I remember, when I lived in town, and converſed among the phyſicians there, a good reputation amongſt thoſe of his own faculty. I can ſay nothing of his late book of fevers, having not read it myſelf, nor heard it ſpoke of by others: but I perfectly agree with you concerning general theories, that they are, for the moſt part, but a ſort of waking dreams, with which, when men have warmed their own heads, they paſs into unqueſtionable truths, and then the ignorant world muſt be ſet right by them. Though this be, as you rightly obſerve, beginning at the wrong end, when men lay the foundation in their own fancies, and then endeavour to ſuit the phænomena of diſeaſes, and the cure of them, to thoſe fancies. I wonder that, after the pattern Dr. Sydenham has ſet them of a better way, men ſhould return again to that romance way of phyſick. But I ſee it is eaſier, and more natural, for men to build caſtles in the air, of their own, than to ſurvey well thoſe that are to be found ſtanding. Nicely to obſerve the hiſtory of diſeaſes in all their changes and circumſtances, is a work of time, accurateneſs, attention, and judgment, and wherein if men,

through prepoſſeſſion or oſcitancy, miſtake, they may be convinced of their error by unerring nature and matter of fact, which leaves leſs room for the ſubtlety and diſpute of words, which ſerves very much inſtead of knowledge, in the learned world, where, methinks, wit and invention has much the preference to truth. Upon ſuch grounds as are the eſtabliſhed hiſtory of diſeaſes, hypotheſes might with leſs danger be erected, which I think are ſo far uſeful, as they ſerve as an art of memory to direct the phyſician in particular caſes, but not to be relied on as foundations of reaſoning, or verities to be contended for; they being, I think I may ſay all of them, ſuppoſitions taken up gratis, and will ſo remain, till we can diſcover how the natural functions of the body are performed, and by what alteration of the humours, or defects in the parts, they are hindered or diſordered. To which purpoſe, I fear the Galeniſts four humours, or the chemiſts ſal, ſulphur, and mercury, or the late prevailing invention of acid and alcali, or whatever hereafter ſhall be ſubſtituted to theſe with new applauſe, will, upon examination, be found to be but ſo many learned empty ſounds, with no preciſe determinate ſignification. What we know of the works of Nature, eſpecially in the conſtitution of health, and the operations of our own bodies, is only by the ſenſible effects, but not by any certainty we can have of the tools ſhe uſes, or the ways ſhe works by. So that there is nothing left for a phyſician to do, but to obſerve well, and ſo, by analogy, argue to like caſes, and thence make to himſelf rules of practice: and he that is this way moſt ſagacious, will, I imagine, make the beſt phyſician, though he ſhould entertain diſtinct hypotheſes concerning diſtinct ſpecies of diſeaſes, ſubſervient to this end, that were inconſiſtent one with another; they being made uſe of in thoſe ſeveral ſorts of diſeaſes, but as diſtinct arts of memory, in thoſe caſes. And I the rather ſay this, that they might be relied on only as artificial helps to a phyſician, and not as philoſophical truths to a naturaliſt. But, Sir, I run too far, and muſt beg your pardon for talking ſo freely on a ſubject you underſtand ſo much better than I do. I hoped the way of treating of diſeaſes, which, with ſo much approbation, Dr. Sydenham had introduced into the world, would have beaten the other out, and turned men from viſions and wrangling to obſervation, and endeavouring after ſettled practices in more diſeaſes; ſuch as I think he has given us in ſome. If my zeal for the ſaving men's lives, and preſerving their health (which is infinitely to be preferred to any ſpeculations ever ſo fine in phyſick) has carried me too far, you will excuſe it in one who wiſhes well to the practice of phyſick, though he meddles not with it. I wiſh you and your brother, and all yours, a very happy New-year, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Nov. 4, 1693.

FOR a while I deferred making any return for the favour of your laſt letter, on the account I underſtood, by one of yours to my brother, that I was ſuddenly to expect another obligation from you, by the receipt of your Treatiſe of Education, which yeſterday firſt came to my hands; and now I return you my hearty thanks for both your kindneſſes together, of which ſhould I expreſs the real thoughts I have, I ſhould ſeem to run either into extravagant compliment, or groſs flattery: but thus much I muſt needs ſay, that as your letter certainly contains, in ſhort, the only true method for the proſecuting the curing part of the practice of phyſick, and the ſure way of improving it; a matter of the chiefeſt good, in relation to men's bodies; ſo your book of Education lays down ſuch rules for the breeding of youth as, if followed, muſt neceſſarily prove of the greateſt advantage to the better part of man, the mind, by inſenſibly diſpoſing it to an habitual exerciſe of what is virtuous and laudable, and the acquiſition of all ſuch knowledge as is neceſſary for one's own good, or that of others whom we are to converſe with. Whence I cannot but think, had thoſe of our own countries but a thorough perſuaſion, and a right ſenſe of the great benefit that redounds from a chearful education, ſo as univerſally to put it in practice; without queſtion, we ſhould ſoon become a nation as remarkably different from the reſt of the world, for the inward endowments of our minds, and the rectitude of our manners, as the negroes are from the reſt of mankind, for their outward ſhape and colour of body. But this, I fear, is a happineſs only to be wiſhed for; however, he that makes it his endeavour to promote ſo great a good, by ſhewing the certain way to it, if they will follow him, juſtly deſerves the high eſteem of all that know how to value a truly publick ſpirit.

I HOPE, Sir, you have your health better, and that we may ſuddenly have abroad your Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, with thoſe farther additions and alterations you have ſome time ſince deſigned for the preſs: I am confident it is impatiently expected by all that are acquainted with your writings, and that peculiar clear manner of delivering truth you are ſo much maſter of, but by none more than,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Oct. 25, 1697.

I SHOULD oftener make acknowledgments to you for your favours, and expreſs the great eſteem I bear you, but that this barren place affords little elſe to ſay; and this I cannot think reaſon enough to trouble one ſo buſy and uſefully engaged as you always are. Yet I would not omit thanking you, by this worthy gentleman, Mr. Berrisford, your acquaintance, for a preſent of a book, I underſtand by my brother, you deſigned for me, though I was ſo unlucky as to miſs of it; and alſo communicate to you the incloſed letter, which the biſhop of Clogher was pleaſed (perhaps out of his too partial friendſhip) to tell me deſerved to be made publick, and deſired me accordingly to tranſmit it to Dr. Sloane: but this I would not do, unleſs it have your approbation alſo; ſo that it is wholly at your diſpoſal to do with it as you pleaſe, as is likewiſe,

SIR,

Your very affectionate friend,
and humble ſervant,
THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Oct. 27, 1698.

DEATH has, with a violent hand, haſtily ſnatched from you a dear brother. I doubt not but, on this occaſion, you need all the conſolation can be given to one unexpectedly bereft of ſo worthy and near a relation. Whatever inclination I may have to alleviate your ſorrow, I bear too great a ſhare in the loſs, and am too ſenſibly touched with it myſelf, to be in a condition to diſcourſe you on this ſubject, or do any thing but mingle my tears with yours. I have loſt, in your brother, not only an ingenious and learned acquaintance, that all the world eſteemed; but an intimate and ſincere friend, whom I truly loved, and by whom I was truly loved: and what a loſs that is, thoſe only can be ſenſible who know how valuable, and how ſcarce, a true friend is, and how far to be preferred to all other ſorts of treaſure. He has left a ſon, who I know was dear to him, and deſerved to be ſo as much as was poſſible, for one of his age. I cannot think myſelf wholly incapacitated from paying ſome of the affection and ſervice that was due from me to my dear friend, as long as he has a child, or a brother, in the world. If, therefore, there be any thing, at this diſtance, wherein I, in my little ſphere, may be able to ſerve your

your nephew or you, I beg you, by the memory of our deceaſed friend, to let me know it, that you may ſee that one who loved him ſo well, cannot but be tenderly concerned for his ſon, nor be otherwiſe than I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and
moſt affectionate ſervant,
JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Nov. 26, 1698.

AS you have a true ſenſe of every thing, ſo you were very much in the right, when you tell me, in the letter you favoured me with of the 27th of laſt month, that I needed all the conſolation could be given one that had loſt ſo unexpectedly a dear and only brother. His death indeed has been a ſevere affliction to me; and though I have you, and many more, that bear a great ſhare with me in my ſorrow, yet this does no way alleviate it, but makes it fall the heavier upon me; for it doubles my grief to think what an unſpeakable loſs he muſt be to ſo near a relation, that is ſo much lamented by thoſe that were only acquainted with him. I could not believe that mortality could have made ſo deep an impreſſion on me, whoſe profeſſion leads into ſo thorough a familiarity with it; but I find a paſſionate affection ſurmounts all this, and the "tecum obeam lubens," though it was the expreſſion of a poet, yet I am ſenſible was a very natural one, where we love extremely, and the Indians prove it no leſs in fact. Could any outward circumſtance of his life have increaſed that brotherly affection I had for him, it muſt have been that he had ſo great a part in your friendſhip, who muſt be allowed to have a nice judgment in diſcerning the true characters and worth of men. He frequently, in his life-time, has expreſſed to me with great complacency of mind, how happy he thought himſelf in your acquaintance; and he ſpoke of you ſeveral times, during his ſhort ſickneſs, with great reſpect. With his own hand he has writ this clauſe in his will: "I give and be-"queath to my excellent friend John Locke, Eſq. author of the Eſſay "concerning Human Underſtanding, the ſum of five pounds, to buy him "a ring, in memory of the value and eſteem I had for him." This I ſhall take care to ſend you in a bill by Mr. Churchill's hands, when he ſtates the account as it ſtands between him and my brother. The only child he has left behind him is under my care and management. I ſhall endeavour to diſcharge this truſt, with all the regard to my brother's memory, and the advantage of his child, I can: but it grieves me to think,

think, that I muſt ſurely fall very much ſhort of that extraordinary application and prudence his father would have ſhewn in his education; for he made it the chiefeſt, and indeed the only buſineſs of his life. I have made his little ſon as ſenſible as his tender age would allow, how much he is obliged to you, his father's friend, for your earneſt deſire to ſerve him: I wiſh you may both prolong your lives ſo, as he may one day be more thankful and capable of your kindneſs, by profiting much from your good inſtructions and advice. And ſince you ſo earneſtly preſs me, by the memory of your deceaſed friend, to let you know wherein you might oblige me, I will venture to break the bounds of modeſty ſo far, as to tell you I ſhould be extremely pleaſed to receive from yourſelf the laſt edition of your incomparable Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, and ſuch other pieces of your works as you ſhall think fit; for all which, as I have a great eſteem, ſo I ſhould have a more particular regard coming from yourſelf, as a private memorial of my dear brother's friend, and of a perſon for whom I have ſuch an extraordinary value, as I ſhall ever be proud of owning myſelf,

SIR,

Your truly affectionate humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 25, 169$\frac{8}{9}$.

I HAVE been ſlower in returning you my thanks for the favour of your letter of the 26th of November, and the civilities you expreſs to me in it, than perhaps I ſhould have been. But the truth is, my thoughts never look towards Dublin now, without caſting ſuch a cloud upon my mind, and laying ſuch a load of freſh ſorrow on me for the loſs of my dear friend, your brother, that I cannot without diſpleaſure turn them that way; and when I do it I find myſelf very unfit for converſation and the entertainment of a friend. It is therefore not without pain that I bring myſelf to write you a ſcurvy letter. What there wants in it of expreſſion, you muſt make up out of the eſteem I have for the memory of our common friend; and I deſire you not to think my reſpects to you leſs, becauſe the loſs of your brother makes me not able to ſpeak them as I would.

SINCE you are pleaſed to put ſuch a value on my trifles, I have given order to Mr. Churchill to ſend you my laſt Reply to the Biſhop of Worceſter, and the laſt edition of my Treatiſe of Education, which came forth ſince Mr. Molyneux's death. I ſend this with the more confidence to you, becauſe your brother told me more than once that he followed the method I therein offer to the world, in the breeding of his ſon. I wiſh you may find it fit to be continued to him, and uſeful to you in

in his Education; for I cannot but be mightily concerned for the ſon of ſuch a father, and wiſh that he may grow up into that eſteem and character, which his father left behind him amongſt all good men who knew him. As for my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, it is now out of print, and if it were not, I think I ſhould make you but an ill compliment in ſending it you leſs perfect than I deſign it ſhould be in the next edition, in which I ſhall make many additions to it: And when it is as perfect as I can make it, I know not whether in ſending it you I ſhall not load you with a troubleſome and uſeleſs preſent. But ſince by deſiring it you ſeem to promiſe me your acceptance, I ſhall as ſoon as it is re-printed take the liberty to thruſt it into your ſtudy. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBROCH JOANNES LOCKE S.P.D.

CUM ante dies decem, ad amicum noſtrum dom. Guenellonem ſcripſi, facilè credes quod te. V. C. non inſalutatum præteriverim: verum mei officii, tuorumque beneficiorum ratio poſtulat à me aliam & ſalutandi & gratias agendi methodum, ne aut obitèr, aut negligentèr, id quod mihi maximè incumbit, agere videar. Præſertim cum Guenellonis noſtri ſilentium me incertum reddat, an meæ ad ipſum pervenerint literæ, quas ſane minime vellem intercidiſſe; ne vobis omnibus, quibus tot nominibus obſtrictus ſum, aut parum memor, aut parum gratus appaream, credatiſque paucarum horarum intervallum ex animo meo tot tantorumque beneficiorum deleviſſe memoriam, quam nulla temporis diuturnitas unquam delere valebit. In iis etiam ſignificavi, quam humaniter tuus Vander Key me excepit, quam officiosè adjuvit, quo nomine hic tibi gratias iterum agendas ſuadet viri iſtius ſumma humanitas, quanquam illud parum eſt, ſi cum maximo beneficiorum tuorum cumulo conferatur. Dom. Veenium & optimam illius fœminam, quibus ſalutem verbis non facile reperio, cum nulla ſint, quæ aut illorum beneficia, aut eas quas habeo & ſemper habebo gratias, æquare poſſint; tuis tamen rogo quibus potes verbis maxime ornes. Ut me hic ulterius pergentem detinuit valetudinis ratio, ad dom. Guenellonem ſcripſi. Amœnitas loci, & ſi non deſidia, ſaltem quietis amor, & moleſtiæ, quam in itinere perpeſſus ſum, averſatio adhuc detinet. Deambulationes hic, quibus quotidie prægreſſum ulciſcor otium, valde jucundæ ſunt; ſed longe jucundiores forent, ſi aliquot veſtrum expatiandi haberem ſocios, quod tam mei quam veſtri cauſâ continuo

tinuo opto, præſertim ſic favente cœlo: nec enim credo ſanitati incommodum eſſet, præſertim dominæ Guenelloni, cujus infirmis pulmonibus & valetudini parum robuſtæ prodeſſet maxime, credo, hic ſerenus & liber aër. Quid agatur apud vos, præſertim noſtrorum reſpectu, ad me perſcribas rogo; præſertim me de tuâ amicorumque noſtrorum valetudine certiorem facias. Sum

Cleve, 28 Sept. 1685.

Tui obſervantiſſimus,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

DUAS à te, vir ampliſſime, officii & benevolentiæ plenas hic accepi literas; nec ingratus tibi videbor, ſpero, ſi ad ſingula, prout oportet, non fuſe reſpondeam, temporis anguſtiâ impeditus. Hoc unum enixè rogo, ut des operam, ut de adventu comitis Pembrokiæ per aliquem tuorum amicorum Hagæ degentium certior fiam, tranſmiſſo ea de re, vel ad me, vel ad te, nuntio. Dux copiarum Britannicarum futurus huc adventat, ſi jam non adeſt, quotidie expectatur. Meâ multum intereſt, ut quam fieri poteſt, maturè illius acceſſum cognoſcam. Hoc cum dixero, ſatis ſcio te omnem curam operamque in eo locaturum, ut quam celerrime id mihi innoteſcat. De aliis alias, nam tabellarius diſcedit. Amicos meos, meo nomine, quam officioſiſſimè quæſo, ſalutes. Vale, & me, ut facis, ama,

Cleve, 3 October 1685.

Tui obſervantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

VIR CLARISSIME,

SI duabus tuis amiciſſimis epiſtolis parum, vel nihil, à me reſponſum eſt, id inſtanti tabellarii diſceſſui imputes, rogo, nec credas me tam rebus meis intentum, tuæ vero conſuetudinis & jucundiſſimi juxta ac doctiſſimi ſermonis negligentem, ut omnia de meis negotiis, de tuis gratiſſimis literis nihil dicerem, niſi gravis aliqua ſubeſſet cauſa, cur de adventu comitis Pembrokiæ, quam fieri potuit citiſſimè, certior fierem. Sed jam quo maximè propendet animus, ad te, vir optime, & ſcripta tua redeo, in quibus primo accuſo amicitiam tuam de me & meritis meis tam magnificè, de veſtris erga me officiis & beneficiis tam exilitèr, loquentem. Hi ſunt, fateor, magnæ & non fictæ amicitiæ aliquando errores, de quibus ideo queror, ut mihi aliter de iiſdem rebus ſentienti ignoſcas, & me credas amicitiæ & gratitudinis dictata ſequi, cum in eâ perſiſtam ſententiâ,

aliqua me apud vos accepiſſe beneficia, quibus reſpondere verbis nec poſſim, nec debeam. Et nisi vos omnes in re, contra quam par eſt, voluntati meæ obſtare viderem, tuam ego hic opem implorarem, ut hanc mihi velles eximere ægritudinem, & tuâ autoritate, quâ plurimum apud præſtantiſſimum Veenium polles, huic querelæ tam juſtæ finem imponeres. Si quod videris promittere, ſed heu! longum abeſt, his in collibus & ſylvarum umbrâ, tuâ frui daretur & amicorum noſtrorum conſuetudine, crederem ego ſpecimen aliquod aurei rediiſſe ſæculi. Nam virtus, benignitas, pax & fides in ſylvis ſolum degebant, quibus in urbanorum hominum frequentiâ vix datur locus. Sic cecinerunt poetæ: an aliquid aliud nos docent hiſtorici, hoc tempore non eſt mihi inquirendi animus. Gaudeo fratrem tuum convaluiſſe, & ſine graviore aliquo ſymptomate. Locum illum epiſtolæ tuæ, ubi ſcriptorum tuorum memineris, non ſine mœrore legi; ſentio quantum ex diſceſſu meo ſecerim jacturam, & voluptatis & eruditionis, quod non legerim reliqua tua ſcripta, ex quibus non minorem mihi lucem promitterem, quam ex jam lectis, multo cum fructu, percepiſſem. Si vis ut ſincerè & apertè dicam, nullibi reperi opiniones magis dilucide propoſitas, argumentorum rationibus melius ſubnixas, à partium ſtudiis longius remotas, & veritati per omnia magis conformes. Hoc me ex animo proferre dubitare non potes, cum me tam importunè, tam deditâ operâ, criticum tam paucis potuiſſe dentem malignum imprimere patet. Sed me miſerum! magnam partem fructûs, quem ex iſtâ meâ criticâ ſeveritate mihi propoſui, perdidi. Plurima enim, quæ inter legendum notaveram, non tam tui corrigendi, quam mei informandi, feci animo, de quibus tecum ulterius inquirendum ſtatueram. Non eſt igitur, quod mihi tanto ardelioni gratias agas; ſatis eſt, ſi vehementi nimis inquiſitori, & culpandi anſas ſtudioſè quærenti ignoſcas. Quanquam non malè pictæ tabulæ indicium eſt, ſi quis cogatur in eâ quærere nævos. Utinam quæ ego meditor, eo eſſent ſcripta idiomate, ut tu poteris vices rependere, reperires te ulciſcendi copioſam materiam. Quod ſcribis de critici critico * facile credo; quamprimum enim attigi iſtum undecimæ epiſtolæ locum, videbar mihi audire obſtrepentium exclamationes, quaſi de religione omnino actum eſſet, nôſti hujuſmodi hominum mores, quo minus heterodoxum aliquid poſſint refellere, ne nihil in cauſâ Dei agere videantur, tanto magis clamoribus, incuſationibus, calumniis inſurgunt. Fateor argumentum iſtud modeſtè proponendum fuiſſe, & cautè tractandum, ſed tamen ejuſmodi eſt, ut mereatur tandem ſummâ cum acribiâ diſcuti. Si omnia, quæ in ſacris libris continentur, pro theopneuſtis paritèr habenda, ſine omni diſcretione, magna ſane præbetur philoſophis de fide & ſinceritate noſtra dubitandi anſa. Si è contrario quædam pro ſcriptis pure humanis habenda: ubi conſtabit ſcripturarum divina autoritas, ſine quâ corruet religio Chriſtiana? quodnam erit criterium? quis modus? adeo ut in hâc quæſtione,

* Sentimens de quelques theologiens d'Hollande ſur l'hiſtoire critique du P. Simon.

ſi quâ aliâ, maxime fundamentali, ſummâ cum cautione, prudentiâ, modeſtiâ agendum, præſertim ab eo cui, uti credo, jam non nimium favent eccleſiaſticæ poteſtates & theologorum claſſes. Sed ſigna cecinerunt, & expectandus eſt conflictus. Ego, qui ubique ſolam quæro veritatem, eamque, quantum capere poſſum, ſive inter orthodoxos reperio, ſive heterodoxos, pariter amplector. Fateor aliqua eſſe in eo ſcripto, quæ mihi plenè non ſatisfaciunt, alia quibus reſpondere non poſſum; de illis ab authore libenter reſponſum acciperem, ſi commodum exiſtimas, de his tuum quæro judicium.

I. NI fallor, author ſæpius utitur contra apoſtolorum continuam inſpirationem hoc argumento, quod ſcil. multa ab illis dicta invenimus, quæ ſine auxilio ſpiritus ſancti dici poterant; quod tamen conceſſum, contra divinam ſacræ ſcripturæ autoritatem & θεοπνευστίαν nihil concludit. Aſſeritur in ſ. ſcripturâ conſtans per omnia & infallibilis veritas. Si quid autem dicit ſanctus Paulus Act. xxiii. (V. 241,) quod cœlitus ipſi revelatum non erat, id nihil detrahit certitudini ſcripturæ, quandoquidem ejuſmodi res eſſet, quam certò & infallibilitèr cognoſcere potuit, ſine revelatione divinâ. Quæ ſenſibus & certâ cognitione apoſtolis conſtabant, non opus erat revelatione, ut earum hiſtoria, ab apoſtolis tradita, pro indubitatâ haberetur. Itaque metuo ne homines ſuſpicentur hoc argumentum potius quæſitum, quam è re natum.

II. EXPLICATIO illius promiſſi Joan. xvi. 13. quam fusè tradit p. 256. nequaquam mihi videtur poſſe accommodari apoſtolo Paulo, ſi quis attentè legat illius hiſtoriam Act. ix. & ſeq. Unde enim ille evangelii hoſtis, &, ut ipſe alicubi fatetur, ignarus, poterat tam cito devenire myſteriorum evangelii interpres & præco, ſine inſpiratione ſupernaturali & divinâ? V. Act. ix. 19, 20.

Hæc aliqua eorum, quæ mihi inter legendum parum ſatisfecerunt; alia fuerunt, quorum oblitus ſum: ſed quid ad hæc dicat author libentèr ſcirem. Verum cum plurima alia ſunt quæ videntur omnimodam ſ. ſcripturæ infallibilitatem & inſpirationem in dubium vocare, quibus fateor me non poſſe reſpondere, enixè rogo ut quid ea de re ſentias, mihi explicare non graveris: multa enim, quæ in libris canonicis occurrebant, jamdiu ante tractatûs hujus lectionem, dubium me & anxium tenuerunt, & gratiſſimum mihi facies, ſi hunc mihi adimas ſcrupulum. Cum ſummâ, quæſo, amicitiæ, gratitudinis & exiſtimationis ſignificatione hanc incluſam hoſpiti meo optimo tradas. Illiuſque & tuam & Guenellonis fœminam, meo nomine ſalutes, reliquoſque noſtros omnes. Vale, & longas epiſtolas ſcribenti ignoſcas, nam tecum loqui haud facile deſiſto.

Cleve, 6 Oct. 1685.

Tibi devotiſſimus,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

QUANQUAM longo uſu ad alia hujus vitæ incommoda occaluit aliquatenus mens mea, à conſuetudine tamen tuâ, vir doctiſſime & amicorum optime, me divelli, ſine magnâ animi ægritudine, pati non poſſum. Tu enim me eruditione tuâ inſtruere, judicio confirmare, conſilio dirigere, & amicitiâ & comitate ſolari ſolebas, quotidianum curarum mearum perfugium: ſed ita plerumque mecum agi ſolet, ut ubi & quibuſcum eſſe maxime cupio, refragante fortunâ, rarò permiſſum ſit. Devorandum igitur, ut potero, hujus abſentiæ tædium, quod frequentibus tuis literis levare debes, jam præſertim dum tempus & otium tibi permittunt adverſarii illi, qui domi ſuæ prælia tibi meditantur. Hoc te in quo jam ſumus ſæculo expectâſſe non dubito. Si candidè, & ut veritatis amici argumentorum pondere tecum agant, tibi ſcio non diſplicebunt, qui veritatem amplecteris, undecunque venientem. Sin iracundè, veteratoriè, malignè, paucis placebunt, niſi ſui ſimilibus; quicquid demum acciderit, hoc certum eſt, quod tu illæſus, victorque abibis, quia veritatem quæris, non victoriam. Sed ut verum fatear, ego à rixoſis hujuſmodi diſputatoribus non multum expecto, qui in alienis convellendis, non ſuis adſtruendis, quærunt gloriam. Artificis & laudem merentis eſt, ædificare. Sed pugnaces hoſce ſibi & curis ſuis relinquamus. Si quid in B—— placidius & liberalius reperiſti, gaudeo; pacificorum vellem quotidiè augeri numerum, præſertim inter reformatos, inter quos nimium quotidiè ſeruntur lites. Inimicus homo facit hoc. Alterius ſunt indolis amici, quibus hic, te favente, familiaritèr utor. Uterque Grævius ſalutem plurimam tibi dicit. Verrynium ſæpius quæſitum nondum domi reperi; hujus ſeptimanæ dies aliquot extra urbem tranſegit; cum domum redierit, non diu inſalutatum permittam. Vale cum tuâ tuiſque, & me ama

Utrecht, 11 Oct. 1686.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir reverendiſſime, amiciſſime, colendiſſime,

SINE fati & ineluctabili prædeſtinationis vi experior in me ipſo, quomodo peccandi initia quandam ſenſim afferunt ſecum peccandi neceſſitatem. Literis tuis amiciſſimis 9. & 14. Febr. datis reſpondendi, quamprimum eas acceperam, anſam mihi eripuit rei alicujus agendæ importuna tum feſtinatio. Sed cum, peracto cum eo quocum mihi res erat negotio, jam deceſſus illius in Angliam mihi fecerit otium, ſatis ad literas ſcribendas vacare mihi videor, nondum tamen nactus ſum eam, quâ aliàs uſus ſum, ſcribendi libertatem. In hoc ſilentii crimen rebus aliis impeditus, quaſi inſcius incidi miſer, quod jam tempore auctum

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penè confirmat pudor. Sic delicta delictis cumulamus ſemel irretiti, & modeſti pariter & pervicaces in vitiis ſuis indureſcunt. Vides quo in ſtatu jam ſum, & niſi credere me vis omnia certa & immutabili neceſſitate evenire, negligentiæ huic meæ ignoſcere debes, ut redeat mihi antiqua mea apud te parrheſia. De Germanâ patrum theologiâ idem tecum planè ſentio. Maxima ſemper fuit, ſemperque erit Germanorum natio, & pauci ſunt in tantâ ſcriptorum multitudine, qui non videntur eo ſub aëre nati. Sed me hâc de re à tuâ opinione non eſſe alienum, non multum miraberis. Aliquid amplius fateor eſt, quod ego numeros tuos ſecretos notaverim, & quod tu hoc obſervaveris. Cave tibi & ignoſce quamprimum ſilentio meo, ne loquacitate tibi magis ſim moleſtus, vides me in ſecretiora tua penetrare. "Scire volunt ſecreta domus" — & nôſti quod ſequitur, — "atque inde timeri." Magicæ hæ metuendæ ſunt artes nimis perſpicaces, quibus ego non parum mihi placeo, quandoquidem ex tam jucundo tam laudabili enaſcuntur fonte, & id mihi teſtatum faciunt, quod ante omnia cupio. Scio jam mentem meam à tuâ harmonicâ quâdam ſympathiâ regi planè & gubernari. Sic me orthodoxum ſemper fore certum eſt. O! utinam eodem modo & ſciens fieri poſſem. Ut enim verum fatear, inſcius tuis numeris uſus ſum, ſed gaudeo me prodiiſſe tenus: vellem & in aliis rebus hoc mihi acciderit. Agnoſco genium tuum, cui me ducendum totum libenter traderem. Gratias ago quam maximas, pro omni tuâ curâ & operâ, in literis, in libris, & aliis meis rebus locatâ. Utinam daretur & vices rependere. Vale, & me ama

Tui Amantiſſimum,

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Rotterodami, Mar. 8. 16)(87
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J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

QUID illo facies homine, qui nec cantare par eſt, nec reſpondere paratus? Quid juvat libertate à te ipſo conceſsâ uti, ſine viribus, ad ea quæ decent præſtanda, neceſſariis? Jucundiſſima tua & floribus, undique referta epiſtola ad ea, quæ ſcribis, iterum iterumque legenda maxime invitat; ut vero calamum ſumam, & aliquid meo more reſcribam valde dehortatur & deterret. Etſi enim grati ſit animi, argutis & facetis amici ſermonibus aliquid reſpondere, imprudentis tamen eſt & parum pudici, ornatis incondita, urbanis agreſtia, pretioſis vilia, vel in ipſo literarum commercio reponere. Fruſtra igitur à te libertate donatus ſum, munus ſane in ſpecie magnificum, ſed niſi aliquid de tuo etiam impertire poſſis ingenio, plane inutile; fruſtra enim accuſabis me tanquam in libertate tardum, cui tam parata & juſta ſit defenſio hebetem non debere eſſe loquacem, nec decere χάλκεα χρύσειων, ut ut enim eo modo liber ſim, parum certe videbor liberalis. Novi animum tuum, novi ingenium, & quam paratus ſis omnia, ab amicâ voluntate profecta, in bonam partem interpretari; hoc boni omnia conſulentis non parva

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laus eſt, ſed male interim ſcribentis peſſima excuſatio. Ea tamen fiducia fretus, en te iterum compellare auſim, melioribus ſtudiis vacantem; ſi quid in eo pecco, nolo incuſare vim à fatis illatam, cauſam ſane, ſi qua ſit, omnium maxime improbam, ſed te ipſum, qui ab omni vi & coactione longiſſime abes, tua humanitas, tua benevolentia, tui lepores cogunt ut agnoſcam, & ut fatear me tibi gratias habere, etiamſi referre non poſſim. Si his conditionibus mecum agere velis, en tibi ad legendas tuas epiſtolas paratiſſimum & cupidiſſimum: ad meas reſcribendas, etiamſi cupiam, tardum, & ſane tam neceſſitate quam officio tardum. Tu cum iſta excuſatione uti non potes, & maturè ſcribas rogo, & abundè. Id ni facias, audies me graviter querentem, te non præſtare & amico & egenti id quod potes, & id quod debes, quia potes. Si jam inciperem iniquo jure communem inter nos colere amicitiam, hæc jam proponere vix animum inducerem; ſed cum hac lege à primordiis amicitiæ ſemper vixi-mus, ut tu properè & cumulatè omnia officia benevolentiæ præſtares, ego vel in agnoſcendo parcus & lentus eſſem, pati jam debes mores meos quantumvis malos, vetuſtate jam confirmatos, in quibus nihil novum, nihil inſolens reperies. Vides quocum tibi res eſt; in hâc tamen culpâ non prorſus ingratus videri vellem, ſi id in ſe aliquid gratitudinis habet, ut qui eam, quâ ſe deſtitutum fatetur, in te miratur & amplectitur virtutem: in ea quæro mihi patrocinium, quod mihimet præſtare non poſſum. Sed de me ſatis, ad majora nunc venio tua, ſcil. typographo haud parum iraſcor quod tuum, tam utile, tam doctum opus adeo procraſtinet, ſpero jam accedente ſole operarum diligentia incaleſcit. De Epiſcopii etiam tractatu gaudeo: de alio quod poſtulas tecum coram agam, ut enim quod res eſt fatear, ſcripſeram prius ad te, niſi ſperaveram antehac me Amſtelodamum acceſſurum, ut jucundiſſimâ illic amicorum conſuetudine fruerer, imprimis tuâ, ſine quâ hi ipſi veris non amœnè tranſeunt dies. Vale, vir præſtantiſſime, &, ut facis, me ama,

Rotterodami, 16 Maij 1687.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

NONNE ſatis tibi eſt, vir clariſſime, Judæum viciſſe *, niſi eodem opere inter Chriſtianos, tui amantiſſimum tibi etiam prorſus ſubjuges? Diverſis fateor armis nos aggrederis, illum argumentis, me beneficiis obſtrictum tenes, è quibus ille ſe vix credo expediet; ego certo de me pronunciare poſſum, me tibi ſemper obnoxium futurum. Quid enim rependam viro, cui non ſufficit me ſuis cumulare beneficiis, niſi inſuper me dignum reddere conetur, dum ſuas ſibi laudes ipſe detrahit, quibus

* De veritate religionis Chriſtianæ amica collatio cum erudito Judæo. (Iſ. Orobio.)

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me ornatum velit; & in earum partem mihi non debitam venire? Tu fateor amicâ tuâ urbanitate facilius me, quocunque velis, circumducere poſſis, quam ille alter ſua quemquam metaphyſica. Sed ne expectes tamen, ut unquam eo uſque me deducas, ut concedam iſtam feſtinationem, quâ exemplar ad me primum omnium miſiſti, mihi quovis jure deberi. Totum hoc beneficium & feſtinationis & muneris tuæ benevolentiæ & amicitiæ acceptum refero. Tu forſan, prout tua eſt humanitas, aliquo modo æquum putâſti ei primo omnium donare, quem noveras debere ex jam deguſtato opere vehementiſſimè omnium expetere hanc diſſertationem, & deſiderare redintegratam ſibi denuò legendi voluptatem. Hujuſmodi meritum facile agnoſco, nec cuiquam donare poteras hoc volumen, cui æque exoptatum, æque acceptum eſſe potuit, ac mihi. Triduum illud & amplius, uti mones, nemo videbit. Laudo ego iſtam tuam erga Judæum comitatem; quanquam, ni fallor, quando perlegerit, vix credet ille, ſibi hoc munere tantum factum eſſe beneficium, ut gaudeat tam maturè hunc librum in manus ſuas perveniſſe. De eo, quod in calce epiſtolæ adjicis brevi plura. Dolui te per triduum mihi tam prope tam procul que fuiſſe. Sed patientius ferendum, quod amicum habeam, quem plures amant. Optimam tuam uxorem, collegas, reliquoſque amicos noſtros, officioſiſſimè quæſo meo nomine ſalutes. Vale, & me ama

Rotterd. 11 Sept. 1687.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

NIMIS ſeverus profectò es, vir clariſſime, tuorum erga amicos officiorum exactor, alienæ vero negligentiæ valde immemor dum te cunctationis inſimulas, apud hominem uti nôſti omnium mortalium maxime cunctatorem. Nolo igitur apud te obtinere axioma illud, quo ultimas tuas male auſpicatus es, "nihil deterius amico cunctatore," ſive de te ipſo cogites, ſive (uti aliquando meliore jure evenire poſſit) de me. Ego enim lentus admodum, & tamen inter eos, qui amicitiam cum fide colunt, non ultimum mihi locum vendico. Si hoc aliquanto arrogantius dictum ſit, tu ipſe videas. Tu alienas laudes mihi tribuis, & ſi illis ſemel mihimet placeo, ubi tandem me ſiſtam? Iſtud ſynagogæ decretum ſatis, ut mihi videtur, à Judæis aſtutè promulgatum, ut eorum hic hyperaſpites aliquid habeat, quod aliis dicat, etiamſi nihil habeat quod tibi reſpondeat: è conſulto hoc factum credo, ut ſalvo honore & quantum fieri poſſit cauſa, poſſit ex arenâ decedere; tua enim argumentandi methodus, an naſutulis quibuſdam Chriſtianis, & nihil niſi ſua probantibus, placebit, neſcio; vix credo placebit Judæis, qui ea ſe magis implicatos ſentient, quam fieri ſolet ab iis, qui Chriſtianam religionem ad ſuum modulum exigentes, vix in ea reperirent, quod ſolidè Judæis opponere

ponere poſſent. Ego à quo librum tuum primum accepi (nam ita me cumulas, ut diſtinctione opus ſit) tam incommodâ uſus ſum valetudine, ut illius lectioni vacare adhuc non potuerim. Sed jam indies convaleſcens, ſpero me non diu cariturum eâ voluptate. Interim gratias tibi ago quam maximas, & jam ſpero credes mihi ſatisfactum duplici hoc tributo, quod illud Judæi ſcriptum, ſive characteres reſpicias, ſive latinitatem, plane barbarum, olim perlegerim; nam de tuo ſi quid dicas, cogitare debes & profiteri, quantum ego per te profecerim. Ita enim, ſi verum dicere liceat, ſe res habet. Sed nolo ulterius ea de re tecum contendere, ne tertium mihi librum mittas. Literas D. Clerici, quas tuis incluſas memoras, nuſpiam reperio; ſpero eas Amſtelodami repertum iri & brevi me accepturum. Illum, tuam, tuos, noſtros, quæſo meo nomine ſalutes, & me ames, vir ampliſſime,

Rotterodami, 23 Sept. 1687.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

INTER cardiaca, & uti noſtri vocant, reſtaurantia, nihil tam efficax reperio quam amicorum benevolentiam. Tuis ultimis literis me maximè recreatum ſentio. Jam diu prioribus tuis humanitatis plenis reſpondiſſem, ſi quid certum de valetudine meâ pronunciare auſus fuiſſem; ſubinde enim, cum me jam ſanum ſalvumque credideram, recidivam paſſus, inter ſpem morbumque diu verſatus, diſtuli ad te literas dare, donec certo aliquot dierum experimento me prorſus convaluiſſe confiderem. Hæc cunctatio ultimas tuas amicitiæ plenas tibi expreſſit literas, & mihi attulit remedium utilius eo & jucundius, quod mihi à Dno Veenio per Helmontium miſiſti, ſumma cum cura & feſtinatione: quanquam fruſtra, famula enim per negligentiam everſa phiola incluſum effudit liquorem. Sed jam ſpero non amplius opus erit remediis, quamvis ſubinde lævia quædam ſentio ſymptomata, quæ ſpero non recrudeſcentis mali eſſe minas, ſed abeuntis reliquias. Hæc ad te ſigillatim ſcribere non vereor, quia de valetudine mea ita ſolicitus es, ut alio modo tuæ humanitati magis gratè reſpondere non poſſim. Gaudeo vehementer te pauco ſanguine redemiſſe quod tibi impendebat malum. Spero te ea cautione & maturè ſemper uſurum: quamprimum aliquam ſentis gravitatem corporis, præſertim capitis vel ventriculi, ad venæſectionem tibi ſtatim confugiendum. Hoc ni facias, de te ſano magis metuendum erit, quam de me ægroto. Nos valetudinarii quoddam genus ſumus hypocritarum, qui eo non proficiſcimur, quo ſæpius videmur tendere. Multum tibi, collegis cæteriſque amicis Amſtelodamenſibus debeo, quibus mea ſanitas ita cordi eſt; nec ſperare poſſum vitam mihi ſatis diuturnam fore, ut tantam benevolentiam, tuam vero imprimis, prout res meretur, poſſim agnoſcere; hoc velim tibi perſuaſum habeas me, quantulus quantulus

lus ſum, totum tuum eſſe. Salutes, quæſo, quam humillimè, meo nomine, Veenioſque, Guenelloſque, & collegas, omnes, illiſque dicas mihi eos tam eximios eſſe medicos, ut magis mihi proſint illorum vota, quam aliorum remedia. Lectiſſimam tuam fœminam, quam officioſiſſime etiam ſalutes. Vale, & ego ut valeam, uti facis, me amando pergeface.

Rotterod. 20 Octob. 1687. Tui, cum amore, obſervantiſſimus,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

CUM nihil adeo corporis ſanitatem foveat & reſtauret, ac animi tranquillitas, non dubitare potes quin jucundiſſimæ tuæ literæ, amoris & benevolentiæ tuæ teſtes, in hac, in qua diu verſatus ſum, infirma mutabilique valetudine, mihi maximo fuerint ſolatio. Aliorum medicamentorum me ſæpe pertæſum, reficiebant illa tua ſemper grata, ſemper ſuaviſſima, & cum alia nauſeabundus reſpuerem, ſalutifera illa ſale tuo Attico condita appetentius ſemper deſideravi. Cave igitur ut credas te mihi epiſtolis tuis creâſſe moleſtiam, niſi ſimul credere velis ingratam fore convaleſcentiam, cujus tu amore, cura, ſtudio tuo maximus fuiſti fautor, nec deſtiterunt tantæ amicitiæ indicia decumbentem me aliquando erigere. Si aliquanto tardius hæc cum gratiarum actione agnoſco, nôſti hominem, nec expectare debes morbum me expeditiorem reddidiſſe. Quanquam, ſi hæc tibi juſta ſatis videri poſſit cauſa, aliquantulum procraſtinavi, ut confirmatæ ſanitatis nuncium tibi poſſem mittere, & mihi tecum gratulari convaleſcentiam, quæ tibi adeo curæ & cordi fuit. Doleo Orobium nobis tam cito ereptum, non quod in eo amiſeris triumphi ornamentm, ſcio enim te, modo veritas vincat, de vincendi gloria parum eſſe ſolicitum, quamvis in illo vivente aliqua veritatis confeſſio non diſplicuiſſet: ſed deſtinaveram in proximis ad te literis petere exactum eorum quæ in inquiſitione paſſus eſt hiſtoriam. Ad hoc me impulit narratio cujuſdam Galli, quæ nuper prodiit de iis, quæ ipſe, etſi Catholicus, paſſus eſt ab inquiſitoribus Luſitanis, in Goâ Indiæ. Quæ à Judæo noſtro confirmari omnia, vel ſuperari poſſe, facile crediderim. Quandoquidem vero ille jam ad ſilentes migraverit, rogo ut tu quicquid iſtius rei tenes memoriâ, velis chartis conſignare, ne intercidat quantum nobis reſtat methodi iſtius evangelicæ teſtimonium. Doleo me non interfuiſſe collegarum convivio, non quod oſtreis caruerim, in hujuſmodi enim conventibus nihil mihi minus placet quam pars taciturna, & ejuſmodi convivarum ſermo aliquid magis ſapidum & jucundius ſalſum habet, quam ipſa oſtrea Gaurana. Salutes eos, quæſo, meo nomine, uti & optimam tuam fœminam, totamque Veenii & Guenellonis familiam. Ante duas vel tres ſeptimanas ad D^m^ le Clerc ſcripſi, unaque chartas aliquas miſi; an

recte acceperit aveo ſcire, jam enim iſtis rebus vacare incipio: ipſum meo etiam nomine ſalutes.

Vale, & ut ipſe valeam, amando & ſcribendo effice,

Rotterd. 30 Nov. 1687. Tui ſtudioſiſſimus, J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ſpectatiſſime,

QUANTUMVIS obfirmato animo minas meas non expaveſcis, ſenties tamen aliquando, datâ occaſione, quid ſit irritâſſe crabronem, in eo enim genere, merito numerari poſſit provocatuſque iratuſque amicus. Nondum vidi acta illa Lipſienſia, ubi tu coram ſiſteris, ſed euge; jam ſalva res eſt, incepi, de iſtius operis merito pretioque aliquomodo dubitare, quod nemo ex ſyſtematicis illis reperiret in eo tractatu quod diſpliceret, nihil enim argumenti aut boni aut novi deberet continere, nec quod ſupra vulgus ſaperet, ſi vulgo placeret. Sed jam vapulans laudo, nec vibices metuo. Benignior his pædagogis ſi non voluntas, ſaltem vis eſt, quam ut eorum virgæ vulnera vel cicatrices relinquant. Conditiones ſubſcriptionum plus ſemel in Angliam miſi, ſed hactenus reſponſi nihil accepi: ego data occaſione iterum & ad alios mittam, quo ſucceſſu neſcio; hæc enim & hujuſmodi, niſi præſto adſis & hæſitantes impellas, immemores moneas, plerumque negliguntur. Quod de Judæo narras, valde placet: brevi habebitis, ſpero, quæ ſufficient ad juſtum volumen, in quo ſanctitas officii ad plenum depicta, omnium oculos animoſque in ſui admirationem arripiat. Dolendum plane eſſet tot et tanta ſanctitatis exempla in tenebris latere; prodeant tandem in lucem, ut quibus fundamentis ſtabilitur & propagatur fides, tandem innoteſcat. De MS. codice ego nihil dico, ante biduum ea de re ſcripſit ad te Furleius noſter. Inde conjicio te aliquando Wetſtenium convenire, eaque occaſione has incluſas illi tradendas ad te mittere auſim. Scripſi ad illum ante quindecim dies aliquoſque miſi ad illum libros, alioſque poſtulavi, & feſtinatò ad me mittendos, ſed nihil audio, nihil reſpondet. Eoque magis ſilentium ejus me ſolicitum habet, quod ſimul miſeram duo volumina Garcilaſſi de la Vega D° Veenio (cum epiſtola, quam ad eum ſcripſi) reddenda, quæ olim ab eo mutuo acceperam. Salutes illum, rogo, meo nomine reliquoſque collegas. Vale, vir amiciſſime, & me ama, ut facis,

Rotterd. 22 Jun. 1688. Tui ſtudioſiſſimum, J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO

PHILIPPO a LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ſpectatiſſime,

SIVE iratum me ſive gratum exiſtimari vellem, ſentio me jam nimis diu tacuiſſe. Amicum amico reſpondiſſe, crabronem irritanti vindictam retuliſſe citius oportuit. Sed ego neſcio qua ingenii tarditate nec amici nec inimici partes recte ego. An tibi hoc modo placere poſſim neſcio, me Slado noſtro (ſi cum eo ita agerem) valde diſpliciturum ſat ſcio, qui hujuſmodi lentulos æquo animo ferre non poteſt. Editionem MS. * de quo cum Wetſtenio tranſigebas, dolendum plane eſt non procedere, & metuo, ſi jam non procedat illius impreſſio, ne intereat tam luculentum hiſtoriæ monumentum; quod ſane multis, quæ jam omnium manibus verſantur, libris longe anteferendum exiſtimo. Multa cum voluptate legi Clerici noſtri Tentamen, ut ipſe vocat, de antiqua Hebræorum poeſi: non parum lucis inde affulſurum pſalmis, reliquiſque quæ in S. S. extant ſcriptis metricis, minime dubito. Totum pſalmorum librum, ſibi ita reſtitutum, edi optarem: incites illum rogo, ut quantum, per alia negotia liceat, hoc opus feſtinet. Cuidam meo amico in literis Hebræis verſatiſſimo cum hoc dixiſſem, credere non potuit; exemplo perſuaſus jam credet. Plura habui dicenda, ſed adventus amici ex Anglia hic me interpellat, adeo ut in aliud tempus ſint rejicienda. Vale & me ama

Rotterd. 30 Julii, 1688. Tui ſtudioſiſſimum, J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

FAMULUS meus, Amſtelodanum res ſuas agens profecturus, meam non prius rogavit veniam quam inſtaret deceſſus, adeo ut ad te ſcribendi tempus non dabatur. Doleo profecto adeo labefactatam in familia tua valetudinem. De morbo & curatione illius abſens nihil audeo pronunciare, nec quidem opus eſt; cum tamen amicos doctoſque paratos tibi habeas medicos. Unum tamen permitte ut moneam, ſi, uti ſperare videris, erumpant tandem variolæ, velim ut in medicamentis aſſumendis & ſtragulorum operimentis caveatur regimen calidius, unde in ſanguine excitatur fervor, non ſine magno ægroti malo & diſcrimine. Hoc vel invito extorſit mihi meus in te tuoſque amor & expertus loquor. Tuorum valetudo eo ſpero in ſtatu eſt, ut de aliis loqui liceat, præſertim tibi haud ingratis,

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* Hiſtoria inquiſitionis.

Furleius noſter principi ante deceſſum adfuit & coram allocutus eſt, ut illius opem contra perſecutionem hac in provincia, ſi unquam alias, certe jam intempeſtive cœptam, efflagitaret. Rem ita urſit, ut placuerit principi epiſtolam ſcribere Bailivio de Kenmerland, qui Foecke Floris miniſtrum eccleſiæ Mennonitarum juſſerat ex autoritate ſynodi, intra octiduum ſolum vertere, & ea ex ditione exire, ni mallet carcere includi. Hiſtoriam iſtius Foecke Floris ex aliis, quam ex me, melius cognoſces. Furleio enim noſtro ante hanc cauſam ne de facie quidem notus. Sed communem chriſtianorum rem in ejus libertate agi ratus, cauſam illius prono animo ſuſcepit, & ſtrenue egit; ſi enim abfuiſſet παῤῥησία, nihil promoviſſet. Hujus epiſtolæ ſufflamine repreſſum audio in præſens perſecutorum fervorem. Si quid de hac re amplius inter Mennonitas veſtros tibi innotuerit, fac nos certiores. Vale, vir optime, cum integra tua familia: ſic animitus opto,

Rotterd. 24 Nov. 1688.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimus,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

QUOD imprimis hinc decedens deſideravi, ut ſcil. te, vir ampliſſime, reliquoſque amicos Amſtelodamenſes amplecti daretur, in eo omnia quaſi deditâ operâ mihi maxime adverſari videntur. Primo glacies & feſtinatio, deinde in ipſo itinere pluvia intercepit. Die enim ſabbati ultimo hinc Hagam profecturum, ut tibi nobilem fœminam ad Amſtelodamum etiam cogitantem compellarem, imber ſatis violentus me Delphos tranſeuntem perfudit quod incommodum Hagæ etiam paſſus ſum. Ita totus madidus acceſſi ad illam, quæ nocturnum illud iter, quo ad vos ea nocte perrecturus eram, tanquam ſanitati meæ nimis periculoſum non diſſuaſit ſolum ſed & prohibuit. Sic pluvia illa quæ jam à duobus menſibus pene unica, quaſi deſignato unius dieculæ vobiſcum ſpem, qua hinc geſtiens deceſſi, prorſus abſtulit. In aula omnia tam parata ad abitum, tam moræ impatientia inveni, ut primo favente vento principem claſſem conſcenſurum nemo dubitet. Iſtud deſtinatum iter ad vos incepi, non tam vento, quam principis religioni confiſus, quam vix credidi die dominica velle iter ingredi, etiamſi ventus orientalis invitaret; ſed jam nihil aliud expectatur, quam ventus navigationi idoneus, quo ſimul ad naves convolandum erit. Heri veſperi huc redii, & quamdiu hic langueſcendum ſit neſcio; hoc certo ſcio, nihil moleſtius eſſe quam ad faſtidium uſque laborare otio, & tamen ad id, quod maxime velles, tempus non ſuppetere. Quam vellem mihi dare apud vos horam unam, vel alteram! Vultus, ſermo, amplexus amicorum neſcio quid habent, quo ſe explere anima mea anxie deſiderat. Quo vos in me ſitis animo, quo ego in vos nullum credo eſt dubium, nec augeri poſſet mutua noſtrûm amicitia

tia valedicentium alloquio opto tamen videre, dextras jungere ac me iterum vobis totum tradere, cujus totus ſum. Hoc ſi mihi jam non conceſſum fuerit, alias ſpero futurum: non enim de me tam male ominor, ut nullam credam fore diem, quæ nos iterum conjungat. Multa ſunt, quæ hanc navigandi occaſionem non mihi omittendam ſuadent: amicorum expectatio, res meæ privatæ jam per aliquot annos neglectæ, piratarum frequentia, & parum tutus alias tranſitus, & nobiliſſimæ fœminæ, ſive cura, ſive amicitia, qua cum iturus ſum. Velim hoc tibi perſuadeas, me hic aliam patriam reperiſſe & pene dixeram parentes. Quod enim in illo nomine cariſſimum eſt, benevolentiam, amorem, charitatem, quæ ad conciliandos homines conjungendoſque fortiora ſanguine habent vincula, apud vos abunde expertus ſum. Habeo hic amicos ſemper mihi colendos, imo & inviſendos, ſi res & dies patiatur. Hoc certò ſcio, quod decedo cum animo revertendi ut cum illis ſolidum aliquando & illibatum capiam gaudium, quorum humanitate effectum eſt, ut à meis, abſens & in communi omnium mœrore nullam ſentirem animi ægritudinem. Te quod attinet (vir omnium optime, amiciſſime, dilectiſſime) cum tuam cogito doctrinam, animum, mores, candorem, ſuavitatem, amicitiam, ſatis in te uno reperi (ut cæteros taceam) quo mihi ſemper gratulari potero optime locatam & fructuoſiſſimam aliquot annorum apud vos moram: nec ſcio an aliquod mea vita tempus æque jucundum habitura ſit, certe magis proficuum nondum habuit. Deus O. M. te omni felicitatum genere cumulatum, familiam, patriam incolumes conſervet & cuſtodiat, ut diu ſis eccleſiæ omnibus bonis utilis. De meo erga te animo qualis jam ſit, qualis futurus ſit, nihil addam, cum meum ſpero amorem non magis mihi notum & certum eſſe quam tibi, cujus in me amicitiam tot beneficiis teſtatam habeo, ut quicquid de ea literis tuis jucundiſſimis dicas, jam jam penitus perſuaſo facile perſuadebis. Optimæ tuæ uxori liberiſque, Veeniis, Guenelloniſque omnibus plurimam ſalutem dicas; te mihi apud illos advocatum & patronum relinquo, ne quid gravius ſtatuant in hominem tot beneficiis devinctum, ſi non fugientem, minus urbane certe, quam oportuit, valedicentem. Sed ita ſunt fere res humanæ, ut nihil præter voluntatem in noſtra ſit poteſtate, ea totus ad eos feror, ea ſingulos amplector, quæ mihi nunquam ad beneficiorum memoriam, ad grati animi confeſſionem defutura eſt. Vale, vir colendiſſime, & me, ut facis, ama

Rotterd. 16 Feb. 1689.

Tui in perpetuum amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

VEREOR ne nomine negligentiæ tibi ſuſpectus ſim, quod tam diuturno utor ſilentio, quod nec tuis meritis, nec meæ voluntati nec noſtræ denique amicitiæ omnino convenit. Scias velim me cum ſolo non animum

animum mutâſſe qui tibi idem qui olim eſt, & ubicunque terrarum fuero, idem futurus eſt amoris & reverentiæ plenus. Sed à meo in patriam reditu, amicorum vel inviſentium, vel viſendorum conſuetudo, vel rerum mearum hinc inde diſperſarum ad præſentem uſum quærendi & colligendi labor, vel aliqualis ad remp. (abſit verbo invidia) ſi non acceſſio, ſaltem ne privatum otium publicis negotiis commutarem, cura & excuſatio, & quod graviſſimum omnium eſt, maligno hujus urbis fumo labefactata valetudo ita me occupatum tenuit, ut vix momentum mihi vacui temporis relictum fuerit, ex quo primum huc appulerim. Prima, qua in terram deſcendi, hora, ad D^m^ Guenellonem, feſtinante calamo & vernacula lingua, inter ſalutantium turbam ſcripſi, ut per eum te, cæteroſque amicos meos Amſtelodamenſes, ſalutarem. Quicquid enim lætum jucundumque hic reperi me monuit aliquid illic relictum eſſe, quod non cum minore voluptate recordarer, quam quo hic oculis uſurparem. Burnetus Epiſcopus Saliſburienſis deſignatur. In parliamento de tolerantia jam agi cœptum eſt ſub duplice titulo, Comprehenſio ſcil. & Indulgentia. Prima eccleſiæ pomœria extendenda ſignificat, ut ablata cæremoniarum parte plures comprehendat. Altera tolerantiam ſignificat eorum qui, oblatis conditiouibus eccleſiæ Anglicanæ, ſe unire vel nolunt vel non poſſunt. Quam laxa vel ſtricta hæc futura ſint, vix dum ſcio, hoc ſaltem ſentio, clerum epiſcopalem his aliiſque rebus, quæ hic aguntur, non multum favere, an cum ſuo vel reip. commodo, ipſi videant. De ſolutione, de qua ad te ante diſceſſum ſcripſi, expecto à te aliquid quotidie. Vale, & me, ut facis, ama

Lond. 12 March, 1689. Tui amantiſſimum, J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir doctiſſime,

TOLERANTIAM apud nos jam tandem lege ſtabilitam te ante hæc audiiſſe, nullus dubito. Non ea forſan latitudine, qua tu & tui ſimiles veri & ſine ambitione vel invidia chriſtiani, optarent. Sed aliquid eſt prodire tenus. His initiis jacta ſpero ſunt libertatis & pacis fundamenta quibus ſtabilienda olim erit Chriſti eccleſia. Nulli à cultu ſuo penitus excluduntur, nec pœnis objiciuntur, niſi Romani, ſi modo juramentum fidelitatis præſtare velint, & renuntiare tranſubſtantiationi & quibuſdam dogmatibus eccleſiæ Romanæ. De juramento autem Quakeris diſpenſatum eſt; nec illis obtruſa fuiſſet malo exemplo, illa quam in lege videbis confeſſio fidei, ſi aliqui eorum iſtam fidei confeſſionem non obtuliſſent, quod imprudens factum multi inter illos & cordatiores valde dolent. Gratias tibi ago pro exemplaribus tractatus de tolerantia & pace eccleſiaſtica, quæ mihi miſiſti, compacta recte accepi, incompacta nondum ad manus

manus meas pervenerunt. In vertendo de tolerantia libello aliquem Anglum jam jam occupatum intelligo. Opinionem illam pacis & probitatis fotricem ubique obtinere optarem. Acta inquiſitionis jam pene deſcripta gaudeo, uti ſpero brevi proditura, opus utile & expectatum. Legem de tolerantia ſancitam ad D^m le Clerc miſi, quo interprete intelliges quouſque extenditur hæc libertas. Vale & me ama

Lond. 6 Jun. 1689.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

PRIORES tuas intercidiſſe valde doleo, nihil enim à te proficiſci poteſt quod mihi, uti convenit, non ſit valde carum. Noviſſimas tuas 29 Maii datas, amore & benevolentia uſitata plenas, accepiſſe lætor, quod tuæ tuorumque valetudinis me certiorem faciunt. S^ti Officii hiſtoriam oſcitantia bibliopolæ in ipſo partu ita hærere doleo. Prolegomena tua D^a Cudwortha & ego valde probamus, & capitum indicem, quem tam amice promittis, avide expectamus, ut iſta ſciagraphia operis tui ſtructuram prælibemus, interim optantes, ut quam citiſſime integrum volumen Chriſtiano orbi maxime proficuum, & pene dixeram hoc tempore neceſſarium, prodeat. Illic enim fons omnis perſecutionis, ſub prætextu religionis, illic fundamentum tyrannidis eccleſiaſticæ, quam minores ſectæ eo exemplo animatæ prædicant, affectantque. Sed quo tendat, quas tragœdias ubique, quando parum adoleverit, editura ſit eo in ſpeculo, qui ſibi oculos non eruunt, facile videbunt. Ejus lectionem ſibi & utiliſſimam & jucundiſſimam fore ſpondet D^a Cudwortha, quæ paternæ benignitatis hæres omnem de rebus religionis perſecutionem maximè averſatur. Gratulatur ſibi ſe in partem amicitiæ, qua patrem amplexus es, ſucceſſiſſe; te officioſiſſime ſalutat, plurimum æſtimat & veneratur, unumque hoc dolet, quod non utatur lingua utrique communi, ut ex commercio literarum amicitiæ & eruditionis tuæ, quem optaret, fructum perciperet.

HISTORIAM tuam de ſurda loquente duplici exemplo hic apud nos confirmare poſſum. Duo juvenes, utrique ſurdi, quorum alter à doctore Wallis, celebri illo Oxonii matheſeos profeſſore, alter à doctore Holder theologo edoctus, loquelæ uſum didicit. Utrumque juvenem novi, & verba proferentem audivi, diſtincte ſatis & articulate, tonus ſolum vocis parum erat ingratus & inharmonicus. De altero quid factum ſit neſcio, alter adhuc vivit, legendi ſcribendique peritus, & à quo illum primo loquentem audivi (viginti enim & plures ſunt anni) uxorem duxit pater-

familias. Vir eſt ex generoſa proſapia nec diu eſt à quo illum viderim. Uxori liberiſque tuis, Veeniis Guenelloniſque & collegis noſtris plurimam ſalutem meo nomine dicas. Valè, vir ampliſſime, & me, ut facis, ama

Oates, 18 Jun. 1691.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUOD grandem tibi jamdiu deſtinaveram epiſtolam ideo accepiſti nullam. Quæſivi vacuum aliquod mihi tempus dari, ut tecum liberius & fuſius colloqui poſſem, & gratias agere pro ultima tua & amiciſſima epiſtola, cui jamdudum reſponſum oportuit. Sed neſcio quam rerum etiam non mearum importunitate ita mihi omne otium ſublatum eſt, ut ne propriis quidem & domeſticis negotiis vacare licuerit. Cave autem credas me publicis negotiis implicitum; nec valetudo, nec vires, nec rerum agendarum imperitia id patiuntur. Et cum mecum repetam, quid à tribus jam menſibus adeo impeditus egerim, incantamenti inſtar videtur, ut quiſque dies afferret negotiorum onus aliorum ex aliis naſcentium, quæ nec ſciens prævideram, nec cupiens evitare poteram.

INDICEM librorum & capitum hiſtoriæ Sᶜⁱ Officii, Domina Cudwortha & ego, legimus ſimul, magna cum voluptate. Hæc prælibatio magnum excitavit in utroque integri operis deſiderium, quod jam ſub prælo eſſe cum gaudio, à quodam Scoto, non ita pridem ex veſtra Batavia redeunte, accepi. Bonis cum avibus procedat opus chriſtiano orbi imprimis utile. Hoſpes mea, tyrannidi eccleſiaſticæ inimiciſſima, ſæpe mihi laudat ingenium & conſilium tuum, laboremque huic operi tam opportune impenſum; creditque fruſtra de religionis reformatione & evangelii propagatione tantum undique ſtrepitum moveri, dum tyrannis in eccleſia, vis in rebus religionis (uti paſſim mos eſt) aliis ſub nominibus, utcunque ſpecioſis, obtinet & laudatur. Quid tandem factum eſt cum Dʳᵉ iſto theologo, qui tam mira docuit de angelis, in libro ſuo, de ſpirituum exiſtentia*? an non expertus eſt fratrum ſuorum, pro religione, pro veritate, pro orthodoxia, zelum? mirum, ſi impune evadat. Apud nos prælum, quod video, nihil pene parturit, quod alieni cives ſcire, aut legere, multum deſiderabunt. Ita obſtrepunt undique arma, ut muſarum voces vix audiantur. Imo lis ipſa theologica jam conſopita magnam in partem conquieſcit, utinam cum animarum & partium concordia. Sed ea ſpes vana eſt, nec tam facile componuntur theologorum controverſiæ. Bene eſt, ſi incertas aliquando ferant inducias: ut mutua charitate ſanentur penitus quis expectabit? Magna mihi apud te excu-

* Balthaſar Bekker.

ſatione

ſatione opus eſt, ut tam diuturno ſilentio ignoſcas. Id tibi perſuadeas velim, hoc non alicui voluntatis alienationi, non decreſcenti & minus fervidæ amicitiæ tribuendum: te ut ſemper maxime æſtimo, amo, amplector, ſemperque amabo. Fac itidem ut facis, & me ama

Lond. 14 Nov. 1691.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

SI ex literarum tarditate de amicitia mea judicaveris, metuo ne me ſuſpiceris ad officia nimis ignavum, à quo me profiteor, cum res poſtulat, longè alienum. In hoc literarum commercio, ſi qua utor libertate, id plerumque evenit, cum ad eos ſcribendum ſit, quibus benevolentiam amicitiamque meam, re potius quam verbis, teſtatam fore mihi in animo eſt. Hoc an tu probaveris neſcio; ita ego tibi perſuaſum velim. Nemo enim omnium, qui te magis ſuſpicit, æſtimat, diligit, quam ego: id nunc facio & ſemper faciam.

NON placet Wetſtenii in edenda Sancti Officii hiſtoria cunctatio; hoc unicum in ea mora placet, quod te identidem relegente & ſub incudem ſæpius revocante, limatiorem perfectioremque habebimus. Hoc unum ut te moneam, jam occurrit, ſcil. alterum hujuſmodi volumen, duodecim circiter ab hinc annis, Monſpeſſulis extitiſſe, ab hoc diſtinctum; duo enim illic tunc erant hujuſmodi volumina.

ZELUS theologicus, uti video, ſemper & ubique idem eſt, eodemque modo procedit: quid tandem devenit paradoxorum ille de angelis auctor, ſcire cupio; ſi evaſit, mirum eſt, quanquam eò res inclinare videbatur, quo tempore ſcripſiſti, favente etiam Amſtelodamenſium prædicatorum deſidia, vix tamen veniam ei datam credo. Hujuſmodi orthodoxiæ propugnatores non ſolent errantibus ignoſcere. Preſbyteriani in Scotia quid agant, mallem ex aliis quam ex me ſcires. Zelus illic in frigido iſto aere per antiperiſtaſin incaleſcere videtur. Satis fervide diſciplinæ ſuæ operam dant, an ſatis prudenter, an ſatis modeſte, ipſi videant. Sed ubi cauſa Dei agitur, ut nôſti & ejus eccleſiæ, quid ſibi theologi non putant licere, autoritatem ſuam ſoli Deo acceptam referentes. D^m^ le Cene ſemel vidi Londini, ſed ſemel tantum, idque obiter, apud nobiliſſimum Boyleum, adeo ut ſermocinandi locus non eſſet, de rebus illius, vel amicis Amſtelodamenſibus; ab eo tempore parum Londini commoratus ſum, valetudini rure vacans, pulmones enim non ferunt fumum urbis. Epiſcopum illum, cui D^m^ le Cene commendaſti, credo pacis eccleſiaſticæ ſincere ſtudioſum. Solicitus ſum de valetudine Veenii noſtri, anguſto eſt pectore, & metuo pulmonibus ejus, metuo etiam ne praxi continuæ jam

à multis annis assuetus, rure otio intabescat. Opto illi diuturnam & validam, jucundamque senectam, multum illi debeo, quod semper gratus agnoscam. Recte facis quod persecutionem religionis ergo in pontificiis solum damnas. Si quam inter christianos sectam feligas, cujus crudelitatem insecteris à reliquis, laudaberis, quanquam persecutio ubique eadem est & plane pontificia. Quælibet enim ecclesia sibi verbis arrogat Orthodoxiam, re infallibilitatem. Dª Cudwortha te omni humanitate & æstimatione resalutat. Saluta quæso uxorem, familiamque tuam, Veenium, Guenellonem, omnemque istam stirpem officiosissime, meo nomine. Vale, Vir colendissime, & me, ut facis, ama,

Oates, 29 Feb. 1692.

Tui amantissimum,
J. LOCKE.

DE miraculis post Apostolorum tempora certiorem fieri cupio. Non ego satis versatus in historia ecclesiastica, ut quid de iis statuam, nôrim. Rogo igitur obnixè, nam mea interest scire, an post apostolorum tempora edita fuerint, in ecclesia christiana, miracula, quibus auctoribus & qua fide memoriæ tradita, quam frequentia, & an ad Constantini imperium, vel diutius, duraverint, & quis fuit ille Thaumaturgus, & quid ab eo actum est, cujus tam speciosa appellatio ad nos pervenit. Non quæro miraculorum, quæ in scriptoribus ecclesiasticis memorantur, catalogum: sed an constat, ex fide dignis historicis, fuisse vera miracula, an raro vel sæpius edita, & quamdiu donum illud ecclesiæ concessum.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir amplissime,

AB acceptis tuis 27 Junii datis, ad urbem accedens hodie primum Archiepiscopum conveni. Quamprimum tuum audivit nomen, agnovit acceptam à te contra Judæum disputationem, excusavit silentium, quod ob valetudinem, oculorum debilitatem, & alia quæ intervenerunt impedimenta, integram nondum perlegerat. Laudavit maxime illud opus, unà cum authore, & gratias, quas nondum egit, se habere agnovit. Historiam Sancti Officii jam valde opportunam judicavit. Capitum indicem summa cum voluptate & approbatione perlegit, & cum tuum de dedicatione consilium aperuissem, ea verborum urbanitate & honore, eo vultu accepit; ut, si adfuisses, hoc sibi non ingratum fore certus esses. Mitte igitur quamprimum dedicationem, novi viri modestiam, & laudo consilium tuum, quod prælectam ab eo prius velis quam editam. Illi monstrabo, quod scio honori ducet, & si quid mutandum videtur, indicabo. Interim dixit se habere librum, Lusitaniæ editum, de quodam actu Inquisitionis in Lusitania, in cujus exordio occurrunt paparum bullæ, aliaque diplomata, quibus potestas Sancti Officii concessa & stabilita est,

accuratius collecta. Nomen authoris non retinebat memoria, & liber ipſe, illius bibliotheca nondum in ordinem redacta, ab ipſo quæſitus, non repertus eſt. Volumen eſt, ut aiunt, in 8vo. Brevi ipſum iterum reviſam, eam curam cuidam domeſticorum mandabit, ut ante reditum meum præſto ſit liber. Tunc tibi nomen authoris præſcribam, & ſi nondum videris ipſum librum, tibi mutuo commodabit reverendiſſimus archiepiſcopus. Grævium, Guenellonem, Veenioſque omnes meo nomine ſaluta. Clerico noſtro, quem officioſiſſime ſaluto, ante aliquot ſeptimanas, an menſes dicam, ſcripſi; an pervenerint ad illum literæ meæ, ignoro; nam ab iſto tempore nihil ab eo accepi. Hoc quæſo illi indices, ne me tarditatis, ſi mea interciderit epiſtola, ſuſpicetur. Fœminam tuam dilectiſſimam liberoſque ſummo cum affectu ſaluto. Vale, vir digniſſime, &, ut facis, me ama,

Lond. 30 Jun. 1692.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

DE adventu librorum tuorum certior factus, qua potui feſtinatione Londinum me contuli, ut quæ tu de iis juſſeras præſens curarem. Archiepiſcopus quamprimum acceſſeram, maximas ſe tibi gratias habere profeſſus eſt, opus ſibi perplacere, ſeque à libri tui lectione, hoc etiam tempore negotiis maximis occupatiſſimo, abſtinere non poſſe: ſed magnam ejus partem ſumma cum voluptate ex quo accepit, percurriſſe. Verum quo animo accepit, legit, laudavit, tunc demum rectius intelliges ex ipſius verbis, cum ad te deſtinatas literas ſcribere vacaverit. Epiſcopus Saliſburienſis multa & his ſimilia mihi dixit, & ſe adeo detentum immerſumque eſſe argumento libri tui (quo hiſtoriam inquiſitionis, ultra quam expectari poterat, dilucidam accuratamque tradidiſti) ut ad te ſcribere, donec totum pervolverit, non potuerit; ſe interim gratias tibi ampliſſimas reddere. Comes Pembrokienſis multa de te cum laude, & pro munere tuo per me gratias agi juſſit, donec ipſe ſua manu agnoſcet acceptiſſimum à te beneficium. Bathonienſem & Wellenſem epiſcopum in domo procerum quæſivi, ſed non aderat: cumque extra urbem habitet, hora una vel altera à meo hoſpitio, eum in tam brevi mora convenire non poteram. Tuum autem librum illi traditum, uti reliquis omnibus, certo ſcio. Cæterum curavi ut D^us Clarke communis noſter amicus eum adeat, ut excuſet librum incompactum à te miſſum, quod ego reliquis quibus opus fuit feci, quanquam non omnino opus fuit. Mireris jam merito cur ego, qui non minus meo, quam horum virorum, nomine, gratias agere deberem, tantus ceſſator eſſem, ubi feſtinandum potius eſſet, ut neglecta proprioris loci commoditate, rus huc commigrarem, antequam ad te darem literas. Dicam

quod res eſt; ſanus urbem adii, ſed unius dieculæ mora adeo mihi mutata eſt valetudo, ut reſpirare vix potuerim. Ingraveſcebat quotidie malum, & tam cito me urbe expulit, ut neglecta maxima rerum illic agendarum parte aufugere neceſſe eſſet.

LIBRUM tuum huc mecum attuli, ut tuo beneficio Dna. Cudwortha & ego habeamus hac hyeme noctes Atticas, quas nihil tam augere poterat, quam authoris præſentia, & quos ſecum ſemper adfert, ſales Attici. Ego huc die Saturni reverſus ſum; hodie libri tui lectionem inchoandam, qua ſpe, qua voluptate, facile dijudicare potes, ſed credas velim quas tibi habeo gratias non eſſe minores. Ex tuis 10 Octob. datis, quamprimum mihi innotuit quot & quibus huc deſtinaveras exemplaria, egi cum hoſpite meo & bibliopola Smith, ut ſingula ſingulis quam ociſſime traderentur, antequam liber uſpiam apud nos proſtaret venalis, quod diligentiſſime factum eſt; nec ea in parte interiit aliqua tam eximii & tam opportuni operis gratia. Sed quid tandem ſtatuendum eſt de MS. codice autographo, quod ego in tutiſſimo aliquo loco inter archiva reponendum ſuaderem, ut in perpetuum ..... effrontes adverſarios faciat fidem. Quinam vero is ſit locus tutiſſimus libenter tecum inquirerem.

EPISCOPII vitam tua manu æternitati conſecrandam gaudeo: ſed qua lingua? cum enim præfigendam eam concionibus illius Belgicis (ut reor) jam prodituris, metuo ne illius quoque hiſtoria prodeat, etiam in lingua mihi minus familiari. Gratulor tamen erudito orbi hæc tam docti tam eximii viri monumenta, cujus omnes lucubrationes ab interitu conſervandæ.

JAM apud nos prodiit Joannes Malela Antiochenus, quem diu & anxie petivit amicus meus Toinardus. Rogo igitur ut cum Weſtenio agas, ut quamprimum aliqua illius libri exemplaria ad illius manus pervenerint (quod ſcio maturius futurum, quam ſi ego unum hinc ad eum Amſtelodamum mittere vellem) unum ad Toinardum quam citiſſime tranſmittendum curabit, pretiumque meis rationibus adſcribat, quod ego ſolvam. Malela author eſt nec magni nominis nec fidei. Sed in dubio aliquo chronologico ſe lucem inde mutuaturum ſperavit Toinardus, & cupio ego maxime illius inſervire deſiderio; igitur rogo ut hanc rem cures ut mihi gratiſſimam.

DE Palinodia, quam ſcripſiſti, in noviſſimis tuis 7 Nov. gratias ago maximas. Eodem tenore & ubique proceditur. Habeo enim de Gallis apud nos, quod poſſit ferre ſecundas, imo quod ſuperat omnibus bene trutinatis. Sed de his alias ſi cupias, jam enim nimis turgeſcit pagina.

CLERICO noſtro ante 15, Guenelloni ante 10 dies ſcripſi. Spero jam omnia pacata & amice compoſita in iſta familia, cui omnino omnia bona opto. Hos cæteroſque meos omnes, imprimis optimam tuam uxorem liberoſque, quæſo, meo nomine officioſiſſime ſalutes, & me, ut facis, ama.

Oates, 28 Nov. 1692.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S.P.D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUAMPRIMUM ad urbem acceſſi nudiuſtertius, reverendiſſimus archiepiſcopus me ad ſe vocari curavit, & ut conveni, de te & libro tuo multa cum laude præfatus, tandem dixit ſe ad te ſcripſiſſe negotiorum multitudine hactenus impeditus, paratamque epiſtolam ſigillo muniens mihi in manus tradidit, ut inſcriptione, illo dictante, mea manu exarata, tibi tranſmittendam curarem, quod libens ſuſcepi. Inſuper mihi tradidit libellum concionum nuper à ſe editarum, ut etiam ad te illum tranſmitterem, quod itidem diligenter curabo, & quamprimum hinc ad vos proficiſcentem quempiam invenero ei tradam ad te perferendum. Hactenus de archiepiſcopi mandatis. Ad me quod attinet multas tibi & habeo & refero gratias pro ea, quam ex hiſtoriæ tuæ lectione percepi voluptate. Illud credo exhauſiſti argumentum; certe illud myſterium iniquitatis mundo palam expoſuiſti, è tenebris in lucem protractum. Multarum rerum importuno impeditus interventu nondum integram perlegi, poſt brevem ac in urbe moram rus reverſurus, pergam porro ut ſatisfaciam ei quod in me excitâſti deſiderio. Noviſſimis tuis literis mihi pro more gratiſſimis reſponſum, hac in charta expectare non debes. Feſtinans ad urbem eas rure reliqui, illuc cum rediero, ad otii & quetis receſſus, opportunior dabitur tecum colloquendi occaſio, hic vix reſpirandi mihi conceditur facultas. Interim amicitiam humanitatemque tuam conſuetam agnoſco. Te maximo cum affectu ſaluto, tuoſque omnes, imprimis dilectiſſimam conjugem, liberoſque Veenios, Guenelloneſque noſtros, omniaque tibi proſpera & felicia precor. Vale & me, ut facis, ama,

Lond. 10. Jan. 1692-3. Tui amantiſſimum, J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

JUSTE meum à te reprehendi ſilentium libens fateor, nec ſi ſeveriore manu delinquentem correxiſſes, queri poſſim. Etſi enim pudet me adeo tardum fuiſſe ad officia, ut non niſi bis monitus excitarer: gaudeo tamen me tanti apud te fuiſſe, ut me primis vocibus male reſpondentem, iterum tentandum arbitrareris: excuſatione valetudinis, quam ipſe tibi pro me ſuggeſſiſti, uti non poſſum. Gratias enim Deo, ex quo ad te ultimas dedi, recte ſatis pro more meo valui, nec tamen ſine omni cauſa à ſcribendo abſtinui. Maximam partem libri tui ſumma cum voluptate perlegeram, progredi mihi in animo erat, et ad finem uſque pervolvere, ut de toto opere, à capite ad calcem perſpecto, eas quas poſſem gratias laudeſque redderem. Non multum aberam à fine libri, & pauca illa

illa capita, quæ mihi reſtabant legenda, ſpem quotidie fecerunt, intra paucos dies potuiſſe abſolvi. Sed ſic negotiorum & inviſentium ſeries, dum nova & inexpectata continuato ordine ſe invicem exciperent, me de die in diem protraxerunt & adhuc protraxiſſent, niſi noviſſimæ tuæ tam amica objurgatione, labentis temporis immemorem, primiſque cogitationibus indormientem excitâſſent. En habes fatentem reum, negligentem agnoſco; ſed eo conſilio, eo animo negligentem, quem culpare vix poſſis: aut ſi qua fuerit culpa, ei ſpei toties deceptæ forte fuit (amicitiæ certe non fuit) quam eandem, quæ erga te ſemper fuit, nec minime, dum ego tacerem, ſiluiſſe profiteri geſtio. Hiſtoria tua inquiſitionis, ut de ea parte quam legi libri pronuntiem, mihi maxime placet: ordine, methodo, perſpicuitate, teſtium fide mihi plane videtur opus abſolutiſſimum, nec video quid in eo deſiderari poſſit. Et ab omnibus, quotquot conſulere contigit, maxime laudatur. Clericum noſtrum nullas à me jam a pluribus hebdomadis (ut ſcribis) accepiſſe doleo; ſcripſi enim ad eum, ante duos circiter menſes, iis incluſas à Comite Pembrokienſi ad illum miſi literas, quas intercidiſſe vereor, quandoquidem D^us^ Clericus in noviſſimis ſuis 11 Septemb. datis de iis ne verbum quidem. Me illum de Spenceri obitu monuiſſe recte memini, & credo ea in epiſtola, quandoquidem tu id hactenus ignorare videris. Bibliorum Caſtellionis editionem, qualem tu narras, apud vos deſignari valde lætor, & viris literatis apud nos gratum acceptumque fore opus, non dubito: Poſt diuturnam ruſticationem nuperus meus in urbem reditus nondum mihi conceſſit plurimorum doctorum colloquia; prout datur occaſio, alios conſulam, quamvis vix credi poteſt elegantem editionem, tam elegantis verſionis notis etiam aliiſque ſcriptis eo ſpectantibus tam docti viri ornatam, non omnibus non placituram. Filiam tuam dilectiſſimam, quam febre continua laborâſſe ſcripſeras, tibi ſuiſque ſanam ſalvamque reſtitutam ſpero, reliquos tuos noſtroſque recte valere gaudeo. Eos omnes, quotquot ſunt, meo nomine, rogo, quam officioſiſſime ſalutes, quibus diuturnam ſanitatem & proſpera omnia largiatur Deus optimus maximus; te imprimis ſoſpitet. Vale, & ut facis perge me amare,

Lond. 10 Nov. 1693. Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

QUALEM te, Vir ſpectatiſſime, ſemper crediderim, talem re ipſa experior, ad omnia infucatiæ amicitiæ officia natum, qui non ſolum pronus in beneficia bene merendi, nullam prætermittis occaſionem, ſed, quod difficilius eſt, eadem facilitate ignoſcis amicorum delictis, qua alii offenſiones objurgant. Diuturnum meum ſilentium graviori reprehenſione dignum, ſimulac tardas tandem à me literas acceperis, quaſi prima vocula

vocula penitus deletum condonas. Agnoſco beneficium candoremque illum tuum, quo tuis, quo omnibus gratus, in quo me tuto repono: dum non ex literis amicitiam meam æſtimas, nec ſilentio imminutam ſuſpicatus fueris. Id enim tibi perſuaſum vellem, tempus mihi & verba deeſſe poſſe, amicitiam, qua te amplector, qua ſemper amplexurus ſum, mihi deeſſe vel labefactari nunquam poſſe.

IN hiſtoria tua inquiſitionis, ex quo noviſſime ad te dedi literas, non magnos progreſſus feci, quotidianis negotiis hactenus impeditus. Quod ſi ex duobus primis libris, quos ſumma cum voluptate perlegi, de duobus reliquis judicare licet, nihil poteſt eſſe in eo genere perfectius, nec ad perfectum illius tribunalis cognitionem aliquid deſiderari poteſt. Laudo ſtudium tuum, quod pleriſque in locis ipſa authorum verba citaveris, etſi nihil contineant quod tu breviore & elegantiore ſtylo exprimere non potuiſſes, ſi lectori placere unica eſſet cura. Sed cum quo genere hominum tibi res eſt, recte tecum reputâſti, & eorum crimina, fraudes & ſævitia ex eorum ipſorum ore optime diſcenda; vix enim credi poterant, ſi ab extraneo vel adverſario afferrentur. Quæ autem ex aliis hauſeris authoribus tam ſero, ut editioni inſeri ſuis apte in locis non potuerint, tuique in marginibus libri adſcripſeris, ea ſi nimis longa non ſint, ut tibi nimiam tranſcribendi creent moleſtiam, ſi mihi per otium excerpta tranſmittere velis, gratiſſimum mihi facies, ut meum etiam librum iis ornem, & ſuis omnibus numeris perfectum habeam, ut nihil deſit huic myſterio iniquitatis revelando. Literas tuas, per Hibernum illum tranſmiſſas, ille ſuis manibus rus huc ad me profectus mihi tradidit. Talem illum reperio, qualem tu deſcripſeris, nec deſunt hic tantæ ſpei fautores. Editionem illam Caſtellionis, quam meditantur elegantem, libens viderem, & noſtratibus gratam fore, nullus dubito. Quod de harmonia evangelica doctiſſimi mei Toinardi ad me ſcribis, de editione illius ego quidem nunquam cogitavi, nec quod amplius eſt, unquam cogitabo, niſi ut ipſum authorem ad opus ſuum luce digniſſimum edendum, qua data occaſione, & quantum poſſum, impellam & inſtigem. Non quod ego hunc theſaurum literato orbi invideam; ego ſumma ope, donec commercio literarum uti licuit, editionem ejus ſemper efflagitavi. Sed non ea (ut mihi viſum eſt) fide mihi concreditum eſt hoc exemplar, ut ego harmoniam hanc, illo inſcio aut inconſulto, typis mandarem. Si mihi integrum eſſet, ſtatim ſub prælo mitterem, ſed dum ille vivit, aut aliunde à ſuis ſpes eſt proditurum, nulla quantivis pretii mercede è meis manibus in publicum elabi patiar. Nuper prodiit hic liber, quem Toinardo gratiſſimum fore ſcio. Si reperire poſſis viam, qua ad illum tranſmitti poteſt, mihi feceris acceptiſſimum beneficium. Liber quem ad illum mittere vellem, eſt Joannes Mallela Antiochenus, Oxonii non ita pridem editus. Si occaſionem mittendi reperias, emptum apud vos librum, ſive compactum ſive incompactum, prout commodiſſimum erit vecturæ, quæſo ad illum mittas, à Monſieur Toinard à Orléans. Gaudio Veenium noſtrum ſanum ſalvumque in urbem & ad praxin rediiſſe. Vir, qui in artis ſuæ exercitatione à juventute uſque conſenuerat, continui tædio otii, credo, langueſceret.

Illum

Illum & Guenellonem noſtrum uxoreſque cum tota familia, quæſo meo nomine officiociſſime ſalutes. Pacem, concordiam, & amicitiam inter eos ſtabilitam ſpero, omnia fauſta, uti par eſt, illis & tibi tuiſque opto. Salutes etiam rogo optimam fœminam tuam, liberoſque, quos ſanos ſalvoſque tibi Deus diu conſervet. Vale, vir humaniſſime, &, ut facis, me ama,

Oates, 13 Jan. 1694.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir colendiſſime,

ETSI meam in ſcribendo tarditatem prorſus excuſare nequeam, me tamen eo proceſſiſſe negligentiæ, ut per totos novem menſes te inſalutatum præterirem nolim credas. Diuturnum nimis ſilentium haud invitus fateor, quod cum nec literarum tuarum ſatietas, nec imminuta erga te voluntas mea effecerit, facilem apud te veniam inventurum ſpero. Puduit ſane ad te iterum ſcribere, antequam, opere tuo penitus perlecto, meam de eo ſententiam ſive potius gratulationem potuerim perſcribere. Quantum voluptatis, quantum lucis ex accurata tua Inquiſitionis hiſtoria perceperim, vix dicere poſſum. Ita ſcripta eſt, ut decet hiſtoriam ſcribi, ubi non ad faſtum aut delectationem inventa, vel ornata res eſt, quo facilius incautis lectoribus fucum faciat, ſed omnia authorum fide & documentorum teſtimoniis rata & ſuffulta ſunt: adeo ut quorum maxime intereſt redarguere, ne hiſcere quidem audeant. Opus illud tenebrarum & occultas nefandæ crudelitatis artes in tam claram lucem ex latibulis ſuis protraxiſti, ut ſi qua reſtarent in iſtis eccleſiæ, ſive potius Antichriſti, ſatellitibus, humanitatis veſtigia, puderet illos tandem tam iniqui, tam horrendi tribunalis, ubi omne jus, fas, & juſtitia ſuſque deque habetur. Verum ſi hæc opprobria, quæ refelli non poſſunt, nihil illos moveant, reformatis ſaltem & ex ſæviſſimo hoc ergaſtulo ereptis, animos addet, contra tam inhumanam tyrannidem, quacunque ſpecie ſive religionis ſive concordiæ, irrepere iterum conantem. Ea eſt diſputantium ſæpe contentio, ea argumentorum ſubtilitas & longa ſeries, ut non ſit uniuſcujuſque ſe argutis & fallaciis innodatum expedire, & de ſumma controverſiæ judicare. Si quis vero è plebe indoctus tuam perlegat hiſtoriam, ſentiat ſtatim illic certe deeſſe religionem, charitatem, juſtitiam, ubi violata æquitatis regula, omnique juris dicendi per orbem terrarum methodo, tam inhumana, tam crudelia perpetrantur, & ab evangelii genio remotiſſima: ideoque dignum opus exiſtimo, quod in cujuſque gentis linguam vulgarem traducatur, tam diſtincta enim & exacta methodo omnia tradidiſti, & teſtibus exceptione majoribus confirmâſti, ut nihil in eo deſiderari videatur, quod vulgus erudiat, literatos inſtruat, omneſque ſtabiliat. Si quid forte tibi, uti mones, occurrat, ad hoc argumentum pertinens, ex libris ante editam hiſtoriam tuam non viſis, rogo ut per otium, ſi non

ſit

ſit nimis operoſum, ad me velis tranſmittere; omnia enim huc facientia in librum tuum ad marginem, aptis in locis adſcripta, conjicere animus eſt, uti nuper ex itinerario in orientem hoc quod ſequitur excerptum, paginæ 276. libri tui inſerui:

LE St. Office, ce redoutable tribunal fameux par ſes injuſtices, & ſes cruautés, regne ici [à Malthe] plus tyranniquement qu'à Rome même, & on m'a fait cent funeſtes recits, donc je vous épargnerai la triſteſſe, ſeulement vous dirai-je, que les confeſſeurs, qui par tout ailleurs ſont tenus de garder le ſecret ſur peine de feu, ſont ici dans l'obligation de les réveler toutes les fois qu'il s'agit d'un cas d'Inquiſition, quoiqu'ils ne l'avoüent pas, car ce ſeroit le moyen d'empêcher les gens de ſe confeſſer: mais c'eſt une choſe qu'on ſçait pourtant bien. Cependant pour en ôter tout ſoupçon, on demeure quelquefois un an ou deux ſans dire mot après quoi l'Inquiſiteur envoye prendre un homme, & lui demande s'il ſçait bien pourquoi il l'a fait ſaiſir, alors c'eſt à lui de ſe reſſouvenir de tout ce qu'il peut jamais avoir dit; que ſi malheureuſement la memoire ne lui fournit pas, ou que le délit, dont il eſt coupable, ait été ſi ſecret que le ſeul confeſſeur en ait eu connoiſſance, & que ſe repoſant là-deſſus il ne veuille pas avoüer c'eſt fait de cet homme-là, on l'étrangle dans la priſon, & puis quelque tems après on dit à ſes parens qu'il n'eſt pas beſoin de lui porter à manger. Heureux ſont ceux qui ne ſont point aſſuejettis à ce joug. Du Mont nouveau voyage au Levant $\frac{158}{475}$. imprimé en 12° à la Haye, 1695.

QUAS minatus es prolixiores literas avide expecto, & ſi ſic ulciſcaris ſilentium meum, quomodo remuneraberis diligentiam? Theologiam tuam tam brevi iterum produturam gaudeo, pauca in ea emendanda facile crediderim; quanta quanta addideris, ex eodem erunt fonte, & augebunt apud lectores pretium. In magna æſtimatione apud eccleſiæ Anglicanæ theologos ſcio. Quid in poſterum futurum ſit, neſcio, audio enim nonnullos Calviniſmum amplexuros, & prædeſtinationem (ſic inter illos convenit) palam ſcriptis propugnaturos. Quot & quales in partes ſuas pertrahet nova hæc paucorum & adhuc privata ſocietas, nondum conjicere licet. Latent omnia & ſecreto peraguntur, & ſi ex auctoribus, quorum nomina mihi amicus quidam ſecreto in aurem dixit, rem metiri libeat, non credo longe evaſurum, niſi aliunde oriatur hoc conſilium, alioſque habeat fautores. Si quid ultra privata aliquot inter ſe colloquia producat, hoc nonnullorum molimen dies indicabit, & tunc quid velint, quo tendant, rectius judicabimus. Sed hæc hactenus. Dolet certe tantam inter nos loci eſſe intercapedinem: ſi vicinus eſſem, haberes me conſultorem quotidie oſtia tua pulſantem. Pauci admodum ſunt limati judicii homines, quibuſcum poteris liberè de ſpeculationibus quibuſcunque, multo minus de rebus religionis diſſerere. Deeſt mutua charitas, deeſt candor, & ut ſuæ quiſque ignorantiæ velum obtendat, non facile

dat veniam alienæ. Nec dubia quæcunque licet proponere, niſi paratus venias te totum illis tradere, & in verba jurare, vel cenſuris onuſtus hæreticus abire. Non hoc de meipſo queror, tanquam aliquid paſſus ab iniquo amicorum judicio; ſed tamen jucundum eſt in proximo habere, quem de maximis minimiſque aperte & audacter conſulas. Libri mei de Intellectu Humano ſecunda editio diſtrahitur, celerius quam credere poſſem, nec adhuc invenit diſſertatio illa, utcunque heterodoxa, oppugnatorem. Utinam eo eſſet ſermone conſcripta, ut tuo uti, de univerſis eo in opere contentis, judicio liceret. Urgent aliqui verſionem, quærit traductorem bibliopola, & ſperat brevi repertum iri, nam mihi non vacat. Vix per valetudinem & ſuccreſcentia quotidie negotia licuit mihi, niſi lento gradu & interciſis temporibus, tuam perlegere hiſtoriam, quanquam legendi voluptas me vix patiebatur ingreſſum avelli. Bibliopola efflagitat, tamen, ut verſionem recenſere velim, ut ſi qua à meo ſenſu aberraverit corrigam, quod ſane vix recuſare poſſum. Sed quid his te tædio prolixioris epiſtolæ jam fatigatum detineo? Vale, &, ut facis, me ama,

Oates, 26 Oct. 1694.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

MAGNA cum voluptate tuas accepi & legi: etſi enim affectum erga me tuum nullatenus fuiſſe imminutum plene perſuaſus eſſem, nihilominus, poſt tam diuturnum ſilentium, literas tuas videre non potuit non eſſe gratiſſimum. Hiſtoriam meam inquiſitionis calculo tuo probari, eſt quod mihi gratulor. Scio judicium tuum eſſe candidum ac limatiſſimum. In præconiis vero quæ addis agnoſco propenſiſſimum tuum erga me affectum, qui omnia quæ probas vero majora tibi repræſentavit. Ego veritati litare ſtudui, & tribunal illud ita exhibere, prout ipſi doctores pontificii, imo inquiſitores id nobis depingunt. Scio quidem, quando ſparſim in ipſorum libris procedendi modus deſcribitur, & fucatis coloribus palliatur, non ita patere ejus injuſtitiam & fœditatem, quam quando omnia ſimul inter ſe connexa nude, ſine fuco, omnium oculis exponuntur. Non crediderim quenquam, ne quidem ex acerrimis inquiſitionis patronis, me malæ fidei inſimulaturum; & ſi quis id auſit, ſtatim autorum, quorum nomina margini paſſim adſcripſi, teſtimoniis redargui poterit. Sed quam diſpari fato libri prodeunt? Tu hiſtoriam meam dignam judicas, quæ in cujuſque gentis linguam vernaculam traducatur. Romæ vero, 19 die Maii, hujus anni, edicto cardinalium, in tota rep. chriſtiana inquiſitorum generalium, condemnata eſt, ejuſque lectio ſeveriſſime prohibita, ſub pœnis in indice librorum prohibitorum contentis. Decretum

hoc, quo & alii libri condemnantur, triduo poſt, videl. 22 Maii, fuit publicatum & affixum ad valvas baſilicæ principis apoſtolorum, palatii S. Officii, & in acie campi Floræ, ac aliis locis ſolitis & conſuetis urbis. Sed mitiorem ſententiam quis ab inquiſitione expectet, contra hiſtoriam, quæ artes ac crudelitates ipſius, quas occultas omnibuſque ignotas eſſe cupit, à tenebris erutas, palam totius mundi oculis exponit, tribunalque hoc non ſanctitate venerandum, ſed injuſtitia, crudelitate, fraudibus, & impoſturis execrandum exhibet? Aliter enim, ſi vere deſcribatur, exhiberi nequit. Quæ ego ex aliis autoribus, quos poſtmodum mihi videre contigit, annotavi, & quæ inpoſterum in aliis, qui forte mihi oſtendentur, reperiam, libentiſſime ad te mittam. Vidi quæ ex itinerario Du Mont annotâſti, quæ optime illo quem deſignâſti loco margini hiſtoriæ meæ adſcribi poſſunt. Sed, ut ingenue dicam, valde dubito, an narratio illius vera ſit. Malæ fidei ipſum neutiquam accuſo: ſed fieri facile poteſt, ut peregrinatores, non diu in regione aliqua commorantes, incidant in homines legum & conſuetudinum patriarum non admodum peritos, nonnunquam etiam mendaces, ex quorum ore quædam veritati minus conſentanea, ſine accuratiore inveſtigatione, annotant. Qualia multa in itinerariis eorum, qui patriæ noſtræ mores & conſuetudines deſcribunt, obſervavi. Ratio dubitandi eſt: quia video omnes doctores pontificios, necnon omnia decreta eccleſiaſtica ſolicite admodum urgere, arcana confeſſionis non eſſe patefacienda; imo ne hæreſin quidem ſub ſigillo confeſſionis revelatam; ſolummodo ſacerdotibus injungunt, ne hæreſin confeſſo abſolutionem impertiantur, ſed omnibus quas poſſunt rationibus hortentur, ut in judicio coram inquiſitoribus juridice confiteatur. Scio quidem, non omnia quæ legibus præcipiuntur, exacte in praxi inquiſitionis obſervari, & ſub ſpecioſo confeſſionis non revelandæ prætextu, ſimpliciores ineſcari poſſe, ut ingenue, etiam quæ inquiſitoribus ignota ſunt, confiteantur, quæ à ſacerdotibus porro inquiſitoribus revelari poſſunt, neque à tali impoſtura tribunalis illius ſanctitatem abhorrere credo; attamen, quia omnes ipſorum conſtitutiones, inſtructiones & leges, omnia illius eccleſiæ decreta contrarium præcipiunt, non id affirmare auſim, niſi autor ſit probatus, cujus nec peritia nec fides in dubium vocari queat. Quare loco, quem mihi ſuggeſſiſti, ex itinerario Du Mont, addi poſſet, ſi vera ſit illius narratio, exinde evidenter liquere inquiſitorum praxin ſæpe adverſari inquiſitionis inſtructionibus & legibus: inquiſitoreſque unice tantum ſpectare, qua ratione miſeros captivos per fas & nefas decipiant, atque ita, fraudibus irretitos, miſera morte perdant. Poſt haſce ſcriptas, triſtis me de ſubita optimi Archiepiſcopi Cantuarienſis morte nuntius non leviter perculit. Deſtinaveram ipſi Theologiæ meæ Chriſtianæ exemplar; pridie autem, antequam tradi potuerit, mortuus eſt. Eccleſiæ reformatæ tanto patrono, tam prudenti, perito, pacis amantiſſimo antiſtiti orbatæ, ſtatum doleo. Utinam Deus, qui potens eſt etiam è lapidibus Abrahæ filios excitare, alium nobis ſubſtituat, illi ſi non parem, quod vix ſperare auſim, tamen veſtigia ejus, quantum fieri poteſt, proxime prementem! Ille tibi

& dominæ Maſham vitam ad ſeros uſque annos producat. Vale, & me, ut facis, amare non deſine

Amſtelod. 12 Dec. 1694.

Tui amantiſſimum,

P. à LIMBOCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

LIBRUM tuum à bibliopola, & epiſtolam tuam 12 datam, recte accepi, utrumque gratiſſimum, & quia tuam, & quia à te. Epiſtolam tuam, à capite ad calcem, ſumma cum voluptate perlegi, gratulorque filiæ tuæ nuperæ talem illi obtigiſſe patrem, cui nec mens defuit, nec viſcera. Qualis inde fuit nonnullorum animus chriſtiano homini eſſet mirandum, niſi inter hujuſmodi zelotas chriſtianæ religionis diu verſatus eſſem. Sed ubique ejuſdem farinæ homines reperire eſt, qui an ſalutem quærant animarum, an evangelio quæſtum faciant, judicent alii; ego, quod doleam, quod indignor, hic, illic, undique video. Theologiam tuam Chriſtianam, quamprimum otium nactus fuero, diligentius perſcrutabor; his enim jam fere ſtudiis mihi vacandum cenſeo, tantoque impenſius me tibi vicinum jam opto, quod erepto nobis magno illo & candido veritatis indagatore (ut cæteras illius virtutes taceam) vix jam habeo, quem de dubiis theologicis libere poſſum conſulere. Quantum virum reſpublica Anglicana, quantum columen eccleſia reformata amiſerit, alii judicabunt. Ego certe à multis annis ſtabilem, candidum, ſincerum, ſummo meo cum damno & deſiderio, amiſi amicum. *Tillotſon*. V. *Birch*'s Life of him. p. 364. 1. ed.

ADDENDA tua ad Hiſtoriam Inquiſitionis, quamprimum rus rediero, locis ſuis inſeram, novum amicitiæ tuæ monumentum. Recte mones de excerptis ex itinerario Du Mont. Nec enim ut reliqui tui ſcriptores (qua uſus es cautione) pro teſte citari poteſt, tum quia reformatus, tum quia peregrinus. Ego vero illius verba non inidonea judicabam, quæ fidem facerent iſti, quæ ex tota pontificiorum œconomia enaſcitur; illos ſcil. quicquid præ ſe ferant, non omiſſuros tantam rei ſuæ bene gerendæ & hæreſeos extirpandæ occaſionem, quæ ex confeſſionibus poſſit oriri: nec aliter confeſſiones tacitas eſſe, ſi quid habeant momenti, quam ut laicis, & quibus non opus eſſet, non evulgarentur. Hæc ego raptim inter urbis negotia & laborantium pulmonum anhelitus, ut ſcires tua munera, quibus me tam magnifice cumulâſti, ad me ſalva perveniſſe. Si ita ſilentium meum ulciſcaris, dubitari poſſit, an non commodum fuerit peccare: ſcias enim velim de tuis epiſtolis, quod de Ciceronis orationibus jure dici poſſe, optimam eſſe quæ longiſſima eſt. Die Veneris noviſſimo ad urbem appuli, in hoſpitio meo inveni literas Clerici noſtri

tri 7 datas, quibus brevi reſponſurus ſum; interim rogo, ut illum Guenellonemque noſtrum meo nomine ſalutes; utrique gratias agam pro epiſtolis mea manu, ubi otium & ſolatium ruris nactus fuero, hic enim laborant pulmones, nec longam in urbe patietur valetudo mea moram. Uxorem tuam dilectiſſimam liberoſque, Veenium noſtrum optimamque uxorem illius ſaluto & Grævium Ultrajectenſem, cui ego debeo epiſtolam, & illius humanitati nondum reſpondiſſe pudet. Vale, & perge, ut facis, me amare,

Lond. 11 Dec. 1694.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

ULTIMAM meam epiſtolam recte ad manus tuas perveniſſe gaudeo. Autographum ſententiarum inquiſitionis Tholoſanæ Romani in manus meas incidiſſe mirantur: quod N. N. ſacerdos quidam ab epiſcopo Hollandiæ ad ipſum miſſus, ut libri poſſeſſorem ex ipſo reſciſcat, affirmavit. N. N. imprudenter me eum à Furlæo accepiſſe reſpondit: verum alium ejus eſſe poſſeſſorem, cujus nomen ignorabat; aiebatque librum à te olim viſum Monſpeliis. Ego dixi N. N. librum à te in Gallia viſum alium eſſe ab hoc. Addit ille, ſacerdotem rogâſſe, ut ex me nomen poſſeſſoris exquirat. Reſpondi ego, me nomen illius ignorare, illud ſemel me ex fratre ipſius audiviſſe, ſed penitus illius oblitum eſſe: & licet ſcirem inconſultum eſſe illud ſacerdoti indicare; quia hoc tam ſolicite inquiri judicem, ut poſſeſſore detecto, ingenti pretio exemplar hoc ſibi redimant, ac Romam mittant, ut ita occaſionem habeant me falſi accuſandi. Idem ſibi videri aiebat. Addidi ego, optâſſe me, ut nomen Furlæi non indicâſſet: ſed quoniam vox emiſſa reverti nequit, nihil ulterius eſſe aperiendum: ſed paucis tantum reſpondendum me poſſeſſoris nomen ignorare. Hoc in ſe ſuſcepit, ſed non recte ſervavit; nam ex fratre ſuo poſtea nomen hoc reſcivit, & proculdubio ſacerdoti indicavit. Nam à me rogatus, ſe neſcire ait, an indicaverit; affirmare ſe non poſſe, nec quod indicaverit, nec quod non indicaverit. Hoc certum eſt, nomen ſacerdoti innotuiſſe, quia alius poſtea Furlæum, ad quem hæc ſcripſeram, acceſſit, & poſſeſſorem nominavit, prout tibi Furlæus ſcripſit. Spero librum à te jam emptum, ac Furlæum illius eſſe poſſeſſorem. Ita omnes illorum conatus irriti erunt. Laudo ego Furlæi prudentiam, quod à ſacerdote teſtimonium de libri authenteia exegerit, & ſacerdotis candorem, qui id tamen luculenter dedit. Interim ſi forte exemplar ipſum nacti fuiſſent, & Romam miſiſſent, non video qua ratione volumen, quod edidi, ſuppoſititium dicere poſſent. Adeo enim ævum illud barbarum redolet, hiſtoriaſque ſingulares illius temporis refert, ut tale quid à quoquam nunc temporis fingi minime queat. Præſtat tamen

tamen id in manibus non esse illorum, quorum interest mysteria hæc iniquitatis tegi, & coram sole non propalari. Vides hic duo adhuc additamenta ad Historiam Inquisitionis epistolæ huic adscripta, quæ, si operæ pretium videatur, reliquis junges. Lutheranus quidam professor Kiloniensis, contra theologiam meam Christianam, exercitationes Anti-Limborchianas edidit. Ita Romæ & in Germania vapulo. Librum satis, ut audio, crassum nondum vidi: sed in Actis Lipsiensibus ejus compendium legi. Verum in ejusmodi antagonistam ego calamum non stringam. Non pugnant illi homines, quantum ex Actis illis mihi colligere licet, pro veritate; sed pro recepta opinione, decretis humanis, & autoritate ecclesiastica. Orthodoxiæ illis norma est consensus cum doctrina Lutherana. Contra tales frustra disputatur. Non enim operæ pretium est, ut inquiramus quid ecclesia Lutherana doceat, quod ex libris & decretis illius ecclesiæ satis notum est, sed, an illius doctrina vera sit, & à scriptoribus divinis dictata. Ita papatum ubique reperimus, & sub specioso orthodoxiæ conversandæ prætextu propria dominatio stabilitur. Sic orthodoxia semper penes potentiorem erit, veritasque alia erit Romæ, alia Genevæ, alia Wittenbergæ. Hæc incommoda vitari nequeunt, si humana placita orthodoxiæ κριτήριον sunt. Quæ in illis exercitationibus maxime odiosa occurrunt, Lipsienses accurate annotârunt. Observavi hanc in illis malignitatem dicam, an inconsultum zelum; quod si in autoribus, quos recenset, quædam reperiantur aut convitia aut inclementius in Remonstrantes dicta, ea solicite indicare soleant, verbisque odiosissimis exprimere. Nescio quo suo facto Remonstrantes inimicitiam eorum in se provocaverint, nisi forsan liberiore veritatis inquisitione, & dissentientium fraterna tolerantia. In ipsos enim calamum nunquam strinximus, neque ego in eos scribam, aut me à criminationibus eorum purgabo; non enim me illis purgatum dabo, nisi me aliis, quibus jam placeo, ingratum reddam. Itaque silentio & contemptu illos ulciscar. Sed aliud quid est quod te velim. Marcus Teuto in gratiam reverendissimi Bathonienſis ac Wellensis in se suscepit versionem vitæ Episcopii, à me conscriptæ, in linguam Latinam. Varia ego citavi ex epistolis ecclesiasticis præstantium ac eruditorum virorum, & ex actis Remonstrantium synodalibus, quæ cum à me è Latino in Belgicum sermonem translata sint, ipse è Belgico in Latinum vertere non debet, sed prout in ipsis libris Latine leguntur, exhibere. Destitutum autem se illis queritur, nec usquam se eos reperire posse. Non dubito quin in multorum Anglorum bibliothecis reperiantur. Si tua opera eos habere possit à quopiam, magnum illi non tantum facies laboris compendium, sed & versionem efficies & meliorem & gratiorem. Ego, si quid hac in parte illi prodesse queas, mihi præstitum agnoscam. Vale, vir amplissime, mihique dilectissime,

Amstelod. 26 Apr. 1695.

Tui amantissimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUAMPRIMUM ego noviſſimas tuas 26 Aprilis datas acceperam, ſtatim Londinum ſcripſi, & quantum in me eſt curavi, ut libri, quos ad opus ſuum deſiderat Marcus ille noſter, ſicubi reperiri poſſint, ei ſuppeditentur. Eo diutius reſponſum diſtuli, ut quid in hoc & altero illo negotio Tholoſano factum ſit, certiorem te facerem; ſed nec D'Aranda, nec alter, cujus curæ librorum perquiſitionem commiſi, hactenus quicquam reſcripſerant, ſed ex eorum ſilentio nolim ego male ominari.

DE autographo, an Furleii jam ſit, rectius ex ipſo quam ex me cognoſces: non quod ego negligens ea in re vel otioſus fuerim procurator; ſed cum per valetudinem Londinum ea tempeſtate adire non auderem, totum negotium amico noſtrûm communi commiſi, viro prudenti & ſedulo, cui ſcirem rem cordi fore; & ne mora circuitu literarum per manus meas tranſeuntium officeret, poſt primum quod ab amico Londinenſi accepi reſponſum, quo intellexi illum omnem navaturum operam, ut rem tranſigeret, monui ut recte ad Furleium ſcriberet, ut ex illo reſciret quod ſcitu ad rem recte perficiendam adhuc opus eſſet. Hoc ab eo factum nullus dubito: ſi quid amplius à me præſtari poſſit, omnem operam, curam, induſtriam me in eo locaturum pro certo habeas.

QUOD de Oxonienſibus noſtris dicis, quanquam nihil fando audiverim, facile crediderim: quod Kilonienſem adverſarium negligis, laudo; quodque ab aliis inter ſe diſſentientibus vapulas tanto magis æſtimo, veritatis enim ſinceris & incorruptis authoribus ſic fieri ſolet. Pro Theologia tua Chriſtiana jam denuo à me tibi reddendæ ſunt gratiæ, non quod bibliothecam volumine, ſed me ſcientia auxerit. Hac enim hyeme, in quo conſiſteret fides chriſtiana, diligenter apud me cogitando, ex ipſis ſcripturæ ſ. fontibus hauriendum duxi, ſemotis quibuſcunque ſectarum & ſyſtematum opinionibus & orthodoxiis. Ex intenta & accurata N. Teſtamenti lectione novi fœderis ſtatus & evangelii doctrina mihi apparuit, ut mihi videbatur meridiana luce clarior, nec quid & fides chriſtiana dubitari poſſe, ſincero evangelii lectori, mihi perſuaſiſſimum eſt. Ideoque cogitata mea in chartam conjeci, ut ea melius partium inter ſe convenientiam, & harmoniam, & fundamenta, quibus inniterentur, ſedate & per otium contemplarer. Cum omnia in hoc meo ſymbolo ſana, & verbo divino ubique conformia videbantur, theologos conſulendos duxi (reformatos videlicet) ut quid illi de fide ſenſerint, viderem. Calvinum adii, Turretinum, alioſque, quos ita id argumentum tractâſſe fateri cogor, ut quid dicant, quid velint, capere nequaquam poſſim; adeo diſſona mihi in illis omnia videntur à ſenſu & ſimplicitate evangelica, ut illorum ſcripta intelligere, nedum cum ſacro codice reconciliare, non valeam. Tandem ſpe meliore tuam in manus cepi theologiam, nec ſine ſummo gaudio legi, cap. viii. lib. v, quo intellexi aliquem reperiri theologum, cui ego non plane eſſem hæreticus. Ut in libro tuo legendo ultra pergerem

gerem, nondum ſatis vacui temporis nactus ſum. Nihil mihi optatius eſſe poſſit, quam te videre, & te coram, quæ commentatus ſum, legere & explicare, ut limato & incorrupto judicio ſubjicerentur. Hæc tibi in aurem dicta ſunto, nam me hoc trâctaſſe argumentum tibi ſoli communicatum volo. Saluto Veenios, Guenellones tuamque imprimis familiam. Vale, &, ut facis, me ama,

Qates, 10 Maii, 1695. Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

UTRI noſtrum diuturnum ac pertinax illud ſilentium imputandum ſit, ignoro. Importunus ſim, ſi à te, negotiis publicis occupatiſſimo, ad ſingulas meas reſponſum efflagitem, aut ſilentium tuum ſilentio ulciſcar. Amicitia ſincera rigorem illum adverſatur, neque epiſtolarum æquali numero, ſed fide ac charitate mutua conſtat. Interim dulciſſimo conſuetudinis noſtræ fructu jam ultra annum carui. Ultimæ enim tuæ, quibus me reſpondiſſe memini, decimo Maii die anni præcedentis ſcriptæ ſunt. Salutem mihi à te aliquoties dixerunt D. D. Clericus & Guenellonus, & literas mihi à te brevi ſcribendas nuntiârunt, quas tamen hactenus fruſtra expectavi; hoc autem negotiorum tuorum, quibus obrutus es, frequentiæ unice adſcribendum duco. Aliquoties tibi ſcribere geſtii; ſed veritus ſum, ne importunior ſcriptio ab amico occupatiſſimo reſponſum minus tempeſtivum extorquere videretur. Nunc vero, cum munus tibi honoratiſſimum, à primoribus Angliæ demandatum eſſe, conſtans ad nos fama pertulit; ſilentium abrumpendum cenſui, ut dignitatem hanc non tam tibi, quam Angliæ, gratuler, quæ in collegio ampliſſimo, una cum ſummis regni proceribus, te aſſeſſorem habet, cujus conſilia omnia prudentia, fide, candore ac ſinceritate diriguntur, & communi civium ſaluti unice deſtinantur. Deus vitam tibi largiatur longævam, conſiliiſque tuis ſucceſſum, quem merentur, concedat. Ego hic occupatus vivo; & tamen vix quicquam promoveo, non aliter ac ſi otio deſidioſo torperem. Arminii ſcripta inedita me occupatum tenent: promiſi ego bibliopolæ Germano, me ea paraturum ad editionem; ſed in ſcriptis ejus relegendis, ob characterum exilitatem & ductum lectu neutiquam commodum, tantam reperio difficultatem, ut niſi tanti viri memoria, & non exigua, quam inde ad publicum rediturum video utilitas, ingrati laboris moleſtiam levaret, jam operæ promiſſæ pœnituiſſet. Hoc opus ubi edidero, nullis amplius poſthumis aliorum operibus edendis me fatigabo. Oculorum acies ſæpiſſime intendenda eſt, ut characteres exiles, & vetuſtate multis in locis ferme evaneſcentes legantur. Ita multum temporis impendo

pendo, non tamen eo cum fructu, qui temporis diuturnitatem compenſare poſſit. Sed quoniam alea jacta eſt, pergendum eſt. Prodibunt de novo prælectiones in Jonam & Malachiam, quibus annectitur diſputatio contra Judæos, in poſteriorem ad Theſſalonicenſes, in ſecundum & tertium caput Apocalypſeos; & diſputatio contra cardinalem Perronium: quæ cum opuſculis antehac editis juſtum conficient volumen. Præmiſit D. Caſper Brantius prolixiorem vitæ Arminii hiſtoriam, quæ multa hactenus exteris ignota continebit. Prodiit nuper apud nos tractatus Anglici, " quod Religio Chriſtiana, qualis nobis eſt repræſentata in ſcriptura ſa- " cra, ſit ſumme rationalis," verſio Gallica. Illius autorem volunt multi eſſe amicum meum. Ego reſpondeo, mihi nihil de eo conſtare; & cum autor, quiſquis ille ſit, latere vult, noſtrum non eſſe conjecturis, ut plurimum fallacibus, indulgere. Ego ſumma cum voluptate lectioni illius incumbo, & in præcipuo (quod toto libro, de fidei chriſtianæ objecto tractat) argumento illi prorſus aſſentior. Hoc recte percepto, graviſſimas ac acerbiſſimas in eccleſia chriſtiana diſputationes feliciter componi poſſe puto; ſaltem eccleſiæ, non obſtante opinionum diverſitate, pacem facili negotio poſſe reſtitui: ea enim quæ nunc à pleriſque ut unicum ferme chriſtianiſmi fundamentum urgentur, objecto fidei non comprehendi planum fiet. Quod unicum anathematiſmis, ſchiſmatibus, & odiis tollendis remedium eſt. Ego, ut videas me attente tractatum hunc legere, omniaque argumenta exacte ponderare, non poſſum, quin tibi obſervationem quandam indicem, quæ licet forte non magni videri poſſet eſſe momenti, tamen argumento autoris, quo utitur, pondus aliquod afferre poteſt. Cap. iv, autor ad ſuæ ſententiæ ſtabilimentum adducit locum ex 2 epiſt. Joan. ver. 7, quem optime ab ipſo allegatum judico: verum verſio Gallica ita eum exhibet, ut, me judice, non exacte exprimat ſenſum, qui in Græco extat, quique ſententiam autoris validius confirmat. Qua ratione eum Anglice expreſſerit autor, ignoro. Gallice autem ita extat: " Que pluſieurs impoſteurs ſe ſont élevez dans le monde, leſquels ne " confeſſent point, que Jeſus, le Meſſie, ſoit venu en chair:" quæ ſenſum hunc continere videntur, quod impoſtores hi non confeſſi ſunt, quod Jeſus, qui eſt Meſſias, venerit in carne. Græcus autem textus ita habet: Ὅτι πολλοὶ πλάνοι ἐισῆλθον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες Ἰησοῦν Χριςὸν ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί. Quæ poſteriora verba ego verto, non, qui non confitentur Jeſum, qui eſt Chriſtus ſeu Meſſias, in carne veniſſe; ſed, qui non confitentur Jeſum Meſſiam, qui in carne venit: non enim eſt infinitivus in Græco, ſed participium. Hic ſenſus eſt longe alius, & autoris hujus ſcopo multo accommodatior. Priore enim ſenſu hæc eſſe impoſtorum falſa doctrina arguitur, quod non confiteantur Jeſum, qui eſt Meſſias, in carne veniſſe. Inde ſequeretur quod qui confitetur Jeſum, de quo Joannes affirmat quod ſit Meſſias (vox enim Χριςὸς, per appoſitionem, hoc ſenſu eſt legenda) in carne veniſſe, maneat in doctrina Chriſti, ut eſt ver. 9. Atqui multi, qui non credebant Jeſum eſſe Meſſiam, credebant tamen Jeſum, qui Meſſias eſt, in carne veniſſe. Si poſteriore ſenſu vertantur, tum ſenſus eſt, impoſtores non confiteri Jeſum Chriſtum, qui in

carne venit; hoc eſt, non confiteri, quod ille Jeſus, qui in carne venit, ſit Meſſias. Confiteri enim Jeſum Meſſiam, eſt, confiteri quod Jeſus ſit Meſſias, ſeque illius diſcipulum profiteri; juxta Matth. x. 32. Illum autem Jeſum, quem confiteri oportet, deſcribit Joannes, quod ſit ille qui in carne venit, & inter Judæos verſatus eſt. Inde ſequitur, quod ille in doctrina Chriſti maneat, qui confitetur quod Jeſus, qui in carne venit, ſit Meſſias. Et hæc eſt ſincera fidei in Chriſtum confeſſio. Eundem eſſe ſenſum puto, 1 Joan. iv. 2, 3. ubi ſimiliter non reperitur infinitivus, ſed participium ἐληλυθότα. Non eſt quidem hæc obſervatio tanti in hoc negotio, facit tamen ad genuinam textus Græci intelligentiam, & autoris inſtituto favet. In aliis autem diſputationibus, quæ cum Mennonitis noſtratibus inſtituuntur, maximi eſt uſus. Sed tempus eſt ut abrumpam. Vides tibi cum homine loquace rem eſſe, qui cum literis ſuis te compellat, calamo imperare non poteſt. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & feliciter age.

Amſtelod. . . . . Tui obſervantiſſimus,
1696.

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

SI omnes in religione eo uterentur candore, quo tu uſus es in amicitia, non majorem offenſionem inter diſſentientes parerent argumenta, quam inter nos nuper peperit diuturnum nimis ſilentium. Si epiſtolarum reciprocationem æſtimem, an tua major taciturnitas, an mea, dicere non auſim, credo me ea ex parte peccâſſe. Ea vero utcunque ſe res habeat, tu certe humanitate tua & ignoſcendo prior effeciſti, ut culpa omnino mea ſit, eoque magis probroſam mihi ſentio, quod tu & leviſſima quidem reprehenſione abſtinuiſti; negotiorum excuſatione, qua pro me apud te uſus es, aliquid momenti erga alium habere potuiſſet, certe tibi me eo nomine excuſatum nolim, addere etiam poteram valetudinem, tota præterita hyeme valde incommodam. Sed nec hoc quidem, quo minus tam charo, tam fido amico ſcriberem, impedimento eſſe non debuit. Vis rem ipſam ut tibi ſcriberem, ſemper quæro tempus omnino vacuum, animumque ab aliis curis & cogitationibus liberum; hoc cum raro accidit ita ad voluntatem, ut non ad aliud & magis opportunum tempus rejiciam, de die in diem differendo annus elabitur, & tandem pudor culpæ ſuperveniens tardiorem reddit. Si hoc ignaviæ latebram dicas, non recuſo; hoc certo ſcio imminutæ amicitiæ, vel mutatæ voluntatis non eſſe crimen; & forſan ut omnia fatear, non expeditus linguæ Latinæ uſus faſtidium menti non bene ſe explicanti oggerit. Sed tua amicitia & benevolentia, vir ampliſſime, omnia ſuperat. Gratulationem tuam, eo, quo tu ſcripſiſti animo, id eſt, amiciſſimo, accipio: ſed quid tandem mihi,

ſenectutis & valetudinis onere ſuccumbenti, cum negotiorum publicorum tumultu? Seceſſus mihi jam quærendus eſſet, & vel annis vel ſtudiis meis quies. Hoc, ſi mihi credas, & magis aveo, & mihi magis accommodatum credo, ſed neſcio quo fato, quod alius ambitioſe & fruſtra quærit, alii vel inſcio, vel etiam detrectanti tribuitur. Viri iſtius magni ſcripta inedita, tua opera proditura, gratulor reipub. chriſtianæ. De libro Anglicano in linguam Gallicam verſo, cujus lectioni, cum ad me ſcripſeras, incubuiſti, idem tecum ſentio, contentionum & ſchiſmatum radices evellit, quantum id poteſt religionis chriſtianæ veritas & fundamentum, ſi id auctor recte explicuerit, ut mihi videtur; cum vero totum perlegeris, & tuam & aliorum de tractatu illo ſententiam ſcire vellem. Theologis noſtris tam conformiſtis, quam non-conformiſtis, diſplicere audio; reliqui (ut fit) probant, improbantve, prout ſuo vel alieno innituntur judicio. Quod monuiſti de loco Joannis tecum ſentio: idem eſt in verſione noſtra, quem in Gallica obſervâſti, error; ſed ad rem facit, verum appoſitè magis textus Græcus, quem tu rectiſſime, ut mihi videtur, interpretaris. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & me ama,

Lond. 3 Sept. 1696.

Tui amantiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

CITIUS tuis, decimo quinto demum Octobris die mihi redditis, reſpondiſſem, verum quoniam judicium meum de tractatu Anglicano in linguam Gallicam verſo petiiſti, tempus à reliquis curis vacuum quæſivi, ut tractatum illum elegantiſſimum uno tenore perlegere, omniaque illo contenta conſiderare & expendere poſſem. Maxime mihi opportunum videbatur tempus hoc hibernum, quo ab exercitiis academicis feriari ſolemus; ſed & illud frigore ſuo acutiſſimo non leviter impetum ſcribendi remoratum eſt. Legi totum tractatum à capite ad calcem; nec unicâ lectione contentus, eum relegi. Interim huc perlatus eſt actorum Lipſienſium menſis October, quo compendium tractatus illius, pro doctorum illorum more, nobis exhibetur. Primo aiunt autoris illius Pockii nomen eſſe dici (credo eos incerto rumori temere fidem adhibuiſſe, & in nomine una aberrâſſe litera) tum compendio quod confecere, omnia, quibus aliquam autori invidiam conflari poſſe putant, ſedulo enumerant, ut ſyſtematum theologicorum contemptum ulciſci velle videantur. Extollunt magnifice Joannem Edvardum, quod præclare hactenus in Anglia contra Socinianam hæreſin variis ſcriptis militaverit, librumque ediderit meditationum quarundam de cauſis & occaſione atheiſmi, hodierni præſertim ſæculi; in quo paſſim autoris hujus anonymi ſententias, ut periculoſas & à ſocinianiſmo ac atheiſmo non alienas, perſtrinxit. Subjungunt hiſce compendium duorum ſcriptorum, quorum alterum brevis

pro tractatu illo eſt apologia: alterum Joannis Edvardi, titulo, "Socinianiſm unmaſked." Tu illos tractatus rectius me nôſti. Videntur dolere, quod meditationes Edvardi ipſis ad manum non fuerint; alias & illarum compendium habuiſſemus. Syſtema theologiæ me ſcripſiſſe nôſti: non tamen eo in pretio apud me ſyſtemata ſunt, ut non hunc exiguum tractatum multis ſyſtematibus præferam; imo plus veræ theologiæ ex illo, quam ex operoſis multorum ſyſtematibus hauſiſſe me ingenue profiteor. Sed vero theologiam autor ille tradit nimis facilem, nimis laxam, quæ ſalutem anguſtis humanorum decretorum vinculis alligatam minime cupit; nec orthodoxiam ex ſectarum confeſſionibus, ſed ſolo verbo divino arceſſit. Hoc crimen eſt, quod ſocinianiſmi & atheiſmi infami convitio à doctoribus ſyſtematicis traduci meretur: non aliter ac ſi, qui humana placita religioſe adorare recuſant, eo ipſo omnem religionem ejurare cenſendi eſſent. Ego autoris in hoc tractatu ſcopum ſummopere laudo; ſcopum ſuum feliciter aſſecutum eſſe, ſolideque ipſum, quod intendit, probâſſe judico. Imprimis placent mihi duo: methodus accurata hiſtoriæ evangelicæ, quam cap. ix. tradit, & per quam varia loca in evangeliis, in ſpeciem obſcura, feliciter admodum interpretatur: & perſpicua illa deductio argumentorum, quibus oſtendit, cur D. Jeſus Chriſtus, in terris degens, non expreſſis verbis docuerit ſe eſſe Meſſiam. Hæc autori huic peculiaria ſunt, ipſiuſque judicium ingeniique perſpicaciam clarè demonſtrant. In iis autem plurima ſunt, quibus præcipuum libri ſui argumentum, quod eſt, fidem, quod Jeſus ſit Chriſtus, eam eſſe, per quam juſtificamur, luculenter confirmat. Habes hic judicium meum de tractatu hoc, quem & tertio relegere ſtatui. Petis autem ut, ſi quædam in illius lectione obſervarem, tibi ſcriberem. Ego in tractatu adeo eximio vix quicquam, quod tibi proponi meretur, obſervavi: ita ſibi penitus me habet aſſentientem, ut exigua ſint, quæ obſervaverim, quæque principali ipſius ſcopo nihil officiunt, & quæ forſitan à me non plene intellecta ſunt. Quia vero judicium meum requiris, ego hæc, qualiacunque, tibi expendenda propono; non quia alicujus pretii ſunt, ſed ut morem geram tuæ voluntati. Statim in initio autor dicit, ſuper lapſu Adami fundatam eſſe doctrinam de redemptione. Equidem certum eſt, lapſum Adami à doctrinâ de redemptione non excludi; attamen & propria cujuſque noſtrûm peccata ab ea ſecludenda non ſunt. Plurimorum doctorum ſententia eſt, Dominum Jeſum nos liberâſſe è miſeria, in quam per Adami peccatum incidimus, & in eundem felicitatis ſtatum, quem in Adamo amiſimus, reſtituiſſe. Ego puto illos exiliter nimium de immenſo Chriſti beneficio ſentire, ipſumque ex multis peccatis, ut Apoſtolus, Rom. v, loquitur, nos liberâſſe, & ad ſtatum multo feliciorem, vitam nempe æternam in cœlis perduxiſſe. Huic addo: quod ibidem dicatur, Adamum per peccatum amiſiſſe immortalitatem, & factum eſſe mortalem. Si immortalitas autori huic ſignificet, quod Adamus ſi non peccâſſet, moriturus non fuiſſet, & mortalitas, quod per peccatum neceſſitatem moriendi contraxerit; veriſſimam ejus ſententiam judico. Si vero immortalitas, ut vox illa proprie ſonat, illi ſignificet moriendi impoſſibilitatem, non recte dici puto

puto Adamum fuiſſe creatum immortalem. Ego ſententiam meam plenius explicui in theologia mea Chriſtiana, lib. ii. cap. 24. Verum hæc immortalitas, hoc eſt, immunitas à morte, alterius plane eſt generis quam immortalitas Dei: ſicut & mortalitas, ſeu moriendi potentia, multum differt à mote, ſeu moriendi neceſſitate. Quare etiam minus commode mihi dictum videtur, p. 230, quod Adami immortalitas ſit imago Dei, ad quam conditus eſt: & licet concederetur, alibi immortalitatem vocari imaginem Dei; non tamen exinde ſequeretur, quando Adamus ad imaginem Dei conditus dicitur, illam imaginem eſſe immortalitatem; non enim neceſſe eſt, omnia quæ alibi ſcriptura imagine Dei deſignat, ea comprehenſa eſſe, quando hominem ad imaginem Dei conditum dicit: ſufficit eximiam quandam in homine eſſe qualitatem, reſpectu cujus imaginem Dei referre dici poſſit. Inter alia loca video, p. 232, citari ad Rom. cap. viii. 29, ubi dicimur à Deo prægogniti & prædeſtinati "ut ſimus conformes imagini filii "ejus, ut ipſe ſit primogenitus inter multos fratres." Putat autor illa imagine, cui conformes eſſe debemus, deſignari immortalitatem & vitam æternam. Ego autem non tam vitam æternam, quam modum ad vitam æternam perveniendi, quo fideles Chriſti ſimiles eſſe debent, hic ſignificari credo, nimirum per crucem & afflictiones: quam imaginem Dominus diſcipulis indicat, Luc. xxiv. 26. "nonnne oportuit Chriſtum iſta "pati, atque intrare in gloriam ſuam?" Hanc explicationem totius capitis ſeries evincit: jam enim, v. 17, dixerat "hæredes ſumus Dei, "cohæredes autem Chriſti, ſiquidem cum ipſo patimur, ut una cum "ipſo glorificemur." Eaque occaſione multus eſt, ut fideles hortetur ad crucem & afflictiones evangelii cauſa ſuſtinendas, inter alia, argumento à voluntate divina petito, quod per crucem nos ad ſalutem velit perducere: & ne id ipſis abſonum videatur, Deum, quos diligit, tot dura in hoc mundo immittere, exemplum illis Chriſti proponit, cujus imagini ut ſint conformes, Deus eos prædeſtinavit, & conſequenter ad crucem ferendam vocavit: & in ſequentibus porro oſtendit, illas afflictiones non poſſe ipſos ſeparare ab amore Dei, quo ipſos in Chriſto complectitur. Hinc & ſcriptura paſſim aliis locis inculcat, nos gloriæ Chriſti fore conſortes, ſi & cum ipſo crucem ſuſtinuerimus, 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. & præſertim, Heb. ii. 10. "Decebat ut ipſe, propter quem ſunt omnia, & per "quem ſunt omnia, multos filios in gloriam adducendo, principem ſalu"tis ipſorum per afflictiones conſecraret." Et hoc potiſſimum argumento fideles ad conſtantem perſecutionum tolerantiam hortatur, 1 Pet. iv. 12, 13. Heb. xii. 1, 2, 3. Hanc credo eſſe imaginem Chriſti, cui ut conformes ſimus Deum nos prædeſtinâſſe ait apoſtolus, Rom. viii. 29. conſentaneè iis quæ leguntur Act. xiv. 22. 2 Tim. iii. 12. Pag. 246, ait autor ſibi non occurrere, quod D. Jeſus ipſe ſibi tribuat titulum ſacerdotis, aut mentionem faciat ullius rei, quæ ad ſacerdotium refertur. Munus Chriſti ſacerdotale in apoſtolorum epiſtolis, & præcipue in epiſtola ad Hebræos nobis plenius eſſe deſcriptum, manifeſtum eſt; nec negari poteſt D. Jeſum nuſquam in evangeliis ſibi ſacerdotis titulum tribuere. Attamen negandum non videtur, quod ſibi alicubi actionem ſacerdotalem tribuat: diſerte enim ait, ſe "animam ſuam λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν da-

"turum,"

" turum," Matth. xx. 28. Sanguinem ſuum vocat ſanguinem novi " fœderis, qui pro multis effunditur, in remiſſionem peccatorum." Matth. xxvi. 28. Negare non poſſumus hunc eſſe actum, qui ad ſacerdotium reſpectum habet. Quare fortaſſe præſtitiſſet id præteriiſſe, neque hominibus calumniandi occaſionem quærentibus quicquam ſuppeditâſſe, quod cum ſpecie aliqua carpere poſſe videatur. Præter hæc, in tractatu hoc, quædam mihi occurrere videntur, quæ vix inter ſe conciliari poſſunt, niſi forte autor mentem ſuam plenius explicet. Pag. 13, ait, Cum Adam pulſus ſit è paradiſo terreſtri, omniſque ejus poſteritas ea propter naſcatur, extra hunc deliciarum locum; inde naturaliter ſequi debet, omnes homines morituros, & in æternum ſub potentia mortis manſuros, atque ita penitus fore perditos: ex eo ſtatu autem omnes per Chriſtum liberatos docet, & quidem per legem fidei, quam poſtea fuſe oſtendit evangelio contineri. Hæc meo judicio vere dicuntur: verum non ſatis capio, quomodo cum his bene concilientur, quæ leguntur, pag. 250 & 266, quod qui juſti ſunt non indigent gratia, ſed jus habent ad arborem vitæ. Illi enim quatenus Adami poſteri, etiam ſub potentia mortis æternum manere debent: quomodo ergo per ſuam juſtitiam jus poſſunt acquirere ad arborem vitæ, ita ut nulla gratia indigeant? cum antea docuerat, omnes ex illo ſtatu neceſſariæ mortis liberatos, & quidem per legem fidei: unde ſequi videtur, liberationem illam non poſſe fieri, niſi per legem fidei. Ergo non per perfectam legis operum obedientiam: nam è miſeria liberare gratiæ eſt, quam lex operum excludit. Tum nec cum principio iſto commode ſatis conciliare poſſum, quod autor dicit, qua ratione illi, qui de Chriſto nihil quicquam inaudiverunt, ſalvari poſſint. Si enim per Adamum neceſſariæ ac æternæ morti ſunt obnoxii, è qua per ſolam legem fidei beneficio Chriſti liberentur, non videtur illis ſufficere poſſe, quod lumine naturæ aliquas fidei illius, quod Deus ſit miſericors, ſcintillas habeant; ſed per illam fidei legem, quam Deus ſalutis obtinendæ conditionem ſtatuit, ſervari debere videntur. Video doctores ſyſtematicos hic multum offendi: atque ideo neque acquieſcere illis quinque fructibus, quos D. Jeſum adventu ſuo in mundum hominibus contuliſſe docet autor. Ego in doctorum ſyſtematicorum gratiam nihil in veritatis præjudicium docendum judico; & ſi quid illi præter rationem carpant, indignationem eorum ſpernendam cenſeo: ſed conſiderandum, an non majus quid dici poſſit & oporteat, quod ipſis licet non ſatisfaciat, minus tamen forſan offendet, & meo judicio plenius rei veritatem exhibet. Video fructus quidem indicari prophetici ac regii muneris Chriſti, nullos vero ſacerdotalis. Quid ſi ergo hic addatur muneris ſacerdotalis fructus; quod mundus Deo ſit reconciliatus, adeo ut nunc per Chriſtum omnibus omnino hominibus remedium paratum ſit è miſeria ſua in quam occaſione peccati Adami, propriiſque peccatis inciderunt, emergendi & ſalutem æternam conſequendi? Hoc poſito, puto explicari poſſe, qua ratione, ſalvis principiis ante poſitis, ii, qui de Chriſto nihil ne fando quidem audiverunt, per Chriſtum ſalvari poſſint. Nempe quod Deus illis qui (ut autor hic ait, pag. 292) inſtinctu luminis naturæ ad gratiam & miſericordiam ejus confugiunt, delictorumque reſipiſcentiam agunt, eorumque

rumque veniam ſupplices petunt, gratiam per Chriſtum impetratam applicet, ipſiſque propter Chriſtum remiſſionem peccatorum & juſtitiam imputet. Atque ita beneficium, quod ubi Chriſtus prædicatus eſt, non niſi per directam in Chriſtum fidem, obtineri poteſt, illi ſine directa in Chriſtum, ipſis non prædicatum, fide conſequantur per gratioſam imputationem divinam; qui favores & beneficia ſua latius extendere poteſt, quam promiſſorum verba ferunt. Ut ita omnium ſalus in ſacrificio Chriſti propitiatorio fundetur. Puto hæc non multum à ſententia hujus autoris differre, & iis, quæ evangelio continentur, conſentanea eſſe. Ultimum caput per omnia amplector: omnia credenda & obſervanda ut ſalutem conſequamur evangeliis & actis contineri, credo; nullumque novum articulum in epiſtolis apoſtolicis ſuperaddi: quæ alii novos fidei articulos urgent, non novi articuli ſunt, ſed aut magis dilucidæ articulorum jam antea traditorum explanationes; aut doctrinæ antea traditæ ab objectionibus præcipue Judæorum vindicationes, cujus illuſtre nobis documentum præbet epiſtola ad Romanos. Hæc ſunt paucula illa, quæ mihi inter legendum ocurrerunt, quæque tibi expendenda propono. Fortaſſe autoris mentem per omnia non plene aſſecutus ſum. Verum exigua hæc ſunt, & extra principalem autoris ſcopum, quem argumentis omni exceptione majoribus eum probâſſe judico, adeo ut me ſibi habeat penitus aſſentientem. Imprimis laudo, quod tam candide & ingenue, nec minus ſolide, demonſtret reſipiſcentiæ & bonorum operum neceſſitatem, & per legem fidei non penitus eſſe abolitam legem operum, ſed mitigatam. Ego illorum hominum theologiam non capio, qui fidem, qua nobis merita Chriſti applicamus, etiam ante ullum reſipiſcentiæ actum, nos coram Deo juſtificare docent. Hac enim perſuaſione imbuti facile, mediis in ſceleribus, homines incauti ſibi juſtitiam & ſalutem adſcribunt, modo in ſe fiduciam minime vacillantem deprehendant. Et doctores improvidi hanc temerariam confidentiam alunt, dum hominibus impiis & ſceleratis, modo circa vitæ finem fiduciam in Chriſti meritis firmam profiteantur, ſalutem ſine ulla hæſitatione addicere non verentur. Hujus generis exemplum in noſtra civitate recens, quod oblivione obliterari non debet, commemorabo. Præterita æſtate ancilla quædam, ut heri ſui ædes ſpoliare poſſet, noctu eas incendit. Mortis damnata fidem ſuam in Chriſti meritis verbis emphaticis, coram miniſtro verbi divini, qui morituræ adfuit, prolixe profeſſa eſt: Ille ſceleratæ non tantum indubiam ſalutis ſpem fecit, ſed & poſtridie pro concione illius fidem prolixe populo commendavit, adeo quidem, ut dicere non veritus ſit, ſe, ſola ignominia excepta, talem ſibi vitæ exitum optare; multis applaudentibus, aliis vero (non Remonſtrantibus modo, ſed & contra-Remonſtrantibus) non ſine indignatione talem Encomiaſten cum ſuo encomio reprehendentibus. Verum tandem manum de tabula. Tu pro ſolita tua benevolentia prolixitati meæ ignoſces. Vale, vir ampliſſime, mihique ſemper venerande.

Amſtelod. 26 Martii, 1697.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

INTER negotia publica & privatam valetudinem tam parum mihi conceditur otii literarii, ut ſperem diuturnum meum ſilentium, non ex imminuta omnino in te voluntate aut amicitia ortum, tibi, quæ tua eſt in amicos lenitas, excuſatum fore. An tui mihi egove tibi noviſſime literas dederim, quærere nolo. Satis egomet mihi culpandus videor, quod tam diu careo fructu ſuaviſſimæ tuæ conſuetudinis, & magnus mihi dolenduſque in curriculo vitæ meæ hiatus apparet, qui deſtitutus literarum inter nos commercio, vacuus ea voluptate fuit, quæ maxima cum ſit, ex benevolentia ſolum mutuiſque amicorum ſermonibus percipitur. Præteritam hyemem cura infirmæ ſanitatis rure totam abſumpſit. Niſi quod negotia nonnulla importuna ſubinde irrepentia totum, id, quicquid erat temporis, quod amicis deſtinaveram invito abriperent. Adeo ut non in tuo ſolum, ſed & multorum mihi amiciſſimorum ære alieno ſim, nec quomodo me redimam ſcio, ſi taciturnitas mea nomine negligentiæ ſuſpecta ſit. Tu, ſcio, humanior es quam ut eo me condemnari velis crimine. Quanquam enim tardior aliquando mihi in reſpondendo calamus, animus tamen nunquam deficit, & ſi quando hac utor libertate, erga eos ſolum utor, quibuſcum non ſolummodo vitam civilem, ſed intimam ſolidamque amicitiam mihi colendam propono, quibus multum me ſcio debere, & quibus inſuper cupio me plurimum debere. Ego nuper Londinum profectus poſt octidui incommodam & anheloſam moram præpropero reditu huc me recipere coactus ſum. Hæc pulmonum imbecillitas me brevi ſpero reſtituet priſtino otio. Valetudinario ſeni quid reſtat præter vota pro patria? Naturæ & imbecillitati cedendum eſt. Hoc mihi ſi concedatur, libri & literæ, amicorumque interrupta vel impedita commercia, optima illa ſenectutis oblectamenta, redibunt. Quid enim in republica literaria agatur, civili implicato vix ſcire vacat. Apud nos ſane diſceptationibus & rixis maximam partem impenditur ſcripturientium atramentum. Si diſputantium fervor ſolo veritatis amore accenderetur, laudanda eſſet litigantium induſtria & contentio; ſed non ita ſemper tractantur argumenta, ut ea ad veritatem ſtabiliendam elucidandamve quæſita, credere poſſis. In mea de Intellectu Humano diſſertatione jam tandem aliquid repertum eſt non ita ſanum, idque à viris haud infimi ſubſellii reprehenſum. Si quid ego eorum argumentis edoctus reprehenſione dignum reperirem, gratus agnoſcerem, & haud invitus corrigerem. Id cum non ſit, rationem mihi reddendam cenſeo, cur non mutaverim ſententiam, cum nihil reperiam in ea à veritate alienum. Hæc mea defenſio aliquam partem præteritæ hyemis, prout tulit valetudo, occupatam habuit. Sed quid ego te moror noſtris nugis? Quid tu illic, voſque alii ſtudiis utilioribus intenti agatis, aveo ſcire. Næ ego iniquus officiorum exactor, ſi à te feſtinatas poſtulem literas in ſcribendo

ipſe

ipse tantus cessator. Verum tu scio id facies ne nimis serio mihi irasci videaris. Vale, vir optime, &, ut facis, me ama,

Oates, 4 Mar. 1696-7.

Tui studiosissimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir amplissime,

MENSE Martio scripsi tibi epistolam satis prolixam. Hâc æstate cum viris aliquot primariis sermonem de variis habui: inter alia incidit sermo de tractatu, de quo, in superioribus meis, judicium meum scripsi. Omnes eum summopere laudabant. Unus vero titulum sibi non satis placere affirmabat; tanquam nimis exilem pro dignitate materiæ, quæ toto libro tractatur. Autoris hujus longe diversum aiebat fuisse institutum à plerorumque scriptorum consuetudine, qui exigui pretii libris titulos magnificos præfigere solent: hunc autem libro magnifico exilem præfixisse titulum. Oportuisse titulum aliquatenus respondisse dignitati operis, ut & ille posset lectores allicere. Alius vir (idem qui tibi antehac Sladum nostrum commendatum esse voluit, quod tibi soli dictum velim) se bis tractatum illum perlegisse aiebat: laudabat illum summopere, autoremque fidei christianæ objectum, quod præcipuum totius libri argumentum est, solidissime probâsse affirmabat; unum desiderabat; nim. quod autor jam statim ab initio vulgarem de peccato originis sententiam rejecerit ac refutaverit, potuisse autorem, intacta illa sententia, nihilominus præcipuum tractatus sui argumentum adstruere: nunc multos, quorum mentibus alte sententia illa insedit, lecto libri initio, antequam ad principale ejus argumentum accedant, offendi, atque ita præjudicium contra autorem concipere, ut sequentia non ea animi serenitate quæ requritur, legant, sicque alieniores reddi: cum potius ipsorum benevolentia captanda fuisset, ut judicio integro expendant sententiam, veram quidem, sed communi theologorum appetitui minus consentaneam; qui omnes ferme fidei christianæ aliquid de suo admixtum cupiunt; quasi ea suo cœtui peculiaris sit, & alii ab illa excludantur. Qui error ut ipsorum animis eruatur, alliciendi potius sunt, quam assertione alicujus dogmatis sibi minus probati alienandi. Candide tibi scribo quid viri hi desideraverint. Hac occasione, ut fieri solet, sermo ad alia deflexit, & quidem quibus argumentis solidissime unitas Dei probetur. Idem ille vir primarius affirmabat, se argumenta quædam irrefragabilia requirere, quibus probetur ens æternum, seu per se existens, seu undiquaque perfectum, esse tantum unum. Desiderabat quædam in argumentis Hugonis Grotii, libro primo de Veritate Religionis Christianæ. Addebat, audivisse se tractatum tuum de Intellectu Humano in linguam Gallicam

verti; multum ſe tribuere judicio tuo, ac ſummopere verſionem illam deſiderare. Quæſivit ex me, num in illo tractatu etiam unitatem entis à ſe exiſtentis adſtruxiſſes? Ego me ignorare reſpondi, qui tractatum, utpote lingua mihi ignota conſcriptum, nunquam legerim. Voluit itaque tibi ſerio per me commendari, ut ſi in tractatu quo quæſtionem hanc intactam reliqueris, illius adſtructione tractatum augere velis, unitatemque entis independentis ſolide adſtruere. Manifeſtum videtur ens independens, quod omnem in ſe complectitur perfectionem, unicum tantum eſſe: ille tamen hoc ita probari cupiebat, ut argumentum nulla parte laboraret. Ante triduum aurem mihi vellicari juſſit, & à me quæri, an jam ad te ſcripſiſſem, & aliquod à te reſponſum accepiſſem. Non crediderat ipſum id tam enixe voluiſſe; ſed quia video rem hanc ipſi cordi eſſe, ſcriptionem meam ulterius differendam minime ſtatui. Rogo, ſi id negotia tua permittant, ut mihi reſponſum ſcribas, quod ipſi prælegere poſſim, ita tamen temperata tua ſcriptione, ut minime ſubolere ipſi poſſit, me tibi ipſum aliquatenus indicâſſe; poſſes ita reſpondere, quaſi ego tibi ſcripſerim, viros quoſdam eruditos de hac materia diſſerentes, ex ipſis aliquem, qui te magni æſtimat, de ea tuum voluiſſe audire judicium, & ut quæſtionem hanc in tuo de Intellectu Humano tractatu expenderes deſiderâſſe. Vides quam aperte tecum agam, & quid ab amicitia tua expectare auſim. Hagam Comitis nuper excurri; ſalutavi honoratiſſimum Comitem Pembrokienſem, & per integram horam varios cum ipſo, etiam de rebus theologicis, ſermones habui. Virum in tam excelſa dignitate conſtitutum tantum in rebus ſacris ſtudium poſuiſſe ſummopere miror. Ita ſermonibus ejus afficiebar, ut vix per ſemihoram ipſi adfuiſſe mihi viſus ſim, cum tamen ab eo digreſſus integram horam eſſe elapſam deprehenderim. Ego viro illi excellentiſſimo longævam vitam precor, ut regni Anglicani negotia ipſius auſpiciis feliciter adminiſtrentur: tibi vero valetudinem proſperam, ut cogitata tua orbi erudito communicare poſſis. Vale, ampliſſime vir, & ſalveat plurimum Domina Maſham. Salutant te uxor mea & filia.

Amſtelod. 8 Oct. 1697.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

Lettre de Mr. LOCKE à Mr. LIMBORCH.

Monſieur,

SI mon nom eſt venu à la connoiſſance de ces habiles gens avec qui vous entretenez quelquefois, & s'ils daignent parler de mes écrits dans les converſations que vous avez avec eux, c'eſt une faveur dont je vous ſuis entierement redevable. La bonne opinion que vous avez d'une perſonne que vous voulez bien honorer de vôtre amitié les a pré-

prévenuë en ma faveur. Je ſouhaiterois que mon Eſſai concernant l'Entendement fut écrit dans une langue que ces excellens hommes pûſſent entendre, car par le jugement éxact & ſincere qu'ils porteroient de mon ouvrage, je pourrois compter ſurement ſur ce qu'il y a de vrai ou de faux, & ſur qu'il peut y avoir de tolerable. Il y a ſept ans que ce livre a été publié. La premiere & la ſeconde édition ont eû le bonheur d'être generalement bien reçuës: mais la derniere n'a pas eû le même advantage. Aprés un ſilence de cinq ou ſix années on commence d'y découvrir je ne ſçai quelles fautes dont on ne s'étoit point apperçu auparavant; & ce qu'il y a de ſingulier, on prétend trouver matiere à des controverſes de religion dans cet ouvrage, ou je n'ai eû deſſein de traiter que des queſtions de pure ſpéculation philoſophique. J'avois reſolu de faire quelques additions, dont j'ai déja compoſé quelques-unes qui ſont aſſez amples, & qui auroient pû paroître en leur place dans la quatriéme édition que le libraire ſe diſpoſe à faire. Et j'aurois volontiers ſatisfait à vôtre deſir, ou au deſir d'aucun de vos amis en y inſerant les preuves de l'unité de Dieu qui ſe preſentent à mon eſprit. Car je ſuis enclin à croire que l'unité de Dieu peut être auſſi évidemment démontrée que ſon exiſtence; & qu'elle peut être établie ſur des preuves qui ne laiſſeront aucun ſujet d'en douter. Mais j'aime la paix, & il y a dens gens dans le monde qui aiment ſi fort les crialleries & les vaines conteſtations, que je doute ſi je dois leur fournir de noveaux ſujets de diſpute.

LES remarques que vous me dites que d'habiles gens on fait ſur le "Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, &c." ſont ſans doute fort juſtes, & il eſt vrai que pluſieurs lecteurs ont été choquez de certaines penſées qu'on voit au commencement de ce livre, leſquelles ne s'accordent pas tout-à-fait avec des doctrines communément reçuës. Mais ſur cela je ſuis obligé de renvoyer ces meſſieurs aux deux défenſes que l'auteur a fait de ſon ouvrage. Car ayant publié ce petit livre, comme il le dit lui-même, principalement afin de convaincre ceux qui doutent de la religion chrétienne, il ſemble qu'il à été conduit à traiter ces matieres malgré lui; car pour rendre ſon livre utile aux déïſtes, il ne pouvoit point ſe taire entierement ſur ces articles, auxquels ils s'aheurtent des qu'ils veulent entrer dans l'éxamen de la religione chrêtienne. Je ſuis,

Londres, 29 Oct. 1697.

Monſieur,

Vôtre très-humble

& très-obéïſſant ſerviteur,

J. LOCKE.

Vir ampliſſime,

NE mireris quod lingua Gallica reſponſum à me ſit acceptiſſimis tuis Latinis 8. hujus menſis mihi ſcriptis, liceat mihi me tibi excuſare & negotiorum multitudine, quæ otium negat, & linguæ Latinæ diſſuetudine, quæ expedite ſcribere prohibet. Hanc meam epiſtolam aliis vel prælegendam vel monſtrandam ex tuis colligo: virorum præcellentium cenſuræ ſtyli negligentia me objicere minime decorum judicavi. Quicquid enim tua vel humanitas vel amicitia in me excuſare ſolet, aliis vel nauſeam vel certe non condonandam moleſtiam creare poteſt. Scripſi igitur quod dicendum habui lingua vernacula feſtinatim, Galloque in ſuam linguam vertendam tradidi. Ex quo exorta eſt inter epiſcopum Wigornienſem (qui me quæſita cauſa aggreſſus eſt) & me diſputatio: gens theologorum togata in librum meum mire excitatur, laudataque hactenus diſſertatio illa tota jam ſcatet erroribus (vel ſaltem continet latentia errorum vel ſcepſeos fundamenta) pia doctorum virorum cura nunc demum detegendis. Ad unitatem Dei quod attinet, Grotii, fateor, in loco à te citato argumenta non abunde ſatisfaciunt. Putaſne tamen quempiam, qui Deum agnoſcit, poſſe dubitare numen illud eſſe unicum? Ego ſane nunquam dubitavi; etiamſi, fateor, mihi ex hac occaſione cogitandi videtur altius aliquanto elevandam eſſe mentem, & à communi philoſophandi ratione ſegregandam, ſi quis id philoſophice, vel, ſi ita dicam, phyſice probare velit; ſed hoc tibi ſoli dictum ſit. Uxorem tuam dilectiſſimam liberoſque officioſiſſime ſaluto.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

GRATISSIMAS tuas 29 Octobris ſcriptas recte accepi, viroque magnifico, cujus potiſſimum rogatu ad te ſcripſi, prælegi. Res ipſa, de qua quæritur, à nemine ſano in dubium vocari poſſe videtur; ipſa enim deitatis notio unitatem involvit, nec permittit, ut illa pluribus communis credi poſſit. Quare, me judice, nemo, qui attente ſecum conſiderat, quid voce Dei intelligamus, pluritatem Deorum aſſerere poteſt. Quia tamen eam ab ethnicis aſſeri videmus, & contra eos ſcripturæ autoritate pugnari non poteſt, rationibus è natura petitis convincendi ſunt. Quare ejuſmodi requirit argumenta vir magnificus, quibus ſolide demonſtretur ens independens & perfectum unicum tantum eſſe poſſe. Ex ſolide adſtructa eſſentiæ divinæ unitate porro facili negotio omnia attributa divina, noſtrumque tam erga Deum, quam proximum officium deduci poſſe certiſſimus eſt. Carteſium dicit unitatem illam non probâſſe, ſed præſuppoſuiſſe. Ipſe ſibi demonſtrationem ſcripſit, ſed

eam aiebat ſubtiliorem eſſe. Et quia multum tuo tribuit judicio, tua argumenta avidiſſime videre deſiderat. Prælegi illi epiſtolam tuam; gaudebat, quod in ea affirmes te id præſtare poſſe: tanto enixius jam argumenta tua deſiderat. Dolebat tibi litem temere motam: quoniam autem, ne fortaſſe novis litibus & ſuſpicionibus præter tuam intentionem vel minimam præbeas anſam, publico ſcripto argumenta tua proferre gravaris, rogat ut ea privatim ad me ſcribas, ſub promiſſo ſilentii: ille hæc evulgare minime intendit, ſed ad propriam ſuam inſtructionem, & in veritate confirmationem requirit. Duobus præter illum viris, intima mihi amicitia conjunctis, qui priori noſtræ converſationi interfuerunt, D. de Hartoge Fiſci Hollandici advocato, & D. advocato Van den Ende, & præter illos, nulli omnino mortalium ea communicabuntur, niſi fortaſſe & D. Clerico ea prælegi permittas, quod tui arbitrii eſt; ipſo enim ignaro hæc omnia ad te ſcribo. Rem facturus es & viro magnifico maximopere gratam: & quod fidis ſolummodo amicis, & quidem paucis adeo, concreditur, cujuſque nullum à me cuiquam apographum dabitur, id diſpaleſcere non poteſt. Quinimo, ut tanto honeſtius apographum denegare queam, ſuaſerim ut id in epiſtola tua enixe à me ſtipuleris. Nolim ego te genti togatæ, tanquam ſcepſeos fundamenta jacientem, magis ſuſpectum fieri: pleroſque illorum alieno judicio, tanquam nervis alienis mobile lignum, præcipites in laudem ac vituperium immerentium rapi certus ſum. Cum tuas legerem, lepida mihi incidit Thomæ Mori in ſua Utopia fabella. Refert is, cum Raphael Hythlodæus, coram Cardinale Archiepiſcopo Cantuarienſi doctiſſime de republica diſſeruiſſet, legis quendam peritum commoto capite, & labiis diſtortis quicquid dixerat improbâſſe; ac ſtatim omnes, qui aderant, pedibus in juriſperiti illius iviſſe ſententiam. Cum vero Cardinalis Hythlodæi ſententiam probabat, mox quæ ipſo narrante contempſerant omnes, eadem neminem non certatim laudibus eſſe proſecutum. Simile quid tractatui tuo evenit, qui antea integro ſexennio communi applauſu acceptus fuit, nunc inſurgente contra te magni nominis epiſcopo totus erroribus ſcatet, & latentia continet ſcepſeos fundamenta. Ita ſolet theologorum vulgus non ex ſuo ſed alieno ſapere cerebro. Verum talium judicio epiſtola tua nequam exponetur. Quod vero linguæ Latinæ diſſuetudinem prætexis, quæ expedite ſcribere prohibet, plane me in ruborem dedit. Quale itaque tuum de me judicium eſſe cenſebo, cujus ſtylus cum tuo comparatus plane ſordet? Epiſtolæ tuæ omnes, etiam veloci calamo ſcriptæ, ſunt non tantum puræ & terſæ, ſed & vividæ ac elegantes: quæ ſi tibi diſpliceant, quid de meis judices non difficile mihi eſt colligere. Nihilominus amicitia tua fretus, confidenter quicquid in calamum venit tibi ſcribo, benignitatis tuæ, quæ defectus meos boni conſulere novit, plane ſecurus: in poſterum vero, ſi ea excuſatione uti pergas, timidiorem me in ſcribendo facies. Excuſationem itaque hanc minime admitti poſſe facile vides. Si vero negotia tua tardius nobis concedant reſponſum, nolim nimia feſtinatione graviora negligas, ſed tempus ad ſcribendum eligas minus occupatum. Quicquid & quandocunque ſcripſeris, gratiſſimum erit: interim ſi cito

des,

des, his te dediſſe gratus agnoſcam. Dedit mihi hebdomade proxime elapſa D. Clericus tuum, de Educatione liberorum, tractatum, in linguam Belgicam verſum; pro quo dono magnifico ſummas tibi ago gratias. Uxor & filia eum attente legunt: ego, ubi illæ ſatiatæ fuerint, integrum, quod & ipſis commendo, à capite ad calcem perlegam. Salutari te quam officioſiſſime juſſit vir magnificus. Vale, vir ampliſſime.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

HAC occaſione mitto tibi quædam ex Paulo Servita excerpta, quæ Hiſtoriæ Inquiſitionis inſeri poſſunt. Ego autores, quos nunc evolvo, majore cum applicatione ad materiam inquiſitionis lego, quam antehac, & ſi quid, quod ad majorem illius illuſtrationem facere poſſit, occurrat, illud excerpere ſoleo, & hiſtoriam meam locupletiorem reddere. Tu, ſi velis, aliis à me antehac ad te miſſis & hæc adjungere poteris. Quæ mihi ante triennium ex itinerario Du Mont ſuppeditâſti, ea quanto magis conſidero, tanto magis hiſtoriæ meæ inſerenda judico. Licet enim leges pontificiæ ſecretum confeſſionis revelari vetent, multa tamen in favorem fidei fiunt legibus prohibita; quas ſanciviſſe videntur eum tantum in finem, ut ſimpliciores iis irretiti facilius caperentur. Itaque non tantum inquiſitionis leges, ſed præcipue geſta ac acta illius, quæ cum legibus ſæpiſſime adverſa fronte pugnant, conſideranda cenſeo. Unum hoc expendi meretur, quod Du Mont ait, confeſſarios Melitenſes obligatos eſſe inquiſitoribus revelare quicquid ipſis in ſecreta confeſſione negotium fidei ſpectans confitentur homines. Secretas illas confeſſiones inquiſitoribus revelari nullus dubito; legem de ea revelanda extare credere vix poſſum: fortaſſe confeſſariis hoc viva voce mandatur, licet nulla hujuſmodi lex extet. Quibus accedit, quod ſit homo reformatus, & peregrinus, qui inter peregrinandum hoc ex quorundum incolarum ſermonibus hauſit; quorum relationes quandoque valde eſſe incertas, imo falſas, ex itinerariis, quibus Belgium deſcribitur, ſæpius ipſe deprehendi. Quare conſiderandum, quomodo ejuſmodi cavillationes pontificiorum ſolide retundi poſſint. Quicquid vero hujus ſit, digna mihi hæc narratio videtur, quæ hiſtoriæ meæ inſeratur, ſi ſcriptoris alicujus pontificiis non ſuſpecti autoritate confirmari poſſet. Si quæ talia tibi inter legendum plura occurrunt, rogo ut & mihi ea impertiri velis.

SCRIPSI, ante duos aut tres menſes, virum quendam eximium argumenta tua de unitate divina videndi deſiderio teneri. Ego aperte & rotunde tecum agere volui, & quod mihi in mandatis datum erat celare non

non potui. Nolui ego graviora tua negotia interturbare, aut aliquid tibi moleſtiæ creare. Scio, ſi ab animo ac negotiis tuis impetrare poſſis, argumenta tua viro magnifico fore gratiſſima, maximi enim & acumen & judicium tuum facit. Si vero negotia tua tempus attentæ ejuſmodi meditationi, & diffuſiori paulum ſcriptioni requiſitum, tibi non concedant, aut aliquam inde tibi forte creandam moleſtiam verearis (de quo tamen te ſecurum eſſe jubeo) ego à te monitus viro magnifico, prout potero, te excuſatum reddam: velim tamen eo in caſu excuſationis rationes à te mihi ſuppeditari: malim autem, ut, ſi ſine incommodo, aut incommodi metu poſſis, te viro magnifico gratiam hanc facere, ut materiam hanc, quam jamdiu animo volvit, tua opera explanatiorem habeat. Vale, vir ampliſſime.

Tui amantiſſimus,

Amſtelod. 11 Martii, $16)(98\frac{9}{3}$ P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

DOCTISSIMAS tuas literas 21 Februarii datas Martii 21. die recte accepi. Paucis id eadem die literis per filium meum tibi tradendis ſignificavi. Attente tuas cum D. Clerico relegi. Ita judicamus argumentis invictis te unitatem eſſentiæ divinæ adſtruxiſſe, nihilque in argumentatione tua deſiderari. Verum nondum viro magnifico eas oſtendendas cenſuimus, niſi ſententia tua propius explorata. Eſt enim aliquid quod mihi imputandum credo, qui viri magnifici mentem non plene tibi aperuerim. Quantum ex ipſius ſermonibus percepi, agnoſcit ille quidem evidens ſatis eſſe, unum tantum hujus univerſi eſſe rectorem: ſed argumentum deſiderat, quo probetur ens, cujus exiſtentia eſt neceſſaria, tantum poſſe eſſe unum; & quidem ut id argumentum à neceſſitate exiſtentiæ defumatur, & à priori (ut in ſcholis loquuntur) non à poſteriori concludat, hoc eſt, ex natura neceſſariæ exiſtentiæ probetur eam pluribus non poſſe eſſe communem. Narrabat enim, ſe cum aliis de materia hac differentem, dixiſſe, quod ſi tale ens exiſtat, præter Deum unicum à quo nos dependemus, illud ens minime nos ſpectare, quia ab eo non dependemus; atque hoc nobis ſufficere, ut Deum unum toto corde amemus & colamus. Sed tum diſquirendum, an tale ens neceſſario exiſtens poſſit eſſe, præter Deum neceſſario exiſtentem, à quo nos dependemus. Si quid itaque ut viri magnifici curioſitati plene ſatisfiat, addendum putes, illud expectabo: interim literas tuas ſolicite aſſervabo, ac nulli oſtendam. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & ſi quid in toto hoc negotio à me per imprudentiam forte peccatum ſit, benignus ignoſce.

Tui amantiſſimus,

Amſtelod. Kal. Apr. $16)(98\frac{1}{19}$ P. à LIMBORCH.

Lettre de Mr. LOCKE à Mr. LIMBORCH.

Monſieur,

LA queſtion que vouz m'avez propoſée, vient de la part d'une perſonne d'un genie ſi vaſte, & d'un ſi profonde capacité, que je ſuis confus de l'honneur qu'il me fait de deferer ſi fort à mon jugement dans une occaſion, ou il lui ſeroit plus advantageux & plus ſeur de s'en rapporter à lui-même. Je ne ſçai quelle opinion vous avez pû lui donner de moi, ſéduit par l'amitie que vous me portez; mais une choſe dont je ſuis fort aſſûré, c'eſt que, ſi je ne conſultois que ma propre reputation, j'eviterois d'expoſer mes foibles penſées devant une perſonne d'un ſi grand jugement, & que je ne me hazarderois pas à regarder cet article comme une queſtion à prouver: bien des gens étant peut être d'avis qu'il vaut mieux le recevoir en qualité de maxime, parce que, ſelon eux, il eſt mieux établi ſur les fondemens ordinaires que ſi l'on tâchoit de l'expliquer par des ſpéculations & des raiſonnemens auxquels tout le monde n'eſt pas accoutumé. Mais je ſçai que la perſonne, par qui je crois que cette queſtion vous a été propoſée, a l'eſprit autrement tourné. Sa candeur & ſa probité égalent ſa ſcience & ſes autres grandes qualitez. S'il ne trouve pas mes raiſons aſſez claires ou aſſez convainçantes, il ne ſera pour cela porté à condamner auſſitôt mon intention, ni à mal juger de moi ſous prétexte que mes preuves ne ſont pas auſſi bonnes qu'il l'auroit ſouhaité. Enfin, moins il trouvere de ſatisfaction dans mes raiſonnemens, plus il ſera obligé de me pardonner, parce que, quelque convaincu que je ſois de ma foibleſſe, je n'ai pas laiſſe d'obéir à ſes ordres. J'ecris donc ſimplement parce que vous le voulez l'un & l'autre; & je veux bien, Monſieur, que vouz faſſiez voir s'il vous plâit ma lettre à cette excellent homme, & aux autres perſonnes, qui ſe trouverent dans vôtre conference. Mais c'eſt aux conditions ſuivantes: La premiere, que ces Meſſieurs me promettront de m'apprendre librement & ſincerement leurs penſées ſur ce qui je dis; la ſeconde, que vous ne donnerez aucune copie de ce que je vous écris à qui que ce ſoit, mais que vous me promettrez de jetter cette lettre au feu quand je vous prierai de la faire. A quoi je ſerois bien aiſe que vous euſſiez la bonté d'ajouter une troiſiéme condition, c'eſt, que ces Meſſieurs me feront l'honneur de me communiquer les raiſons ſur leſquelles ils établiſſent eux-mêmes l'unité de Dieu.

LA queſtion dont vous me parlez, ſe réduit á ceci, " Comment l'unité " de Dieu peut être prouvée?" ou en d'autres termes, " Comment on " peut prouver qu'il n'y a qu'un Dieu?"

POUR reſoudre cette queſtion il eſt néceſſaire de ſcavoir, avant que de venir aux preuves de l'unité de Dieu, ce qu'on entend par le mot de Dieu. L'idée ordinaire, & à ce que je crois, la véritable idée qu'ont de Dieu, ceux qui reconnoiſſent ſon éxiſtence, c'eſt, qu'il eſt " un Etre in-

" fini

« fini, éternel, incorporel & tout parfait." Or cette idée une fois reconnuë, il me ſemble fort aiſé d'en déduire l'unité de Dieu. En effet un être qui eſt tout parfait, ou pour ainſi dire, parfaitement parfait, ne peut être qu'unique, parce qu'un être tout parfait ne ſçauroit manquer d'aucun des attributs, perfections ou dégrez des perfections, qu'il lui importe plus de poſſéder, que d'en être privé. Car autrement il s'en faudroit d'autant qu'il ne fut entierement parfait. Par éxemple, avoir du pouvoir eſt une plus grande perfection, que de n'en avoir point; avoir plus de pouvoir eſt une plus grande perfection, que d'en avoir moins; & avoir tout pouvoir (ce qui eſt être tout puiſſant) c'eſt une plus grande perfection que de ne l'avoir pas tout. Cela poſé; deux êtres tout puiſſans ſont incompatibles; parce qu'on eſt obligé de ſuppoſer que l'un doit vouloir néceſſairement ce que l'autre veut; & en ce cas-là, l'un des deux, dont la volonté eſt néceſſairement déterminée par la volonté de l'autre, n'eſt pas libre, & n'a pas, par conſéquent, cette perfection-la: car ill eſt mieux d'être libre, que d'être ſoumis à la détermination de la volonté d'un autre. Que s'ils ne ſont pas tous deux réduits à la neceſſité de vouloir toûjours la même choſe, alors l'un peut vouloir faire ce que l'autre ne voudroit pas qui fut fait, auquel cas la volonté de l'un prévaudra ſur la volonté de l'autre, & ainſi celui des deux, dont la puiſſance ne ſauroit ſeconder la volonté, n'eſt pas tout-puiſſant; car il ne peut pas faire autant que l'autre. Donc l'un des deux n'eſt pas tout-puiſſant. Donc il n'y a, ni ne ſauroit y avoir deux tout puiſſans, ni par conſéquent deux Dieux.

PAR la même idée de perfection nous venons à connoître, que Dieu eſt omniſcient. Or dans la ſuppoſition de deux êtres diſtincts, qui ont un pouvoir & une volonté diſtincte, c'eſt une imperfection de ne pouvoir pas cacher ſes penſées à l'autre. Mais ſi l'un des deux cache ſes penſées à l'autre, cet autre n'eſt pas omniſcient, car non ſeulement il ne connoit pas tout ce qui peut être connu, mais il ne connoit pas même ce qu'un autre connoit.

ON peut dire la même choſe de la toute-preſence de Dieu: il vaut mieux qu'il ſoit par tout dans l'étenduë infinie de l'eſpace, que d'être exclus de quelque partie de cet eſpace, car s'il eſt exclu de quelque endroit, il ne peut pas y operer, ni ſavoir ce qu'on y fait, & par conſéquent il n'eſt ni tout-puiſſant ni omniſcient.

QUE ſi pour anéantir les raiſonnemens que je viens de faire, on dit que les deux Dieux qu'on ſuppoſe; ou les deux cent mille (car par la même raiſon qu'il peut y en avoir deux il y en peut avoir deux millions, parce qu'on n'a plus aucun moyen d'en limiter le nombre) ſi l'on oppoſe, dis-je, que pluſieurs Dieux ont une parfaite toute-puiſſance qui ſoit éxactement la même, qu'ils ont auſſi la même connoiſſance, la même volonté, & qu'ils exiſtent également dans le même lieu, c'eſt ſeulement multiplier le même être, mais dans le fonds & dans la verité de la choſe on ne fait que réduire une pluralité ſuppoſée à une véritable unité. Car de ſuppoſer deux êtres intelligens, qui connoiſſent, veulent & font inceſſamment la même choſe, & qui n'ont pas une exiſtence ſeparée, c'eſt ſuppo-

ſer en paroles une pluralité mais poſer effectivement une ſimple unité. Car être inſéparablement uni par l'entendement, par la volonté, par l'action, & par le lieu; c'eſt être autant uni qu'un être intelligent peut-être uni à lui même, & par conſéquent, ſuppoſer que là, où il y a une telle union, il peut y avoir deux êtres, c'eſt ſuppoſer une diviſion ſans diviſion, & une choſe diviſée d'avec elle-même.

JE me ſuis hazardé à vous écrire mes réflexions ſur ce ſujet, comme elles ſe ſont preſentées à mon eſprit, ſans les ranger dans un certain ordre qui pourroit ſervir peut-être à les mettre dans un plus grand jour, ſi on leur donnoit un peu plus d'étenduë. Mais ceci doit paroître devant des perſonnes d'une ſi grand pénétration, que ce ſeroit les amuſer inutilement que développer davantage mes penſées. Telles qu'elles ſont je vous prie de m'en écrire vôtre opinion & celle de ces Meſſieurs, afin que ſelon le jugement que vous en ferez, je puiſſe, pour ma propre ſatisfaction, les éxaminer de nouveau, & leur donner plus de force (ce que ma mauvaiſe ſanté & le peu de loiſir qui me reſte, ne me permettent pas de faire preſentement) ou bien les abandonner tout-à fait comme ne pouvant être d'aucun uſage. Je ſuis,

Oates, 2 April, 1698.

Monſieur,
Vôtre très-humble
& très-obéïſſant ſerviteur,
J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

LITERAS tuas poſtremas recte mihi fuiſſe traditas jam intellexeris. Statim eas viro magnifico prælegi: verum quia tunc occupatior erat, aliud deſignavit tempus magis opportunum prolixiori colloquio, quod materiæ gravitas mereri videtur. Paucis itaque abhinc diebus me denuo ad ſe vocavit; iterumque epiſtolam tuam legimus. Probat argumenta tua, ſuppoſita illa, quam adhibes, Dei definitione; ens enim undiquaque perfectum, ſeu, quod eodem redit, omnes in ſe complectens perfectiones, non niſi unum eſſe poſſe manifeſtum eſt. Verum ille quærit argumentum, non ex definitione Dei deſumptum, ſed ex ipſa ratione naturali, & per quod deducamur in definitionem Dei. Hac nempe methodo inſtituit demonſtrationem ſuam. I. Datur ens æternum, independens, neceſſitate naturæ ſuæ exiſtens, & ſibi ipſi ſufficiens. II. Ens tale eſt tantum unum, & plura iſtiuſmodi entia eſſe nequeunt. III. Illud ens, quia eſt unicum, omnes in ſe complectitur perfectiones; atque hoc ens eſt Deus. Primam propoſitionem ait vir magnificus te in tractatu tuo de intellectu Humano egregie adſtruxiſſe, iiſdem plane argumentis, quibus

quibus ipſe in demonſtratione ſua uſus eſt, adeo ut ſuas cogitationes in argumentatione tua expreſſas viderit. Tanto enixius ſecundam propoſitionem à te probatam videre deſiderat: qua ſolide probata, tertia nullo negotio ex duabus prioribus deduci poteſt. Secundam ait, omnes theologos ac philoſophos, quin & ipſum Carteſium, non probare, ſed præſupponere. Non dubito, quin mihi omnem ſuam argumentationem communicaturus ſit; credo autem non id facturum, antequam tua argumenta viderit; ut tuas cogitationes, quas ipſe es meditatus, cum ſuis conferre poſſit. Verum hic ambigere quis poſſit, an non propoſitionum harum ordo mutari, & quæ nunc ſecunda eſt, tertia, & quæ nunc tertia eſt, ſecunda eſſe debeat: hoc eſt, an non, quando probatum eſt, dari ens æternum, independens, ſibi ipſi ſufficiens, exinde poſſit porro probari, illud in ſe omnes complecti perfectiones; quia fieri nequit, ut enti æterno, independenti, ſibique ſufficienti ulla perfectio deſit: atque ita probato, ens illud omnes in ſe complecti perfectiones, porro inferatur illud ens tantum eſſe unum. Verum huic methodo hæc objicitur difficultas, quod deprehendamus eſſe duas naturas tota eſſentia diverſas (loquor terminis eorum, qui hanc movent difficultatem) cogitationem & extenſionem: ſuppoſito dari cogitationem æternam, & independentem, à qua ego dependeo, ſtatuere quis poſſit etiam eſſe extenſionem ſeu materiam æternam, ſibi ipſi ſufficientem, & à cogitatione æterna minime dependentem? ſic ſtatuerentur duo entia æterna: & tamen ex poſitione materiæ æternæ & independentis minime ſequeretur, eam in ſe complecti omnes perfectiones. Quare primo probandum videtur, ens æternum & independens eſſe tantum unum, antequam omnes in ſe complecti perfectiones probari poſſit.

QUOD ſi ſecunda propoſitio, ens independens eſſe tantum unum, non poſſit probari, nihil religioni, ſeu neceſſitati ens illud unice colendi, decedere videtur: quia ego totus ab illo uno ente, quod me produxit, dependeo: illi ergo ſoli ſum obligatus, illud ex toto corde, tota anima diligere, illiuſque præceptis per omnia obedire debeo. Si præter illud ens aliud forte exiſtat, quia ab eo non dependeo, illud neutiquam me ſpectat, neque ego ullum ad id relationem habeo, neque id ullam in me operationem exſerere poteſt. Imo neutrum horum entium de altero ullam notitiam habere, aut ullam in alterum operationem edere poſſet. Quoniam enim ſibi ipſi eſt ſufficiens, ergo nec per alterius poſitionem, aut remotionem, ullam acquirere poteſt majorem perfectionem, aut de ſua perfectione quicquam amittere; alias ſibi non eſſet ſufficiens. Licet itaque veritatis ſcrutatori ſummopere gratum ſit, evidenter demonſtrare poſſe, ens independens eſſe tantum unum: ſi tamen forte contingat, illud evidenter demonſtrari non poſſe, nihil tamen religionis neceſſitati & perfectioni propterea deceſſurum videtur, quoniam ens, à quo ego dependeo, eſt tantum unum. Hæc fuit ſermonum viri magnifici ſumma, quantum ego mentem ejus percepi.

EGO argumentationis tuæ filum, in tractatu tuo de Intellectu Humano, non legi. Probâſſe te, ens aliquod eſſe à quo dependes, illudque ens eſſe æternum & ſibi ipſi ſufficiens, nullus dubito. Argumentum, quo id

probatur, evidens eſt & clarum. Verum, an ibidem probaveris, te ab uno ente tantum dependere, neque fieri poſſe ut à pluribus dependeas, ignoro. Argumentatio viri magnifici quidem infert, me ab ente æterno dependere; ſed nondum vidi ab ipſo probatum ab uno tantum ente me dependere: quod tamen ſpectat primam propoſitionem. Nam in ſecunda ponitur, præter illud ens æternum à quo ego dependeo, aliud nullum eſſe ens æternum. Itaque ſimiliter hic præſupponi videtur, me ab uno tantum ente dependere, ſaltem id nondum diſtincte probatum audivi: quod tamen primo probandum videtur, antequam ad probationem propoſitionis ſecundæ procedatur. Tum & diſpiciendum, an quidem ratio permittat, ſupponi materiam æternam ac ſibi ſufficientem: ſi enim ens ſibi ſufficiens & æternum, neceſſario ſit omni modo perfectum; ſequitur, materiam, quæ iners eſt ſubſtantia, omni motu ac vita deſtituta, non poſſe concipi æternam ac ſibi ſufficientem.

VOLUIT vir magnificus, ut tibi diſtinctius, qualem deſideret probationem, præſcriberem: verbis ſuis te quam officioſiſſime ſalutari juſſit; pro ſuſcepto in ſui gratiam labore gratias agit: dolet valetudinem tuam afflictam; & ſi ea minus permittat ſubtilioribus indulgere cogitationibus, minime cupit ut te fatiges meditationibus, tibi ob valetudinem afflictiorem moleſtis, aut valetudini noxiis. Precatur interim tibi valetudinem firmam ac vegetam; & ſi ea permittat, ut de propoſitionis ſecundæ, prout nunc à me ex mente illius propoſita eſt, judicium tuum ſcribas, rem facies ipſi gratiſſimam. Tu ipſe judicabis de illius methodo, & quid reſcribendum ſit. Hoc unum addo, ipſum, lecta tua epiſtola, nullum illius apographum petiiſſe; ſed conditionibus, quas ſtipularis, acquieviſſe: & ſi petiiſſet, ego modeſte negâſſem; verum ea eſt humanitate, ut hoc à me flagitare noluerit. Verum tandem tempus eſt manum de tabula tollere. Vale, vir ampliſſime.

Amſtelod. 16 Maii 1698.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

Lettre de Mr. LOCKE à Mr. LIMBORCH.

Monſieur,

SI ma ſantè ne me permettoit pas de ſatisfaire commodément l'envie que j'ai d'éxécuter les ordres de ce grand homme qui reçoit ſi favorablement mes réflections, toutes médiocres qu'elles ſont, il eſt pourtant vrai que je ne ſaurois la ſacrifier pour une meilleure occaſion que celle qui me porte à examiner la ſujet où il m'a engagé, & qui me fournit le moyen de lui faire voir combien je ſuis prêt à lui obêïr. Mais je ne prétens pas qu'en cette rencontre il me ſoit obligé d'un tel ſacrifice; car ſi je ne hazarde

zarde point ma réputation auprès de lui, je ſuis fort aſſuré que ma ſanté ne ſera point intéreſſée parce que je vais écrire. Ayant à faire à un homme qui raiſonne ſi nettement, & qui a ſi bien approfondi cette matiere, je n'aurai pas beſoin de parler beaucoup pour me faire entendre. Son extreme penetration lui fera ſentir d'abord le fondement de la preuve que je vais propoſer, de ſorte que, ſans qu'il ſoit néceſſaire que je m'engage dans de longues déductions, il pourra juger ſi ille eſt bien ou mal fondée.

JE ne puis m'empêcher de remarquer l'exactitude de ſon jugement par rapport à l'ordre qu'il a donné à ſes propoſitions, & il eſt vrai comme il l'a fort bien remarqué qu'en mettant la troiſiéme à la place de la ſeconde, les Théologiens, les Philoſophes, & Deſcartes lui-même, ſuppoſent l'unite, de Dieu, ſans la prouver.

SI par la queſtion qui me fuit d'abord propoſée, j'euſſe compris comme je fais préſentement, quel étoit le but de cet habile homme, je n'aurois pas envoyé la réponſe que je vous ai envoyé, mais une beaucoup plus courte & plus conforme à l'ordre de la nature & de la raiſon, où chaque choſe paroit dans ſon meilleur jour.

JE crois que quicunque réfléchira ſur ſoi-même, connoîtra évidement ſans en pouvoir douter le moins du monde, qu'il y a eû de toute éternité un être intelligent. Je crois encore qu'il eſt évident à tout homme qui penſe, qu'il y a auſſi un être infini. Or je dis qu'il ne peut y avoir qu'un être infini, & que cet être infini doit être auſſi l'être éternel; parce que, ce qui eſt infini doit avoir été infini de toute éternité, car aucuns additions faites dans le tems, ne ſauroient rendre une choſe infinie, ſi elle ne l'eſt pas en elle-même, & par elle-même, de toute éternité. Telle étant la nature de l'infini qu'on n'en peut rien ôter, & qu'on n'y peut rien ajouter. D'où il s'enſuit, que l'infini ne ſauroit être ſéparé en plus d'un, ni être qu'un.

C'EST-là, ſelon moi, une preuve à priori, que l'être éternal independent n'eſt qu'un; & ſi nous y joignons l'idée de toutes les perfections poſſibles, nous avons allors l'idée d'un Dieu éternel, infini, omniſcient, & tout-puiſſant, &c.

SI ce raiſonnement s'accorde avec les notions de l'excellent homme, qui doit le voir, j'en ſerai extrêmement ſatisfait. Et s'il ne s'en accommode pas, je regarderai comme une grande faveur s'il veut bien me communiquer ſa preuve, que je tiendrai ſecrete, ou que je communiquerai comme venant de ſa part, ſelon qu'il le jugera à propos. Je vous prie de l'aſſurer de mes trés-humbles reſpects. Je ſuis, &c.

Oates, 21 Mai, 1698. J. LOCKE.

JOANNI

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir amiciſſime,

VIRO magnifico poſtremas tuas oſtendi; illo pro labore rogatu ſuo à te ſuſcepto maximas agit gratias: non tamen in tua argumentatione acquieſcit. Methodus illius primo loco probat, dari ens aliquod per ſe exiſtens ac ſibi ſufficiens: deinde, illud ens eſſe tantum unum: tertio, illud ens in ſe complecti omnes perfectiones, ac proinde eſſe Deum. Tu vero in tua argumentatione præſupponis, omni homini attente meditanti, evidens eſſe dari ens infinitum, cui nihil addi aut demi poteſt, atque id idem ipſi eſt ac ſupponere, dari ens undiquaque perfectum: quæ eſt tertia ipſius theſis; adeo ut ex præſuppoſita illius theſi tertia probes ſecundam: cum ſecunda prius probari debeat, antequam ex illa poſſit concludi tertia. Hæc fuit cauſa cur ego tibi conſiderandum dederim, an non ordo illius mutari debeat, & quæ illius tertia eſt non debeat eſſe ſecunda theſis: verum ut argumentatio procedat, non deberet ea theſis præſupponi, ſed ex prima theſi probari: aut ſi illius methodus placeat, deberet prius ex eo, quod ſit ens æternum ac ſibi ſufficiens, probari illud eſſe unum; & hoc probato porro exinde deduci illud eſſe infinitum, ſeu undiquaque perfectum. Argumentationem ſuam mihi nondum communicavit: an communicaturus ſit, valde dubito. Idem ipſum qui te ſcrupulus retinet: metuit iniquas theologorum cenſuras, qui omnia è ſchola ſua non hauſta, atro carbone notare, ac infami exoſiſſimarum hæreſium nomenclatura traducere ſolent. Tentabo tamen, an prolixiore colloquio, quod mecum inſtituere velle dixit, aliquatenus elicere poſſim, quod ſcripto tradere gravatur. Vale, vir ampliſſime,

Amſtelod. Cal. Jul. 1698.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

POST ultimum meum cum viro magnifico colloquium nulla ipſum conveniendi occaſio fuit: aliquandiu febricula laboravit. Colloquium habui cum quodam illius amico, qui inter alia dixit, minime ſibi probari viri magnifici argumentationem, qua contendit, ſi ſupponamus dari cogitationem per ſe exiſtentem, & præterea extenſionem, ſeu materiam, quod neutra ullam alterius poſſit habere cognitionem: extenſionem quidem (aiebat) nullam habituram cognitionem cogitationis; fieri autem non poſſe, quin cogitatio cognitionem ſit habitura extenſionis: quia cum cogitatio per ſe exiſtat, ſibique ſit ſufficiens, etiam eſt infinita; ac proinde

inde vi infinitæ ſuæ cogitationis neceſſario cognoſcit extenſionem exiſtentem. Sed cum regererem, virum magnificum improbare methodum, qua enti per ſe exiſtenti ſibique ſufficienti probantur ineſſe alia attributa, antequam probatum ſit illud eſſe tantum unicum; reſpondebat, neceſſario de tali ente debere affirmari illud eſſe infinitum, ſed in ſua natura; cogitationem quidem eſſe infinitæ ſcientiæ; materiam infinitæ extenſionis, ſi quidem per ſe exiſtat. Sed inde ſequi colligebam, etiam alia attributa poſſe probari: probata enim infinitate etiam probari poſſe alia illi ineſſe, ſine quibus infinitas concipi nequit. Quod non negavit. Atque ita mecum ſentire videbatur unitatem ejuſmodi entis tali methodo fruſtra quæri, ſed oportere theſin ſecundam eſſe tertiam. Crediderim ego virum magnificum hanc ſibi inveſtigandæ veritati præſcripſiſſe methodum, & cum ipſe, quæ ſibi ſatisfaciant, argumenta invenire nequeat, ea apud alios quærere. Difficile mihi videtur probatu, ens neceſſitate naturæ ſuæ exiſtens eſſe tantum unum, antequam ex neceſſaria exiſtentia, alia, quæ eam neceſſario comitantur, attributa deduxeris. Si vir magnificus ea habeat, operæ pretium foret ea erudito orbi communicare.

NUPER profeſſor Vander Weeyen tractatulum quendam Rittangeliæ edidit, illique prolixam ac virulentam contra D. Clericum præfixit præfationem, qua explicationem initii evangelii Joannis à D. Clerico editam, refutare conatur. Ego æquitatem & judicium in illo ſcripto deſidero. In fine etiam contra me inſurgit, verum paucis, quia in Theologia mea Chriſtiana ſcripſi Burmanum pleraque, quæ in ſua Synopſi Theologiæ habet de omnipotentia divina, deſcripſiſſe ex Spinoſæ Cogitatis Metaphyſicis. Ille non negat, ſed contendit Burmannum propterea non eſſe Spinoſiſtam, quod ego nuſquam ſcripſi. Neuter noſtrûm tam inepto ſcriptori quicquam reponet. Dedi ante paucas hebdomadas N. N. literas ad te perferendas; verum ille adhuc Roterodami commoratur: vir eſt eruditus & moribus probatis. Non tu ex eorum es genere, qui viri, non per omnia tecum in religione ſentientis, alloquium horreas. Ille quando advenerit, de ſtatu noſtro plura dicere poterit. Hac hebdomade D. Guenellonus me tuis verbis ſalutavit, quodque poſtremis meis literis nondum reſponderis excuſavit. Gratiſſimæ mihi ſemper ſunt literæ tuæ, & quanto crebriores tanto gratiores; ſed non ſum importunus adeo exactor, ut cum meliorum laborum diſpendio eas à te flagitem. Scio reſponſi tarditatem non oblivioni mei, ſed negotiis, quibus obrueris, adſcribendam. Spem fecit Guenellonus nonnullam profectionis tuæ inſtante hyeme in Galliam, & reditus tui in Angliam per Hollandiam noſtram. Si id confirmandæ valetudini inſervire queat, opto ſummis votis, ut iter hoc perficias, ut tui poſt tam diuturnam abſentiam videndi & amplectendi, & fortaſſe ultimum valedicendi occaſio detur. Vale.

Amſtelod. 12 Sept. 1698.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime, Lond. 4 Octob. 1698.

ROGO ut magnificum virum meo nomine adeas, dicaſque me magnopere rogare ut ſuam methodum, qua unitatem entis per ſe exiſtentis ſibique ſufficientis adſtruit, mihi indicare velit: quandoquidem mea ea de re argumentandi ratio ipſi non penitus ſatisfaciat. Nollem ego in re tanti momenti, falſo vel fallaci innixus fundamento, mihimet imponere. Si quid ſtabilius, ſi quid rectius noverit, ut candidus impertiri velit, enixè rogito. Si tectum, ſi tacitum velit, pro me meoque ſilentio ſpondeas. Sin tantum beneficium orbi non invideat, in proxima, quæ jam inſtat, libri mei editione palam faciam, agnito, ſi libet, vel velato auctore.

CARTESIANORUM, quam in epiſtola tua reperio loquendi formulam, nullatenus capio. Quid enim ſibi velit cogitatio infinita, plane me fugit. Nullo enim modo mihi in animum inducere poſſum cogitationem per ſe exiſtere, ſed rem, vel ſubſtantiam, cogitantem, eamque eſſe, de qua affirmari poſſit eſſe vel finitam vel infinitam. Qui aliter loqui amant, neſcio quid obſcuri vel fraudulenti ſub tam dubia locutione continere mihi videntur, & omnia tenebris involvere: vel ſaltem quod ſentiant clare & dilucide enuntiare non audere, faventes nimium hypotheſi non undique ſanæ. Sed de hoc forſan alias, quando majus ſuppetet otium.

QUOD de profeſſore Vander Weeyen ſcribis non miror. Iſtius farinæ homines ſic ſolent, nec aliter poſſunt; recte facitis quod negligitis.

LITERAS tuas, quæ Roterodami hærent, avide expecto, & virum illum cui eas ad me perferendas tradidiſti. Ex tua commendatione mihi erit gratiſſimus. Viros probos fovendos colendoſque ſemper exiſtimavi. Ignoſcant alii meis erroribus; nemini propter opinionum diverſitatem bellum indico, ignarus ego & fallibilis homuncio. Evangelicus ſum ego chriſtianus, non papiſta.

HUCUSQUE ſcripſeram die ſupra notato, quo autem die epiſtolam hanc finiri permiſſum eſt, infra videbis.

QUOD velim cum me chriſtianum Evangelicum, vel ſi mavis orthodoxum, non papiſtam dico, paucis accipe. Inter chriſtiani nominis profeſſores duas ego tantum agnoſco claſſes, evangelicos & papiſtas. Hos, qui tanquam infallibiles dominium ſibi arrogant in aliorum conſcientias: illos, qui quærentes unice veritatem, illam & ſibi & aliis, argumentis ſolum rationibuſque perſuaſam volunt; aliorum erroribus faciles, ſuæ imbecillitatis haud immemores: veniam fragilitati & ignorantiæ humanæ dantes petenteſque viciſſim.

HYEMS jam ingraveſcens & pulmonibus meis infeſta me brevi urbe expellet; & abitum ſuadet invaleſcens tuſſis & anhelitus. Iter in Galliam dudum propoſitum langueſcere videtur: quid fiet neſcio, ubicunque fuero totus ubique tuus ſum. Saluto uxorem tuam optimam liberoſque amicoſque noſtros communes, Veenios, Guenellones, Clericos. Accepi

nuper

nuper à Dº Guenellone epiſtolam, 3 Octobris datam, pro qua nunc per te gratias reddere cupio, ipſi prima data occaſione reſponſurus. Vale, vir amiciſſime, & me ama

Tui amantiſſimum,

18 Octob. J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime Vir,

QUOD literis tuis hactenus non reſponderim valetudo minus proſpera in cauſa fuit. Aliquot hebdomadibus febricula laboravi, acceſſere dolores colici acres admodum ac vehementes. Tandem benignitate divina convalui, & ad intermiſſa ſtudia reverſus ſum.

CARTESIANAM illam loquendi formulam ego tecum non capio; cogitationem enim per ſe exiſtentem non percipio, ſed quidem ſubſtantiam cogitantem: verum ne ſententiam ſuam minus candide proponi querantur, iiſdem, quibus illi eam explicant verbis uti, neceſſe habui: ego autem quando me explico, ita loqui non ſoleo.

QUÆ de chriſtianis evangelicis & papiſtis diſſeris, optima ſunt & veriſſima. Ego utramque claſſem in omnibus chriſtianorum ſectis reperiri credo. Nullum enim cœtum ita prorſus corruptum mihi perſuadeo, ut nemo in tanto numero ſit evangelicus; licet enim cœtus ipſe profeſſionem edat papiſmi, nonnullos tamen in eo latere credo evangelicos, quibus dominatus ille in aliorum conſcientias diſplicet, ac diſſentientibus ſalutem abjudicare religio eſt. Rurſus licet cœtus evangelicam charitatem profiteatur, non adeo in omnibus & per omnia purgatum, ſperare auſim, quin & degeneres aliquot in eo reperiantur, qui profeſſionis ſuæ obliti, tyrannidem animo fovent, libertatemque ſentiendi, quam ſibi cupiunt, aliis invident. Ita ubique zizania tritico permixta in hoc ſæculo habebimus. Evangelicos ego, quocunque in cœtu ſunt, amo ac fraterna charitate complector. Papiſtas, licet ejuſdem mecum cœtus membra, tanquam ſpurios Chriſtianos conſidero, nec genuina eſſe corporis Chriſti membra agnoſco, utpote charitate, ex qua diſcipulos ſuos agnoſci vult Chriſtus, deſtitutos.

BIBLIOPOLÆ Churchill tradetur faſciculus, quem ad te mittet, complectens Hiſtoriam Inquiſitionis, quam cum epiſtola addita Franciſco Cudworth Maſham tradi velim: addidi tria defenſionis meæ contra Joannem Vander Weeyen exemplaria, quorum unum tibi, alterum Franciſco, tertium Dº Coſte deſtinavi. Adverſarius meus ſe reformatum vocat: an evangelicus, an vero papiſta ſit, tu dijudicabis. Amicorum hortatui obſecutus ſum; verum bonas meas horas melioribus ſtudiis deſtinavi, nec facile me iſtiuſmodi ſcriptis inde denuo avelli patiar. Ut ſcias quo reſpi-

ciam, quando de ſpatiis imaginariis ultra polos loquor, adſcribam lineas aliquot ex tractatu quodam Weeyeni contra Spanhemium, quibus Spanhemio geographiæ ignorantiam objicit, ipſe adeo rudis, ut diſcrimen inter gradus longitudinis & latitudinis prorſus ignoret. Hæc ſunt ejus verba: * " Ridere in calce ſi lubeat, lege quæſo Diſſertat. Hiſtor. p. 298. Ame-" ricæ longitudinem protendit [Spanhemius] ultra 180 gradus. Forte " pars ejus in ſpatiis imaginariis collocanda erit! cum hactenus ab uno " polo ad alium non ultra 180 gradus ponant geographi. Arcticæ & " antarcticæ terræ partibus nullus jam locus erit, ubi America ultra pó-" los ignorantiſſime protenditur. Cave credas [Spanhemio] adeo craſſe " philoſophanti, cum ad matheſin ventum eſt." Monitus ab amico, reſciſſo hoc folio, aliud ſubſtituit: ſed libellus jam toto Belgio diſperſus erat, & in omnium officinis proſtabat. Vide cum quali heroë mihi res ſit. Hyemem hanc ſine gravi incommodo ruri ut tranſigas voveo. Domino ac Dominæ Maſham, totique familiæ officioſiſſimam à nobis dicas ſalutem. Uxor ac filia te plurimum ſalutant, imprimis ego

Amſtelod. 9 Dec. 1698.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime Vir,

LITERAS tuas vir eruditiſſimus fideliter mihi ante duos circiter menſes tradidit. Edidit Weeyenus diſſolutionem defenſionis meæ, verum adeo diſſolutam, maledicam, & nihil ad principale argumentum facientem, ut ſponte evanitura ſit. Ego nolo mihi cum tam impotenti adverſario quicquam negotii eſſe. Ut exiguum aliquod ſpecimen tibi referam, carpit quod dixi indolem, qua à litibus abhorreo, mihi eſſe innatam; atque propterea me criminatur, quod glorier de propriis meis viribus, ſe vero omnia gratiæ divinæ adſcribere jactat, idque duabus aut tribus primis foliis plus ſexies repetit: talis farinæ totus eſt liber. Si dixiſſem me natura eſſe propenſum ad odium Dei & proximi, fuiſſem illi orthodoxus. Hanc ſibi indolem naturalem agnoſcit: actiones vero ejus oſtendunt, regenerationem (quam ſibi tribuit) admodum eſſe imperfectam, partemque irregenitam multum prædominari regenitæ. D. Clericus edidit Gallice ſua Parrhaſiana, in quibus de variis differit, & paucis etiam hunc hominem perſtringit: verum accuratiorem illius refutationem Latinam brevi editurus eſt. Prodiit etiam alterius docti viri tractatus, quem tibi in Anglia oſtendit. Quænam de illo aliorum futura ſint ju-

* Spanhemii epiſt. ad amicum, & neceſſ. animadverſ. p. 72. & ſeq.

dicia

dicia brevi audiemus. Multa ſupponit tanquam certa, quæ mihi incertiſſima ſunt, aliis falſa habebuntur.

LEGI nuper Camdeni Hiſtoriam Angliæ ſub Elizabetha, in cujus parte II. anno 1579. hæc verba reperi: " Execranda Matthæi Ham-" monti impietas, quæ in Deum Chriſtumque ejus, Norwici, hoc tem-" pore debacchata eſt, & cum illius vivicomburio, ut ſpero, extincta, ob-" livione potius eſt obruenda, quam memorada." Velim Camdenus paulo diſtinctius impietatem illam indicâſſet, ut de criminis, quod tam horrendo ſupplicio vindicatum fuit, atrocitate conſtare poſſit. Scimus innoxios quandoque errores à theologis blaſphemias & impietates execrandas vocari, ut crudelitati, qua in diſſentientes ſæviunt, prætextum quærant. Fruſtra ego hactenus in autoribus, qui mihi ad manum ſunt, exactiorem hujus Hammonti hiſtoriam quæſivi: non dubito tamen, quin ea in ſcriptoribus Anglis reperiri poſſit. Si ſine tuo incommodo explicatiorem illius narrationem mihi ſuppeditare queas, rem feceris mihi longè gratiſſimam. Plura illius generis collegi, quæ in ordinem redigere ſtatui, non ut alios traducam, ſed ut omnes à ſævitia in diſſentientes, quantum in me, deterream. Guenellonus noſter plurimam tibi ſalutem ſcribi juſſit. Literas traditurus eſt nobili Muſcovitæ ad te perferendas, qui propediem hinc in Anglicam trajiciet, quod tibi ſignificari voluit. Salutant te ac Dominum & Dominam Maſham totamque familiam uxor ac liberi: Franciſci Maſham epiſtola mihi perplacet, ſed jam non eſt reſpondendi otium: à tali indole egregia quævis expecto. Nominatim illi, ut & Dº Coſte ſalutem dices à me

Amſtelod. 23 Junii, 1699.

Tui amantiſſimo,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

LITERAS meas, circa menſis Junii finem ſcriptas, fideliter tibi eſſe traditas nullus dubito. Indicavit mihi D. Clericus ſibi à te miſſum D. Allix tractatum Anglicum, quo probare contendit, Paraphraſtas Judæos æternam filii Dei generationem agnoviſſe. Nuperrime hic prodiit tractatus ante plures annos, ut præfatio habet, & argumentum libri clare oſtendit, ab autore ignoto ſcriptus, qui duos ſcriptores Rittangelium & Voiſinum, idem quod D. Allix aſſerentes, impugnat. Commodâ mihi, per nautam mihi notum oblata occaſione exemplar illius ad bibliopolam Churchill tibi porro tradendum mitto, ut hujus cum tractatu D. Allix collatione inſtituta, de tota controverſia judices. Ego non video cauſæ principali aliquod creari periculum, etiamſi argumento hoc, ex Judæorum ſcriptis deprompto, propugnari non poſſet: nec ego tali argu-

mento, in diſputatione contra Judæos, multum tribuere auſim. Alia ſunt majoris momenti, & quæ fortius ſtringunt: verum hoc ſine occultæ cum fidei hoſtibus conſpirationis ſuſpicione affirmari non patiuntur orthodoxiæ, ſemel decretis humanis definitæ, jurati vindices, quibus piaculum eſt vel unum argumentum, licet elumbe ac ſtramineum, modo à zelotis adhiberi ſolitum, omittere, aut de illius evidentia ac robore vel minimum dubitare.

ADFUERE mihi nuper aliquot præſtantiſſimi Angli, de quibus, an tibi noti ſint, ignoro. Omnes mihi narraverunt T—— quendam, juvenem Hibernum, & ut audio, non magnifice de ſ. ſcripturæ divinitate ſentientem, aliquoties gloriatum de honore, ſibi ab aliquot viris eruditis in patria noſtra exhibito: inter alia etiam amicitiam ac familiaritatem mecum contractam jactare. Miror quid hominem, nunquam mihi viſum, quique ater an albus ſit ignoro, moveat, falſo jactare familiaria mecum habita colloquia. Quoniam autem juſtam mihi cauſam præbet ſuſpicandi, ſimilia eum de noſtra amicitia in Anglia diſſeminaturum, hac occaſione id ſcribere tibi conſultum duxi: ut ſi quid ſimile jactet rumorem illum falſi coarguere queas. Antehac de D. Clerici amicitia multum gloriatus eſt; ipſum hunc bis convenit, ſed ſemel in alienis ædibus: verum ita à Clerico exceptus eſt, ut de conſenſu illius ſecum minime gloriari queat. Sub prælo jam habet D. Clericus aliquot epiſtolas, quibus ſe contra criminationes Cavei, Weeyeni, aliorumque defendit. Semel hoc labore defungi cupit, ideoque pluribus ſimul reſpondet. Vitam Epiſcopii à Marco Teute in Latinum ſermonem verſam relegi: quædam emendavi; omnia autem ſi emendare cupiam, res magni eſſet laboris: addidi etiam quædam, quibus Hiſtoria noſtra exteris plenius paulo explicatur: verum quoniam non Remonſtrantiſmi, ſed ſolummodo vitæ Epiſcopii Hiſtoriam conſcripſi, intra cancellos rerum ab ipſo Epiſcopio geſtarum continere me debui. Fortaſſe verſio illa, qualiſcunque ſit, brevi prælo ſubjicietur. Vale, vir ampliſſime: ſalutem dices Dominæ Maſham totique familiæ, à me, uxore, & filia, qui omnes tibi ſalutem precantur.

Amſtelod. 3 Auguſt. 1699.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

NUDIUSTERTIUS tractatum contra Rittangelium, quem mihi miſiſti, accepi. Benigne mecum actum erit, ſi hoc nomine mihi ignoſcas tarditatem reſponſi ad literas tuas, tertio Auguſti datas. Nondum mihi vacui temporis ſatis datum eſt, ut Allixi librum hoc de argumento

mento aggrederer, qui mirus pleriſque primo auditu viſus eſt, quod trinitatis doctrinam è ſynagoga haurire præ ſe fert. Accingam me quamprimum jam per otium liceat ad utriuſque lectionem; multi enim, ut audio, apud nos dictitant quæſtionem hanc, prius non intellectam, jam primum in lucem produxiſſe Allixium, & ſuis fundamentis innixam mundo obtuliſſe. Quas partes hac in controverſia habent Judæi, perpenſis utrinque argumentis jam videbimus.

HIBERNUM quem nominas, vanæ hujuſmodi gloriolæ avidum, ex aliis audivi: ſi de te tuaque amicitia aliquid jactitet apud communes amicos familiareſque meos, quam omnino tibi ignotus ſit, ex me ſcient.

CRIMINATIONES hujuſmodi adverſariorum, quibuſcum res eſt Domino Clerico, an negligendæ, an refutandæ, haud facile eſt ſtatuere. Quidam enim non aliud quærunt niſi calumniandi rixandique anſam. Non dubito quin amicus noſter ſatis habet quod reſpondeat. Ego ſane laudo tuum conſilium, qui placide juxta ac ſoline refutaveris quæ contra te maligne ſcripſerat Weeyenus. De controverſiarum, quæ me aliquamdiu exercuerunt, eventu, etiamſi non multum habeam quod querar, piget tamen pœnitetque tantum temporis mihi ſuffuratum, quod aliis ſtudiis majore cum fructu poterat impendi. Si quæ novæ oriantur vellicationes, eas in poſterum mihi negligendas cenſeo.

VITAM Epiſcopii latinitate donatam lubens viderim; Belgica enim lingua non ſatis mihi nota, ut quam tu ediderіs legere poſſim. Non dubito quin multa contineat ſcitu & jucunda & utilia, ſive mores privatos reſpicias, ſive rerum eo tempore geſtarum hiſtoriam.

HACTENUS ad tuas 3 Auguſti datas, ſed qua excuſatione utar, cum reſpicio ad antiquiores, ſcilicet menſe Junio ſcriptas? Si delictum conſuetudine delinquendi defendi poſſit, habeo quod dicam: nôſti tarditatem meam hoc in genere. Fac ut ſoles, & inveteraſcentem in me delinquendi morem tu conſuetudine ignoſcendi vincas.

CUM in noviſſimis tuis de viro magnifico ne verbum quidem, amici tui opinionem pronus amplector. Operoſe ab aliis quærit, non quod domi habet, ſed quod nuſquam adhuc reperire potuit, & quod forſan reperiri poſſit *.

TRACTATUS viri docti, quem in Angliæ videram, apud vos editus, nondum ad manus meas pervenit: de fundamentis quibus tanquam certiſſimis ſuperſtructum cenſuit, minime mihi ſatisfecit, cum de iis coram diſceptavimus.

EXACTIOREM Hammonti hiſtoriam quæſivi, nondum autem reperi quenquam, qui eam mihi explicatius tradere poſſit, vel ſcriptorem aliquem indicare in quo eam reperire licet. Non tamen deſiſtam. Laudo enim conſilium tuum in colligendis hujuſmodi exemplis.

GUENELLONI noſtri literas, quas me expectare juſſeras, nondum vidi, nec nobilem Muſcovitam, cui tradendæ erant ad me perferendæ. Quo

* Mirum viros clariſſ. latuiſſe quæ ſuper hac quæſtione meditatus eſt B. Spinoſa. Vide epiſt. 39, 40, 41. & oper poſthum.

infortunio hoc acciderit, nondum ſcio. Doleo interim mihi ablatam occaſionem teſtandi, quam paratus eſſem inſervire peregrino, à tam caro amico adventanti. Illum uxoremque ipſius, ſocerumque ejus Veenium noſtrum, officioſiſſime meo nomine quæſo ſalutes: imprimis autem uxorem liberoſque tuos. Vale, & me, ut facis, ama

Lond. 5 Sept. 1699.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

LICET nihil mihi literis tuis gratius ſit, abſit tamen, ut amicum plurimis ac graviſſimis diſtractum negotiis, ad ſingulis meis reſpondendum conſtringi cupiam. Amicitia arithmeticam illam ſcribendi & reſpondendi proportionem non requirit, ſed in prompto ac benevolo amici animo acquieſcit, & bene ſecum actum credit, quotieſcunque amicus aliquam à gravioribus curis reſpirationem nactus, vel tantillum temporis, epiſtolio, licet breviori, impendit. Ego ex tuis te recte valere lætus intellexi: Deus hanc tibi diu continuet valetudinem. Anonymi librum contra Rittangelium recte ad manus tuas perveniſſe gaudeo. Ubi eum legeris & cum Allixii libro contuleris, rem mihi facies maximopere gratam, ſi vel tribus lineis judicium tuum de utroque ad me ſcribas.

D. CLERICI epiſtolæ criticæ, quibus pluribus, qui calamum in ipſum ſtrinxerunt ſimul reſpondet, brevi lucem videbunt. Adverſarios habet parum candidos, & eorum quoſdam imperitos admodum ac indoctos; præſertim illum qui ipſum & me non provocatus invaſit. Homo ille omnium imperitus de omnibus judicium pronuntiat, quæque minime intelligit magno cum ſupercilio carpit. Contra Clericum ſcribit, Philonem à Spencero vocari fabularum ſterquilinium: verum quod Spencerus ſcribit de fictitio antiquitatum biblicarum libro, Philoni falsò tributo, quique nuſquam in Philonis operibus exſtat, ille de genuino Philone dicta putat. Et hic heros, adeo in Philone hoſpes, Clericum malæ fidei in Philone citando accuſare audet. Me ſibi ſeditionem objicere putat, quando triumphum in ſpatiis imaginariis agere jubeo, innumerabili ex fœcunda gente Meneni turba currum fauſtis acclamationibus proſequente: ignarus fœcundam gentem Meneni non ſeditioſos, ſed ſtolidos, quorum magna ubique copia eſt, deſignare. Clerico contra talem adverſarium ſimilem, quanquam non adeo glorioſum, propter adverſarii exiguam eruditionem, eventum, qualem tu nuper omnium judicio conſecutus es, prævideo. Scripſit de eo nuperrime ad me doctus quidem Anglus, qui me præterito anno vidit, his verbis: " Non dubito quin jamdudum audiviſti de indubitata " victoria, quam amicus tuus D. Locke retulit de epiſcopo Vigornienſi, " in ejus reſponſione ultima ad objectiones epiſcopi, contra librum " de intellectu Humano. Epiſcopus eam vidit, nec multo poſt mor-

" tuus

" tuus eſt. Sed etiamſi diutius vixiſſet, vix credo eum reſponſurum " fuiſſe: omnia enim iſtic adeo ad vivum demonſtrantur, ut nullus lo- " cus contradictioni relinquatur."

EXACTIOREM Hammonti hiſtoriam quærendo nolo multum te fatiges: ſi abſque tuo incommodo eam mihi ſuppeditare potuiſſes, gratum fuiſſet. Credidi ego lingua Anglica exſtare hiſtorias eccleſiaſticas, in quibus hoc hæretici adeo horrendi exemplum prætermiſſum neutiquam eſt. Ejuſmodi enim orthodoxiæ de hæreſibus triumphos zelotæ, in ſuis hiſtoriis, magnifice deprædicare ſolent. Sed quoniam illud exemplum tibi obvium non eſt, ego brevi illa Camdeni narratione contentus ero. Epiſcopii vitam jam paucas intra hebdomadas prælo ſubjiciendam credo, quoniam ingens, quod ſub prælo habebat typographus, opus jam jam in lucem proditurum eſt, ut jam illius præla hujus opuſculi editione occupari poſſint.

DE magnifico viro nihil jam audio, nihil etiam ab ipſo reſponſi expecto. Videtur aliquatenus congreſſum meum vitare, fortaſſe quia me reſponſum flagitaturum credit: verum ego ſtatui eum amplius non urgere, ne reſponſum, quod declinet, flagitando importunus videar.

ME Guenelloni, quæ de eo ſcripſiſti, prælegiſſe teſtes ſunt literæ ipſius, quibus has incluſas voluit. Ipſe de nobili illo Muſcovita pluribus ad te ſcribit. Salutem quam officioſiſſime à nobis dices Dominæ Maſham totique familiæ. Salutant te uxor & liberi, imprimis ego

Amſtelod. 2 Oct. 1699. Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUOD à me petiiſti, quærendo apud veterem hiſtoricum tandem inveni. En tibi igitur Hammonti crimen & vivicomburium.

MATTHÆUS HAMMONT aratrorum faber ex vico Hetharſet, tribus milliaribus à Norwico diſtante, reus factus coram epiſcopo Norwicenſi accuſatus, quod negaverat Chriſtum ſalvatorem noſtrum. Comparenti in judicio objectum eſt, quod ſequentes propoſitiones hæreticas publicâſſet, nempe quod Novum Teſtamentum & evangelium Chriſti pura ſtultitia erat, inventum humanum, & mera fabula. Quod homo in gratiam reſtituitur ſola miſericordia divina, ſine ope ſanguinis, mortis, & paſſionis Chriſti. Inſuper, quod Chriſtus non eſt Deus, nec ſalvator mundi, ſed merus homo, peccator, & idolum abominandum; & quod omnes, qui illum colunt, ſunt idololatræ abominandi. Item, quod Chriſtus non reſurrexit à morte ad vitam, poteſtate ſuæ divinitatis, neque in cœlum aſcendit. Item, quod Spiritus ſanctus non eſt Deus, nec quidem omnino eſt. Item, quod baptiſmus in eccleſia Dei non eſt neceſſarius, nec uſus ſacramenti corporis & ſanguinis Chriſti. Propter quas hæreſes

hæreſes condemnatus eſt in conſiſtorio, epiſcopo ſententiam pronunciante, 13 die Aprilis 1579, & deinde traditus vicecomiti Norwicenſi. Et quia verba blaſphemiæ (non recitanda) locutus fuerat contra reginam alioſque è concilio reginæ ſanctiore, condemnatus eſt à judice Norwicenſi Windamo, & prætore Norwicenſi Roberto Wood, ut ei amputarentur auriculæ, quod factum eſt in foro Norwicenſi 13 Maii, & poſtea 12 ejuſdem menſis vivicomburium paſſus eſt, in foſſa caſtelli Norwicenſis.

HACTENUS Hollinſhead ad annum 21 Elizabethæ. Huic ſimile exemplum reperio in eodem hiſtorico, ad annum Elizabethæ 25. Verba authoris hæc ſunt:

18 DIE Septembris anno 1583, Johannes Lewes, hæreticus obſtinatus, qui negavit deitatem Chriſti, & profeſſus plures alias deteſtandas hæreſes, quales fere erant prædeceſſoris ſui Hammonti, combuſtus eſt Norwici.

LUBET etiam duo alia exempla ejuſmodi ex alio autore ſuggerere, quæ tibi etiam forte uſui eſſe poſſunt in eo, quod præ manibus habes, argumento. Primum eſt vivicomburium Bartholomæi Legatt Londinenſis, anno 1611, & Jacobi primi 9, ob varios errores, hæreſes, & blaſphema dogmata aſſerta & publicata, præcipue in his tredecim poſitionibus ſequentibus. Nempe quod ſymbolum dictum Nicænum, illudque alterum Athanaſii, non continent veram profeſſionem fidei chriſtianæ: vel quod ille ipſe non vult profiteri ſuam fidem ſecundum illa ſymbola. Quod Chriſtus non eſt de Deo Deus genitus, non factus; ſed & genitus & factus. Quod nullæ ſunt in Deitate perſonæ. Quod Chriſtus non fuit Deus ab æterno, ſed incipit eſſe Deus, quando carnem aſſumpſit ex virgine Maria. Quod Mundus non fuit factus per Chriſtum. Quod apoſtoli docent Chriſtum eſſe merum hominem. Quod in Deo nulla ſit generatio niſi creaturarum. Quod hæc aſſertio, Deus factus eſt homo, contraria eſt fidei regulæ & blaſphemia enormis. Quod Chriſtus non fuit ante plenitudinem temporis, niſi promiſſione. Quod Chriſtus non fuit aliter Deus quam unctus Deus. Quod Chriſtus non fuit in forma Dei æqualis Deo, i. e. in ſubſtantia Dei, ſed in juſtitia & dando ſalutem. Quod Chriſtus deitate ſua nulla operatus eſt miracula. Quod preces Chriſto non ſunt offerendæ.

HIC Bartholomæus Legatt ab epiſcopo Londinenſi, aſſiſtentibus conſentientibuſque aliis reverendis epiſcopis, doctiſque clericis, hæreſeos condemnatus eſt, & brachio ſæculari traditus, & deinde igni commiſſus & combuſtus in Weſt-Smithfield Londini.

EODEM ſupplicio affectus eſt Edvardus Wightman, in civitate Lichfield, anno 1611, ab epiſcopo Coventriæ & Lichfield, hæreſeos damnatus, ob has ſequentes opiniones:

1. QUOD non eſt trinitas perſonarum, patris, filii, & ſpiritus ſancti, in unitate Deitatis.

2. QUOD Jeſus Chriſtus non eſt verus, naturalis filius Dei, Deus perfectus, & ejuſdem ſubſtantiæ, æternitatis, & majeſtatis cum patre, reſpectu deitatis ſuæ.

3. QUOD

3. QUOD Jeſus Chriſtus eſt homo ſolummodo, & mera creatura, & non Deus ſimul & homo in una perſona.

4. QUOD ſalvator noſter Chriſtus non ſibi ſumpſit carnem humanam ex ſubſtantia virginis Mariæ matris ſuæ; & quod promiſſio illa, "Semen mu-"lieris conteret caput ſerpentis," non adimpleta erat in Chriſto.

5. QUOD perſona ſpiritus ſancti non eſt Deus, coæqualis, coæternus, coeſſentialis cum patre & filio.

6. QUOD tria ſymbola, ſc. Apoſtolorum, Nicænum, & Athanaſii, continent hæreſin Nicolaïtarum.

7. QUOD ille, nempe Eduardus Wightman, eſt propheta ille, cujus mentio facta eſt xviii. Deuteron. his verbis: "Suſcitabo illis prophetam," &c. Et quod verba Iſaiæ, "Ego ſolus torcular calcavi," & Lucæ, "Cujus ventilabrum in manu ejus," pertinent proprie & perſonaliter eidem dicto Eduardo Wightman.

8. QUOD ille, nempe Wightman, eſt perſona illa ſpiritus ſancti, cujus mentio facta eſt in ſcriptura, & paracletus ille, de quo loquitur Joannes, c. xvi. evangelii ſui.

9. QUOD verba ſalvatoris noſtri Chriſti, de peccato blaſphemiæ contra ſpiritum ſanctum, de ſua perſona intelligenda ſunt.

10. QUOD Elias ille venturus, de quo loquitur Malach. c. iv, ſuam perſonam deſignat.

11. QUOD anima æque ac corpus dormit in ſomno primæ mortis, & eſt mortalis, reſpectu ſomni primæ mortis, uti corpus; & quod anima ſervatoris noſtri Jeſu Chriſti in illo ſomno mortis dormivit, æque ac corpus ejus.

12. QUOD animæ ſanctorum defunctorum non ſunt membra, quæ poſſident eccleſiam triumphantem in cœlo.

13. QUOD Pædobaptiſmus eſt ritus abominandus.

14. QUOD celebratio cœnæ dominicæ in elementis panis & vini in eccleſia eſſe non debet; neque baptiſmi in elemento aquæ, uti nunc in eccleſia Anglicana uſus obtinet. Sed baptiſmus in aqua adminiſtrari debet ſolis adultis à paganiſmo ad fidem converſis.

15. QUOD Deus ordinavit & miſit illum, ſcil. Eduardum Wightman, ad exequendum ſuam partem operis ſalutis mundi, ut ſua doctrina ſuiſque monitis mundum liberaret ab hæreſi Nicolaïtarum, ut Chriſtus ordinatus fuit & miſſus ad mundum ſervandum, & à peccato liberandum morte ſua, & Deo reconciliandum.

16. QUOD Chriſtiana religio non integra, ſed pars ſolum illius prædicatur & admittitur in eccleſia Anglicana.

HÆC ex lingua Anglicana nimis fidus interpres, verbatim pene, neglecta latinitatis elegantia & ſermonis proprietate, tranſtuli, ut dogmata illa hæretica & capitalia, quæ ſupplicium illud meruerunt, tibi, ut apud nos memoriæ mandantur, perfecte innoteſcerent. Si qua alia hujus generis exempla apud nos extant, ſi cupias, ex noſtra hiſtoria eruam & ad te mittam.

DUM hæc præ manibus haberem, allata mihi eſt gratiſſima tua 2. hujus menſis ſcripta epiſtola, adjunctis duabus aliis. Sentio te eundem ſemper quem fueras, facilem, dulcemque amicis.

QUAMPRIMUM per otium licebit Allixii & Anonymi libros mihi perlegendos proponam, nec oſcitanter. Quandoquidem in eo cardine ſummam quæſtionis verſari creditum eſt. Gaudeo D. Clerici Epiſtolas Criticas propediem prodituras; ut brevi confoſſis adverſariis in pace vacet ſtudiis melioribus. Controverſiarum enim tædium ingens, fructus exiguus. De magnifico viro idem quod tu plane ſentio, nec ultra fatigandum cenſeo. Guenellonis epiſtolæ amicæ brevi reſpondebo. Hos ambos interim rogo officiociſiſſime meo nomine ſalutes, ut et uxorem tuam et filiam; Dominam Guenellonem, Veeneumque, reliquoſque amicos noſtros communes. Vale, &, ut facis, me ama

Lond. 7 Octob. 1699.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

PRO labore, quem meo rogatu ſuſcepiſti, maximas tibi habeo gratias. Gaudeo me ex literis tuis didiciſſe, quæ epiſcoporum illius temporis judicio horrenda illa crimina fuerint, non niſi atrociſſimo ignis ſupplicio luenda. Video quandoque unum idemque dogma diverſis verbis enuntiari, atque ita, quod uno comprehendi poterat articulo, in plures diſtendi, proculdubio ut plurium hæreſium reatus tam atroci ſupplicio prætexi poſſit. Malim dogmata ipſis eorum, qui ea profeſſi fuerint, verbis legere expreſſa; ſic certus forem, me non legere conſequentias, ſed ipſa dogmata, eaque non terminis odioſis concepta, forte in alienum ſenſum detorta, ſed ipſis autorum verbis nude & candide enuntiata, nihilque continentia, niſi quod ipſe, cujus cauſa agitur, pro ſuo agnoſcit. Quando autem procedendi modum video, ad ſancti tribunalis inſtar omnia exacte eſſe conformata, non ſine dolore, agnoſco. Bartholomæi Legatt, ſupplicium, verum ſuppreſſo illius nomine, laudat Caſaubonus, in epiſtola dedicatoria in Exercit. ad Baronium. Wightmani ſupplicium paucis narrat Gilbertus Clerke, in Antinicæniſmo contra Bullum, p. 30. Utriuſque autem latius deſcribit Gerardus Croeſius Hiſtoriæ Quakerianæ, lib. iii. p. 479. Verum licet non penitus illorum ſuppliciorum ignarus ſim, rem mihi feciſti longe gratiſſimam, quod pleniorem hæreſium ipſis attributaram hiſtoriam miſeris: multa hactenus mihi ignorata, & ſcopo meo apprime inſervientia, me docuiſti. Verum unum eſt quod deſidero, nomen autoris ex quo hiſtoriam Legatti & Wightmani habes: illud enim in epiſtola tua non reperio. Tum & leviculum erratum, fortaſſe calami feſtinatione, commiſſum eſt. Ais Hammonto auriculas amputatas in foro Norwi-

Norwicenſi, 13 Maii, & poſtea 12 ejuſdem menſis illum vivicomburium paſſum. Atqui dies duodecimus antecedit decimum tertium. Præter hæc ſupplicia legi in Burneti Hiſtoria Reform. Eccl. Angl. ad annum 1549, ſub Eduardo VI. vivicomburium Johannæ Bocheræ, ſeu Johannæ de Kent, & Georgii Van Pare, utrumque ſatis diſtincte deſcriptum: itaque nihil eſt quod hic deſidero.

VERUM in Mennonitarum ſcriptis, ad annum 1575, reperio ſub Elizabetha, ſævam, contra Mennonitas è Belgio profugos, excitatam perſecutionem. Narrant nimirum, cœtus ſuos in Anglia fuiſſe diſturbatos, aliquot ſuorum in carcerem conjectos, quorum quinque, poſt varias diſputationes & comminationes mortis, ad profeſſionem religionis reformatæ adacti ſunt: qui nihilominus in cœmeterio Divi Pauli publico ſpectaculo fuere expoſiti, ſingulorumque humero rogus fuit impoſitus, quod deſignabatur ignis ſupplicium fuiſſe meritos. Quatuordecim mulieres navibus ſunt impoſitæ, juvenis quidam currui alligatus flagris cæſus, unaque cum mulieribus regno exire juſſus, intentata pœna mortis ſi redirent. Quinque viri in ſqualido ac profundo carcere detenti ſunt, quorum unus in carcere diem ſuum obiit. Miniſtri Belgicarum & Gallicarum eccleſiarum Londini reliquos quatuor in ſuam ſententiam pellicere conabantur. Tandem Julii die 22, duo maximi natu, Johannes Petri & Henricus Terwoord, eodem in loco, in quo antehac reformatis ignis ſupplicium irrogatum fuit, vivi combuſti & in cineres redacti ſunt, &c. Hiſtoriam hanc ſatis diſtincte, multiſque circumſtantiis veſtitam narrant Mennonitæ. De hiſce nihil prorſus ſcribit Camdenus; ſolummodo ad annum 1560, refert Elizabetham anabaptiſtas & id genus hæreticos, qui in maritima Angliæ oppida ex tranſmarinis regionibus, ſpecie declinandæ perſecutionis, convolârant, & ſectarum virus in Anglia ſparſerant, è regno intra viginti dies excedere imperâſſe, ſive illi indigenæ, ſive exteri, ſub pœna incarcerationis & bonorum amiſſionis. Velim ſcire, ſi levi labore fieri poſſit, an quæ de ſupplicio hoc narrant ſcriptores Angli conſentanea ſint illis, quæ hic ex Mennonitarum ſcriptis excerpſi. Talia in reformationis opprobrium cedunt. Mihi enim perinde chriſtianæ charitati adverſari videtur tribunal de fide, ſive id prope Tiberim, ſive Lemanum, ſive Thameſin conſtituatur: eadem quippe exercetur crudelitas, licet alio in loco & ab aliis hominibus. Et ut noſtrate proverbio dicitur, "Idem eſt monachus, ſed alio indutus cu-"cullo." Judicium tuum de Allixii & Anonymi libro audire geſtio. In hoc argumento quæſtionis cardinem verti à veſtratibus credi miror. Ego nihil cauſæ principali contra Judæos deeſſe credo, etiamſi hoc argumento deſtituatur. D. Clerici Epiſtolæ Criticæ nondum prodeunt; propediem vero eas expectamus. Vale, vir ampliſſime,

Amſtelod. 6 Nov. 1699. Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

RECTE quidem mones, vir ampliſſime, errore feſtinantis calami tranſpoſiti ſunt characteres numerales, & 12 ſcriptum pro 21: nam 21 Maii Hammontus paſſus eſt vivicomburium. Quereris inſuper, idque non ſine cauſa, quod nomen auctoris, ex quo hiſtoriam Legatti & Wightmani hauſi, omiſerim. Id autem negligentia non factum mea eſt. Libellus proſtat Anglicè, cui titulus, "The hiſtory of the firſt four-"teen years of king James;" i. e. Hiſtoria quatuordecim primorum annorum Jacobi regis. Autor nomen ſuum tacuit. Huic libello annectitur ad finem tractatulus, cui titulus, "A true relation of the commiſſions and "warrants for the condemnation and burning of Bartholomew Legatt and "Edward Wightman, the one in Weſt-Smithfield, the other in Litch-"field, in the year 1611, ſigned with king James's own hand."

DE Mennonitis quod quæris, nondum aliquid ex noſtris hiſtoricis eruere mihi contigit, quod tibi ſatisfaciat, vel lucem afferat: forſan quia idonei hic rure non ad manus ſint ſcriptores, quos conſulam. Ne tamen tibi in tam deſiderato opere quicquam, quod in me eſt, opis tibi deſit, id negotii dedi ingenuo doctoque amico, ut ſi qua opera reperire poſſit, inter autores noſtros, illius rei monumenta, id totum quicquid eſt, excerptum ad me tranſmittere velit. Quamprimum aliqua teſtimonia, ad rem tuam facientia, mihi oblata fuerint, tibi confeſtim tranſmittenda curabo.

ALLIXII librum, quamprimum prodiit, coëmi, animo legendi, ſed otioſe hactenus præ manibus jacuit, nec dum, ſive per valetudinem, ſive per alias avocationes, legere licuit; ſpero propediem pinguius & fructuoſius otium. Quid de eo audias interim mihi dicas. Quidam apud nos valde paradoxam credunt doctrinam trinitatis, Judæis tribuere, & ſtabilimentum iſtius dogmatis è ſynagoga petere. Alii è contra dictitant, hoc jugulum cauſæ eſſe; & hoc fundamento ſtabiliri orthodoxiam & everti omnia unitariorum argumenta. Quid ipſa res doceat, aveo videre, opem enim in hac cauſa à Judæis & Rabbinis olim non expectavi. Sed lux ſemper gratiſſima, undecunque affulgeat.

DOMINA Maſham reliquique ex hac familia te plurimum ſalvere jubent. Noſque omnes tibi tuiſque omnibus felicem annum exoptamus. Vale, vir optime, &, ut facis, me ama

Oates, 6 Jan. 1700.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

VEENIUM, Guenellonem, Clericum, reliquoſque noſtros, quæſo meo nomine officioſiſſime ſalutes, quibus omnibus felicem hujus ſæculi exitum & futuri introitum opto.

JOANNI

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUOD hactenus ad amiciſſimas tuas ſiluerim, ulla tui oblivione factum credas nolim. Multa reſponſum diſtulere; præcipue quidem triſtis ille caſus tibi ſatis notus, & mœror inde contractus. Ego ad ſtudia, hoc infelici caſu multum languentia, reverſus ſum; recuperata jam ſanitate, quæ valde afflicta fuit. Relegi epiſtolam tuam; video nihil eam continere quod promptum reſponſum flagitet; attamen benevolus tuus affectus, quo propoſitum meum promovere contendis, citius merebatur reſponſum: tu autem tarditatem facile condonabis mœrori meo.

DE Bilibra hic apud nos altum eſt ſilentium. Verum vidi reverendiſſimum epiſcopum Bathonienſem & Wellenſem, in præfatione tertiæ partis contra Judæos, eam breviter & generatim oppugnâſſe. Ego velim genuinum ſtatum controverſiæ ingenue ac terminis minime ambiguis proponi, & argumenta candide ac ſolide in utramque partem expendi, quod prolixiorem tractatum & animum non ſtudio partium abreptum, ſed veritatis ſincere ſtudioſum, requirit. Prodiit hac hyeme liber Gallice ſcriptus, cui autor titulum præfixit, " Le Platoniſme dévoilé." Autorem jam obiiſſe præfatio docet. Dicitur in Anglia ſcriptus, indeque huc miſſus, ut in lucem edatur. Quamvis eruditus ſit tractatus, multis diſpliciturum credo: & licet ego diſcrepantes de religione ſententias, ſine ulla erga autores indignatione, inveſtigare ſoleo, non poſſum tamen diſſimulare, aculeatos ipſius ſarcaſmos in materia ſacra mihi quam maxime diſplicere; licet enim credere poſſet, adverſarios, quos oppugnat, illos meruiſſe; materiæ tamen quam tractat majeſtas cohibere eum debuiſſet, ne hic quicquam gravitati chriſtianæ adverſum immiſceret. Tum & prudentiæ fuit, mordacibus ejuſmodi ſarcaſmis adverſariorum contra ſe ac ſuos indignationem, alias ſatis acrem, non magis exacerbare. Audio plura illius exemplaria in Angliam eſſe miſſa; quare à te viſum eſſe nullus dubito.

BURMANNI filios, dehortantibus nequicquam amicis, contra me tractatum ſcripſiſſe aiunt, eumque jam ſub prælo eſſe, ac brevi proditurum: Weeyenum habuere continuum inſtigatorem, qui cum Burmannum purgare non potuit, illius filios in me concitavit, ut ipſi, ſub ſpecioſo defendendi patris prætextu, inanem in ſe ac inglorium laborem ſuſciperent: non enim verba parentis ſui, nec Spinoſæ, è libris editis eradere poſſunt; neque inficiari eadem eſſe quæ in Spinoſa, & parentis ſui ſynopſi Theologiæ leguntur verba. Quæſtio facti eſt, quæ, prolatis ex utroque autore teſtimoniis, in dubium vocari nequit. Ego talia ſcripta maxima animi ſerenitate contemnere poſſum. Vale, vir ampliſſime. Salveat Domina Maſham cum tota familia. Omnes mei te ſalutant.

Amſtelod. 11 Maii, 1700.

Tui amantiſſimus,
P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

ANTE hebdomadas aliquot, tuo nomine, mihi datus eſt præſtantiſſimus tuus de Intellectu Humano liber, in linguam Gallicam verſus. Pro eximio illo dono grates tibi, quas poſſum maximas, ago. Nondum eum legere potui; verum nunc inſtant feriæ meæ, quibus ejus lectionem deſtinavi. Materiæ enim, quæ in illo tractatur, gravitas ac varietas, quam ex capitum indice didici, ſummam animi attentionem, & continuatam minimeque interruptam lectionem requirit. Itaque tempus, quo à quotidianis negotiis immunitatem habeo, illi impendam, ut tanto majore meo cum fructu eum evolvam.

LEGI in novellis noſtratibus, quod & D. Clericus literis tuis confirmavit, te ob ætatem ingraveſcentem & valetudinem minus firmam, honoratiſſimi muneris, ante aliquot annos tibi demandati, dimiſſionem obtinuiſſe. Equidem inſtitutum tuum minime improbare poſſum, quinimo laude dignum cenſeo, quod extremos vitæ tuæ dies, procul à ſtrepitu politico, quieti, ſtudiis ac meditationibus ſacris conſecrare, quam negotiis honeſtis quidem, attamen nihil ultra vitæ hujus tranquillitatem ſpectantibus, implicatos habere malueris. Hanc tibi quietem ex animo gratulor, Deumque precor, ut ſenectutem tuam eximiis, quibus vera paratur felicitas, donis magis magiſque exornet, ac quicquid corpuſculi viribus decedit, vivaciore mentis acie & ſpiritus robore compenſet.

TANDEM prodiit contra me Burmannorum Pietas, is libri titulus eſt, mole ingens, verboſus, contumelioſis plurimis declamationibus & invectivis refertus. Illi per D. Crucium, fratrem ſuum uterinum, à civitate Leidenſi in collegium rerum maritimarum deputatum, mihi pietatis ſuæ exemplar tradi voluerunt. Legi illam, ſed cum nauſea; & niſi in me ſcriptus fuiſſet liber, lectionem abſolvere non potuiſſem. Illi in eo ſummis verbis probare nituntur, parentem ſuum à me Spinoſiſmi accuſatum; & eum prolixe excuſare contendunt. Ægerrime ferunt, parenti ſuo à me aſcribi imprudentiam, & quod ſine judicio Spinoſam ſecutus ſit. Aiunt parentem ſuum hæc ex Spinoſa cum judicio exſcripſiſſe, ut mere Carteſiana: Spinoſam enim in eo libro ſuam doctrinam nec aperte inculcâſſe, nec tecte inſinuâſſe, ſed ſola Carteſii dogmata tradidiſſe. Verum ego non credo Carteſianos hæc quatuor pro ſuis agnituros. 1. Tota natura naturata non eſt, niſi unicum ens. 2. Poſſibilitas & contingentia non ſunt affectiones rerum, ſed intellectus noſtri defectus. 3. Si homines clarè totum ordinem naturæ intelligerent, omnia æque neceſſaria reperirent, ac omnia illa, quæ in matheſi tractantur. 4. De extraordinaria Dei potentia, qua miracula facit, non immerito valde dubitari poſſe: quæ tamen omnia in illo Spinoſæ libro diſertis verbis reperiuntur. Sarcaſmis plurimis in paralleliſmum inter Spinoſæ & Burmanni verba ludunt; verum nihil in eo reprehendere, aut falſi arguere poſſunt. Ego illi

illi libro nihil reponam, præſertim cum ob molem ſuam non diſtrahatur & à nemine legatur:

" Verſiculos in me narratur ſcribere Cinna:
" Non ſcribit, cujus carmina nemo legit."

Idem mihi cum Martiale dicere licet. Addo, quod quicunque meam contra Weeyenum defenſionem legerit, nova defenſione non indigebit: qui eam legere non vult, illi nec decem apologiis ſatisfecero. Vale, vir ampliſſime.

Amſtelod. 20 Julii, 1700.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

HAC æſtate binas ad te literas dedi, quas ad manus tuas perveniſſe ſpero. Dolerem ſi aberrâſſent. Nunc ad te mitto vitam Epiſcopii, ante plures annos, uti nôſti, à me lingua Belgica ſcriptam, & præfixam concionibus aliquot Epiſcopii, quarum exemplar illo tempore ad te miſi. Quoniam nunc Latino ſermone prodit, à noſtro Marco Teute, cum in Anglia eſſet verſa, illius ad te duo mitto exemplaria, quorum alterum filio Dominæ Maſham trades, alterum ut benigno à me recipias vultu, rogo. Videbis ibi ſpecimen aliquod perſecutionis in patria noſtra, libertatis aſylo inſtitutæ; unde quomodo erga integras eccleſias, & ingenuos veritatis confeſſores, paſſim ſævitum fuerit, facile colliges. Utinam & hodie omnes hanc ſævitiam deteſtentur! verum qua nunc fruimur, quietem, non moderatioribus eccleſiaſtarum conſiliis, ſed magiſtratûs prudentiæ & benignitati debemus; quæ niſi igneum illorum zelum compeſceret, eadem nos hodie, quæ olim majores noſtros, procella obrueret. Jam magnam libri tui eruditiſſimi partem maxima cum voluptate legi. Omnia mihi mirifice placent. Verum quoniam non tantam linguæ Gallicæ quam Latinæ cognitionem habeo, aliquando ut vim phraſium Gallicarum intelligam, atque mentem tuam diſtincte percipiam, bis terve quædam mihi relegenda ſunt; quod lectionem mihi aliquanto tardiorem reddit; verum moleſtiam hanc dilucida veritatis explicatione, argumentorumque quibus eam adſtruis pondere, abunde compenſas. Quando ad finem pervenero, caput xxi. de la puiſſance, ubi prolixe de voluntate ac hominis libertate in volendo diſſeris, relegam: quædam enim ibi habeas nova, quæ attentum requirunt lectorem. Ego totum ubi perlegero, candide meum tibi judicium ſcribam. Verum vix credo in quoquam

quoquam à te diſſenſurum, adeo omnia, quæ legi, mihi probantur. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & ſalve à me ac meis: ſalutem etiam officioſiſſimam dices D. Maſham totique familiæ.

Amſtelod. 30 Octob. 1700. Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

PRÆLEGIT mihi hiſce diebus Guenellonus noſter epiſtolam tuam, quæ te cum aſthmate graviter conflictari nuntiabat. Equidem valetudinem tuam afflictam ex animo doleo, eamque tibi firmiorem precor. Sed non ſine admiratione ex literis tuis intellexi, te binas tantum hoc anno à me accepiſſe; cum circa finem menſis Octobris tertias ſcripſerim, quibus addidi duo vitæ Epiſcopii, à Marco Teute latinitate donatæ, exemplaria, unum tibi, alterum Franciſco Cudworth Maſham, una cum literis ad ipſum, quæ jamdudum tibi reddita nullus dubitabam. Faſciculus quatuor comprehendebat exemplaria, quorum reliqua duo deſtinata erant rev. Epiſcopis Saliſburienſi, ac Bathonienſi & Wellenſi. Doleo interim etiam epiſtolam aberrâſſe, in qua ſcripſi magnam me libri tui partem legiſſe, omniaque maximopere mihi probari. Poſtea retulit mihi amicus, ſe Carteſii quoſdam ſequaces, à quibus aliquot ex prioribus capitibus lecta erant, conveniſſe; illis maxime diſplicuiſſe duo, quæ ego veriſſima duco; nullas videlicet dari ideas innatas, & animam non eſſe nudam cogitationem. Verum quid aliud à Carteſii ſequace expectes? Alios audivi magnopere librum tuum laudantes, & ſententiæ tuæ applaudentes. Ego ſumma delectatione illum legi, & etiamnum lectionem illius continuo. Verum quoniam non tam exactam linguæ Gallicæ cognitionem habeo, ut phraſeon quarundam Gallicarum vim prima lectione aſſequar, præſertim in materia ſubtili & ardua, cogor nonnunquam, ut diſtincte mentem tuam percipiam, lectionem aliquoties repetere. Gratiſſimum foret, ſi librum tuum latinitate donatum conſpicere quandoque daretur; tum facilius quæ ſcripſiſti intelligerem, & fortaſſe de quibuſdam, quæ de libertate hominis in volendo ſcripſiſti, tecum conferrem. Valde quæ ibi ſcribis mihi probantur: video te terminos aliquot obſcuros aut ambiguos in illa materia elucidâſſe; ſed neſcio an ubique mentem tuam perceperim: relegam integrum caput, & ſi quid occurrat ad quod hæſito, ingenue ac rotunde ad te ſcribam, plane perſuaſus dilucida tua explicatione, omnem (ſi quæ ſit) obſcuritatem diſparituram. Sed & ingenue tibi confiteor, mœrorem ſæpe meditationes meas, quas ſtudiis conſecravi, turbare. Verum dabit Deus his quoque finem. Ego ut honeſta & non inutili occupatione mœroris mei tædium diluam, incepi

cepi commentarium in Acta Apoſtolorum conſcribere, ſed nova quadam ratione ac methodo. Criticos egerunt Grotius aliique, quorum laboribus mea diligentia nihil addere poteſt. Itaque omiſſa critica, aliam mihi interpretandi methodum præſcripſi; ut ex hiſtoria apoſtolorum, variiſque illius circumſtantiis, ac præſertim eorum concionibus, religionis chriſtianæ veritatem ac divinitatem aſſeram, & qua methodo apoſtoli contra Judæos eam adſtruxerint, oſtendam. In hiſce explicandis prolixior paulo ſum: reliqua huc non ſpectantia obiter tantum attingo. Quibus alia contra Judæos diſputandi methodus placet, meum laborem non probatum iri, facile prævideo. Sed veritati litandum eſt; & apoſtolos duces ſequi præſtat, quam homines affectibus ac præjudiciis nimium indulgentes. Vale, vir ampliſſime. Deus priſtinam tibi reſtituat ſanitatem, ut, quoad vivis, egregiis tuis laboribus publico inſervire poſſis. Salutant te quam officioſiſſime uxor mea liberique. Salutem à nobis dices Dominæ Maſham totique familiæ.

Amſtelod. 18 Feb. 1701.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir colendiſſime,

EX ultimis tuis 18 præſentis Februarii datis, probe ſentio, quam firma, quam immutabilis ſit tua erga me amicitia, cum, tribus ante miſſis ad me ſilentem literis, quartas addere non dedignatus es, ſine reprehenſione ulla tantæ & tam criminoſæ taciturnitatis. Ignoſcis video, ideoque valetudinis incommoda non cauſabor. Penultimas tuas cum faſciculo librorum vel amiſſas, vel in itinere male hærentes, maxime doleo, quod crediderim te ſenſum tuum de libro meo, jam tum, cum ſcriberes, perlecto liberius explicuiſſe. Quod de iis, quæ de libertate hominis in volendo ſcripſerim, aliquantum hæſitas, non miror. Totum illud argumentum in prima editione penitus omittendum cenſui; ſed noluerunt amici, quicquid ego de rei ipſius & novitate & ſubtilitate contra afferrem, ne lectores, aliis aſſueti ratiocinationibus, non probe perſpecto ubique animi mei ſenſu, offenderentur; & ea, quæ in iſto parergo commentatus ſum, vel tanquam novatoris paradoxa, vel tanquam inconſulte errantis ſphalmata, negligerent, ſi non plane condemnarent. Nec me eventus penitus fefellit, cum plures inter amicos familiareſque meos, de hoc uno ſubjecto, mecum ſeruere ſermones, quam de omnibus reliquis totius libri capitibus. Fateor adhuc neminem fuiſſe cui ſcrupulum, quo detinebatur, non exemi, ſi modo dabatur otium ſenſim & pedetentim integram materiam à capite ad calcem mecum perpendendi: quod quidem rei veritati, non meæ quantulæcunque mediocritati tribuendum cenſeo.

cenſeo. Quod ſi tibi nova recenſione, ut promittis, recurrenti aliqua objicienda occurrunt, perſuaſum tibi ſit nihil acceptius mihi fore, quam errores meos amicâ manu detegi, eoque ipſo evelli: non enim famæ, nec opinioni, ſed veritati ſoli litandum cenſeo. Quicquid demum fuerit, diſputationes noſtras in unam eandemque ſententiam terminatum iri pro certo habeo, cum utrique unam eandemque illibatam veritatem ſtudioſe quærimus.

GAUDEO te commentarium in Acta Apoſtolorum meditari, & ejuſmodi interpretandi methodum, quæ non hæreat in criticis obſervationibus & verborum cortice. Nullibi magis apparet, ut mihi videtur, ſcopus geniuſque religionis chriſtianæ, quam in ea hiſtoria. Quid enim magis genuinum ſincerumque evangelii ſenſum nobis indicare poſſit, quam primæ illæ apoſtolorum prædicationes, quibus infideles, tam Gentiles quam Judæos, ad fidem Chriſti convertebant?

AD priores tuas ut aliquando veniam; laudo conſilium tuum quod Burmannorum Pietati minime reſpondendum cenſueris: hujuſmodi vitiligantium opprobria omnino contemnenda.

PRÆLUM noſtrum in fermento eſt, nec quicquam pene prodire videmus præter diſputationes politicas eccleſiaſticaſque. Quorſum tandem res evadet neſcio. Quid minatur turbo video: exitum non video. Tranquillitati quantum poſſum ſtudeo. Deus optimus maximus eccleſiarum reformatarum & totius Europæ libertatem conſervet: ſic precatur

Oates, 22 Feb. 1700-1. Tui obſervantiſſimus,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

NUPER Tranſilvalani rigoris in cauſa religionis minime excuſandi exemplum præbuere vere deteſtandum. Quidam miniſter Mennonita jam ante annos quindecim ſynodo ſuſpectus fuit Socinianiſmi, & illius hæreſeos coram ordinibus Tranſilvalanis à miniſtris eccleſiæ publicæ accuſatus. Itaque à muneris ſui functione ſuſpenſus fuit, adeo ut integro circiter biennio eccleſia illius publico religionis exercitio caruerit. Poſt longam actionem, cum miniſtri accuſationem ſuam probare non poſſent, ipſe ad eccleſiam ſuam fuit remiſſus, eique injunctum, ut ſibi à dogmatibus Socinianis docendis caveret, ſub pœna arbitraria. Ille ante triennium libellum edidit exigui admodum pretii, quo unionem inter omnes Chriſtianorum ſectas ſuadet, etiam cum Socinianis; qua occaſione imprudentius quædam pro Socinianis ſcripſit; & alicubi quædam occurrunt aculeata in gentem togatam. Libellus hic ſi contemptus fuiſſet, vix inveniſſet lectores: verum ſcis gentem illam ſacram vel minima injuria facile

cile irritari. Itaque denuo delatus fuit ad ſatrapam diſtrictus Vollenho, à deputatis claſſis Vollenho, qui exhibito libello ſupplice petunt, ut hic homo, qui non tantum Socinianas hæreticas opiniones clam & palam docuit, ſed etiam audaciſſime edidit, & ſparſit, iiſque intolerandos ſarcaſmos ac blaſphemias admiſcuit, ab ipſo ſatrapa compellatur coram proxima ſynodo libellum hunc palam revocare, & pœnitentiam ob commiſſa teſtari: ut libellus hic flammis tradatur, ac in tota provincia vetetur vendi, ac ſupprimatur: impenſæ quas claſſis ob hanc cauſam ſuſtinere debuit ab ipſo reſtituantur, ipſeque propter crimen commiſſum pœna arbitraria afficiatur. Satrapa petitioni huic annuit hominemque ad ſynodum ablegat. Synodus illi offert quinque articulos ſubſcribendos, quibus continebatur confeſſio, quod contra mandatum ordinum libellum iſtum edidiſſet, quod ipſum inobedientiæ illius pœniteret, quod omnia libelli ſui exemplaria eſſet ſuppreſſurus; aliaque quibus ipſe ſubſcribere recuſavit. Inſtabant aliqui ex miniſtris, imo obteſtabantur ut ſubſcriberet: verum ille conſtanter recuſavit. Poſtea dicitur compertum fuiſſe, illos id adeo ardenter cupiviſſe, ut haberent reum confitentem, & ſic propria ſua confeſſione arbitrariæ pœnæ obnoxium. Hæc geſta ſunt media æſtate anni CIↃ IↃC XC IX. Proximo Januario anni ſequentis à ſatrapa in carcerem eſt conjectus, & poſt longam novem vel decem menſium incarcerationem tandem ſententia judicis homini pauperi, tenui victu, & diuturno carceris ſqualore emaciato, mulcta irrogatur centum ducatorum argenteorum, qui conficiunt libras veſtras ſtirlingas circiter triginta, nec dimittendus à carcere pronunciatur, niſi ſoluta pecunia. Ille cum ſolvendo non eſſet, utpote pauper, in tetrum, fœtidum, ac tenebroſum carcerem ſubterraneum detruditur; ubi poſtquam duabus hebdomadibus pane & aqua vitam toleravit, tandem aliud ipſi mandatum exhibetur menſe Novembri proxime elapſo, quo ipſe errores libello ipſius contentos diſſeminare prohibetur, ſub pœna ſi ſecus fecerit cataſtæ & exilii, ſine ulla ulteriore forma proceſſus: atque ita è carcere dimittitur. Nunc miſer ad extremam inopiam redactus eſt: omni illius divendita ſupellectile, quæ tamen neutiquam explere potuit mulctam in quam condemnatus erat. Non poſſum excuſare illius imprudentiam: verum nec poſſum quin deteſter hanc ſævitiam, præſertim quando in extenſione ſententiæ leges imperatoriæ ex codice adferuntur, ut fulcra ac fundamenta, quibus dura hæc ſententia innititur. Sic ſenſim ad deteſtandum illud inquiſitionis tribunal relabimur.

RELEGI magna cum attentione cap. xxi. lib. ii. tractatus tui de Intellectu Humano. Expendi voces ac phraſes, quas in materia hac controverſa adhibes. Puto me jam plene mentem tuam percepiſſe, à qua ego non diſſentio. § 6, optime doces, intellectum & voluntatem non eſſe duas facultates revera ab anima diſtinctas, ſed mentem ipſam humanam immediate per ſe ipſam intelligere & velle. Inde infers non recte voluntatem dici liberam, ſed hominem: recte etiam meo judicio definis libertatem. Verum quando dicis, § 24, libertatem conſiſtere in potentia agendi &

non agendi, & quidem in eo ſolo: non puto id te reſtringere ad ſolas actiones externas, ſed & extendere ad internas, ſeu cogitationes noſtras; illæ enim, non minus quam actiones externæ, ſubjectæ ſunt arbitrio noſtro: idque conſentaneum eſt iis, quæ in ſequentibus capitis illius ſcribis. Porro jam inquiris, quod præcipuum eſt, quid ſit illud, quod hominem ad hoc aut illud agendum movet? Ego hactenus ita me explicui; bonum jucundum, ſeu voluptatem eſſe id, quod hominem allicit, illique oppoſitum dolorem eſſe malum, quod homo averſatur: adeoque quodcunque homo vult, id ab eo conſiderari ut jucundum, quod vero averſatur & fugit, ut moleſtum. Non negas tu illud, quinimo id etiam urges, § 41. & ſeqq. Verum ut diſtinctius oſtendas, qua ratione voluptas aut dolor hominem moveat, doces, § 29. & ſeqq. voluntatem determinari ab inquietudine, quam homo in ſe experitur, aut ex præſentia doloris, aut ex abſentia boni, ſeu voluptatis, in qua vel totam, vel ſaltem partem ſuæ beatitudinis collocat; quamdiu enim homo in ſtatu ſuo acquieſcit, nullam illius mutationem quærit, ſed ſolummodo quando in ſtatu ſuo non acquieſcit, ſeu quandam inquietudinem, ſive ex præſentia doloris, ſive ex abſentia voluptatis, quam ut felicitatis ſuæ partem conſiderat, in ſe ſentit. In his facile tibi aſſentior. Inde recte deducis, bonum in nobis excitare deſiderium, non tamen inde ſequi majus bonum ſemper in nobis majus deſiderium excitare. Quod veriſſimum eſt, & tu recte probas. Unde porro deducis, libertatem hominis in eo conſiſtere, quod poſſit ſuſpendere impletionem cujuſcunque deſiderii ſui, plenamque habeat libertatem unum poſt aliud conſiderandi, objecta eorum examinandi, eaque ab omni parte obſervandi, ac inter ſe comparandi, antequam ſe determinet ad agendum. Et hoc tecum agnoſco. Inde jam infers, indifferentiam, quæ non poſſit determinari per ultimum judicium, quod homo fert, de bono & malo, cujus electionem ſequendam credit, eſſe ſummam naturæ intelligentis imperfectionem. In Remonſtrantium ſcriptis ſæpe vox INDIFFERENTIA occurrit, quando de libertate hominis agitur: verum ea nunquam à nobis hoc ſenſu accipitur, quod poſito illo ultimo judicio, in quo proprie actus volitionis conſiſtit, nihilominus hominis potentia agendi ſit indifferens, & per voluntatem non determinetur: ſed, quod ante illud voluntatis decretum homo libertatem habet ſe in hanc vel illam partem determinandi, & non ad unum tantum oppoſitorum determinatus eſt: accedente autem voluntatis decreto, ſeu volendi actu, indifferentia illa tollitur, & potentia ad agendum aut non agendum determinatur. Et hic etiam puto nos conſentire. Reliqua capitis iis, quæ jam recenſita ſunt, magis illuſtrandis ac confirmandis inſerviunt. Puto me hic ſententiam tuam de libertate hominis recte percepiſſe. Nec eſt quod illi quicquam opponam: imo quædam diſtinctius, & clarioribus, quam hactenus à noſtris factum eſt, terminis ac phraſibus poſſe exprimi didici. Si non bene perceperim, aut ſi quid omiſerim, quod ut ſententia tua plene percipiatur, omitti non debuit, rogo ut me erroris admoneas: nolim enim in ſententiæ tuæ explicatione, quam, prout eam percepi, etiam meam eſſe agnoſco, à mente tua aberrare.

aberrare. Si in quibuſdam diſſentimus, quod ego ignoro, amice tecum conferre geſtio, ut exiguus, qui forte reſtare poſſet, diſſenſus tollatur. Plures tecum de hoc capite contuliſſe non miror. Materia eſt intricata & diverſis philoſophorum ac theologorum ſententiis ſemper agitata. Primus, meo judicio, Epiſcopius in tractatu de Libero Arbitrio, & contra Cameronem, eam clarius explicuit, oſtenditque intellectum & voluntatem non eſſe duas facultates revera inter ſe & ab anima diſtinctas, uti hactenus in ſcholis creditum fuit, ſed animam immediate per ſeipſam intelligere ac velle. Porro licet non iiſdem tecum vocibus ac phraſibus utatur, in ſumma tamen rei, quantum ego percipio, eſt conſenſus. Gratias interim tibi ago, quod multa me libri tui editione docueris. Ego eum iteratò evolvere ſtatui; ſecunda enim lectione multo diſtinctius eum intelligo. Deum precor ut diu te nobis incolumem ac proſpera fruentem valetudine conſervet. Uxor ac filia te ſalutant. Salveat quam officioſiſſime à me, uxore & filia, Domina Maſham ejuſque liberi. Vale.

Amſtelod. 30 Mart. 1701.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

MAGNO honori mihi eſſe duco, quod tu tantum lucubrationibus meis tribuas, ut in iis perlegendis bonas tuas horas locare velis: & eas tibi veritatis amatori non diſplicuiſſe gaudeo. Cum ego libertatem conſiſtere dico, § 24. cap. xxi. lib. ii, in potentia agendi & non agendi, nequaquam id reſtringo ad ſolas actiones externas, uti conſtat ex § 8, 38, aliiſque illius capitis locis: de hoc igitur inter nos convenit. Quando vero dicis, quod "quicquid homo vult ab eo conſiderari, ut jucundum," metuo ne voluntatem cum deſiderio confundas. Quod à pleriſque factum video, qui hoc argumentum tractant, non ſine magno veritatis, vel ſaltem perſpicuitatis, incommodo. Deſiderium fertur in jucundum, fateor; ſed voluntas fertur ſolum in actiones noſtras, & ibi terminatur. Sed quia voluntas raro agit, niſi ducente deſiderio, ideo pro uno eodemque actu plerumque ſumuntur, cum toto cœlo diſtent, § 30, 40. Cupido enim paſſio eſt mota à bono abſente. Volitio autem actus voluntatis, vel animæ, imperium excercentis in potentias hominis operatrices. Hæ duæ operationes animæ, ſcil. illa qua cupit aliquid, & illa qua determinat, vel imperat, aliquid agendum, niſi diſtinguantur probe, nihil dilucidè, ut mihi videtur, de humana voluntate ſtatui poteſt: ideòque ſpero ignoſces mihi, quod de iſta loquendi forma te monitum velim, cum de ſumma rei à me omnino non diſſentias. In uſu vocis "indifferentia," quod à veſtris differam, non mirum eſt, cum in his ſcribendis

nec

nec aliorum placita ſecutus ſum, nec vel ſcripta omnino conſuluerim, ſed quæ res ipſæ me, quantum indagatione & meditatione aſſequi poteram, docuerint, ea verbis quam potui aptiſſimis explicuerim. De terminorum igitur uſu nulla inter nos erit diſputatio, modo de re ipſa conſtet. Quamvis, ut libere dicam, iſta antecedens indifferentia hominis, qua homo, ante determinationem ſive decretum voluntatis, ſupponitur libertatem habere ſe determinandi ad alterutram partem oppoſitorum, non omnino mihi videtur ſpectare ad quæſtionem de libertate; quæ libertas unice conſiſtit in potentia agendi, vel non agendi, ſecundum determinationem voluntatis. Diſputare autem, an homo, ante ultimum judicium intellectûs, libertatem habet ſe determinandi ad alterutrum oppoſitorum, mihi videtur omnino de nihilo, ſive de re impoſſibili, diſputatio. Quis enim rogaret, vel quorſum attinet rogare, an homo poteſt ad alterutram partem oppoſitorum ſe determinare in ſtatu, in quo ſe non poteſt omnino determinare? Nam, ante judicium intellectûs, non poteſt ſe omnino determinare, ideoque fruſtra quæritur, an in illo ſtatu libertatem habet ſe determinandi in alterutram, ubi in neutram omnino partem poteſt ſe determinare. Ideòque omnes illæ lites, quæ agitantur de libertate ſe in alterutram partem determinandi, ante judicium intellectûs, mihi videntur (ignoſcas fatenti) nullo modo pertinere ad quæſtionem de libertate: quæ ne ſupponi quidem debet, nec poteſt, in ſtatu in quo manifeſtum eſt quod homo, ut agens liberum, non poteſt agere; cum libertas, ut dixi, conſiſtat in ſola potentia agendi, vel non agendi, conſequenter & congrue ad determinationem voluntatis. Ita autem ſæpe uſu venit. Diſputantium fervor & partium ſtudium rebus per ſe claris nubem & caliginem obducunt, dum undique conquiſitis laqueis alter alterum innodare & abſurdis involvere conatur. Vides quam libere tecum agam, eandem à te libertatem viciſſim expectans; ſi enim tu meæ, vel ego tuæ opinioni aſſentior, perinde eſt veritatem quærentibus, dummodo illius potior habetur ſententia quæ verior, & in ea conſentiamus. In aliis libri mei partibus, dum percurras, ſi quid minus recte dictum, vel cogitatum invenias, moneri imo & redargui à te cupio. Vale, vir optime, & me, ut facis, ama

Oates, 21 Maii, 1701.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

EODEM die quo nuperrime ad te mane ſcripſi, literas tuas 27 Maii datas veſperi accepi. Vitam Epiſcopii ſumma cum voluptate perlegi. Hiſtoria placet, res geſtæ plane diſplicent. Doleo ſane reformatos tam propere mores pontificios, de quibus tam graviter queſti ſunt,

ſunt, imitatos. Sed ſcire juvat quod cognitum laudare non poſſis. Inquiſitionem, quæ in Eccleſia Romana lentius ſuccrevit, uno quaſi nixu inceptam & pene perfectam hic conſpicere mihi videor. An has proteſtantium inter ſe inimicitias & mutuas perſecutiones jam caſtigaturus ſit Deus, neſcio: hoc ſaltem credo, theologorum ambitioſa diſſidia, & invicem dominandi in fratres cupido, orbem reformatum antiquis hoſtibus denuo obruendum objecit, & in tantum periculum adduxit. Avertat Deus O. M. omen, nec ad perſecutionem tam proclives animos perſecutione catholica puniat. Unum eſt, quod in libro tuo deſidero, nempe articulos illos quinque Remonſtrantium, quorum tam frequens eſt mentio. Hos vel quod in propera lectione non obſervatos præterierim, vel quod eos hiſtoriæ tuæ non inſeruiſti, ignorare me fateor. Rogo igitur ut mihi indicare velis ubi eos legere poſſim; magnam enim lucem, ut mihi videtur, præbebunt cauſam Remonſtrantium penitus cognoſcere cupienti: nam iterum, credo, perlegam hanc tuam hiſtoriam. Maximas pro hoc dono gratias ago. Vive diu utilis religioni chriſtianæ. Vale, & me ama

Oates, 1 Jun. 1701.

Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

VITAM Epiſcopii tibi, ſummi judicii viro, non diſplicuiſſe eſt quod mihi gratuler. Multa exteris ignota ibi eſſe præterita, quia nobis notiſſima, nullus dubito. Quinque autem articulos noſtros, quorum decidendorum cauſa ſynodus Dordracena convocata fuit, nulli ignotos credebam. In explicatione ſententiæ Arminii, p. 6, in vita Epiſcopii ego eos brevi in compendio exhibui. Extant autem in Remonſtrantia ordinibus Hollandiæ CIↃ IↃC X oblata, quam reperies in epiſtolis præſtantium virorum à me editis, n° cxlv. p. 254, vel in hiſtoria quinquarticulana Petri Heilini Anglica, cap. v. p. 50. Si altera vitæ Epiſcopii editio aliquando prodeat, poſſem illi quinque illos articulos aliaque quædam non ſine Epiſcopio geſta, aut ipſum ipſiuſve conſanguineos ſpectantia, hic illic inſerere, quæ ad hiſtoriæ noſtræ cognitionem penitiorem, haud exigui futura ſunt momenti. Continuavit Brantius noſter ſenior hiſtoriam uſque ad finem anni CIↃ IↃC XXIII, in qua gravis illa contra noſtros perſecutio exacte deſcribitur; verum illa hactenus lucem non adſpexit; & præ metu ne edatur, ſynodus Hollandica jam ab aliquot annis deputatis ſuis in mandatis dedit, ut ſolicite invigilent, ne illa alicubi imprimatur. Nolunt enim myſteria illa iniquitatis revelari. Utinam hiſtoriam

toriam ſuam continuâſſet ad annum uſque CIↃ IↃC XXXII, quo perſecutioni ubique ferme in patria noſtra finis eſt impoſitus, nobiſque palam in cœtus religioſos convenire non fuit prohibitum. Ex illius lectione deprehendere poſſes veritatem dicti cujuſdam monachi, quod Marnixius refert in epiſtola ad Caſparum Verheiden, inter epiſt. ſelectas à Belgis vel ad Belgas, anno 1617, à Baudio & Heinſio editas, cent. ii. epiſt. 51. "Haud æque diu "reformatorum ollam calefactam fuiſſe, atque illorum quos tantopere in- "ceſſerunt: videre ſe plane, antequam per ſæculorum intervallum labatur, "parem utrobique imperii eccleſiaſtici fore rationem." Scripta eſt hæc epiſtola ult. Mart. 1577.

LEGI, relegi, & ſerio expendi quæ de libertate ſcribis; ſed non deprehendi illum inter nos eſſe conſenſum, quem, lecto illo "de Potentia" capite, credidi. Quia uterque unice veritatem quærimus, paulo diſtinctius terminos quibus uſus ſum explicabo, & ſi qui aptiores ſint, illis lubens utar; amo enim perſpicuitatem; & in veritatis inquiſitione omnem verborum ambiguitatem, quantum fieri poteſt, vitandam judico. Putas non recte dici nos velle jucundum, illud eſſe deſiderium, non voluntatem. Deſiderium enim ferri in bonum abſens; volitionem autem eſſe actum voluntatis vel animæ imperium exercentis in potentias hominis operatrices. Facile ego hoc diſcrimen admitto, & ut, perſpicuitatis cauſa, unicuique verbo ſuam tribuamus ſignificationem, utile eſſe exiſtimo. Verum ego puto nos duo velle, finem & media quæ ad finem ducunt. Multa deſideramus, quæ tamen non volumus. Eſt enim deſiderium aliud completum, aliud incompletum; ſicut & voluptas alia eſt completa, alia incompleta, quam barbaro vocabulo in ſcholis vocant velleïtatem, qua deſignamus non quid homo proprie velit, ſed quid vellet. Prudentis eſt ex multis deſiderabilius illud eligere, ſibique omnium ſuarum actionem finem proponere, quod undequaque eſt perfectum, & in quo concurrunt omnes rationes, quæ rem deſiderabilem faciunt. Atqui illa electio non fit ſine determinatione voluntatis, qua homo diſcernit hoc bonum, quod omnibus aliis præferendum judicat, ſibi omnium ſuarum actionum finem proponere. Ita ego credidi recte poſſe dici hominis voluntatem in bonum ferri, idque bonum ſemper ab ipſo apprehendi, ut jucundum. Si vero credas actionem, qua ferimur in bonum illud, improprie dici voluntatem, ſed debere appellari deſiderium, quia fertur in bonum abſens, de termino non contendam, modo de illius ſignificatione conſtet. Ut ergo omnibus ambiguitas vitetur, dicamus deſiderium ferri in bonum, voluntatem dirigere actiones. Sed caveamus ne quævis deſideria confundamus, & deſideria completa diſtinguamus ab incompletis, quæ velleïtates, voce in ſcholis uſitata, appellari ſolent. Si vero aliud aptius vocabulum indicare poſſis, eo lubens utar, ut omnis, quantum fieri poteſt, obſcuritas & ambiguitas in ſermone noſtro vitetur.

QUOD attinet vocem "indifferentia," certum eſt noſtros ea non raro eſſe in hac materia uſos: verum eam non adeo deperimus, quin ſi commodior nobis offeratur eam repudiaturi ſimus: eoque magis, quia videmus

mus philoſophos Carteſianos ea ſenſu à noſtro plane alieno uti: illis enim indifferentia eſt fluctuatio judicii; quando mens, ex rationum pro utraque parte æquilibrio, incerta eſt, quid ſibi eligendum ſit. Nobis vero indifferentia eſt vis illa animæ, qua, poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poteſt agere vel non agere. Verum, in tota hac de libertate diſputatione, video ſæpe ludi verbis ambiguis, aut ſaltem in ambiguum ſenſum detortis. Optandum foret omnia verba eodem ſignificatu ab omnibus accipi; multæ inanes diſceptationes & λογομαχίαι vitari poſſent. Nunc quoniam in ſignificatione verborum convenire non poſſumus, neceſſe eſt ut quiſque explicet, quo ſignificatu unaquaque voce, de qua contenditur, utatur. Circa rem ipſam video nos diſſentire. Dicis, "Iſta "antecedens indifferentia, qua homo ante determinationem, ſive decre-"tum voluntatis, ſupponitur libertatem habere ſe determinandi ad alter-"utram partem oppoſitorum, non omnino mihi videtur ſpectare ad "quæſtionem de libertate; quia libertas unice conſiſtit in potentia agen-"di, vel non agendi, ſecundum determinationem voluntatis." Mihi plane contrarium videtur, libertatem unice conſiſtere in potentia, qua homo actionem volendi poteſt determinare vel non determinare: & ſi eam homo ante voluntatis determinationem non habet quod non ſit liber, neque ullus ſtatus concipi poſſit, in quo liber dici queat. Quia enim voluntas actionum noſtrarum domina eſt, eaſque pro arbitrio moderatur, ſi determinatio voluntatis non ſit libera, nec in actionibus noſtris ulla erit libertas, quia actiones noſtræ voluntatis determinationem neceſſario ſequuntur. Quare vix capio quid velis, cum dicis ante ultimum judicium intellectûs homo non poteſt ſe omnino determinare. Verum antequam hic ſententiam meam explicem, quid per ultimum judicium intellectûs ſignificetur, propius explicandum eſt, ne hic propter ambiguitatem vocis, in oratione noſtra aliqua ſit obſcuritas. Communiter ultimum intellectus judicium vocant, quo homo diſcernit quid ſibi faciendum ſit, idque vocant ultimum judicium practicum intellectus: verum hoc judicium non eſt tam actus intellectus quam voluntatis, vel ſaltem actus mixtus, ad cujus complementum voluntas concurrit. Judicium autem quod ſolius intellectus actus eſt, non ulterius procedit, quam hoc oportet facere, hoc oportet omittere. Ulterius ſi procedat, intercedit aliqua actio voluntatis. Quæ duo tamen à multis confunduntur. Jam mea eſt ſententia hominem, quando recte rationi conſentaneè agit, ſemper velle, quod intellectus judicat oportere fieri: poſſe tamen etiam contra rationem agere, & voluntatem in contrariam partem determinare: quin &, antequam intellectus poſt accuratum rationum examen judicaverit quid facere oporteat, poſſe bruto impetu agere non quod rationi conſentaneum eſt, ſed quod concupiſcentia dictat. Hic ſi homo non habet libertatem ſe determinandi, aut non determinandi, & actionem ſuam ſuſpendendi, videre nequeo, in quo libertas conſiſtat. Eandem tuam eſſe putabam ſententiam, idque colligebam ex § 47. capitis ſupra nominati, ubi inter alia ais, "Animam, quæ habet potentiam ſuſpendendi impletionem "cujuſcunque deſiderii ſui, ſicuti evidenter patet per experientiam,

" conſequenter, etiam habere libertatem ea ſucceſſive unum poſt alterum
" conſiderandi, eorum objecta examinandi, ea ex omni parte obſervandi,
" & inter ſe comparandi; & in hoc conſiſtere libertatem hominis: om-
" nemque erroris & vitiorum originem inde arceſſis, quod præcipitemus
" judicium, voluntatemque noſtram cito nimis determinemus, & actioni
" nos accingamus, antequam bene examinaverimus quid agere nos opor-
" teat." Hæc, aliaque quæ ibi addis, veriſſima eſſe judico; iiſque plane aſſentior. Verum hæc cum iis, quæ epiſtola ſcribis, " quod homo, ante
" judicium intellectûs, ſe non poteſt omnino determinare," conciliare non poſſum. Fortaſſe mentem tuam non bene percepi. Rogo itaque, ſi grave non ſit, ut oſtendas, qua ratione hæc inter ſe conciliare debeam, & diſtinctius quod ego non plene percepi, explices. Nulli opinioni, nedum phraſi aut voci, ita ſum addictus, quin meliora monſtranti cedere paratus ſim: veritatem enim unice quæro, quam ſi invenero, de errore triumphabo.

Hæc ſcripſeram, cum ad me exemplar Latinum tractatus tui de Intellectu Humano affertur; pro quo eximio dono, ego ſummas tibi habeo ac ago gratias. Statui illud à capite ad calcem perlegere, & cum elegantiſſima verſione Gallica conferre, quæ proculdubio Latinæ nonnunquam lucem fœnerabitur: & quando integrum tractatum perlegero, candide tibi judicium meum ſcribam, non quia neceſſe eſt, ſed quia id à me exigis, idque ego tibi petenti me debere agnoſco. Verum quantum ex Gallicæ verſionis lectione percepi, me ſententiæ tuæ approbatorem habebis: ſi vero ad quædam hæſitavero, ea tibi candide indicabo, ut pleniorem eorum explicationem ex te eliciam. Deum precor ut tibi vitam ac vires continuet, ut egregiis tuis laboribus orbi literato porro prodeſſe poſſis. Salutant te uxor ac filia. Salutem à nobis officioſiſſimam dices dominæ Maſham totique familiæ. Vale.

Amſtelod. 19 Julii, 1701. Tui amantiſſimus, P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUOD omnis obſcuritas & ambiguitas in verborum uſu ſit vitanda tecum plane ſentio; verum liceat mihi adjicere, quod hoc ſæpe non ſit etiam à volentibus evitare obſcuritatem. Ideæ, quæ obſervantur hominum mentibus, præſertim eorum, qui veritatem attentiùs quærunt, multo plures ſunt quam voces cujuſvis linguæ, quæ ad eas exprimendas paratæ ſunt. Hinc fit, quod homines (quibus integrum non eſt nova vocabula quoties opus eſt ad novas ideas ſignificandas, ad libitum procudere) eadem voce, pro diverſis ideis, præſertim ſi cognatæ ſint, identidem utuntur: unde oritur non raro ſermonis obſcuritas & incertus ſenſus, quando ad præciſiones accuratas veniendum eſt, quo non ſolum audientium, ſed & ipſorum etiam loquentium mentes implicantur. Inter alia

quæ

quæ propoſui, lib. iii. cap. xi, huic malo remedia, illud mihi præcipuum videtur, ſc. ut diligenter colligamus omnes ſimplices ideas, quæ ingrediuntur compoſitionem cujuslibet ideæ complexæ, cujus nomen uſurpamus, eaſque eidem voci affixas ſedulo in animo teneamus. V. g. in argumento, quod præ manibus habemus, ſi voluntas ſignificat potentiam, quam homo habet incipiendi, ſiſtendi, vel vitandi aliquam actionem mentis vel corporis ſui, ut ego fuſius explicui, lib. ii. cap. xxi. § 5, &c. in quo tu etiam acquieſcere videris: ſi hæc, inquam, ſit idea, quam vox voluntas ſignificat, eamque præſentem in animo habemus, quando de voluntate loquamur, nihil certius eſſe poteſt, quam quod voluntas terminatur ſolummodo in actionibus noſtris, nec poteſt ulterius extendi ad rem aliquam aliam, nec ferri in bonum remotum & abſens. Adeoque ſi contendis voluntatem ferri in bonum, ut finem, recedis ab ea idea, quam huic voci aſſignavimus, aliamque ſubſtituis; unde fit quod tu & ego diverſas res deſignamus, quando de voluntate loquimur, nec omnino poſſumus inter nos de voluntate differentes quicquam proficere, donec tu ideam indices cujus apud te vox voluntas ſignum eſt, ut de ſenſu vocis, i. e. de re, de qua diſſerimus, conveniamus.

DISTINCTIO de deſiderio completo & incompleto, ſive de voluntate completa & incompleta, quam affers, nihil mihi videtur argumentum tuum juvere. Sive enim aliquod ſit incompletum deſiderium, vil incompleta voluntas, quod ſane dubito, id nunquam efficiet ut ſit verum, quod voluntas fertur in bonum. Dico me dubitare an aliqua poteſt eſſe incompleta volitio; voluntas enim hic, ni fallor, ſumitur pro actu voluntatis, i. e. pro volitione. Volitionem inefficacem facile agnoſco, ut cum paralyticus manum paralyſi ſolutam movere velit, inefficax fateor & ſine ſucceſſu eſt iſta volitio, ſed non incompleta. Actus enim volendi hoc in caſu æque completus eſt, ac olim, quando manus volitioni obſequebatur. Itidem deſiderium alicujus propoſiti boni, quod propter majus bonum incompatibile proſequi negligimus, non eſt incompletum deſiderium, nec incompleta voluntas, ſed deſiderium completum brevi terminatum, eo uſque non procedens, ut nos impellat ad volendum actiones, quibus obtineri poſſit illud bonum, in quod ferebatur breve illud deſiderium: nec incompleta dici poteſt voluntas, ubi nulla omnino eſt volitio, etiamſi ſcholæ velleïtatem appellare ament. Quod ſi breve illud deſiderium eouſque procedat, ut nos ad volendum aliquam actionem excitet, voluntas illa non eſt incompleta, ſed completus actus volendi, etiamſi omiſſa ulteriore inefficax ſit ad obtinendum bonum propoſitum quod ceſſante deſiderio negligitur. In his & hujuſmodi mentis actionibus adeo celeres ſunt motus animi, & inter ſe conjuncti, ut non mirum ſit, quod ſæpe, uti fit, confundantur, quæ attentius conſideranti diſtinguenda ſunt, ut recte conceptus noſtros formemus. Vis libere dicam, quid hac de re ſentio. Homo fertur in bonum abſens, ſive finem. Multis ſimul intellectui obverſantibus bonis non ſubordinatis nec conſiſtentibus, homo unum, neglectis aliis, ſibi proponit ut finem, i. e. ut proſequendum; hoc facit voluntarie,

adeoque voluntas fertur in illam actionem mentis, qua unum præ reliquis ſibi proponit, ut finem, & in ea actione terminatur, eodem modo quo terminatur in computatione, quando vult numerare, vel in motione pedum, quando vult ambulare. Ob hanc voluntariam propoſitionem iſtius boni, ut finis, fateor non raro dicitur vulgo, quod voluntas fertur in eum finem vel in id bonum, an proprie & ut philoſophicam decet ἀκρίβειαν, tu judices.

QUANTA ſit vis conſuetudinis in uſu verborum, quæ irrepit ſubinde nobis inſciis, patet, ut mihi videtur, in iis quæ in epiſtola tua ſequuntur. In priore epiſtola libens & aperte mecum conſentire videris, quod actiones ſunt agentium ſive ſubſtantiarum, & non potentiarum ſive facultatum: & tamen hic uſitata loquendi forma te abduci pateris, diciſque quod "voluntas eſt actionum noſtrarum domina, eaſque pro arbitrio modera-"tur," & ſimilia paſſim, in toto illo epiſtolæ tuæ paragrapho; quod ni feciſſes, nulla arbitror mihi tecum lis eſſet. Hoc non dico, quod adeo delicatulus ſim, ut hujuſmodi loquendi formulas nullo in loco pati poſſim: earum uſus in ſermone familiari, ſi recte intelligantur, non omnino vituperandus. Quando vero in diſceptationibus philoſophicis pro fundamentis argumentorum, quaſi iis inniteretur rerum veritas, omnino rejiciendæ ſunt metaphoricæ & tralatitiæ hujuſmodi locutiones, ne nos in errorem inducant: reſque ipſæ, uti revera ſunt, propriis & non figuratis vocabulis exprimendæ: v. g. dicere, "quod voluntas ſit actionum noſtra-"rum domina, eaſque pro arbitrio moderatur," & inde arguere, quod "niſi voluntas ſit libera, nulla erit in homine libertas," eſt, ut mihi videtur, ex vi metaphoræ illius nos in errorem conjicere. "Libertas, apud me, "eſt poteſtas hominis agendi vel non agendi ſecundum ſuam voluntatem;" ſcilicet ſi homo poteſt agere hoc, ſi vult agere hoc; & abſtinere, è contra, ab agendo hoc, quando vult abſtinere ab agendo hoc, eo in caſu liber eſt homo. Hanc eſſe veram libertatis notionem videtur mihi conſtare, ex iis quæ à me dicta ſunt § 8. & ſeqq. Quæ ſi vera ſit, inde omnino ſequitur libertatem nullo modo competere voluntati, uti monſtravi § 14. Imo inde ſequitur, quod illa antecedens indifferentia, ante decretum voluntatis, nullo modo, ut dixi, pertinet ad quæſtionem de libertate. Si enim libertas ſit potentia agendi actionem, quam vult homo, & viciſſim abſtinendi ab eadem actione, ſi ab ea homo vult abſtinere: quid facit, rogo, iſta antecedens indifferentia ad libertatem, quæ eſt potentia agendi vel non agendi, conſequenter ad voluntatis determinationem?

QUANDOQUIDEM vero inciderit quæſtio, de iſta veſtra antecedente indifferentia, cui vos omnem inniti libertatem contenditis, de ea liceat mihi paulo diſtinctius inquirere. Hæc indifferentia definitur à te, "vis "animi, qua, poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poteſt agere vel "non agere." Jam hic rogo, an intellectus, judicium, vel cogitatio, ſit unum ex requiſitis ad agendum?

1. SI dicas quod intellectus, judicium, vel cogitatio, ſit unum ex requiſitis ad agendum, veſtra antecedens indifferentia nunquam efficiet, ut voluntas

luntas ſit libera (quamvis eum in finem, ut inde adſtrui poſſit voluntatis libertas, excogitata & introducta videtur) quia, ut dixi, aliqua actione ſemel intellectui propoſita, voluntas non eſt in ſtatu, in quo poteſt agere vel non agere (in quo, ut mihi videtur, conſiſtit libertas) neceſſario debet agere; nec poteſt abſtinere ab agendo, i. e. à volendo, actionem illam ſcilicet, vel illius omiſſionem. Imo vero voluntas, eo in ſtatu, non eſt indifferens ad alterutram partem oppoſitorum, nempe actionem propoſitam, vel ejus omiſſionem, quia determinatur à præcedente intellectus judicio, actionem illam vel ejus omiſſionem præferente.

2. SI dicas quod intellectus, judicium, ſive cogitatio, non ſit unum ex requiſitis ad agendum: videas, quæſo, dum hominem hoc modo liberum reddere velis, an non agentem cæcum plane efficis; & ut liberum facias ab eo intellectum removes, ſine quo nec eſſe, nec ſupponi poteſt libertas ulla. Ad res enim cogitatione & intellectu deſtitutas, nulla omnino attinet libertas. Perpende igitur, quæſo, & tecum cogita, an libertas hominis recte fundari poteſt in ejuſmodi ſtatu, qui excludit cogitationem, redditque lapidem æque capacem libertatis; an illa indifferenaia pertinere poteſt ad quæſtionem de libertate, quæ ſepoſita cogitatione nullum locum in ſubjecto relinquit libertati.

HÆC omnia ita ſe habent ex mea libertatis notione, quam fuſius traditam invenies § 8, 13. Quod ſi tu alium iſti voci ſenſum tribuas, forſan hæ omnes evaneſcent difficultates. Sed tunc rogandus es, ut tuam libertatis definitionem ad me mittas, ſi de diverſis rebus, ſub eodem nomine diſſerentes, nolumus ſine fructu diſputare.

Ex his, quæ ſupra dixi, mihi conſtare videtur, quod libertas nullatenus conſiſtit in indifferentia hominis, ſed ſolummodo in potentia agendi, vel non agendi, prout volumus. Exemplo forſan res clarior erit. Homo, v. g. amat vinum, judicat ſibi bonum eſſe, ex voluntate ſua bibit: nulla hic indifferentia eſt, & tamen libera prorſus eſt hæc actio, quia, ſi modo mutaverit voluntatem, poteſt abſtinere. Contra, homo vinum nec amat, nec averſatur, nec judicat ſibi bonum aut malum eſſe; ſupponamus quantamlibet hominis indifferentiam: ex voluntate abſtinet à vino in carcere, ubi vinum non permittitur. Hæc actio, nempe abſtinentia à potione vini, eſt voluntaria fateor, ſed non eſt libera: quoniam homo ille, ſi mutet voluntatem, vinum tamen in eo caſu bibere non poteſt. Vides igitur quod indifferentia poteſt eſſe ſine libertate, & libertas ſine indifferentia, & actio voluntaria ſine utraque. Hæc me res ipſæ per ſe planæ docere videntur. Imo vero res ipſæ melius forſan & ſimplicius nos docerent multa, ſi ſcholarum ſubtilitas in procudendis facultatibus diſtinctionibus, aliiſque ſpecioſis inventis mire acuta, non obduceret ſæpe rebus in ſe claris operoſam & doctam obſcuritatem.

DICIS porro, quod " Libertas conſiſtit in potentia, qua homo actionem " volendi poteſt determinare, vel non determinare." Si, per actionem volendi determinare vel non determinare, ſignificas velle aut non velle; libertas in eo conſiſtere non poteſt: quia aliqua actione homini propoſita, homo non poteſt abſtinere à volitione, debet neceſſario velle aut actionem

tionem illam propoſitam, aut abſtinentiam ab iſta actione; quamtumvis levis & inſtantanea præcedat mentis cogitatio, ſemper & neceſſario ſequitur actus volendi, quo actio propoſita vel eligitur vel negligitur: & ita voluntas, præcedente cogitatione, ſemper determinatur ad agendum, i. e. ad volendum ſcil. exiſtentiam, vel non exiſtentiam, actionis propoſitæ. Quod ſi per "potentiam, qua homo actionem volendi poteſt determinare, vel non determinare," ſignificas potentiam quicquid temere volendi, vel ſine prævia cogitatione, vel contra intellectus judicium, uti ſequentia verba videntur innuere, ubi dicis, "niſi determinatio voluntatis ſit li-"bera, & loqueris de bruto impetu:" libertas in hujuſmodi potentia non poteſt conſiſtere. Quia, ut dixi, libertas ſupponit cogitationem. Ubi enim nulla eſt cogitatio, nulla eſſe poteſt libertas, uti fuſius explicui § 8. & 9. Porro libertas non poteſt conſiſtere in potentia determinandi actionem volendi contra judicium intellectus, quia homo non habet hujuſmodi potentiam. Actio enim volendi hoc aut illud, ſemper ſequitur judicium intellectus, quo homo judicat pro hic & nunc hoc eſſe melius. Ex quo facile eſt intelligere, quid velim, cum dico, ante ultimum judicium intellectus homo non poteſt omnino ſe determinare: hocque facile conciliare poſſis cum iis, quæ citas ex § 47, de ſuſpenſione impletionis cujuſcunque deſiderii, ſi modo memineris, quod ante unamquamque volitionem præcedit ſemper judicium aliquod intellectus de re agenda; judiciumque illud, quod immediate præcedit volitionem, ſive actum volendi, eſt eo in caſu ultimum judicium intellectus. Quod te in diverſum abripuit mihi videtur hoc eſſe, nempe, quod ultimum judicium intellectus videris confundere cum maturo & recto judicio, ſi recte capio ſenſum iſtius ſententiæ, ubi hæc verba lego: "Intellectus poſt "accuratum rationum examen judicaverit, quid facere oporteat," &c. Sed id non eſt ultimum judicium, de quo ego loquor. Loquor ego de eo judicio, quod in omni volitione immediate præcedit volitionem, quod revera eſt ultimum judicium, ſive bene expenſum ſit & matura deliberatione recoctum, ſive extemporaneum & ſubito impetu enatum, & æque voluntatem determinat, ſive ſit, ſive non ſit rationi conſentaneum.

SI meum ſenſum in his ſatis recte & clare expoſui, non apparebit tibi, credo, hæc relegenti tanta inter nos opinionum diſtantia, quantum credidiſti: pro certo habeo nos, veritatem utrinque ſincere quærentes, non poſſe diu de rebus ipſis diſſentire, quanquam loquendi formulæ videantur nonnunquam in diverſum abire. Sed de rebus ipſis cogitantibus facile erit phraſeologiæ nebulas diſcutere, ex quibus fere oriuntur inter veritatis amatores omnes controverſiæ.

EN prolixiore epiſtola tibi explicationem ſententiæ meæ poſcenti, ut potui, morem geſſi. Ignoſcas, rogo, quod toties citaverim librum meum; hoc feci brevitatis cauſa, ne hic in epiſtola ea reſcriberem, quæ in libro impreſſo melius legeres.

DE duabus verſionibus monere te convenit, ut ſicubi inter ſe diſſentientes reperias de ſenſu meo ex Gallica dijudices. Illam enim mihi auctor totam perlegit, & ubi à ſenſu meo aberrare deprehendi, correxit.

Latinam nondum mihi legere contigit. Valetudo & negotia non ſatis otii conceſſerunt. Vale, &, ut facis, me ama

Oates, 12 Aug. 1701. Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

POSTQUAM, quæ ſupra habentur, ſcripſeram, mihi venit in mentem non incommodum fore, ſi aliquid libro meo inſererem, ad elucidandam indifferentiæ naturam, in qua conſiſtit libertas, in gratiam eorum, qui indifferentiam hoc in argumento tanti faciunt, ut illa ablata vel omiſſa nihil recte vel clare ſtatui de libertate poſſe exiſtimant. En igitur quæ § 71. ſubjungenda cenſui. Ego Anglice ſcripſi; Gallice vertit D. Coſte; adeoque, ſi probas, Gallicæ verſioni libri mei inſerere poſſis.

Liv. II. Chap. XXI. § 71, après ces mots, " par ſon propre jugement," ajoutez ce qui ſuit.

" JE ſçai que certaines gens font conſiſter la liberté dans une certaine " Indifference de l'homme, antecedente à la determination de ſa volonté. " Je ſouhaiterois que ceux qui font tant de fonds ſur cette indifference " antecedente, comme ils parlent, nous euſſent dit nettement ſi cette " indifference qu'ils ſuppoſent, précede la penſée & le jugement de l'en- " tendement auſſi bien que le decret de la volonté; car il eſt bien mal- " aiſé de la placer entre ces deux termes, je veux dire immediatement " après le jugement de l'entendement, & devant la détermination de la " volonté, parce que la determination de la volonté ſuit immediatement " le jugement de l'entendement: & d'ailleurs, placer la liberté dans une " indifference, qui précede la penſée & le jugement de l'entendement, " c'eſt, ce me ſemble, faire conſiſter la liberté dans un état de tenebres, " où, nous ne pouvons ni voir ni dire ce que c'eſt: c'eſt du moins la " placer dans un ſujet incapable de liberté, nul agent n'étant jugé capable " de liberté qu'en conſequence de la penſée, & du jugement qu'on re- " connoit en lui. Comme je ne ſuis pas délicat en matiere d'expreſ- " ſions, je conſens à dire avec ceux qui aiment à parler ainſi, que la li- " berté eſt placée dans l'indifference; mais c'eſt dans une ſorte d'indif- " ference qui reſte après le jugement de l'entendement, & même après " la determination de la volonté: ce qui n'eſt pas une indifference " de l'homme (car après que l'homme a une fois jugé ce qu'il eſt meilleur " de faire ou de ne pas faire, il n'eſt plus indifferent) mais une indiffe- " rence des puiſſances actives ou operatives de l'homme, leſquelles de- " meurant tout autant capables d'agir, ou de ne pas agir après, qu'avant " le decret de la volonté, ſont dans un état qu'on peut appeller, ſi l'on " veut, indifference: & auſſi loin que s'étend cette indifference, juſ- " ques-là l'homme eſt libre, & pas au delà. Par exemple, j'ai la puiſ- " ſance de mouvoir ma main, ou de la laiſſer en repos: cette faculté

" operative

" operative eſt indifferente au mouvement & au repos de ma main : je ſuis
" donc libre à cet égard. Ma volonté vient à déterminer cette puiſſance
" operative au repos, je ſuis encore libre, parce que l'indifference de cette
" puiſſance operative qui eſt en moi, d'agir ou de ne pas agir, reſte encore ;
" la puiſſance de mouvoir ma main n'étant nullement diminué par la
" determination de ma volonté, qui à preſent ordonne le repos ; l'indif-
" ference de cette puiſſance à agir ou ne pas agir, eſt juſtement telle
" qu'elle etoit auparavant, comme il paroit ſi la volonté veut en faire
" l'epreuve en ordonnant le contraire. Mais ſi pendant que ma main
" eſt en repos, elle vient à être ſaiſie d'une ſoudaine paralyſie, l'indiffe-
" rence de cette puiſſance operative eſt detruité, & ma liberté avec elle :
" je n'ai plus de liberté à cet égard, mais je ſuis dans la néceſſité de
" laiſſer ma main en repos. D'un autre côté, ſi main eſt miſe en
" mouvement par une convulſion, l'indifference de cette faculté opera-
" tive s' évanouït ; & en ce cas-là ma liberté eſt detruité ; car je me
" trouve dans la néceſſité de laiſſer mouvoir ma main. J'ai ajouté ceci
" pour faire voir dans quelle ſorte d'indifference il me paroit que la li-
" berté conſiſte préciſement, & qu'elle ne peut conſiſter dans aucune
" autre, réelle ou imaginaire."

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Ampliſſime vir,

QUOD tantum mea cauſa laborem ſuſceperis, ut prolixiori epiſtola ſententiam tuam mihi diſtinctius explicare non fueris gravatus, maximas tibi habeo gratias : legi, relegi, expendi epiſtolam tuam magna cum attentione. Quanto exactius eam expendo, tanto magis obſervare videor, nos tam ſententiis, quam phraſibus ac loquendi modis diſcrepare, & quandoque diverſas ideas iiſdem, nonnunquam eaſdem ideas diverſis vocibus deſignare. Reſpondiſſem citius, verum conſulto reſponſum diſtuli, donec integrum tuum tractatum perlegiſſem. Eo jam perlecto, & cum epiſtola tua collato, magis magiſque obſervare videor, omnem, qui inter nos apparet diſſenſum, non tam circa rem ipſam, quam circa voces, ac diverſam ejuſdem rei explicandæ rationem occupari. Quia vero non ubique phraſium mearum ſenſum recte percepiſſe videris, & ut, quicquid fortaſſe adhuc inter nos reſtat diſſenſus, paucis & in compendio comprehendi poſſit, primo ſenſum vocum ac phraſium, quibus uſus ſum, quanta poſſum perſpicuitate explicabo : deinde phraſibus claris & ambiguitati non obnoxiis ſententiam meam quanta poſſum brevitate exponam. Tandem inquiram in quibus conſentiamus, & quis adhuc remaneat diſſenſus ; utrumne ille in re ipſa, an vero in vocibus ac phraſibus, & diverſa rem quam inquirimus explicandi ratione conſiſtat. Ita puto, ſi fortaſſe nondum per omnia idem ſentiamus, brevi omnem diſſenſum ſublatam iri, nec veritatem ſincere eam quærentibus diu abſconditam fore.

SIGNI-

SIGNIFICATIONEM voluntatis, quod ſit "potentia, quam homo habet "incipiendi, ſiſtendi, vel vitandi aliquam actionem mentis, vel corporis," ego tecum agnoſco, & ab ea non recedam: à voluntate etiam diſtinguo deſiderium, quo ferimur in bonum abſens, neque id unquam ſub notione voluntatis comprehendam. Agnoſco hic me minus exacte locutum, & deſiderium à voluntate eſſe diſtinguendum. Quod dixi, voluntatem etiam ferri in finem, nihil aliud volui, niſi quod tu ipſe in epiſtola tua dicis: "Multis ſimul intellectui obverſantibus bonis non ſubordinatis nec con-"ſiſtentibus, hominem unum, neglectis aliis, ſibi proponere ut finem, & "ut proſequendum: hoc facit voluntarie." Hæc ergo electio eſt actio voluntatis: quando hanc ſibi electionem fecit homo, deſiderio ſuo fertur in bonum illud quod ſibi elegit; & voluntate ſua dirigit actiones ſuas, quibus ſe bonum deſideratum conſecuturum credit.

Vox "libertas" mihi deſignat dominium, quod homo habet in actionem ſuam: quo nempe, poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poteſt agere & non agere: qui non eſt actionis ſuæ dominus, ſeu agere non poteſt quod vult, non eſt liber. Verum ego puto hoc ad omnes hominis actiones, ſine ulla exceptione, extendi, tam ad internas actiones mentis, quam externas corporis, adeo ut etiam actio volendi, quæ eſt interna mentis actio, ſit libera. Quando autem dixi voluntatem eſſe actionum noſtrarum dominam, nihil aliud volui, niſi, actiones noſtras externas dirigi à volitione noſtra, adeo ut faciamus quæ volumus, & non faciamus quæ nolumus, niſi intercedat cohibitio, aut coactio: utraque enim illa libertatem deſtruit. Semel declaravi credere me animam, ſeu mentem immediate, abſque ullis intermediis facultatibus, intelligere & velle: per intellectum itaque & voluntatem, quotieſcunque iis vocibus utor, aliud non intelligo niſi potentiam ſeu facultatem ipſius animæ, qua elicit actionem intelligendi ac volendi, & quam actionem anima immediate exercet. Et hanc ſignificationem te etiam admittere puto.

SUPEREST ut dicam de "indifferentia." De qua primo præmoneo, eam non eſſe noſtram, uti tu credis, id eſt, à nobis inventam, aut ita à nobis adſcitam, ut pro ea tanquam neceſſario in hac quæſtione uſurpanda contendamus. Nihil minus. Nos diu illa voce uſi non fuimus: libertatem definientes, eam ordinarie vocavimus dominium quod homo in actionem ſuam habet. In diſputatione autem contra illos theologos, qui intellectum ac voluntatem ſtatuunt duas eſſe facultates, realiter & ab anima & à ſe invicem diſtinctas, quarum una tantum intelligit, nihil autem vult, altera tantum vult, nihil autem intelligit, hanc illorum ſententiam hoc argumento oppugnavimus: quod per eam aut omnis libertas tollatur, aut omnis actio hominis reddatur bruta ac irrationalis. Aut enim voluntas determinatur ab intellectu, adeo ut neceſſario velit quod intellectus illi præſcribit: atqui tum omnis actio neceſſaria eſt, quia omnis actio intellectus eſt neceſſaria: aut non determinatur ab intellectu, ſed ſeipſam determinat: atqui tum omnis actio voluntatis eſt bruta & irrationalis; quia ſupponitur voluntatem nihil intelligere, ſed ſolummodo velle. Hujus

argumenti ictum ut evitent, reſponderunt, radicem libertatis eſſe in intellectu; quia in intellectu eſt indifferentia, qua poteſt quodcunque objectum, quod ſibi offertur, apprehendere & dijudicare. Reſponderunt noſtri, eam eſſe tantum indifferentiam paſſivam, qualis eſt in oculo, qui etiam quævis objecta ſibi occurrentia poteſt videre, eorumque imagines recipere; quem tamen nemo propterea dixerit libere videre; quia non poteſt, quin quod ſibi videndum proponitur videat: ſicut non poteſt intellectus, quin quod ſibi clare proponitur comprehendat; aut dubitet de eo, pro quo utrinque æque graves militant rationes. Si vero libertas quæratur in indifferentia, oportere eam eſſe activam, qua homo dominium habet in ſuam actionem. Exinde, quoniam alii vocem "indifferentiæ" adhibuerunt, nos, ut omnem in diſputando ambiguitatem vitaremus, diſtinctionis cauſa addidimus vocem "activæ," diximuſque libertatem conſiſtere in indifferentia activa, eamque reſidere in voluntate. Vides ergo, nos non pro hac voce velle decertare, nec eam à nobis eſſe excogitatam: ſed nos vocem ab aliis uſurpatam explicuiſſe, & additione vocis activæ ſignificationem illius explanatiorem reddidiſſe. Interim non nego, nos poſtea, quandoque etiam illa in ſcriptis noſtris eſſe uſos, quia juxta explicationem noſtram accepta, commodiſſima viſa fuit, & idem ſignificare cum phraſi antea à nobis uſurpata, dominium in actiones noſtras. Idque etiam conſtat ex definitione hujus indifferentiæ, quam in præcedente mea epiſtola dedi; quod ſit vis illa animi, qua poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis poteſt agere vel non agere: quod mihi aliud nihil eſt, quam quod homo dominium habet in actionem ſuam, ut poſſit, prout ipſi placuerit, vel agere vel non agere. Itaque inter omnia ad agendum requiſita vel maxime colloco intellectus judicium, quod præcedere debet; alias volendi actio mere eſſet irrationalis. Quando autem dico, quod "poſſit agere & non agere," mens mea non eſt, quod ſimul poſſit agere & non agere; aut nec agere nec non agere, ſeu nec velle nec non velle: hoc enim contradictorum eſt; ſed quod potentia ad neutrum ſit determinata, ac proinde ex duobus oppoſitis poſſit eligere quodcunque ipſi libitum fuerit; imo ubi jam ſe determinavit ad agendum, quod actionem ſuam ſiſtere poſſit, & ſe rurſus in partem oppoſitam determinare. Hoc eſt quod dominium habet in ſuam actionem. Ubi hoc non poteſt, non eſt liber. Sic recte mones, eum, qui volens in carcere à vino abſtinet, non libere abſtinere, quia non habet facultatem vinum bibendi: nec qui volens in carcere manet, libere manere, quia non habet facultatem exeundi. Sed vero alia eſt ratio actionum internarum, quæ ſola mente perficiuntur. Ad illarum libertatem nihil requiritur, niſi libera determinatio voluntatis. Sic qui in carcere concupiſcit alterius uxorem, eaque turpi concupiſcentia ſe oblectat, eamque in animo fovet, libere concupiſcit & peccat, licet ea concupiſcentia intra ſolam delectationem moroſam, uti ſcholaſtici loquuntur, conſiſtat; ideoque ad ejus conſummationem ipſe externus adulterii actus non requiritur. Per "brutum impetum," non intelligo actionem voluntatis ſine ulla præcedente cogitatione; ſic enim

onciperem non hominem; ſed præcipitatam actionem, ante debitum & accuratum illius examen: ſicuti videmus multos homines vehementi affectu ſæpe abripi, ut hoc aut illud agere velint, antequam omnes actionis circumſtantias, rationeſque ac argumenta, quibus ad eam incitari, aut ab ea deterreri poſſint, rite conſideraverint. Hanc ergo tribuo libertatem homini, ut quando actio ipſi propoſita eſt, poſſit vel præcipitare judicium, vel mature omnes actionis circumſtantias examinare, atque ita vel bruto impetu, vel prævio, maturo, ac deliberato conſilio agere: ejuſque libertatis unumquemque ſibi eſſe conſcium credo. Nec hoc omittendum per "indifferentiam," me non intelligere ſtatum, in quo homo, quaſi in æquilibrio eſt conſtitutus, nec in unam partem magis propendet, quam in alteram; talis enim ſtatus indifferentiæ circa actiones morales in nullo homine reperitur: ſemper in unam partem magis propendemus quam in aliam, in actionibus præſertim moralibus, prout vel affectibus agimur, aut conſuetudo ac habitus nos erga virtutem aut vitia proniores reddidit: ſed ſtatum, in quo homo potentiam habet ſe determinandi in quamcunque oppoſitorum partem velit: licet enim magis ſit propenſus in unam partem quam in alteram, non tamen dominium in actionem ſuam amiſit, ſed in alteram partem etiam ſe determinare poteſt. Verum quia vox "indifferentia" accipi poteſt pro ſtatu, quo homo in neutram partem inclinat, ſed plane in æquilibrio eſt conſtitutus, licet ille ſenſus directæ explicationi noſtræ adverſetur, ad omnem vitandam amphibologiam, à voce illa abſtinebo.

"ULTIMUM intellectus judicium" ego non confundo cum maturo & recto judicio; ſed ibi diſtinguo ultimum judicium, quod ſit vel maturum & rectum, vel pravum & præcipitatum, quod ibi vocavi brutum impetum, quia illud magis ſequitur vehementem concupiſcentiam carnalem, quam ductum rationis: utrumque eſt ultimum judicium, quando immediate actionem volendi antecedit, & inter illud actionemque volendi nullum aliud judicium intermedium eſt.

ITA explicatis terminis quibus uſus ſum, jam quanta poſſum brevitate & perſpicuitate ſententiam meam proponam. Eam his theſibus comprehendo.

1. HOMO eſt agens liberum, & habet dominium in actiones ſuas, illas vel faciendi, vel omittendi.

2. INTELLECTUS & voluntas non ſunt duæ facultates realiter ab anima hominis & à ſe invicem diſtinctæ; ſed anima per ſuam eſſentiam immediate intelligit & vult.

3. HOMO nihil vult aut facit, niſi deſiderio boni, aut ſenſu moleſtiæ ex abſentia boni deſiderati excitatus.

4. ACTUM volendi antecedit actus intelligendi, quo homo judicium fert de actione ſua.

5. JUDICIUM illud vel eſt prudens, poſt adhibitum maturum rationum ab utraque parte militantium examen: vel eſt præcipitatum, & ab affectu magis quam ratione dictatum.

6. JUDICIUM hoc, quatenus eſt merus intelligendi actus, non procedit ultra ſuaſionem, hoc eſt eligibile, ſeu hoc conſentaneum eſt eligere, hoc conſentaneum eſt rejicere: aut inter eligibilia hoc magis, hoc minus eſt eligibile; inter fugienda hoc magis, hoc minus oportet fugere.

7. JUDICIUM, quo homo decernit hoc eſt faciendum, eſt ipſa volitio; vel ad minimum, actus mixtus ex intellectione & volitione, & ad cujus conſummationem actus volendi concurrit.

8. ACTUS intelligendi, quatenus eſt merus intelligendi actus, eſt neceſſarius, & nititur momento rationum ab homine perceptarum.

9. ACTUS volendi liber eſt, habetque homo dominium in illum, ac facultatem eum vel eliciendi, vel non eliciendi. Si quæ ergo libertas in judicio eſt, ea procedit non ab actu intelligendi, ſed volendi.

10. ACTIONUM internarum, quæ ſola mente perficiuntur, libertas conſiſtit in libera mentis determinatione, qua actionem volendi vel elicere poteſt, vel cohibere. Ad libertatem vero actionum externarum, ad quarum conſummationem concurrere debent membra externa, etiam requiritur ut homo habeat facultatem ſive potentiam faciendi quod vult, & omittendi, ſeu non faciendi, quod non vult; ſive liberum & non impeditum membrorum externorum uſum.

ITA paucis explicata ſententia mea, videamus nunc in quibus conveniamus, & quis inter nos ſuperſit diſſenſus. Quando epiſtolam tuam confero cum lib. ii. cap. xxi. de potentia, videor mihi poſſe dicere, nos in quinque primis theſibus conſentire, nec de iis inter nos ullum eſſe diſſenſum. De ultima etiam nulla eſt inter nos controverſia, niſi forte quod tu libertatem in ſola potentia faciendi quod volumus, & non faciendi quod nolumus, collocare videris, cum ego eam etiam ad ipſius voluntatis determinationem, ſeu volitionis actum extendam. De quo mox. Utroque etiam pollice amplector quod in epiſtola tua ſcribis, quod homo fertur in bonum abſens, ſive finem; & quod multis ſimul intellectui obverſantibus bonis non ſubordinatis nec conſiſtentibus, homo unum, neglectis aliis, ſibi proponit ut finem, id eſt, ut proſequendum: & hoc facit voluntarie: ideoque voluntas fertur in illam actionem mentis, qua unum præ reliquis ſibi proponit, ut finem; & in ea actione terminatur: eam autem voluntatis actionem ſequitur deſiderium finis. Hactenus ergo conſentimus. Videamus quouſque in reliquis conſentiamus & quis ſuperſit diſſenſus.

PRIMO, non videmur convenire in definitione libertatis. Sic enim dicis: "Libertas apud me eſt poteſtas hominis agendi, vel non agendi, ſecundum "ſuam voluntatem." Quæ definitio mihi anguſta nimis eſſe videtur: & ſi ea agnoſcatur, tum certum eſt, libertatem nullo modo competere voluntati: ſicut certum eſt, animam nunquam poſſe eſſe ſine cogitatione, ſi vera ſit definitio, anima eſt cogitatio. Imo ſi hæc genuina ſit definitio libertatis, fieri poſſet ut libertas conſiſteret cum ſumma neceſſitate. Ut mox oſtendam. Ego autem puto. libertatem eſſe dominium, quod homo habet in quamcunque ſuam actionem, eamque extendi non tantum ad actiones, quas facit ſecundum ſuam voluntatem, ſed & ad ipſum volendi actum, ſeu volitionem.

QUOD ſextam & ſeptimam theſin attinet, neſcio quouſque in illis conſentiamus, aut quis de illis inter nos ſit diſſenſus. In poſtrema mea epiſtola idem jam affirmavi: verum tu nullam in tua epiſtola illius mentionem facis: itaque incertus ſum quouſque hic mecum ſentias. Mihi evidens videtur, hominem judicium ſuum determinare, quia vult acquieſcere rationibus quas expendit: ſuſpendere autem judicium ſuum, quia nondum vult acquieſcere, ſed rationes aut exactius expendere, aut an ſint plures, quibus judicium ejus inclinare poſſit, inquirere. Atque ita determinationem ultimi judicii, quo homo decernit hoc eſt eligendum, aut faciendum, ſi non totam, maximam ſaltem partem, eſſe actionem volendi.

OCTAVA theſis, qua ſtatuo, omnem actum intellectus, quatenus merus intelligendi actus eſt, eſſe neceſſarium, neſcio an inter nos controverſa ſit. Illam enim expreſſe aſſerere videris, lib. iv. cap. xiii. § 2. & cap. xx. § 16. At ea diſtinctius paulum explicanda eſt, ut pateat, an aliquis de ea ſit diſſenſus. Hic ergo obſerva, quod res, quas intellectus percipit, ſunt vel meræ theoreticæ, vel practicæ. Circa veritates theoreticas actio intellectus neceſſaria prorſus eſt: propoſita veritate clara & evidenti, intellectus neceſſario aſſentitur, ſeu homo neceſſario eam percipit, illique aſſenſum præbet; propoſitis argumentis veriſimilibus tantum, homo neceſſario opinatur: propoſitis utrinque argumentis æqualis ponderis, homo, ſeu intellectus, neceſſario dubitat: omneſque hæ intelligendi actiones nituntur momento rationum ab homine perceptarum. Circa veritates practicas actio intelligendi, quatenus mera intelligendi actio eſt, & nulla intercedit actio volendi, etiam neceſſaria eſt: pro rationum enim momento, quas intellectus expendit, judicat quid convenientius, quid minus conveniens, quid ex uſu ſit facere, vel non facere. Hoc judicium ducit quidem voluntatem, verum eam non plene determinat: eſt enim illud imperium tantum ſuaſionis, cui voluntas poteſt non obtemperare, ſeu homo poteſt aliud velle; determinatio autem procedit à voluntate, qua homo decernit hoc eſt faciendum, eaque determinatio fit vel juxta ſuaſionem intellectus, & tunc eſt rationalis; vel fieri poteſt contra eam, & tunc eſt irrationalis, hoc eſt, procedit ab affectu carnali, & ſuaſioni intellectus neutiquam auſcultat: vel etiam poteſt eſſe præceps & temeraria, ita ut maturum judicium antevertat. Hic videmur diſſentire: dicis enim "hominem non habere potentiam determinandi actionem volendi contra judicium intellectus: actio enim volendi hoc, aut illud, "ſemper ſequitur judicium intellectus, quo homo judicat hoc & nunc "illud eſſe melius." Idem etiam videris affirmare in fine § 71. dicti capitis. Sed tamen, quando hæc confero cum definitione voluntatis in tua epiſtola, quod ſit "potentia, quam homo habet incipiendi, ſiſtendi, "vel vitandi aliquam actionem mentis, vel corporis," & cum § 47. cap. xxi. & aliquot anteced. & ſeqq. dubito, an multum diſſentiamus, & an non magis diverſitas ſit in modo explicandi, quam in re ipſa. Omnino enim mihi videris illic agnoſcere libertatem quandam in judicando. Dicis enim illic, "liberum eſſe menti appetitionum ſuarum objecta conſiderare, "eas introſpicere penitus, & utrum præponderet, trutina diligenter exa-

"minare.

" minare. In hoc libertas hominis consistit:" & quæ ibi porro egregia habes. Addis mox: " indultam nobis potestatem voluntatem revo-" candi, à prosecutione hujus aut illius appetitionis. Hic mihi videtur " fons esse omnis libertatis," &c. Ex iis enim liquere videtur, libertatem etiam versari in judicio formando, imo ibi esse libertatis fontem. Unde colligo libertatem (juxta tuam explicationem) non solummodo consistere in potentia faciendi quod volumus: sed etiam ante volitionis actum, imo ante judicium de actione sua, hominem esse liberum, & libertatem suam exercere. Solummodo discrimen inter nos esset, an judicium ultimum, quo discernitur, non hoc convenit facere, sed hoc est faciendum, sit actio intelligendi mera; an vero ad id etiam concurrat actio volendi? &, an libertas resideat in actione intelligendi, an volendi? sive, an id quod in judicio, quo hominis actio determinatur, liberum est, resideat in intellectione, an volitione? Si in eo consistat discrimen, puto facile sententias nostras conciliari posse: quamvis enim mihi perspicuum videatur, libertatem residere in actione volendi, nihilque esse liberum, quin sit etiam voluntarium; non tamen hic tantopere videmur posse dissentire, quin facile ad consensum reducamur. Cum enim uterque statuamus, intellectum & voluntatem non esse duas potentias realiter ab anima & à se invicem distinctas; sed hominem, seu animam, immediate per suam essentiam intelligere ac velle; satis convenimus, quando uterque agnoscimus judicium hominis ultimum libere determinari: quando enim adest potentia faciendi quod ultimum illud judicium libere à nobis determinatum dictat, non faciendi, seu omittendi, quod ultimo illo judicio non esse faciendum decernitur, homo plena fruitur libertate; solummodo controvertitur, an illud judicium, quod homo libere format, & quo actiones ejus determinantur, sit actio intellectus an voluntatis? Si disquireretur solummodo utra explicatio cum philosophica ἀκριβείᾳ melius conciliari posset, in re ipsa autem foret consensus. Si vero dicamus, omnem actionem intellectus esse necessariam, & ultimum illud judicium practicum esse merum intellectus actum, ac per illud voluntatem determinari; non video, quomodo ulla in homine reliqua sit libertas. Actiones enim omnes determinantur à voluntate, nisi homo aut cohibeatur quo minus facere possit quod vult, aut cogatur facere quod non vult; cohibitio enim & coactio, ut recte observas, repugnant libertati, & quando nostri juris sumus, semper facimus quod volumus. Si autem voluntas determinatur ab intellectu, & intellectus actio sit necessaria, omnia erunt necessaria: nam à principio necessario, hoc est, judicio intellectus, determinatur voluntas; à voluntate actiones: itaque homo ad actiones suas determinatus est; & licet potentiam habeat faciendi quod vult, & non faciendi quod non vult; potentia tamen illa, per antecedentem voluntatis determinationem ad unum determinata est. Atque sic mera in actionibus hominis regnaret necessitas. Prolixior paulo fui; sed prolixitatem, ut perspicue mentem meam explicarem, evitare vix potui. Si alicubi mentem tuam non recte, aut non plene, percepi, aut me à veritate aberrare credis, me libere moneas & instruas, rogo: veritatem enim unice sector. Et quoniam nunc plenius mentem meam explicui, brevius, quicquid tibi

non

non probetur, indicare poſſes. Ut vero plenius ſententiam noſtram percipias, ſuaderem ut legas brevem Epiſcopii tractatum de Libero Arbitrio, qui extat in vol. i. part. ii. p. 198. operum ejus; & epiſtolam illius, qua judicium ſuum profert de loco quodam ethices non edito; quæ eſt ICLV. inter epiſtolas noſtras eccleſiaſticas & theologicas. Reliqua libri tui mihi valde probantur, multumque me ex illius lectione profeciſſe gratus agnoſco. Lectionem ejus repetere ſtatui. Verum verſio Gallica multum Latinæ præſtat; eam ego ſubinde conſulo, quando Latina obſcurior eſt, ſive interpretis ſive typographi culpa. Quæ epiſtolæ tuæ incluſa ſunt errata, & additamentum de indifferentia, neſcio an in privatum meum uſum miſeris, an vero ut imprimantur. Verum ego puto te ſententiam noſtram de indifferentia non recte percepiſſe, ideoque eam in hac epiſtola plenius & diſtinctius explicui. Sed tandem manum de tabula. Vale, vir ampliſſime. Uxor & filia te plurimum ſalvere jubent. Salutem à nobis officiociſſimam dices D. Maſham totique familiæ.

Amſtelod. 11 Oct. 1701.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

GRATISSIMAM epiſtolam tuam, 11 Oct. datam, legi relegique, & (te auctore) perlegi Epiſcopii tractatum de Libero Arbitrio. Non tam magnifice de me ſentio, ut audeam in tantorum virorum ſcriptis quicquam reprehendere; fateor tamen nonnulla & in illius diſſertatione & in tua epiſtola occurrere, quæ, ſi coram tibi adeſſem, explicari à te peroptarem, ut melius perſpicere poſſem, quomodo inter ſe & cum rei veritate conſiſtere poſſint. Sed ſi ſingula, quæ in hoc argumento, in aliorum ſcriptis, ſuboriri poſſunt, dubia perſequi velim, & penſiculatius ad trutinam revocare, in volumen abiret epiſtola: nec meum eſt aliorum opiniones convellere (quarum ignarus in ſcribendo nec aliorum ſententiam fugi, nec autoritatem ſecutus ſum) ſed ſolum mea cogitata, quantum ex rebus ipſis perſpicere poſſum, rebus ipſis conformare. Hæc cauſa eſſe poteſt quod, inconſultis auctoribus, & mea mecum meditatus terminis & loquendi formulis hoc in ſubjecto familiaribus non ſum uſus. Hoc mihi ignoſcendum poſtulo. Nec Epiſcopii acutiſſimi, cujus memoria ſumma apud me in veneratione eſt, mentionem hic feciſſem, niſi te ſuaſore tractatum ejus de Libero Arbitrio perlegiſſem, quem tuum feciſti, tuamque per omnia ſententiam continere mihi notum feciſſes.

Hæc à me præfanda erant, ne forſan videar aliorum ſcripta, qui me in hoc argumento præceſſerunt, inſolenter nimis negligere, vel non ſatis eorum autoritati tribuere: quod à meo animo, & à mea mediocritate, & eſt,

eſt, & eſſe debet, remotiſſimum. Fateor, ego non ſector nomina, ſed ubique veritati litans, eamque quacunque ducit unice ſequor: ideoque gratias tibi ago maximas, quod me, ubi errâſſe exiſtimas, in viam reducere conaris.

PRIMUM & præcipuum, quod in noviſſima hac tua epiſtola culpare videris, eſt mea definitio libertatis, quam dicis " nimis eſſe anguſtam." An tua laxior eſt quam illa, quam ego lib. ii. cap. xxi. § 8. & 12. tradidi, tum videbimus, cum tu illam proferes. Nam quod dicis " libertatem " eſſe dominium, quod homo habet in quamcunque ſuam actionem," hoc mihi non videtur eſſe definitio libertatis, quum nihil aliud dicit niſi hominem habere dominium in actiones ſuas quod habet; quod huc tantum redit, libertatem eſſe libertatem, quam homo habet in quamcunque ſuam actionem; quo evenire poteſt, ut nulla omnino ſit hominis libertas: ſcis enim eſſe aliquos, qui negant hominem ullum in actiones ſuas habere dominium, ſed omnia præſtituto & ineluctabili duci fato. Quod ſi dicas te ſupponere hominem habere dominium in actiones ſuas, & in eo conſiſtere libertatem; tunc rogo, quid ſit dominium hominis in actiones ſuas? Dominium enim, ſive ſit vox tralatitia, ſive ob aliquam aliam cauſam, mihi videtur æque, ſi non magis obſcura, quam vox Libertas, ideoque non minus eget definitione. Et ſic pergam rogando, donec perventum erit ad ſimplices ideas, ex quibus conflatur idea libertatis.

VIDEO ex hac tua epiſtola, quanta ſit vis conſuetudinis, & qua conſtantia non cogitantibus etiam & invitis irrepit. Fateris & candide fateris, voluntatem eſſe animæ facultatem, & facultates non eſſe agentes: & tamen, ut alia omittam, hic dicis, " ſi mea definitio libertatis agnoſca- " tur, certum eſt libertatem nullo modo competere voluntati." Voluntati enim nullo modo competere poteſt libertas, niſi pro agente agnoſcatur. Quippe agentium ſolummodo eſt libertas. Scio te Epiſcopii exemplo poſſe teipſum excuſare, qui in principio diſſertationis ſuæ ſtrenue rejiciens facultatem operationis, ſubinde tamen relabitur in argumentationes, quibus ſupponuntur agentes: permitte tamen ut amice moneam, niſi hoc maxime caveas, multum in hac materia tibi faceſſes negotium, & tenebras ſæpiſſime tibi offundes.

AD reliqua, de quibus dubitare videris, ne in longitudinem molemque nimiam extendatur reſponſio, rectius me & compendioſius ſatisfacturum credo, ſi aliquas hic illic capiti xxi. inſeram explicationes, quibus animi mei ſenſum negligentius forſan, vel obſcurius traditum, clariorem reddam, adeo ut feſtinanti etiam, uti fit, lectori in poſterum pateat, modo quæ tradita ſunt memoria tenere non dedignetur. Hæc cum tu attente perlegeris, & cum reliquis, quæ in iſto capite expoſui, contuleris, plene tibi ſatisfactum iri ſpero. Quod ſi quæ poſtea tibi remanſerint dubia, & aliqua reſtant, quæ vel obſcura nimis, quorum te fugit ſenſus, vel parum veritati congrua, quibus aſſenſum præbere non potes, moneas rogo, ut aut te auctore corrigam, aut ulterius explicando, veritatem, ſua propria luce nitentem tibi ante oculos ponam.

Si qua ſunt in epiſtola tua, ad quæ non ſatis diſtincte reſponſum à me credas, ignoſcas rogo valetudini parum firmæ, quæ languidiorem me & ad ſcribendum minus aptum reddit. Quanquam ſpero ex annexis explicationibus, ex quibus mentem meam percipies, perſpicuum tibi fore quid ad ſingulas dubitationes tuas reſpondi poſſit. Vale, vir optime, &, ut facis, me ama

Oates, 19 Nov. 1701.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimum,
J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

QUOD lectionem tractatus Epiſcopii de Libero Arbitrio tibi commendaverim, id eo fine non feci, ut viri illius auctoritate contra te utar; nihil minus: ſcio enim in ſincera veritatis inquiſitione nullam valere auctoritatem humanam, ſed tantum momenta rationum, quibus veritas adſtruitur. Nec ego, licet Epiſcopii ſententiam approbem, vellem illius auctoritate conſtringi, ut omnia, etiam quæ, ſalva principali veritate, in dubium vocari poſſunt, admittam, nedum phraſibus ac loquendi formulis ab ipſo uſurpatis alligari me patiar. Sed illius legendi tibi auctor fui, ut ex illo cognoſceres, nos jam a multo tempore renuntiâſſe illi ſententiæ, quæ ſtatuit animam intermediis facultatibus agere; ſed aſſeruiſſe tecum animam immediate per ſeipſam intelligere ac velle. Unde cognoſcere poſſes, quando communem loquendi uſum ſecuti utimur vocibus intellectus ac voluntatis, nos iis non intelligere facultates realiter ab anima diſtinctas; ſed ipſas intelligendi ac volendi actiones, quas anima immediate ex ſeipſa elicit. Hoc ego etiam brevioribus verbis ſignificatum dedi, in Theologia mea Chriſtiana, lib. ii. cap. xxiii. § 1, 2. Itaque ſi per incogitantiam, ex inveterata conſuetudine, mihi forte exciderit voluntatem eſſe liberam, rogo ut id meo ſenſu accipias, ac ſi dixiſſem actio volendi eſt libera, ſeu homo in elicienda actione volendi eſt liber: ac proinde pro verbis meis, ſi tua libertatis definitio agnoſcatur, "certum eſt liber-"tatem nullo modo competere voluntati," hæc ſubſtituas, "certum eſt "actionem volendi neutiquam eſſe liberam, ſeu hominem non libere "velle." Gratias interim tibi ago, quod inconſideratam hanc meam locutionem mihi indicaveris: ego annitar ut in poſterum omnem ambiguam locutionem vitem, & ab inſolita loquendi conſuetudine non abripiar; ne ulla in verbis meis ſit obſcuritas.

LIBERTATEM ego definivi per dominium in actiones: quia vox dominii tibi explicatione indigere videtur, ſimplicius dico libertatem eſſe facultatem hominis actionem ſuam vel eliciendi, vel non eliciendi: qui alterutrum tantum poteſt, non eſt liber. Per actionem autem ego intelligo actionem quamcunque, etiam actiones internas intelligendi ac volendi:

circa quaſcunque actiones non habet homo hanc facultatem eas vel eliciendi, vel non eliciendi, ſed alterutrum tantum poteſt, hæ non ſunt liberæ: & quia illi hanc facultatem tribuo circa actiones volendi, ideo eas liberas voco: quando hac facultate homo deſtitutus eſt, libere nec vult, nec velle poteſt.

UTINAM facultas eſſet coram tecum de omnibus his diſſerendi, & ex ore tuo pleniorem omnium, circa quæ hæſito, explanationem audiendi; meamque ſententiam, ac loquendi phraſes diſtincte explicandi, non dubito, quin felicius totam hanc quæſtionem terminare poſſemus. Nunc etiam circa ea, quæ explicationis gratia addidiſti, hæſito, an ſtatuas judicium illud, quo formato, non amplius in homine libertas eſt non volendi, ſit actio mera intelligendi, eaque intelligendi actio ſit libera vel neceſſaria: ſi in ea elicienda hominem liberum agnoſcas, non video quis inter nos, quoad ſummam rei, maneat diſſenſus. Sed coram poſſemus hæc diſtinctius & exactius expendere; idque maxime percuperem, ut uterque in hac materia, quanta fieri poteſt perſpicuitate, nos explicemus & difficultatibus hinc inde oborientibus occurramus. Nunc quoniam utriuſque ætas id neutiquam permittit, quæ miſiſti, ſemper, quando de hac materia ago, conſulam, ne aut ipſe errem, aut aliis inconſiderata loquendi ratione errandi occaſionem præbeam. Vale, vir ampliſſime. Salutant te uxor ac filia, omneſque proſperam tibi precamur valetudinem. Generoſo Domino Maſham gratulamur continuatam dignitatem: illi, ut & Dominæ Maſham totique familiæ, ut annus hic ex voto fluat precamur.

Amſtelod. 3 Jan. 1702.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

DE valetudine ſatis conſtanti quod ſcribis, maxime lætor, & quod palpitatio illa cordis moleſta amplius non fuerit, gaudeo. Quæ ad ſanitatem tuendam faciunt tam recte & prudenter moderaris, ut ſperem te diu ab illo aliiſque morbis tutum & ſoſpitem futurum: præcipue ſi dictæ mediocritati venæ ſectionem, ſi plethoram vel ſentias vel metuas, quotieſcunque inde malum ingruit, addere velis.

NUNC demum, ſi placet, ad diu intermiſſa ſtudia redeamus. Habeo jam præ manibus literas tuas 3 Januarii datas, in quibus videris mihi dubitare, an ego ſtatuam hominem eſſe in volendo vel in intelligendo liberum; ita enim quæſtionem tuam interpretor: etiam tu rogas, an actio volendi vel intelligendi ſit libera? ad quam quæſtionem ſic reſpondeo.

1. GENERA-

1. GENERALITER, nempe quod mea ſententia homo in omni actione tam volendi quam intelligendi liber eſt, ſi ab actione illa volendi aut intelligendi potuit abſtinuiſſe; ſi non, non.

2. SPECIALIUS, quoad voluntatem, aliqui ſunt caſus in quibus homo non poteſt non velle, & in omnibus iſtis volendi actibus homo non eſt liber, quia non poteſt non agere. In cæteris, ubi potuit velle, vel non velle, liber eſt.

3. QUOAD actus intelligendi, in iſta voce intelligendi ſuſpicor latere amphiboliam; nam ſignificare poteſt actionem cogitandi de aliquo ſubjecto, & in iſto ſenſu homo plerumque liber eſt in iſtiuſmodi actionibus intellectus. V. g. poſſum cogitare de peccato Adami, vel inde amovere cogitationem meam ad urbem Romam, vel ad artem bellicam præſentis ſæculi. In quibus omnibus & hujuſmodi aliis infinitis, liber ſum, quia pro libitu meo poſſum de hoc vel illo cogitare, vel non cogitare; vel actus intelligendi poteſt ſumi pro ea actione, qua percipio aliquid eſſe verum, & in hac actione intelligendi, v. g. quod tres anguli trianguli ſunt æquales duobus rectis, homo non eſt liber, qui excuſſa demonſtratione non poteſt non hoc intelligere. Homo poteſt plerumque non aperire oculos, vel non advertere aciem oculorum ad hoc vel illud objectum, verum apertis & converſis ad ſolem vel lunam oculis, neceſſario videt & ſplendorem & figuram quæ ſe offert intuitui videndam. Quod de oculis dixi ad intellectum transferre licet. Par utrinque eſt ratio. Sed de his hactenus. Si ſatisfactum tibi ſit gaudeo. Sin dubia reſtent, utere libertate tua, ego paratus ſum & in his & in omnibus, quantum in me eſt, tibi obtemperare.

Oates, 28 Sept. 1702.

Tui ſtudioſiſſimus,

J. LOCKE.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

MULTIS me obruis beneficiis, quorum memoriam nulla unquam eluet ætas. Ego hactenus Dei gratia bene valeo: ante ſeptem circiter hebdomadas plethoram mihi moleſtam ſenſi, ſine tamen gravi cordis palpitatione: quare venæ ſectionem adhibui, atque ita omnis illa moleſtia evanuit.

1. QUÆ de libertate hominis in actione intelligendi ac volendi ſcribis, tecum veriſſima agnoſco; nimirum in omnibus actionibus, à quibus homo potuit abſtinuiſſe, eſſe liberum: minime vero, ſi abſtinuiſſe non potuit.

2. SIMILITER, quoſdam eſſe caſus, in quibus homo non poteſt non velle, & non agere; quia facultate non agendi deſtitutus eſt. Sed vero in omnibus actibus obedientiæ ab ipſo præſtandis, & ob quos non præ-

ſtitos pœnæ reus ſit, liberum credo, neque quemquam poſſe reum pœnæ fieri, ob non præſtitum actum ſibi minime poſſibilem, aut ob præſtitum ſibi inevitabilem: nihil enim homini magis liberum eſſe debet, quam id ob quod pœnæ reus redditur.

3. HOMINEM eſſe liberum, ut contemplationem vel cogitationem ſuam ab uno objecto avertat & in aliud dirigat, atque hoc reſpectu in actionibus intellectus liberum dici poſſe, tecum agnoſco. Verum hæc actio, ſi accurate loqui velimus, proprie eſt actio volendi, non intelligendi: avertit enim homo cogitationes ſuas ab uno objecto, & in aliud dirigit, quia non vult priores cogitationes continuare, & quia vult novas inchoare. Quod vero actionem intelligendi attinet, qua homo aliquid percipit eſſe verum, eam recte dicis non eſſe liberam: idque locum habet tam in percipiendis iis, quæ philoſophi per ſolam intelligentiam cognoſci dicunt; ut, bis duo ſunt quatuor; idem non poteſt ſimul eſſe & non eſſe, &c. quam illis, quæ excuſſa demonſtratione cognoſci, optime dicis; videl. tres angulos trianguli eſſe æquales duobus rectis. Idem etiam locum habere cenſeo in aliis intelligendi actionibus, quando res eſt obſcura aut dubia, & nullæ ſunt rationes eam evidenter probantes, aut pro utraque ſententia rationes ſunt æqualis ponderis; tum enim homo neceſſario aut ſuſpenſus eſt, aut dubitat, aut leviter tantum aſſentitur, ita tamen ut falli poſſe ſe credat. Adeo ut intelligendi actio accommodata ſit rationibus ac argumentis, quorum pondere in hanc aut illam partem inclinatur. Qualia plurima ſunt in vita humana. Et actio illa intelligendi non mutatur, quamdiu non accedunt novæ rationes, aut rationum, quibus rei veritas innititur, clarior & evidentior perceptio. Non nego tamen in ejuſmodi cognitione inevidenti fieri poſſe, quin & ſæpius contingere, ut nulla accedente nova luce, aut magis diſtincta perceptione, homo aut eliciat plenum aſſenſum, aut opinionem ſuam mutet: verum illa mutatio judicii aut aſſenſus, non procedit ab actione aliqua intelligendi, ſed volendi: quia nimirum homo, licet nova ratione minime illuſtratus, judicium ſuum in alteram partem inclinare vult. Scimus affectus noſtros valde inclinare judicium noſtrum: itaque indulgendo affectui cuipiam, qui me in alteram partem impellit, eo etiam judicium & aſſenſum meum inclinare poſſum. Atque ita judicium hoc meum erit actio mixta, partim intelligendi, partim volendi: quatenus intelligendi eſt actio, ſeu rem percipit, eſt neceſſaria: verum quicquid in judicio liberum eſt, procedit ab actione volendi: quatenus ſcilicet ego rationibus allatis acquieſcere volo, ut judicium feram. Qualem actionem mixtam ego etiam credo fidem noſtram eſſe, prout explicui in Theol. mea Chriſt. lib. v. cap. ix. § 21, 22, 23. ibique plenius oſtendo, quomodo actio intelligendi & volendi in fide chriſtiana concurrunt: ſolummodo ex inveterata loquendi conſuetudine, uſus ſum vocibus intellectus & voluntatis, quibus actiones intelligendi & volendi deſigno, juxta ea quæ jam declaraveram lib. ii. cap. xxiii. § 1, 2. Hæc ſic diſtincte conſideranda exiſtimo; verum nolim ego multum contendere, utrum illa libertas etiam ſit dicenda ineſſe actioni intelligendi, dummodo conſtet hominem in actione illa liberum eſſe:

&

& hominem libere ab una cogitatione ſe convertere in alteram. Diſtinctione tamen hac adhibita puto rem dilucidius explicari. Et ſic etiam ſimilitudo tua ab oculis deſumpta plenius applicatur: quod enim homo non aperiat oculos, aut oculorum aciem non advertat, hoc facit, quia ita vult: oculi autem quando aperiuntur & in objectum diriguntur, illud quale ſe oculis repræſentat, neceſſario conſpiciunt: ſi in debita diſtantia oculis objiciatur, etiam neceſſario diſtincte videtur: ſi nimis remotum ſit, diſtincte videri non poteſt; neque homo libertatem habet procurandi ut objectun in tali diſtantia ipſi diſtincte appareat: ſed ſi diſtincte contemplari velit, libertatem habet propius accedendi. In his puto nos conſentire, atque ita in ſumma rei nullum eſſe diſſenſum, licet forſitan in modo explicandi aliqua diſcrepantia ſit. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & ſalve ab uxore, filia, & me

Amſtelod. 27 Oct. 1702.

Tui amantiſſimo,

P. à LIMBORCH.

JOANNI LOCKE PHILIPPUS à LIMBORCH, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

POSTQUAM afflicta tua valetudo, præſertim in extrema ſenectute, nos admodum de te ſolicitos habuit, tandem gratior paulo nuntius nos recreavit calore æſtatis, qui tamen nunc apud nos calorem vernum non excedit, te nonnihil reſpirare, & meliuſcule te habere. Utinam firmam tibi valetudinem concedat benignum numen, ut quos vitæ tuæ adjicere dignabitur dies iis, quibus te conſecrâſti, ſtudiis impendas, & donec hujus vitæ uſura frueris, doctiſſimis tuis lucubrationibus, orbi chriſtiano inſervire poſſis! Quæ tu concordiæ chriſtianæ jeciſti ſemina, licet nunc ab ingratis conculcentur, gratæ poſteritati fructus ſuos ferent. Quod licet mens mihi certo præſagiat, nihilominus, quando ſervilia plurimorum, & pro auctoritate humana decertantia ingenia conſidero, ægre ſperare licet, eos depoſitis præjudiciis & affectibus, animo puro ac ſincero momenta rationum, quibus veritas nititur ponderaturos, ac uni veritati candide ceſſuros. Etiam reformatos, qui ſeſe opponendo papatui nulla ſe humana auctoritate conſtringi velle, aut poſſe, proteſtati ſunt, nimium humanæ auctoritati tribuere, ſcriptaque humana majore quam par eſt in veneratione habere, actus ſingulis trienniis in patria noſtra repetitus, & cujus ſolennem repetitionem novellæ noſtrates paucas ante hebdomadas nobis retulerunt, argumentum eſt omni exceptione majus: cujus quoniam nunc recens memoria eſt, quia illius narrationem tibi non ingratam fore confido, licet res ipſa maxime diſpliceat, eam diſtinctius & cum præcipuis circumſtantiis deſcribam. Jam anno CIↃ IↃC XXV. Ordines Generales decreverunt, ut ſingulis trienniis acta authentica ſynodi Dordracenæ, quæ

Hagæ aſſervantur, à deputatis ordinum & eccleſiarum inſpiciantur: poſtquam deinde anno CIↃ IↃC XXXVII. prodiit nova bibliorum verſio, juſſu ejuſdem ſynodi adornata, illius etiam exemplar, à tranſlatoribus, & reviſoribus, hunc in finem Lugdunum evocatis, ultimo correctum, quod Lugduni Batavorum aſſervatur, inſpici ſolet. Redeunte itaque quolibet triennio deputati ſynodorum Hollandiæ Auſtralis & Borealis cœtum convocant, ex omnium provinciarum eccleſiis, necnon ex eccleſia Walonica. Hi patres conſcripti, ubi convenere, præſidi Ordinum Generalium adventum fratrum indicant: precibus à paſtore loci, ſi cœtus membrum ſit, habitis, & literis credentialibus lectis, præſes & ſcriba eliguntur. Præcedentis cœtus acta præleguntur: exinde deputati cœtus ad Ordines Generales mittuntur, ut ſcriptorum ſynodalium viſionem petant, & ut aliquos è collegio ſuo ad eam deputent, locum & tempus ſtatuant, quin & per epiſtolam conſules Lugdunenſes præmoneant, & collegii regentem, unius clavis cuſtodem, ut adſit, quando Lugdunum convenient ad inſpiciendum autographa verſionis. His peractis, certa à deputatis Ordinum conſtituta hora, comparent in Ordinum Generalium camera; primo funduntur preces, quibus Deo gratiæ aguntur, quod eccleſiam reformatam à variis erroribus purgaverit, quod ſynodum ipſis conceſſerit, cujus acta authentica in præcedente cœtu adhuc incorrupta conſpexerunt; & quoniam nunc convenerunt ut ea denuo inſpiciant, oratur Deus ut gratiam hanc ipſis concedat, ut integra æque ac incorrupta ab ipſis conſpiciantur, perinde uti ante triennium conſpecta fuere. Poſtquam ſcripta inſpecta ſunt, gratiæ Deo pro tanto beneficio aguntur, idque depoſitum denuo tutelæ divinæ committitur, ut in proximo cœtu æque ſincerum atque incorruptum reperiatur prout nunc deponitur. Poſtridie Lugdunum proficiſcuntur, & à magiſtratu in curiam adſciti authentica verſionis inſpiciunt. Hæc inſpectio ſimilibus precibus inchoatur ac finitur. Exin lauto excipiuntur convivio, in quo à præſide cœtus & ſcriba deputatis Ordinum & magiſtratus Lugdunenſis gratiæ aguntur. Hagam reverſi in actis ſcribunt, ſcripta illis integra adhuc, & à vermibus, tinea & muribus inviolata eſſe reperta: atque ita cœtui finis imponitur. Hæc eſt illa triennalis ſolennitas, viſioni ſcriptorum ſynodalium deſtinata, quam paulo diſtinctius, variiſque circumſtantiis veſtitam tibi ſcribere volui, ut, quanta veneratione ſynodæ illius famoſæ reliquiæ hic aſſerventur, cognoſcas. Hæc ego excerpſi ex narratione cujuſdam miniſtri, qui ipſe cœtus illius membrum fuit, ſcripta inſpexit, & in quorundam amicorum gratiam hanc hiſtoriolam ſcripto conſignavit. Cui etiam conſonant aliorum qui ſolemnitati illi interfuerunt relationes. Non credo Romæ tanta cum veneratione tantiſque ſumptibus acta concilii Tridentini inſpici. Ridenda hæc forent, ſi quorundam privatorum inconſiderato zelo agerentur; nunc, quia auctoritate publica fiunt, dolenda ſunt. Quid Gallica ſynodus nuperrime contra D. Clerici verſionem Gallicam Novi Teſtamenti ejuſque notas decreverit, quam frivolæ illius ſint criminationes, quam plene brevi ſcripto edito eas D. Clericus refutaverit,

ipſe tibi aut jam ſcripſit, aut brevi, ut credo, ſcripturus eſt. Hæc ſimiliaque quando conſidero, bonæ conſcientiæ ſtudio acquieſcendum, & neglectis hominum iniquorum molitionibus, veritati ac paci indefeſſo ſtudio unice litandum, laborumque noſtrorum benedictionem à ſolo Deo, qui è tenebris lucem eruere poteſt, expectandum eſſe certus ſum. Illius te tutelæ commendo; illum oro, ut omnia tibi largiatur fauſta ac ſalutaria, necnon honoratiſſimæ in qua vivis familiæ. Salutant te, Dominum ac Dominam Maſham, una cum digniſſima filia ac filio, uxor ac filia. Salutem etiam à me dices D° Coſte.

Amſtelod. Jun. 21, 1704.

Tui amantiſſimus,

P. à LIMBORCH.

PHILIPPO à LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE, S. P. D.

Vir ampliſſime,

PUDET me ſane tam diuturni ſilentii, nec ab infirma & plane fracta valetudine ſatis excuſatum credo, etiamſi admixta etiam aliqua tui reverentia me à ſcribendo aliquantulum detinuit, ſatis ex ipſo morbo deſidioſum. Quorſum enim attinet te eruditioribus ſermonibus aptum & commerciis literarum docto liberoque animo dignis, ægrotantis querelis, laborioſiſque verbis anhelum ſcriptorem redolentibus fatigare? juvat tamen experiri amicitiam tuam, veterem amicum, etiamſi ſenio & morbo mutilum, ad ſepulchrum uſque proſequi. Nihil ſane jucundius, nec eſt, quod magis animum debilem & langueſcentem refocillat, quam conſtans & vegeta amicorum benevolentia; magnum perfugium humanæ fragilitatis, in quo reperitur magna pars voluptatis, cum reliqua plane inſipida ſunt & fruſtra ſolicitantur. Gratiſſimæ igitur mihi fuerunt epiſtolæ tuæ benevolentiæ & amicitiæ plenæ, nec quantum ex illis ſolatii perceperim ex taciturnitate mea, ſed ex voluptate quam profiteor judicare debes. Ea enim infirmi corporis morbus eſt, hoc ſentientis grati & animi teſtimonium.

ETIAMSI ſervilium ingeniorum, humana venerantium, exempla cumulate ſatis mihi obtulit longa dies, nec melior omnino mihi ſpes eſt de futuro; donec placuerit Deo optimo maximo ex miſericordia ſua, ſecundo filii ſui adventu, reſtaurare eccleſiam; maxime tamen mihi placuit hiſtoria iſta, quam in noviſſimis tuis perſcripſiſti. Actus ille triennalis, cum omni ſuo apparatu partim ridiculo, partim ſuperſtitioſo, habet in ſe quod & ſtomachum & ſplenem moveat: certe cum omnibus ſuis circumſtantiis ita graphice depictus conſervari debet, etiam ubi commode fieri poteſt typis mandari, & in publicum prodire, ut quod privatim obtinet, oculis

oculis hominum obverſetur, & pudeſiant qui ſic ſacris illudunt, Deique nomen ſacroſanctum, placitis inventiſque ſuis, audacter præfigunt. Vitam tibi in utilitatem religionis longam validamque, & in uſum familiæ & amicorum tuorum animitùs precor, uti & omnia proſpera tibi tuiſque. Optimam tuam fœminam filiamque, reliquoſque amicos noſtros, meo nomine, rogo officioſiſſime ſalutes. Hæc tota familia te tuoſque ſalutat. Vale, vir ampliſſime, & me ama

Oates, 4 Auguſt. 1704. Tui amantiſſimum,

J. LOCKE.

A COL-

A

COLLECTION

OF

SEVERAL PIECES

OF

Mr. JOHN LOCKE.

PUBLISHED BY

Mr. DESMAIZEAUX,

Under the Direction of

ANTHONY COLLINS, Esq.

JOHN GOSKE

of

OTTUMWA

TO

HUGH WROTTESLEY, Eſquire.

SIR,

HAVING met with ſeveral of Mr. LOCKE's works, which were never printed; I thought myſelf obliged to impart them to the public, together with ſome pieces, of that illuſtrious writer, which had indeed been publiſhed before, but without his name to them, and were grown very ſcarce. The value you have for every thing that was written by Mr. LOCKE, and your eſteem for ſome of his friends concerned in this collection, emboldens me to offer it to you; and I flatter myſelf that you will favour it with your acceptance.

THE firſt piece in this collection, contains "The Fundamental Conſtitutions of Carolina." You know, Sir, that CHARLES II. made a grant of that country by letters patents, bearing date March 24th, 1663, to the duke of ALBEMARLE, the earl of CLARENDON, the earl of CRAVEN, the lord BERKELEY of Stratton, the lord ASHLEY, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, Sir WILLIAM BERKELEY, and Sir JOHN COLLETON; who thereupon became proprietors of that colony. My lord ASHLEY, afterwards ſo well known by the title of earl of SHAFTESBURY, was diſtinguiſhed by an exquiſite judgment, an uncommon penetration, and a deep inſight into civil affairs. The other proprietors deſired him to draw up the laws neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of their new colony; to which he the more readily conſented, becauſe he relied on the aſſiſtance of Mr. LOCKE, who had the good fortune to gain his friendſhip and confidence.

MY lord ASHLEY well knew, that our philoſopher had a peculiar right to a work of this nature. He called to his mind ſo many ancient philoſophers, who had been legiſlators, and who, on this very account, had ſtatues erected to them. And indeed, Sir, if we conſider on the one hand, that a philoſopher makes Man his particular ſtudy, knows the reach of his mind, and the ſprings of his paſſions, in fine, his good and bad qualities; and that on the other hand, not being biaſſed by any motives of ſelf-intereſt, he hath nothing in view but the general good of mankind; it will be granted, that no-body is better qualified than ſuch

an one, not only to civilize a barbarous people, but to prevent the inconveniencies and diſorders which even the moſt polite nations are apt to fall into. In this reſpect it is, that the philoſopher hath the advantage over the courtier, or what we call the politician. For this latter, being accuſtomed to ſtudy the genius and inclinations of men for his own ends only, and to make his own advantage of them; it is impoſſible he ſhould entirely overcome the force of cuſtom, and the tyranny of prejudice, when the concerns of the publick, and the welfare of ſociety, are under deliberation. But the philoſopher conſiders things in general, and as they really are in themſelves. He examines the moſt difficult and important points of government, with the ſame accuracy, and the ſame diſpoſition of mind, as his other philoſophical ſpeculations. And therefore, as all his views are more extenſive and impartial, they muſt needs be more beneficial and ſecure.

But though ſome may be of opinion, that in matters of ſtate, the politician ought to have the preference of the philoſopher, this will not in the leaſt diminiſh the value of the Fundamental Conſtitutions of Carolina; ſince not only a philoſopher, but a politician of the firſt rank, was concerned therein. No man is more capable of judging of the excellence of ſuch conſtitutions, than yourſelf, Sir, who not only have acquired a complete knowledge of our laws, but ſtudied them as a philoſopher, by looking for the motives and foundations of them, in the very nature of mankind.

For the reſt, you have here thoſe conſtitutions, printed from Mr. Locke's copy, wherein are ſeveral amendments made with his own hand. He had preſented it, as a work of his, to one of his friends, who was pleaſed to communicate it to me.

The ſecond piece in this collection is, "A Letter from a Perſon of "Quality, to his Friend in the Country." It gives an account of the debates and reſolutions of the Houſe of Lords, in April and May, 1675, concerning a bill, intitled, "An act to prevent the dangers, which may "ariſe from perſons diſaffected to the government." By that bill, which was brought in by the court-party, all ſuch as enjoyed any beneficial office or employment, civil or military, to which was afterwards added, privy counſellors, juſtices of the peace, and members of parliament, were, under a penalty, to take the oath, and make the declaration and abhorrence following: "I A. B. do declare, that it is not lawful, upon "any pretence whatſoever, to take up arms againſt the king; and that I "do abhor that traitorous poſition, of taking arms by his authority, againſt "his perſon; or againſt thoſe that are commiſſioned by him, in purſuance "of ſuch commiſſion; and I do ſwear, that I will not, at any time, en-"deavour the alteration of the government, either in church or ſtate. So "help me, God."

SUCH of the lords as had no dependance upon the court, and were diſtinguiſhed by the name of country-lords, looked upon this bill as a ſtep the court was making to introduce arbitrary power; and they oppoſed it ſo vigorouſly, that the debate laſted five ſeveral days, before it was committed to a committee of the whole houſe; and afterwards it took up ſixteen or ſeventeen whole days; the houſe ſitting many times till eight or nine of the clock at night, and ſometimes till midnight. However, after ſeveral alterations, which they were forced to make, it paſſed the committee; but a conteſt then ariſing between the two houſes, concerning their privileges, they were ſo inflamed againſt each other, that the king thought it adviſeable to prorogue the parliament; ſo that the bill was never reported from the committee to the houſe.

THE debates, occaſioned by that bill, failed not to make a great noiſe throughout the whole kingdom: and becauſe there were but few perſons duly apprized thereof, and every body ſpoke of it as they ſtood affected; my lord SHAFTESBURY, who was at the head of the country-party, thought it neceſſary to publiſh an exact relation of every thing that had paſſed upon that occaſion; in order, not only to open the people's eyes upon the ſecret views of the court, but to do juſtice to the country-lords, and thereby to ſecure to them the continuance of the affection and attachment of ſuch as were of the ſame opinion with themſelves, which was the moſt conſiderable part of the nation. But though this lord had all the faculties of an orator; yet, not having time to exerciſe himſelf in the art of writing, he deſired Mr. LOCKE to draw up this relation; which he did under his lordſhip's inſpection, and only committed to writing what my lord SHAFTESBURY did in a manner dictate to him. Accordingly you will find in it a great many ſtrokes, which could proceed from no-body but my lord SHAFTESBURY himſelf; and, among others, the characters and eulogiums of ſuch lords as had ſignalized themſelves in the cauſe of publick liberty.

THIS letter was privately printed ſoon afterwards; and the court was ſo incenſed at it, that, at the next meeting of the parliament, towards the end of the year 1675, the court-party, who ſtill kept the aſcendant in the houſe of lords, ordered it to be burnt by the common hangman. "The particular relation of this debate, ſays the ingenious Mr. MAR-"VEL, which laſted many days, with great eagerneſs on both ſides, and "the reaſons but on one, was, in the next ſeſſion, burnt by order of the "lords, but the ſparks of it will eternally fly in their adverſaries "faces *."

* An account of the growth of popery, and arbitrary government in England, more particularly from the long prorogation of November, 1675, ending the 15th of February 1676, till the laſt meeting of parliament; the 16th of July, 1677. By ANDREW MARVEL, Eſq; p. m. 89.

THIS

THIS piece was grown very ſcarce. It is true it was inſerted, in the year 1689, in the firſt volume of the State Tracts; but in ſuch a manner, that it had been far better not to have reprinted it at all. And, indeed, among numbers of leſſer faults, there are ſeveral whole periods left out; and many places appear to be deſignedly falſified. It is likely all this was occaſioned by the compiler's making uſe of the firſt printed copy that fell into his hands; without giving himſelf the trouble to look out for more exact ones. That I might not be guilty of the ſame fault, I have ſought after all the editions I could poſſibly hear of; and have luckily met two printed in the year 1675, both pretty exact, though one is more ſo than the other. I have collated them with each other, and with that contained in the State Tracts. In ſhort, that this piece might appear to the beſt advantage, I have taken the ſame care as if I had been to publiſh ſome Greek or Latin author from antient manuſcripts. And truly, when a man undertakes to republiſh a work that is out of print, and which deſerves to be made more eaſy to be come at, be it either antient or modern, it is the ſame thing; the publick is equally abuſed, if, inſtead of reſtoring it according to the beſt editions, and in the moſt correct manner that is poſſible, the editor gives it from the firſt copy he chances to light upon, without troubling himſelf whether that copy be defective or not.

THE third piece in this collection conſiſts of "Remarks upon ſome "of Mr. NORRIS's Books, wherein he aſſerts Father MALEBRANCHE's "Opinion, of our ſeeing all things in GOD." It is in a manner the ſequel of a much larger diſcourſe, printed in the year 1706, among the "Poſthumous Works of Mr. LOCKE." Our author had reſolved to give that ſubject a thorough examination; and this ſmall piece is but a ſketch, containing ſome curſory reflections, which he had thrown together, in reading over ſome of Mr. NORRIS's books. Accordingly, I find theſe words in his manuſcript, written before thoſe Remarks: "Some other "thoughts, which I ſet down, as they came in my way, in a haſty pe-"ruſal of ſome of Mr. NORRIS's writings, to be better digeſted, when "I ſhall have leiſure to make an end of this argument." And at the end of them, he hath added theſe words: "the finiſhing of theſe haſty "thoughts muſt be deferred to another ſeaſon." But though this ſmall piece is far from being perfected, it however contains many important reflections; and therefore, I was of opinion it deſerved to be publiſhed; and I hope, Sir, you will not diſapprove my inſerting it in this collection.

IT is followed here by the "Elements of Natural Philoſophy." Mr. LOCKE had compoſed, or rather dictated, theſe Elements for the uſe of a young gentleman, whoſe education he had very much at heart. It is an abſtract or ſummary of whatever is moſt material in natural philoſo-

phy; which Mr. Locke did afterwards explain more at large to that young gentleman. The ſame is practiſed in the univerſities, where, you know, it is cuſtomary for the profeſſors to dictate ſuch abridgments, to ſerve for the ſubject and rule of their lectures. And therefore this ſmall tract is far from being what Mr. Locke would have made it, had he written upon that matter profeſſedly, and deſigned to make it a complete work.

However, as the generality of men expect every thing ſhould be perfect, that proceeds from ſuch a writer as Mr. Locke, and do not enter into the occaſions or deſigns which he propoſed to himſelf in writing; I own that ſome perſons, very good judges, whom I have taken the liberty to conſult about the impreſſion of ſome pieces in this collection, were of opinion that this little treatiſe had better been left out, for fear every reader ſhould not make the proper allowances, and leſt the memory of Mr. Locke ſhould ſuffer by it. I yielded to their opinion; and was reſolved to lay that piece aſide. But being informed that there were ſeveral other copies of it abroad, which it was impoſſible to ſuppreſs, or hinder from falling, one time or other, into the hands of the printers, maimed and disfigured, as is too often the caſe on ſuch occaſions; I was obliged to take other meaſures; and I the more eaſily determined to publiſh it, becauſe I could give it more complete, more correct, and in better order, than can poſſibly be pretended to, by the copies above-mentioned.

After all, I may take upon me to ſay, that, in its kind, this piece is no way to be deſpiſed. We wanted ſuch a work in Engliſh; and it would not have been an eaſy matter to find any other perſon, who could have comprehended ſo many things in ſo few words, and in ſo clear and diſtinct a manner. Great uſe may be made of it in the inſtruction of young gentlemen, as it was originally deſigned by Mr. Locke. And perſons even of riper years may improve by it; either by recalling ideas that had ſlipt out of their memory; or by informing themſelves of ſeveral things, which were unknown to them.

To this treatiſe are ſubjoined, "Some Thoughts concerning Reading "and Study for a Gentleman." Mr. Locke having one day, in converſation, diſcourſed upon the method that a young gentleman ſhould take in his reading, and ſtudy; one of the company was ſo well pleaſed with it, that he deſired him to dictate to him the ſubſtance of what he had been ſpeaking; which Mr. Locke immediately did. This is one of the uſual converſations of Mr. Locke, reduced into writing; from whence you may judge, Sir, how agreeable and advantageous it was to converſe with that great man.

Mr.

Mr. Locke not only points out the ſciences that a gentleman ought to ſtudy, whether as a private man, or one in a public capacity; but likewiſe directs to ſuch books as treat of thoſe ſciences, and which, in his opinion, are the propereſt for that end. As you have acquired, Sir, in Italy, the moſt refined taſte for the politer arts, and have added that ſtudy to thoſe Mr. Locke here recommends to a gentleman; you will perhaps wonder, that he ſays nothing of painting, ſculpture, architecture, and other arts of this kind, which make an accompliſhed gentleman. But I deſire you would conſider, that there are but few perſons, in poſſeſſion of the means neceſſary for attaining this ſort of knowledge; and that Mr. Locke is ſpeaking here of what may ſuit the circumſtances of the generality of people. Beſides, he was very far from imagining, that an extemporary advice, which he was giving by his fire-ſide, would ever be expoſed to common view. However, I preſume to think, that after you have peruſed it, you will be of opinion it was not unworthy to be made publick.

But among the works of Mr. Locke, contained in this volume, I do not know that any will afford you more pleaſure than his Letters. Some of them are written upon weighty ſubjects; and are upon that very account exceeding valuable. Others are what Mr. Locke wrote out of the country to one of his friends in London, about private buſineſs. In theſe, one would expect nothing but what was common, and cuſtomary; but a ſubject ſo ſimple, and vulgar in itſelf, changes, as it were, its very nature, when managed by Mr. Locke; and becomes ſomething conſiderable and of moment, by the turn and manner in which he expreſſes the ſentiments of affection and gratitude he hath for his friend. And indeed, though true friendſhip be founded upon eſteem; yet we may ſay, if friendſhip goes no farther, there is ſomething in it auſtere, not to ſay dry, and ruſtick. But there is a certain agreeable and complaiſant way of ſhewing this eſteem, wherein conſiſts the greateſt charm of friendſhip; as it is what ſupports it, and adds force and vigour to it. Now this is Mr. Locke's peculiar talent; and it is impoſſible that a perſon of your nice taſte ſhould not be ſenſibly touched with the reſpectful, endearing, and affectionate manner in which he writes here to his friend; and which he ſtill repeats with new graces. It is a pattern of urbanity, politeneſs, and gaiety. For our old philoſopher hath nothing moroſe, nor uneaſy. Whenever he ſpeaks of his infirmities, it is by way of pleaſantry, or that he may have an opportunity of ſaying ſome obliging thing to his friend.

The laſt piece in this collection contains the "Rules of a Society, "which met once a Week for their Improvement in uſeful Knowledge, "and the promoting of Truth and Chriſtian Charity." Mr. Locke took a delight in forming ſuch ſocieties, wherever he made any ſtay. He had eſtabliſh-

eſtabliſhed one at Amſterdam in 1687, of which Mr. LIMBORCH, and Mr. LE CLERC, were members. He ſettled this club at London, ſoon after the Revolution; and drew up the rules you will find here. But his deſign in doing this, was not only to paſs away time in an agreeable converſation of two or three hours; he had views far more ſolid and ſublime. As there is nothing that more obſtructs the advancement of truth, and the progreſs of real chriſtianity, than a certain narrow ſpirit, which leads men to cantoniſe themſelves, if I may ſo ſpeak, and to break into ſmall bodies, which at laſt grow into ſo many factions; Mr. LOCKE, zealous for the general good of mankind, would have gladly inſpired them with ſentiments of a higher and more extenſive nature, and united thoſe whom the ſpirit of prejudice or party had kept aſunder. This is what continually employed his thoughts. He never loſes ſight of it throughout his works. Nay, it is the principal ſubject of them. But he did not confine himſelf to bare ſpeculation; and he formed the ſociety above-mentioned with a deſign to render, as much as lay in his power, ſuch a deſirable union practicable. This appears from the diſpoſition of mind he requires in thoſe, who were to be members of it; and eſpecially by the declaration they were obliged to ſubſcribe, that, "by their becoming of that ſociety, they propoſed to themſelves an im-"provement in uſeful knowledge, and the promoting of truth and chri-"ſtian charity."

BUT you will find, Sir, the ſame mind, the ſame genius, not only in this ſmall piece, but in all others in this collection. Mr. LOCKE every-where diſcovers a ſincere love of truth, and an invincible averſion to what-ever may do it the leaſt wrong. To the quality of a great philoſopher, he every-where joins that of a true chriſtian. You ſee him full of love, reſpect, and admiration, for the chriſtian religion. And thereby he furniſhes us with the ſtrongeſt preſumption, that can be imagined, for the truth as well as excellency of that holy inſtitution. For this is not the approbation of a vulgar mind, who is ſtill fettered by the prejudices of infancy; it is the ſuffrage of a wit, a ſuperior genius, who has laboured all his life to guard againſt error; who, in ſeveral important points, departed from the common opinion; and made chriſtianity his ſtudy, without taking it upon truſt. It is, doubtleſs, a great advantage, not to ſay an honour, for a doctrine to be embraced and countenanced by ſuch a man. But let us return to our collection.

To make it more uſeful, I have added notes to illuſtrate certain paſſages, which ſuppoſe the knowledge of ſome facts, that may be unknown to the reader, or which would not readily occur to his memory; and therefore theſe notes are merely hiſtorical. I pretend neither to approve nor diſapprove the particulars they contain. I only act the part of an hiſtorian. There is but one of them that can be looked upon as critical; and even that is only intended to ſettle a matter of fact, miſrepreſented

by a late hiſtorian. Theſe notes are not very numerous; and I do not know but the fear of ſwelling them too much may have made me ſuppreſs ſome, which would not have been wholly uſeleſs.

As for what concerns the impreſſion itſelf, in order to make it more beautiful, I have been obliged to recede, in ſeveral reſpects, from our uſual way of printing; which, if I am allowed to ſpeak freely, is extremely vicious. It is matter of wonder, that in ſuch a country as this, where there is ſo much encouragement for printing, there ſhould prevail a ſort of Gothic taſte, which deforms our Engliſh impreſſions, and makes them not a little ridiculous. For can any thing be more abſurd, than ſo many capital letters, that are not only prefixed to all noun ſubſtantives, but alſo often to adjectives, pronouns, particles, and even to verbs? And what ſhall we ſay of that odd mixture of italick, which, inſtead of helping the reader to diſtinguiſh matters the more clearly, does only perplex him; and breeds a confuſion ſhocking to the eye? But you are not to be informed, Sir, you, who every day enrich your library with books of the fineſt editions, that none of theſe faults were ever committed by the printers, who have been eminent in their art. Surely, if the authors on the one hand, and the readers on the other, would oppoſe this barbariſm, it would be no difficult matter to reſtore a juſt taſte, and a beautiful way of printing.

To the pieces already mentioned, I have prefixed the character of Mr. LOCKE, at the requeſt of ſome of his friends; as you will ſee by the letter before it, which was ſent to me together with that character.

THESE, Sir, are all the pieces, which make up this volume. Why may I not, at the ſame time that I offer it to you, unfold to the view of the publick ſo many perfections, which a too ſevere and ſcrupulous modeſty conceals from it! Why may I not make known the rare endowments of your mind, as well as the noble and generous ſentiments of your heart! But I fear I have already too much preſumed upon your goodneſs, by prefixing your name to this diſcourſe. And after having been ſo bold, as not to conſult you, upon a thing which you would never have permitted; I ought to account myſelf very fortunate, if, in conſideration of my paſſing over your excellent qualities in profound ſilence, you are pleaſed to forgive the freedom I have taken; and will give me leave to declare to you and all the world, how ſenſible I am of the friendſhip you honour me with, and to aſſure you that I ſhall always be, with the greateſt reſpect,

SIR,

March 23, 1719.

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

DES MAIZEAUX.

A

TABLE

OF THE

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Rules of a ſociety, which met once a week, for their improvement in uſeful knowledge, and for the promoting of truth and chriſtian charity.

THE CHARACTER OF MR. LOCKE.

BY

MR. PETER COSTE:

WITH

A LETTER relating to that CHARACTER, and to the AUTHOR of it.

A LETTER to Mr. ******.

SIR, London, Feb. 4, 1720.

BEING informed, that you design to publish several new pieces of Mr. Locke, I here send you, at the request of some of his friends, the translation of a letter, attempting his character, and containing several passages of his life and conversation; which you are desired to prefix before that collection.

THE author of that letter is Mr. Peter Coste, who has translated into French Mr. Locke's Thoughts concerning Education, his Reasonableness of Christianity, and Vindications thereof; with his principal work, the Essay concerning Human Understanding.

MR. COSTE lived in the same family with Mr. Locke, during the seven last years of that great man's life; whereby he had all possible opportunities to know him.

THE letter was written some time after Mr. Locke's death; and appears to be the production of a man in raptures, and struck with the highest admiration of Mr. Locke's virtue, capacity, and of the excellency of his writings; and under the deepest affliction for the loss of a person, to whom in his life-time he had paid the most profound respect, and for whom he had constantly expressed the greatest esteem, and that even in writings, whereof Mr. Locke did not know him to be the author.

AND

AND therefore Mr. Locke's friends judge its publication neceſſary, not only, as they think it contains a juſt character of Mr. Locke, as far as it goes; but as it is a proper vindication of him againſt the ſaid Mr. Coſte, who in ſeveral writings, and in his common converſation throughout France, Holland, and England, has aſperſed and blackened the memory of Mr. Locke, in thoſe very reſpects, wherein he was his panegyriſt before.

FOR, they conceive, the elogium contained in the following letter muſt ſtand good, till Mr. Coſte thinks fit either to deny his own experience, or to confeſs, that the ſame things, which he then thought praiſe-worthy, have ſince changed their nature. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

* * *

The CHARACTER of Mr. LOCKE;

In a LETTER to the AUTHOR of the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. By Mr. P. COSTE *.

SIR, London, Dec. 10, 1704.

YOU muſt have heard of the death of the illuſtrious Mr. Locke. It is a general loſs. For that reaſon he is lamented by all good men, and all ſincere lovers of truth, who were acquainted with his character. He was born for the good of mankind. Moſt of his actions were directed to that end; and I doubt whether, in his time, any man in Europe applied himſelf more earneſtly to that noble deſign, or executed it with more ſucceſs.

I WILL forbear to ſpeak of the valuableneſs of his works. The general eſteem they have attained, and will preſerve, as long as good ſenſe and virtue are left in the world; the ſervice they have been of to England in particular, and univerſally to all that ſet themſelves ſeriouſly to the ſearch of truth, and the ſtudy of chriſtianity; are their beſt elogium. The love of truth is viſible in every part of them. This is allowed by all that have read them. For even they, who have not reliſhed ſome of Mr. Locke's opinions, have done him the juſtice to confeſs, that the manner, in which he defends them, ſhews he advanced nothing that he was not ſincerely convinced of himſelf. This his friends gave him an ac-

* That letter was printed in the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, for the month of February 1705, art. II. page 154, with this title, A LETTER of Mr. COSTE to the author of theſe Nouvelles, written on occaſion of the death of Mr. Locke.

count

count of from ſeveral hands: "Let them after this, anſwered he, ob-
"ject whatever they pleaſe againſt my works; I ſhall never be diſturbed
"at it. For ſince they grant I advance nothing in them but what I
"really believe, I ſhall always be glad to prefer truth to any of my opi-
"nions, whenever I diſcover it by myſelf, or am ſatisfied that they are
"not conformable to it." Happy turn of mind! which, I am fully per-ſuaded, contributed more even than the penetration of that noble genius, to his diſcovery of thoſe great and uſeful truths which appear in his works.

But, without dwelling any longer upon conſidering Mr. Locke in the quality of an author, which often ſerves only to diſguiſe the real character of the man, I haſte to ſhew him to you in particulars much more amiable, and which will give you a higher notion of his merit.

Mr. Locke had a great knowledge of the world, and of the buſineſs of it. Prudent without being cunning; he won people's eſteem by his probity, and was always ſafe from the attacks of a falſe friend, or a ſordid flatterer. Averſe to all mean complaiſance; his wiſdom, his experience, his gentle and obliging manners, gained him the reſpect of his inferiors, the eſteem of his equals, the friendſhip and confidence of the greateſt quality.

Without ſetting up for a teacher, he inſtructed others by his own conduct. He was at firſt pretty much diſpoſed to give advice to ſuch of his friends as he thought wanted it; but at length, finding that, "good
"counſels are very little effectual in making people more prudent," he grew much more reſerved in that particular. I have often heard him ſay, that the firſt time he heard that maxim, he thought it very ſtrange; but that experience had fully convinced him of the truth of it. By coun-ſels, we are here to underſtand thoſe which are given to ſuch as do not aſk them. Yet, as much as he deſpaired of rectifying thoſe whom he ſaw taking of falſe meaſures; his natural goodneſs, the averſion he had to diſorder, and the intereſt he took in thoſe about him, in a manner forced him ſometimes to break the reſolution he had made of leaving them to go their own way; and prevailed upon him to give them the advice, which he thought moſt likely to reclaim them; but this he al-ways did in a modeſt way, and ſo as to convince the mind by fortifying his advice with ſolid arguments, which he never wanted upon a proper occaſion.

But then Mr. Locke was very liberal of his counſels, when they were deſired; and no-body ever conſulted him in vain. An extreme vi-vacity of mind, one of his reigning qualities, in which perhaps he never had an equal; his great experience, and the ſincere deſire he had of being ſerviceable to all mankind; ſoon furniſhed him with the expedients, which were moſt juſt and leaſt dangerous. I ſay, the leaſt dangerous; for what he propoſed to himſelf before all things was to lead thoſe, who conſulted him, into no trouble. This was one of his favourite maxims, and he never loſt ſight of it upon any occaſion.

THOUGH Mr. Locke chiefly loved truths that were uſeful, and with ſuch fed his mind, and was generally very well pleaſed to make them the ſubject of his diſcourſe; yet he uſed to ſay, that in order to employ one part of this life in ſerious and important occupations, it was neceſſary to ſpend another in mere amuſements; and when an occaſion naturally offered, he gave himſelf up with pleaſure to the charms of a free and facetious converſation. He remembered a great many agreeable ſtories, which he always brought in properly; and generally made them yet more delightful, by his natural and agreeable way of telling them. He was no foe to raillery, provided it were delicate and perfectly innocent.

NO-BODY was ever a greater maſter of the art of accommodating himſelf to the reach of all capacities; which, in my opinion, is one of the ſureſt marks of a great genius.

IT was his peculiar art in converſation, to lead people to talk of what they underſtood beſt. With a Gardener, he diſcourſed of gardening; with a Jeweller, of a diamond; with a Chymiſt, of chymiſtry, &c. "By this, ſaid he himſelf, I pleaſe all thoſe men, who commonly can "ſpeak pertinently upon nothing elſe. As they believe I have an eſteem "for their profeſſion, they are charmed with ſhewing their abilities be-"fore me; and I, in the mean while, improve myſelf by their diſcourſe." And indeed Mr. Locke had by this means acquired a very good inſight into all the arts, of which he daily learnt more and more. He uſed to ſay too, that the knowledge of the arts contained more true philoſophy, than all thoſe fine learned hypotheſes, which, having no relation to the nature of things, are fit for nothing at the bottom, but to make men loſe their time in inventing, or comprehending them. A thouſand times have I admired how, by the ſeveral queſtions he would put to artificers, he would find out the ſecret of their art, which they did not underſtand themſelves; and oftentimes gives them views entirely new, which ſometimes they put in practice to their profit.

THIS eaſineſs, with which Mr. Locke knew how to converſe with all ſorts of men, and the pleaſure he took in doing it, at firſt ſurprized thoſe, who had never talked with him before. They were charmed with this condeſcenſion, not very common among men of letters; and which they ſo little expected from a perſon, whoſe great qualities raiſed him ſo very much above all other men. Many who knew him only by his writings, or by the reputation he had gained of being one of the greateſt philoſophers of the age, having imagined to themſelves beforehand, that he was one of thoſe ſcholars, that, being always full of themſelves, and their ſublime ſpeculations, are incapable of familiarizing themſelves with the common ſort of mankind, or of entering into their little concerns, or diſcourſing of the ordinary affairs of life; were perfectly amazed to find him nothing but affability, good-humour, humanity, pleaſantneſs, always ready to hear them, to talk with them of things which they beſt underſtood, much more deſirous of informing himſelf in what they underſtood better than himſelf, than to make a

ſhew of his own ſcience. I know a very ingenious gentleman in England, that was for ſome time in the ſame prejudice. Before he ſaw Mr. Locke, he had formed a notion of him to himſelf under the idea of one of the antient philoſophers, with a long beard, ſpeaking nothing but by ſentences, negligent of his perſon, without any other politeneſs but what might proceed from the natural goodneſs of his temper, a ſort of politeneſs often very coarſe and very troubleſome in civil ſociety. But one hour's converſation entirely cured him of his miſtake, and obliged him to declare, that he looked upon Mr. Locke to be one of the politeſt men he ever ſaw: "He is not a philoſopher always grave, always confined to "that character, as I imagined; he is, ſaid he, a perfect courtier, as "agreeable for his obliging and civil behaviour, as admirable for the pro-"foundneſs and delicacy of his genius."

Mr. Locke was ſo far from aſſuming thoſe airs of gravity, by which ſome folks, as well learned as unlearned, love to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the reſt of the world; that, on the contrary, he looked upon them, as an infallible mark of impertinence. Nay, ſometimes he would divert himſelf with imitating that ſtudied gravity, in order to turn it the better into ridicule; and upon this occaſion he always remembered this maxim of the duke of la Rochefoucault, which he admired above all others, "that gravity is a myſtery of the body, invented to conceal the defects "of the mind." He loved alſo to confirm his opinion on this ſubject, by that of the famous earl of Shaftſbury *, to whom he took a delight to give the honour of all the things, which he thought he had learnt from his converſation.

Nothing ever gave him a more ſenſible pleaſure than the eſteem, which that earl conceived for him, almoſt the firſt moment he ſaw him, and which he afterwards preſerved as long as he lived. And, indeed, nothing ſet Mr. Locke's merit in a better light, than the conſtant eſteem of my lord Shaftſbury, the greateſt genius of his age, ſuperior to ſo many great men that ſhone at the ſame time at the court of Charles II; not only for his reſolution and intrepidity in maintaining the true intereſts of his country, but alſo for his great abilities in the conduct of the moſt knotty affairs. When Mr. Locke ſtudied at Oxford, he fell by accident into his company, and one ſingle converſation with that great man won him his eſteem and confidence to ſuch a degree, that ſoon afterwards my lord Shaftſbury took him to be near his perſon, and kept him as long as Mr. Locke's health or affairs would permit. That earl particularly excelled in the knowledge of men. It was impoſſible to catch his eſteem by moderate qualities; this his enemies themſelves could never deny. I wiſh I could, on the other hand, give you a full notion of the idea, which Mr. Locke had of that nobleman's merit. He loſt no opportunity of ſpeaking of it; and that in a manner, which ſufficiently ſhewed

* Chancellor of England in the reign of Charles II.

he ſpoke from his heart. Though my lord Shaftſbury had not ſpent much time in reading; nothing, in Mr. Locke's opinion, could be more juſt than the judgment he paſſed upon the books, which fell into his hands. He preſently ſaw through the deſign of a work; and without much heeding the words, which he ran over with vaſt rapidity, he immediately found whether the author was maſter of his ſubject, and whether his reaſonings were exact. But, above all, Mr. Locke admired in him that penetration, that preſence of mind, which always prompted him with the beſt expedients, in the moſt deſperate caſes; that noble boldneſs, which appeared in all his public diſcourſes, always guided by a ſolid judgment, which, never allowing him to ſay any thing but what was proper, regulated his leaſt word, and left no hold to the vigilance of of his enemies.

During the time Mr. Locke lived with that illuſtrious lord, he had the advantage of becoming acquainted with all the polite, the witty, and agreeable part of the court. It was then that he got the habit of thoſe obliging and benevolent manners, which, ſupported by an eaſy and polite expreſſion, a great knowledge of the world, and a vaſt extent of capacity, made his converſation ſo agreeable to all ſorts of people. It was then too, without doubt, that he fitted himſelf for the great affairs, of which he afterwards appeared ſo capable.

I know not whether it was the ill ſtate of his health, that obliged him, in the reign of king William, to refuſe going ambaſſador to one of the moſt conſiderable courts in Europe. It is certain that great prince judged him worthy of that poſt, and no-body doubts but he would have filled it gloriouſly.

The ſame prince, after this, gave him a place among the lords commiſſioners, whom he eſtabliſhed for advancing the intereſt of trade and the plantations. Mr. Locke executed that employment for ſeveral years; and it is ſaid (abſit invidia verbo) that he was in a manner the ſoul of that illuſtrious body. The moſt experienced merchants were ſurpriſed, that a man, who had ſpent his life in the ſtudy of phyſick, of polite literature, or of philoſophy, ſhould have more extenſive and certain views than themſelves, in a buſineſs which they had wholly applied themſelves to from their youth. At length, when Mr. Locke could no longer paſs the ſummer at London, without endangering his life, he went and reſigned that office to the king himſelf, upon account that his health would permit him to ſtay no longer in town. This reaſon did not hinder the king from entreating Mr. Locke to continue in his poſt, telling him expreſsly, that, though he could ſtay at London but a few weeks, his ſervices in that office would yet be very neceſſary to him; but at length he yielded to the repreſentations of Mr. Locke, who could not prevail upon himſelf to hold an employment of that importance, without doing the duties of it more regularly. He formed and executed this deſign without mentioning a word of it to any body whatſoever; thus avoiding, with a generoſity rarely to be found, what others would have

have earneſtly laid out after; for by making it known that he was about to quit that employment, which brought him in a thouſand pounds a year, he might eaſily have entered into a kind of compoſition with any pretender, who, having particular notice of this news, and being befriended with Mr. Locke's intereſt, might have carried the poſt from any other perſon. This, we may be ſure, he was told of, and that too by way of reproach. "I knew it very well, replied he; but this was the very rea-"ſon why I communicated my deſign to no-body. I received this place "from the king himſelf, and to him I reſolved to reſtore it, to diſpoſe of "it as he thought proper." "Heu priſca fides!" Where are ſuch examples, at this day, to be met with?

One thing, which thoſe who lived for any time with Mr. Locke could not help obſerving in him, was, that he took a delight in making uſe of his reaſon in every thing he did; and nothing, that is attended with any uſefulneſs, ſeemed unworthy his care; ſo that we may ſay of him, what was ſaid of queen Elizabeth, that he was no leſs capable of ſmall things than of great. He uſed often to ſay himſelf, that there was an art in every thing; and it was eaſy to be convinced of it, to ſee the manner in which he went about the moſt trifling thing he did, and always with ſome good reaſon. I might here deſcend into particulars, which probably, to many, would not be unpleaſant; but the bounds I have ſet myſelf, and the fear of taking up too many pages in your journal, will not give me leave to do it.

Mr. Locke, above all things, loved order; and he had got the way of obſerving it in every thing with wonderful exactneſs.

As he always kept the uſeful in his eye, in all his diſquiſitions, he eſteemed the employments of men only in proportion to the good they were capable of producing; for which reaſon he had no great value for thoſe critics, or mere grammarians, that waſte their lives in comparing words and phraſes, and in coming to a determination in the choice of a various reading, in a paſſage that has nothing important in it. He cared yet leſs for thoſe profeſſed diſputants, who, being wholly taken up with the deſire of coming off with the victory, fortify themſelves behind the ambiguity of a word, to give their adverſaries the more trouble. And whenever he had to deal with this ſort of folks, if he did not beforehand take a ſtrong reſolution of keeping his temper, he quickly fell into a paſſion. And, in general, it muſt be owned, he was naturally ſomewhat cholerick. But his anger never laſted long. If he retained any reſentment, it was againſt himſelf for having given way to ſo ridiculous a paſſion; which, as he uſed to ſay, may do a great deal of harm, but never yet did the leaſt good. He often would blame himſelf for this weakneſs. Upon which occaſion, I remember, that two or three weeks before his death, as he was ſitting in a garden taking the air in a bright ſun-ſhine, whoſe warmth afforded him a great deal of pleaſure, which he improved as much as poſſible, by cauſing his chair to be drawn more and more towards the ſun, as it went down; we happened to ſpeak of Horace,

I know not on what occaſion, and having repeated to him theſe verſes, where that poet ſays, of himſelf, that he was

Solibus aptum;
Iraſci celerem, tamen ut placabilis eſſem:

"That he loved the warmth of the ſun, and that, though he was natu-
"rally cholerick, his anger was eaſily appeaſed." Mr. Locke replied, that, if he durſt preſume to compare himſelf with Horace in any thing, he thought he was perfectly like him in thoſe two reſpects. But, that you may be the leſs ſurprized at his modeſty, upon this occaſion, I muſt, at the ſame time, inform you, that he looked upon Horace to be one of the wiſeſt and happieſt Romans that lived in the age of Auguſtus, by means of the care he took to preſerve himſelf clear of ambition and avarice, to keep his deſires within bounds; and to cultivate the friendſhip of the greateſt men of thoſe times, without living in their dependence.

Mr. Locke alſo diſliked thoſe authors that labour only to deſtroy, without eſtabliſhing any thing themſelves: "A building, ſaid he, diſ-
"pleaſes them. They find great faults in it; let them demoliſh it, and
"welcome, provided they endeavour to raiſe another in its place, if it
"be poſſible."

He adviſed, that, whenever we have meditated any thing new, we ſhould throw it as ſoon as poſſible upon paper, in order to be the better able to judge of it by ſeeing it all together; becauſe the mind of man is not capable of retaining clearly a long chain of conſequences, and of ſeeing, without confuſion, the relation of a great number of different ideas. Beſides, it often happens, that what we had moſt admired, when conſidered in the groſs, and in a perplexed manner, appears to be utterly inconſiſtent and unſupportable, when we ſee every part of it diſtinctly.

Mr. Locke alſo thought it neceſſary always to communicate one's thoughts to ſome friend, eſpecially if one propoſed to offer them to the publick; and this was what he conſtantly obſerved himſelf. He could hardly conceive how a being of ſo limited a capacity as man, and ſo ſubject to error, could have the confidence to neglect this precaution.

Never man employed his time better than Mr. Locke, as appears by the works he publiſhed himſelf; and perhaps, in time, we may ſee new proofs of it. He ſpent the laſt fourteen or fifteen years of his life at Oates, a country-ſeat of Sir Francis Maſham's, about five and twenty miles from London, in the county of Eſſex. I cannot but take pleaſure in imagining to myſelf, that this place, ſo well known to ſo many perſons of merit, whom I have ſeen come thither from ſo many parts of England to viſit Mr. Locke, will be famous, to poſterity, for the long abode that great man made there. Be that as it may, it was there that enjoying ſometimes the converſation of his friends, and always the company of my lady Maſham, for whom Mr. Locke had long conceived a very particu-

lar eſteem and friendſhip (in ſpite of all that lady's merit, this is all the elogium ſhe ſhall have of me now) he taſted ſweets, which were interrupted by nothing but the ill ſtate of a weakly and delicate conſtitution. During this agreeable retirement, he applied himſelf eſpecially to the ſtudy of the Holy Scripture; and employed the laſt years of his life in hardly any thing elſe. He was never weary of admiring the great views of that ſacred book, and the juſt relation of all its parts; he every day made diſcoveries in it, that gave him freſh cauſe of admiration. It is ſtrongly reported, in England, that thoſe diſcoveries will be communicated to the public. If ſo, the whole world, I am confident, will have a full proof of what was obſerved by all that were near Mr. Locke to the laſt part of his life; I mean, that his mind never ſuffered the leaſt decay, though his body grew every day viſibly weaker and weaker.

His ſtrength began to fail him more remarkably than ever, at the entrance of the laſt ſummer; a ſeaſon which, in former years, had always reſtored him ſome degrees of ſtrength. Then he foreſaw that his end was very near. He often ſpoke of it himſelf, but always with great compoſure, though he omitted none of the precautions, which his ſkill in phyſick taught him, to prolong his life. At length, his legs began to ſwell; and, that ſwelling increaſing every day, his ſtrength diminiſhed very viſibly. He then ſaw how ſhort a time he had left to live, and prepared to quit this world, with a deep ſenſe of all the bleſſings which God had granted him, which he took delight in numbering up to his friends, and full of a ſincere reſignation to his will, and of firm hopes in his promiſes, built upon the word of Jeſus Chriſt, ſent into the world to bring to light life and immortality, by his goſpel.

At length, his ſtrength failed him to ſuch a degree, that, the 26th of October 1704, two days before his death, going to ſee him in his cloſet, I found him on his knees, but unable to riſe again without aſſiſtance.

The next day, though he was not worſe, he would continue a-bed. All that day he had a greater difficulty of reſpiration than ever, and about five of the clock, in the evening, he fell into a ſweat, accompanied with an extreme weakneſs, that made us fear for his life. He was of opinion himſelf, that he was not far from his laſt moment. Then he deſired to be remembered at evening prayers; thereupon my lady Maſham told him, that, if he would, the whole family ſhould come and pray by him in his chamber. He anſwered, he ſhould be very glad to have it ſo, if it would not give too much trouble; there he was prayed for particularly. After this, he gave ſome orders with great ſerenity of mind; and, an occaſion offering of ſpeaking of the goodneſs of God, he eſpecially exalted the love which God ſhewed to man, in juſtifying him by faith in Jeſus Chriſt. He returned him thanks, in particular, for having called him to the knowledge of that divine Saviour. He exhorted all about him to read the Holy Scripture attentively, and to apply themſelves ſincerely to the practice of all their duties; adding, expreſsly, that

" by

" by this means they would be more happy in this world, and ſecure to " themſelves the poſſeſſion of eternal felicity in the other." He paſt the whole night without ſleep. The next day he cauſed himſelf to be carried into his cloſet, for he had not ſtrength to walk by himſelf; and there in his chair, and in a kind of dozing, though in his full ſenſes, as appeared by what he ſaid from time to time, he gave up the ghoſt about three in the afternoon, the 28th of October.

I BEG you, Sir, not to take what I have ſaid of Mr. Locke's character for a finiſhed portrait. It is only a ſlight ſketch of ſome few of his excellent qualities. I am told we ſhall quickly have it done by the hand of a maſter. To that I refer you. Many features, I am ſure, have eſcaped me; but I dare affirm, that thoſe, which I have given you a draught of, are not ſet off with falſe colours, but drawn faithfully from the life.

I MUST not omit a particular in Mr. Locke's will, which it is of no ſmall importance to the commonwealth of learning to be acquainted with; namely, that therein he declares what were the works which he had publiſhed without ſetting his name to them. The occaſion of it was this: ſome time before his death, Dr. Hudſon, keeper of the Bodleian library at Oxford, had deſired him to ſend him all the works with which he had favoured the public, as well thoſe with his name as thoſe without, that they might be all placed in that famous library. Mr. Locke ſent him only the former; but in his will he declares he is reſolved fully to ſatisfy Dr. Hudſon; and to that intent he bequeaths to the Bodleian library a copy of the reſt of his works, to which he had not prefixed his name, viz. a Latin " Letter concerning Toleration," printed at Tergou, and tranſlated ſome time afterwards into Engliſh, unknown to Mr. Locke; two other letters upon the ſame ſubject, in anſwer to the objections made againſt the firſt; " The Reaſonableneſs of " Chriſtianity," with two Vindications of that book; and " Two Trea- " tiſes of Government." Theſe are all the anonymous works which Mr. Locke owns himſelf to be the author of.

FOR the reſt, I ſhall not pretend to tell you at what age he died, becauſe I do not certainly know it. I have often heard him ſay, he had forgot the year of his birth; but that he believed he had ſet it down ſomewhere. It has not yet been found among his papers; but it is computed that he was about ſixty-ſix.

THOUGH I have continued ſome time at London, a city very fruitful in literary news, I have nothing curious to tell you. Since Mr. Locke departed this life, I have hardly been able to think of any thing, but the loſs of that great man, whoſe memory will always be dear to me; happy if, as I admired him for many years, that I was near him, I could but imitate him in any one reſpect! I am, with all ſincerity, Sir, your, &c.

THE

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA.

OUR Sovereign Lord the King having, out of his royal grace and bounty, granted unto us the province of Carolina, with all the royalties, properties, juriſdictions, and privileges, of a county palatine, as large and ample as the county palatine of Durham, with other great privileges; for the better ſettlement of the government of the ſaid place, and eſtabliſhing the intereſt of the lords proprietors with equality, and without confuſion; and that the government of this province may be made moſt agreeable to the monarchy under which we live, and of which this province is a part; and that we may avoid erecting a numerous democracy: we, the lords and proprietors of the province aforeſaid, have agreed to this following form of government, to be perpetually eſtabliſhed amongſt us, unto which we do oblige ourſelves, our heirs, and ſucceſſors, in the moſt binding ways that can be deviſed.

I.

THE eldeſt of the lords proprietors ſhall be palatine; and, upon the deceaſe of the palatine, the eldeſt of the ſeven ſurviving proprietors ſhall always ſucceed him.

II.

THERE ſhall be ſeven other chief offices erected, viz. the admiral's chamberlain's, chancellor's, conſtable's, chief-juſtice's, high-ſteward's, and treaſurer's; which places ſhall be enjoyed by none but the lords proprietors, to be aſſigned at firſt by lot; and upon the vacancy of any one of the ſeven great offices by death, or otherwiſe, the eldeſt proprietor ſhall have his choice of the ſaid place.

III.

THE whole province ſhall be divided into counties; each county ſhall conſiſt of eight ſigniories, eight baronies, and four precincts; each precinct ſhall conſiſt of ſix colonies.

IV.

EACH ſigniory, barony, and colony, ſhall conſiſt of twelve thouſand acres; the eight ſigniories being the ſhare of the eight proprietors, and

the eight baronies of the nobility; both which ſhares, being each of them one fifth part of the whole, are to be perpetually annexed, the one to the proprietors, the other to the hereditary nobility, leaving the colonies, being three fifths, amongſt the people: that ſo in ſetting out, and planting the lands, the balance of the government may be preſerved.

V.

At any time before the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and one, any of the lords proprietors ſhall have power to relinquiſh, alienate, and diſpoſe to any other perſon, his proprietorſhip, and all the ſigniories, powers, and intereſt thereunto belonging, wholly and entirely together, and not otherwiſe. But, after the year one thouſand ſeven hundred, thoſe, who are then lords proprietors, ſhall not have power to alienate or make over their proprietorſhip, with the ſigniories and privileges thereunto belonging, or any part thereof, to any perſon whatſoever, otherwiſe than as in § xviii. but it ſhall all deſcend unto their heirs-male; and, for want of heirs-male, it ſhall all deſcend on that landgrave, or caſſique, of Carolina, who is deſcended of the next heirs-female of the proprietor; and, for want of ſuch heirs, it ſhall deſcend on the next heir-general; and, for want of ſuch heirs, the remaining ſeven proprietors ſhall, upon the vacancy, chuſe a landgrave to ſucceed the deceaſed proprietor, who being choſen by the majority of the ſeven ſurviving proprietors, he and his heirs, ſucceſſively, ſhall be proprietors, as fully, to all intents and purpoſes, as any of the reſt.

VI.

That the number of eight proprietors may be conſtantly kept; if, upon the vacancy of any proprietorſhip, the ſeven ſurviving proprietors ſhall not chuſe a landgrave to be a proprietor, before the ſecond biennial parliament after the vacancy; then the next biennial parliament but one after ſuch vacancy ſhall have power to chuſe any landgrave to be a proprietor.

VII.

Whosoever after the year one thouſand ſeven hundred, either by inheritance or choice, ſhall ſucceed any proprietor in his proprietorſhip, and ſigniories thereunto belonging; ſhall be obliged to take the name and arms of that proprietor, whom he ſucceeds; which from thenceforth ſhall be the name and arms of his family and their poſterity.

VIII.

Whatsoever landgrave or caſſique ſhall any way come to be a proprietor, ſhall take the ſigniories annexed to the ſaid proprietorſhip; but his former dignity, with the baronies annexed, ſhall devolve into the hands of the lords proprietors.

IX.

There ſhall be juſt as many landgraves as there are counties, and twice as many caſſiques, and no more. Theſe ſhall be the hereditary nobility of the province, and by right of their dignity be members of parliament.

parliament. Each landgrave ſhall have four baronies, and each caſſique two baronies, hereditarily and unalterably annexed to, and ſettled upon the ſaid dignity.

X.

THE firſt landgraves and caſſiques of the twelve firſt counties to be planted, ſhall be nominated thus; that is to ſay, of the twelve landgraves, the lords proprietors ſhall each of them ſeparately for himſelf, nominate and chuſe one; and the remaining four landgraves of the firſt twelve, ſhall be nominated and choſen by the palatine's court. In like manner, of the twenty-four firſt caſſiques, each proprietor for himſelf ſhall nominate and chuſe two, and the remaining eight ſhall be nominated and choſen by the palatine's court; and when the twelve firſt counties ſhall be planted, the lords proprietors ſhall again in the ſame manner nominate and chuſe twelve more landgraves, and twenty-four caſſiques for the twelve next counties to be planted; that is to ſay, two-thirds of each number by the ſingle nomination of each proprietor for himſelf, and the remaining one-third by the joint election of the palatine's court, and ſo proceed in the ſame manner till the whole province of Carolina be ſet out and planted, according to the proportions in theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions.

XI.

ANY landgrave or caſſique at any time before the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and one, ſhall have power to alienate, ſell, or make over to any other perſon, his dignity, with the baronies thereunto belonging, all intirely together. But after the year one thouſand ſeven hundred, no landgrave or caſſique ſhall have power to alienate, ſell, make over, or lett the hereditary baronies of his dignity, or any part thereof, otherwiſe than as in § XVIII; but they ſhall all intirely, with the dignity thereunto belonging, deſcend unto his heirs male; and for want of heirs male, all intirely and undivided, to the next heir general; and for want of ſuch heirs, ſhall devolve into the hands of the lords proprietors.

XII.

THAT the due number of landgraves and caſſiques may be always kept up; if, upon the devolution of any landgraveſhip or caſſiqueſhip, the palatine's court ſhall not ſettle the devolved dignity, with the baronies thereunto annexed, before the ſecond biennial parliament after ſuch devolution; the next biennial parliament but one after ſuch devolution ſhall have power to make any one landgrave or caſſique, in the room of him, who dying without heirs, his dignity and baronies devolved.

XIII.

No one perſon ſhall have more than one dignity, with the ſigniories or baronies thereunto belonging. But whenſoever it ſhall happen, that any one, who is already proprietor, landgrave, or caſſique, ſhall have any of theſe dignities deſcend to him by inheritance, it ſhall be at his choice to keep which of the dignities, with the lands annexed, he ſhall like beſt; but ſhall leave the other, with the lands annexed, to be en-

joyed by him, who not being his heir apparent, and certain ſucceſſor to his preſent dignity, is next of blood.

XIV.

WHOSOEVER, by right of inheritance, ſhall come to be landgrave or caſſique, ſhall take the name and arms of his predeceſſor in that dignity, to be from thenceforth the name and arms of his family and their poſterity.

XV.

SINCE the dignity of proprietor, landgrave, or caſſique, cannot be divided, and the ſignories or baronies thereunto annexed muſt for ever all intirely deſcend with, and accompany that dignity; whenſoever for want of heirs male it ſhall deſcend on the iſſue female, the eldeſt daughter and her heirs ſhall be preferred; and in the inheritance of thoſe dignities, and in the ſigniories or baronies annexed, there ſhall be no coheirs.

XVI.

IN every ſigniory, barony, and manor, the reſpective lord ſhall have power in his own name to hold court-leet there, for trying of all cauſes both civil and criminal; but where it ſhall concern any perſon being no inhabitant, vaſſal, or leet-man of the ſaid ſigniory, barony, or manor, he, upon paying down of forty ſhillings to the lords proprietors uſe, ſhall have an appeal from the ſigniory or barony-court to the county-court, and from the manor-court to the precinct-court.

XVII.

EVERY manor ſhall conſiſt of not leſs than three thouſand acres, and not above twelve thouſand acres in one entire piece and colony: but any three thouſand acres or more in one piece, and the poſſeſſion of one man, ſhall not be a manor, unleſs it be conſtituted a manor by the grant of the palatine's court.

XVIII.

THE lords of ſigniories and baronies ſhall have power only of granting eſtates not exceeding three lives, or thirty-one years, in two-thirds of the ſaid ſigniories or baronies, and the remaining third ſhall be always demeſne.

XIX.

ANY lord of a manor may alienate, ſell, or diſpoſe to any other perſon and his heirs for ever, his manor, all entirely together, with all the privileges and leet-men thereunto belonging, ſo far forth as any colony lands; but no grant of any part thereof, either in fee, or for any longer term than three lives, or one-and-twenty years, ſhall be good againſt the next heir.

XX.

No manor, for want of iſſue male, ſhall be divided amongſt coheirs; but the manor, if there be but one, ſhall all entirely deſcend to the eldeſt daughter and her heirs. If there be more manors than one, the eldeſt daughter firſt ſhall have her choice, the ſecond next, and ſo on, beginning again at the eldeſt, till all the manors be taken up; that ſo the privileges,

leges, which belong to manors being indiviſible, the lands of the manors, to which they are annexed, may be kept entire, and the manor not loſe thoſe privileges, which, upon parcelling out to ſeveral owners, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe.

XXI.

EVERY lord of a manor, within his manor, ſhall have all the powers, juriſdictions, and privileges, which a landgrave or caſſique hath in his baronies.

XXII.

IN every ſigniory, barony, and manor, all the leet-men ſhall be under the juriſdiction of the reſpective lords of the ſaid ſigniory, barony, or manor, without appeal from him. Nor ſhall any leet-man, or leet-woman, have liberty to go off from the land of their particular lord, and live any where elſe, without licence obtained from their ſaid lord, under hand and ſeal.

XXIII.

ALL the children of leet-men ſhall be leet-men, and ſo to all generations.

XXIV.

No man ſhall be capable of having a court-leet, or leet-men, but a proprietor, landgrave, caſſique, or lord of a manor.

XXV.

WHOEVER ſhall voluntarily enter himſelf a leet-man, in the regiſtry of the county-court, ſhall be a leet-man.

XXVI.

WHOEVER is lord of leet-men, ſhall upon the marriage of a leet-man, or leet-woman of his, give them ten acres of land for their lives; they paying to him therefor not more than one eighth part of all the yearly produce and growth of the ſaid ten acres.

XXVII.

No landgrave or caſſique ſhall be tried for any criminal cauſe, in any but the chief-juſtice's court, and that by a jury of his peers.

XXVIII.

THERE ſhall be eight ſupreme courts. The firſt called the palatine's court, conſiſting of the palatine, and the other ſeven proprietors. The other ſeven courts of the other ſeven great officers, ſhall conſiſt each of them of a proprietor, and ſix counſellors added to him. Under each of theſe latter ſeven courts, ſhall be a college of twelve aſſiſtants. The twelve aſſiſtants of the ſeveral colleges ſhall be choſen, two out of the landgraves, caſſiques, or eldeſt ſons of the proprietors, by the palatine's court; two out of the landgraves, by the landgraves chamber; two out of the caſſiques, by the caſſiques chamber; four more of the twelve ſhall be choſen by the commons chamber, out of ſuch as have been, or are members of parliament, ſheriffs, or juſtices of the county-court, or the younger ſons of proprietors, or eldeſt ſons of landgraves or caſſiques;

the two other ſhall be choſen by the palatine's court, out of the ſame ſort of perſons, out of which the commons chamber is to chuſe.

XXIX.

OUT of theſe colleges ſhall be choſen at firſt by the palatine's court, ſix counſellors, to be joined with each proprietor in his court; of which ſix, one ſhall be of thoſe, who were choſen into any of the colleges by the palatine's court, out of the landgraves, caſſiques, or eldeſt ſons of proprietors; one out of thoſe who were choſen by the landgraves chamber; and one out of thoſe, who were choſen by the caſſiques chamber; two out of thoſe, who were choſen by the commons chamber; and one out of thoſe, who were choſen by the palatine's court, out of the proprietors younger ſons, or eldeſt ſons of landgraves, caſſiques, or commons, qualified as aforeſaid.

XXX.

WHEN it ſhall happen that any counſellor dies, and thereby there is a vacancy, the grand council ſhall have power to remove any counſellor that is willing to be removed out of any of the proprietors courts to fill up the vacancy; provided they take a man of the ſame degree and choice the other was of, whoſe vacant place is to be filled up. But if no counſellor conſent to be removed, or upon ſuch remove the laſt remaining vacant place, in any of the proprietor's courts, ſhall be filled up by the choice of the grand council, who ſhall have power to remove out of any of the colleges any aſſiſtant, who is of the ſame degree and choice that counſellor was of, into whoſe vacant place he is to ſucceed. The grand council alſo ſhall have power to remove any aſſiſtant, that is willing, out of one college into another, provided he be of the ſame degree and choice. But the laſt remaining vacant place in any college, ſhall be filled up by the ſame choice, and out of the ſame degree of perſons the aſſiſtant was of who is dead, or removed. No place ſhall be vacant in any proprietor's court above ſix months. No place ſhall be vacant in any college longer than the next ſeſſion of parliament.

XXXI.

No man, being a member of the grand council, or of any of the ſeven colleges, ſhall be turned out, but for miſdemeanor, of which the grand council ſhall be judge; and the vacancy of the perſon ſo put out ſhall be filled, not by the election of the grand council, but by thoſe, who firſt choſe him, and out of the ſame degree he was of, who is expelled. But it is not hereby to be underſtood, that the grand council hath any power to turn out any one of the lords proprietors or their deputies, the lords proprietors having in themſelves an inherent original right.

XXXII.

ALL elections in the parliament, in the ſeveral chambers of the parliament, and in the grand council, ſhall be paſſed by balotting.

XXXIII.

THE palatine's court ſhall conſiſt of the palatine, and ſeven proprietors, wherein nothing ſhall be acted without the preſence and conſent of

of the Palatine or his deputy, and three others of the proprietors or their deputies. This court ſhall have power to call parliaments, to pardon all offences, to make elections of all officers in the proprietor's diſpoſe, and to nominate and appoint port-towns; and alſo ſhall have power by their order to the treaſurer, to diſpoſe of all publick treaſure, excepting money granted by the parliament, and by them directed to ſome particular publick uſe; and alſo ſhall have a negative upon all acts, orders, votes, and judgments, of the grand council and the parliament, except only as in § VI. and XII. and ſhall have all the powers granted to the lords proprietors, by their patent from Our Sovereign Lord the King, except in ſuch things as are limited by theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions.

XXXIV.

THE palatine himſelf, when he in perſon ſhall be either in the army, or in any of the proprietors courts, ſhall then have the power of general, or of that proprietor, in whoſe court he is then preſent; and the proprietor, in whoſe court the palatine then preſides, ſhall during his preſence there be but as one of the council.

XXXV.

THE chancellor's court, conſiſting of one of the proprietors, and his ſix counſellors, who ſhall be called vice-chancellors, ſhall have the cuſtody of the ſeal of the palatine, under which all charters of lands or otherwiſe, commiſſions and grants of the palatine's court, ſhall paſs. And it ſhall not be lawful to put the ſeal of the palatinate to any writing, which is not ſigned by the Palatinate or his deputy, and three other proprietors or their deputies. To this court alſo belong all ſtate matters, diſpatches, and treaties with the neighbour Indians. To this court alſo belong all invaſions of the law, of liberty of conſcience, and all diſturbances of the publick peace, upon pretence of religion, as alſo the licence of printing. The twelve aſſiſtants belonging to this court ſhall be called recorders.

XXXVI.

WHATEVER paſſes under the ſeal of the Palatinate, ſhall be regiſtered in that proprietor's court, to which the matter therein contained belongs.

XXXVII.

THE chancellor, or his deputy, ſhall be always ſpeaker in parliament, and preſident of the grand council; and in his and his deputies abſence, one of his vice-chancellors.

XXXVIII.

THE chief juſtice's court, conſiſting of one of the proprietors and his ſix counſellors, who ſhall be called juſtices of the bench, ſhall judge all appeals in caſes both civil and criminal, except all ſuch caſes as ſhall be under the juriſdiction and cognizance of any other of the proprietors courts, which ſhall be tried in thoſe courts reſpectively. The government and regulation of the regiſtries of writings and contracts, ſhall belong to the juriſdiction of this court. The twelve aſſiſtants of this court ſhall be called maſters.

XXXIX.

XXXIX.

THE conſtable's court, conſiſting of one of the proprietors and his ſix counſellors, who ſhall be called marſhals, ſhall order and determine of all military affairs by land, and all land-forces, arms, ammunition, artillery, garriſons and forts, &c. and whatever belongs unto war. His twelve aſſiſtants ſhall be called lieutenant-generals.

XL.

IN time of actual war, the conſtable, whilſt he is in the army, ſhall be general of the army; and the ſix counſellors, or ſuch of them as the palatine's court ſhall for that time or ſervice appoint, ſhall be the immediate great officers under him, and the lieutenant-generals next to them.

XLI.

THE admiral's court, conſiſting of one of the proprietors, and his ſix counſellors, called conſuls, ſhall have the care and inſpection over all ports, moles, and navigable rivers, ſo far as the tide flows, and alſo all the publick ſhipping of Carolina, and ſtores thereunto belonging, and all maritime affairs. This court alſo ſhall have the power of the court of admiralty; and ſhall have power to conſtitute judges in port-towns, to try caſes belonging to law-merchant, as ſhall be moſt convenient for trade. The twelve aſſiſtants, belonging to this court, ſhall be called proconſuls.

XLII.

IN time of actual war, the admiral, whilſt he is at ſea, ſhall command in chief, and his ſix counſellors, or ſuch of them as the palatine's court ſhall for that time and ſervice appoint, ſhall be the immediate great officers under him, and the proconſuls next to them.

XLIII.

THE treaſurer's court, conſiſting of a proprietor and his ſix counſellors, called under-treaſurers, ſhall take care of all matters that concern the publick revenue and treaſury. The twelve aſſiſtants ſhall be called auditors.

XLIV.

THE high ſteward's court, conſiſting of a proprietor and his ſix counſellors, called comptrollers, ſhall have the care of all foreign and domeſtick trade, manufactures, publick buildings, work-houſes, highways, paſſages by water above the flood of the tide, drains, ſewers, and banks againſt inundations, bridges, poſt, carriers, fairs, markets, corruption or infection of the common air or water, and all things in order to the publick commerce and health; alſo ſetting out and ſurveying of lands; and alſo ſetting out and appointing places for towns to be built on in the precincts, and the preſcribing and determining the figure and bigneſs of the ſaid towns, according to ſuch models as the ſaid court ſhall order; contrary or differing from which models it ſhall not be lawful for any one to build in any town. This court ſhall have power alſo to make any publick building, or any new highway, or enlarge any old highway, upon any man's land whatſoever; as alſo to make cuts, channels, banks,

banks, locks, and bridges, for making rivers navigable, or for draining fens, or any other publick uſe. The damage the owner of ſuch lands, (on or through which any ſuch publick things ſhall be made) ſhall receive thereby, ſhall be valued, and ſatisfaction made by ſuch ways as the grand council ſhall appoint. The twelve aſſiſtants, belonging to this court, ſhall be called ſurveyors.

XLV.

THE chamberlain's court, conſiſting of a proprietor and his ſix counſellors, called vice-chamberlains, ſhall have the care of all ceremonies, precedency, heraldry, reception of publick meſſengers, pedigrees, the regiſtry of all births, burials, and marriages, legitimation, and all caſes concerning matrimony, or ariſing from it; and ſhall alſo have power to regulate all faſhions, habits, badges, games, and ſports. To this court alſo it ſhall belong to convocate the grand council. The twelve aſſiſtants belonging to this court ſhall be called provoſts.

XLVI.

ALL cauſes belonging to, or under the juriſdiction of any of the proprietors courts, ſhall in them reſpectively be tried, and ultimately determined without any farther appeal.

XLVII.

THE proprietors courts ſhall have a power to mitigate all fines, and ſuſpend all executions in criminal cauſes, either before or after ſentence, in any of the other inferior courts reſpectively.

XLVIII.

IN all debates, hearings, or trials, in any of the proprietors courts, the twelve aſſiſtants belonging to the ſaid courts reſpectively, ſhall have liberty to be preſent, but ſhall not interpoſe, unleſs their opinions be required, nor have any vote at all; but their buſineſs ſhall be, by the direction of the reſpective courts, to prepare ſuch buſineſs as ſhall be committed to them; as alſo to bear ſuch offices, and diſpatch ſuch affairs, either where the court is kept, or elſewhere, as the court ſhall think fit.

XLIX.

IN all the proprietors courts, the proprietor, and any three of his counſellors, ſhall make a quorum; provided always, that for the better diſpatch of buſineſs, it ſhall be in the power of the palatine's court, to direct what ſort of cauſes ſhall be heard and determined by a quorum of any three.

L.

THE grand council ſhall conſiſt of the palatine and ſeven proprietors, and the forty-two counſellors of the ſeveral proprietors courts, who ſhall have power to determine any controverſies that may ariſe between any of the proprietors courts, about their reſpective juriſdictions, or between the members of the ſame court, about their manner and methods of proceeding; to make peace and war, leagues, treaties, &c. with any of the neighbour Indians; to iſſue out their general orders to the conſtable's

and admiral's courts, for the raiſing, diſpoſing, or diſbanding the forces, by land or by ſea.

LI.

THE grand council ſhall prepare all matters to be propoſed in parliament. Nor ſhall any matter whatſoever be propoſed in parliament, but what hath firſt paſſed the grand council; which, after having been read three ſeveral days in the parliament, ſhall by majority of votes be paſſed or rejected.

LII.

THE grand council ſhall always be judges of all cauſes and appeals that concern the palatine, or any of the lords proprietors, or any counſellor of any proprietor's court, in any cauſe, which otherwiſe ſhould have been tried in the court, in which the ſaid counſellor is judge himſelf.

LIII.

THE grand council, by their warrants to the treaſurer's court, ſhall diſpoſe of all the money given by the parliament, and by them directed to any particular publick uſe.

LIV.

THE quorum of the grand council ſhall be thirteen, whereof a proprietor, or his deputy, ſhall be always one.

LV.

THE grand council ſhall meet the firſt Tueſday in every month, and as much oftener as either they ſhall think fit, or they ſhall be convocated by the chamberlain's court.

LVI.

THE palatine, or any of the lords proprietors, ſhall have power under hand and ſeal, to be regiſtered in the grand council, to make a deputy, who ſhall have the ſame power, to all intents and purpoſes, as he himſelf who deputes him; except in confirming acts of parliament, as in § LXXVI, and except alſo in nominating and chuſing landgraves and caſſiques, as in § X. All ſuch deputations ſhall ceaſe and determine at the end of four years, and at any time ſhall be revocable at the pleaſure of the deputator.

LVII.

No deputy of any proprietor ſhall have any power, whilſt the deputator is in any part of Carolina, except the proprietor, whoſe deputy he is, be a minor.

LVIII.

DURING the minority of any proprietor, his guardian ſhall have power to conſtitute and appoint his deputy.

LIX.

THE eldeſt of the lords proprietors, who ſhall be perſonally in Carolina, ſhall of courſe be the palatine's deputy, and if no proprietor be in Carolina, he ſhall chuſe his deputy out of the heirs-apparent of any of the proprietors, if any ſuch be there; and if there be no heir-apparent of any

of the lords proprietors above one and twenty years old, in Carolina, then he ſhall chuſe for deputy any one of the landgraves of the grand council; till he have, by deputation, under hand and ſeal choſen any one of the fore-mentioned heirs apparent, or landgraves, to be his deputy, the eldeſt man of the landgraves, and for want of a landgrave, the eldeſt man of the caſſiques, who ſhall be perſonally in Carolina, ſhall of courſe be his deputy.

LX.

EACH proprietor's deputy ſhall be always one of his own ſix counſellors reſpectively; and in caſe any of the proprietors hath not, in his abſence out of Carolina, a deputy, commiſſioned under his hand and ſeal, the eldeſt nobleman of his court ſhall of courſe be his deputy.

LXI.

IN every county there ſhall be a court, conſiſting of a ſheriff and four juſtices of the county, for every precinct one. The ſheriff ſhall be an inhabitant of the county, and have at leaſt five hundred acres of freehold within the ſaid county; and the juſtices ſhall be inhabitants, and have each of them five hundred acres a-piece freehold within the precinct, for which they ſerve reſpectively. Theſe five ſhall be choſen and commiſſioned from time to time by the palatine's court.

LXII.

FOR any perſonal cauſes exceeding the value of two hundred pounds ſterling, or in title of land, or in any criminal cauſe; either party, upon paying twenty pounds ſterling to the lords proprietors uſe, ſhall have liberty of appeal from the county-court unto the reſpective proprietor's court.

LXIII.

IN every precinct there ſhall be a court, conſiſting of a ſteward and four juſtices of the precinct, being inhabitants, and having three hundred acres of freehold within the ſaid precinct, who ſhall judge all criminal cauſes; except for treaſon, murder, and any other offences puniſhable with death, and except all criminal cauſes of the nobility; and ſhall judge alſo all civil cauſes whatſoever; and in all perſonal actions, not exceeding fifty pounds ſterling, without appeal; but where the cauſe ſhall exceed that value, or concern a title of land, and in all criminal cauſes; there either party, upon paying five pounds ſterling to the lords proprietors uſe, ſhall have liberty of appeal to the county-court.

LXIV.

No cauſe ſhall be twice tried in any one court, upon any reaſon or pretence whatſoever.

LXV.

FOR treaſon, murder, and all other offences puniſhable with death, there ſhall be a commiſſion, twice a-year, at leaſt, granted unto one or more members of the grand council, or colleges, who ſhall come as itinerant judges to the ſeveral counties, and, with the ſheriff and four juſtices, ſhall hold aſſizes to judge all ſuch cauſes; but, upon paying of

fifty pounds ſterling to the lords proprietors uſe, there ſhall be liberty of appeal to the reſpective proprietor's court.

LXVI.

THE grand jury at the ſeveral aſſizes ſhall, upon their oaths, and under their hands and ſeals, deliver in to the itinerant judges a preſentment of ſuch grievances, miſdemeanors, exigences, or defects, which they think neceſſary for the publick good of the country; which preſentments ſhall, by the itinerant judges, at the end of their circuit, be delivered in to the grand council at their next ſitting. And whatſoever therein concerns the execution of laws already made, the ſeveral proprietors courts, in the matters belonging to each of them reſpectively, ſhall take cognizance of it, and give ſuch order about it as ſhall be effectual for the due execution of the laws. But whatever concerns the making of any new law, ſhall be referred to the ſeveral reſpective courts to which that matter belongs, and be by them prepared and brought to the grand council.

LXVII.

FOR terms, there ſhall be quarterly ſuch a certain number of days, not exceeding one and twenty at any one time, as the ſeveral reſpective courts ſhall appoint. The time for the beginning of the term, in the precinct-court, ſhall be the firſt Monday in January, April, July, and October; in the county-court, the firſt Monday in February, May, Auguſt, and November; and in the proprietors courts, the firſt Monday in March, June, September, and December.

LXVIII.

IN the precinct-court no man ſhall be a jury-man under fifty acres of freehold. In the county-court, or at the aſſizes, no man ſhall be a grand jury-man under three hundred acres of freehold; and no man ſhall be a petty jury-man under two hundred acres of freehold. In the proprietors courts no man ſhall be a jury-man, under five hundred acres of freehold.

LXIX.

EVERY jury ſhall conſiſt of twelve men; and it ſhall not be neceſſary they ſhould all agree, but the verdict ſhall be according to the conſent of the majority.

LXX.

IT ſhall be a baſe and vile thing to plead for money or reward; nor ſhall any one (except he be a near kinſman, not farther off than couſin-german to the party concerned), be permitted to plead another man's cauſe, till before the judge, in open court, he hath taken an oath, that he doth not plead for money or reward, nor hath, nor will receive, nor directly, nor indirectly, bargained with the party whoſe cauſe he is going to plead, for money or any other reward, for pleading his cauſe.

LXXI.

THERE ſhall be a parliament, conſiſting of the proprietors, or their deputies, the landgraves and caſſiques, and one freeholder out of every

precinct, to be choſen by the freeholders of the ſaid precinct reſpectively. They ſhall ſit all together in one room, and have every member one vote.

LXXII.

No man ſhall be choſen a member of parliament who hath leſs than five hundred acres of freehold within the precinct, for which he is choſen; nor ſhall any have a vote in chuſing the ſaid member that hath leſs than fifty acres of freehold within the ſaid precinct.

LXXIII.

A NEW parliament ſhall be aſſembled the firſt Monday of the month of November every ſecond year, and ſhall meet and ſit in the town they laſt ſat in, without any ſummons, unleſs, by the palatine's court, they be ſummoned to meet at any other place. And if there ſhall be any occaſion of a parliament in theſe intervals, it ſhall be in the power of the palatine's court to aſſemble them in forty days notice, and at ſuch time and place as the ſaid court ſhall think fit; and the palatine's court ſhall have power to diſſolve the ſaid parliament when they ſhall think fit.

LXXIV.

AT the opening of every parliament, the firſt thing that ſhall be done, ſhall be the reading of theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions, which the palatine and proprietors, and the reſt of the members then preſent, ſhall ſubſcribe. Nor ſhall any perſon whatſoever ſit or vote in the parliament, till he hath that ſeſſion ſubſcribed theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions, in a book kept for that purpoſe by the clerk of the parliament.

LXXV.

IN order to the due election of members for the biennial parliament, it ſhall be lawful for the freeholders of the reſpective precincts to meet the firſt Tueſday in September every two years, in the ſame town or place that they laſt met in to chuſe parliament-men; and there chuſe thoſe members that are to ſit the next November following, unleſs the ſteward of the precinct ſhall, by ſufficient notice thirty days before, appoint ſome other place for their meeting, in order to the election.

LXXVI.

No act, or order of parliament, ſhall be of any force, unleſs it be ratified in open parliament, during the ſame ſeſſion, by the palatine or his deputy, and three more of the lords proprietors, or their deputies; and then not to continue longer in force but until the next biennial parliament, unleſs, in the mean time, it be ratified under the hands and ſeals of the palatine himſelf, and three more of the lords proprietors themſelves, and by their order publiſhed at the next biennial parliament.

LXXVII.

ANY proprietor, or his deputy, may enter his proteſtation againſt any act of the parliament, before the palatine or his deputy's conſent be given as aforeſaid; if he ſhall conceive the ſaid act to be contrary to this eſtabliſhment, or any of theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions of the govern-

ment. And in ſuch caſe, after full and free debate, the ſeveral eſtates ſhall retire into four ſeveral chambers; the palatine and proprietors into one; the landgraves into another; the caſſiques into another; and thoſe choſen by the precincts into a fourth; and if the major part of any of the four eſtates ſhall vote that the law is not agreeable to this eſtabliſhment, and theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions of the government, then it ſhall paſs no farther, but be as if it had never been propoſed.

LXXVIII.

THE quorum of the parliament ſhall be one half of thoſe who are members, and capable of ſitting in the houſe that preſent ſeſſion of parliament. The quorum of each of the chambers of parliament ſhall be one half of the members of that chamber.

LXXIX.

To avoid multiplicity of laws, which by degrees always change the right foundations of the original government, all acts of parliament whatſoever, in whatſoever form paſſed or enacted, ſhall, at the end of an hundred years after their enacting, reſpectively ceaſe and determine of themſelves, and without any repeal become null and void, as if no ſuch acts or laws had ever been made.

LXXX.

SINCE multiplicity of comments, as well as of laws, have great inconveniencies, and ſerve only to obſcure and perplex; all manner of comments and expoſitions, on any part of theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions, or any part of the common or ſtatute law of Carolina, are abſolutely prohibited.

LXXXI.

THERE ſhall be a regiſtry in every precinct, wherein ſhall be enrolled all deeds, leaſes, judgments, mortgages, and other conveyances, which may concern any of the land within the ſaid precinct; and all ſuch conveyances, not ſo entered or regiſtered, ſhall not be of force againſt any perſon or party to the ſaid contract or conveyance.

LXXXII.

No man ſhall be regiſter of any precinct who hath not at leaſt three hundred acres of freehold within the ſaid precinct.

LXXXIII.

THE freeholders of every precinct ſhall nominate three men; out of which three, the chief juſtice's court ſhall chuſe and commiſſion one to be regiſter of the ſaid precinct, whilſt he ſhall well behave himſelf.

LXXXIV.

THERE ſhall be a regiſtry in every ſigniory, barony, and colony, wherein ſhall be recorded all the births, marriages, and deaths, that ſhall happen within the reſpective ſigniories, baronies, and colonies.

LXXXV.

No man ſhall be regiſter of a colony that hath not above fifty acres of freehold within the ſaid colony.

LXXXVI.

THE time of every one's age, that is born in Carolina, ſhall be reckoned from the day that his birth is entered in the regiſtry, and not before.

LXXXVII.

No marriage ſhall be lawful, whatever contract and ceremony they have uſed, till both the parties mutually own it before the regiſter of the place where they were married, and he regiſter it, with the names of the father and mother of each party.

LXXXVIII.

No man ſhall adminiſter to the goods, or have right to them, or enter upon the eſtate of any perſon deceaſed, till his death be regiſtered in the reſpective regiſtry.

LXXXIX.

HE that doth not enter, in the reſpective regiſtry, the birth or death of any perſon that is born, or dies, in his houſe or ground, ſhall pay to the ſaid regiſter one ſhilling per week for each ſuch neglect, reckoning from the time of each birth, or death, reſpectively, to the time of regiſtering it.

XC.

IN like manner the births, marriages, and deaths, of the lords proprietors, landgraves, and caſſiques, ſhall be regiſtered in the chamberlain's court.

XCI.

THERE ſhall be in every colony one conſtable, to be choſen annually by the freeholders of the colony; his eſtate ſhall be above a hundred acres of freehold within the ſaid colony, and ſuch ſubordinate officers appointed for his aſſiſtance, as the county-court ſhall find requiſite, and ſhall be eſtabliſhed by the ſaid county-court. The election of the ſubordinate annual officers ſhall be alſo in the freeholders of the colony.

XCII.

ALL towns incorporate ſhall be governed by a Mayor, twelve Aldermen, and twenty-four of the common-council. The ſaid common-council ſhall be choſen by the preſent houſholders of the ſaid town; the aldermen ſhall be choſen out of the common-council; and the mayor out of the aldermen, by the palatine's court.

XCIII.

IT being of great conſequence to the plantation, that Port-Towns ſhould be built and preſerved; therefore whoſoever ſhall lade or unlade any commodity at any other place but a Port-Town, ſhall forfeit to the lords proprietors, for each tun ſo laden or unladen, the ſum of ten pounds ſterling; except only ſuch goods as the palatine's court ſhall licenſe to be laden or unladen elſewhere.

XCIV.

THE firſt Port-Town upon every river, ſhall be in a colony, and be a Port-Town for ever.

XCV.

XCV.

No man ſhall be permitted to be a freeman of Carolina, or to have any eſtate or habitation within it, that doth not acknowledge a GOD; and that God is publickly and ſolemnly to be worſhipped.

XCVI.

[As the country comes to be ſufficiently planted and diſtributed into fit diviſions, it ſhall belong to the parliament to take care for the building of churches, and the publick maintenance of divines, to be employed in the exerciſe of religion, according to the church of England; which being the only true and orthodox, and the national religion of all the king's dominions, is ſo alſo of Carolina; and therefore it alone ſhall be allowed to receive publick maintenance, by grant of parliament *].

XCVII.

But ſince the natives of that place, who will be concerned in our plantation, are utterly ſtrangers to chriſtianity, whoſe idolatry, ignorance, or miſtake, gives us no right to expel, or uſe them ill; and thoſe who remove from other parts to plant there, will unavoidably be of different opinions concerning matters of religion, the liberty whereof they will expect to have allowed them, and it will not be reaſonable for us on this account to keep them out; that civil peace may be maintained amidſt the diverſity of opinions, and our agreement and compact with all men may be duly and faithfully obſerved; the violation whereof, upon what pretence ſoever, cannot be without great offence to almighty God, and great ſcandal to the true religion, which we profeſs; and alſo that Jews, Heathens, and other Diſſenters from the purity of chriſtian religion, may not be ſcared and kept at a diſtance from it, but by having an opportunity of acquainting themſelves with the truth and reaſonableneſs of its Doctrines, and the peaceableneſs and inoffenſiveneſs of its profeſſors, may by good uſage and perſuaſion, and all thoſe convincing methods of gentleneſs and meekneſs, ſuitable to the rules and deſign of the goſpel, be won over to embrace and unfeignedly receive the truth; therefore any ſeven or more perſons, agreeing in any religion, ſhall conſtitute a church or profeſſion, to which they ſhall give ſome name, to diſtinguiſh it from others.

XCVIII.

The terms of admittance and communion with any church or profeſſion ſhall be written in a book, and therein be ſubſcribed by all the members of the ſaid Church or profeſſion; which book ſhall be kept by the publick regiſter of the precinct where they reſide.

XCIX.

The time of every one's ſubſcription and admittance ſhall be dated in the ſaid book or religious record.

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* This article was not drawn up by Mr. Locke; but inſerted by ſome of the chief of the proprietors, againſt his judgment; as Mr. Locke himſelf informed one of his friends, to whom he preſented a copy of theſe conſtitutions.

C.

In the terms of communion of every church or profeſſion, theſe following ſhall be three; without which no agreement or aſſembly of men, upon pretence of religion, ſhall be accounted a church or profeſſion within theſe rules:

1. "That there is a GOD.
2. "That GOD is publickly to be worſhipped.
3. "That it is lawful and the duty of every man, being thereunto "called by thoſe that govern, to bear witneſs to truth; and that every "church or profeſſion ſhall in their terms of communion ſet down the "external way whereby they witneſs a truth as in the preſence of GOD, "whether it be by laying hands on, or kiſſing the Bible, as in the "church of England, or by holding up the hand, or any other ſenſible "way."

CI.

No perſon above ſeventeen years of age ſhall have any benefit or protection of the law, or be capable of any place of profit or honour, who is not a member of ſome church or profeſſion, having his name recorded in ſome one, and but one religious record at once.

CII.

No perſon of any other church or profeſſion ſhall diſturb or moleſt any religious aſſembly.

CIII.

No perſon whatſoever ſhall ſpeak any thing in their religious aſſembly, irreverently or ſeditiouſly of the government or governors, or ſtate-matters.

CIV.

Any perſon ſubſcribing the terms of communion in the record of the ſaid church or profeſſion, before the precinct regiſter, and any five members of the ſaid church or profeſſion; ſhall be thereby made a member of the ſaid church or profeſſion.

CV.

Any perſon ſtriking out his own name out of any religious record, or his name being ſtruck out by any officer thereunto authoriſed by each church or profeſſion reſpectively, ſhall ceaſe to be a member of that church or profeſſion.

CVI.

No man ſhall uſe any reproachful, reviling, or abuſive language, againſt any religion of any church or profeſſion; that being the certain way of diſturbing the peace, and of hindering the converſion of any to the truth, by engaging them in quarrels and animoſities, to the hatred of the profeſſors and that profeſſion, which otherwiſe they might be brought to aſſent to.

CVII.

Since charity obliges us to wiſh well to the ſouls of all men, and religion ought to alter nothing in any man's civil eſtate or right, it ſhall be

be lawful for ſlaves, as well as others, to enter themſelves, and be of what church or profeſſion any of them ſhall think beſt, and thereof be as fully members as any freeman. But yet no ſlave ſhall hereby be exempted from that civil dominion his maſter hath over him, but be in all other things in the ſame ſtate and condition he was in before.

CVIII.

ASSEMBLIES, upon what pretence ſoever of religion, not obſerving and performing the aboveſaid rules, ſhall not be eſteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be puniſhed as other riots.

CIX.

No perſon whatſoever ſhall diſturb, moleſt, or perſecute another for his ſpeculative opinions in religion, or his way of worſhip.

CX.

EVERY freeman of Carolina ſhall have abſolute power and authority over his negro ſlaves, of what opinion or religion ſoever.

CXI.

No cauſe, whether civil or criminal, of any freeman, ſhall be tried in any court of judicature, without a jury of his peers.

CXII.

No perſon whatſoever ſhall hold or claim any land in Carolina by purchaſe or gift, or otherwiſe, from the natives or any other whatſoever; but merely from and under the lords proprietors; upon pain of forfeiture of all his eſtate, moveable or immoveable, and perpetual baniſhment.

CXIII.

WHOSOEVER ſhall poſſeſs any freehold in Carolina, upon what title or grant ſoever, ſhall, at the fartheſt from and after the year one thouſand ſix hundred eighty-nine, pay yearly unto the lords proprietors for each acre of land, Engliſh meaſure, as much fine ſilver as is at this preſent in one Engliſh penny, or the value thereof, to be as a chief rent and acknowledgment to the lords proprietors, their heirs and ſucceſſors for ever. And it ſhall be lawful for the palatine's court by their officers, at any time, to take a new ſurvey of any man's land, not to out him of any part of his poſſeſſion, but that by ſuch a ſurvey the juſt number of acres he poſſeſſeth may be known, and the rent thereupon due may be paid by him.

CXIV.

ALL wrecks, mines, minerals, quarries of gems, and precious ſtones, with pearl-fiſhing, whale-fiſhing, and one half of all amber-greaſe, by whomſoever found, ſhall wholly belong to the lords proprietors.

CXV.

ALL revenues and profits belonging to the lords proprietors, in common, ſhall be divided into ten parts, whereof the palatine ſhall have three, and each proprietor one; but, if the palatine ſhall govern by a deputy, his deputy ſhall have one of thoſe three tenths, and the palatine the other two tenths.

CXVI.

CXVI.

ALL inhabitants and freemen of Carolina above ſeventeen years of age, and under ſixty, ſhall be bound to bear arms, and ſerve as ſoldiers whenever the grand council ſhall find it neceſſary.

CXVII.

A TRUE copy of theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions ſhall be kept in a great book by the regiſter of every precinct, to be ſubſcribed before the ſaid regiſter. Nor ſhall any perſon of what condition or degree ſoever, above ſeventeen years old, have any eſtate or poſſeſſion in Carolina, or protection or benefit of the law there, who hath not, before a precinct regiſter, ſubſcribed theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions in this form:

"I A. B. do promiſe to bear faith and true allegiance to our ſovereign "lord king Charles the Second, his heirs and ſucceſſors; and will "be true and faithful to the palatine and lords proprietors of Ca-"rolina, their heirs and ſucceſſors; and with my utmoſt power "will defend them, and maintain the government according to this "eſtabliſhment in theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions."

CXVIII.

WHATSOEVER alien ſhall, in this form, before any precinct regiſter, ſubſcribe theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions, ſhall be thereby naturalized.

CXIX.

IN the ſame manner ſhall every perſon, at his admittance into any office, ſubſcribe theſe Fundamental Conſtitutions.

CXX.

THESE Fundamental Conſtitutions, in number a hundred and twenty, and every part thereof, ſhall be and remain the ſacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina for ever. Witneſs our hands and ſeals, the firſt day of March, 1669.

RULES of PRECEDENCY.

I.

THE lords proprietors; the eldeſt in age firſt, and ſo in order.

II.

THE eldeſt ſons of the lords proprietors; the eldeſt in age firſt, and ſo in order.

III.

THE landgraves of the grand council; he that hath been longeſt of the grand council firſt, and ſo in order.

IV.

THE caſſiques of the grand council; he that hath been longeſt of the grand council firſt, and ſo in order.

V.

THE ſeven commoners of the grand council that have been longeſt of the grand council; he that hath been longeſt of the grand council firſt, and ſo in order.

VI.

THE younger ſons of proprietors; the eldeſt firſt, and ſo in order.

VII.

THE landgraves; the eldeſt in age firſt, and ſo in order.

VIII.

THE ſeven commoners, who next to thoſe before-mentioned have been longeſt of the grand council; he that hath been longeſt of the grand council firſt, and ſo in order.

IX.

THE caſſiques; the eldeſt in age firſt, and ſo in order.

X.

THE ſeven remaining commoners of the grand council; he that hath been longeſt of the grand council firſt, and ſo in order.

XI.

THE male line of the proprietors.

THE reſt ſhall be determined by the chamberlain's court.

A LETTER

A

LETTER

FROM A

Perſon of Quality to his Friend in the Country;

GIVING

An Account of the Debates and Reſolutions of the Houſe of Lords, in April and May, 1675, concerning a Bill, intitled, "An Act to prevent the Dangers which may ariſe from "Perſons diſaffected to the Government."

SIR,

THIS ſeſſion being ended, and the bill of teſt being finiſhed at the committee of the whole houſe; I can now give you a perfect account of this ſtate maſter-piece. It was firſt hatched (as almoſt all the miſchiefs of the world have hitherto been) amongſt the great churchmen; and is a project of ſeveral years ſtanding, but found not miniſters bold enough to go through with it, until theſe new ones, who, wanting a better bottom to ſupport them, betook themſelves wholly to this; which is no ſmall undertaking, if you conſider it in its whole extent.

FIRST, To make a diſtinct party from the reſt of the nation of the high epiſcopal men and the old cavaliers; who are to ſwallow the hopes of enjoying all the power and offices of the kingdom; being alſo tempted by the advantage they may receive from overthrowing the act of oblivion; and not a little rejoicing to think, how valiant they ſhould prove, if they could get any to fight the old quarrel over again, now they are poſſeſſed of the arms, forts, and ammunition of the nation.

NEXT, they deſign to have the government of the church ſworn to as unalterable; and ſo tacitly owned to be of divine right; which, though inconſiſtent with the oath of ſupremacy, yet the churchmen eaſily break through all obligations whatſoever, to attain this ſtation; the advantage of which the prelate of Rome hath ſufficiently taught the world.

THEN, in requital to the crown, they declare the government abſolute and arbitrary; and allow monarchy, as well as epiſcopacy, to be jure divino, and not to be bounded or limited by human laws.

AND to ſecure all this, they reſolve to take away the power and opportunity of parliaments to alter any thing in church or ſtate; only leave them as an inſtrument to raiſe money, and to paſs ſuch laws as the court and church ſhall have a mind to; the attempt of any other, how neceſſary ſoever, muſt be no leſs a crime than perjury.

AND as the top-ſtone of the whole fabrick, a pretence ſhall be taken from the jealouſies they themſelves have raiſed, and a real neceſſity from the ſmallneſs of their party, to increaſe and keep up a ſtanding army; and then in due time the cavalier and churchman will be made greater fools, but as arrant ſlaves as the reſt of the nation.

IN order to this, the firſt ſtep was made in the act for regulating corporations, wiſely beginning that, in thoſe leſſer governments, which they meant afterwards to introduce upon the government of the nation; and making them ſwear to a declaration and belief of ſuch propoſitions as they themſelves afterwards, upon debate, were enforced to alter, and could not juſtify in thoſe words *; ſo that many of the wealthieſt, worthieſt, and ſobereſt men, are ſtill kept out of the magiſtracy of thoſe places.

THE next ſtep was in the act of militia †, which went for moſt of the chiefeſt nobility, and gentry, being obliged as lord-lieutenants, deputy-lieutenants, &c. to ſwear to the ſame declaration and belief; with the addition only of theſe words, "in purſuance of ſuch military "commiſſions;" which makes the matter rather worſe than better. Yet this went down ſmoothly, as an oath in faſhion, a teſtimony of loyalty; and none adventuring freely to debate the matter, the humour of the age, like a ſtrong tide, carries wiſe and good men down before it. This act is of a piece; for it eſtabliſheth a ſtanding army by a law, and ſwears us into a military government.

IMMEDIATELY after this, followeth the act of uniformity, by which all the clergy of England are obliged to ſubſcribe, and declare what the corporations, nobility, and gentry had before ſworn; but with this additional clauſe of the militia act omitted. This the clergy readily complied with; for you know, that ſort of men are taught rather to obey than underſtand; and to uſe that learning they have, to juſtify, not to examine what their ſuperiors command. And yet that Bartholomew-day was fatal to our church and religion, in throwing out a very great number of worthy, learned, pious, and orthodox di ines, who could not come up to this, and other things in that act. And it is upon this occaſion worth your knowledge, that ſo great was the zeal in carrying on

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* BY the act for the well governing and regulating of corporations, paſſed in the year 1661, all perſons bearing any office of magiſtracy, place of truſt, or other employment, relating to the government of any city, corporation, borough, &c. were ordered to take the following oath:

"I A. B. do declare and believe, that it is not lawful, upon any pretence whatſoever, to "take arms againſt the king; and that I do abhor that traitorous poſition of taking arms "by his authority againſt his perſon, or againſt thoſe that are commiſſioned by him."

† THE act for ordering the forces in the ſeveral counties of this kingdom.

this

this church affair, and ſo blind was the obedience required, that if you compute the time of the paſſing this act, with the time allowed for the clergy to ſubſcribe the book of Common-Prayer thereby eſtabliſhed; you ſhall plainly find it could not be printed and diſtributed ſo, as one man in forty could have ſeen and read the book they did ſo perfectly aſſent and conſent to *.

But this matter was not compleat until the five-mile act paſſed at Oxford, wherein they take an opportunity to introduce the oath in the terms they would have it †. This was then ſtrongly oppoſed by the lord treaſurer Southampton, lord Wharton, lord Aſhley ‡, and others; not only in the concern of thoſe poor miniſters that were ſo ſeverely handled, but as it was in itſelf a moſt unlawful, and unjuſtifiable oath. However, the zeal of that time againſt all non-conformiſts eaſily paſſed the act.

This act was ſeconded the ſame ſeſſion at Oxford, by another bill in the houſe of Commons, to have impoſed that oath on the whole nation. And the providence, by which it was thrown out, was very remarkable; for Mr. Peregrine Bertie, being newly choſen, was that morning introduced into the houſe by his brother the now Earl of Lindſey, and Sir Thomas Oſborn §, now lord treaſurer, who all three gave their votes againſt that bill; and the numbers were ſo even upon the diviſion, that their three votes carried the queſtion againſt it. But we owe that right to the earl of Lindſey, and the lord treaſurer, as to acknowledge that they have ſince made ample ſatisfaction for whatever offence they gave either the church or court in that vote.

Thus our church became triumphant, and continued ſo for divers years; the diſſenting proteſtant being the only enemy, and therefore only perſecuted; whilſt the papiſts remained undiſturbed, being by the

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* By the act of uniformity of publick prayers, &c. which received the royal aſſent, on the 19th of May, 1662, all parſons, vicars or other miniſters, &c. were ordered to conform to the church of England, before the feaſt of St. Bartholomew, or the 20th of Auguſt following, upon pain of loſing all their eccleſiaſtical preferments, &c. And it is certain, that, "the Com-"mon-Prayer Book, with the alterations and amendments . . . . . made by the convocation, did "not come out of the preſs till a few days before the 24th of Auguſt." See Dr. Calamy's Abridgment of Mr. Baxter's hiſtory of his life and times, ubi ſupra, p. 201.

† By that act, paſſed in the parliament held at Oxford the 9th of October, 1665, and intitled, An act for reſtraining non-conformiſts from inhabiting corporations; the non-conforming miniſters were prohibited, upon a penalty of forty pounds for every offence, to come, unleſs only in paſſing upon the road, within five miles of any city, corporation, borough, town, or place where they had been miniſters, or had preached after the act of uniformity; unleſs they firſt ſubſcribed to the declarations of the act of uniformity, and did take and ſubſcribe the following oath:

"I A. B. do ſwear, that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatſoever to take arms againſt "the king: and that I do abhor that traitorous poſition of taking arms by his authority "againſt his perſon, or againſt thoſe that are commiſſioned by him, in purſuance of ſuch "commiſſions; and that I will not at any time endeavour any alteration of government, "either in church or ſtate."

‡ Anthony Aſhley-Cooper, afterwards earl of Shaftſbury.

§ Sir Thomas Oſborn, created afterwards baron of Kiveton and viſcount Latimer, in 1673; earl of Danby, in 1674; marquis of Carmarthen, in 1689; and duke of Leeds, in 1694.

court thought loyal, and by our great biſhops not dangerous; they differing only in doctrine and fundamentals; but, as to the government of the church, that was, in their religion, in its higheſt exaltation.

This dominion continued unto them, until the lord Clifford, a man of a daring and ambitious ſpirit, made his way to the chief miniſtry of affairs by other and far different meaſures; and took the opportunity of the war with Holland, the king was then engaged in, to propoſe the declaration of indulgence *, that the diſſenters of all ſorts, as well proteſtants as papiſts, might be at reſt, and ſo a vaſt number of people not be made deſperate at home, while the king was engaged with ſo potent an enemy abroad. This was no ſooner propoſed, but the earl of Shaftſbury, a man as daring, but more able, (though of principles and intereſt diametrically oppoſite to the other) preſently cloſed with it; and perhaps the opportunity I have had, by my converſation with them both; who were men of diverſion, and of free and open diſcourſes where they had a confidence; may give you more light into both their deſigns, and ſo by conſequence the aims of their parties, than you will have from any other hand.

My lord Clifford did in expreſs terms tell me one day in private diſcourſe: "That the king, if he would be firm to himſelf, might ſettle what religion he pleaſed, and carry the government to what height he "would. For if men were aſſured in the liberty of their conſcience, "and undiſturbed in their properties, able and upright judges made in "Weſtminſter-hall, to judge the cauſes of meum and tuum; and if, on "the other hand, the fort of Tilbury was finiſhed to bridle the city; "the fort of Plymouth to ſecure the weſt; and arms for 20,000 in each "of theſe; and in Hull, for the northern parts; with ſome addition, "which might be eaſily and undiſcernibly made to the forces now on "foot; there were none that would have either will, opportunity, or "power to reſiſt." But he added withal, "he was ſo ſincere in the "maintenance of property and liberty of conſcience, that if he had his "will, though he ſhould introduce a biſhop of Durham (which was the "inſtance he then made, that ſee being then vacant) of another religion; "yet he would not diſturb any of the church beſide, but ſuffer them to "die away, and not let his change (how haſty ſoever he was in it) overthrow either of thoſe principles, and therefore deſired he might be "thought an honeſt man as to his part of the declaration, for he meant "it really."

The lord Shaftſbury (with whom I had more freedom) I with great aſſurance aſked, "What he meant by the declaration? for it ſeemed "to me (as I then told him) that it aſſumed a power to repeal and ſuſpend all our laws, to deſtroy the church, to overthrow the proteſtant "religion, and to tolerate popery." He replied, all angry, "that he "wondered at my objection, there being not one of theſe in the caſe.

* That declaration bore date, March 17, 1671-2.

"For

" For the king aſſumed no power of repealing laws, or ſuſpending them,
" contrary to the will of his parliament, or people; and not to argue
" with me at that time the power of the king's ſupremacy, which was
" of another nature than that he had in civils, and had been exerciſed
" without exception in this very caſe by his father, grandfather, and
" queen Elizaberh, under the great ſeal to foreign proteſtants, become
" ſubjects of England; not to inſtance in the ſuſpending the execution
" of the two acts of navigation and trade, during both this, and the laſt
" Dutch war, in the ſame words, and upon the ſame neceſſity, and as
" yet without clamour, that ever we heard; but to paſs by all that, this
" was certain, a government could not be ſuppoſed, whether monarchi-
" cal, or of any other ſort, without a ſtanding ſupreme, executive
" power, fully enabled to mitigate, or wholly to ſuſpend, the execution
" of any penal law, in the intervals of the legiſlative power; which
" when aſſembled, there was no doubt but, wherever there lies a nega-
" tive in paſſing of a law, there the addreſs or ſenſe known of either of
" them to the contrary (as for inſtance of either of our two houſes of
" parliament in England) ought to determine that indulgence, and reſtore
" the law to its full execution. For without this, the laws were to no
" purpoſe made, if the prince could annul them at pleaſure; and ſo on
" the other hand, without a power always in being, of diſpenſing upon
" occaſion, was to ſuppoſe a conſtitution extremely imperfect and im-
" practicable; and to cure thoſe with a legiſlative power always in being,
" is, when conſidered, no other than a perfect tyranny.

" As to the church, he conceived the declaration was extremely their
" intereſt; for the narrow bottom they had placed themſelves upon,
" and the meaſures they had proceeded by, ſo contrary to the properties
" and liberties of the nation, muſt needs, in a ſhort time, prove fatal to
" them; whereas this led them into another way, to live peaceably with
" the diſſenting and differing proteſtants, both at home and abroad, and
" ſo by neceſſary and unavoidable conſequences, to become the head of
" them all. For that place is due to the church of England, being in
" favour, and of neareſt approach to the moſt powerful prince of that
" religion, and ſo always had it in their hands to be the interceſſors and
" procurers of the greateſt good and protection that party, throughout
" all chriſtendom, can receive. And thus the archbiſhop of Canterbury
" might become, not only " alterius orbis," but " alterius regionis papa;"
" and all this addition of honour and power attained without the leaſt
" loſs, or diminution of the church; it not being intended that one
" living, dignity, or preferment, ſhould be given to any but thoſe that
" were ſtrictly conformable.

" As to the proteſtant religion, he told me plainly, it was for the
" preſerving of that, and that only, that he heartily joined in the declara-
" tion; for, beſides that, he thought it his duty to have care, in his place
" and ſtation, of thoſe he was convinced were the people of God, and

" feared him; though of different perſuaſions. He alſo knew nothing " elſe but liberty and indulgence, that could poſſibly (as our caſe ſtood) " ſecure the proteſtant religion in England; and he begged me to con- " ſider, if the church of England ſhould attain to a rigid, blind, and un- " diſputed conformity, and that power of our church ſhould come " into the hands of a popiſh prince; which was not a thing ſo impoſſible, " or remote, as not to be apprehended; whether, in ſuch a caſe, would " not all the arms and artillery of the government of the church be " turned againſt the preſent religion of it? And ſhould not all good " proteſtants tremble to think what biſhops ſuch a prince was like to " make, and whom thoſe biſhops would condemn for hereticks, and that " prince might burn. Whereas if this, which is now but a declaration, " might ever, by the experience of it, gain the advantage of becoming " an eſtabliſhed law; the true proteſtant religion would ſtill be kept up " amongſt the cities, towns, and trading places, and the worthieſt and " ſobereſt (if not the greateſt) part of the nobility, and gentry, and " people."

As for the toleratiou of popery, he ſaid, " It was a pleaſant objection, " ſince he could confidently ſay, that the papiſts had no advantage in the " leaſt, by this declaration, that they did not as fully enjoy, and with " leſs noiſe, by the favour of all the biſhops. It was the vanity of the " lord-keeper, that they were named at all; for the whole advantage " was to the diſſenting proteſtants, which were the only men diſturbed " before. And yet he confeſſed to me, that it was his opinion, and al- " ways had been, that the papiſts ought to have no other preſſure laid " upon them, but to be made incapable of office, court, or arms, and " to pay ſo much as might bring them at leaſt to a balance with the pro- " teſtants, for thoſe chargeable offices they are liable unto."

AND concluded with this, " That he deſired me ſeriouſly to weigh, " whether liberty and property were likely to be maintained long, in a " country like ours, where trade is ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the very " being, as well as proſperity of it, and in this age if the world; if ar- " ticles of faith, and matters of religion, ſhould become the only acceſ- " ſible ways to our civil rights."

THUS, Sir, you have perhaps, a better account of the declaration, than you can receive from any other hand; and I could have wiſhed it a longer continuance, and better reception than it had; for the biſhops took ſo great offence at it, that they gave the alarm of popery through the whole nation, and by their emiſſaries the clergy, (who, by the contexture and ſubordination of their government, and their being poſted in every pariſh, have the advantage of a quick diſperſing their orders, and a ſud- den and univerſal inſinuation of whatever they pleaſed) raiſed ſuch a cry, that thoſe good and ſober men, who had really long feared the increaſe and countenance popery had hitherto received, began to believe the biſhops were in earneſt; their eyes opened, though late, and therefore joined

joined in heartily with them; ſo that, at the next meeting of parliament *, the proteſtants intereſt was run ſo high, as an act came up from the commons to the houſe of lords in favour of the diſſenting proteſtants, and had paſſed the lords, but for want of time. Beſides, another excellent act paſſed the royal aſſent for the excluding all papiſts from office †; in the oppoſition to which, the lord treaſurer Clifford fell, and yet, to prevent his ruin, this ſeſſion had the ſpeedier end. Notwithſtanding, the biſhops attained their ends fully; the declaration being cancelled, and the great ſeal being broken off from it; the parliament having paſſed no act in favour of the diſſenters, and yet the ſenſe of both houſes ſufficiently declared againſt all indulgence, but by act of parliament. Having got this point, they uſed it at firſt with ſeeming moderation. There were no general directions given for perſecuting the nonconformiſts; but here and there ſome of the moſt confiding juſtices were made uſe of, to try how they could revive the old perſecution. For, as yet, the zeal raiſed againſt the papiſts was ſo great, that the worthieſt, and ſobereſt, of the epiſcopal party, thought it neceſſary to unite with the diſſenting proteſtants, and not to divide their party, when all their forces were little enough. In this poſture the ſeſſion of parliament, that began October 27, 1673, found matters; which being ſuddenly broken up, did nothing.

THE next ſeſſion, which began January 7, following ‡, the biſhops continued their zeal againſt the papiſts, and ſeemed to carry on, in joining with the country lords, many excellent votes, in order to a bill, as in particular, that the princes of the blood-royal ſhould all marry proteſtants, and many others; but their favour to diſſenting proteſtants was gone, and they attempted a bargain with the country lords, with whom they then joined, not to promote any thing of that nature, except the bill for taking away aſſent and conſent, and renouncing the covenant *.

THIS ſeſſion was no ſooner ended, without doing any thing, but the whole clergy were inſtructed to declare, that there was now no more danger of the papiſts. The fanatick (for ſo they call the diſſenting proteſtant) is again become the only dangerous enemy; and the biſhops had found a Scotch lord, and two new miniſters, or rather great officers of England, who were deſperate and raſh enough to put their maſter's buſineſs upon ſo narrow and weak a bottom; and the old covenanter, Lauderdale †, is become the patron of the church, and has his coach

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* February 4, 1672-3.

† By the "Act for preventing Dangers, which may happen from Popiſh Recuſants," paſſed March 29, 1673, all perſons having any office, or place of truſt, under his majeſty, &c. were obliged to take the oath of allegiance and ſupremacy, &c. and to receive the Sacrament according to the uſage of the church of England, &c. From that time no act was paſſed till the 13th of October 1675.

‡ 1673-4.

* See Dr. Calamy's "Abridgement of Mr. Baxter's Hiſtory of his Life and Times, &c." Vol. I. p. 340. of the 2d edit. London, 1713, in 8vo.

† John Maitland, duke of Lauderdale. He was created baron of Peterſham, and earl of Guilford, in England, in the year 1674.

and table filled with biſhops. The keeper ‡, and the treaſurer, are of a juſt ſize to this affair; for it is a certain rule with the churchmen, to endure (as ſeldom as they can) in buſineſs, men abler than themſelves. But his grace of Scotland was leaſt to be excuſed, of the three; for having fallen from preſbytery, proteſtant religion, and all principles of publick good, and private friendſhip; and become the ſlave of Clifford, to carry on the ruin of all that he had profeſſed to ſupport; does now alſo quit even Clifford's generous principles, and betake himſelf to a ſort of men that never forgive any man the having once been in the right; and ſuch men, who would do the worſt of things by the worſt of means, enſlave their country, and betray them, under the maſk of religion, which they have the publick pay for, and the charge of; ſo ſeething the kid in the mother's milk. Our ſtateſmen and biſhops being now as well agreed, as in old Laud's time, on the ſame principles, with the ſame paſſion to attain their end; they, in the firſt place, give orders to the judges, in all their circuits, to quicken the execution of the laws againſt diſſenters; a new declaration is publiſhed directly contrary to the former; moſt in words againſt the papiſts, but in the ſenſe, and in the cloſe, did fully ſerve againſt both; and, in the execution, it was plain who were meant. A commiſſion, beſides, comes down, directed to the principal gentlemen of each county, to ſeize the eſtates of both papiſts and fanaticks, mentioned in a liſt annexed; wherein, by great miſfortune, or ſkill, the names of papiſts of beſt quality and fortune (and ſo beſt known) were miſtaken, and the commiſſion rendered ineffectual as to them.

Besides this, the great miniſters of ſtate did, in their common publick talk, aſſure the party, that all the places of profit, command, and truſt, ſhould only be given to the old cavaliers; no man that had ſerved, or been of the contrary party, ſhould be left in any of them. And a direction is iſſued to the great miniſters before-mentioned, and ſix or ſeven of the biſhops, to meet at Lambeth-houſe, who were, like the lords of the articles in Scotland, to prepare their compleat model for the enſuing ſeſſion of parliament.

And now comes this memorable ſeſſion of April 13, 1675, than which never any came with more expectation of the court, or dread and apprehenſion of the people. The officers, court-lords, and biſhops, were clearly the major vote in the lords houſe; and they aſſured themſelves to have the commons as much at their diſpoſe, when they reckoned the number of the courtiers, officers, penſioners, increaſed by the addition of the church and cavalier party; beſides the addreſs they had made to men of the beſt quality there, by hopes of honour, great employment, and ſuch things as would take. In a word, the French king's miniſters, who are the great chapmen of the world, did not out-do ours, at this

‡ Sir Heneage Finch, afterwards earl of Nottingham.

time,

time, and yet the over-ruling hand of God has blown upon their politicks, and the nation is eſcaped this ſeſſion, like a bird out of the ſnare of the fowler.

In this ſeſſion, the biſhops wholly laid aſide their zeal againſt popery. The committee of the whole houſe for religion, which the country lords had cauſed to be ſet up again by the example of the former ſeſſions, could hardly get, at any time, a day appointed for their ſitting; and the main thing deſigned for a bill voted in the former ſeſſion, viz. the marrying our prince to none but proteſtants, was rejected, and carried in the negative, by the unanimous votes of the biſhops bench; for I muſt acquaint you, that our great prelates were ſo near an infallibility, that they were always found in this ſeſſion of one mind in the lords houſe, yet the lay lords, not underſtanding from how excellent a principle this proceeded, commonly called them, for that reaſon, the dead weight. And they really proved ſo, in the following buſineſs; for the third day of this ſeſſions, this bill of the teſt was brought into the lords houſe by the earl of Lindſey, lord high-chamberlain, a perſon of great quality, but in this impoſed upon; and received its firſt reading, and appointment for the ſecond, without much oppoſition; the country lords being deſirous to obſerve what weight they put upon it, or how they deſigned to manage it.

At the ſecond reading, the lord-keeper, and ſome other of the court-lords, recommended the bill to the houſe in ſet and elaborate ſpeeches, the keeper calling it a moderate ſecurity to the church and crown; and that no honeſt man could refuſe it; and whoſoever did, gave great ſuſpicion of dangerous and anti-monarchical principles. The other lords declaimed very much upon the rebellion of the late times; the great number of fanaticks; the dangerous principles of rebellion ſtill remaining; carrying the diſcourſe on, as if they meant to trample down the act of oblivion, and all thoſe whoſe ſecurities depended on it. But the earl of Shaftſbury, and ſome other of the country lords, earneſtly preſt that the bill might be laid aſide, and that they might not be engaged in the debate of it; or elſe that that freedom they ſhould be forced to uſe in the neceſſary defence of their opinion, and the preſerving of their laws, rights, and liberties, which this bill would overthrow, might not be miſconſtrued. For there are many things that muſt be ſpoken upon the debate, both concerning church and ſtate, that it was well known they had no mind to hear. Notwithſtanding this, the great officers and biſhops called out for the queſtion of referring the bill to a committee; but the earl of Shaftſbury, a man of great abilities and knowledge in affairs, and one that, in all this variety of changes of this laſt age, was never known to be either bought or frighted out of his publick principles, at large opened the miſchievous and ill deſigns, and conſequences of the bill; which, as it was brought in, required all officers of church and ſtate, and all members of both houſes of parliament, to take this oath following.

"I A. B. do declare, that it is not lawful, upon any pretence whatſo-
" ever, to take up arms againſt the king; and that I do abhor that
" traitorous poſition of taking arms by his authority, againſt his
" perſon, or againſt thoſe that are commiſſioned by him in purſu-
" ance of ſuch commiſſion; and I do ſwear, that I will not at any
" time endeavour the alteration of the government, either in church
" or ſtate. So help me God."

THE earl of Shaftſbury, and other lords, ſpake with ſuch convincing reaſon, that all the lords, who were at liberty from court engagements, reſolved to oppoſe, to the uttermoſt, a bill of ſo dangerous conſequence; and the debate laſted five ſeveral days before it was committed to a committee of the whole houſe; which hardly ever happened to any bill before. All this, and the following debates, were managed chiefly by the lords, whoſe names you will find to the following proteſtations; the firſt whereof was as followeth:

" WE, whoſe names are under-written, being peers of this realm, do,
" according to our rights, and the antient uſage of parliaments, declare,
" that the queſtion having been put whether the bill, entitled, " An act
" to prevent the dangers which may ariſe from perſons diſaffected to the
" government," doth ſo far intrench upon the privileges of this houſe,
" that it ought therefore to be caſt out; it being reſolved in the nega-
" tive, we do humbly conceive, that any bill, which impoſeth an oath
" upon the peers with a penalty, as this doth, that upon the refuſal of
" that oath, they ſhall be made incapable of ſitting and voting in this
" houſe; as it is a thing unprecedented in former times, ſo is it, in our
" humble opinion, the higheſt invaſion of the liberties and privileges
" of the peerage, that poſſibly may be, and moſt deſtructive of the free-
" dom which they ought to enjoy as members of parliament; becauſe
" the privilege of ſitting and voting in parliament is an honour they
" have by birth, and a right ſo inherent in them, and inſeparable from
" them, as that nothing can take it away, but what by the law of the
" land muſt withal take away their lives, and corrupt their blood; upon
" which ground we do here enter our diſſent from that vote, and our
" proteſtation againſt it."

BUCKINGHAM	WINCHESTER
BRIDGEWATER	SALISBURY
BEDFORD	MOHUN
DORSET	STAMFORD
AILSBURY	HALLIFAX
BRISTOL	DE LA MER
DENBIGH	EURE
PAGITT	SHAFTSBURY
HOLLES	CLARENDON

PETER

PETER
HOWARD of
BERKS

GREY ROLL
SAY and SEAL
WHARTON.

THE next proteſtation was againſt the vote of committing the bill, in the words following:

"THE queſtion being put, whether the bill, intitled, "An Act to pre-
"vent the dangers which may ariſe from perſons diſaffected to the go-
"vernment," ſhould be committed; it being carried in the affirmative,
"and we, after ſeveral days debate, being in no meaſure ſatisfied, but
"ſtill apprehending that this bill doth not only ſubvert the privileges and
"birth-right of the peers, by impoſing an oath upon them with the pe-
"nalty of loſing their places in parliament, but alſo, as we humbly con-
"ceive, ſtrike at the very root of government; it being neceſſary to all
"government to have freedom of votes and debates in thoſe who have
"power to alter and make laws; and beſides, the expreſs words of this
"bill obliging every man to abjure all endeavours to alter the govern-
"ment in the church, without regard to any thing that rules of prudence
"in the government, or chriſtian compaſſion to proteſtant diſſenters, or
"the neceſſity of affairs at any time, ſhall or may require; upon theſe
"conſiderations, we humbly conceive it to be of dangerous conſequence
"to have any bill of this nature ſo much as committed, and do enter our
"diſſents from that vote, and proteſtation againſt it."

BUCKINGAM
WINTON
SALISBURY
DENBIGH
BRISTOL
HOWARD of
BERKS

CLARENDON
STAMFORD
SHAFTSBURY
WHARTON
MOHUN
DE LA MER.

WHICH proteſtation was no ſooner entered and ſubſcribed the next day, but the great officers and biſhops raiſed a ſtorm againſt the lords that had ſubſcribed it; endeavouring not only ſome ſevere proceedings againſt their perſons, if they had found the houſe would have borne it, but alſo to have taken away the very liberty of entering proteſtations with reaſons. But that was defended with ſo great ability, learning, and reaſon, by the lord Holles, that they quitted the attempt; and the debate ran for ſome hours, either wholly to raze the proteſtation out of the books, or at leaſt ſome part of it; the expreſſion of "chriſtian compaſſion to proteſtant diſ-
"ſenters," being that, which gave them moſt offence. But both theſe ways were ſo diſagreeable to the honour and privilege of the houſe, and the latter to common ſenſe and right; that they deſpaired of carrying it,

and contented themſelves with having voted, " that the reaſons given, in " the ſaid proteſtation, did reflect upon the honour of the houſe, and " were of dangerous conſequence." And I cannot here forbear to mention the worth and honour of that noble lord Holles, ſuitable to all his former life; that whilſt the debate was at the height, and the proteſting lords in danger of the Tower, he begged the houſe to give him leave to put his name to that proteſt, and take his fortune with thoſe lords, becauſe his ſickneſs had forced him out of the houſe the day before; ſo that, not being at the queſtion, he could not, by the rules of the houſe, ſign it. This vote againſt thoſe twelve lords begat the next day the following proteſtation, ſigned by one and twenty:

" WHEREAS it is the undoubted privilege of each peer in parliament, " when a queſtion is paſt contrary to his vote and judgment, to enter " his proteſtation againſt it; and that, in purſuance thereof, the bill, in- " titled, " An Act to prevent the dangers which may ariſe from perſons " diſaffected to the government," being conceived by ſome lords to be of " ſo dangerous a nature, as that it was not fit to receive the countenance " of a commitment; thoſe lords did proteſt againſt the commitment of " the ſaid bill; and, the houſe having taken exceptions at ſome expreſ- " ſions in their proteſtation, thoſe lords, who were preſent at the de- " bate, did all of them ſeverally and voluntarily declare, that they had " no intention to reflect upon any member, much leſs upon the whole " houſe; which, as is humbly conceived, was more than in ſtrictneſs " did conſiſt with that abſolute freedom of proteſting, which is inſepa- " rable from every member of this houſe, and was done by them merely " out of their great reſpect to the houſe, and their earneſt deſire to give " all ſatisfaction concerning themſelves, and the clearneſs of their inten- " tions; yet the houſe, not ſatisfied with this their declaration, but pro- " ceeding to a vote, " That the reaſons given in the ſaid proteſtation do " reflect upon the honour of the houſe, and are of dangerous conſe- " quence;" which is, in our humble opinion, a great diſcountenancing " of the very liberty of proteſting; we, whoſe names are underwritten, " conceive ourſelves and the whole houſe of peers extremely concerned " that this great wound ſhould be given (as we humbly apprehend) to " ſo eſſential a privilege of the whole peerage of this realm, as their li- " berty of proteſting; do now (according to our unqueſtionable right) " make uſe of the ſame liberty to enter this our diſſent from, and pro- " teſtation againſt, the ſaid vote:

BUCKS	DENBIGH
WINTON	BERKS
BEDFORD	CLARENDON
DORSET	AILSBURY
SALISBURY	SHAFTSBURY
BRIDGEWATER	SAY and SEAL
	HALLIFAX

HALLIFAX
AUDLEY
FITZWALTER
EURE
WHARTON
MOHUN
HOLLES
DE LA MER
GREY ROLL.

AFTER this bill being committed to a committee of the whole houſe, the firſt thing inſiſted upon by the lords, againſt the bill, was, that there ought to be paſſed ſome previous votes to ſecure the rights of peerage, and privilege of parliament, before they entered upon the debate or amendments of ſuch a bill as this. And at laſt two previous votes were obtained, which I need not here ſet down, becauſe the next proteſtation hath them both in terminis:

"WHEREAS upon the debate on the bill, intitled, "An Act to prevent "the dangers which may ariſe from perſons diſaffected to the govern-"ment," it was ordered by the houſe of peers, the 30th of April laſt, "that no oath ſhould be impoſed, by any bill, or otherwiſe, upon the "peers, with a penalty, in caſe of refuſal, to loſe their places, or votes "in parliament, or liberty to debate therein: and whereas alſo, upon "debate of the ſame, it was ordered, the third of this inſtant May, "that there ſhall be nothing in this bill, which ſhall extend to deprive "either of the houſes of parliament, or any of their members, of their "juſt, antient freedom and privilege of debating any matter or buſineſs, "which ſhall be propounded or debated in either of the ſaid houſes, or "at any conference or committee of both, or either of the ſaid houſes of "parliament; or touching the repeal, or alteration of any old, or pre-"paring any new laws; or the redreſſing any publick grievance; but "that the ſaid members of either of the ſaid houſes, and the aſſiſtants of "the houſe of peers, and every of them, ſhall have the ſame freedom of "ſpeech, and all other privileges whatſoever, as they had before the "making of this act; both which orders were paſſed as previous di-"rections unto the committee of the whole houſe, to whom the ſaid "bill was committed, to the end that nothing ſhould remain in the ſaid "bill, which might any ways tend towards the depriving of either of "the houſes of parliament, or any of their members, of their antient "freedom of debates, or votes, or other privileges whatſoever; yet the "houſe being pleaſed, upon the report from the committee, to paſs a "vote, That all perſons who have, or ſhall have right to ſit and vote in "either houſe of parliament, ſhould be added to the firſt enacted clauſe "in the ſaid bill, whereby an oath is to be impoſed upon them as men-"bers of either houſe; which vote, we whoſe names are underwritten, "being peers of the realm, do humbly conceive, is not agreeable to the "ſaid two previous orders; and it having been humbly offered and in-"ſiſted upon by divers of us, that the proviſo in the late act, intitled, "An act for preventing dangers that may happen from popiſh recuſants," "might be added to the bill depending, whereby the peerage of every

" peer of this realm, and all their privileges, might be preſerved in this " bill, as fully as in the ſaid late act; yet the houſe not pleaſing to ad- " mit of the ſaid proviſo, but proceeding to the paſſing of the ſaid vote; " we do humbly, upon the grounds aforeſaid, and according to our " undoubted right, enter this our diſſent from, and proteſtation againſt " the ſame:

BUCKS	DENBIGH
BEDFORD	DORSET
WINTON	SHAFTSBURY
SALISBURY	WHARTON
BERKS	EURE
BRIDGEWATER	DE LA MER
STAMFORD	PAGITT
CLARENDON	MOHUN.

THIS was their laſt proteſtation; for, after this, they altered their method, and reported not the votes of the committee, and parts of the bill to the houſe, as they paſſed them; but took the ſame order as is obſerved in other bills, not to report unto the houſe, until they had gone through with the bill, and ſo report all the amendments together. This they thought a way of more diſpatch, and which did prevent all proteſtations, until it came to the houſe; for the votes of a committee, though of the whole houſe, are not thought of that weight, as that there ſhould be allowed the entering a diſſent of them, or proteſtation againſt them.

THE bill being read over at the committee, the lord keeper objected againſt the form of it, and deſired that he might put it in another method; which was eaſily allowed him, that being not the diſpute. But it was obſervable the hand of God was upon them in this whole affair; their chariot-wheels were taken off, they drew heavily; a bill ſo long deſigned, prepared, and of that moment to all their affairs, had hardly a ſenſible compoſure.

THE firſt part of the bill that was fallen upon, was, " whether there " ſhould be an oath at all in the bill;" and this was the only part the court-party defended with reaſon. For, the whole bill being to enjoin an oath, the houſe might reject it, but the committee was not to deſtroy it. Yet the lord Hallifax did with that quickneſs, learning, and elegance, which are inſeparable from all his diſcourſes, make appear, that as there really was no ſecurity to any ſtate by oaths; ſo alſo no private perſon, much leſs ſtates-man, would ever order his affairs as relying on it; no man would ever ſleep with open doors, or unlockt-up treaſure or plate, ſhould all the town be ſworn not to rob; ſo that the uſe of multiplying oaths had been moſt commonly to exclude or diſturb ſome honeſt conſcientious men, who would never have prejudiced the government. It was alſo inſiſted on by that lord and others, that the oath, impoſed

poſed by the bill, contained three clauſes; the two former aſſertory, and the laſt promiſſory; and that it was worthy the conſideration of the biſhops, whether aſſertory oaths, which were properly appointed to give teſtimony of a matter of fact, whereof a man is capable to be fully aſſured by the evidence of his ſenſes, be lawful to be made uſe of to confirm or invalidate doctrinal propoſitions; and whether that legiſlative power, which impoſes ſuch an oath, does not neceſſarily aſſume to itſelf an infallibility? And, as for promiſſory oaths, it was deſired that thoſe learned prelates would conſider the opinion of Grotius, "De jure belli & pacis," who ſeems to make it plain, that thoſe kind of oaths are forbidden by our Saviour Chriſt, Matt. v. 34, 37 *; and whether it would not become the fathers of the church, when they have well weighed that and other places of the New Teſtament, to be more tender in multiplying oaths, than hitherto the great men of the church have been? But the biſhops carried the point, and an oath was ordered by the major vote.

THE next thing in conſideration, was about the perſons that ſhould be enjoined to take this oath; and thoſe were to be "all ſuch as enjoyed "any beneficial office or employment, eccleſiaſtical, civil or military;" and no farther went the debate for ſome hours, until at laſt the lord-keeper riſes up, and with an eloquent oration, deſires to add privy-counſellors, juſtices of the peace, and members of both houſes; the two former particularly mentioned only to uſher in the latter, which was ſo directly againſt the two previous votes; the firſt of which was enrolled amongſt the ſtanding orders of the houſe, that it wanted a man of no leſs aſſurance in his eloquence to propoſe it. And he was driven hard, when he was forced to tell the houſe, that they were maſters of their own orders, and interpretation of them.

THE next conſideration, at the committee, was the oath itſelf; and it was deſired by the country lords that it might be clearly known, whether it were meant all for an oath, or ſome of it for a declaration, and ſome an oath? If the latter, then it was deſired it might be diſtinctly parted; and that the declaratory part ſhould be ſubſcribed by itſelf, and not ſworn. There was no ſmall pains taken by the lord-keeper and the biſhops to prove that the two firſt parts were only a declaration, and not an oath. And though it was replied, that to declare upon one's oath, or to abhor upon one's oath, is the ſame thing with, I do ſwear; yet there was ſome difficulty to obtain the dividing of them, and that the declaratory part ſhould be only ſubſcribed, and the reſt ſworn to.

* Notandum hic eſt obiter, quod in Chriſti præceptis, & apud Jacobum de non jurando dicitur, proprie non ad aſſertorium juramentum, cujus apud Paulum apoſtolum exempla extant aliquot, ſed ad promiſſorium futuri incerti pertinere. Oſtendit hoc evidenter oppoſitio illa in verbis Chriſti: "Audiſtis dictum antiquis, non pejerabis, ſed reddes Domino juramentum. Ego vero "dico vobis, ne jurate omnino." Et ratio quam Jacobus adjicit: μὴ εἰς ὑπόκρισιν πέσητε, id eſt "ne fallaces inveniamini." Nam eum ſenſum vox ὑπόκρισεως apud Helleniſtas habet . . . . . Idem evincit illud in Chriſti verbis ἔστω δὲ λόγος ὑμων ναὶ ναὶ, οὒ, οὔ, quod ſic Jacobus explicat, ἤτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ, καὶ τὸ οὒ οὔ, ... Nam prius ναὶ & οὒ promiſſum ſignificat, poſterius ejus implementum, &c. De jure belli & pacis, lib. II. cap. xiii. § 21.

THE perſons being determined, and this diviſion agreed to; the next thing was the parts of the declaration; wherein the firſt was, "I A. B. "do declare, that it is not lawful, upon any pretence whatſoever, to "take up arms againſt the king." This was liable to great objections; for it was ſaid, it might introduce a great change of government, to oblige all the men in great truſt in England to declare that exact boundary and extent of the oath of allegiance, and enforce ſome things to be ſtated, that are much better involved in generals, and peradventure are not capable of another way of expreſſion, without great wrong on the one ſide or the other. There is a law of 25th Edward III. that "arms "ſhall not be taken up againſt the king, and that it is treaſon to do ſo;" and it is a very juſt and reaſonable law. But it is an idle queſtion at beſt, to aſk, "whether arms in any caſe can be taken up againſt a lawful "prince;" becauſe it neceſſarily brings, in the debate, in every man's mind, how there can be a diſtinction then left between abſolute and bounded monarchies, if monarchs have only the fear of God, and no fear of human reſiſtance to reſtrain them. And it was farther urged, that if the chance of human affairs in future ages ſhould give the French king a juſt title and inveſtiture in the crown of England, and he ſhould avowedly own a deſign by force to change the religion, and make his government here as abſolute as in France, by the extirpation of the nobility, gentry, and principal citizens of the proteſtant party; whether in ſuch, or like caſes, this declaration will be a ſervice to the government, as it is now eſtabliſhed. Nay, and it was farther ſaid, that they overthrow the government, that propoſe to place any part of it above the fear of man. For, in our Engliſh government, and all bounded monarchies, where the prince is not abſolute, there every individual ſubject is under the fear of the king and his people; either for breaking the peace, or diſturbing the common intereſt that every man hath in it; for if he invades the perſon or right of his prince, he invades his whole people, who have bound up in him, and derive from him, all their liberty, property, and ſafety; as alſo the prince himſelf is under the fear of breaking that golden chain and contexture between him and his people, by making his intereſt contrary to that they juſtly and rightly claim. And therefore neither our anceſtors, nor any other country free like ours, whilſt they preſerved their liberties, did ever ſuffer any mercenary or ſtanding guards to their prince; but took care that his ſafety ſhould be in them, as theirs was in him.

THOUGH theſe were the objections to this head, yet they were but lightly touched, and not fully inſiſted upon, until the debate of the ſecond head, where the ſcope of the deſign was opened clearer, and more diſtinct to every man's capacity.

THE ſecond was, "And that I do abhor that traitorous poſition of "taking arms by his authority againſt his perſon." To this was objected, that if by this be meant an explanation of the oath of allegiance, to leave men without pretence to oppoſe where the individual perſon of the

king is; then it was to be conſidered, that the poſition, as it is here ſet down, is univerſal; and yet, in moſt caſes, the poſition is not to be abhorred by honeſt or wiſe men. For there is but one caſe, and that never like to happen again, where this poſition is in danger to be traitorous, which was the caſe of the Long-parliament, made perpetual by the king's own act, by which the government was perfectly altered, and made inconſiſtent with itſelf; but it is to be ſuppoſed the crown hath ſufficient warning, and full power to prevent the falling again into that danger. But the other caſes are many, and ſuch as may every day occur, wherein this poſition is ſo far from traitorous, that it would prove both neceſſary and our duty. The famous inſtance of Henry VI, who, being a ſoft and weak prince, when taken priſoner by his couſin Edward IV, that pretended to the crown, and the great earl of Warwick, was carried in their armies; gave what orders and commiſſions they pleaſed; and yet all thoſe, that were loyal to him, adhered to his wife and ſon; fought in a pitched battle againſt him in perſon; and retook him. This was directly "taking up arms againſt his perſon, and againſt thoſe that were "commiſſioned by him:" and yet to this day no man hath ever blamed them, or thought but that, if they had done otherwiſe, they had betrayed their prince. The great caſe of Charles VI. of France, who being of a weak and crazy brain, yet governed by himſelf, or rather by his wife, a woman of a paſſionate and heady humour, that hated her ſon the Dauphin, a vigorous and brave prince, and paſſionately loved her daughter; ſo that ſhe eaſily (being preſſed by the victory of Henry V. of England) complied to ſettle the crown of France upon him, to marry her daughter to him, and own his right, contrary to the Salique law. This was directly oppoſed with arms and force by the Dauphin and all good Frenchmen, even in his father's life-time. A third inſtance is that of king James of bleſſed memory; who, when he was a child, was ſeized and taken priſoner, by thoſe, who were juſtly thought no friends to his crown or ſafety. And if the caſe ſhould be put, that a future king of England, of the ſame temper with Henry VI, or Charles VI. of France, ſhould be taken priſoner by Spaniards, Dutch, or French, whoſe overgrowing power ſhould give them thoughts of vaſt empire, and ſhould, with the perſon and commiſſion of the king, invade England for a conqueſt; were it not ſuitable to our loyalty to join with the ſon of that king, for the defence of his father's crown and dignity, even againſt his perſon and commiſſion? In all theſe and the like caſes, it was not juſtified, but that the ſtrict letter of the law might be otherwiſe conſtrued; and when wiſely conſidered, fit it ſhould be ſo; yet that it was not ſafe either for the kingdom, or perſon of the king and his crown, that it ſhould be in expreſs words ſworn againſt; for if we ſhall forſwear all diſtinctions, which ill men have made ill uſe of, either in rebellion or hereſy, we muſt extend the oath to all the particulars of divinity and politicks. To this the aged biſhop of Wincheſter* replied, that "to take up arms, in ſuch caſes, is

* George Morley. He was then 78 years old.

" not againſt, but for the perſon of the king;" but his lordſhip was told, that he might then as well, nay much better, have left it upon the old oath of allegiance, than made ſuch a wide gap in this new declaration.

THE third and laſt part of the declaration was, " or againſt thoſe that " are commiſſioned by him." Here the maſk was plainly plucked off, and arbitrary government appeared bare-faced, and a ſtanding army to be eſtabliſhed by act of parliament. For it was ſaid by ſeveral of the lords, that, if whatever is by the king's commiſſion be not oppoſed by the king's authority, then a ſtanding army is law, whenever the king pleaſes; and yet the king's commiſſion was never thought ſufficient to protect, or juſtify any man, where it is againſt his authority, which is the law. This allowed, alters the whole law of England, in the moſt eſſential and fundamental parts of it; and makes the whole law of property to become arbitrary, and without effect, whenever the king pleaſes.

FOR inſtance, if in ſuit with a great favourite, a man recovers houſe and lands, and by courſe of law be put into poſſeſſion by the ſheriff; and afterwards a warrant is obtained by the intereſt of the perſon to command ſome ſoldiers of the ſtanding army to take the poſſeſſion, and deliver it back; in ſuch a caſe, the man in poſſeſſion may juſtify to defend himſelf, and killing thoſe, who ſhall violently endeavour to enter his houſe. The party, whoſe houſe is invaded, " takes up arms by the king's " authority againſt thoſe who are commiſſioned by him." And it is the ſame caſe, if the ſoldiers had been commiſſioned to defend the houſe againſt the ſheriff, when he firſt endeavoured to take poſſeſſion according to law. Neither could any order or commiſſion of the king's put a ſtop to the ſheriff, if he had done his duty in raiſing the whole force of that county to put the law in execution; neither can the court, from whom that order proceeds, (if they obſerve their oaths and duty) put any ſtop to the execution of the law in ſuch a caſe, by any command or commiſſion from the king whatſoever; nay, all the guards and ſtanding forces in England cannot be ſecured by any commiſſion from being a direct riot and unlawful aſſembly, unleſs in time of open war and rebellion. And it is not out of the way to ſuppoſe, that if any king hereafter ſhall, contrary to the Petition of Right, demand and levy money by privy ſeal, or otherwiſe, and cauſe ſoldiers to enter and diſtrain for ſuch-like illegal taxes; that in ſuch a caſe any man may by law defend his houſe againſt them; and yet this is of the ſame nature with the former, and againſt the words of the declaration. Theſe inſtances may ſeem ſomewhat rough, and not with the uſual reverence towards the crown; but they alledged, they were to be excuſed, when all was concerned; and without ſpeaking thus plain, it is refuſed to be underſtood; and, however happy we are now, either in the preſent prince, or thoſe we have in proſpect, yet the ſuppoſitions are not extravagant, when we conſider kings are but men, and compaſſed with more temptations than others;

and, as the Earl of Saliſbury, who ſtood like a rock of nobility, and Engliſh principles, excellently replied to the lord-keeper, who was pleaſed to term them remote inſtances; that they would not hereafter prove ſo, when this declaration had made the practice of them juſtifiable.

THESE arguments enforced the lords for the bill, to a change of this part of the declaration; ſo that they agreed the ſecond and third parts of it ſhould run thus: "And I do abhor that traitorous poſition of taking "arms by his authority againſt his perſon, or againſt thoſe that are "commiſſioned by him according to law, in time of rebellion or war, "acting in purſuance of ſuch commiſſion." Which mends the matter very little; for if they mean the king's authority, and his lawful commiſſion, to be two things, and ſuch as are capable of oppoſition; then it is as dangerous to the liberties of the nation, as when it ran in the former words, and we are only cheated by new phraſing of it. But if they underſtand them to be one and the ſame thing, as really and truly they are; then we are only to abhor the treaſon of the poſition of taking arms by the king's authority againſt the king's authority, becauſe it is nonſenſe, and not practicable. And ſo they had done little but confeſſed, that all the clergy, and many other perſons, have been forced, by former acts of this preſent parliament, to make this declaration in other words, that now are found ſo far from being juſtifiable, that they are directly contrary to Magna Charta, our properties, and the eſtabliſhed law and government of the nation.

THE next thing in courſe was the oath itſelf, againſt which the objection lay ſo plain and ſo ſtrong at the firſt entrance, viz. That there was no care taken of the doctrine, but only the diſcipline of the church. The papiſts need not ſcruple the taking this oath; for epiſcopacy remains in its greateſt luſtre, though the popiſh religion was introduced; but the king's ſupremacy is juſtled aſide by this oath, and makes better room for an eccleſiaſtical one. Inſomuch that, with this and much more, they were enforced to change their oath, and the next day bring it in as followeth:

"I do ſwear, that I will not endeavour to alter the proteſtant religion, "or the government either of church or ſtate."

BY this they thought they had ſalved all, and now began to call their oath, "A ſecurity for the proteſtant religion, and the only good deſign "to prevent popery," if we ſhould have a popiſh prince. But the country lords wondered at their confidence in this, ſince they had never thought of it before; and had been, but the laſt preceding day of the debate, by pure ſhame, compelled to this addition. For it was not unknown to them, that ſome of the biſhops themſelves had told ſome of the Roman catholic lords of the houſe, that "care had been taken that "it might be ſuch an oath as might not bear upon them." But let it be whatever they would have it, yet the country lords thought the addition

tion was unreaſonable, and of as dangerous conſequence as the reſt of the oath. And it was not to be wondered at, if the addition of the beſt things, wanting the authority of an expreſs divine inſtitution, ſhould make an oath not to endeavour to alter, juſt ſo much worſe by the addition. For, as the earl of Shaftſbury very well urged, that it is a far different thing to believe, or to be fully perſuaded of the truth of the doctrine of our church, and to ſwear never to endeavour to alter; which laſt muſt be utterly unlawful, unleſs you place an infallibility either in the church or yourſelf; you being otherwiſe obliged to alter, whenever a clearer or better light comes to you. And he deſired leave to aſk, where are the boundaries, or where ſhall we find how much is meant by the proteſtant religion?

THE lord-keeper, thinking he had now got an advantage, with his uſual eloquence, deſires, "that it might not be told in Gath, nor pub-"liſhed in the ſtreets of Aſkalon," that a lord of ſo great parts and eminence, and profeſſing himſelf for the church of England, ſhould not know what is meant by the proteſtant religion! This was ſeconded with great pleaſantneſs by divers of the lords the biſhops. But the biſhop of Wincheſter, and ſome others of them, were pleaſed to condeſcend to inſtruct that lord, that the proteſtant religion was comprehended in XXXIX articles, the liturgy, the catechiſm, the homilies, and the canons.

To this the earl of Shaftſbury replied, that he begged ſo much charity of them to believe, that he knew the proteſtant religion ſo well, and was ſo confirmed in it, that he hoped he ſhould burn for the witneſs of it, if Providence ſhould call him to it. But he might perhaps think ſome things not neceſſary, that they accounted eſſential; nay, he might think ſome things not true, or agreeable to the ſcripture, that they might call doctrines of the church. Beſides, when he was to ſwear "never to "endeavour to alter," it was certainly neceſſary to know "how far the "juſt extent of this oath was." But ſince they had told him that the proteſtant religion was in thoſe five tracts; he had ſtill to aſk, whether they meant thoſe whole tracts were the proteſtant religion; or only that the proteſtant religion was contained in all thoſe, but that every part of theſe was not the proteſtant religion?

IF they meant the former of theſe, then he was extemely in the dark to find the doctrine of predeſtination, in the 17th and 18th articles, to be owned by ſo few great doctors of the church, and to find the 19th article to define the church directly, as the Independents do. Beſides, the 20th article, ſtating the authority of the church, is very dark; and either contradicts itſelf, or ſays nothing, or what is contrary to the known laws of the land. Beſides, ſeveral other things in the XXXIX articles have been preached and writ againſt, by men of great favour, power, and preferment, in the church.

HE humbly conceived the liturgy was not ſo ſacred, being made by men the other day, and thought to be more differing from the diſſenting pro-

proteſtants, and leſs eaſy to be complied with, upon the advantage of a pretence well known unto us all, of making alterations as might the better unite us; inſtead whereof, there is ſcarce one alteration but widens the breach. And no ordination allowed by it here, (as it now ſtands laſt reformed in the act of uniformity) but what is epiſcopal; inſomuch that a popiſh prieſt is capable, when converted, of any church-preferment, without re-ordination; but no proteſtant miniſter not epiſcopally ordained but is required to be re-ordained; as much as in us lies unchurching all the foreign proteſtants that have not biſhops; though the contrary was both allowed and practiſed, from the beginning of the Reformation till the time of that act, and ſeveral biſhops made of ſuch as were never ordained prieſts by biſhops. Moreover, the uncharitableneſs of it was ſo much againſt the intereſt of the crown and church of England, (caſting off the dependency of the whole proteſtant party abroad) that it would have been bought by the pope and the French king at a vaſt ſum of money; and it is difficult to conceive ſo great an advantage fell to them merely by chance, and without their help. So that he thought to endeavour to alter and reſtore the liturgy to what it was in queen Elizabeth's days, might conſiſt with his being a very good proteſtant.

As to the catechiſm, he really thought it might be mended; and durſt declare to them, it was not well that there was not a better made.

For the homilies, he thought there might be a better book made; and the third homily, of "repairing and keeping clean of churches," might be omitted.

What is yet ſtranger than all this, the canons of our church are directly the old popiſh canons, which are ſtill in force, and no other; which will appear, if you turn to the ſtat. 25 Henry VIII. cap. 19. confirmed and received by 1 Eliz. where all thoſe canons are eſtabliſhed, until an alteration ſhould be made by the king, in purſuance of that act; which thing was attempted by Edward VI, but not perfected, and let alone ever ſince; for what reaſons, the lords the biſhops could beſt tell. And it was very hard to be obliged by oath "not to endeavour to "alter either the Engliſh Common-Prayer-Book, or the canon of the "maſs."

But if they meant the latter, that the proteſtant religion is contained in all thoſe, but that every part of thoſe is not the proteſtant religion; then he apprehended it might be in the biſhops power to declare, "ex "poſt facto," what is the proteſtant religion or not, or elſe they muſt leave it to every man to judge for himſelf, what parts of thoſe books are or are not; and then their oath had been much better let alone.

Much of this nature was ſaid by that lord and others; and the great officers and biſhops were ſo hard put to it, that they ſeemed willing and convinced to admit of an expedient.

The lord Wharton, an old and expert parliament-man, of eminent piety and abilities, beſides a great friend to the proteſtant religion, and intereſt

intereſt of England, offered, as a cure to the whole oath, and what might make it paſs in all the three parts of it, without any farther debate; the addition of theſe words, at the latter end of the oath, viz. "as "the ſame is, or ſhall be eſtabliſhed by act of parliament." But this was not endured at all; when the lord Grey of Rolſton, a worthy and true Engliſh lord, offered another expedient; which was the addition of theſe words, "by force or fraud," to the beginning of the oath; and then it would run thus, "I do ſwear not to endeavour, by force or fraud, "to alter." This was alſo a cure that would have paſſed the whole oath, and ſeemed as if it would have carried the whole houſe; the duke of York, and biſhop of Rocheſter, both ſeconding it; but the lord-treaſurer, who had privately before conſented to it, ſpeaking againſt it, gave the word and ſign to that party; and it being put to the queſtion, the major vote anſwered all arguments, and the lord Grey's propoſition was laid aſide.

HAVING thus carried the queſtion, relying upon their ſtrength of votes, taking advantage that thoſe expedients that had been offered, extended to the whole oath, though but one of the three clauſes in the oath had been debated, the other two not mentioned at all; they attempted ſtrongly, at nine of the clock at night, to have the whole oath put to the queſtion; and though it was reſolutely oppoſed by the lord Mohun, a lord of great courage and reſolution in the publick intereſt, and one whoſe own perſonal merits, as well as his father's, gave him a juſt title to the beſt favours of the court; yet they were not diverted, but by as great a diſorder as ever was ſeen in that houſe, proceeding from the rage thoſe unreaſonable proceedings had cauſed in the country lords; they ſtanding up together, and crying out with ſo loud a continued voice, Adjourn, that when ſilence was obtained, fear did what reaſon could not do, cauſe the queſtion to be put only upon the firſt clauſe, concerning the proteſtant religion, to which the biſhops deſired might be added, "as it is now eſtabliſhed." And one of the eminenteſt of thoſe who were for the bill, added the words, "by law." So that, as it was paſſed, it ran, "I A. B. do ſwear, that I will not endeavour to alter the "proteſtant religion, now by law eſtabliſhed in the church of Eng-"land."

AND here obſerve the words, "by law," do directly take in the canons, though the biſhops had never mentioned them.

AND now comes the conſideration of the latter part of the oath, which comprehends theſe two clauſes, viz. "nor the government either "in church or ſtate," wherein the church came firſt to be conſidered. And it was objected by the lords againſt the bill, that it was not agreeable to the king's crown and dignity, to have his ſubjects ſworn to the government of the church equally as to himſelf; that for the kings of England to ſwear to maintain the church, was a different thing from enjoining all his officers, and both his houſes of parliament, to ſwear to them; it would be well underſtood, before the bill paſſed, what the "govern-

" government of the church" (we are to ſwear to) is, and what the boundaries of it; whether it derives no power nor authority, nor the exerciſe of any power, authority, or function, but from the king, as head of the church, and from God, as through him, as all his other officers do.

FOR no church or religion can juſtify itſelf to the government, but the ſtate religion, that owns an entire dependency on, and is but a branch of it; or the independent congregations, whilſt they claim no other power, but the excluſion of their own members from their particular communion; and endeavour not to ſet up a kingdom of Chriſt to their own uſe, in this world, whilſt our Saviour hath told us, that " his kingdom is not " of it." For otherwiſe there ſhould be " imperium in imperio," and two diſtinct ſupreme powers inconſiſtent with each other, in the ſame place, and over the ſame perſons. The biſhops alledged that prieſthood, and the power thereof, and the authorities belonging thereunto, were derived immediately from Chriſt; but that the licence of exerciſing that authority and power in any country, is derived from the civil magiſtrate. To which was replied, that it was a dangerous thing to ſecure, by oath and act of parliament, thoſe in the exerciſe of an authority and power in the king's country, and over his ſubjects, which being received from Chriſt himſelf, cannot be altered, or limited, by the king's laws; and that this was directly to ſet the mitre above the crown. And it was farther offered, that this oath was the greateſt attempt that had been made againſt the king's ſupremacy ſince the Reformation; for the king, in parliament, may alter, diminiſh, enlarge, or take away, any biſhoprick; he may take any part of a dioceſe, or a whole dioceſe, and put them under deans, or other perſons. For if this be not lawful, but that epiſcopacy ſhould be " jure divino," the maintaining the government, as it is now, is unlawful; ſince the deans of Hereford and Saliſbury have very large tracts under their juriſdiction; and ſeveral parſons of pariſhes have epiſcopal juriſdiction; ſo that at beſt that government wants alteration, that is ſo imperfectly ſettled. The biſhop of Wincheſter affirmed in this debate, ſeveral times, that there was no Chriſtian church before Calvin, that had not biſhops; to which he was anſwered, that the Albigenſes, a very numerous people, and the only viſible known church of true believers, of ſome ages, had no biſhops. It is very true what the biſhop of Wincheſter replied, that they had ſome amongſt them who alone had power to ordain; but that was only to commit that power to the wiſeſt and graveſt men amongſt them, and to ſecure ill and unfit men from being admitted into the miniſtry; but they exerciſed no juriſdiction over the others.

AND it was ſaid by divers of the lords, that they thought epiſcopal government beſt for the church, and moſt ſuitable for the monarchy; but they muſt ſay, with the lord of Southampton, upon the occaſion of this oath in the parliament of Oxford, " I will not be ſworn not to take " away epiſcopacy;" there being nothing that is not of divine precept,

but ſuch circumſtances may come in human affairs, as may render it not eligible by the beſt of men. And it was alſo ſaid, that if epiſcopacy be to be received as by divine precept, the king's ſupremacy is overthrown; and ſo is alſo the opinion of the parliaments both in Edward the VIth, and queen Elizabeth's time; and the conſtitution of our church ought to be altered, as hath been ſhewed. But the church of Rome itſelf hath contradicted that opinion, when ſhe hath made ſuch vaſt tracts of ground, and great numbers of men, exempt from epiſcopal juriſdiction.

THE lord Wharton, upon the biſhop's claim to a divine right, aſked a very hard queſtion, viz. "whether they then did not claim withal a "power of excommunicating their prince?" which they evading to anſwer, and being preſſed by ſome other lords, ſaid, "they never had done "it." Upon which the lord Halliſax told them, that that might well be; for ſince the Reformation they had hitherto had too great a dependence on the crown, to venture on that or any other offence to it.

AND ſo the debate paſſed on to the third clauſe, which had the ſame exceptions againſt it with the two former, of being unbounded, how far any man might meddle, and how far not; and is of that extent, that it overthrew all parliaments, and left them capable of nothing but giving money. For what is the buſineſs of parliaments, but the alteration, either by adding, or taking away, ſome part of the government, either in church or ſtate? And every new act of parliament is an alteration; and what kind of government in church and ſtate muſt that be, which I muſt ſwear, upon no alteration of time, emergency of affairs, nor variation of human things, never to endeavour to alter? Would it not be requiſite that ſuch a government ſhould be given by God himſelf; and that with all the ceremony of thunder and lightning, and viſible appearance to the whole people, which God vouchſafed to the children of Iſrael at Mount Sinai? And yet you ſhall no-where read that they were ſworn to it by any oath like this; nay, on the contrary, the princes and the rulers, even thoſe recorded for the beſt of them, did make ſeveral variations.

THE lord Stafford, a nobleman of great honour and candour, but who had been all along for the bill, yet was ſo far convinced with the debate, that he freely declared, there ought to be an addition to the oath, for preſerving the freedom of debates in parliament. This was ſtrongly urged by the never to be forgotten earl of Bridgewater, who gave reputation and ſtrength to this cauſe of England; as did alſo thoſe worthy earls, Denbigh, Clarendon, and Ailſbury, men of great worth and honour. To ſalve all that was ſaid by theſe and the other lords, the lord-keeper and the biſhops urged, that there was a proviſo, which fully preſerved the privileges of parliament; and, upon farther enquiry, there appearing no ſuch, but only a previous vote, as is before-mentioned, they allowed that that previous vote ſhould be drawn into a proviſo, and added

to the bill; and then, in their opinion, the exception to the oath for this cauſe was perfectly removed. But on the other ſide it was offered, that a poſitive abſolute oath being taken, a proviſo in the act could not diſpenſe with it, without ſome reference in the body of the oath unto that proviſo. But this alſo was utterly denied, until the next day, the debate going on upon other matters; the lord-treaſurer, whoſe authority eaſily obtained with the major vote, re-aſſumed what was mentioned in the debates of the preceding days, and allowed a reference to the proviſo; ſo that it then paſſed in theſe words:

" I A. B. do ſwear, that I will not endeavour to alter the proteſtant
" religion now by law eſtabliſhed in the church of England; nor
" the government of this kingdom in church or ſtate, as it is now
" by law eſtabliſhed; and I do take this oath according to the
" meaning of this act, and the proviſo contained in the ſame. So
" help me God."

THERE was a paſſage of the greateſt obſervation in the whole debate, and which with moſt clearneſs ſhewed what the great men and biſhops aimed at; and ſhould in order have come in before, but that it deſerved ſo particular a conſideration, that I thought beſt to place it here by itſelf; which was, that upon paſſing of the proviſo for preſerving the rights and privileges of parliaments, made out of the previous votes, it was excellently obſerved by the earl of Bolingbroke, a man of great ability and learning in the laws of the land, and perfectly ſtedfaſt in all good Engliſh principles; that though that proviſo did preſerve the freedom of debates and votes in parliaments, yet the oath remained, notwithſtanding that proviſo, upon all men, that ſhall take it as a prohibition, either by ſpeech or writing, or addreſs, to " endeavour any altera-
" tion in religion, church, or ſtate:" nay, alſo upon the members of both houſes otherwiſe than as they ſpeak and vote in open parliaments or committees. For this oath takes away all private converſe upon any ſuch affairs even one with another. This was ſeconded by the lord De La Mer, whoſe name is well known, as alſo his worth, piety, and learning; I ſhould mention his merits too, but I know not whether that be lawful, they lying yet unrewarded.

THE lord Shaftſbury preſently drew up ſome words for preſerving the ſame rights, privileges, and freedoms, which men now enjoy by the laws eſtabliſhed; ſo that by a ſide-wind we might not be deprived of the great liberty we enjoy as Engliſhmen; and deſired thoſe words might be inſerted in that proviſo before it paſſed. This was ſeconded by many of the fore-mentioned lords; and preſſed upon thoſe terms, that they deſired not to countenance, or make in the leaſt degree any thing lawful, that was not already ſo; but that they might not be deprived, by this dark way of proceeding, of that liberty, which was neceſſary to them as men, and without which parliaments would be rendered uſeleſs.

UPON this all the great officers ſhewed themſelves: nay, the duke of Lauderdale himſelf, though under the load of two addreſſes *, opened his mouth, and, together with the lord-keeper and the lord-treaſurer, told the committee in plain terms; that they intended, and deſigned to prevent caballing and conſpiracies againſt the government; that they knew no reaſon why any of the king's officers ſhould conſult with parliament-men about parliament-buſineſs; and particularly mentioned thoſe of the army, treaſury, and navy. And when it was objected to them, that the greateſt part of the moſt knowing gentry were either juſtices of the peace, or of the militia; and that this took away all converſe, or diſcourſe of any alteration, which was in truth of any buſineſs in parliament; and that the officers of the navy and treaſury might be beſt able to adviſe what ſhould be fit in many caſes; and that withal none of their lordſhips did offer any thing to ſalve the inconvenience of parliament-men being deprived of diſcourſing one with another, upon the matters that were before them; beſides it muſt be again remembered, that nothing was herein deſired to be countenanced, or made lawful, but to preſerve that which is already law, and avowedly juſtified by it; for, without this addition to the proviſo, the oath rendered parliaments but a ſnare, not a ſecurity, to the people; yet to all this was anſwered, ſometimes with paſſion and high words, ſometimes with jeſts and raillery, (the beſt they had) and at the laſt the major vote anſwered all objections, and laid aſide the addition tendered.

THERE was another thing before the finiſhing of the oath, which I ſhall here alſo mention, which was an additional oath, tendered by the marquis of Wincheſter; who ought to have been mentioned in the firſt and chiefeſt place, for his conduct and ſupport in the whole debate, being an expert parliament-man, and one, whoſe quality, parts, and fortune, and owning of good principles, concur to give him one of the greateſt places in the eſteem of good men. The additional oath tendered was as followeth:

"I do ſwear that I will never by threats, injunctions, promiſes, advan-
"tages, or invitation, by or from any perſon whatſoever, nor from
"the hopes or proſpect of any gift, place, office, or benefit whatſo-
"ever; give my vote other than according to my opinion and con-
"ſcience, as I ſhall be truly and really perſuaded upon the debate
"of any buſineſs in parliament. So help me God."

THIS oath was offered upon the occaſion of ſwearing members of parliament; and upon this ſcore only, that if any new oath was thought

* The houſe of commons addreſſed the king to remove the duke of Lauderdale from his employments, and from his majeſty's preſence and councils, for ever; as a man of arbitrary principles, and a perſon obnoxious and dangerous to the government.

fit

fit (which that noble lord declared his own judgment perfectly againſt); this certainly was (all conſiderations and circumſtanees taken in) moſt neceſſary to be a part; and the nature of it was not ſo ſtrange, if they conſidered the judges oath, which was not much different from this. To this the lord-keeper ſeemed very averſe, and declared in a very fine ſpeech, that it was an uſeleſs oath; for all gifts, places, and offices were likelieſt to come from the king; and no member of parliament in either houſe could do too much for the king, or be too much of his ſide; and that men might lawfully and worthily have in their proſpect ſuch offices or benefits from him. With this the lords againſt the bill were in no terms ſatisfied, but plainly ſpoke out, that men had been, might, and were likely to be, in either houſe, too much for the king, as they called it; and that whoever did endeavour to give more power to the king than the law and conſtitution of the government had given, eſpecially if it tended to the introducing an abſolute and arbitrary government; might juſtly be ſaid to do too much for the king, and to be corrupted in his judgment by the proſpect of advantages and rewards; though, when it is conſidered that every deviation of the crown towards abſolute power, leſſens the king in the love and affection of his people, making him become leſs in their intereſt; a wiſe prince will not think it a ſervice done him.

AND now remains only the laſt part of the bill, which is the penalty, different according to the qualifications of the perſons: "all that are, "or ſhall be privy-counſellors, juſtices of the peace, or poſſeſſors of any "beneficial office, eccleſiaſtical, civil, or military; are to take the oath "when ſummoned, upon pain of 500l. and being made incapable of "bearing office; the members of both houſes are not made incapable, "but liable to the penalty of 500l. if they take it not." Upon all which, the conſiderations of the debate were, that thoſe officers, and members of both houſes, are, of all the nation, the moſt dangerous to be ſworn into a miſtake, or change of the government; and that, as to the members of both houſes, the penalty of 500l was directly againſt the latter of the two previous votes; and although they had not applied the penalty of incapacity unto the members of both houſes, becauſe of the firſt previous vote in the caſe of the lords; neither durſt they admit of a propoſition made by ſome of themſelves, that thoſe that did not come up, and ſit as members, ſhould be liable to the taking the oath, or penalty, until they did ſo; yet their ends were not to be compaſſed without invading the latter previous vote, and, contrary to the rights and privileges of parliament, enforce them to ſwear, or pay 500l. every parliament. And this they carried through with ſo ſtrong a reſolution, that having experienced their misfortunes in replies for ſeveral hours, not one of the party could be provoked to ſpeak one word.

THOUGH, beſides the former arguments, it was ſtrongly urged, that this oath ought not to be put upon officers with a heavier penalty than the teſt was in the act of the immediate preceding ſeſſion againſt the papiſts;

piſts; by which any man might ſit down with the loſs of his office, without being in the danger of the penalty of 500l. And alſo that this act had a direct retroſpect, which ought never to be in penal laws; for this act puniſhes men for having an office without taking this oath; which office, before this law paſs, they may lawfully enjoy without it. Yet notwithſtanding it provides not a power, in many caſes, for them to part with it, before this oath overtake them. For the clauſe, "whoever is in office the 1ſt of September," will not relieve a juſtice of the peace, who, being once ſworn, is not in his own power to be left out of commiſſion. And ſo might be inſtanced in ſeveral other caſes. As alſo the members of the houſe of commons were not in their own power to be unchoſen; and as to the lords, they were ſubjected by it to the meaneſt condition of mankind, if they could not enjoy their birthright, without playing tricks ſuitable to the humour of every age, and be enforced to ſwear to every fancy of the preſent times. Three years ago it was all liberty and indulgence, and now it is ſtrict and rigid conformity; and what it may be, in ſome ſhort time hereafter, without the ſpirit of propheſying, might be ſhrewdly gueſſed by a conſidering man.

THIS being anſwered with ſilence, the duke of Buckingham, whoſe quality, admirable wit, and unuſual pains that he took all along in the debate againſt this bill, makes me mention him in this place, as general of the party, and coming laſt out of the field; made a ſpeech late at night of eloquent and well-placed nonſenſe; ſhewing how excellently well he could do both ways, and hoping that might do, when ſenſe (which he often before uſed with the higheſt advantage of wit and reaſon) would not. But the earl of Winchelſea, readily apprehending the dialect, in a ſhort reply put an end to the debate; and the major vote, "ultima ratio ſenatuum & conciliorum," carried the queſtion as the court and biſhops would have it *.

THIS was the laſt act of this tragi-comedy, which had taken up ſixteen or ſeventeen whole days debate; the houſe ſitting many times till eight or nine of the clock at night, and ſometimes till midnight; but the buſineſs of privilege between the two houſes † gave ſuch an inter-

* Mr. Echard in his hiſtory of England (Vol. III. ad an. 1675, page 383) hath tranſcribed ſeveral paragraphs out of this letter, though he never cites it; and ends his account of the debate thus: "The debate, ſays he, laſted ſixteen or ſeventeen whole days, the houſe often ſitting till nine at "night, and ſometimes till midnight; in the concluſion of which, the Duke of Buckingham, as gene"ral of the party, and laſt in the field, made a famous ſpeech, conſiſting of eloquent, regular, and "well-placed non-ſenſe, hoping that that might prevail, when nothing elſe would; and ſo brought "confuſion into the houſe;" where, beſides the inaccuracy of bringing into his narrative and making his own the expreſſions, which the author of the letter hath uſed, by way of compliment or encomium, and thereby miſrepreſenting the matter, he affirms, that the debate was put to an end, by the confuſion, which the duke of Buckingham's ſpeech brought into the houſe; whereas it appears by the letter itſelf, that no confuſion was brought into the houſe by that ſpeech; but, on the contrary, that, after a ſhort reply of the earl of Winchelſea, the queſtion was put regularly to the vote, and carried as the court and biſhops would have it.

† Dr. Shirley having brought an appeal in the houſe of lords, from a decree in chancery, againſt Sir John Flagg, a member of the houſe of commons; the commons looked upon it as an infringement of their privileges; and this occaſioned a conteſt between the two houſes, which ran ſo high, that the king thought fit to put a ſtop to it, by proroguing the parliament, on the 9th of June 1675, after they had ſat near two months.

ruption,

ruption, that this bill was never reported from the committee to the houſe

I HAVE mentioned to you divers lords, that were ſpeakers, as it fell in the debate; but I have not diſtributed the arguments of the debate to every particular lord. Now you know the ſpeakers, your curioſity may be ſatisfied, and the lords I am ſure will not quarrel about the diviſion. I muſt not forget to mention thoſe great lords, Bedford, Devonſhire, and Burlington, for the countenance and ſupport they gave to the Engliſh intereſt. The earl of Bedford was ſo brave in it, that he joined in three of the proteſts; ſo alſo did the earl of Dorſet; and the earl of Stamford, a young nobleman of great hopes; the lord viſcount Say and Seal and the lord Pagitt in two; the lord Audley and the lord Fitzwalter in the third; and the lord Peter, a nobleman of great eſtate, and always true to the maintenance of liberty and property, in the firſt. And I ſhould not have omitted the earl of Dorſet, lord Audley, and the lord Peter, amongſt the ſpeakers; for I will aſſure you, they did their parts excellently well. The lord viſcount Hereford was a ſteady man among the country lords; ſo alſo was the lord Townſhend, a man juſtly of great eſteem and power in his own country, and amongſt all thoſe that well know him. The earl of Carnarvon ought not to be mentioned in the laſt place; for he came out of the country on purpoſe to oppoſe the bill, ſtuck very faſt to the country party, and ſpoke many excellent things againſt it. I dare not mention the Roman catholick lords, and ſome others, for fear I hurt them; but thus much I ſhall ſay of the Roman catholick peers, that if they were ſafe in their eſtates, and yet kept out of office, their votes in that houſe would not be the moſt unſafe to England of any ſort of men in it. As for the abſent lords, the earl of Rutland, lord Sandys, lord Herbert of Cherbury, lord North, and lord Crew, ought to be mentioned with honour; having taken care their votes ſhould maintain their own intereſt and opinions. But the earls of Exeter and Cheſterfield, that gave no proxies this ſeſſion; the lord Montague of Boughton, that gave his to the treaſurer; and the lord Roberts his to the Earl of Northampton; are not eaſily to be underſtood. If you aſk after the earl of Carliſle, the lord viſcount Falconberg, and the lord Berkley of Berkley-Caſtle, becauſe you find them not mentioned amongſt all their old friends; all I have to ſay is, that the earl of Carliſle ſtepped aſide to receive his penſion; the lord Berkley to dine with the lord-treaſurer; but the lord viſcount Falconberg, like the nobleman in the goſpel, went away ſorrowful, for he had a great office at court. But I deſpair not of giving you a better account of them next ſeſſion; for it is not poſſible, when they conſider, that Cromwell's major-general, ſon-in-law, and friend, ſhould think to find their accounts amongſt men that ſet up on ſuch a bottom.

THUS, Sir, you ſee the ſtandard of the new party is not yet ſet up, but muſt be the work of another ſeſſion; though it be admirable to me, how

how the king can be induced to venture his affairs upon ſuch weak counſels, and of ſo fatal conſequences. For I believe it is the firſt time in the world, that ever it was thought adviſeable, after fifteen years of the higheſt peace, quiet, and obedience, that ever was in any country; that there ſhould be a pretence taken up, and a reviving of former miſcarriages, eſpecially after ſo many promiſes and declarations, as well as acts of oblivion, and ſo much merit of the offending party, in being the inſtruments of the king's happy return; beſides the putting ſo vaſt a number of the king's ſubjects in utter deſpair of having their crimes ever forgotten. And it muſt be a great miſtake in counſels, or worſe, that there ſhould be ſo much pains taken by the court to debaſe and bring low the houſe of peers, if a military government be not intended by ſome. For the power of peerage, and a ſtanding army, are like two buckets, the proportion that one goes down, the other exactly goes up. And I refer you to the conſideration of all the hiſtories of ours, or any of our neighbour northern monarchies; whether ſtanding forces, military and arbitrary government, came not plainly in by the ſame ſteps that the nobility were leſſened; and whether, whenever they were in power and greatneſs, they permitted the leaſt ſhadow of any of them. Our own country is a clear inſtance of it; for though the white roſe and the red changed fortunes often, to the ruin, ſlaughter, and beheading the great men of the other ſide; yet nothing could enforce them to ſecure themſelves by a ſtanding force. But I cannot believe that the king himſelf will e er deſign any ſuch thing; for he is not of a temper robuſt and laborious enough to deal with ſuch a ſort of men, or reap the advantages, if there be any, of ſuch a government. And I think he can hardly have forgot the treatment his father received from the officers of his army, both at Oxford and Newark; it was an hard, but almoſt an even choice, to be the parliament's priſoner, or their ſlave; but I am ſure the greateſt proſperity of his arms could have brought him to no happier condition, than our king his ſon has before him, whenever he pleaſes. However, this may be ſaid for the honour of this ſeſſion, that there is no prince in Chriſtendom hath, at a greater expence of money, maintained for two months ſpace a nobler or more uſeful diſpute of the politicks, myſtery, and ſecrets of government, both in church and ſtate, than this hath been; of which noble deſign no part is owing to any of the country lords, for ſeveral of them begged, at the firſt entrance into the debate, that they might not be engaged in ſuch diſputes as would unavoidably produce divers things to be ſaid, which they were willing to let alone. But I muſt bear them witneſs, and ſo will you, having read this; that they did their parts in it, when it came to it, and ſpoke plain, like old Engliſh lords.

I SHALL conclude with what, upon the whole matter, is moſt worthy your conſideration, that the deſign is "to declare us firſt into an-"other government more abſolute and arbitrary than the oath of alle-"giance, or old law, knew; and then "make us ſwear unto it," as it

is ſo eſtabliſhed. And leſs than this the biſhops could not offer in requital to the crown for parting with its ſupremacy, and ſuffering them to be ſworn to be equal with itſelf. Archbiſhop Laud was the firſt founder of this device. In his canons of 1640, you ſhall find an oath very like this, and a declaratory canon preceding, "that monarchy is of di-"vine right*;" which was alſo affirmed in this debate by our reverend prelates, and is owned in print by no leſs men than archbiſhop Uſher, and biſhop Sanderſon †; and I am afraid it is the avowed opinion of

* In the conſtitutions and canons eccleſiaſtical; treated upon by the archbiſhops of Canterbury and York, &c. in the year 1640, and publiſhed for the due obſervation of them, by his majeſty's authority, under the great ſeal of England; the I. canon contains an explanation of the regal power, ordained and decreed to be read by every parſon, vicar, curate, or preacher, upon ſome one Sunday in every quarter of the year at morning prayer; wherein it is ſaid: "The moſt high and ſacred order "of kings is of divine right, being the ordinance of God himſelf, founded in the prime laws of nature, "and clearly eſtabliſhed by expreſs texts both of the Old and New Teſtament. . . . . ."

"For any perſon or perſons to ſet up, maintain, or avow in any (king's) realms or territories re-"ſpectively, under any pretence whatſoever, any independent co-active power, either papal or po-"pular (whether directly or indirectly) is to undermine the great royal office, and cunningly to over-"throw that moſt ſacred ordinance, which God himſelf hath eſtabliſhed: And ſo is treaſonable againſt "God, as well as againſt the king."

"For ſubjects to bear arms againſt their kings, offenſive or defenſive, upon any pretence whatſoever, "is at the leaſt to reſiſt the powers, which are ordained of God: And though they do not invade, but "only reſiſt, St. Paul tells them plainly, they ſhall receive to themſelves damnation."

And, by the VI. canon, an oath againſt all innovation of doctrine or diſcipline is decreed and ordained to be taken, not only by all archbiſhops, and biſhops, and all other prieſts and deacons; upon pain, if they refuſe to take it, of being deprived of all their eccleſiaſtical promotions whatſoever, and execution of their functions, which they hold in the church of England; but likewiſe by all maſters of arts, bachelors and doctors in divinity, law or phyſick; all ſchoolmaſters, &c. which hath theſe words: "I A. B. do ſwear, that I do approve the doctrine and diſcipline or government eſtabliſhed "in the church of England, as containing all things neceſſary to ſalvation. . . . . Nor will I ever "give my conſent to alter the government of this church by arch-biſhops, biſhops, deans, and arch-"deacons, &c. as it ſtands now eſtabliſhed, and as by right it ought to ſtand," &c.

These canons were no ſooner publiſhed, but there was a general outcry made againſt them. How they were treated by the Puritans, may be ſeen in a pamphlet printed in 1640, with this title: "England's complaint to Jeſus Chriſt, againſt the biſhops canons, of the late ſinful ſynod, a ſeditious "conventicle, a packe of hypocrites, a ſworn confederacy, a traiterous conſpiracy againſt the true re-"ligion of Chriſt, and the weale publicke of the land, and conſequently againſt the kingdome and "crowne. In this complaint are ſpecified thoſe impieties and inſolencies which are moſt notorious, "ſcattered through the canons and conſtitutions of the ſaid ſinful ſynod. And confuted by arguments "annexed hereunto," in 4to. Several petitions being at the ſame time preſented to the king againſt the new canons, and particularly againſt the oath before-mentioned: his majeſty was pleaſed to ſuſpend their execution; which, however, could not prevent their falling under the cenſure of the houſe of commons; for on the 16th of December 1640, they declared that thoſe canons did contain many matters contrary to the king's prerogative, to the fundamental laws and ſtatutes of this realm, to the rights of parliament, to the property and liberty of the ſubject, and matters tending to ſedition, and of dangerous conſequence. "Theſe publick cenſures of the canons," ſays a learned and ingenious hiſtorian, "however grounded on prejudice and faction, have made them ever ſince reputed null and void, &c." See the Complete Hiſtory of England, &c. Vol. III. ad ann. 1640, p. 113. Lond. 1719, in fol.

† Archbiſhop Uſher did, by order of King Charles I, write a treatiſe, intitled, "The Power com-"municated by God to the Prince, and the Obedience required of the Subject, &c." which was publiſhed, in the year 1660, by Dr. Sanderſon, biſhop of Lincoln; and in that treatiſe, after having obſerved that the commands of princes are either of ſuch things as may and ought to be done, or of ſuch as cannot or ought not to be done, he puts this queſtion: But how are ſubjects to carry themſelves, when ſuch things are enjoined as cannot or ought not to be done? To which he anſwers, "Surely not "to accuſe the commander, but humbly to avoid the command . . . . . And, when nothing elſe will "ſerve the turn, as in things that may be done, we are to expreſs our ſubmiſſion by active, ſo in "things that cannot be done, we are to declare the ſame by paſſive obedience, without reſiſtance and "repugnancy; ſuch a kind of ſuffering being as ſure a ſign of ſubjection as any thing elſe whatſo-"ever." And ſome pages lower, he propoſes an objection, and anſwers it. "But, ſays he, if men's "hands be thus tied, will ſome ſay, no man's ſtate can be ſecure; nay, the whole frame of the com-"monwealth would be in danger to be ſubverted and utterly ruined, by the unbridled luſt of a diſ-"tempered governor."

much the greater part of our dignified clergy. If ſo, I am ſure they are the moſt dangerous ſort of men alive to our Engliſh government; and it is the firſt thing ought to be looked into, and ſtrictly examined by our parliaments. It is the leaven that corrupts the whole lump. For if that be true, I am ſure monarchy is not to be bounded by human laws; and the 8th chapter of 1 Samuel will prove (as many of our divines would have it) the great charter of the royal prerogative; and our "Magna Charta," that ſays, "Our kings may not take our fields, our "vineyards, our corn, and our ſheep," is not in force, but void and null; becauſe againſt divine inſtitution. And you have the riddle out, why the clergy are ſo ready to take themſelves, and to impoſe upon others, ſuch kind of oaths as theſe. They have placed themſelves and their poſſeſſions upon a better and a ſurer bottom (as they think) than "Magna Charta;" and ſo have no more need of, or concern for it. Nay, what is worſe, they have trucked away the rights and liberties of the people, in this and all other countries, wherever they have had opportunity; that they might be owned by the prince to be "jure divino," maintained in that pretenſion by that abſolute power and force they have contributed ſo much to put into his hands; and that prieſt and prince may, like Caſtor and Pollux, be worſhipped together as divine, in the ſame temple, by us poor lay-ſubjects; and that ſenſe and reaſon, law, properties, rights, and liberties, ſhall be underſtood, as the oracles of thoſe deities ſhall interpret, or give ſignification to them; and never be made uſe of in the world to oppoſe the abſolute and free will of either of them.

SIR, I have no more to ſay, but beg your pardon for this tedious trouble, and that you will be very careful to whom you communicate any of this.

"I ANSWER, God's word is clear in the point, (Rom. xiii. 2, 5.) Whoſoever reſiſteth the power, "reſiſteth the ordinance of God; and they that reſiſt ſhall receive to themſelves damnation; and "thereby a neceſſity is impoſed upon us of being ſubject even for conſcience ſake; which may not be "avoided by the pretext of any enſuing miſchief whatſoever. For, by this means we ſhould have li-"berty given unto us to (James iv. 11.) ſpeak evil of the law, and to judge the law. But if thou "judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge, ſaith St. James. It becomes us, in obe-"dience, to perform our part; and leave the ordering of events to God, whoſe part only that is." The Power communicated by God to the Prince, &c. pag. 147, 149, 150, 157. London, 1683, in 8vo.

Dr. SANDERSON was of the ſame opinion, as it appears by his long preface to archbiſhop Uſher's treatiſe juſt mentioned; wherein, among other things, he ſays, that a mixt monarchy is an arrant bull, a contradiction in adjecto, and deſtroyeth itſelf; but more particularly by that famous paſſage in a ſermon of his preached at Hampton-Court, in the year 1640: "No conjuncture of circumſtances whatſo-"ever can make that expedient to be done at any time, that is of itſelf, and in the kind (Οὐ γὰρ ὧ "μὴ καλὸν, ἔποτ' ἔφυ καλὸν. Eurip. Phœniſſ. Act. 3.) unlawful. For a man to blaſpheme the holy "name of God, to ſacrifice to idols, to give wrong ſentence in judgment, by his power to oppreſs "thoſe that are not able to withſtand him, by ſubtilty to over-reach others in bargaining, to take up "arms, (offenſive or defenſive) againſt a lawful ſovereign; none of theſe, and ſundry other things of "like nature, being all of them ſimply, and de toto genere, unlawful, may be done by any man, at "any time, in any caſe, upon any colour or pretenſion whatſoever; the expreſs command of God "himſelf only excepted, as in the caſe of Abraham for ſacrificing his ſon (Gen. xxii.). Not for the "avoiding of ſcandal, not at the inſtance of any friend, or command of any power upon earth, nor "for the maintenance of the lives or liberties either of ourſelves or others; nor for the defence of re-"ligion; nor for the preſervation of a church or ſtate; no, nor yet, if that could be imagined poſſi-"ble, for the ſalvation of a ſoul, no, not for the redemption of the whole world. Sermon XII. ad "Aulam, preached at Hampton-Court, July 26, 1640, on 1 Cor. x. 23. But all things are not "expedient . . . . . But all things edify not." See XXXIV Sermons, &c. by Robert Sanderſon, &c. pag. 522, of the 8th edit. London, 1686, in fol.

REMARKS

REMARKS

UPON SOME OF

Mr. NORRIS's BOOKS,

Wherein he aſſerts F. MALEBRANCHE's Opinion of our ſeeing all Things in God.

THERE are ſome, who think they have given an account of the nature of ideas, by telling us, "we ſee them in God" (1), as if we underſtood, what ideas in the underſtanding of God are, better than when they are in our own underſtandings; or their nature were better known, when it is ſaid, that "the immediate object of our underſtandings are the divine ideas, the omniform eſſence of God, partially repreſented or exhibited" (2). So that this now has made the matter clear, there can be no difficulty left, when we are told that our ideas are the divine ideas; and the "divine ideas the omniform eſſence of God." For what the divine ideas are, we know as plainly, as we know what 1, 2, and 3, is; and it is a ſatisfactory explication of what our ideas are to tell us, they are no other than the divine ideas; and the divine eſſence is more familiar, and level to our knowledge, than any thing we think of. Beſides, there can be no difficulty in underſtanding how the "divine ideas are God's eſſence."

2. I AM complained of for not having "given an account of, or defined the nature of our ideas" (3). By "giving an account of the "nature of ideas," is not meant, that I ſhould make known to men their ideas; for I think no-body can imagine that any articulate ſounds of mine, or any body elſe, can make known to another what his ideas, that is, what his perceptions are, better than what he himſelf knows and perceives them to be; which is enough for affirmations, or negations, about them. By the "nature of ideas," therefore, is meant here their cauſes and manner of production in the mind, i. e. in what alteration of the mind this perception conſiſts; and as to that, I anſwer, no man can

(1) See Curſory Reflections upon a book called, "An Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding." Written by John Norris, M. A. rector of Newton St. Loe, in Somerſetſhire, and late fellow of All-Souls college: in a letter to a friend; printed at the end of his "Chriſtian Bleſſedneſs, or Diſcourſes "upon the Beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt;" pag. 30. Lond. 1690. in 8vo.

(2) Ibid. pag. 31.

(3) Ibid. pag. 3.

tell; for which I not only appeal to experience, which were enough, but ſhall add this reaſon, viz. becauſe no man can give any account of any alteration made in any ſimple ſubſtance whatſoever; all the alteration we can conceive, being only of the alteration of compounded ſubſtances; and that only by a tranſpoſition of parts. Our ideas, ſay theſe men, are the "divine ideas, or the omniform eſſence of God," which the mind ſometimes ſees, and ſometimes not. Now I aſk theſe men, what alteration is made in the mind upon ſeeing? for there lies the difficulty, which occaſions the enquiry.

FOR what difference a man finds in himſelf, when he ſees a marygold, and ſees not a marygold, has no difficulty, and needs not be enquired after: he has the idea now, which he had not before. The difficulty is, what alteration is made in his mind; what changes that has in itſelf, when it ſees what it did not ſee before, either the divine idea in the underſtanding of God, or, as the ignorant think, the marygold in the garden. Either ſuppoſition, as to this matter, is all one; for they are both things extrinſical to the mind, till it has that perception; and when it has it, I deſire them to explain to me, what the alteration in the mind is, beſides ſaying, as we vulgar do, it is having a perception, which it had not the moment before; which is only the difference between perceiving and not perceiving; a difference in matter of fact agreed on all hands; which, wherein it conſiſts, is, for aught I ſee, unknown to one ſide as well as the other; only the one have the ingenuity to confeſs their ignorance; and the other pretend to be knowing.

3. P. MALEBRANCHE ſays, "Gods does all things by the ſimpleſt and "ſhorteſt ways," i. e. as it is interpreted in Mr. Norris's Reaſon and Religion, "God never does any thing in vain" (4). This will eaſily be granted them; but how will they reconcile to this principle of theirs, on which their whole ſyſtem is built, the curious ſtructure of the eye and ear; not to mention the other parts of the body? For if the perception of colours and ſounds depended on nothing but the preſence of the object affording an occaſional cauſe to God Almighty to exhibit to the mind the idea of figures, colours, and ſounds; all that nice and curious ſtructure of thoſe organs is wholly in vain: ſince the ſun by day, and the ſtars by night, and the viſible objects that ſurround us, and the beating of a drum, the talk of people, and the change made in the air by thunder; are as much preſent to a blind and deaf man, as to thoſe who have their eyes and ears in the greateſt perfection. He that underſtands opticks ever ſo little, muſt needs admire the wonderful make of the eye, not only for the variety and neatneſs of the parts; but as ſuited to the nature of refraction, ſo as to paint the image of the object in the retina;

(4) "Reaſon and Religion; or, the Grounds and Meaſures of Devotion, conſidered from the nature of God, and the nature of man. In ſeveral contemplations. With exerciſes of devotion applied to every contemplation." By John Norris, M. A. and fellow of All-ſouls college in Oxford. Part II. Contemplation II. § 17. p. 195. Lond. 1689. in 8vo.

which

which theſe men muſt confeſs to be all loſt labour, if it contributes nothing at all, in the ordinary way of cauſes and effects, to the producing that idea in the mind. But that only the preſence of the object gave occaſion to God to ſhew to the mind that idea in himſelf, which certainly is as preſent to one that has a gutta ſerena, as to the quickſightedeſt man living. But we do not know how, by any natural operation, this can produce an idea in the mind; and therefore (a good concluſion!) God, the author of nature, cannot this way produce it. As if it were impoſſible for the Almighty to produce any thing, but by ways we muſt conceive, and are able to comprehend; when he that is beſt ſatisfied of his omniſcient underſtanding, and knows ſo well how God perceives, and man thinks, cannot explain the coheſion of parts in the loweſt degree of created beings, unorganiſed bodies.

4. THE perception of univerſals alſo proves that all beings are preſent to our minds; and that can only be by the preſence of God, becauſe all "created things are individuals" (5). Are not all things that exiſt individuals? If ſo, then ſay not, all created, but all exiſting things are individuals; and if ſo, then the having any general idea proves not that we have all objects preſent to our minds. But this is for want of conſidering wherein univerſality conſiſts; which is only in repreſentation, abſtracting from particulars. An idea of a circle, of an inch diameter, will repreſent, where, or whenſoever exiſting, all the circles of an inch diameter; and that by abſtracting from time and place. And it will alſo repreſent all circles of any bigneſs, by abſtracting alſo from that particular bigneſs, and by retaining only the relation of equidiſtance of the circumference from the center, in all the parts of it.

5. WE have a "diſtinct idea of God" (6), whereby we clearly enough diſtinguiſh him from the creatures; but I fear it would be preſumption for us to ſay, we have a clear idea of him, as he is in himſelf.

6. THE argument, that "we have the idea of infinite, before the idea "of finite, becauſe we conceive infinite being, barely by conceiving be-"ing, without conſidering, whether it be finite or infinite" (7); I ſhall leave to be conſidered, whether it is not a miſtake, of priority of nature, for priority of conception.

7. "GOD made all things for himſelf" (8); therefore, we "ſee all "things in him." This is called demonſtration. As if all things were not as well made for God, and mankind had not as much reaſon to magnify him, if their perception of things were any other way than ſuch an one of ſeeing them in him; as ſhews not God more than the other, and wherein not one of a million takes more notice of him, than thoſe who think they perceive things, where they are, by their ſenſes.

8. IF God ſhould create a mind, and give it the ſun, ſuppoſe, for its idea, "or immediate object of knowledge, God would then make that

(5) "Reaſon and Religion," &c. Part II. Contempl. II. § 19. p. 197.
(6) Ibid. § 20. p. 198. (7) Ibid. § 21. p. 198. (8) Ibid. § 22. p. 199.

"mind

" mind for the ſun, and not for himſelf" (9). This ſuppoſes, that thoſe that ſee things in God, ſee at the ſame time God alſo, and thereby ſhew that their minds are made for God, having him for the " immediate object of their knowledge." But for this I muſt appeal to common experience, whether every one, as often as he ſees any thing elſe, ſees and perceives God in the caſe; or whether it be not true of men, who ſee other things every moment, that God is not in all their thoughts? Yet, ſays he, " when the mind ſees his works, it ſees him " in ſome manner" (10). This ſome manner, is no manner at all to the purpoſe of being made only for God, for his idea, or for his immediate object of knowledge. A man bred up in the obſcurity of a dungeon, where, by a dim and almoſt no light, he perceives the objects about him; it is true, he owes this idea to the light of the ſun; but having never heard, nor thought of the ſun, can one ſay that the idea of the ſun is " his imme- " diate object of knowledge," or that therefore " his mind was made for " the ſun?" This is the caſe of a great part of mankind; and how many can we imagine of thoſe, who have got ſome notion of God, either from tradition or reaſon; have an idea of him preſent in their minds as often as they think of any thing elſe?

9. BUT if our being made for God neceſſarily demonſtrates that we ſhould " ſee all things in him;" this, at laſt, will demonſtrate, that we are not half made for him, ſince it is confeſſed by our author, that we ſee no other ideas in God, but thoſe of number, extenſion, and eſſences; which are not half the ideas that take up men's minds.

10. " THE ſimple eſſences of things are nothing elſe but the di- " vine eſſence itſelf conſidered with his connotation, as variouſly " repreſentative, or exhibitive of things, and as variouſly imitable " or participable by them" (11); and this he tells us are ideas (12). The meaning, I take it, of all this, put into plain intelligible words, is this; God has always a power to produce any thing that involves not a contradiction. He alſo knows what we can do. But what is all this to ideas in him, as real beings viſible by us? God knew, from eternity, he could produce a pebble, a muſhroom, and a man. Were theſe, which are diſtinct ideas, part of his ſimple eſſence? It ſeems then we know very well the eſſence of God, and uſe the word ſimple, which comprehends all ſorts of variety, in a very proper way. But God knew he could produce ſuch creatures; therefore, where ſhall we place thoſe ideas he ſaw of them, but in his own eſſence? There theſe ideas exiſted " eminenter;" and ſo they are the eſſence of God. There are things themſelves exiſted too " eminenter," and therefore all the creatures, as they really exiſt, are the eſſence of God. For if finite real beings of one kind, as ideas are ſaid to be, are the the eſſence of the infinite God;

(9) Reaſon and Religion,. Part II. Contempl. II. § 22. p. 199. (10) Ibid. § 23. p. 200.
(11) Ibid. Part I. Contempl. V. § 19. p. 82. (12) Ibid. § 20.

other finite beings, as the creatures, may be alſo the eſſence of God. But after this rate we muſt talk, when we will allow ourſelves to be ignorant of nothing; but will know even the knowledge of God, and the way of his underſtanding!

11. THE "eſſences of things, or ideas exiſting in God" (13.). There are many of them that exiſt in God; and ſo the ſimple eſſence of God has actually exiſting in it as great a variety of ideas as there are of creatures; all of them real beings, and diſtinct one from another. If it be ſaid, this means, God can, and knows he can produce them; what doth this ſay more than every one ſays? If it doth ſay more, and ſhews us not this infinite number of real diſtinct beings in God, ſo as to be his very eſſence; what is this better than what thoſe ſay, who make God to be nothing but the univerſe; though it be covered under unintelligible expreſſions of ſimplicity and variety, at the ſame time, in the eſſence of God? But thoſe who would not be thought ignorant of any thing, to attain it, make God like themſelves; or elſe they could not talk as they do, of "the "mind of God, and the ideas in the mind of God, exhibitive of all the "whole poſſibility of being" (14).

12. IT is "in the divine nature that theſe univerſal natures, which "are the proper object of ſcience, are to be found. And conſequently "it is in God that we know all the truth which we know" (15). Doth any univerſal nature therefore exiſt? Or can any thing that exiſts any where, or any how, be any other than ſingular? I think it cannot be denied that God, having a power to produce ideas in us, can give that power to another; or, to expreſs it otherwiſe, make any idea the effect of any operation on our bodies. This has no contradiction in it, and therefore is poſſible. But you will ſay, you conceive not the way how this is done. If you ſtand to that rule, that it cannot be done, becauſe you conceive not the manner how it is brought to paſs; you muſt deny that God can do this, becauſe you cannot conceive the manner how he produces any idea in us. If viſible objects are ſeen only by God's exhibiting their ideas to our minds, on occaſion of the preſence of thoſe objects, what hinders the Almighty from exhibiting their ideas to a blind man, to whom, being ſet before his face, and as near his eyes, and in as good a light as to one not blind, they are, according to this ſuppoſition, as much the occaſional cauſe to one as the other? But yet under this equality of occaſional cauſes one has the idea, and the other not; and this conſtantly; which would give one reaſon to ſuſpect ſomething more than a preſential occaſional cauſe in the object.

13. FARTHER, if light ſtriking upon the eyes be but the occaſional cauſe of ſeeing; God, in making the eyes of ſo curious a ſtructure, ope-

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(13) Reaſon and Religion, Part I. Contempl. V. § 21. p. 83. (14) Ibid. § 30. p. 92, 93.
(15) Ibid. Part II. Contempl. II. § 30. p. 206.

rates

rates not by the ſimpleſt ways; for God could have produced viſible ideas, upon the occaſion of light ſtriking upon the eye-lids or forehead.

14. OUTWARD objects are not, when preſent, always occaſional cauſes. He that has long continued in a room perfumed with ſweet odours, ceaſes to ſmell, though the room be filled with thoſe flowers; though, as often as after a little abſence he returns again, he ſmells them afreſh. He that comes out of bright ſunſhine into a room where the curtains are drawn, at firſt ſees nothing in the room; though thoſe who have been there ſome time, ſee him and every thing plainly. It is hard to account for either of theſe phænomena, by God's producing theſe ideas upon the account of occaſional cauſes. But by the production of ideas in the mind, by the operation of the object on the organs of ſenſe; this difference is eaſy to be explained.

15. WHETHER the ideas of light and colours come in by the eyes, or no; it is all one as if they did; for thoſe who have no eyes, never have them. And whether, or no, God has appointed that a certain modified motion of the fibres, or ſpirits in the optick nerve, ſhould excite, or produce, or cauſe them in us; call it what you pleaſe: it is all one as if it did; ſince where there is no ſuch motion, there is no ſuch perception or idea. For I hope they will not deny God the privilege to give ſuch a power to motion, if he pleaſes. Yes, ſay they, they be the occaſional, but not the efficient cauſe; for that they cannot be, becauſe that is in effect to ſay, he has given this motion in the optick nerve a power to operate on himſelf, but cannot give it a power to operate on the mind of man; it may by this appointment operate on himſelf, the impaſſible infinite ſpirit, and put him in mind when he is to operate on the mind of man, and exhibit to it the idea which is in himſelf of any colour. The infinite eternal God is certainly the cauſe of all things, the fountain of all being and power. But, becauſe all being was from him, can there be nothing but God himſelf? or, becauſe all power was originally in him, can there be nothing of it communicated to his creatures? This is to ſet very narrow bounds to the power of God, and, by pretending to extend it, takes it away. For which (I beſeech you, as we can comprehend) is the perfecteſt power; to make a machine, a watch, for example, that when the watch-maker has withdrawn his hands, ſhall go and ſtrike by the fit contrivance of the parts; or elſe requires that whenever the hand by pointing to the hour, minds him of it; he ſhould ſtrike twelve upon the bell? No machine of God's making can go of itſelf. Why? becauſe the creatures have no power; can neither move themſelves, nor any thing elſe. How then comes about all that we ſee? Do they do nothing? Yes, they are the occaſional cauſes to God, why he ſhould produce certain thoughts and motions in them. The creatures cannot produce any idea, any thought in man. How then comes he to perceive or think? God, upon the occaſion of ſome motion in the optick nerve, exhibits the colour of a marygold or a roſe to his

mind. How came that motion in his optick nerve? On occaſion of the motion of ſome particles of light ſtriking on the retina, God producing it, and ſo on. And ſo whatever a man thinks, God produces the thought; let it be infidelity, murmuring, or blaſphemy. The mind doth nothing; his mind is only the mirror that receives the ideas that God exhibits to it, and juſt as God exhibits them; the man is altogether paſſive in the whole buſineſs of thinking.

16. A MAN cannot move his arm or his tongue; he has no power; only upon occaſion, the man willing it, God moves it. The man wills, he doth ſomething; or elſe God, upon the occaſion of ſomething, which he himſelf did before, produced this will, and this action in him. This is the hypotheſis that clears doubts, and brings us at laſt to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoſa, by reſolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irreſiſtible fatal neceſſity. For, whether the original of it be from the continued motion of eternal all-doing matter, or from an omnipotent immaterial Being which, having begun matter and motion, continues it by the direction of occaſions which he himſelf has alſo made; as to religion and morality, it is juſt the ſame thing. But we muſt know how every thing is brought to paſs, and thus we have it reſolved, without leaving any difficulty to perplex us. But perhaps it would better become us to acknowledge our ignorance, than to talk ſuch things boldly of the Holy One of Iſrael, and condemn others for not daring to be as unmannerly as ourſelves.

17. IDEAS may be real beings, though not ſubſtances; as motion is a real being, though not a ſubſtance; and it ſeems probable that, in us, ideas depend on, and are ſome way or other the effect of motion; ſince they are ſo fleeting; it being, as I have elſewhere obſerved, ſo hard, and almoſt impoſſible, to keep in our minds the ſame unvaried idea, long together, unleſs when the object that produces it is preſent to the ſenſes; from which the ſame motion that firſt produced it being continued, the idea itſelf may continue.

18. THIS therefore may be a ſufficient excuſe of the ignorance I have owned of what our ideas are, any farther than as they are perceptions we experiment in ourſelves; and the dull unphiloſophical way I have taken of examining their production, only ſo far as experience and obſervation lead me; wherein my dim ſight went not beyond ſenſation and reflection.

19. TRUTH (16) lies only in propoſitions. The foundation of this truth is the relation that is between our ideas. The knowledge of truth is that perception of the relation between our ideas to be as it is expreſſed.

20. THE immutability of eſſences lies in the ſame ſounds, ſuppoſed

(16) See Reaſon and Religion, &c. Part II. Contempl. II. § 29. p. 204.

to ſtand for the ſame ideas. Theſe things conſidered, would have ſaved this learned diſcourſe.

21. WHATEVER exiſts, whether in God, or out of God, is ſingular (17).

22. IF no propoſition ſhould be made, there would be no truth nor falſhood; though the ſame relations ſtill ſubſiſting between the ſame ideas, is a foundation of the immutability of truth (18) in the ſame propoſitions, whenever made.

23. WHAT wonder is it that the ſame idea (19) ſhould always be the ſame idea? For if the word triangle be ſuppoſed to have the ſame ſignification always, that is all this amounts to.

24. "I DESIRE to know (20) what things they are that God has pre-"pared for them that love him." Therefore I have ſome knowledge of them already, though they be ſuch as "eye hath not ſeen, nor ear heard, "nor have entered into the heart of man to conceive."

25. IF I "have all things actually preſent to my mind;" why do I not know all things diſtinctly?

26. HE that conſiders (21) the force of ſuch ways of ſpeaking as theſe, "I deſire it, pray give it me, ſhe was afraid of the ſnake, and ran away "trembling;" will eaſily conceive how the meaning of the words "deſire" and "fear," and ſo all thoſe which ſtand for intellectual notions, may be taught by words of ſenſible ſignifications.

27. THIS, however otherwiſe in experience, ſhould be ſo on this hypotheſis; v. g. the uniformity of the ideas, that different men have when they uſe ſuch words as theſe, "glory, worſhip," religion, are clear proofs that "God exhibited to their minds that part of the ideal world, as is "ſignified by that ſign."

28. STRANGE! that truth being, in any queſtion, but one; the more we diſcover of it, the more uniform our judgments ſhould be about it (22).

29. THIS argues that the ground of it is the always immutable relations of the ſame ideas. Several ideas that we have once got acquainted with, we can revive; and ſo they are preſent to us when we pleaſe. But the knowledge of their relations, ſo as to know what we may affirm or deny of them, is not always preſent to our minds; but we often miſs truth, even after ſtudy. But in many, and poſſibly not the feweſt, we have neither the ideas, nor the truth, conſtantly, or ſo much as at all, preſent to our minds.

AND I think I may, without any diſparagement to the author, doubt whether he ever had, or, with all his application, ever would have, the ideas of truth preſent to the mind, that Mr. Newton had in writing his book.

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(17) See Reaſon and Religion, &c. Part II. Contempl. II. § 30. p. 206.
(18) Ibid. § 32. p. 207. (19) Ibid. § 33. p. 208, 209. (20) Ibid. § 34. p. 210.
(21) Ibid. § 35. p. 211, 212, 213. (22) Ibid. § 36. p. 214.

30. THIS

30. THIS ſection (23) ſuppoſes we are better acquainted with God's underſtanding than our own. But this pretty argument would perhaps look as ſmilingly thus: We are like God in our underſtandings; he ſees what he ſees, by ideas in his own mind; therefore we ſee what we ſee, by ideas that are in our own minds.

31. THESE texts (24) do not prove that we ſhall "hereafter ſee all "things in God." There will be objects in a future ſtate, and we ſhall have bodies and ſenſes.

32. Is he, whilſt we ſee through the veil of our mortal fleſh here, intimately preſent to our minds?

33. To think of any thing (25) is to contemplate that preciſe idea. The idea of Being, in general, is the idea of Being abſtracted from whatever may limit or determine it to any inferior ſpecies; ſo that he that thinks always of being in general, thinks never of any particular ſpecies of being; unleſs he can think of it with and without preciſion, at the ſame time. But if he means, that he thinks of being in general, whenever he thinks of this or that particular being, or ſort of being; then it is certain he may always think of being in general, till he can find out a way of thinking on nothing.

34. BEING in general, is being (26) abſtracted from wiſdom, goodneſs, power, and any particular ſort of duration; and I have as true an idea of being, when theſe are excluded out of it, as when extenſion, place, ſolidity, and mobility, are excluded out of my idea. And therefore, if being in general, and God, be the ſame, I have a true idea of God, when I exclude out of it power, goodneſs, wiſdom, and eternity.

35. As if there was no difference (27) between "man's being his own "light," and "not ſeeing things in God." Man may be enlightened by God, though it be not by "ſeeing all things in God."

THE finiſhing of theſe haſty thoughts muſt be deferred to another ſeaſon.

Oates, 1693. JOHN LOCKE.

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(23) See Reaſon and Religion, Part II. Contempl. II. § 37. p. 215.
(24) Ibid. § 38. p. 216, 217. (25) Ibid. § 39. p. 217, 218.
(26) Ibid. § 40. p. 219. (27) Ibid. § 43. p. 223.

ELEMENTS OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAP. I.

Of Matter and Motion.

MATTER is an extended ſolid ſubſtance; which being comprehended under diſtinct ſurfaces, makes ſo many particular diſtinct bodies.

MOTION is ſo well known by the ſight and touch, that to uſe words to give a clear idea of it, would be in vain.

MATTER, or body, is indifferent to motion, or reſt.

THERE is as much force required to put a body, which is in motion, at reſt; as there is to ſet a body, which is at reſt, into motion.

No parcel of matter can give itſelf either motion or reſt, and therefore a body at reſt will remain ſo eternally, except ſome external cauſe puts it in motion; and a body in motion will move eternally, unleſs ſome external cauſe ſtops it.

A BODY in motion will always move on in a ſtrait line, unleſs it be turned out of it by ſome external cauſe; becauſe a body can no more alter the determination of its motion, than it can begin it, alter or ſtop its motion itſelf.

THE ſwiftneſs of motion is meaſured by diſtance of place, and length of time wherein it is performed. For inſtance, if A and B, bodies of equal or different bigneſs, move each of them an inch in the ſame time; their motions are equally ſwift; but if A moves two inches, in the time whilſt B is moving one inch; the motion of A is twice as ſwift as that of B.

THE quantity of motion is meaſured by the ſwiftneſs of the motion, and the quantity of the matter moved, taken together. For inſtance, if A, a body equal to B, moves as ſwift as B; then it hath an equal quantity of motion. If A hath twice as much matter as B, and moves

equally as ſwift, it hath double the quantity of motion; and ſo in proportion.

IT appears, as far as human obſervation reaches, to be a ſettled law of Nature, that all bodies have a tendency, attraction, or gravitation towards one another.

THE ſame force, applied to two different bodies, produces always the ſame quantity of motion in each of them. For inſtance, let a boat which with its lading is one ton, be tied at a diſtance to another veſſel, which with its lading is twenty-ſix tons; if the rope that ties them together be pulled, either in the leſs or bigger of theſe veſſels, the leſs of the two, in their approach one to another, will move twenty-ſix feet, while the other moves but one foot.

WHEREFORE the quantity of matter in the earth being twenty-ſix times more than in the moon; the motion in the moon towards the earth, by the common force of attraction, by which they are impelled towards one another, will be twenty-ſix times as faſt as in the earth; that is, the moon will move twenty-ſix miles towards the earth, for every mile the earth moves towards the moon.

HENCE it is, that, in this natural tendency of bodies towards one another, that in the leſſer is conſidered as gravitation; and that in the bigger as attraction; becauſe the motion of the leſſer body (by reaſon of its much greater ſwiftneſs) is alone taken notice of.

THIS attraction is the ſtrongeſt, the nearer the attracting bodies are to each other; and, in different diſtances of the ſame bodies, is reciprocally in the duplicate proportion of thoſe diſtances. For inſtance, if two bodies, at a given diſtance, attract each other with a certain force, at half the diſtance, they will attract each other with four times that force; at one third of the diſtance, with nine times that force; and ſo on.

Two bodies at a diſtance will put one another into motion by the force of attraction; which is inexplicable by us, though made evident to us by experience, and ſo to be taken as a principle in natural philoſophy.

SUPPOSING then the earth the ſole body in the univerſe, and at reſt; if God ſhould create the moon, at the ſame diſtance that it is now from the earth; the earth and the moon would preſently begin to move one towards another in a ſtrait line by this motion of attraction or gravitation.

IF a body, that by the attraction of another would move in a ſtrait line towards it, receives a new motion any ways oblique to the firſt; it will no longer move in a ſtrait line, according to either of thoſe directions; but in a curve that will partake of both. And this curve will differ, according to the nature and quantity of the forces that concurred to produce it; as, for inſtance, in many caſes it will be ſuch a curve as ends where it began, or recurs into itſelf; that is, makes up a circle, or an ellipſis or oval very little differing from a circle.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Univerſe.

TO any one, who looks about him in the world, there are obvious ſeveral diſtinct maſſes of matter, ſeparate from one another; ſome whereof have diſcernible motions. Theſe are the ſun, the fixt ſtars, the comets and the planets, amongſt which this earth, which we inhabit, is one. All theſe are viſible to our naked eyes.

BESIDES theſe, teleſcopes have diſcovered ſeveral fixt ſtars, inviſible to the naked eye; and ſeveral other bodies moving about ſome of the planets; all which were inviſible and unknown, before the uſe of perſpective-glaſſes were found.

THE vaſt diſtances between theſe great bodies, are called intermundane ſpaces; in which though there may be ſome fluid matter, yet it is ſo thin and ſubtile, and there is ſo little of that in reſpect of the great maſſes that move in thoſe ſpaces, that it is as much as nothing.

THESE maſſes of matter are either luminous, or opake or dark.

LUMINOUS bodies, are ſuch as give light of themſelves; and ſuch are the ſun and the fixt ſtars.

DARK or opake bodies, are ſuch as emit no light of themſelves, though they are capable of reflecting of it, when it is caſt upon them from other bodies; and ſuch are the planets.

THERE are ſome opake bodies, as for inſtance the comets, which, beſides the light that they may have from the ſun, ſeem to ſhine with a light that is nothing elſe but an accenſion, which they receive from the ſun, in their near approaches to it, in their reſpective revolutions.

THE fixt ſtars are called fixt, becauſe they always keep the ſame diſtance one from another.

THE ſun, at the ſame diſtance from us that the fixt ſtars are, would have the appearance of one of the fixt ſtars.

CHAP. III.

Of our Solar Syſtem.

OUR ſolar ſyſtem conſiſts of the ſun, and the planets and comets moving about it.

THE planets are bodies, which appear to us like ſtars; not that they are luminous bodies, that is, have light in themſelves; but they ſhine by reflecting the light of the ſun.

THEY are called planets from a Greek word, which ſignifies wandering; becauſe they change their places, and do not always keep the ſame diſtance with one another, nor with the fixt ſtars, as the fixt ſtars do.

THE

THE planets are either primary, or ſecondary.

THERE are ſix primary planets, viz. Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.

ALL theſe move round the ſun, which is, as it were, the center of their motions.

THE ſecondary planets move round about other planets. Beſides the moon, which moves about the earth; four moons move about Jupiter, and five about Saturn, which are called their ſatellites.

THE middle diſtances of the primary planets from the ſun are as follows:

Mercury	Is diſtant from the ſun's center, about	32,000,000	Statute miles, each 5280 Engliſh and 4943 French feet.
Venus.		59,000,000	
The Earth		81,000,000	
Mars		123,000,000	
Jupiter		424,000,000	
Saturn		777,000,000	

THE orbits of the planets, and their reſpective diſtances from the ſun, and from one another, together with the orbit of a comet, may be ſeen in the figure of the ſolar ſyſtem hereunto annexed.

THE periodical times of each planet's revolution about the ſun are as follows:

		Y.	D.	H.	M.
Mercury	Revolves about the Sun, in the ſpace of	0	88	0	0
Venus		0	225	0	0
The Earth		0	365	5	49
Mars		1	322	0	0
Jupiter		11	319	0	0
Saturn		29	138	0	0

THE planets move round about the ſun from weſt to eaſt in the zodiac; or, to ſpeak plainer, are always found amongſt ſome of the ſtars of thoſe conſtellations, which make the twelve ſigns of the zodiac.

THE motion of the planets about the ſun is not perfectly circular, but rather elliptical.

THE reaſon of their motions in curve lines, is the attraction of the ſun, or their gravitations towards the ſun, (call it which you pleaſe); and an oblique or ſide-long impulſe or motion.

THESE two motions or tendencies, the one always endeavouring to carry them in a ſtrait line from the circle they move in, and the other endeavouring to draw them in a ſtrait line to the ſun, makes that curve line they revolve in.

THE motion of the comets about the ſun is in a very long ſlender oval: whereof one of the focuſes is the center of the ſun, and the other very much beyond the ſphere of Saturn.

THE moon moves about the earth, as the earth doth about the ſun. So that it hath the center of its motion in the earth; as the earth hath the center of its revolution in the ſun, about which it moves.

THE moon makes its ſynodical motion about the earth, in 29 days, 12 hours, and about 44 minutes.

IT is full moon, when, the earth being between the ſun and the moon, we ſee all the enlightened part of the moon; new moon, when, the moon being between us and the ſun, its enlightened part is turned from us; and half moon, when the moon being in the quadratures, as the aſtronomers call it, we ſee but half the enlightened part.

AN eclipſe of the moon is, when the earth, being between the ſun and the moon, hinders the light of the ſun from falling upon, and being reflected by, the moon. If the light of the ſun is kept off from the whole body of the moon, it is a total eclipſe; if from a part only, it is a partial one.

AN eclipſe of the ſun is, when the moon, being between the ſun and the earth, hinders the light of the ſun from coming to us. If the moon hides from us the whole body of the ſun, it is a total eclipſe; if not, a partial one.

OUR ſolar ſyſtem is diſtant from the fixt ſtars 20,000.000.000 ſemi-diameters of the earth; or, as Mr. Huygens expreſſes the diſtance, in his Coſmotheoros (1): the fixt ſtars are ſo remote from the earth, that, if a cannot-bullet ſhould come from one of the fixt ſtars with as ſwift a motion as it hath when it is ſhot out of the mouth of a cannon, it would be 700,000 years in coming to the earth.

THIS vaſt diſtance ſo much abates the attraction to thoſe remote bodies, that its operation upon thoſe of our ſyſtem is not at all ſenſible, nor would draw away or hinder the return of any of our ſolar comets; though ſome of them ſhould go ſo far from the ſun, as not to make the revolution about it in leſs than 1000 years.

IT is more ſuitable to the wiſdom, power, and greatneſs of God, to think that the fixt ſtars are all of them ſuns, with ſyſtems of inhabitable planets moving about them, to whoſe inhabitants he diſplays the marks of his goodneſs as well as to us; rather than to imagine that thoſe very remote bodies, ſo little uſeful to us, were made only for our ſake.

CHAP IV.

Of the Earth, conſidered as a Planet.

THE earth, by its revolution about the ſun in 365 days, 5 hours, 49 minutes, makes that ſpace of time we call a year.

THE line, which the center of the earth deſcribes in its annual revolution about the ſun, is called ecliptick.

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(1) Chriſtiani Huygenii ΚΟΣΜΟΘΕΩΡΟΣ, ſive de terris cœleſtibus earumque ornatu, conjecturæ, &c. p. m. 137.

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THE annual motion of the earth about the ſun, is in the order of the ſigns of the zodiack; that is, ſpeaking vulgarly, from weſt to eaſt.

BESIDES this annual revolution of the earth about the ſun in the ecliptick, the earth turns round upon its own axis in 24 hours.

THE turning of the earth upon its own axis every 24 hours, whilſt it moves round the ſun in a year, we may conceive by the running of a bowl on a bowling-green; in which not only the center of the bowl hath a progreſſive motion on the green; but the bowl in its going forward, from one part of the green to another, turns round about its own axis.

THE turning of the earth on its own axis, makes the difference of day and night; it being day in thoſe parts of the earth which are turned towards the ſun; and night in thoſe parts which are in the ſhade, or turned from the ſun.

THE annual revolution of the earth in the ecliptick, is the cauſe of the different ſeaſons, and of the ſeveral lengths of days and nights, in every part of the world, in the courſe of the year.

THE reaſon of it, is the earth's going round its own axis in the ecliptick, but at the ſame time keeping every-where its axis equally inclined to the plane of the ecliptick, and parallel to itſelf. For the plane of the ecliptick inclining to the plane of the equator, 23 degrees and an half, makes that the earth, moving round in the ecliptick, hath ſometimes one of its poles, and ſometimes the other, nearer the ſun.

IF the diameter of the ſun be to the diameter of the earth, as 48 to 1, as by ſome it is accounted; then the diſk of the ſun, ſpeaking "numero rotundo," is above 2000 times bigger than the diſk of the earth; and the globe of the ſun is above 100,000 times bigger than the globe of the earth.

THE diſtance of the earth's orbit from the ſun, is above 20,000 ſemidiameters of the earth.

IF a cannon-bullet ſhould come from the ſun, with the ſame velocity it hath when it is ſhot out of the mouth of a cannon, it would be 25 years in coming to the earth.

CHAP. V.

Of the Air and Atmoſphere.

WE have already conſidered the earth as a planet, or one of the great maſſes of matter moving about the ſun; we ſhall now conſider it as it is made up of its ſeveral parts, abſtracting from its diurnal and annual motions.

THE exterior part of this our habitable world is the air or atmoſphere; a light, thin fluid, or ſpringy body, that encompaſſes the ſolid earth on all ſides.

THE height of the atmoſphere, above the ſurface of the ſolid earth, is not certainly known; but that it doth reach but to a very ſmall part of the diſtance betwixt the earth and the moon, may be concluded from the refraction of the rays coming from the ſun, moon, and other luminous bodies.

THOUGH conſidering that the air we are in, being near 1000 times lighter than water; and that the higher it is, the leſs it is compreſſed by the ſuperior incumbent air, and ſo conſequently being a ſpringy body the thinner it is; and conſidering alſo that a pillar of air of any diameter is equal in weight to a pillar of quickſilver of the ſame diameter of between 29 and 30 inches height; we may infer that the top of the atmoſphere is not very near the ſurface of the ſolid earth.

IT may be concluded, that the utmoſt extent of the atmoſphere reaches upwards, from the ſurface of the ſolid earth that we walk on, to a good diſtance above us; firſt, if we conſider that a column of air of any given diameter is equiponderant to a column of quickſilver of between 29 and 30 inches height. Now quickſilver being near 14 times heavier than water, if air was as heavy as water, the atmoſphere would be about 14 times higher than the column of quickſilver, i. e. about 35 feet.

SECONDLY, if we conſider that air is 1000 times lighter than water, then a pillar of air equal in weight to a pillar of quickſilver of 30 inches high will be 35000 feet; whereby we come to know that the air or atmoſphere is 35000 feet, i. e. near ſeven miles high.

THIRDLY, if we conſider that the air is a ſpringy body, and that that, which is neareſt the earth, is compreſſed by the weight of all the atmoſphere that is above it, and reſts perpendicularly upon it; we ſhall find that the air here, near the ſurface of the earth, is much denſer and thicker than it is in the upper parts. For example, if upon a fleece of wool you lay another; the under one will be a little compreſſed by the weight of that which lies upon it; and ſo both of them by a third, and ſo on; ſo that, if 10000 were piled one upon another, the under one would by the weight of all the reſt be very much compreſſed, and all the parts of it be brought abundantly cloſer together, than when there was no other upon it; and the next to that a little leſs compreſſed, the third a little leſs than the ſecond, and ſo on till it came to the uppermoſt, which would be in its full expanſion, and not compreſſed at all. Juſt ſo it is in the air; the higher you go in it, the leſs it is compreſſed, and conſequently the leſs denſe it is; and ſo the upper part being exceedingly thinner than the lower part, which we breathe in (which is that that is 1000 times lighter than water); the top of the atmoſphere is probably much higher than the diſtance above aſſigned.

THAT the air near the ſurface of the earth will mightily expand itſelf, when the preſſure of the incumbent atmoſphere is taken off, may be abundantly ſeen in the experiments made by Mr. Boyle in his pneumatick engine. In his "Phyſico-mechanical Experiments," concerning

the air, he declares (1) it probable that the atmoſphere may be ſeveral hundred miles high; which is eaſy to be admitted, when we conſider what he proves in another part of the ſame treatiſe, viz. that the air here about the ſurface of the earth, when the preſſure is taken from it, will dilate itſelf above 152 times.

THE atmoſphere is the ſcene of the meteors; and therein is collected the matter of rain, hail, ſnow, thunder, and lightning; and a great many other things obſervable in the air.

CHAP. VI.

Of Meteors in general.

BESIDES the ſpringy particles of pure air, the atmoſphere is made up of ſeveral ſteams or minute particles of ſeveral ſorts, riſing from the earth and the waters, and floating in the air, which is a fluid body, and though much finer and thinner, may be conſidered in reſpect of its fluidity to be like water, and ſo capable, like other liquors, of having heterogeneous particles floating in it.

THE moſt remarkable of them are, firſt, the particles of water raiſed into the atmoſphere, chiefly by the heat of the ſun, out of the ſea and other waters, and the ſurface of the earth; from whence it falls in dew, rain, hail, and ſnow.

OUT of the vapours riſing from moiſture, the clouds are principally made.

CLOUDS do not conſiſt wholly of watery parts; for, beſides the aqueous vapours that are raiſed into the air, there are alſo ſulphureous and ſaline particles that are raiſed up, and in the clouds mixed with the aqueous particles, the effects whereof are ſometimes very ſenſible; as particularly in lightning and thunder, when the ſulphureous and nitrous particles firing break out with that violence of light and noiſe, which is obſervable in thunder, and very much reſembles gun-powder.

THAT there are nitrous particles raiſed into the air is evident from the nouriſhment which rain gives to vegetables more than any other water; and alſo by the collection of nitre or ſalt-petre in heaps of earth, out of which it has been extracted, if they be expoſed to the air, ſo as to be kept from rain; not to mention other efforts, wherein the nitrous ſpirit in the air ſhews itſelf.

CLOUDS are the greateſt and moſt conſiderable of all the meteors, as furniſhing matter and plenty to the earth. They conſiſt of very ſmall drops of water, and are elevated a good diſtance above the ſurface of

(1) New Experiments Phyſico-mechanical, touching the ſpring of the air, and its effects; (made for the moſt part in a new pneumatical engine) written .... by the honourable ROBERT BOYLE, Eſq; experiment xxxvi. p. 155. Oxford, 1662, in 4to.

the earth; for a cloud is nothing but a miſt flying high in the air, as a miſt is nothing but a cloud here below.

How vapours are raiſed into the air in inviſible ſteams by the heat of the ſun out of the ſea, and moiſt parts of the earth, is eaſily underſtood; and there is a viſible inſtance of it in ordinary diſtillations. But how theſe ſteams are collected into drops, which bring back the water again, is not ſo eaſy to determine.

To thoſe that will carefully obſerve, perhaps it will appear probable, that it is by that, which the chymiſts call precipitation; to which it anſwers in all its parts.

THE air may be looked on as a clear and pellucid menſtruum, in which the inſenſible particles of diſſolved matter float up and down, without being diſcerned, or troubling the pellucidity of the air; when on a ſudden, as if it were by a precipitation, they gather into the very ſmall but viſible miſty drops that make clouds.

THIS may be obſerved ſometimes in a very clear ſky; when, there not appearing any cloud, or any thing opake, in the whole horizon, one may ſee on a ſudden clouds gather, and all the hemiſphere overcaſt; which cannot be from the riſing of the new aqueous vapours at that time, but from the precipitation of the moiſture, that in inviſible particles floated in the air, into very ſmall, but very viſible drops, which by a like cauſe being united into greater drops, they become too heavy to be ſuſtained in the air, and ſo fall down in rain.

HAIL ſeems to be the drops of rain frozen in their falling.

SNOW is the ſmall particles of water frozen before they unite into drops.

THE regular figures, which branch out in flakes of ſnow, ſeem to ſhew that there are ſome particles of ſalt mixed with the water, which makes them unite in certain angles.

THE rain-bow is reckoned one of the moſt remarkable meteors, though really it be no meteor at all; but the reflection of the ſun-beams from the ſmalleſt drops of a cloud or miſt, which are placed in a certain angle made by the concurrence of two lines, one drawn from the ſun, and the other from the eye to theſe little drops in the cloud, which reflect the ſun-beams; ſo that two people, looking upon a rainbow at the ſame time, do not ſee exactly the ſame rain-bow.

CHAP. VII.

Of Springs, Rivers, and the Sea.

PART of the water that falls down from the clouds, runs away upon the ſurface of the earth into channels, which convey it to the ſea; and part of it is imbibed in the ſpungy ſhell of the earth, from whence ſinking lower by degrees, it falls down into ſubterranean channels,

nels, and ſo under ground paſſes into the ſea; or elſe, meeting with beds of rock or clay, it is hindered from ſinking lower, and ſo breaks out in ſprings, which are moſt commonly in the ſides, or at the bottom of hilly ground.

SPRINGS make little rivulets; thoſe united make brooks; and thoſe coming together make rivers, which empty themſelves into the ſea.

THE ſea is a great collection of waters in the deep valleys of the earth. If the earth were all plain, and had not thoſe deep hollows, the earth would be all covered with water; becauſe the water, being lighter than the earth, would be above the earth, as the air is above the water.

THE moſt remarkable thing in the ſea is that motion of the water called tides. It is a riſing and falling of the water of the ſea. The cauſe of this is the attraction of the moon, whereby the part of the water in the great ocean, which is neareſt the moon, being moſt ſtrongly attracted, is raiſed higher than the reſt; and the part oppoſite to it on the contrary ſide, being leaſt attracted, is alſo higher than the reſt. And theſe two oppoſite riſes of the ſurface of the water in the great ocean, following the motion of the moon from eaſt to weſt, and ſtriking againſt the large coaſts of the continents that lie in its way; from thence rebounds back again, and ſo makes floods and ebbs in narrow ſeas, and rivers remote from the great ocean. Herein we alſo ſee the reaſon of the times of the tides, and why they ſo conſtantly follow the courſe of the moon.

CHAP. VIII.

Of ſeveral ſorts of Earth, Stones, Metals, Minerals, and other Foſſils.

THIS ſolid globe we live upon is called the earth, though it contains in it a great variety of bodies, ſeveral whereof are not properly earth; which word, taken in a more limited ſenſe, ſignifies ſuch parts of this globe as are capable, being expoſed to the air, to give rooting and nouriſhment to plants, ſo that they may ſtand and grow in it. With ſuch earth as this, the greateſt part of the ſurface of this globe is covered; and it is as it were the ſtore-houſe, from whence all the living creatures of our world have originally their proviſions; for from thence all the plants have their ſuſtenance, and ſome few animals, and from theſe all the other animals.

OF earth, taken in this ſenſe, there are ſeveral ſorts, v. g. common mould, or garden earth, clay of ſeveral kinds, ſandy ſoils.

BESIDES theſe, there is medicinal earth; as that which is called terra lemnia, bolus armena, and divers others.

AFTER the ſeveral earths, we may conſider the parts of the ſurface of this globe, which is barren; and ſuch, for the moſt, are ſand, gravel, chalk, and rocks, which produce nothing, where they have no earth mixt

amongſt them. Barren ſands are of divers kinds, and conſiſt of ſeveral little irregular ſtones without any earth; and of ſuch there are great deſerts to be ſeen in ſeveral parts of the world.

BESIDES theſe, which are moſt remarkable on the ſurface of the earth, there are found deeper, in this globe, many other bodies, which, becauſe we diſcover by digging into the bowels of the earth, are called by one common name, foſſils; under which are comprehended metals, minerals, or half metals, ſtones of divers kinds, and ſundry bodies that have the texture between earth and ſtone.

To begin with thoſe foſſils which come neareſt the earth; under this head we may reckon the ſeveral ſorts of oker, chalk, that which they call black-lead, and other bodies of this kind, which are harder than earth, but have not the conſiſtency and hardneſs of perfect ſtone.

NEXT to theſe may be conſidered ſtones of all ſorts; whereof there is almoſt an infinite variety. Some of the moſt remarkable, either for beauty or uſe, are theſe: marble of all kinds, porphyry, granate, free-ſtone, &c. flints, agates, cornelians, pebbles, under which kind come the precious ſtones, which are but pebbles of an exceſſive hardneſs, and when they are cut and poliſhed, they have an extraordinary luſtre. The moſt noted and eſteemed are, diamonds, rubies, amethyſts, emeralds, topazes, opals.

BESIDES theſe, we muſt not omit thoſe which, though of not ſo much beauty, yet are of greater uſe, viz. loadſtones, whetſtones of all kinds, limeſtones, calamint, or lapis calaminaris; and abundance of others.

BESIDES theſe, there are found in the earth ſeveral ſorts of ſalts, as eating or common ſalt, vitriol, ſal gemma, and others.

THE minerals, or ſemi-metals, that are dug out of the bowels of the earth, are antimony, cinnabar, zink, &c. to which may be added brimſtone.

BUT the bodies of moſt uſe, that are ſought for out of the depths of the earth, are the metals; which are diſtinguiſhed from other bodies by their weight, fuſibility, and malleableneſs; of which there are theſe ſorts, gold, ſilver, copper, tin, lead, and, the moſt valuable of them all, iron; to which one may join that anomalous body quickſilver, or mercury.

HE that deſires to be more particularly informed concerning the qualities and properties of theſe ſubterraneous bodies, may conſult natural hiſtorians and chymiſts.

WHAT lies deeper towards the center of the earth we know not, but a very little beneath the ſurface of this globe; and whatever we fetch from under ground is only what is lodged in the ſhell of the earth.

ALL ſtones, metals, and minerals, are real vegetables; that is, grow organically from proper ſeeds, as well as plants.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Vegetables, or Plants.

NEXT to the earth itſelf, we may conſider thoſe that are maintained on its ſurface; which, though they are faſtened to it, yet are very diſtinct from it; and thoſe are the whole tribe of vegetables or plants. Theſe may be divided into three ſorts, herbs, ſhrubs, and trees.

HERBS are thoſe plants whoſe ſtalks are ſoft, and have nothing woody in them, as graſs, ſowthiſtle, and hemlock. Shrubs and trees have all wood in them; but with this difference, that ſhrubs grow not to the height of trees, and uſually ſpread into branches near the ſurface of the earth; whereas trees generally ſhoot up in one great ſtem or body, and then, at a good diſtance from the earth, ſpread into branches; thus gooſeberries, and currants, are ſhrubs; oaks, and cherries, are trees.

IN plants, the moſt conſiderable parts are theſe, the root, the ſtalk, the leaves, the flower, and the ſeed. There are very few of them that have not all theſe parts, though ſome there are that have no ſtalk; others that have no leaves; and others that have no flowers. But without ſeed or root I think there are none.

IN vegetables, there two things chiefly to be conſidered, their nouriſhment and propagation.

THEIR nouriſhment is thus: the ſmall and tender fibres of the roots, being ſpread under ground, imbibe, from the moiſt earth, juice fit for their nouriſhment; this is conveyed by the ſtalk up into the branches, and leaves, through little, and, in ſome plants, imperceptible tubes, and from thence, by the bark, returns again to the root; ſo that there is in vegetables, as well as animals, a circulation of the vital liquor. By what impulſe it is moved, is ſomewhat hard to diſcover. It ſeems to be from the difference of day and night, and other changes in the heat of the air; for the heat dilating, and the cold contracting thoſe little tubes, ſuppoſing there be valves in them, it is eaſy to be conceived how the circulation is performed in plants, where it is not required to be ſo rapid and quick as in animals.

NATURE has provided for the propagation of the ſpecies of plants ſeveral ways. The firſt and general is by ſeed. Beſides this, ſome plants are raiſed from any part of the root ſet in the ground; others by new roots that are propagated from the old one, as in tulips; others by offſets, and in others, the branches ſet in the ground will take root and grow; and laſt of all, grafting and inoculation, in certain ſorts, are known ways of propagation. All theſe ways of increaſing plants make one good part of the ſkill of gardening; and from the books of gardeners may be beſt learnt.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Animals.

THERE is another ſort of creatures belonging to this our earth, rather as inhabitants than parts of it. They differ in this from plants, that they are not fixed to any one place, but have a freedom of motion up and down, and, beſides, have ſenſe to guide them in their motions.

MAN and brute, divide all the animals of this our globe.

BRUTES may be conſidered as either aerial, terreſtrial, aquatick, or amphibious. I call thoſe aerial, which have wings, wherewith they can ſupport themſelves in the air. Terreſtrial, are thoſe, whoſe only place of reſt is upon the earth. Aquatick, are thoſe, whoſe conſtant abode is upon the water. Thoſe are called amphibious, which live freely in the air upon the earth, and yet are obſerved to live long upon the water, as if they were natural inhabitants of that element; though it be worth the examination to know, whether any of thoſe creatures that live at their eaſe, and by choice, a good while or at any time upon the earth, can live a long time together perfectly under water.

AERIAL animals may be ſubdivided into birds, and flies.

FISHES, which are the chief part of aquatick animals, may be divided into ſhell-fiſhes, ſcaly fiſhes, and thoſe that have neither apparent ſcales nor ſhells.

AND the terreſtrial animals may be divided into quadrupeds or beaſts, reptiles, which have many feet, and ſerpents, which have no feet at all.

INSECTS, which in their ſeveral changes belong to ſeveral of the before-mentioned diviſions, may be conſidered together as one great tribe of animals. They are called inſects, from a ſeparation in the middle of their bodies, whereby they are, as it were, cut into two parts, which are joined together by a ſmall ligature; as we ſee in waſps, common flies, and the like.

BESIDES all theſe, there are ſome animals that are not perfectly of theſe kinds, but placed, as it were, in the middle betwixt two of them, by ſomething of both; as bats, which have ſomething of beaſts and birds in them.

SOME reptiles of the earth, and ſome of aquaticks, want one or more of the ſenſes, which are in perfecter animals; as worms, oyſters, cockles, &c.

ANIMALS are nouriſhed by food, taken in at the mouth, digeſted in the ſtomach, and thence by fit veſſels diſtributed over the whole body, as is deſcribed in books of anatomy.

THE

THE greateſt part of animals have five ſenſes, viz. ſeeing, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, and feeling. Theſe, and the way of nouriſhment of animals, we ſhall more particularly conſider; becauſe they are common to man with beaſts.

THE way of nouriſhment of animals, particularly of man, is by food taken in at the mouth, which being chewed there, is broken and mixed with the ſaliva, and thereby prepared for an eaſier and better digeſtion in the ſtomach.

WHEN the ſtomach has performed its office upon the food, it protrudes it into the guts, by whoſe periſtaltick motion it is gently conveyed along through the guts, and, as it paſſes, the chyle, which is the nutritive part, is ſeparated from the excrementitious, by the lacteal veins; and from thence conveyed into the blood, with which it circulates till itſelf be concocted into blood. The blood, being by the vena cava brought into the right ventricle of the heart, by the contraction of that muſcle, is driven through the arteria pulmonaris into the lungs; where the conſtantly inſpired air mixing with it, enlivens it; and from thence being conveyed by the vena pulmonaris into the left ventricle of the heart, the contraction of the heart forces it out, and, by the arteries, diſtributes it into all parts of the body; from whence it returns by the veins into the right ventricle of the heart, to take the ſame courſe again. This is called the circulation of the blood; by which life and heat are communicated to every part of the body.

IN the circulation of the blood, a good part of it goes up into the head; and by the brains are ſeparated from it, or made out of it, the animal ſpirits; which, by the nerves, impart ſenſe and motion to all parts of the body.

THE inſtruments of motion are the muſcles; the fibres whereof contracting themſelves, move the ſeveral parts of the body.

THIS contraction of the muſcles is, in ſome of them, by the direction of the mind, and in ſome of them without it; which is the difference between voluntary and involuntary motions, in the body.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Five Senſes.

OF SEEING.

THE organ of ſeeing is the eye; conſiſting of variety of parts wonderfully contrived, for the admitting and refracting the rays of light; ſo that thoſe that come from the ſame point of the object, and fall upon different parts of the pupil, are brought to meet again at the bottom of the eye, whereby the whole object is painted on the retina that is ſpread there.

THAT which immediately affects the ſight, and produces in us that ſenſation which we call ſeeing, is light.

LIGHT may be conſidered either, firſt, as it radiates from luminous bodies directly to our eyes; and thus we ſee luminous bodies themſelves, as the ſun, or a flame, &c. or, ſecondly, as it is reflected from other bodies; and thus we ſee a man, or a picture, by the rays of light reflected from them to our eyes.

BODIES, in reſpect of light, may be divided into three ſorts; firſt, thoſe that emit rays of light, as the ſun and fixt ſtars; ſecondly, thoſe that tranſmit the rays of light, as the air; thirdly, thoſe that reflect the rays of light, as iron, earth, &c. The firſt are called luminous; the ſecond pellucid; and the third opake.

THE rays of light themſelves are not ſeen; but by them the bodies, from which they originally come; as the ſun, or a fixt ſtar; or the bodies, from which they are reflected; as a horſe, or a tulip. When the moon ſhines, we do not ſee the rays which come from the ſun to the moon, but by them we ſee the moon, from whence they are reflected.

IF the eye be placed in the medium, through which the rays paſs to it, the medium is not ſeen at all; for inſtance, we do not ſee the air through which the rays come to our eyes. But if a pellucid body, through which the light comes, be at a diſtance from our eye, we ſee that body, as well as the bodies, from whence the rays come that paſs through them to come to our eyes. For inſtance, we do not only ſee bodies through a pair of ſpectacles, but we ſee the glaſs itſelf. The reaſon whereof is, that pellucid bodies being bodies, the ſurfaces of which reflect ſome rays of light from their ſolid parts; theſe ſurfaces, placed at a convenient diſtance from the eye, may be ſeen by thoſe reflected rays; as, at the ſame time, other bodies beyond thoſe pellucid ones may be ſeen by the tranſmitted rays.

OPAKE bodies are of two ſorts, ſpecular, or not ſpecular. Specular bodies, or mirrors, are ſuch opake bodies, whoſe ſurfaces are poliſhed; whereby they, reflecting the rays in the ſame order as they come from other bodies, ſhew us their images.

THE rays that are reflected from opake bodies, always bring with them to the eye the idea of colour; and this colour is nothing elſe, in the bodies, but a diſpoſition to reflect to the eye more copiouſly one ſort of rays than another. For particular rays are originally endowed with particular colours; ſome are red, others blue, others yellow, and others green, &c.

EVERY ray of light, as it comes from the ſun, ſeems a bundle of all theſe ſeveral ſorts of rays; and as ſome of them are more refrangible than others; that is, are more turned out of their courſe, in paſſing from one medium to another; it follows, that after ſuch refraction they will be ſeparated, and their diſtinct colour obſerved. Of theſe, the moſt refrangible are violet, and the leaſt red; and the intermediate ones, in

order, are indigo, blue, green, yellow, and orange. This ſeparation is very entertaining, and will be obſerved with pleaſure in holding a priſm in the beams of the ſun.

As all theſe rays differ in refrangibility, ſo they do in reflexibility; that is, in the property of being more eaſily reflected from certain bodies, than from others; and hence ariſe, as hath been ſaid, all the colours of bodies; which are, in a manner, infinite, as an infinite number of compoſitions and proportions, of the original colours, may be imagined.

THE whiteneſs of the ſun's light is compounded of all the original colours, mixed in a due proportion.

WHITENESS, in bodies, is but a diſpoſition to reflect all colours of light, nearly in the proportion they are mixed in the original rays; as, on the contrary, blackneſs is only a diſpoſition to abſorb or ſtifle, without reflection, moſt of the rays of every ſort that fall on the bodies.

LIGHT is ſucceſſively propagated with an almoſt inconceivable ſwiftneſs; for it comes from the ſun, to this our earth, in about ſeven or eight minutes of time, which diſtance is about 80,000,000 Engliſh miles.

BESIDES colour, we are ſuppoſed to ſee figure; but, in truth, that which we perceive when we ſee figure, as perceivable by ſight, is nothing but the termination of colour.

OF HEARING.

NEXT to ſeeing, hearing is the moſt extenſive of our ſenſes. The ear is the organ of hearing, whoſe curious ſtructure is to be learnt from anatomy.

THAT which is conveyed into the brain by the ear is called ſound; though, in truth, till it come to reach and affect the perceptive part, it be nothing but motion.

THE motion, which produces in us the perception of ſound, is a vibration of the air, cauſed by an exceeding ſhort, but quick, tremulous motion of the body, from which it is propagated; and therefore we conſider and denominate them as bodies ſounding.

THAT ſound is the effect of ſuch a ſhort, briſk, vibrating motion of bodies, from which it is propagated, may be known from what is obſerved and felt in the ſtrings of inſtruments, and the trembling of bells, as long as we perceive any ſound come from them; for as ſoon as that vibration is ſtopt, or ceaſes in them, the perception ceaſes alſo.

THE propagation of ſound is very quick, but not approaching that of light. Sounds move about 1140 Engliſh feet in a ſecond of time; and in ſeven or eight minutes of time, they move about one hundred Engliſh miles.

OF SMELLING.

SMELLING is another ſenſe, that ſeems to be wrought on by bodies at a diſtance; though that, which immediately affects the organ, and produces in us the ſenſation of any ſmell, are effluvia, or inviſible particles, that, coming from bodies at a diſtance, immedately affect the olfactory nerves.

SMELLING bodies ſeem perpetually to ſend forth effluvia, or ſteams, without ſenſibly waſting at all. Thus a grain of muſk will ſend forth odoriferous particles for ſcores of years together, without its being ſpent; whereby one would conclude that theſe particles are very ſmall; and yet it is plain, that they are much groſſer than the rays of light, which have a free paſſage through glaſs; and groſſer alſo than the magnetick effluvia, which paſs freely through all bodies, when thoſe that produce ſmell will not paſs through the thin membranes of a bladder, and many of them ſcarce ordinary white paper.

THERE is a great variety of ſmells, though we have but a few names for them; ſweet, ſtinking, ſour, rank, and muſty, are almoſt all the denominations we have for odours; though the ſmell of a violet, and of muſk, both called ſweet, are as diſtinct as any two ſmells whatſoever.

OF TASTE.

TASTE is the next ſenſe to be conſidered.

THE organ of taſte is the tongue and palate.

BODIES that emit light, ſounds, and ſmells, are ſeen, heard, and ſmelt at a diſtance; but bodies are not taſted, but by immediate application to the organ; for till our meat touch our tongues, or palates, we taſte it not, how near ſoever it be.

IT may be obſerved of taſtes, that though there be a great variety of them, yet, as in ſmells, they have only ſome few general names; as ſweet, bitter, ſour, harſh, rank, and ſome few others.

OF TOUCH.

THE fifth and laſt of our ſenſes is touch; a ſenſe ſpread over the whole body, though it be moſt eminently placed in the ends of the fingers.

BY this ſenſe the tangible qualities of bodies are diſcerned; as hard, ſoft, ſmooth, rough, dry, wet, clammy, and the like.

BUT the moſt conſiderable of the qualities, that are perceived by this ſenſe, are heat and cold.

THE due temperament of thoſe two oppoſite qualities, is the great inſtrument of nature, that ſhe makes uſe of in moſt, if not all, her productions.

HEAT is a very briſk agitation of the inſenſible parts of the object, which produces in us that ſenſation, from whence we denominate the object hot; ſo what in our ſenſation is heat, in the object is nothing but motion. This appears by the way whereby heat is produced; for we ſee that the rubbing of a braſs nail upon a board will make it very hot; and the axle-trees of carts and coaches are often hot, and ſometimes to a degree, that it ſets them on fire, by the rubbing of the nave of the wheel upon it.

ON the other ſide, the utmoſt degree of cold is the ceſſation of that motion of the inſenſible particles, which to our touch is heat.

BODIES are denominated hot and cold in proportion to the preſent temperament of that part of our body to which they are applied; ſo that feels hot to one, which ſeems cold to another; nay, the ſame body, felt by the two hands of the ſame man, may at the ſame time appear hot to the one, and cold to the other; becauſe the motion of the inſenſible particles of it may be more briſk than that of the particles of the other.

BESIDES the objects before-mentioned, which are peculiar to each of our ſenſes, as light, and colour of the ſight; ſound of hearing; odours of ſmelling; ſavours of taſting; and tangible qualities of the touch; there are two others that are common to all the ſenſes; and thoſe are pleaſure and pain, which they may receive by and with their peculiar objects. Thus, too much light offends the eye; ſome ſounds delight, and others grate the ear; heat in a certain degree is very pleaſant, which may be augmented to the greateſt torment; and ſo the reſt.

THESE five ſenſes are common to beaſts with men; nay, in ſome of them, ſome brutes exceed mankind. But men are endowed with other faculties, which far excel any thing that is to be found in the other animals in this our globe.

MEMORY alſo brutes may be ſuppoſed to have, as well as men.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Underſtanding of Man.

THE underſtanding of man does ſo ſurpaſs that of brutes, that ſome are of opinion brutes are mere machines, without any manner of perception at all. But letting this opinion alone, as ill-grounded, we will proceed to the conſideration of human underſtanding, and the diſtinct operations thereof.

THE

THE loweſt degree of it conſiſts in perception, which we have before in part taken notice of, in our diſcourſe of the ſenſes. Concerning which it may be convenient farther to obſerve, that, to conceive a right notion of perception, we muſt conſider the diſtinct objects of it, which are ſimple ideas; v. g. ſuch as are thoſe ſignified by theſe words, ſcarlet, blue, ſweet, bitter, heat, cold, &c. from the other objects of our ſenſes; to which we may add the internal operations of our minds, as the objects of our own reflection, ſuch as are thinking, willing, &c.

OUT of theſe ſimple ideas are made, by putting them together, ſeveral compounded or complex ideas; as thoſe ſignified by the words pebble, marygold, horſe.

THE next thing the underſtanding doth in its progreſs to knowledge, is to abſtract its ideas, by which abſtraction they are made general.

A GENERAL idea is an idea in the mind, conſidered there as ſeparated from time and place; and ſo capable to repreſent any particular being that is conformable to it. Knowledge, which is the higheſt degree of the ſpeculative faculties, conſiſts in the perception of the truth of affirmative, or negative, propoſitions.

THIS perception is either immediate, or mediate. Immediate perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, is when, by comparing them together in our minds, we ſee, or, as it were, behold, their agreement, or diſagreement. This therefore is called intuitive knowledge. Thus we ſee that red is not green; that the whole is bigger than a part; and that two and two are equal to four.

THE truth of theſe, and the like propoſitions, we know by a bare ſimple intuition of the ideas themſelves, without any more ado; and ſuch propoſitions are called ſelf-evident.

THE mediate perception of the agreement, or diſagreement, of two ideas, is when, by the intervention of one or more other ideas, their agreement, or diſagreement, is ſhewn. This is called demonſtration, or rational knowledge. For inſtance: The inequality of the breadth of two windows, or two rivers, or any two bodies that cannot be put together, may be known by the intervention of the ſame meaſure, applied to them both; and ſo it is in our general ideas, whoſe agreement or diſagreement may be often ſhewn by the intervention of ſome other ideas, ſo as to produce demonſtrative knowledge; where the ideas in queſtion cannot be brought together, and immediately compared, ſo as to produce intuitive knowledge.

THE underſtanding doth not know only certain truth; but alſo judges of probability, which conſiſts in the likely agreement, or diſagreement, of ideas.

THE aſſenting to any propoſition as probable is called opinion, or belief.

WE have hitherto conſidered the great and viſible parts of the univerſe, and thoſe great maſſes of matter, the ſtars, planets, and particularly this our earth, together with the inanimate parts, and animate inhabitants of it; it may be now fit to conſider what theſe ſenſible bodies are made of, and that is of unconceivably ſmall bodies, or atoms, out of whoſe various combinations bigger moleculæ are made: and ſo, by a greater and greater compoſition, bigger bodies; and out of theſe the whole material world is conſtituted.

BY the figure, bulk, texture, and motion, of theſe ſmall and inſenſible corpuſcles, all the phænomena of bodies may be explained.

SOME

SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING READING AND STUDY FOR A GENTLEMAN.

READING is for the improvement of the underſtanding.

THE improvement of the underſtanding is for two ends; firſt, for our own increaſe of knowledge; ſecondly, to enable us to deliver and make out that knowledge to others.

THE latter of theſe, if it be not the chief end of ſtudy in a gentleman; yet it is at leaſt equal to the other, ſince the greateſt part of his buſineſs and uſefulneſs in the world is by the influence of what he ſays, or writes to others.

THE extent of our knowledge cannot exceed the extent of our ideas. Therefore he, who would be univerſally knowing, muſt acquaint himſelf with the objects of all ſciences. But this is not neceſſary to a gentleman, whoſe proper calling is the ſervice of his country; and ſo is moſt properly concerned in moral and political knowledge; and thus the ſtudies, which more immediately belong to his calling, are thoſe which treat of virtues and vices, of civil ſociety, and the arts of government; and will take in alſo law and hiſtory.

IT is enough for a gentleman to be furniſhed with the ideas belonging to his calling, which he will find in the books that treat of the matters above-mentioned.

BUT the next ſtep towards the improvement of his underſtanding, muſt be, to obſerve the connection of theſe ideas in the propoſitions, which thoſe books hold forth, and pretend to teach as truths; which till a man can judge, whether they be truths or no, his underſtanding is but little improved; and he doth but think and talk after the books that he hath read, without having any knowledge thereby. And thus men of much reading are greatly learned, but may be little knowing.

THE third and laſt ſtep therefore, in improving the underſtanding, is to find out upon what foundation any propoſition advanced bottoms; and to obſerve the connection of the intermediate ideas, by which it is joined to that foundation, upon which it is erected, or that principle, from

from which it is derived. This, in ſhort, is right reaſoning; and by this way alone true knowledge is to be got by reading and ſtudying.

WHEN a man, by uſe, hath got this faculty of obſerving and judging of the reaſoning and coherence of what he reads, and how it proves what it pretends to teach; he is then, and not till then, in the right way of improving his underſtanding, and enlarging his knowledge by reading.

BUT that, as I have ſaid, being not all that a gentleman ſhould aim at in reading, he ſhould farther take care to improve himſelf in the art alſo of ſpeaking, that ſo he may be able to make the beſt uſe of what he knows.

THE art of ſpeaking well conſiſts chiefly in two things, viz. perſpicuity and right reaſoning.

PERSPICUITY conſiſts in the uſing of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts, which he would have paſs from his own mind into that of another man. It is this, that gives them an eaſy entrance; and it is with delight, that men hearken, to thoſe, whom they eaſily underſtand; whereas what is obſcurely ſaid, dying as it is ſpoken, is uſually not only loſt, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that ſpoke knew not what he ſaid, or was afraid to have it underſtood.

THE way to obtain this, is to read ſuch books as are allowed to be writ with the greateſt clearneſs and propriety, in the language that a man uſes. An author excellent in this faculty, as well as ſeveral others, is Dr. Tillotſon, late archbiſhop of Canterbury, in all that is publiſhed of his. I have choſen rather to propoſe this pattern, for the attainment of the art of ſpeaking clearly, than thoſe who give rules about it; ſince we are more apt to learn by example, than by direction. But if any one hath a mind to conſult the maſters in the art of ſpeaking and writing, he may find in Tully "De Oratore," and another treatiſe of his called, Orator; and in Quintilian's Inſtitutions; and Boileau's "Traité du Sublime" (1); inſtructions concerning this, and the other parts of ſpeaking well.

BESIDES perſpicuity, there muſt be alſo right reaſoning; without which, perſpicuity ſerves but to expoſe the ſpeaker. And for the attaining of this, I ſhould propoſe the conſtant reading of Chillingworth, who by his example will teach both perſpicuity, and the way of right reaſoning, better than any book that I know; and therefore will deſerve to be read upon that account over and over again; not to ſay any thing of his argument.

BESIDES theſe books in Engliſh, Tully, Terence, Virgil, Livy, and Cæſar's Commentaries, may be read to form one's mind to a reliſh of a right way of ſpeaking and writing.

THE books I have hitherto mentioned have been in order only to writing and ſpeaking well; not but that they will deſerve to be read upon other accounts.

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(1) That treatiſe is a tranſlation from Longinus.

THE ſtudy of morality, I have above mentioned as that that becomes a gentleman; not barely as a man, but in order to his buſineſs as a gentleman. Of this there are books enough writ both by antient and modern philoſophers; but the morality of the Goſpel doth ſo exceed them all, that, to give a man a full knowledge of true morality, I ſhould ſend him to no other book, but the New Teſtament. But if he hath a mind to ſee how far the heathen world carried that ſcience, and whereon they bottomed their ethicks, he will be delightfully and profitably entertained in Tully's Treatiſes "De Officiis."

POLITICKS contains two parts, very different the one from the other. The one, containing the original of ſocieties, and the riſe and extent of political power; the other, the art of governing men in ſociety.

THE firſt of theſe hath been ſo bandied amongſt us, for theſe ſixty years backward, that one can hardly miſs books of this kind. Thoſe, which I think are moſt talked of in Engliſh, are the firſt book of Mr. Hooker's "Eccleſiaſtical Polity," and Mr. Algernon Sydney's "Diſcourſes concerning Government." The latter of theſe I never read. Let me here add, "Two Treatiſes of Government," printed in 1690 (2); and a Treatiſe of "Civil Polity," printed this year (3). To theſe one may add, Puffendorf "De Officio Hominis & Civis," and "De Jure Naturali & Gentium;" which laſt is the beſt book of that kind.

As to the other part of politicks, which concerns the art of government; that, I think, is beſt to be learned by experience and hiſtory, eſpecially that of a man's own country. And therefore I think an Engliſh gentleman ſhould be well verſed in the hiſtory of England, taking his riſe as far back as there are any records of it; joining with it the laws that were made in the ſeveral ages, as he goes along in his hiſtory; that he may obſerve from thence the ſeveral turns of ſtate, and how they have been produced. In Mr. Tyrrel's Hiſtory of England, he will find all along thoſe ſeveral authors which have treated of our affairs, and which he may have recourſe to, concerning any point, which either his curioſity or judgment ſhall lead him to enquire into.

WITH the hiſtory, he may alſo do well to read the antient lawyers; ſuch as Bracton, "Fleta," Henningham, "Mirror of Juſtice," my lord Coke's "Second Inſtitutes," and the "Modus tenendi Parliamentum;" and others of that kind, which he may find quoted in the late controverſies between Mr. Petit, Mr. Tyrrel, Mr. Atwood, &c. with Dr. Brady; as alſo, I ſuppoſe, in Sedler's Treatiſe of "Rights of the Kingdom, and "Cuſtoms of our Anceſtors," whereof the firſt edition is the beſt; wherein he will find the antient conſtitution of the government of England.

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(2) Theſe two treatiſes are written by Mr. Locke himſelf.

(3) "Civil Polity. A treatiſe concerning the nature of government," &c. London 1703, in 8vo. Written by Peter Paxton, M. D.

THERE

THERE are two volumes of "State Tracts" printed ſince the Revolution, in which there are many things relating to the government of England (4).

As for general hiſtory, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Dr. Howel, are books to be had. He, who hath a mind to launch farther into that ocean, may conſult Whear's "Methodus legendi Hiſtorias," of the laſt edition; which will direct him to the authors he is to read, and the method wherein he is to read them.

To the reading of hiſtory, chronology and geography are abſolutely neceſſary.

IN geography, we have two general ones in Engliſh, Heylin and Moll; which is the beſt of them, I know not; having not been much converſant in either of them. But the laſt, I ſhould think to be of moſt uſe; becauſe of the new diſcoveries that are made every day, tending to the perfection of that ſcience. Though, I believe, that the countries, which Heylin mentions, are better treated of by him, bating what new diſcoveries ſince his time have added.

THESE two books contain geography in general, but whether an Engliſh gentleman would think it worth his time to beſtow much pains upon that; though without it he cannot well underſtand a Gazette; it is certain he cannot well be without Camden's "Britannia," which is much enlarged in the laſt Engliſh edition. A good collection of maps is alſo neceſſary.

To geography, books of travels may be added. In that kind, the collections made by our countrymen, Hackluyt and Purchas, are very good. There is alſo a very good collection made by Thevenot in folio, in French; and by Ramuzio, in Italian; whether tranſlated into Engliſh or no, I know not. There are alſo ſeveral good books of travels of Engliſhmen publiſhed, as Sandys, Roe, Brown, Gage, and Dampier.

THERE are alſo ſeveral voyages in French, which are very good, as Pyrard (5), Bergeron (6), Sagard (7), Bernier (8), &c. whether all of them are tranſlated into Engliſh, I know not.

THERE is at preſent a very good "collection of voyages and travels," never before in Engliſh, and ſuch as are out of print; now printing by Mr. Churchill (9).

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(4) We have now two collections of ſtate tracts; one, in two volumes in folio, printed in 1689 and 1692, contains "ſeveral treatiſes relating to the government from the year 1660 to 1689; and the other, in three volumes in folio, printed in 1705, 1706, and 1707, is a "Collection of tracts, publiſhed on occaſion of the late revolution in 1688, and during the reign of K. William III." Theſe collections might have been made more complete and more convenient; eſpecially the firſt, which is extremely defective and incorrect.

(5) "Voyage de Francois Pyrard de Laval. Contenant ſa navigation aux Indes Orientales, Maldives, Moluques, Breſil." Paris 1619, 8vo, 3d edit.

(6) "Relation des voyages en Tartarie, &c. Le tout recüeilli per Pierre Bergeron, Paris 1634, 8vo"

(7) "Le grand voyage des Hurons, ſitues en l'Amerique, &c. Par. F. Gab. Sagard Theodat." Paris 1632, 8vo.

(8) "Memoires de l'empire du Grand Mogol, &c. par Francois Bernier. Paris 1670 & 1671, 3 Vol. in 12mo.

(9) That collection of voyages and travels was publiſhed an. 1704, in 4 Vol. in fol.

THERE are beſides theſe a vaſt number of other travels; a ſort of books that have a very good mixture of delight and uſefulneſs. To ſet them down all, would take up too much time and room. Thoſe I have mentioned are enough to begin with.

As to chronology, I think Helvicus the beſt for common uſe; which is not a book to be read, but to lie by, and be conſulted upon occaſion. He that hath a mind to look farther into chronology, may get Tallent's "Tables," and Strauchius's "Breviarium Temporum," and may to thoſe add Scaliger "De Emendatione Temporum," and Petavius, if he hath a mind to engage deeper in that ſtudy.

THOSE, who are accounted to have writ beſt particular parts of our Engliſh hiſtory, are Bacon, of Henry VII; and Herbert of Henry VIII. Daniel alſo is commended; and Burnet's "Hiſtory of the Reformation."

MARIANA's "Hiſtory of Spain," and Thuanus's "Hiſtory of his "own Time," and Philip de Comines; are of great and deſerved reputation.

THERE are alſo ſeveral French and Engliſh memoirs and collections, ſuch as la Rochefoucault, Melvil, Ruſhworth, &c. which give a great light to thoſe who have a mind to look into what hath paſt in Europe this laſt age.

To fit a gentleman for the conduct of himſelf, whether as a private man, or as intereſted in the government of his country, nothing can be more neceſſary than the knowledge of men; which, though it be to be had chiefly from experience, and, next to that, from a judicious reading of hiſtory; yet there are books that of purpoſe treat of human nature, which help to give an inſight into it. Such are thoſe treating of the paſſions, and how they are moved; whereof Ariſtotle in his ſecond book of Rhetorick hath admirably diſcourſed, and that in a little compaſs. I think this Rhetorick is tranſlated into Engliſh; if not, it may be had in Greek and Latin together.

LA BRUYERE's "Characters" are alſo an admirable piece of painting; I think it is alſo tranſlated out of French into Engliſh.

SATYRICAL writings alſo, ſuch as Juvenal, and Perſius, and above all Horace; though they paint the deformities of men, yet they thereby teach us to know them.

THERE is another uſe of reading, which is for diverſion and delight. Such are poetical writings, eſpecially dramatick, if they be free from prophaneneſs, obſcenity, and what corrupts good manners; for ſuch pitch ſhould not be handled.

OF all the books of fiction, I know none that equals Cervantes's "Hiſ-"tory of Don Quixote" in uſefulneſs, pleaſantry, and a conſtant decorum. And indeed no writings can be pleaſant, which have not nature at the bottom, and are not drawn after her copy.

THERE is another ſort of books, which I had almoſt forgot, with which a gentleman's ſtudy ought to be well furniſhed, viz. dictionaries

of all kinds. For the Latin tongue, Littleton, Cooper, Calepin, and Robert Stephens's "Theſaurus Linguæ Latinæ," and "Voſſii Etymologi-"cum Linguæ Latinæ." Skinner's "Lexicon Etymologicum," is an excellent one of that kind, for the Engliſh tongue. Cowel's "Interpreter" is uſeful for the law terms. Spelman's "Gloſſary" is a very uſeful and learned book. And Selden's "Titles of Honour," a gentleman ſhould not be without. Baudrand hath a very good "Geographical Dictionary." And there are ſeveral hiſtorical ones, which are of uſe; as Lloyd's, Hoffman's, Moreri's. And Bayle's incomparable dictionary, is ſomething of the ſame kind. He that hath occaſion to look into books written in Latin ſince the decay of the Roman empire, and the purity of the Latin tongue, cannot be well without Du Cange's "Gloſſarium me-"diæ & infimæ Latinitatis."

AMONG the books above ſet down, I mentioned Voſſius's "Etymo-"logicum Linguæ Latinæ;" all his works are lately printed in Holland in ſix tomes. They are very fit books for a gentleman's library, containing very learned diſcourſes concerning all the ſciences.

SEVERAL

SEVERAL

LETTERS

TO

ANTH. COLLINS, Esq;

AND

OTHER PERSONS.

A Letter from Mr. Locke to Mr. Oldenburg, concerning a poisonous Fish about the Bahama Islands.

SIR,

I Herewith send you an account I lately received from New Providence, one of the Bahama islands, concerning a fish there; which is as followeth:

"I have not met with any rarities here, worth your acceptance, "though I have been diligent in enquiring after them. Of those, which "I have heard of, this seems most remarkable to me. The fish, which "are here, are many of them poisonous, bringing a great pain on their "joints, who eat them, and continue for some short time; and at last, "with two or three days itching, the pain is rubbed off. Those of the "same species, size, shape, colour, taste, are, one of them, poison; the "other, not in the least hurtful; and those that are, only to some of the "company. The distemper to men never proves mortal. Dogs and "cats sometimes eat their last. Men, who have once had that disease, "upon the first eating of fish, though it be those which are wholesome, "the poisonous ferment in their body is revived thereby, and their pain "increased."

Thus far the ingenious person, from whom I had this relation, who having been but a very little while upon the island, when he writ this, could not send so perfect an account of this odd observation, as one could wish, or as I expect to receive from him, in answer to some queries I lately sent

him by a ſhip bound thither. When his anſwer comes to my hand, if there be any thing in it, which may gratify your curioſity, I ſhall be glad of that or any other occaſion to aſſure you that I am,

SIR, Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

A LETTER to ANTHONY COLLINS, Eſq;

SIR, Oates, 4 May 1703.

NONE of your concerns are of indifference to me. You may from thence conclude I take part in your late great loſs. But I conſider you as a philoſopher, and a chriſtian; and ſo ſpare you the trouble of reading from me, what your own thoughts will much better ſuggeſt to you.

You have exceedingly obliged me, in the books of yours that you have ſent me, and thoſe of mine you have been at ſo much trouble about. I received but juſt now the packet, wherein they and your obliging letter were; that muſt be my excuſe for ſo tardy a return of my thanks.

I AM overjoyed with an intimation I have received alſo, that gives me hopes of ſeeing you here the next week. You are a charitable good friend, and are reſolved to make the decays and dregs of my life the pleaſanteſt part of it. For I know nothing calls me ſo much back to a pleaſant ſenſe of enjoyment, and makes my days ſo gay and lively, as your good company. Come then, and multiply happy minutes upon, and rejoice here in the good you do me. For I am, with a perfect eſteem and reſpect,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt obedient ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 3 June 1703.

IT is not enough to have heard from my couſin King * that you got ſafe to town, or from others that you were ſince well there. I am too much concerned in it, not to enquire of yourſelf, how you do. Beſides,

* Sir Peter King.

that

that I owe you my thanks, for the greateſt favour I can receive, the confirmation of your friendſhip, by the viſit I lately received from you. If you knew what ſatisfaction I feel ſpread over my mind by it, you would take this acknowledgment as coming from ſomething beyond civility; my heart goes with it, and that you may be ſure of; and ſo uſeleſs a thing as I am have nothing elſe to offer you.

As a mark that I think we are paſt ceremony, I here ſend you a new book * in quires, with a deſire you will get it bound by your binder. In the parts of good binding beſides folding, beating, and ſewing, will I count ſtrong paſteboards, and as large margins as the paper will poſſibly afford; and, for lettering, I deſire it ſhould be upon the ſame leather blacked, and barely the name of the author, as, in this caſe, Voſſius.

PARDON this liberty, and believe me with perfect ſincerity and reſpect, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 18 June 1703.

IT would be ſtrange, if after all thoſe marks of friendſhip and eſteem I have received from you, in the little time I have had the honour of your acquaintance, I ſhould quarrel with you; and ſhould repay the continuance of your good offices, employed even in things beneath you, with grumbling at you; and yet this I can hardly forbear to do. Do not, I beſeech you, take this to be altogether ill-nature, but a due eſtimate of what I enjoy in you. And, ſince upon juſt meaſures I count it the great treaſure of my life, I cannot with patience hear you talk of condeſcenſion in me, when I ſtick not to waſte your time in looking after the binding of my books. If you pleaſe, let us live upon fairer terms; and when you oblige me, give me leave to be ſenſible of it. And pray remember, that there is one Mr. Collins, with whom, if I deſire to live upon equal terms, it is not that I forget how much he is ſuperior to me, in many things wherein he will always have the precedency; but I aſſume it upon the account of that friendſhip that is between us; friendſhip levelling all inequalities between thoſe whom it joins, that it may leave nothing that may keep them at a diſtance, and hinder a perfect union and enjoyment.

THIS is what I would be at with you; and, were I not in earneſt in it, out of a ſincere love of you, I would not be ſo fooliſh to rob myſelf of the only way wherein I might pretend to enter the liſts with you. I am old and uſeleſs, and out of the way; all the real ſervices are then like to be on your ſide. In words, expreſſions, and acknowledgment, there might have been perhaps ſome room to have made ſome offers of holding up to you. But I deſire that nothing of the court-guiſe may mix in

* "G. J. Voſſii etymologicum Linguæ Latinæ." Amſtelodami 1695.

our

our converſation. Put not, I beſeech you, any thing into your letters to make me forget how much I am obliged to you by the liberty you allow me to tell you, that I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 24 June 1703.

MR. Bold *, who leaves us to-day, intends to ſee you; and I cannot forbear going, as far as I can, to make the third in the company. Would my health ſecond my deſires, not only my name, and a few words of friendſhip, ſhould go with him to you; but I myſelf would get to horſe; and had I nothing elſe to do in town, I ſhould think it worth a longer journey than it is thither, to ſee and enjoy you. But I muſt ſubmit to the reſtraints of old age, and expect that happineſs from your charity.

IT is but ſix days ſince, that I writ to you; and ſee here another letter. You are like to be troubled with me. If it be ſo, why do you make yourſelf beloved? Why do you make yourſelf ſo neceſſary to me? I thought myſelf pretty looſe from the world, but I feel you begin to faſten me to it again. For you make my life, ſince I have had your friendſhip, much more valuable to me than it was before.

You thanked me in your laſt, for the employment I gave you; I wiſh I do not make you repent it; for you are likely to have my cuſtom. I deſire you would do me the favour to get me Dr. Barrow's Engliſh works, bound as Voſſius's Etymologicum was. I am in no manner of haſte for them, and therefore you may get them from your bookſeller in quires, when you go to his ſhop upon any other occaſion; and put them to your binder at leiſure. I have them for my own uſe already; theſe are to give away to a young lady here in the country. When they are bound, I deſire your binder would pack them up carefully, and cover them with paper enough to keep their corners and edges from being hurt in the carriage. For carriers are a ſort of brutes, and declared enemies to books. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 9 July 1703.

YOURS, of the 30th of June, I received juſt now, and cannot forbear a moment to tell you, that if there were any thing in my laſt letter, that gave you an occaſion, after having mentioned diſguiſe, to

* Mr. Samuel Bold died in Auguſt 1737, aged 88. He had been rector of Steeple, in Dorſetſhire, 56 years. He was author of ſeveral books; and, among others, ſome in defence of Mr. Locke's "Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding," and his "Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity." He was impriſoned and perſecuted in the reign of James II. for a ſermon againſt perſecution, and for a pamphlet intitled, "A Plea for Moderation;" doctrines which neither the court nor prelates of thoſe times could bear. He was a man of true learning and genuine piety, of ſound doctrine and moſt exemplary life; a moſt uſeful man in his ſtation, and a zealous promoter of true religion.

ſay, you "have made uſe of no way to ſhew your eſteem of me, but ſtill "your heart went with it," I am very ſorry for it. For, however I might think the expreſſions in your letter above what I could deſerve, yet my blaming your exceſs of civility to me tended not to any doubt of the ſincerity of your affection. Had I not been ſecure of that, I could not have talked to you with the ſame freedom I did, nor have endeavoured to perſuade you, that you were lodged ſo near my heart as you are. Though my friendſhip be of very little value, or uſe; yet being the beſt thing I have to give, I ſhall not forwardly beſtow it, where I do not think there is worth and ſincerity; and therefore, pray, pardon me the forwardneſs wherewith I throw my arms about your neck; and holding you ſo, tell you, you muſt not hope, by any thing that looks like compliment, to keep me at a civiler, and more faſhionable diſtance.

You comply with me, I ſee, by the reſt of your letter; and you bear with my treating you with the familiarity of an eſtabliſhed friendſhip. You pretend you have got the advantage by it. I wiſh it may be ſo; for I ſhould be very glad there were any thing, wherein I could be uſeful to you. Find it out, I beſeech you; and tell me of it, with as little ceremony and ſcruple, as you ſee I uſe with you.

The New Teſtament, you mention *, I ſhall be glad to ſee, ſince Mr. Bold has told you how deſirous I was to ſee it. I have expected one of them from Holland ever ſince they have been out; and ſo I hope to reſtore it to you again in a few days.

The other book, you mentioned †, I have ſeen; and am ſo well ſatisfied, by his 5th ſection, what a doughty 'ſquire he is like to prove in the reſt, that I think not to trouble myſelf to look farther into him. He has there argued very weakly againſt his adverſary, but very ſtrongly againſt himſelf.

But this will be better entertainment for you when we meet, than matter for a letter, wherein I make it my buſineſs to aſſure you, that I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 10 September 1703.

YOURS of the 7th, which I juſt now received, is the only letter I have a long time wiſhed for, and the welcomeſt that could come; for I longed to hear that you were well, that you were returned, and that I might have the opportunity to return you my thanks for the books you ſent me, which came ſafe; and to acknowledge my great obliga-

* Mr. Le Clerc's French Tranſlation of the New Teſtament.

† "Pſychologia; or an Account of the Nature of the Rational Soul," &c. By John Broughton, M. A. Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Marlborough. Lond. 1703, in 8vo.

tions to you for one of the moſt villainous books, that, I think, ever was printed *. It is a preſent that I highly value. I had heard ſomething of it, when a young man in the univerſity; but poſſibly ſhould never have ſeen this quinteſſence of railing, but for your kindneſs. It ought to be kept as the pattern and ſtandard of that ſort of writing, as the man he ſpends it upon, for that of good temper, and clear and ſtrong arguing. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 1 October 1703.

YOU are a good man, and one may depend upon your promiſe. This makes me paſs my days in comfortable hopes, when I remember you are not far off. I have your word for it, and that is better than city-ſecurity. But for fear villainous buſineſs ſhould impertinently ſtep in again, between you and your kind purpoſes to us here; give me leave to beg the favour of you, that if you write again, before I have the happineſs to ſee you, you will do me the favour to ſend me a note of what you have laid out for me, that I may pay you that part of the debt I am able, of what I owe you, and may not have ſo much to interrupt the advantages I am to reap from your converſation, when you honour me with your company, as an apology to be made, if I am not out of your debt before we meet.

DOTH Mr. Le Clerc's New Teſtament make any noiſe amongſt the men of letters or divinity in your town? The divines of Brandenburg or Cleve have got the king of Pruſſia to prohibit it in his dominions; and the Walloon divines in Holland are ſolliciting the ſame at the Hague, but it is thought will not prevail †. I have not yet heard what are the exceptions made in particular, either by the one, or the other. If there be need of authentick interpreters of the word of God, what is the way to find them out? That is worth your thinking of, unleſs you would have every one interpret for himſelf; and what work would that make? Betwixt theſe two, find ſomething if you can; for the world is in want of peace, which is much better than everlaſting Billingſgate.

I THOUGHT not to have troubled you with hard queſtions, or any thing that ſhould have required a ſerious thought, any farther than what day you ſhould pitch on to come hither. But everlaſting wrangling, and calling of names, is ſo odious a thing, that you will

* "Chillingworthi Noviſſima. Or the ſickneſs, hereſy, death, and burial of William Chillingworth, (in his own phraſe) clerk, of Oxford, and in the conceit of his fellow-ſoldiers, the Queen's arch-engineer and grand-intelligencer . . . . . By Francis Cheynell, late fellow of Merton College. Lond. 1644, in 4to." See the article of Mr. Chillingworth, in my "Attempt towards an hiſtorical and critical Engliſh Dictionary."

† See Mr. Bayle's "Entretiens de Maxime & de Themiſte; ou Reſponſe à ce que Mr. Le Clerc a "ecrit dans ſon X. tome de la Bibliotheque Choiſie contre Mr. Bayle." A Rotterdam 1707, in 8vo. page 70 & ſuiv.

pardon me, if it puts me out of temper a little. But I think of you, and ſome few ſuch as you in the world, and that reconciles me to it; or elſe it would not be worth ſtaying in an hour. I am, &c.

A LETTER to the Lady CALVERLEY in Yorkſhire.

MADAM,

WHATEVER reaſon you have to look on me, as one of the ſlow men of London, you have this time given me an excuſe for being ſo; for you cannot expect a quick anſwer to a letter, which took me up a good deal of time to get to the beginning of it. I turned and turned it on every ſide; looked it again and again, at the top of every page; but could not get into the ſenſe and ſecret of it, till I applied myſelf to the middle.

YOU, Madam, who are acquainted with all the ſkill and methods of the antients, have not, I ſuppoſe, taken up with this hieroglyphical way of writing for nothing; and ſince you were going to put into your letter things that might be the reward of the higheſt merit, you would, by this myſtical intimation. put me into the way of virtue, to deſerve them.

BUT whatever your ladyſhip intended, this is certain, that, in the beſt words in the world, you gave me the greateſt humiliation imaginable. Had I as much vanity as a pert citizen, that ſets up for a wit in his pariſh, you have ſaid enough in your letter to content me; and if I could be ſwoln that way, you have taken a great deal of pains to blow me up, and make me the fineſt gaudy bubble in the world, as I am painted by your colours. I know the emperors of the Eaſt ſuffer not ſtrangers to appear before them, till they are dreſſed up out of their own wardrobes; is it ſo too in the empire of wit? and muſt you cover me with your own embroidery, that I may be a fit object for your thoughts and converſation? This, Madam, may ſuit your greatneſs, but doth not at all ſatisfy my ambition. He, who has once flattered himſelf with the hopes of your friendſhip, knows not the true value of things, if he can content himſelf with theſe ſplendid ornaments.

As ſoon as I had read your letter, I looked in my glaſs, felt my pulſe, and ſighed; for I found, in neither of thoſe, the promiſes of thirty years to come. For at the rate I have hitherto advanced, and at the diſtance, I ſee, by this complimental way of treatment, I ſtill am; I ſhall not have time enough in this world to get to you. I do not mean to the place where you now ſee the pole elevated, as you ſay, 54 degrees. A poſt-horſe, or a coach, would quickly carry me thither. But when ſhall we be acquainted at this rate? Is that happineſs reſerved to be compleated by the goſſipping bowl, at your grand-daughter's lying-in?

IF I were ſure that, when you leave this dirty place, I ſhould meet you in the ſame ſtar where you are to ſhine next, and that you would then admit

admit me to your converſation, I might perhaps have a little more patience. But, methinks, it is much better to be ſure of ſomething, than to be put off to expectations of ſo much uncertainty. If there be different elevations of the pole here, that keep you at ſo great a diſtance from thoſe who languiſh in your abſence; who knows but, in the other world, there are different elevations of perſons? And you, perhaps, will be out of ſight, among the ſeraphims; while we are left behind in ſome dull planet. This the high flights of your elevated genius give us juſt augury of, whilſt you are here. But yet, pray take not your place there before your time; nor keep not us poor mortals at a greater diſtance than you need. When you have granted me all the nearneſs that acquaintance and friendſhip can give, you have other advantages enough ſtill to make me ſee how much I am beneath you. This will be only an enlargement of your goodneſs, without leſſening the adoration due to your other excellencies.

You ſeem to have ſome thoughts of the town again. If the parliament, or the term, which draw ſome by the name and appearance of buſineſs; or if company, and muſick-meetings, and other ſuch entertainments, which have the attractions of pleaſure and delight, were of any conſideration with you; you would not have much to ſay for Yorkſhire, at this time of the year. But theſe are no arguments to you, who carry your own ſatisfaction, and I know not how many worlds always about you. I would be glad you would think of putting all theſe up in a coach, and bringing them this way. For though you ſhould be never the better; yet there be a great many here that would, and amongſt them.

The humbleſt of your Ladyſhip's ſervants,

JOHN LOCKE.

A LETTER to ANTHONY COLLINS, Eſq.

SIR, Oates, October 29, 1703.

YOU, in yours of the 21ſt, ſay a great many very kind things; and I believe all that you ſay; and yet I am not very well ſatisfied with you. And how then is it poſſible to pleaſe you? will you be ready to ſay. Think that I am as much pleaſed with your company, as much obliged by your converſation, as you are by mine; and you ſet me at reſt, and I am the moſt ſatisfied man in the world. You complain of a great many defects; and that very complaint is the higheſt recommendation I could deſire, to make me love and eſteem you, and deſire your friendſhip. And if I were now ſetting out in the world, I ſhould think it my great happineſs to have ſuch a companion as you, who had a true reliſh of truth, would in earneſt ſeek it with me, from whom I

might receive it undiſguiſed, and to whom I might communicate what I thought true freely.

BELIEVE it, my good friend, to love truth, for truth's ſake, is the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the ſeed-plot of all other virtues; and, if I miſtake not, you have as much of it as ever I met with in any body. What then is there wanting to make you equal to the beſt; a friend for any one to be proud of? Would you have me take upon me, becauſe I have the ſtart of you in the number of years, and be ſupercilious, conceited, for having in a long ramble travelled ſome countries, which a young voyager has not yet had time to ſee, and from whence one may be ſure he will bring larger collections of ſolid knowledge?

IN good earneſt, Sir, when I conſider how much of my life has been trifled away in beaten tracts, where I vamped on with others, only to follow thoſe that went before us; I cannot but think I have juſt as much reaſon to be proud, as if I had travelled all England, and (if you will) France too, only to acquaint myſelf with the roads, and be able to tell how the high ways lie, wherein thoſe of equipage, and even the herd too, travel.

Now, methinks, (and theſe are often old men's dreams) I ſee openings to truth, and direct paths leading to it; wherein a little induſtry and application would ſettle one's mind with ſatisfaction, even in thoſe matters which you mention, and leave no darkneſs or doubt, even with the moſt ſcrupulous. But this is at the end of my day, when my ſun is ſetting. And though the proſpect it has given me be what I would not, for any thing, be without; there is ſo much irreſiſtible truth, beauty, and conſiſtency, in it; yet it is for one of your age, I think I ought to ſay for yourſelf, to ſet about it, as a work you would put into order, and oblige the world with.

YOU ſee whither my juſt thoughts of you have led me; and that I ſhall have no quarrel with you, if you will ceaſe to ſet me, as you do, on the higher ground, and to think that I have not as much pleaſure and ſatisfaction from your company as you have from mine. If I were able to live in your neighbourhood in town, I ſhould quickly convince you of that; and you eſcape being haunted by me only by being out of my reach. A little better acquaintance will let you ſee that, in the communication of truth, between thoſe who receive it in the love of it, he that anſwers, is no leſs obliged, than he who aſks the queſtion; and therefore you owe me not thoſe mighty thanks you ſend me, for having the good luck to ſay ſomething that pleaſed you. If it were good ſeed, I am ſure it was ſown in good ground, and may expect a great increaſe.

I THINK you have a familiar, ready to diſpatch what you undertake for your friends. How is it poſſible elſe, you ſhould ſo ſoon procure for me Kircher's Concordance? "Shew me the man, and I will ſhew "you his cauſe;" will hold now-a-days almoſt in all other caſes, as well as

as that of προσκυνεῖν *; and yet they must be all thought lovers and promoters of truth. But my letter is too long already, to enter into so copious a subject. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, Nov. 16, 1703.

IF I ask you, how you do; it is because I am concerned for your health, If I ask you, whether you have sent me any books since you went to town; it is not that I am in haste for them, but to know how the carrier uses me. And if I ask, whether you are of Lincoln's-Inn; it is to know of what place you write yourself, which I desire you to tell me in your next, and what good new books there are. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, Nov. 17, 1703.

THE books I received from you to-night, with the kind letter accompanying them, far more valuable than the books, give matter of enlarging myself this evening. The common offices of friendship, that I constantly receive from you, in a very obliging manner, give me scope enough, and afford me large matter of acknowledgment. But when I think of you, I feel something of nearer concernment that touches me; and that noble principle of the love of truth, which possesses you, makes me almost forget those other obligations, which I should be very thankful for to another.

In good earnest, Sir, you cannot think what a comfort it is to me to have found out such a man; and not only so, but I have the satisfaction that he is my friend. This gives a gusto to all the good things you say to me, in your letter. For though I cannot attribute them to myself, (for I know my own defects too well) yet I am ready to persuade myself you mean as you say; and to confess the truth to you, I almost loathe to undeceive you, so much do I value your good opinion.

But to set it upon the right ground, you must know that I am a poor ignorant man, and, if I have any thing to boast of, it is that I sincerely love and seek truth, with indifferency whom it pleases or displeases. I take you to be of the same school, and so embrace you. And if it please God to afford me so much life as to see you again, I shall communicate to you some of my thoughts tending that way.

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* Mr. Locke had been informed that one of the objections of the Walloon Divines, against Mr. Le Clerc's New Testament, was his translating προσκυνεῖν in St. Matthew (chap. II. v. 2.) so as to signify the civil, but not religious, worship of the wise men.

You

You need not make any apology for any book that is not yet come. I thank you for thoſe you have ſent me; they are more, I think, than I ſhall uſe; for the indiſpoſition of my health has beaten me almoſt quite out of the uſe of books; and the growing uneaſineſs of my diſtemper * makes me good for nothing. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, January 24, 1703-4.

TILL your confidence in my friendſhip, and freedom with me, can preſerve you from thinking you have need to make apologies for your ſilence, whenever you omit a poſt or two, when in your kind way of reckoning you judge a letter to be due; you know me not ſo well as I could wiſh; nor am I ſo little burthenſome to you as I deſire. I could be pleaſed to hear from you every day; becauſe the very thoughts of you, every day, afford me pleaſure and ſatisfaction. But I beſeech you to believe, that I meaſure not your kindneſs by your opportunities of writing; nor do ſuſpect that your friendſhip flattens, whenever your pen lies a little ſtill. The ſincerity you profeſs, and I am convinced of, has charms in it, againſt all the little phantoms of ceremony. If it be not ſo, that true friendſhip ſets one free from a ſcrupulous obſervance of all thoſe little circumſtances, I ſhall be able to give but a very ill account of myſelf to my friends; to whom, when I have given poſſeſſion of my heart, I am leſs punctual in making of legs, and kiſſing my hand, than to other people, to whom that out-ſide civility is all that belongs.

I RECEIVED the three books you ſent me. That which the author ſent me † deſerves my acknowledgment more ways than one; and I muſt beg you to return it. His demonſtrations are ſo plain, that, if this were an age that followed reaſon, I ſhould not doubt but his would prevail. But to be rational is ſo glorious a thing, that two-legged creatures generally content themſelves with the title; but will not debaſe ſo excellent a faculty, about the conduct of ſo trivial a thing, as they make themſelves.

THERE never was a man better ſuited to your wiſhes than I am. You take a pleaſure in being troubled with my commiſſions; and I have no other way of commerce with you, but by ſuch importunities. I can only ſay, that, were the tables changed, I ſhould, being in your place, have the ſame ſatisfaction; and therefore confidently make uſe of your kind offer. I therefore beg the favour of you to get me Mr. Le Clerc's "Harmony of the Evangeliſts" in Engliſh, bound very finely in calf, gilt,

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* An aſthma.

† "Reaſons againſt reſtraining the Preſs." Lond. 1704, in 4to.

and

and lettered on the back, and gilt on the leaves. So alſo I would have Moliere's works (of the beſt edition you can get them) bound. Theſe books are for ladies; and therefore I would have them fine, and the leaves gilt, as well as the back. Moliere, of the Paris edition, I think, is the beſt, if it can be got in London in quires. You ſee the liberty I take. I ſhould be glad you could find out ſomething for me to do for you here. I am perfectly, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, Feb. 7, 1703-4.

IT is with regret I conſider you ſo long in Eſſex, without enjoying you, any part of the time. Eſſex, methinks, (pardon the extravagancy, extraordinary paſſions and caſes excuſe it) when you are to go into it, ſhould all be Oates; and your journey be no whither, but thither. But lands and tenements ſay other things, whilſt we have carcaſes that muſt be cloathed and fed; and books, you know, the fodder of our underſtandings, cannot be had without them. What think you? are not thoſe ſpirits in a fine ſtate, that need none of all this luggage; that live without plowing and ſowing; travel as eaſy as we wiſh; and inform themſelves, not by a tireſome rummaging in the miſtakes and jargon of pretenders to knowledge, but by looking into things themſelves?

SIR, I forgot you had an eſtate in the country, a library in town, friends every-where, amongſt which you are to while away, as pleaſantly, I hope, as any one of this our planet, a large number of years, (if my wiſhes may prevail) yet to come; and am got, I know not how, into remote viſions, that help us not in our preſent ſtate, though they ſhew us ſomething of a better. To return therefore to myſelf and you, I conclude, by this time, you are got to town again, and then, in a little time, I ſhall hear from you. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, Feb. 21, 1703-4.

I MUST acknowledge it as an effect of your zeal to ſerve me, that you have ſent me Le Clerc's Harmony, and Moliere's works, by the Biſhop-Stortford Coach; and I return you my thanks as much as if it exactly anſwered my purpoſe. I ought not to think it ſtrange, that you in town, amidſt a hurry of buſineſs, ſhould not keep preciſely in mind my little affairs; when I here, where I have nothing to diſturb my thoughts, do ſo often forget. When I wrote to you to do me the favour to get theſe books for me carefully bound, I think I made it my requeſt to you, I am ſure I intended it, to write word when they were done, and

then I would acquaint you how they were to be diſpoſed of; for the truth is, they were to be diſpoſed of in town. But whether I only meant this, and ſaid nothing; or you forgot it; the matter is not much. I expect to receive the books to-morrow, and ſhall do well enough with them.

I SHOULD not have taken notice of this to you at all, did I not intend it for an excuſe for an ill-mannered thing, very neceſſary in buſineſs, which perhaps you will find me uſe with you for the future; which is, to repeat the little circumſtances of buſineſs which are apt to be forgotten in every letter till the danger be over. This, if you obſerve to do, will prevent many croſs accidents in your affairs; I aſſure it you upon experience.

I DESIRE you to ſtop your hand a little, and forbear putting to the preſs the two diſcourſes you mention *. They are very touchy ſubjects at this time; and that good man, who is the author, may, for aught I know, be crippled by thoſe, who will be ſure to be offended at him, right or wrong. Remember what you ſay, a little lower in you letter, in the caſe of another friend of your's, that " in the way of reaſon they are " not to be dealt with."

IT will be a kindneſs to get a particular account of thoſe proceedings †; but therein muſt be contained the day, the names of thoſe preſent, and the very words of the order or reſolution; and to learn, if you can, from whence it had its riſe. When theſe particulars are obtained, it will be fit to conſider what uſe to make of them. In the mean time I take what has been done, as a recommendation of that book to the world, as you do; and I conclude, when you and I meet next, we ſhall be merry upon the ſubject. For this is certain, that becauſe ſome men wink, or turn away their heads, and will not ſee, others will not conſent to have their eyes put out.

I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, Feb. 24, 1703-4.

YOU know me not yet as you ought, if you do not think I live with you with the ſame confidence I do with myſelf, and with the ſame ſincerity of affection too. This makes me talk to you with the ſame freedom I think; which, though it has not all the ceremony of good

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* " A Diſcourſe concerning the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, with two Letters concerning the " neceſſary immateriality of a created thinking Subſtance." Theſe pieces, written by Mr. Bold, were printed at London 1705, in 8vo

† It was propoſed, at a meeting of the heads of the houſes of the univerſity of Oxford, to cenſure and diſcourage the reading of Mr. Locke's " Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding;" and, after various debates among themſelves, it was concluded, that each head of a houſe ſhould endeavour to prevent its being read in his college, without coming to any publick cenſure.

breeding,

breeding, yet it makes amends with ſomething more ſubſtantial, and is of better reliſh in the ſtomach. Believe it, therefore, that you need not trouble yourſelf with apologies for having ſent the books hither. You have obliged me as much by it, as you could by any thing of that nature, which I had deſired; neither need you be concerned for the future. It is convenient to make it a rule not to let one's friend forget little circumſtances, whereby ſuch croſs purpoſes ſometimes happen; but when they do happen between friends, they are to be made matter of mirth.

THE gentleman that writ you the letter, which you ſent to me, is an extraordinary man, and the fitteſt in the world to go on with that inquiry. Pray, let him, at any rate, get the preciſe time, the perſons preſent, and the minutes of the Regiſter taken of their proceedings; and this without noiſe, or ſeeming concern to have them, as much as may be; and I would beg you not to talk of this matter, till we have got the whole matter of fact, which will be a pleaſant ſtory, and of good uſe.

I WISH the books, you mentioned *, were not gone to the preſs, and that they might not be printed; for when they are printed, I am ſure they will get abroad; and then it will be too late to wiſh it had not been ſo. However, if the fates will have it ſo, and their printing cannot be avoided; yet, at leaſt, let care be taken to conceal his name. I doubt not of his reaſoning right, and making good his points; but what will that boot, if he and his family ſhould be diſturbed, or diſeaſed?

I SHALL, as you deſire, ſend Moliere, and Le Clerc, back to you, by the firſt opportunity. I am, with perfect ſincerity and reſpect, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 28 February 1703-4.

I SAW the packet was exactly well made up, and I knew the books in it were well bound; whereupon I let it alone, and was likely to have ſent it back to you unopened; but my good genius would not ſuffer me to loſe a letter of yours in it, which I value more than all the books it accompanied. Since my laſt therefore to you, I opened the packet, and therein found yours of the 16th inſtant, which makes me love and value you, if it were poſſible, more than I did before; you having therein, in ſhort, ſo well deſcribed, wherein the happineſs of a rational creature in this world conſiſts; though there are very few that make any other uſe of their half employed and undervalued reaſon, but to bandy againſt it. It is well, as you obſerve, that they agree as ill with one another, as they do with common ſenſe. For when, by the influence of

* Mr. Bold's Treatiſes mentioned in the preceding letter.

ſome prevailing head, they all lean one way; Truth is ſure to be borne down, and there is nothing ſo dangerous, as to make any enquiry after her; and to own her, for her own ſake, is a moſt unpardonable crime.

You aſk me, how I like the binding of Moliere, and Le Clerc. You will wonder to hear me ſay, not at all; but you muſt take the other part of my anſwer, which is, nor do I diſlike it. It is probable, that this yet doth not ſatisfy you, after you have taken ſuch eſpecial care with your binder, that they ſhould be exactly well done. Know then, that upon moving the firſt book, having luckily eſpied your letter, I only juſt looked into it to ſee the Paris print of Moliere; and, without ſo much as taking it out of the paper it was wrapped up in, caſt my eye upon the cover, which looked very fine, and curiouſly done, and ſo put it up again, haſting to your letter. This was examining, more than enough, of books whoſe binding you had told me you had taken care of; and more than enough, for a man who had your letter in his hand unopened.

Pray ſend me word what you think or hear of Dr. Pitt's laſt book *. For as for the firſt of the other authors you mention †, by what I have ſeen of him already, I can eaſily think his arguments not worth your reciting. And as for the other, though he has parts, yet that is not all which I require in an author I am covetous of, and expect to find ſatisfaction in.

Pray, forget not to write to your friend in Oxford, to the purpoſe I mentioned in my laſt to you. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 6 March 1703-4.

WERE you of Oxenford itſelf, bred under thoſe ſharp heads, which were for damning my book, becauſe of its diſcouraging the ſtaple commodity of the place; which in my time was called hog's-ſhearing, (which is, as I hear, given out for the cauſe of their decree); you could not be a more ſubtle diſputant than you are. You do every thing that I deſire of you, with the utmoſt care and concern; and becauſe I underſtand and accept it ſo, you contend that you are the party obliged. This, I think, requires ſome of the moſt refined logick to make good; and if you will have me believe it, you muſt forbid me too to read my own book, and oblige me to take to my help more learned and ſcholaſtick notions. But the miſchief is, I am too old to go to ſchool again; and too reſty now to ſtudy arts, however authorized, or

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* "The Antidote; or the preſervative of health and life, and the reſtorative of phyſick to its ſincerity "and perfection; &c. By R. Pitt, M. D. Fellow and Cenſor of the College of Phyſicians, &c." Lond. 1704, 8vo.

† "The Grand Eſſay; or a Vindication of reaſon and religion, againſt the impoſture of Philo- "ſophy, &c." Lond. 1704, in 8vo.

wherever

wherever taught, to impoſe upon my own underſtanding. Let me therefore, if you pleaſe, be ſenſible of your kindneſs; and I give you leave to pleaſe yourſelf, with my interpreting them as I ought, as much as you think fit. For it would be hard in me to deny you ſo ſmall a ſatisfaction, where I receive ſo great and real advantage.

To convince you, that you are not like to loſe what you ſo much value, and is all you can expect in our commerce, I put into your hands a freſh opportunity of doing ſomething for me, which I ſhall have reaſon to take well. I have this day ſent back the bundle of books. I have taken what care I can to ſecure them from any harm, that might threaten them in the carriage. For I ſhould be extremely vexed that books, ſo curiouſly finiſhed by your care, ſhould be in the leaſt injured, or loſe any thing of their perfect beauty, till they came to the hands, for whom they are deſigned.

You have, you ſee, by your kind offer, drawn upon yourſelf a farther trouble with them, which was deſigned for my couſin King. But he ſetting out for the circuit to-morrow morning, I muſt beg you, that may be my excuſe for taking this liberty with you. Moliere's works are for the counteſs of Peterborough, which I deſire you to preſent to her from me, with the encloſed for her, and my moſt humble ſervice. I am in truth, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 13 March 1703-4.

IF the diſputers of this world were but half ſo good at doing as you, the mart of Logick and Syllogiſms would no doubt be the only place for the young frye "ad capiendum ingenii cultum;" (pardon, I beſeech you, this ſcrap of Latin, my thoughts were in a place that authorizes it, and one cannot chop Logick half ſo well in unlearned modern vulgar languages.) But the traders in ſubtilty have not your way of recommending it, by turning it into ſubſtantial ſolidity, whereby you prevail ſo much on me, that I can ſcarce avoid being perſuaded by you, that when I ſend you of a jaunt beyond Piccadilly, you are the perſon obliged, and I ought to expect thanks of you for it. Excuſe me, I intreat you, if, for decency's ſake, I ſtop a little ſhort of that; and let it ſatisfy you, that I believe, nay ſuch is the power of your Logick, that I cannot help believing, that you ſpare no pains for your friends, and that you take a pleaſure in doing me kindneſs. All that remains for me to aſk of you, is, to do me this right in your turn, to believe I am not inſenſible of your favours, and know how to value ſuch a friend.

THOUGH you ſaw not my lady, when you delivered Moliere and my letter at her houſe; yet had you no meſſage from her? Or did you not go in, or ſtay, when you heard ſhe was indiſpoſed?

Mr. Le Clerc's Harmony is for Mr. Secretary Johnſton's lady. The book ſent to his lodgings, with a note to inform him, that it is for his lady from me, will do the buſineſs; ſo that, for this errand, I am glad your ſervant is ſufficient without ſending you; for you muſt give me leave ſometimes on ſuch occaſions to be a little ſtingy, and ſparing of my favours.

I perceive, by the encloſed you did me the favour to ſend me, that thoſe worthy heads are not yet grown up to perfect infallibility. I am ſorry however, that their mighty thoughts wanted utterance. However, I would very gladly know the true matter of fact, and what was really propoſed, reſolved, or done; this, if poſſible, I would be aſſured of, that I might not be miſtaken in what gratitude I ought to have.

You baulked my having the biſhop of St. Aſaph's * ſermon, by telling my couſin King, that I care not for ſermons; and, at the ſame time, you ſend my lady plays. This has raiſed a diſpute between her ladyſhip and me, which of us two it is, you think beſt of. Methinks you are of opinion, that my lady is well enough ſatisfied with the unreformed ſtage; but that I ſhould be glad, that ſome things were reformed in the pulpit itſelf. The reſult is, that my lady thinks it neceſſary for you to come, and appeaſe theſe broils you have raiſed in the family. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 21 March 1703-4.

GIVE me leave to tell you, Sir, that you are miſtaken in me. I am not a young lady, a beauty, and a fortune. And unleſs you thought me all this, and deſigned your addreſſes to me; how is it poſſible you ſhould be afraid you acquitted not yourſelf well in my commiſſion beyond Piccadilly? Your waiting in the parlour a quarter of an hour was more than any reaſonable man could demand of you; and if either of us ought to be troubled in the caſe, it is I, becauſe you did ſo much; and not you, becauſe you did ſo little. But the reality of your friendſhip has ſo blended our concerns into one, that you will not permit me to obſerve, whether I do, or receive the favour, in what paſſes between us; and I am almoſt perſuaded by you to believe, that ſitting here by the fire I trudge up and down for you in London. Give me leave however to thank you, as if you had delivered Mr. Le Clerc's Harmony to Mr. Secretary Johnſton for me, and ſent me the two bibles, which I received.

As for the rummaging over Mr. Norris's late book †, I will be ſworn, it is not I have done that; for however I may be miſtaken in what

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* Dr. George Hooper.

† "An Eſſay towards the Theory of the ideal or intelligible world. Being the relative part of it. "Wherein the intelligible world is conſidered, with relation to Human Underſtanding. Whereof "ſome account is here attempted, and propoſed. Part II. By John Norris, Rector of Bemerton, "near Sarum." Lond. 1704, in 8vo.

paſſes without me, I am infallible in what paſſes in my own mind; and I am ſure, the ideas that are put together in your letter out of him, were never ſo in my thoughts, till I ſaw them there. What did I ſay, "put ideas together? I aſk your pardon, it is, "put words together without ideas;" juſt as I ſhould ſuſpect I did, if I ſhould ſay you diſparaged a very good ſtrait ruler I had, if you told me it would not enable me to write ſenſe, though it were very good and uſeful, to ſhew me whether I writ ſtrait or no.

MEN of Mr. Norris's way ſeem to me to decree, rather than to argue. They, againſt all evidence of ſenſe and reaſon, decree brutes to be machines, only becauſe their hypotheſis requires it; and then with a like authority, ſuppoſe, as you rightly obſerve, what they ſhould prove; viz. that whatſoever thinks, is immaterial. Cogitation, ſays Mr. Norris, "is more excellent than motion, or vegetation; and therefore muſt be-"long to another ſubſtance than that of matter, in the idea whereof, "motion and vegetation are contained." This latter part, I think, would be hard for him to prove, viz. "that motion and vegetation are "contained in the idea of the ſubſtance of matter." But to let that paſs at preſent; I aſk, whether if this way of arguing be good, it will not turn upon him thus: "If the idea of a ſpirit does not comprehend mo-"tion and vegetation; then they muſt belong to another ſubſtance than "a ſpirit; and therefore are more excellent than cogitation, or the af-"fections of a ſpirit." For if its greater excellency proves any mode or affection to "belong to another ſubſtance;" will not its "belonging "to another ſubſtance," by the ſame rule, prove it to be more excellent? But this is only to deal with theſe men of Logick and ſubtilty, in their own way, who uſe the term "excellent," to prove a material queſtion by, without having, as you remark, a clear and determined idea of what they mean by more or leſs excellent.

BUT not to waſte your time, in playing with the arguments of men, that examine not ſtrictly the meaning of the words they uſe; I will ſhew you the fallacy whereby they impoſe on themſelves; for ſuch talkers commonly cozen themſelves, as well as others. Cogitation, ſay they, "is not comprehended in the idea of extenſion and ſolidity;" for that is it which they mean, when they ſay, the "idea of matter;" from whence they conclude right, that "cogitation belongs not to extenſion "or ſolidity; or is not included in either of them, or both together;" but this is not the conſequence that they draw, but infer a concluſion that is not contained in the premiſes, and is quite beſides them; as Mr. Norris, if he would make uſe of Syllogiſm to its proper purpoſe, might ſee. Extenſion, and ſolidity, we have the ideas of; and ſee, that cogitation has no neceſſary connection with them, nor has any conſequential reſult from them; and therefore is not a proper affection of extenſion and ſolidity, nor doth naturally belong to them; but how doth it follow from hence, that it may not be made an affection of, or be annexed to that ſubſtance, which is veſted with ſolidity and extenſion? Of this

ſubſtance we have no idea, that excludes cogitation, any more than ſolidity. Their concluſion, therefore, ſhould be the excluſion of cogitation from the ſubſtance of matter, and not from the other affections of that ſubſtance. But they either overlook this, which is the true ſtate of that argument, or elſe avoid to ſet it in its clear light; leſt it ſhew too plainly, that their great argument either proves nothing, or, if it doth, it is againſt them.

WHAT you ſay about my Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, that nothing can be advanced againſt it, but upon the principle of innate ideas, is certainly ſo; and therefore all who do not argue againſt it, from innate ideas, in the ſenſe I ſpeak of innate ideas; though they make a noiſe againſt me, yet at laſt they ſo draw and twiſt their improper ways of ſpeaking, which have the appearance and ſound of contradiction to me, that at laſt they ſtate the queſtion ſo, as to leave no contradiction in it to my Eſſay; as you have obſerved in Mr. Lee *, Mr. Lowde †, and Mr. Norris in his late treatiſe. It is reward enough for the writing my book, to have the approbation of one ſuch a reader as you are. You have done me and my book a great honour, in having beſtowed ſo much of your thoughts upon it. You have a comprehenſive knowledge of it, and do not ſtick in the incidents; which I find many people do; which, whether true or falſe, make nothing to the main deſign of the Eſſay, that lies in a little compaſs; and yet, I hope, may be of great uſe to thoſe who ſee and follow that plain and eaſy method of nature, to carry them the ſhorteſt and cleareſt way to knowledge. Pardon me this vanity; it was with a deſign of enquiring into the nature and powers of the underſtanding, that I writ it; and nothing but the hope that it might do ſome ſervice to truth and knowledge, could excuſe the publiſhing of it.

I KNOW not whether I ever ſhewed you an occaſional ſketch of mine, about "ſeeing all things in God." If I did not, if it pleaſe God I live to ſee you here again, I will ſhew it you ‡; and ſome other things. If you will let me know before-hand, when you deſign us that favour; it will be an addition to it. I beg your pardon for holding you ſo long from better employment. I do not, you ſee, willingly quit your converſation. If you were nearer me, you would ſee it more, for I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 3 April 1704.

IN good ſooth, Sir, you are an obſtinate lover; there is no help for it, you muſt carry your point. Only give me leave to tell you, that I do not like the puling fit you fall into, at the lower end of the page;

* "Anti-Scepticiſm; or notes upon each chapter of Mr. Locke's Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, with an explanation of all the particulars of which he treats, and in the ſame order. In four books. By Henry Lee, B. D. formerly fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge, now Rector of Tichmarſh in Northamptonſhire." Lond. 1702, in fol.

† In his "Diſcourſe concerning the Nature of Man," &c. and his "Moral Eſſays," &c.

‡ That Diſſertation hath been publiſhed in Mr. Locke's Poſthumous Works; Lond. 1706, in 8vo.

where

where you tell me, " I have given you an argument againſt preſuming ſo " far again upon the liberty I allow you." That is to ſay, you may give me books, you may buy books for me, you may get books bound for me, you may trudge up and down with them on my errand to ladies; but my book you may not preſume to read, uſe your judgment about, and talk to me freely of; though I know no-body that underſtands it ſo well, nor can give me better light concerning it. Away with this ſqueamiſhneſs, I beſeech you; and be aſſured, that, among the many good offices you daily do for me in London, there is none whereby I ſhall reap ſo much profit and pleaſure, as your ſtudying for me; and let us both, without ſcruple or reſerve, help one another the beſt we can, in the way to truth and knowledge. And whenever you find me preſume, that I know all that belongs to the ſubject of my own book, and diſdain to receive light and inſtruction from another, though of much lower form than you; conclude that I am an arrant coxcomb, and know nothing at all.

You will ſee by the incloſed, that I can find buſineſs for you at Oxford, as well as at London. I have left it open, that you may read it before you ſeal and deliver it. In it you will ſee what he writ to me, on that affair. He is well acquainted with them in the Univerſity; and if he has not, may be prevailed on by you to fiſh out the bottom of that matter, and inform you in all the particulars of it. But you muſt not take his conjectures for matter of fact; but know his authors, for any matter of fact he affirms to you. You will think I intend to engage you in a thouſand diſputes with him; quite the contrary. You may avoid all diſpute with him, if you will but ſay after him; though you put him upon things that ſhew you queſtion all he ſays.

If Mr. Wynne of Jeſus-College, who epitomiſed my book *, be in the Univerſity; it is like you will ſee him, and talk to him of that matter. Pray, give him my ſervice. But be ſure, forget me not, with all manner of reſpect, to Mr. Wright, for whom I have, as I ought, a very peculiar eſteem.

I hope you will be pleaſed with me; for you ſee I have cut out work for you; and that is all that is left for me to do, to oblige you. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

Dear SIR, Oates, 19 May, 1704.

NOTHING works ſo ſteadily and effectually as friendſhip. Had I hired a man to have gone to town in my buſineſs, and paid him well, my commiſſions would not have been ſo ſoon, nor ſo well diſpatched, as I find, by yours of the 16th, they have been by you. You ſpeak of my affairs, and act in them with ſuch an air of intereſt and ſa-

* Mr. Wynne, afterwards Lord Biſhop of St. Aſaph, was the Author of " An Abridgment of Mr. " Locke's Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding." Lond. 1696, in 8vo.

tisfaction, that I can hardly avoid thinking, that I oblige you with employing you in them. It is no ſmall advantage to me, to have found ſuch a friend, at the laſt ſcene of my life; when I am good for nothing, and am grown ſo uſeleſs, that I cannot but be ſure that, in every good office you do me, you can propoſe to yourſelf no other advantage but the pleaſure of doing it.

EVERY one here finds himſelf obliged, by your late good company. As for myſelf, if you had not convinced me by a ſenſible experiment, I could not have believed I could have had ſo many happy days together. I ſhall always pray that yours may be multiplied. Could I, in the leaſt, contribute any thing thereunto, I ſhould think myſelf happy in this poor decaying ſtate of my health; which, though it affords me little in this world to enjoy, yet I find the charms of your company make me not feel the want of ſtrength, or breath, or any thing elſe.

THE biſhop of Gloceſter came hither the day you went from hence, and in no very good ſtate of health. I find two groaning people make but an uncomfortable concert. He returned yeſterday, and went away in ſomewhat a better ſtate. I hope he got well to town.

ENJOY your health, and youth, whilſt you have it, to all the advantages and improvements of an innocent and pleaſant life; remembering that mercileſs old age is in purſuit of you, and, when it overtakes you, will not fail, ſome way or other, to impair the enjoyments both of body and mind. You know how apt I am to preach. I believe it is one of the diſeaſes of old age. But my friends will forgive me, when I have nothing to perſuade them to, but that they ſhould endeavour to be as happy as it is poſſible for them to be; and to you I have no more to ſay, but that you go on in the courſe you are in. I reflect often upon it, with a ſecret joy, that you promiſed I ſhould, in a ſhort time, ſee you again. You are very good, and I dare not preſs you. But I cannot but remember how well I paſſed my time, when you were here. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, 25 May, 1704.

WHEN you come to my age, you will know that, with us old fellows, convenient always carries it before ornamental. And I would have as much of the free air when I go abroad in it*, as is poſſible. Only I aſk whether thoſe, which fall back, ſo as to give as free a proſpect behind as before, be as eaſily managed, and brought over you again, in caſe of need, as in a ſhower; as one that falls back, upon two ſtanding corner pillars? And next, whether that which falls back ſo well, doth, when it is drawn up over you, come ſo far over your head, when it is erected, as to ſhelter it from the dew, without ſhutting you

* That is, in a Chaiſe, which Mr. Locke deſired to have made for him.

up

up from the free open air? For I think ſometimes in the evening of a warm day to ſit abroad in it, to take the freſco; but would have a canopy over my head, to keep the dew off. If this be ſo, I am plainly, and without balancing, for that which falls flatteſt. One queſtion more, and I have done. Pray, what place is there for a footman in any of them? Moſt of my time being ſpent in ſitting, I deſire ſpecial care may be taken, in making the ſeat broad enough, and the two cuſhions ſoft, plump, and thick enough.

You know I have great liking to be canonical; but I little thought, that you, of all others, was the man to make me ſo. I ſhall love it the better for your ſake; and wiſh that canonical were ready, that you might have the handſelling of it hither ſpeedily. If I did not take you for myſelf, as you have taught me to do, I ſhould not be thus free with you. Count me in your turn all yourſelf, except my age and infirmities; thoſe I deſire to keep to myſelf; all the reſt of me is yours.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, 26 May, 1704.

MY letter yeſterday went away without an anſwer to one of your demands; and that was, whether I would have any braſs on the harneſs? To which, give me leave to tell you, that, in my whole life, I have been conſtantly againſt any thing that makes a ſhew; no maxim being more agreeable to my condition and temper, than "qui bene la-"tuit bene vixit." I like to have things ſubſtantially good of their kind, and uſeful, and handſomely made, and fitly adapted to their uſes; for, if either were neceſſary, I had rather be taken notice of for ſomething that is faſhionably gaudy, than ridiculouſly uncouth, or for its poorneſs and meanneſs remarkable. Therefore, if you pleaſe, let the harneſs, and all the whole accoutrements be of as good materials, and as handſomely made and put together as may be; but for ornaments of braſs, or any ſuch thing, I deſire it may be ſpared.

ONE queſtion more comes into my mind to aſk you, and that is, whether the back of thoſe, that fall down ſo flat, are ſo made that, when it is up, one may lean and loll againſt it at one's eaſe, as in a coach or a chariot; for I am grown a very lazy fellow, and have now three eaſy chairs to lean and loll in, and would not be without that relief in my chaiſe.

You ſee I am as nice as a young fond girl, that is coming into the world, with a face and a fortune, as ſhe preſumes, to command it. Let not this, however, deter you; for I ſhall not be ſo hard to be pleaſed. For what you do will be as if I did it myſelf. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, 29 May, 1704.

HOW ſhould I value the chaiſe you take ſo much pains about, if I could hope I could have your company with me abroad in it, every two or three days. However, it wears the ſignature of your friendſhip, and ſo will always have ſomething in it to pleaſe me.

I KNOW not whether it be worth while to clog it with any thing, to make a place for a footman. That muſt, I ſuppoſe, make it bigger and heavier, which I would avoid; and I think, upon the whole matter, there will be no great need of it. But when I hear from you again, I ſhall know that. In the mean time, all the reſt, I think, is reſolved; for, I ſuppoſe of courſe, you will chuſe a cloth for the lining of a duſt colour; that is the proper colour for ſuch a prieſt as you mention in your letter.

IF poor Pſalmanaſſar be really a convert from paganiſm (which I would be glad to be aſſured of); he has very ill luck, not to herd any where among the variety of ſorts that are among us. But I think it ſo, that the parties are more for doing one another harm, than for doing any body good. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, 9 June, 1704.

I MIGHT number my days, (and it is a pleaſant ſort of Almanack) by the kindneſſes I receive from you. Your packet I received, and have reaſon to thank you for all the particulars in it; however, you thought fit to prepare me for being diſappointed, in the binding my Greek Teſtament. There is nothing in it that offends me, but the running of his paring-knife too deep into the margin; a knaviſh and intolerable fault in all our Engliſh book-binders.

BOOKS ſeem to me to be peſtilent things, and infect all that trade in them; that is, all but one ſort of men, with ſomething very perverſe and brutal. Printers, binders, ſellers, and others that make a trade and gain out of them; have univerſally ſo odd a turn and corruption of mind, that they have a way of dealing peculiar to themſelves, and not conformed to the good of ſociety, and that general fairneſs that cements mankind.

WHETHER it be, that theſe inſtruments of truth and knowledge will not bear being ſubjected to any thing but thoſe noble ends, without revenging themſelves on thoſe who meddle with them to any other purpoſe, and proſtitute them to mean and miſbecoming deſigns; I will not enquire. The matter of fact, I think, you will find true; and there we will leave

it to thoſe who ſully themſelves with printer's ink, till they wholly expunge all the candour that nature gives, and become the worſt ſort of black cattle.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, June 29, 1704.

IF the chaiſe you have had ſo much trouble about gives me as much ſatisfaction afterwards, as it will in the firſt ſervice I ſhall receive from it; the conquerors of the world will not ride in their triumphant chariots with more pleaſure, than I ſhall in my little tumbrel. It will bring me what I prefer to glory. For, methinks, he underſtands but little of the true ſweetneſs of life, that doth not more reliſh the converſation of a worthy and ingenuous friend in retirement, than the noiſe and rout of the croud in the ſtreets, with all their acclamations and huzza's. I long, therefore, that the machine ſhould be diſpatched; and expect it as greedily as a hungry merchant doth a ſhip from the Eaſt-Indies, which is to bring him a rich cargo. I hope the coach-maker doth not live far from you; for if he be a ſlow man of London, I would have him quickened once a day, that he may make as much haſte as if the ſatisfaction of two lovers depended on his diſpatch. In the mean time, give me leave to deſire you to beſtow ſome of your ſpare hours on the Epiſtles to the Corinthians, and to try whether you can find them intelligible or no. You will eaſily gueſs the reaſon of this *; and when I have you here, I hope to convince you it will not be loſt labour; only permit me to tell you, you muſt read them with ſomething more than an ordinary application.

THE ſamples you have ſent me †, I muſt conclude, from the abilities of the author, to be very excellent. But what ſhall I be the better for the moſt exact and beſt proportioned picture that ever was drawn, if I have not eyes to ſee the correſpondence of the parts? I confeſs the lines are too ſubtle for me, and my dull ſight cannot perceive their connections. I am not envious, and therefore ſhall not be troubled, if others find themſelves inſtructed with ſo extraordinary and ſublime a way of reaſoning. I am content with my own mediocrity. And though I call the thinking faculty in me, mind; yet I cannot, becauſe of that name, equal it in any thing to that infinite and incomprehenſible being, which, for want of right and diſtinct conceptions, is called mind alſo, or the eternal mind. I endeavour to make the beſt uſe I can of every thing; and therefore, though I am in deſpair to be the wiſer for theſe

* Mr. Locke writ this to Mr. Collins, in order to prepare him to read afterwards with him his "Paraphraſe and Notes on the Epiſtles of St. Paul to the Corinthians;" which have been publiſhed ſince his death.

† That is, out of Dr. Sherlock's "Digreſſion concerning Connate Ideas, or Inbred Knowledge," againſt Mr. Locke; inſerted in the 3d ſection of the 2d chapter of his "Diſcourſe concerning the "happineſs of good men, and the puniſhment of the wicked, in the next world, &c." Lond. 1704, in 8vo.

learned

learned inſtructions; yet I hope I ſhall be the merrier for them, when you and I take an air in the calaſh together. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, July 23, 1704.

THE gentlemen you ſpeak of, have a great deal of reaſon to be pleaſed with the Diſcourſe* you mention; there being nothing ever writ in their ſtrain and way more perfectly than it is; and it may ſtand for a pattern to thoſe that have a mind to excel in their admirable uſe of language and method of talking; if, at leaſt, there be any need of a pattern to thoſe, who ſo naturally, and by a peculiar genius of their own, fall into that, which the profane illiterate vulgar, poor wretches, are ſtrangers to, and cannot imitate. But more of this to make us merry, when the chaiſe brings us together.

I NOW every moment wiſh the chaiſe done; not out of any impatience I am for the machine, but for the man; the man, I ſay, that is to come in it. A man, that has not his fellow; and, to all that, loves me. If I regret my old age, it is you that make me, and call me back to the world juſt as I was leaving it, and leaving it as a place that has very little valuable in it; but who would not be glad to ſpend ſome years with you? Make haſte, therefore, and let me ingroſs what of you I can. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, Auguſt 2, 1704.

THOUGH I cannot, by writing, make you a ſurer title to myſelf than you have already; yet I cannot forbear to acknowledge, under my hand and ſeal, the great ſenſe I have of the late favour you did me. Whether that, or any thing elſe, will be able to add any duration to my mouldering carcaſe, I cannot ſay; but this I am ſure, your company and kindneſs have added to the length of my life, which, in my way of meaſuring, doth not lie in counting of minutes, but taſting of enjoyments. I wiſh the continuance and increaſe of yours, without ſtint, and am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, Auguſt 11, 1704.

KIND and good-natured friends do, like you, beſtow their favours, and thank thoſe that receive them. I was never more obliged, nor better entertained, than by your company here; and you heap upon

* Dr. Sherlock's "Digreſſion concerning Connate Ideas, &c." mentioned in the foregoing letter.

me your acknowledgments, as if I had made a journey to London for your ſake, and there done you I know not how many courteſies. This, however, has the effect you could wiſh upon me. I believe all that you would have me. And ſince one naturally loves as well thoſe that one has done good to, as thoſe whom one has received good from; I leave it to you, to manage the account as you pleaſe. So the affection and good-will between us doth but increaſe, whoſe hands lay moſt fuel on the fire, that warms us both, I ſhall not be nicely ſolicitous; ſince I am ſure you cannot impute to me more than I really wiſh, but at the ſame time know that wiſhing in me is all, for I can do juſt nothing. Make no apologies to me, I beſeech you, for what you ſaid to me about the Digreſſion *. It is no more, but what I find other people agree with you in; and it would afford as much diverſion as any hunting you could imagine, had I ſtrength and breath enough to purſue the chace.

BUT of this we may, perhaps, have better opportunity to talk, when I ſee you next. For this I tell you before-hand, I muſt not have you be under any reſtraint to ſpeak to me, whatever you think fit for me to do; whether I am of the ſame mind or no. The uſe of a friend is to perſuade us to the right, not to ſuppoſe always that we are in it. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, Auguſt 16, 1704.

WHICH way ſoever I turn myſelf, I meet on all ſides your friendſhip, in all manner of ſhapes, and upon all ſorts of occaſions, beſetting me. Were I as averſe, as I am pleaſed, with my happineſs in your kindneſs; I muſt, however, yield to ſo powerful and conſtant attacks †. But it is paſt that time of day. I have long ſince ſurrendered myſelf to you. And I am as certainly in your coach, as count Tallard in the duke of Marlborough's, to be diſpoſed as you pleaſe; only with this difference, that he was a priſoner of war againſt his will; I am your captive, by the ſoft, but ſtronger, force of your irreſiſtible obligations, and with the conſent and joy of my own mind.

JUDGE then, whether I am willing my ſhadow ſhould be in poſſeſſion of one with whom my heart is; and to whom all that I am, had I any thing beſides my heart, worth the preſenting, doth belong. Sir Godfrey, I doubt not, will make it very like. If it were poſſible for his pencil to make it a ſpeaking picture, it ſhould tell you every day how much I love and eſteem you; and how pleaſed I am to be, ſo much as in effigy, near a perſon, with whom I ſhould be glad to ſpend an age to come. I am, &c.

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* See above, page 629, 630.

† Mr. Collins had deſired Mr. Locke to let Sir Godfrey Kneller come down into the country, to draw Mr. Locke's picture; which Sir Godfrey did.

TO

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, September 11, 1704.

HE that has any thing to do with you, muſt own that friendſhip is the natural product of your conſtitution; and your ſoul, a noble ſoil, is enriched with the two moſt valuable qualities of human nature, truth and friendſhip. What a treaſure have I then in ſuch a friend, with whom I can converſe, and be enlightened about the higheſt ſpeculations! When one hears you upon the principles of knowledge, or the foundations of government, one would hardly imagine your thoughts ever deſcended to a bruſh, or a curry-comb, or other ſuch trumpery of life; and yet, if one employ you but to get a pair of ſhoe-buckles, you are as ready and dextrous at it, as if the whole buſineſs of your life had been with nothing but ſhoe-buckles.

As to my lady's picture, pray, in the firſt place, ſee it, and tell me how you like it. In the next place, pray get Sir Godfrey to write upon it, on the back-ſide, lady Maſham, 1704; and on the back-ſide of mine, John Locke, 1704. This he did on Mr. Molyneux's and mine, the laſt he drew; and this is neceſſary to be done, or elſe the pictures of private perſons are loſt in two or three generations; and ſo the picture loſes of its value, it being not known whom it was made to repreſent.

TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, Oates, October 1, 1704.

TO compleat the ſatisfaction I have lately had here, there has been nothing wanting but your company. The coming of his father-in-law *, joined with the ſtraitneſs of the lodging in this houſe, hindered me from having my couſin King and you together; and ſo cut off one part of the enjoyment, which you know is very valuable to me. I muſt leave it to your kindneſs and charity, to make up this loſs to me. How far the good company I have had here has been able to raiſe me into a forgetfulneſs of the decays of age, and the uneaſineſs of my indiſpoſition, my couſin King is judge. But this I believe he will aſſure you, that my infirmities prevail ſo faſt on me, that, unleſs you make haſte hither, I may loſe the ſatisfaction of ever ſeeing again a man, that I value in the firſt rank of thoſe that I leave behind me †.

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* Sir Peter King's father-in-law.

† Mr. Locke died on the 28th of October, 1704; that is, 27 days after the writing of this letter.

TO

TO THE SAME. [Directed thus:]

For ANTHONY COLLINS, Esq. . ;

To be delivered to him after my deceaſe.

DEAR SIR, Oates, Auguſt 23, 1704.

BY my will, you will ſee that I had ſome kindneſs for * * * *. And I knew no better way to take care of him, than to put him, and what I deſigned for him, into your hands and management. The knowledge I have of your virtue, of all kinds, ſecures the truſt which, by your permiſſion, I have placed in you; and the peculiar eſteem and love I have obſerved in the young man for you, will diſpoſe him to be ruled and influenced by you, ſo that of that I need ſay nothing.

BUT there is one thing, which it is neceſſary for me to recommend to your eſpecial care and memory * * * * * *

MAY you live long and happy in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all thoſe bleſſings which Providence has beſtowed on you, and your virtue intitles you to. I know you loved me living, and will preſerve my memory now I am dead. All the uſe to be made of it is, that this life is a ſcene of vanity, that ſoon paſſes away; and affords no ſolid ſatisfaction, but in the conſciouſneſs of doing well, and in the hopes of another life. This is what I can ſay, upon experience; and what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account. Adieu; I leave my beſt wiſhes with you.

JOHN LOCKE.

A LETTER to the Reverend Mr. RICHARD KING.

SIR, Oates, July 23, 1703.

I CANNOT but think myſelf beholden to any occaſion that procures me the honour of a letter from you. I return my acknowledgments for thoſe great expreſſions of civility, and marks of friendſhip, I received in yours of the 8th inſtant; and wiſh I had the opportunity to ſhew the eſteem I have of your merit, and the ſenſe of your kindneſs to me, in any real ſervice.

THE deſire of your friend, in the incloſed letter you ſent me, is what of myſelf I am inclined to ſatisfy; and am only ſorry, that ſo copious a ſubject has loſt, in my bad memory, ſo much of what heretofore I could have ſaid concerning that great and good man, of whom he enquires *.

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* Dr. Pococke. See the following letter.

Time, I daily find, blots out apace the little ſtock of my mind, and has diſabled me from furniſhing all that I would willingly contribute, to the memory of that learned man. But give me leave to aſſure you, that I have not known a fitter perſon than he, to be preſerved as an example, and propoſed to the imitation of men of letters. I therefore wiſh well to your friend's deſign, though my mite be all I have been able to contribute to it.

I WISH you all happineſs, and am, with a very particular reſpect,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

A LETTER to ****

SIR, Oates, July 23, 1703.

I HAVE ſo great a veneration for the memory of that excellent man, whoſe life you tell me you are writing †, that when I ſet myſelf to recollect what memoirs I can (in anſwer to your deſire) furniſh you with; I am aſhamed I have ſo little in particular to ſay, on a ſubject that afforded ſo much. For I conclude you ſo well acquainted with his learning and virtue, that I ſuppoſe it would be ſuperfluous to trouble you on thoſe heads. However, give me leave not to be wholly ſilent upon this occaſion. So extraordinary an example, in ſo degenerate an age, deſerves, for the rarity, and, as I was going to ſay, for the incredibility of it, the atteſtation of all that knew him, and conſidered his worth.

THE Chriſtian world is a witneſs of his great learning, that the works he publiſhed would not ſuffer to be concealed. Nor could his devotion and piety lie hid, and be unobſerved in a college; where his conſtant and regular aſſiſting at the cathedral ſervice, never interrupted by ſharpneſs of weather, and ſcarce reſtrained by downright want of health, ſhewed the temper and diſpoſition of his mind.

BUT his other virtues, and excellent qualities, had ſo ſtrong and cloſe a covering of modeſty and unaffected humility; that, though they ſhone the brighter to thoſe who had the opportunities to be more intimately acquainted with him, and eyes to diſcern and diſtinguiſh ſolidity from ſhew, and eſteem virtue that ſought not reputation; yet they were the leſs taken notice, and talked of, by the generality of thoſe to whom he was not wholly unknown. Not that he was at all cloſe and reſerved;

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† Dr. Edward Pococke, regius profeſſor of Hebrew, in the univerſity of Oxford. He was born at Oxford on the 8th of November 1603, and he died on the 10th of September 1691.

but, on the contrary, the readieſt to communicate to any one that conſulted him.

INDEED he was not forward to talk, nor ever would be the leading man in the diſcourſe, though it were on a ſubject that he underſtood better than any of the company; and would often content himſelf to ſit ſtill and hear others debate in matters which he himſelf was more a maſter of. He had often the ſilence of a learner, where he had the knowledge of a maſter; and that not with a deſign, as is often, that the ignorance any one betrayed might give him the opportunity to diſplay his own knowledge, with the more luſtre and advantage, to their ſhame; or cenſure them when they were gone. For theſe arts of triumph and oſtentation, frequently practiſed by men of ſkill and ability, were utterly unknown to him. It was very ſeldom that he contradicted any one; or if it were neceſſary at any time to inform any one better, who was in a miſtake, it was in ſo ſoft and gentle a manner, that it had nothing of the air of diſpute or correction, and ſeemed to have little of oppoſition in it. I never heard him ſay any thing that put any one that was preſent the leaſt out of countenance; nor ever cenſure, or ſo much as ſpeak diminiſhingly, of any one that was abſent.

HE was a man of no irregular appetites. If he indulged any one too much, it was that of ſtudy, which his wife would often complain of, (and, I think, not without reaſon) that a due conſideration of his age and health could not make him abate.

THOUGH he was a man of the greateſt temperance in himſelf, and the fartheſt from oſtentation and vanity in his way of living; yet he was of a liberal mind, and given to hoſpitality; which, conſidering the ſmallneſs of his preferments, and the numerous family of children he had to provide for, might be thought to have out-done thoſe who made more noiſe and ſhew.

HIS name, which was in great eſteem beyond ſea, and that deſervedly, drew on him viſits from all foreigners of learning, who came to Oxford, to ſee that univerſity. They never failed to be highly ſatisfied with his great knowledge and civility, which was not always without expence.

THOUGH at the reſtoration of king Charles, when preferment rained down upon ſome men's heads, his merits were ſo over-looked or forgotten, that he was barely reſtored to what was his before, without receiving any new preferment then, or at any time after; yet I never heard him take any the leaſt notice of it, or make the leaſt complaint in a caſe that would have grated ſorely on ſome men's patience, and have filled their mouths with murmuring, and their lives with diſcontent. But he was always unaffectedly chearful; no marks of any thing that lay heavy at his heart, for his being neglected, ever broke from him. He was ſo far from having any diſpleaſure lie concealed there, that whenever any expreſſions of diſſatisfaction, for what they thought hard uſage, broke

from others in his preſence, he always diverted the diſcourſe; and if it were any body with whom he thought he might take that liberty, he ſilenced it with viſible marks of diſlike.

THOUGH he was not, as I ſaid, a forward, much leſs an aſſuming talker; yet he was the fartheſt in the world from being ſullen or moroſe. He would talk very freely, and very well, of all parts of learning, beſides that wherein he was known to excel. But this was not all; he could diſcourſe very well of other things. He was not unacquainted with the world, though he made no ſhew of it.

HIS backwardneſs to meddle in other people's matters, or to enter into debates, where names and perſons were brought upon the ſtage, and judgments and cenſures were hardly avoided; concealed his abilities, in matters of buſineſs and conduct, from moſt people. But yet I can truly ſay, that I knew not any one in that univerſity, whom I would more willingly conſult, in any affair that required conſideration, nor whoſe opinion I thought it better worth the hearing than his, if he could be drawn to enter into it, and give his advice.

THOUGH in company he never uſed himſelf, nor willingly heard from others, any perſonal reflections on other men, though ſet off with a ſharpneſs that uſually tickles, and by moſt men is miſtaken for the beſt, if not the only ſeaſoning of pleaſant converſation; yet he would often bear his part in innocent mirth, and, by ſome appoſite and diverting ſtory, continue and heighten the good-humour.

I SHALL give you an inſtance of it in a ſtory of his, which on this occaſion comes to my mind; and I tell it you not as belonging to his life, but that it may give you ſome part of his character; which, poſſibly, the very ſerious temper of this good man may be apt to make men overſee. The ſtory was this: There was at Corpus-Chriſti college, when he was a young man there, a proper fellow, with a long grey beard, that was porter of the college. A waggiſh fellow-commoner of the houſe would be often handling and ſtroking this grey beard, and jeſtingly told the porter, he would, one of theſe days, fetch it off. The porter, who took his beard for the great ornament that added grace and authority to his perſon, could ſcarce hear the mention, in jeſt, of his beard being cut off, with any patience. However, he could not eſcape the mortal agony that ſuch a loſs would cauſe him. The fatal hour came; and ſee what happened. The young gentleman, as the porter was ſtanding at the college-gate with other people about him, took hold of his beard with his left hand, and with a pair of ſciſſars, which he had ready in his right, did that execution, that the porter and by-ſtanders heard the cutting of ſciſſars, and ſaw a handful of grey hairs fall to the ground. The porter, on that ſight, in the utmoſt rage, ran immediately away to the preſident of the college; and there, with a loud and lamentable out-cry, deſired juſtice to be done on the gentleman-commoner, for the great indignity and injury he had received

received from him. The preſident demanding what harm the other had done, the porter replied, an affront never to be forgiven; he had cut off his beard. The preſident, not without laughing, told him, that his barber was a bungler, and that therefore he would do him that juſtice, that he ſhould have nothing for his pains, having done his work ſo negligently; for he had left him, for aught he could ſee, after all his cutting, the largeſt and moſt reverend beard in the town. The porter, ſcarce able to believe what he ſaid, put up his hand to his chin, on which he found as full a grown beard as ever. Out of countenance for his complaint for want of a beard, he ſneaked away, and would not ſhew his face for ſome time after.

THE contrivance of the young gentleman was innocent and ingenious. He had provided an handful of white horſe-hair, which he cut, under the covert of the other's beard, and ſo let it drop; which the teſty fellow, without any farther examination, concluded to be of his own growth; and ſo, with open mouth, drew on himſelf every one's laughter; which could not be refuſed to ſuch ſad complaints, and ſo reverend a beard.

SPEAKING of the expedite way of juſtice in Turky, he told this pleaſant ſtory; whereof he was an eye-witneſs at Aleppo. A fellow, who was carrying about bread to ſell, at the turn of a ſtreet ſpying the cadee coming towards him, ſet down his baſket of bread, and betook himſelf to his heels. The cadee coming on, and finding the baſket of bread in his way, bid ſome of his under officers to weigh it; (for he always goes attended, for preſent execution of any fault he ſhall meet with) who finding it as it ſhould be, left it, and went on. The fellow watching, at the corner of the ſtreet, what would become of his bread; when he found all was ſafe, returned to his baſket. The by-ſtanders aſked him why he ran away, his bread being weight? That was more than I knew, ſays he; for though it be not mine, but I ſell it for another; yet if it had been leſs than weight, and taken upon me, I ſhould have been drubbed.

MANY things of this nature, worth notice, would often drop from him in converſation; which would inform the world of ſeveral particularities, concerning that country and people, among whom he ſpent ſeveral years. You will pardon me, if on the ſudden my bad memory cannot, after ſuch a diſtance of time, recollect more of them. Neither, perhaps, had this now occurred, had I not, on an occaſion that revived it in my memory ſome time ſince by telling it to others, refreſhed it in my own thoughts.

I KNOW not whether you find amongſt the papers of his, that are, as you ſay, put into your hands, any Arabick proverbs, tranſlated by him. He has told me that he had a collection of 3000, as I remember; and that they were, for the moſt part, very good. He had, as he intimated, ſome thoughts of tranſlating them, and adding ſome notes, where they were neceſſary to clear any obſcurities; but whether he ever did

did any thing in it before he died, I have not heard. But to return to what I can call to mind, and recover of him.

I DO not remember that, in all my converſation with him, I ever ſaw him once angry, or to be ſo far provoked as to change colour or countenance, or tone of voice. Diſpleaſing actions and accidents would ſometimes occur; there is no help for that; but nothing of that kind moved him, that I ſaw, to any paſſionate words; much leſs to chiding or clamour. His life appeared to me one conſtant calm.

How great his patience was in his long and dangerous lameneſs (wherein there were very terrible and painful operations) you have, no doubt, learnt from others. I happened to be abſent from Oxford moſt of that time; but I have heard, and believed it, that it was ſuitable to the other parts of his life.

To conclude, I can ſay of him, what few men can ſay of any friend of theirs, nor I of any other of my acquaintance: that I do not remember I ever ſaw in him any one action that I did, or could in my own mind blame, or thought amiſs in him.

SIR, if I had been put upon this taſk ſoon after his death, I might poſſibly have ſent you a paper better furniſhed than this is, and with particularities fitter for your purpoſe, to fill up the character of ſo good and extraordinary a man, and ſo exemplary a life. The eſteem and honour I have ſtill for him would not ſuffer me to ſay nothing; though my decaying bad memory did ill ſecond my deſire to obey your commands. Pray accept this, as a mark of my willingneſs, and believe that I am

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

A LETTER to the Reverend Mr. RICHARD KING.

SIR, Oates, 25 Aug. 1703.

YOURS of the 4th inſtant I received; and though I am conſcious I do not deſerve thoſe advantageous things, which your civility ſays of me in it; yet give me leave to aſſure you, that the offers of my ſervice to you, which you are pleaſed to take notice of, is that part, which I ſhall not fail to make good on all occaſions.

You aſk me, "what is the ſhorteſt and ſureſt way, for a young gen-"tleman, to attain a true knowledge of the chriſtian religion, in the full "and juſt extent of it?" For ſo I underſtand your queſtion; if I have miſtaken in it, you muſt ſet me right. And to this I have a ſhort and plain anſwer: "Let him ſtudy the holy ſcripture, eſpecially the New "Teſtament." Therein are contained the words of eternal life. It has God for its author; ſalvation for its end; and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter. So that it is a wonder to me, how any one pro-

profeſſing chriſtianity, that would ſeriouſly ſet himſelf to know his religion, ſhould be in doubt where to employ his ſearch, and lay out his pains for his information; when he knows a book, where it is all contained, pure and entire; and whither, at laſt, every one muſt have recourſe, to verify that of it, which he finds any where elſe.

YOUR other queſtion, which I think I may call two or three, will require a larger anſwer.

As to morality, which, I take it, is the firſt in thoſe things you enquire after; that is beſt to be found in the book that I have already commended to you. But becauſe you may perhaps think, that, the better to obſerve thoſe rules, a little warning may not be inconvenient, and ſome method of ranging them be uſeful for the memory; I recommend to you the "Whole Duty of Man," as a methodical ſyſtem; and if you deſire a larger view of the parts of morality, I know not where you will find them ſo well and diſtinctly explained, and ſo ſtrongly enforced, as in the practical divines of the church of England. The Sermons of Dr. Barrow, Archbiſhop Tillotſon, and Dr. Whichcote, are maſter-pieces in this kind; not to name abundance of others, who excel on that ſubject. If you have a mind to ſee how far human reaſon advanced in the diſcovery of morality, you will have a good ſpecimen of it in "Tully's Offices;" unleſs you have a mind to look farther back into the ſource from whence he drew his rules; and then you muſt conſult Ariſtotle, and the other Greek philoſophers.

THOUGH prudence be reckoned among the cardinal virtues, yet I do not remember any profeſſed treatiſe of morality, where it is treated in its full extent, and with that accuracy that it ought. For which poſſibly this may be a reaſon, that every imprudent action does not make a man culpable "in foro conſcientiæ." The buſineſs of morality I look upon to be the avoiding of crimes; of prudence, inconveniencies, the foundation whereof lies in knowing men and manners. Hiſtory teaches this beſt, next to experience; which is the only effectual way to get a knowledge of the world. As to the rules of prudence, in the conduct of common life, though there be ſeveral that have employed their pens therein; yet thoſe writers have their eyes ſo fixed on convenience, that they ſometimes loſe the ſight of virtue; and do not take care to keep themſelves always clear from the borders of diſhoneſty, whilſt they are tracing out what they take to be, ſometimes, the ſecureſt way to ſucceſs; moſt of thoſe that I have ſeen on this ſubject having, as it ſeemed to me, ſomething of this defect. So that I know none that I can confidently recommend to your young gentleman, but the ſon of Sirach.

To "compleat a man in the practice of human offices," (for to that tend your enquiries) there is one thing more required; which, though it be ordinarily conſidered, as diſtinct both from virtue and prudence, yet I think it ſo near allied to them, that he will ſcarce keep himſelf from ſlips in both, who is without it. That, which I mean, is good breeding.

breeding. The ſchool, for a young gentleman to learn it in, is the converſation of thoſe who are well-bred.

As to the laſt part of your enquiry, which is after "books that will "give an inſight into the conſtitution of the government, and real intereſt of his country;" to proceed orderly in this, I think the foundation ſhould be laid, in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil ſociety; and how it is formed into different models of government; and what are the ſeveral ſpecies of it. Ariſtotle is allowed a maſter in this ſcience, and few enter upon the conſideration of government, without reading his "Politicks." Hereunto ſhould be added, true notions of laws in general; and property, the ſubject-matter about which laws are made. He, that would acquaint himſelf with the former of theſe, ſhould thoroughly ſtudy the judicious Hooker's firſt book of "Eccleſiaſtical Polity." And property I have no-where found more clearly explained, than in a book intitled, "Two Treatiſes of Government." But not to load your young gentleman with too many books on this ſubject, which require more meditation than reading; give me leave to recommend to him Puffendorf's little Treatiſe, "De Officio Hominis & Civis."

To get an inſight into the particular conſtitution of the government of his own country, will require a little more reading; unleſs he will content himſelf with ſuch a ſuperficial knowledge of it as is contained in Chamberlayne's "State of England," or Smith "De Republica Angli-"cana." Your enquiry manifeſtly looks farther than that; and to attain ſuch a knowledge of it, as becomes a gentleman of England to have, to the purpoſes that you mention, I think he ſhould read our antient lawyers; ſuch as Bracton, "Fleta," "The Mirror of Juſtice," &c. which our couſin King * can better direct you to, than I; joining with them the "Hiſtory of England under the Normans," and ſo continuing it down quite to our times; reading it always in thoſe authors who lived neareſt thoſe times; their names you will find, and characters often, in Mr. Tyrrel's "Hiſtory of England." To which, if there be added a ſerious conſideration of the laws made in each reign, and how far any of them influenced the conſtitution; all theſe together will give him a full inſight into what you deſire.

As to the intereſt of any country, that, it is manifeſt, lies in its proſperity and ſecurity. Plenty of well-employed people, and riches within, and good alliances abroad, make its ſtrength. But the ways of attaining theſe comprehend all the arts of peace and war; the management of trade; the employment of the poor; and all thoſe other things that belong to the adminiſtration of the publick; which are ſo many, ſo various, and ſo changeable, according to the mutable ſtate of men, and things, in this world; that it is not ſtrange, if a very ſmall part of this conſiſts in book-learning. He, that would know it, muſt have his eyes

* Sir Peter King.

open upon the preſent ſtate of affairs; and from thence take his meaſures of what is good, or prejudicial, to the intereſt of his country.

You ſee how ready I am to obey your commands, though in matters wherein I am ſenſible of my own ignorance. I am ſo little acquainted with books, eſpecially on theſe ſubjects relating to politicks, that you muſt forgive, if, perhaps, I have not named to you the beſt in every kind. And you muſt take it as a mark of my readineſs to ſerve you, that I have ventured ſo far out of what lay in my way of reading, in the days that I had leiſure to converſe with books. The knowledge of the Bible, and the buſineſs of his calling, is enough for an ordinary man; a gentleman ought to go farther.

Those of this place return their ſervice and thanks, for the honour of your remembrance. I am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

Dear SIR,

I AM ſorry to find, that the queſtion, which was the moſt material, and my mind was moſt upon, was anſwered ſo little to your ſatisfaction, that you are fain to aſk it again. Since therefore you aſk me a ſecond time, "what is the beſt method to ſtudy religion?" I muſt aſk you, "what religion you mean?" For if it be, as I underſtood you before, the "chriſtian religion in its full extent and purity;" I can make you no other anſwer but what I did, viz. that "the only way to attain "a certain knowledge of that, is the ſtudy of the holy ſcripture." And my reaſon is, becauſe the chriſtian religion is a revelation from God Almighty, which is contained in the Bible; and ſo all the knowledge we can have of it muſt be derived from thence. "But if you aſk, which is "the beſt way to get the knowledge of the Romiſh, Lutheran, or re-"formed religion, of this or that particular church, &c." each whereof intitles itſelf to be the true chriſtian religion, with ſome kind of excluſion or diminution to the reſt; that will not be hard to tell you. But then it is plain that the books, that beſt teach you any one of theſe, do moſt remove you from all the reſt; and in this way of ſtudying, you pitch upon one as the right, before you know it to be ſo; whereas that choice ſhould be the reſult of your ſtudy of the chriſtian religion, in the ſacred ſcriptures. And the method I have propoſed would, I preſume, bring you the ſureſt way to that church, which, I imagine, you already think moſt conformable to the word of God.

I find the letter you laſt honoured me with contains a new queſtion, and that a very material one, viz. "what is the beſt way of interpreting the "ſacred ſcripture?" Taking "interpreting" to mean "underſtanding," I think the beſt way for underſtanding the ſcripture, or the New Teſtament, (for of that the queſtion will here be in the firſt place) is to read it aſſiduouſly and diligently; and, if it can be, in the original. I do not mean, to read every day ſome certain number of chapters, as is

uſual; but to read it ſo, as to ſtudy and conſider, and not to leave till you are ſatisfied that you have got the true meaning.

To this purpoſe, it will be neceſſary to take the aſſiſtance of interpreters and commentators; ſuch as are thoſe called the criticks, and Pool's "Synopſis Criticorum;" Dr. Hammond on the New Teſtament, and Dr. Whitby, &c.

I SHOULD not think it convenient to multiply books of this kind, were there any one that I could direct you to, that was infallible. But you will not think it ſtrange, if I tell you, that, after all, you muſt make uſe of your own judgment; when you conſider, that it is, and always will be, impoſſible to find an expoſitor, whom you can blind-fold rely upon, and cannot be miſtaken in following. Such a reſignation as that, is due to the holy ſcriptures alone; which were dictated by the infallible ſpirit of God.

SUCH writings alſo as Mr. Mede's and Dr. Lightfoot's are very much conducing to lead us into a true ſenſe of the ſacred ſcriptures.

As to the method of reading them, order requires that the four Evangeliſts ſhould, in the firſt place, be well ſtudied, and thoroughly underſtood. They all treating of the ſame ſubject do give great light to one another; and, I think, may with the greateſt advantage, be read in harmony. To this purpoſe, Monſieur Le Clerc's, or Mr. Whiſton's "Harmony of the four Evangeliſts," will be of uſe, and ſave a great deal of time and trouble, in turning the Bible. They are now both in Engliſh, and Le Clerc's has a paraphraſe. But if you would read the Evangeliſts in the original, Mr. Le Clerc's edition of his "Harmony" in Greek and Latin will be the beſt.

IF you find that, by this method, you advance in the knowledge of the goſpel; when you have laid a foundation there to your ſatisfaction, it will not be hard to add what may help you forwards, in the ſtudy of other parts of the New Teſtament.

BUT I have troubled you too much already, for which I beg your pardon; and am, &c.

TO THE SAME.

SIR, Oates, 20 January, 1703-4.

THE ſmall acknowledgments I was able to make, for the honour of your viſit, and enjoyment of your company here, left the debt on my ſide, and deſerve not the notice you are pleaſed to take of them.

IN your obliging letter of the 13th, you do me favours, and you thank me too. If you intend by this a perfect acquiſition of ſo inconſiderable a thing as I am, your worth and virtue diſpoſe me to be as much at your ſervice as you pleaſe; I wiſh I found any thing in myſelf that might promiſe you any uſefulneſs from me. That defect I ſhall endeavour to make up the beſt I can, with a perfect eſteem, and a readineſs of will; which muſt ſupply the want of the abilities of doing.

I THANK you for the printed paper you ſent me *, and am very glad to ſee ſuch a ſpirit raiſed, for the ſupport and enlargement of religion. Proteſtants, I think, are as much concerned now, as ever, to be vigorous in their joint endeavours for the maintenance of the Reformation. I wiſh all, that call themſelves ſo, may be prevailed with by thoſe, whom your paper intimates, to imitate the zeal, and purſue the principles of thoſe great and pious men, who were inſtrumental to bring us out of Roman darkneſs and bondage. I heartily pray for good ſucceſs on all ſuch endeavours.

IF I may gueſs at the intention of the ſociety, by the only man you let me know of it, I may be confident that the glory of God, and the propagation of true religion, is the only aim of it. May God eminently proſper all endeavours that way, and increaſe the number of thoſe who ſeriouſly lay it to heart.

SIR Francis †, my lady, and the reſt of this family, return you their humble ſervice. I am, &c.

RULES of a SOCIETY,

Which met once a week, for their improvement in uſeful knowledge, and for the promoting of truth and chriſtian charity.

I.

THAT it begin at ſix in the evening, and end at eight; unleſs a majority of two thirds preſent are inclined to continue it longer.

II.

THAT no perſon be admitted into this ſociety, without the ſuffrage of two thirds of the parties preſent, after the perſon, deſiring ſuch admiſſion, hath ſubſcribed to the rules contained in this paper, and anſwered in the affirmative to the following queſtions:

1. WHETHER he loves all men, of what profeſſion or religion ſoever?

2. WHETHER he thinks no perſon ought to be harmed in his body, name, or goods, for mere ſpeculative opinions, or his external way of worſhip?

3. WHETHER he loves and ſeeks truth for truth's ſake; and will endeavour impartially to find and receive it himſelf, and to communicate it to others?

III.

THAT no perſon be admitted occaſionally, without a good teſtimony from ſome of the ſociety that knows him, and he anſwering in the affirmative to the above-mentioned queſtions.

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* "AN Account of the Society for promoting Chriſtian Knowledge."

† SIR Francis Maſham.

IV.

THAT every member in his courſe, if he pleaſe, be moderator; (and the courſe here meant, is that of their ſirnames, according to the Alphabet); whoſe care muſt be to keep good order, tu propoſe the queſtion to be debated, recite what may have been ſaid to it already, briefly deliver the ſenſe of the queſtion, and keep the parties cloſe to it; or, if he pleaſe, he may name one to be moderator for him. The queſtion for the enſuing conference to be always agreed, before the company departs.

V.

THAT no perſon or opinion be unhandſomely reflected on; but every member behave himſelf with all the temper, judgment, modeſty, and diſcretion he is maſter of.

VI.

THAT every member place himſelf to the left hand of the moderator, in order, as he happens to come in; and in his turn ſpeak as plainly, diſtinctly, and conciſely as he can to the queſtion propoſed, directing his diſcourſe to the moderator.

VII.

THAT no more than one perſon ſpeak at once; and none object, till it come to his turn to ſpeak.

VIII.

THAT, the queſtion having gone round, if the time will permit, and the company pleaſes, it may be diſcourſed again in the ſame order; and no weighty queſtion to be quitted, till a majority of two thirds be ſatisfied, and are willing to proceed to a new one. That when a controverſy is not thought, by two thirds of the company, likely to be ended in a convenient time; then thoſe two thirds may diſmiſs it, and, if they pleaſe, another queſtion may be propoſed. That two thirds of the company may adjourn the ordinary ſubject in queſtion, for good and ſufficient reaſons.

IX.

THAT no queſtion be propoſed, that is contrary to religion, civil government, or good manners; unleſs it be agreed to debate ſuch queſtion, merely and only the better to confute it.

WE whoſe names are here under-written, propoſing to ourſelves an improvement in uſeful knowledge, and the promoting of truth and Chriſtian charity, by our becoming of this ſociety, do hereby declare our approbation of, and conſent to, the rules before written.

A LETTER to Mrs. COCKBURN.

MADAM,

THERE was nothing more publick than the obligation I received from you, nor any thing more concealed than the perſon I was obliged to. This is a generoſity above the ſtrain of this groveling age, and like that of ſuperior ſpirits, who aſſiſt without ſhewing themſelves. I uſed my beſt endeavours to draw from you by your bookſeller the confeſſion of your name, for want whereof I could, whilſt you kept yourſelf under that reſerve, no more addreſs myſelf directly to you with good manners, than I could have pulled off your maſk by force, in a place where you were reſolved to conceal yourſelf. Had not this been ſo, the bearer hereof would not the firſt time have come to you without a letter from me to acknowledge the favour you had done me. You not affording me an opportunity for that, I deſigned to make you ſome ſmall acknowledgment, in a way that chance had opened to me, without your conſent. But this gentleman tranſgreſſed my order in two main points of it. The one was in delaying it ſo long. The other was in naming me to you, and talking of matters which he had no commiſſion from me to mention. What he deſerves from you for it, muſt be left to your mercy. For I cannot in earneſt be angry with him for procuring me, without any guilt of mine, an opportunity to own you for my protectreſs, which is the greateſt honour my Eſſay could have procured me. Give me leave therefore to aſſure you, that as the reſt of the world take notice of the ſtrength and clearneſs of your reaſoning, ſo I cannot but be extremely ſenſible that it was employed in my defence. You have herein not only vanquiſhed my adverſary, but reduced me alſo abſolutely under your power, and left no deſires more ſtrong in me than thoſe of meeting with ſome opportunity to aſſure you with what reſpect and ſubmiſſion I am, Madam,

Your moſt humble,

Oates, 30 Dec. 1702. and moſt obedient ſervant,

J. LOCKE.

A LETTER from Mr. LOCKE to Mr. SAMUEL BOLD.

SIR, Oates, 16 May, 1699.

YOURS of the 11th of April I received not till the laſt week. I ſuppoſe Mr. Churchill ſtaid it till that diſcourſe wherein you have been pleaſed to defend my Eſſay was printed, that they might come together, though neither of them need a companion to recommend it to me.

me. Your reaſonings are ſo ſtrong and juſt, and your friendſhip to me ſo viſible, that every thing muſt be welcome to me that comes from your pen, let it be of what kind ſoever. I promiſe myſelf that to all thoſe who are willing to open their eyes and to enlarge their minds to a true knowledge of things, this little treatiſe of yours will be greatly acceptable and uſeful; and for thoſe who will ſhut their eyes for fear they ſhould ſee more than others have ſeen before them, or rather for fear they ſhould make uſe of them, and not blindly and lazily follow the ſayings of others; what can be done to them? They are to be let alone to join in the cry of the herd they have placed themſelves in, and take that for applauſe which is nothing but the noiſe that of courſe they make to one another, which way ever they are going: ſo that the greatneſs of it is no manner of proof that they are in the right.—I ſay not this becauſe it is a diſcourſe wherein you favour any opinions of mine, (for I take care not to be deceived by the reaſonings of my friends) but I ſay it from thoſe who are ſtrangers to you, and who own themſelves to have received light and conviction from the clearneſs and cloſeneſs of your reaſonings, and that in a matter at firſt ſight very abſtruſe and remote from ordinary conceptions.—There is nothing that would more rejoice me than to have you for my neighbour. The advantages that you promiſe yourſelf from mine, I ſhould receive from your converſation. The impartial lovers and ſearchers of truth are a great deal fewer than one could wiſh or imagine. It is a rare thing to find any one to whom one can communicate one's thoughts freely, and from whom one may expect a careful examination and impartial judgment of them. To be learned in the lump by other men's thoughts, and to be in the right by ſaying after others, is the much eaſier and quicker way; but how a rational man that ſhould enquire and know for himſelf, can content himſelf with a faith or religion taken upon truſt, or with ſuch a ſervile ſubmiſſion of his underſtanding, as to admit all and nothing elſe but what faſhion makes at preſent paſſable amongſt ſome men, is to me aſtoniſhing. I do not wonder that concerning many points you ſhould have different apprehenſions from what you meet with in authors; with a free mind, that unbiaſſedly purſues truth, it cannot be otherwiſe; 1ſt, becauſe all authors did not write unbiaſſedly for truth's ſake; and, 2dly, becauſe there are ſcarce any two men that have perfectly the ſame views of the ſame thing till they come with attention, and perhaps mutual aſſiſtance, to examine it. A conſideration that makes converſation with the living much more deſirable and uſeful than conſulting the dead, would the living but be inquiſitive after truth, apply their thoughts with attention to the gaining of it, and be indifferent with whom it was found, ſo they could but find it. The firſt requiſite to the profiting by books is not to judge of opinions by the authority of the writers. None have the right of dictating but God himſelf, and that becauſe he is truth itſelf. All others have a right to be followed as far as I have, and no farther, i. e. as far as the evidence of what they ſay convinces, and of that my own underſtanding alone

muſt be judge for me, and nothing elſe. If we made our own eyes our own guides, and admitted or rejected opinions only by the evidence of reaſon, we ſhould neither embrace nor refuſe any tenet, becauſe we find it publiſhed by another, of what name or character ſoever he was.

You ſay you loſe many things becauſe they ſlip from you. I have had experience of that myſelf, but for that my Lord Bacon has provided a ſure remedy. For, as I remember, he adviſes ſomewhere never to go without pen and ink, or ſomething to write with, and to be ſure not to neglect to write down all thoughts of moment that come into the mind. I muſt own I have omitted it often, and often repented it. The thoughts that come often unſought, and, as it were, drop into the mind, are commonly the moſt valuable of any we have, and therefore ſhould be ſecured, becauſe they ſeldom return again.

You ſay alſo that you loſe many things, becauſe your own thoughts are not ſteady and ſtrong enough to follow and purſue them to a juſt iſſue. Give me leave to think that herein you miſtake yourſelf, and your own abilities. Write down your thoughts upon any point as far as you have at any time purſued them, and go on with them again ſome other time, when you find your mind diſpoſed to it, and ſo till you have carried them as far as you can, and you will be convinced that, if you have loſt any, it has not been for want of ſtrength of mind to bring them to an iſſue, but for want of memory to retain a long train of reaſonings which the mind, having once beat out, is loth to be at the pains to go over again, and ſo the connection and train having ſlipped the memory, the purſuit ſtops, and the reaſoning is neglected before it comes to the laſt concluſion. If you have not tried it, you cannot imagine the difference there is in ſtudying with and without a pen in your hand. Your ideas, if the connections of them that you have traced be ſet down, ſo that, without the pains of recollecting them in your memory, you can take an eaſy view of them again, will lead you farther than you could expect. Try, and tell me if it be not ſo. I ſay not this that I ſhould not be glad to have any converſation with you, upon any points you ſhall employ your thoughts about. Propoſe what you have of this kind freely, and do not ſuſpect it will interfere with any of my affairs. Know that beſides the pleaſure it is to converſe with a thinking man, and a lover of truth, I ſhall profit by it more than you. This you would ſee by the frequency of my viſits, if you were within the reach of them.

That which I think of Deut. xii. 15. is this, that the reaſon why it is ſaid, *as the roebuck and the hart*, is, becauſe, Lev. xvii. to prevent idolatry in offering the blood to other gods, they were commanded to kill all the cattle that they ate at the door of the Tabernacle, as a peace-offering, and ſprinkle the blood on the altar. But wild beaſts that were clean might be eaten, tho' their blood were not offered to God, ver. 13, becauſe being commonly killed before they were taken, their blood could not be ſprinkled on the altar, and therefore it ſufficed in ſuch caſes to pour out their

blood wherever they were killed, and cover it with duſt, and for the ſame reaſon, when the camp was broken up, wherein the whole people was in the neighbourhood of the Tabernacle, during their 40 years paſſage from Egypt to Canaan, and the people were ſcattered in their habitations through all the Land of Promiſe, thoſe who were too far off from the Temple were excuſed (Deut. xii. v. 21, 22.) from killing their tame cattle at Jeruſalem and ſprinkling their blood on the altar. No more was required of them than was required in killing a roebuck, or any other clean wild beaſt: they were only to pour out the blood, and cover it with duſt, and ſo they might eat of the fleſh.

Theſe are my thoughts concerning that paſſage. What you ſay about critics and critical interpretations, particularly of the Holy Scriptures, is not only in my opinion very true, but of great uſe to be obſerved on reading learned commentators, who not ſeldom make it their buſineſs to ſhew in what ſenſe a word has been uſed by other authors; whereas the proper buſineſs of a commentator is barely to ſhew in what ſenſe it was uſed by the author in that place; which in the Scripture we have reaſon to conclude was moſt commonly in the ordinary vulgar ſenſe of that word or phraſe known in that time, becauſe the books were writ, as you juſtly obſerve, and adapted to the people. If the critics had obſerved this, we ſhould have had in their works leſs oſtentation, and more truth, and a great deal of the darkneſs and doubtfulneſs now ſpread upon the Scriptures had been avoided. I have had a late proof of this in myſelf, who have lately found in ſome large paſſages of Scripture a ſenſe quite different from what I underſtood it in before, and from what I find in commentators; and yet it appears ſo clear to me, that when I ſee you next I ſhall dare to appeal to you in it. But I read the word of God without preposſeſſion or bias, and come to it with a reſolution to take my ſenſe from it, and not with a deſign to bring it to the ſenſe of my ſyſtem. How much that had made men wind and twiſt and pull the text in all the ſeveral ſects of Chriſtians, I need not tell you. I deſire to take my religion from the Scriptures, and then whether it ſuits or ſuits not any other denomination, I am not much concerned; for I think at the laſt day it will not be enquired whether I were of the church of England, or church of Geneva, but whether I ſought and embraced the truth in the love of it. The proofs I have ſet down in my book, of one infinite, independent, eternal Being, ſatisfied me; and the gentleman that deſired others, and pretended that the next propoſition to that of the exiſtence of a ſelf-ſufficient, independent Being, ſhould be this, that ſuch a Being is but one, and that he could prove it antecedent to his attributes, v. g. of Infinity, Omnipotence, &c. I am pretty well ſatisfied, pretended to what he had not, and therefore trouble not myſelf any farther about that matter. As to what you ſay upon this occaſion, I agree with you, that the ideas of the modes and actions of ſubſtances are uſually in our minds before the idea of ſubſtance itſelf; but in this I differ from you, that I

do not think the ideas of the operations of things are antecedent to the ideas of their exiſtence, for they muſt exiſt before they can any way affect us, or make us ſenſible of their operations, and we muſt ſuppoſe them to be before they operate. My Eſſay is going to be printed again; I wiſh you were near me, that I might ſhew you the ſeveral alterations and additions I have made, before they go to the preſs.

The warm weather that begins now with us makes me hope I ſhall now ſpeedily get to town; if any buſineſs draws you thither this ſummer, I hope you will order it ſo that I may have a good ſhare of your company. No body values it more than I do; and I have a great many things to talk with you. I am, Sir,

Your moſt affectionate,

and moſt humble Servant,

For Mr. Samuel Bold,
at Steeple.

J. Locke.

Oates, April 24, 1696.

Dear Coll,

I SEE by the temper the country is in, (and I doubt not but there are thoſe who will blow the coal) that if London does not ſet them a good example, the act will be broken through, and clipping will be continued upon us.—I am ſure the trade goes on as briſk as ever; a company was lately taken at or about Ware. Somebody ready, as ſoon as the day comes, to arreſt a goldſmith that refuſed to pay money according to the law, would ſpoil the trick, eſpecially if ſeveral of them were made examples.—If clipped money once get but currency in London amongſt thoſe blades, but for the firſt week after the 4th of May, I look upon it as irretrievable, but if it be ſtopped there, the reſt of the kingdom will fall into it, eſpecially if receiving clipped money by weight be introduced. Theſe are at preſent my thoughts, which I trouble thoſe with who I know are able to make uſe of them, if they may be of any. Duty and ſervice from all here.

I am, dear Col, &c.

J. Locke.

Lord

Lord ASHLEY to Dr. FELL.

SIR, Dec. 8, 1670.

YOU are well acquainted with the kindneſſe I have great reaſon to have to Mr. Locke, in whoſe behalf I had prevailed with the Duke of Ormond for his aſſiſtance towards the attaining his doctor's degree, at the reception of the Prince of Aurange; and I am apt to think the inſtance of your chancellor, and the relation he has to me, would not have been denied by the univerſity. But Mr. Locke underſtanding the provoſt of Eaton declared himſelf, and you, diſſatisfied with it, has importuned me to give him leave to deline it, which, upon conference with my worthy friend the Biſhop of Rocheſter, I have donne, and returned his Grace's letter, though my Lord Biſhop of Rocheſter can tell you I I could not but complain to him, that your chapter had not been ſo kinde to me, in Mr. Locke's affairs, as I thought I might juſtly expect, conſidering him a member of their houſe, having done both my life and family that ſervice I owne from him, and I being of that quality I am under his majeſtie, under which title only I pretend to any favour from them. All that I requeſt now, of you and them, is, that ſince he will not allow me to doe him this kindneſſe, you will give me leave to beſpeake your favour for the next faculty place, and that a more powerful hand may not take it from him. I rely very much on my Lord Rocheſter's mediation, and your own kindneſſe to me, that may induce you to believe, that an obligation will not be abſolutely caſt away on,

SIR,

Your affectionate friend and ſervant.

MY LORD,

I DOUBT not but your Lordſhip hath before this time heard of the death of Mr. Locke, who was in the full poſſeſſion of his reaſon and underſtanding to the laſt minute of his life; he hath made me his executor, by means whereof his writings are come to my hands, amongſt which I find three or four ſheets of memoirs of your grandfather's life, with an epitaph on your grandfather. Mr. Locke deſigned, if he had lived longer, to have gone on farther with thoſe memoirs. I beg your Lordſhip's pardon that I have not acquainted your Lordſhip herewith ſooner; but Mr. Locke happening to dye in the term, I had not leiſure to look into his concerns,

concerns, beyond what was abſolutely neceſſary, till within theſe few days. Theſe papers properly belong to your Lordſhip, and I thought it my duty to acquaint your Lordſhip therewith, and ſhall diſpoſe of them as your Lordſhip ſhall direct.

I am, with all ſincerity,

Your Lordſhip's moſt dutiful,

and affectionate ſervant,

Inner Temple,
Dec. 9, 1704.

PETER KING.

OBSERVATIONS

OBSERVATIONS

UPON THE

GROWTH AND CULTURE

OF

VINES AND OLIVES:

The PRODUCTION of SILK:

The PRESERVATION of FRUITS.

Written at the REQUEST of

The EARL of SHAFTSBURY.

To whom it is Inſcribed.

(FIRST PUBLISHED in M.DCC.LXVI.)

The EDITOR to the READER.

AT this time, when every improvement of the garden is ſo much the ſtudy and delight of our countrymen; when artificial means have been diſcovered to ſupply every defect of climate, and the vegetable productions of every other region of the globe have been raiſed in our own ſoil; it is preſumed the following ſmall tract, printed from a manuſcript very neatly written by Mr. John Locke, with his uſual accuracy, will be no unwelcome preſent to the public.

SUBJECTS of curioſity and inſtruction, to the inquiſitive philoſopher, and his noble patron, will, doubtleſs, be entertaining to every reader.

SHOULD it gain a paſſage to America, it will be of far more extenſive uſe both to that country and to Britain.

No union, no alliance, is ſo firm and laſting as that which is founded upon the ſolid baſis of a mutual intereſt.

NECESSITY, natural or artificial, is the real cauſe and ſupport of trade and navigation. Our commerce with Spain and Portugal, and other countries, will ſubſiſt under every change of government or inhabitants, whilſt we are in want of the productions of their ſoil and induſtry.

POLITICIANS, who ought to know how commerce, and conſequently naval force, has fluctuated in the world, will take care not to oppreſs, by very heavy and improvident taxations, their manufactures, and other articles of trade at home, nor ſuch commodities imported from abroad, as may diſpoſe other nations to cultivate thoſe very articles among themſelves, which they have hitherto received from us.

HOWEVER populous and great, induſtrious and rich, the ſettlements in the vaſt continent of America may hereafter become, this the mother-country may for ever be connected with it more intimately than the ſouthern nations, by encouraging the growth and produce of vines and olives, ſilk and fruits, which cannot advantageouſly be raiſed in England: and ſound policy will always engage the ſubjects in England and America not to be rivals in trade, by ſetting up ſuch manufactures in one country as muſt neceſſarily diſtreſs the other.

THE

THE wiſdom of this country will inſtruct governors to do all that is poſſible to promote the linen manufacture in Ireland; and the wiſe and good in both kingdoms will never deſire ſuch uſe of their wool and their ports as muſt be directly prejudicial to England.

THE moſt perfect harmony will ſubſiſt between Great Britain and her colonies, as long as Britiſh ſubjects, cemented by blood, by mutual intereſt and commerce, continue friends to liberty and the proteſtant religion, and ſucceſſion in the preſent royal family; this is a true and laſting family-compact: all which ineſtimable bleſſings will be rendered permanent and inviolable by the fleets of England, which, whilſt the Britiſh empire is united, will be ſuperior to all other powers in the world.

THE editor cannot take his leave of the reader without obſerving, that very important ſervices have been done to America, by a plan of government drawn up for the province of Carolina by Mr. Locke, under the direction of that eminent and able ſtateſman, the firſt earl of Shafteſbury; and by the preſent earl of Shafteſbury, as an active and zealous truſtee for the colony of Georgia; from which, in time, we may expect a conſiderable qnantity of raw ſilk will be imported into England.

VINES are natural to the ſoil of many parts in America; and, if olive-trees are planted in ſuch provinces as are moſt proper for the growth of them, the planters will ſoon be enriched, and England relieved in ſeveral articles made from this profitable fruit, and which are neceſſary to the ſupport of every individual, and every manufacture in the kingdom.

Temple, March 1766.

G. S.

To

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

ANTHONY EARL OF SHAFTSBURY.

MY LORD,

THE country, where theſe obſervations were made, hath vanity enough to over-value every thing it produces: and it is hard to live in a place, and not take ſome tincture from the manners of the people. Yet I think I ſhould ſcarce have ventured to trouble your lordſhip with theſe French trifles, had not your lordſhip yourſelf encouraged me to believe, that it would not be unacceptable to you, if I took this way (for I ought all manner of ways) to expreſs that duty and obſervance wherewith I am,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt humble,

Ch. Ch. Feb. 1, 1679.

and moſt obedient ſervant

JOHN LOCKE.

WINE.

IN Languedoc they plant their vineyards in February; and they chuſe the quarter before the full, as the fitteſt time of the moon to do it in.

THEY ſet the cuttings they plant exactly in quincunx, and the rows at four and a half, five, and ſix pans diſtance.—A pan is $9\frac{5}{6}$ inches.

ABOUT Tholoun, in Provence, and alſo about Bourdeaux, I have ſeen vines and corn interchangeably; viz. two or three rows of vines, and then a ridge or two of corn.

THEY ſet their plants about a ſpit deep, and always leave two knots above ground.

IN ſetting the vines, they dig the ground ſometimes all over, ſometimes only in trenches.

THEY plant their vineyards both in plains and on hills, with indifferency; but ſay that on hills, eſpecially opening to the eaſt or ſouth, the wine is beſt: in plains they produce moſt. The ſoil about Frontignan, where the beſt muſcat grows, is ſo ſtony, that one can ſee no earth at all. And the vine de Pontac, ſo much eſteemed in England, grows on a riſing opening to the weſt, in a white ſand mixed with a little gravel, which one would think would bear nothing; but there is ſuch a particularity in the ſoil, that at Mr. Pontac's, near Bourdeaux, the merchants aſſured me that the wine growing in the very next vineyards, where there was only a ditch between, and the ſoil, to appearance, perfectly the ſame, was by no means ſo good. The ſame alſo they obſerve about Montpelier, where two vineyards, bounding one upon another, conſtantly produce the one good and the other bad wine.

A VINEYARD, from its planting, will laſt fifty, eighty, or an hundred years. The older the vineyard, the fewer the grapes, but the better the wine. New-planted vineyards produce more, but the wine not ſo good: it is generally green, i. e. more inclining to verjuice.

THE vineyard thus planted, the next year at pruning they cut them, ſo that (if conveniently there can) there may be four ſhoots next year, near the ground, at leaſt three, ſpreading ſeveral ways, which may come to be ſo many ſtanding branches, out of which the ſhoots are to ſprout. There being thus left the beginnings of three or four branches ſpreading different ways, ever afterwards, when they come to prune, they leave about an inch of that laſt year's ſhoot, which grew ſtraight out of the top

of each of the four ſtanding branches; all the reſt they cut off clean to the old ſtock.

IF by chance they find (when they are pruning) a vine decayed, or gone in any place, they dig a trench from the next ſtock to that place, and, laying the old ſtock along in the trench, order it ſo that one laſt year's ſhoot of the ſaid ſtock ſhall come out juſt where the laid ſtock grew, and another where there was one wanting: theſe they cut off about eight or nine inches above the ground, which being fed by the great old root (which they move not when they lay the old ſtock, but ſo looſen it only as it may let the old ſtock be gently bent down, and ſo be buried in the trench) will bear the next vintage; whereas, if they planted a cutting in the place where they found a ſtock wanting, it would not bear in three or four years. By theſe young plants, they ſtick in a good ſtrong branch, a pretty deal longer than the plant, which they leave there to defend it.

THEY prune their vines in December, January, February, and March: they that do it ſo late as the latter end of February, or the month of March, are ſuch as have vineyards apt to ſhoot early in the ſpring; and, if cold weather nip the young ſhoots, they have the fewer grapes at the vintage. And in pruning their vines they obſerve to do it one year in the new and another in the old of the moon, or elſe they ſay they will grow too much to wood.

THEY turn the ground of their vineyards twice a year; about the end of February or in March, and again in May: they do it either by ploughing betwixt the rows of vines, or, which they count better, by digging, in which they ſometimes uſe little ſpades, but moſt commonly large houghs, the uſual way of delving in this country; in which way they turn up the earth as deep and much faſter than our men do with ſpades in England.

PIGEONS dung and hens dung they make uſe of in their vineyards, as an improvement that will increaſe the quantity without injuring the goodneſs of their wine: but horſe dung, or that of any beaſt, they ſay, ſpoils the goodneſs of their wine. This they have ſo ſtrong an opinion of at Galliac, a place about thirty leagues from Montpelier, that, if a peaſant there ſhould uſe any but birds dung about his vines, his neighbours would burn his houſe; becauſe they would not have the wine of that place loſe its reputation.

I HAVE been told that a ſheep's horn buried at the root of a vine will make it bear well even in barren ground. I have no great faith in it, but mention it, becauſe it may ſo eaſily be tried.

BUT I ſuppoſe the huſbandry in their vineyards differs much, both according to the faſhion of ſeveral countries, and the difference of ſoil; for I remember that, at Mr. Pontac's vineyard near Bourdeaux, the vines in ſome parts of the vineyard grew four or five feet high, and were tied to ſtakes; and in another part of the ſame vineyard they were directed along upon the ground, not above a foot from it, between little low

ſtakes

ſtakes or laths, ſo that the old branches ſtand on each ſide the root like a pair of arms ſpread out, and lying open towards the ſouth. The reaſon of this different way of culture I could not learn of the labourers for want of underſtanding Gaſcoin. In Languedoc they uſe no ſtakes at all to ſupport their vines, but they truſt them to the ſtrength of their own growth, pruning them as I have above mentioned; which makes them ſay in the more northerly parts of France, that in Languedoc they have wine without taking pains for it.

WHEN the grapes are ready to turn, they go into the vineyards, and there taking four, five, or ſix of the neighbour ſhoots, twiſt them together at the top; and thus the ſhoots all through the vineyard, being as it were tied together, ſtand upright, whereby the grapes have more ſun, and perhaps the ſap too is hindered from running into the wood and leaves.

THEY have about Montpelier theſe following ſorts of grapes:

1. Eſpiran.
2. Eſpiran verdau.
3. Tarret.
4. Barbaroux.
5. Grumeau negre.
6. Grumeau blanc.
7. Grumeau blanc muſcat.
8. Laugeby.
9. L'ougré.
10. Raiſin de St. Jean.
11. Marroquin.
12. Marroquin gris.
13. Marroquin bleu.
14. Clarette.
15. Clarette rouge.
16. Ovilla de negre.
17. Ovilla de blanc.
18. Covilla de Gal.
19. Ramounen.
20. Unio negro.
21. Unio blanquo.
22. Corinth.
23. Effouimu.
24. Iragnou.
25. Piquepoul.
26. Farret.
27. Piquardan.
28. Muſquat negre.
29. Muſquat blanc.
30. Muſquat d'Eſpagne.
31. Palofedo.
32. Servan.
33. Damas violet.
34. Raiſon de la fon.
35. Sadoulo boyyier.
36. Sergouſan.
37. L'ambruſque.
38. Rovergas.
39. Coltort.
40. Muſquadaſſas.
41. Criſpata.

THESE are the names of grapes they have about Montpelier, as they are called in the pattoy of that country.

1. THE eſpiran, a round, black, very ſweet and very wholeſome grape: they eat them in great quantities when thorough ripe (which is about the middle of Auguſt ſtylo novo) without any fear of ſurfeit; and they are often preſcribed by phyſicians to be eaten plentifully. I think them one of the beſt fruits in the world. Theſe alone, of all the red grapes, make good wine by themſelves; but they plant them not in ſo great

quantities as the other ſorts, becauſe in hot and dry ſeaſons they will dry up before they are ripe.

2. ESPIRAN verdau, or the green eſpiran, called ſo from its colour; an admirable grape alſo to eat, though not altogether ſo delicate as the black eſpiran; but its excellency is, that it will keep long in the winter for eating; and I have eat very good of them at Chriſtmas. Their way of keeping them is to gather them when ripe, and ſo hang them up, every bunch ſingle, to the roof of a cloſe room.

3. TARRET is a black, very large, but not very ſweet grape, and therefore uſed only for wine; wherein it gives a very large quantity; but not much ſtrength.

5. GRUMEAU negre, or the black grumeau, is an exceeding large grape, very fleſhy, and well enough taſted, of the faſhion of a pear. I have ſeen one ſingle grape of this ſort which was in compaſs above 3½ inches Engliſh meaſure, and in compaſs the long way 3¼, and weighed of their weights ℥ſs. ℈j. gr. iij. and all the reſt of the grapes of the ſame bunch proportionable; but I have not obſerved them ordinarily planted in their vineyards.

10. RAISIN de St. Jean is a ſort of grape which they have only at the phyſick-garden at Montpelier: it came from India; it is a black grape, very good, ripe at Midſummer (and therefore called St. John's grape) two months before any of the other ſorts.

11. MARROQUIN, a very black, large, fleſhy, round grape, very good to to eat, but ſeldom uſed in wine.

14. CLARETTE, white, longiſh, middle-ſized, ſweet, good to eat, and good for wine.

19. RAMOUNEN, black, very ſweet, middle-ſized, good for wine, and eating.

22. CORINTH; this we have in England; and I do not find they uſe it much there for wine.

25. PIQUEPOUL, black and very ſweet, good for wine and for eating.

27. PIQUARDAN, white, long, large, very ſweet, with a little of the muſcat taſte in it; makes very good wine alone or mingled.

29. MUSQUAT blanc, or white muſcat; this is uſually planted and preſſed alone, and makes the wine we uſually call Frontiniac, from Frontignan, a town on the Mediterranean, near two or three leagues from Montpelier, where the moſt and beſt of this ſort of wine is made. It is a pleaſant grape, and early ripe, before the other ordinary ſorts; but they are not near ſo good to eat as the eſpiran, being apt to fume to the head and make it ache.

32. SERVAN, a long, large, white, fleſhy, ſweet grape, called ſo, becauſe they keep well, and you have of theſe always lateſt in winter.

41. CRISPATA; this I ſaw no-where but in the phyſick-garden at Montpelier: a good ſweet white grape; called ſo from its jagged leaves, and I ſuppoſe the ſame with our parſley grape in England.

AT Marmouſtier, the great abbey of Benedictins near Tours, I ſaw in their garden a ſort of grapes pretty ripe, which they called raiſins de Ste. Magdalene, becauſe they uſed to be ripe about that time, which is the 22d of July.

UPON the ſkilful mixture of theſe ſeveral ſorts of grapes, as well as on the propriety of the ſoil, depends in a great meaſure the goodneſs of their wine: though, as far as I could obſerve, it was not ſo far improved as it might; nor any other great care taken, but that there ſhould be always a mixture of white grapes when they made their red wine, which will otherwiſe be too thick and deep-coloured: and therefore, if they have a ſufficient quantity of claret or piquardin grapes in their vineyards, they ſeem not over curious of an exact proportion of the other ſorts, which are planted there promiſcuouſly.

WHEN their grapes are ripe, and they have leave, they cut them, carry them home, and tread them immediately; for they will not keep without ſpoiling: this is the reaſon they muſt have leave; for, the parſon being to have his tithe, and of that make his wine, if the pariſhioners were not obliged to vintage all at the ſame time, he could not make wine of his ſhare, ſince one parcel of grapes could not ſtay till the other was cut to be preſſed with them.

THE grapes being brought in great tubs, either on mules or men's backs, to the place where the wine is to be made, they put them in a kind of grate over the kuve, and there tread them till they are all broken, and then they throw them, huſks, ſtalks, and all, into the kuve: and thus till all their whole crop of grapes are trod.

WHEN all the maſs is in the kuve, they let it work there one, two, or three days, as they think fit to have their wine: the longer it works, and the more ſtalks are in it (for ſometimes they put them not all in) the rougher and deeper-coloured will the wine be, but keep the longer.

WHEN it has wrought its time in the kuve, they put it into buts, and there let it work as long as it will, filling up the working veſſel every day with ſome of the ſame muſt kept on purpoſe, for it waſtes much in working.

OF the marc (which is huſks, ſtalks, and other ſediment, left at the bottom of the kuve when the muſt is taken out) they make a worſe and coarſe ſort of wine for the ſervants, and this they preſs as we do our apples, to make cyder.

THE ſtones, after preſſing, ſome people cleanſe from the reſt of the marc, and ſell for food for pigeons: the ſtalks alſo cleanſed they uſe in making of verdigris. And in ſome places they take the remaining marc after preſſing, put it in great tubs, and cover it with water, keeping the marc down with weights, and of this they give to their horſes, which very much cools and refreſhes them there in the hot ſeaſon. This may give one reaſon to conſider, whether any ſuch uſe might be made of the marc of our apples, after making cyder.

WHEN

WHEN they have a mind to have their wine fine ſooner than ordinary, they put into the caſk a pretty good quantity of ſhavings of fir, and in ſome places of hazel, and with it they ſometimes put ſome whole white grapes.

A LITTLE bread or oil (they ſay ever ſo little, and therefore they are very careful in this point) mixed with the muſt, turns the wine to vinegar; and ſo does thunder: but they ſay iron laid upon the veſſels will keep wine from ſouring by thunder.

THE kuve is, in ſome places, a great veſſel made of wood (witneſs the great kuve that is yet to be ſeen at Marmouſtier, which, they ſay, will hold two hundred tun of wine) as our brewers veſſels for the working of their kuve is in England. But, at Montpelier, it is uſually a place made in the ground in ſome part of the houſe, proportionably big accordingly to the quantity they ordinarily make, and lined with plaſter of Paris, to keep it from leaking. In the kuve (which is made uſe of but once a year) as well as all other parts of their making wine, they are, according to their manner, ſufficiently naſty: the grapes often are alſo very rotten, and always full of ſpiders. Beſides that, I have been told by thoſe of the country, that they often put ſalt, dung, and other filthineſs, in their wine to help, as they think, its purging. But, without theſe additions, the very ſight of their treading and making their wine (walking without any ſcruple out of the grapes into the dirt, and out of the dirt into grapes they are treading) were enough to ſet one's ſtomach ever after againſt this ſort of liquor.

IN ſome parts of Languedoc, out of the great roads, their wine is ſo cheap, that one may ordinarily buy three pints a penny.

IT is uſual to ſet fig-trees, pear-trees, &c. up and down in their vineyards, and ſometimes I have ſeen olive-trees. Here at Montpelier, as in other parts of France, it is no diſcredit for any man to hang out a buſh at his door, and ſell his wine by retail, either to thoſe that fetch it out of doors, or will come and drink it at his houſe; for which they uſually, for that time, ſet apart a room or quarter of the houſe, and have a ſervant on purpoſe to attend it. This I have known both gentlemen and churchmen do. But whoever, in Languedoc, ſells his own wine at his houſe, muſt not afford his cuſtomers ſo much as a bit of bread, or any thing elſe, to eat with it; for then it will come under the notion of a cabaret, or common drinking-houſe, and their tax or exciſe overtake them. I mention Languedoc, becauſe in other parts of France they who ſell their own wine by retail, are not excuſed from paying the king a part of what they ſell it for. At Saumur, I remember I was told, they then ſold their wine (which is a very good ſort of white wine) at their buſhons, i. e. private houſes, for 18 deniers per pint, which is more than our quart; out of which 18d. the king had 10d. and the proprietor the remaining 8d.

O I L.

THE ſorts of olives, as well as grapes, are very various about Montpelier: the names of ſome of them are as followeth:

1. Grooſau, a large olive.
2. Pichulina, little.
3. Verdal, middle-ſized.

Theſe three ſorts are good to eat, and the laſt alſo is good for oil, and a great bearer.

4. Olivera.
5. Corneau.
6. Salierna.
7. Clarmonteſa.
8. Redonau.

} Good bearers.

9. Bootiliau.
10. Argentau.
11. Moorau.
12. Marſilieſa.
13. Pigau.

All theſe are little olives, and uſed only for oil: they plant them promiſcuouſly in their olive-yards, and mingle the olives in making oil. That which they principally regard in the plants is, that they be of the ſorts that are the beſt bearers, and if they have not enough of thoſe, they plant others, and inoculate them. The ſlips will grow, but they commonly uſe off-ſets from the roots.

THEIR time of planting is February, March, and April. Their olive-trees laſt to a great age; they ſay two hundred years. When the old ſtocks are faulty or decayed, they let up young off-ſets from the roots round about, and when they are grown up to any conſiderable bigneſs, cut away the old ſtock cloſe to the ground; and when the remaining young trees have not room to ſpread, becauſe of their neighbourhood, they tranſplant them, till they leave at laſt but one ſtanding.

THEY ſet their olive-trees ordinarily in quincunx, the rows at thirty or forty feet diſtance in their arable ground; for this hinders them not from ploughing and ſowing corn in the ſame ground.

THEY dig about their olive-trees every year, and about the ſame time they dig their vineyards, and ſometimes at others; and lay ſoil in the trenches they open about their roots; this is uſually done in March, and the ſoil they uſe is horſe-dung.

IN pruning their olive-trees, which they do about the beginning of March, I obſerved them to cut off the top branches, I ſuppoſe to make them ſpread.

ABOUT the beginning of October they gather the olives, yet green, that they intend to pickle for eating (for about the end of October they turn black) and having carefully picked out thoſe that have worms, they ſoak the ſound ones, in the ſtrongeſt ley they can get, four, ſix, or eight hours, according as they deſign to eat them ſooner or later: the longer they ſoak in the ley, the more of their bitterneſs is taken way, but they will keep the leſs while. This ley they buy for this purpoſe at the ſoap-boilers. After they have been ſoaked in ley, they put them into water, which, for the three or four firſt days, they change two or three times a day, and afterwards once; in all a fortnight: this they do to take away the taſte of the ley. The ley and water they uſe both cold. When this is done, they put them into pickle of ſalt and water, and ſo keep them.

I HAVE been told, that cutting each olive in two or three places to the ſtone, and ſo ſoaking them in fair water ſeven or eight days, changing it every day, will take away their bitterneſs, and prepare them well enough for the pickle: but they count the ley the better way.

THEY often pickle them alſo after they are turned black, cutting them in two or three places to the ſtone, and then ſoaking them about a fortnight in water changed every day, and then boiling them in ſalt and water, which is the pickle they keep them in. Theſe have a much worſe taſte than the green, having no very pleaſant mixture of bitter and oily: but the good houſewives think they will go much farther (for they are oftener food than ſauce there) and ſo in their private families are commonly uſed.

THEY count their olives ripe enough for oil about St. Catharine's day, the 25th of November; and about that time they begin to gather them: though I have ſeen them let them hang on the trees, and not gathered till the latter end of January.

IN the gathering there will be leaves and branches mixed with them; to ſeparate theſe they lay them down in a heap in a field, and a workman, taking up a few in a ſhovel, throws them into a winnowing ſheet ſet up at a good diſtance from him, whither the olives come alone, the leaves and branches falling by the way.

THE manner of making oil is this:

THEY take four ſeptiés of olives a little heaped, and put them into a mill, which is drawn by a mule, where they grind them, as tanners grind bark, to a fine pulp, one ſtanding by as the mill goes round, and ſhovelling in a little of the olives or pulp towards the center, and clearing a part of the ſtone at the bottom, where he ſtands with a ſhovel, which he doth ſo by degrees and in ſucceſſion, that I believe the mule goes round forty or fifty times for his once.

THEY being ſufficiently ground, they put them into a ſtone trough, two whereof ſtand between the mill and the preſs; out of theſe troughs they take the pulp, and put it into frails, and ſpread it in them equally, ſo that they may lay them plain one upon another. Of theſe frails there were, when I ſaw them preſs, twenty-four upon each pedeſtal; viz. in all forty-eight; in which were contained ten ſeptiés of olives. Sometimes they preſs twelve ſeptiés of olives at once, and then they uſe more frails proportionably.

THE frails being filled with pulp, and placed evenly and upright upon the two pedeſtals in equal number, they ſet the preſs a-working, firſt lifting up the ſcrew end, that ſo the other end of the beam, ſinking upon the hinder pile of frails, and preſſing them, may make way for the putting in the wedges into the great mortiſe, and diſcharge the wedge in the little mortiſe, which, whilſt they were placing the frails upon the pedeſtals, ſupported the beam; which being taken out, they work the ſcrew the other way, and ſo bringing down the ſcrew end of the beam preſs both on the fore and hinder pile of frails; a man attending in the mean time at each pile of frails with a lever in his hand, which reſting in the groove or gutter where the oil runs, he thruſts againſt the ſide of the pile of frails, whenever he perceives it begin to ſwell out on any ſide, and thus keeps it upright from leaning any way whilſt it is preſſing, eſpecially at the beginning; another man in the mean time not ceaſing to turn the ſcrew till the great ſtone at the end of it be clear off from the ground.

WHEN the oil ceaſes to run, or but in ſmall quantity, they lift up the ſcrew end of the beam, and then putting a wedge in the little mortiſe, bring down the ſcrew end of the beam again, and ſo lift up the great end that preſſed the frails, and ſo bringing the beam to a level (the whole weight whereof lies upon the wedge in the little mortiſe, which ſupports it in the middle) diſcharge it clear from the frails.

THEN they take off all the frails, except the eight or ten lower, on each pedeſtal, and ſtirring the pulp in one of the frails taken off, replace it again upon thoſe that remained ſtill on the pedeſtal; and then one pours on it a bucket of ſcalding water; after which he ſtirs the pulp again, and lays it flat and equal as at firſt, and then ſtirs and puts on another frail as before, with a bucket of ſcalding water poured on it;

and ſo they ſerve them all, till all the frails that were taken off are replaced on the two piles as at firſt; and then they ſet the preſs a-working again as long as any quantity will run; and then lifting up the beam again, take off all the frails, ſtir the pulp, and pour on freſh hot water upon every frail, a little bucket-full as at firſt, and then preſs as long as any thing will run, ſcrewing the ſtone up clear from the ground, and letting it hang ſo a good while. When not one jot more of liquor will be preſſed from the frails, and they perfectly ceaſe running, they let down the ſtone, and that preſſing is done; and then one with a broad, but very ſhallow ſkimming-diſh of braſs ſkims off the oil from the water, puts it into a braſs veſſel like a tumbler, but holding, as I gueſs, about three pints, and out of that pouring it into the veſſels of the owners by a braſs funnel.

WHEN the oil is well ſkimmed off from the water, they pull out a ſtopple in the bottom of the ciſtern, and ſo let go the water, which runs into a great ciſtern called hell, which is locked up and out of ſight; into this hell all the water that hath ſerved in preſſing the oil, runs, and is made ſo, that though it be always full of this water, yet the water alone runs out, and the oil that ſwims on top ſtays behind, by which means all the oil that eſcaped the ſkimming-diſh is here caught: but this I ſuppoſe belongs to the maſter of the oil-preſs, for every body's water runs in here to the former oil and water.

N. B.

I°. THAT the mill which grinds the olives is much after the ſame faſhion with that which our tanners uſe to grind bark, only with ſome difference.

As, 1°, that in the center of the oil-mill there ſtands up a round ſtone, very ſmooth and true wrought, about two feet Engliſh in diameter, and about the ſame height, which the inſide of the great grinding ſtone touches in its going round about it, ſo that no olives can eſcape the great ſtone towards the center, nor get beſide it that way.

2°. THAT the floor of the mill, upon which the great turning ſtone bears in its turning round, is alſo of hard ſtone and ſmooth, and a little ſhelving, the declivity being towards the center; to anſwer which, the edge of the turning ſtone which is to grind the olives, that it may bear in its whole breadth upon the ſtones in the floor, is not cut with a direct perpendicular to the ſides, but the line of the inſide of the ſaid grinding ſtone, and of the edge or circumference, make an angle ſomething leſs than a right one, and on the outſide there is left no angle, but it is cut off with a round; by which means I ſuppoſe the great grinding ſtone ſlides conſtantly towards and is kept cloſe to the round ſtone that ſtands fixed in the center, deſcribed N° 1°, upon which the perpendicular turning beam ſtands.

3°. So much of the floor or inſide of the mill as the grinding ſtone does not touch, or is a little without his breadth, is covered with boards

lying more ſhelving than the ſtone-floor within it; on which board-floor the olives to be ground are at firſt laid, which are not thrown all at once under the grinding ſtone, but are by ſmall parcels ſhovelled down under the grinding ſtone by the man that attends the mill; every paſſing round of the ſtone a few; and here lies alſo the pulp which the ſtone works out in its grinding, which is alſo ſhovelled in its turn; for the floor of the mill, where the grinding ſtone bears on it, has always very little upon it, its great weight working it ſtill out towards the circumference of the floor, for the ſtone in the middle hinders it from going inwards.

4°. THE grinding ſtone is about ſix feet diameter, and about eleven inches thick, and on the edge and inſide is wrought very ſmooth, and ſtands upright without leaning, that I could perceive; though, as I have ſaid, the edge be not ſquare to the ſides, which is recompenſed in the ſinking of the floor towards the center. The ſtone whereof it is made ſeems to be very hard, and it need be hard and heavy to break olive-ſtones and grind them to powder.

II°. THAT the ſhovels which they uſe to ſhovel in the pulp under the grinder, and when it is fine enough to take it out, and put it in the ſtone troughs, and then into the frails, are more like bakers peels than ſhovels, and there is not any iron upon any of them.

III°. THAT there are between the mill and the preſs two great ſtone troughs to put the pulp in when ground; two pedeſtals and two ſtone ciſterns, into which the oil runs from the two pedeſtals by diſtinct paſſages, ſo that two people's oil may be preſſed at once, without the danger of mingling a drop.

IV°. THE preſs is made thus: there are two pedeſtals about nineteen or twenty inches aſunder, which lie juſt under the great end of the great beam; that which I call a pedeſtal is a round plain ſtone about twenty-ſix inches diameter, round about which is cut a groove or little trench in the ſame ſtone nine or ten inches broad; from the groove of each pedeſtal there is made a diſtinct paſſage for the oil to run to the two ciſterns: upon theſe pedeſtals the frails are laid, and into theſe grooves or trenches the oil runs when preſſed out of the frails, and ſo is conveyed ſeparately to the two ciſterns.

V°. BEHIND the hindmoſt pedeſtal ſtand erect in the ground two great beams, well faſtened in the ground, as far on ſunder from each other as the breadth of the preſſing beam which is to paſs up and down between them. From the neareſt ſide of the neareſt pedeſtal to the middle of the thickneſs of theſe beams horizontally is about twenty-nine inches: in the middle of each of theſe beams, in reſpect of their thickneſs, is cut a mortiſe or ſlit quite through, about forty-four or forty-five inches long, and about five or ſix inches broad; the bottom of this mortiſe is about forty-four inches higher than the pedeſtal.

VI°. THIS which I call the great mortiſe, they fill with ſeveral pieces of wood reaching quite athwart from outſide to outſide, and more, of the

the two erect beams; theſe pieces of wood, or, as I call them, wedges, are as thick as juſt eaſily to go into the mortiſe, and ſomewhat broader; with theſe they fill up this mortiſe when this end of the preſſing beam is ſunk below the loweſt part of it, and thereby pin down the great end of the ſaid beam to keep it down upon the frails, when the other end is drawn down by the ſcrew; for by more or leſs of the wedges put into this mortiſe, they keep down the great end of the beam to the height that is fitteſt to preſs with.

VII°. THE preſſing beam is thirty-eight pans, or about thirty-two feet long, and about thirty-four inches broad; and, to increaſe its weight and ſtrength, another great beam was faſtened to it all along with bands of iron.

VIII°. AT the little end is a ſcrew, whereof the very ſcrew (for it ſtanding upright I could not meaſure it) was, as I gueſs, about thirteen or fourteen feet; the ſquare of it, wherein the holes for the levers were cut, ſomething above a yard; and at the bottom was a great round ſtone, in which this lower end of the ſcrew is faſtened with iron-work, ſo as to have the liberty to turn. The ſcrew, when it is turned faſter than this end of the preſſing beam ſinks, lifts up this great ſtone from the ground, which is as broad, thick, and heavy as an ordinary mill-ſtone.

IX°. BETWEEN the ſcrew and the two erect beams placed behind the pedeſtals before deſcribed, ſtand two other beams, erect as the former, with a mortiſe in them long enough to hold only one wedge; this I call the little mortiſe, the top whereof is higher than the level of the higheſt frail, when they lay on moſt: upon this wedge the beam is to reſt, when they are laying in or taking out the frails. So that the length of the great beam is thus divided: behind the pinning wedges three pans, from the pinning to the ſupporting wedge twenty pans, from the ſupporting wedge to the ſcrew fifteen pans.

THERE is a piece of wood faſtened on to the great beam, croſs it, hanging over on each ſide, and placed juſt by the middle erect beams on the ſide towards the pedeſtals, to keep the great beam from ſliding towards the ſcrew.

X°. THE ground where the great ſcrew-ſtone lies is much lower than the level of the pedeſtals, which affords alſo a convenience for the placing the two ciſterns, which are juſt under the great beam, and a little diſtance from the outmoſt pedeſtal.

XI°. THE matter of the frails they uſe in preſſing, and the texture, is the ſame with the frails that bring raiſins to England; but the figure juſt the ſame with that of an hat-caſe, the crown being taken away: they are exactly all of a breadth, and ſcarce diſcernibly narrower than the pedeſtals; the hole to put in the pulp about one third of the breadth or diameter.

XII°. THE oil that runs at firſt preſſing, before the mixture of water, they call virgin oil, which is better than the other; but they all ſay it

it will not keep, but ſpoil in a month or two, unleſs you put to it ſalt or ſugar, ſalt is the better of the two, and then it will keep ſix months: as much as you can hold in your two hands is enough to put into a ſeptié of oil.——A ſeptié is thirty-two pots, and their pot is more than our quart.

XIII°. THEY uſually, therefore, let the virgin and other oil, of the ſecond and third preſſing, mingle all together in the ciſtern, which being afterwards put up in jars, and kept in cool cellars, will keep good ſeven years: but the mingling of ſome of the hot water, after preſſing with the virgin oil, will not preſerve it. So that it ſeems to be ſomething either in the ſkins or ſtones of the olives, that comes not out but by the mixture of hot water and hard preſſing, that ſerves to preſerve it.

XIV°. THEY begin to gather their olives, as I have ſaid, about St. Catharine's day, i. e. the 25th of November.

XV°. ALL confeſs that oil is better which is made of olives freſh gathered, than thoſe that have been kept a month or two: but ſome tell me they delay ſo long (for when I ſaw them making oil, it was almoſt the middle of February) becauſe olives that are kept yield the more oil; others ſay, the reaſon why they are not preſſed ſooner, is, becauſe every body's grift cannot be ground at once, and they muſt ſtay till they can get a turn; and by keeping, they ſay alſo, they grind better, for the new gathered ſpirt away from the mill.

XVI°. AFTER they have gathered their olives, they lay them in heaps in the corner of a cellar, or ſome ſuch other place, upon little faggots of dried vine branches (a good part of the fuel of the country) between the olives and the ground, where ſometimes a black water will run from them; this they call purging them. In theſe heaps they lie till they preſs them: none lie leſs than fifteen days; but, for the reaſons above-mentioned, they ſometimes lie two months.

XVII°. THOUGH they begin to gather their olives about the end of November, as has been ſaid; yet they never ſet their mills on work till after Twelfth-day, or New-year's-day, at ſooneſt: the reaſon whereof is this: the maſter of the mill hires a great many men, for the time that oil is made, who keep the mill going day and night. Thoſe whoſe oil is making give theſe workmen meat and drink, whilſt they are employed about their olives; ſo that if the maſter ſhould entertain them before Chriſtmas, he muſt not only pay them for ſo many holidays, whilſt they ſtand ſtill, but maintain them too.

XVIII°. FOUR ſeptiés of olives uſually yield one ſeptié of oil: but I obſerved they were ſomewhat heaped.

XIX°. THE goodneſs of the oil depends exceedingly on the property of the ſoil: this makes the oil of Aramont in Provence, not far from Avignon, the beſt in France.

XX°. WHEN they are either filling the frails, or new ſtirring the pulp in them, there are two men at work at each pedeſtal, beſides a fifth, that

that takes the pulp out of the trough thereby, wherein it lies ready ground; and with a ſhovel puts it into the frails as they bring them; or elſe lades boiling water out of the furnace (which is alſo by, and the top of it level with the ground, with a trap-door over) and pours it into the frails as they are ready for it.

XXI°. WHEN the oil is made, carried home, and has ſettled, they uſually take three-fourths of the upper part; this they call the flower, and put it in earthen pots for eating; the remainder, being thicker, is kept for lamps and ſuch other uſes: and the very thick ſediment they put in the ſun, to get as much oil out as they can.

XXII°. THE pulp, that is left after all the preſſing and affuſion of boiling water, belongs to the maſter of the mill, who ſells it for a groat, or five-pence a mill-full, to others, who preſs it again, and make a coarſe oil for ſoap, and other ſuch uſes.

XXIII°. THE remaining pulp the bakers uſe to throw a little of it into their ovens as they are heating, it making a very violent fire.

XXIV°. OIL they count one of the beſt and ſureſt commodities of their country. The ordinary rate of good oil at Montpelier is ſome years three, ſome four, and ſome years four livres and a half per quartal, i. e. one fourth of a ſeptié, or eight pots.

FRUIT.

FRUIT.

PLUMS.

THE beſt plums are,

1. Perdrigon.
2. D'Apricot.
3. Diapré.
4. Ste. Catherine,
5. Vert & long.
6. Damar violett.
7. Roche corbon.
8. Mirabell.
9. Catalane.

OF theſe the beſt to dry is the roche corbon, a large red plum; and the next to that the Ste. Catherine, large and yellow; becauſe they are large and fleſhy: not but that they dry of the other ſorts too.

THE way they take in drying them is this:

1°. THEY let them be ſo ripe, that they drop off from the tree of themſelves, which is beſt; or elſe fall with a little ſhaking.

2°. WHEN you have them thus ripe, the beſt way (though not always obſerved) is to put them two or three days in the hot ſun-ſhine, which will dry up gently ſome part of the ſuperfluous moiſture.

3°. WHEN they have been thus a little dried in the ſun, you muſt heat the oven gently; one little bruſh faggot is enough the firſt time; and having placed them ſingly upon wicker driers about two feet broad, and four or five feet long (or of a round figure ſo large as will go into the oven's mouth) put them into the oven, and ſo let them dry there till the oven is cold; and then they muſt be taken out and turned, whilſt the oven is heating again. The oven may be thus heated twice a day, at eight in the morning, and at eight at night.

4°. THE ſecond time the oven may be made a little hotter than the firſt; and thus the heating of the oven, and turning the plums, be repeated till they are dry enough, which is when they are of a due conſiſtence and browniſh colour.

5°. WHEN they are ſo far dried as to be capable of preſſing, the beſt way is to preſs them gently with the fingers, not into a flat, but round figure, for that way they keep beſt.

6°. THE great care to be taken is in the firſt putting them into the oven, that the oven be not too hot; for if it be, it makes them crack their ſkins and run out, which makes them much worſe.

PEACHES.

AFTER the ſame manner one dries peaches, with this difference, that after the firſt time they have been in the oven, one peels them with a knife, for the ſkin will eaſily ſtrip; and the ſtone then is to be taken out, and, if one will, a little peach thruſt into its place, which makes the other large and better. This alſo they often do in drying their plums, when they take out the ſtone of a great one, thruſt a little plum into the place of it.

PEARS.

THUS alſo pears are to be dried; but that the oven may be made a little hotter for pears than plums; they are to be ſtripped alſo after their firſt coming out of the oven.

THE beſt pears to be dried, are the rouſelette de Champagne.

THE pears in moſt eſteem amongſt them about Tours and Saumur (for this is the part of France where are the beſt pears, plums, peaches, and melons) are,

1. Moule bouche.
2. Virgoleuſe.
3. Martin ſec.
4. Double fleur.
5. Rouſelette.
6. Colmar.
7. St. Marſiac.
8. Vert & long.
9. Burée Blanche.
10. Rouſelette de Champagne.
11. La poire de citron.
12. La citron de carmes.
13. La poire de monſieur.
14. La verate.
15. L'amadote muſquée.
16. La muſcate d'Almagne.

The 10, 11, 12, 13, are their beſt ſummer pears.

The Virgoleuſe, Amadote muſquée,
Verate, Muſcate d'Almagne,
are their beſt winter pears.

IN the Recolets garden at Saumur there is abundance of good fruit, amongſt the reſt a ſort of pear, which they call

17. Poire ſans peau,

which is ripe at the ſame time cherries are. They told me it was a very good pear, and a great bearer. Before the middle of Auguſt, when I was there, they were all gone.

THEY have in the ſame garden another pear, which they call

18. Poire de jaſmin,

which, as they ſay, hath ſomething of the flavour of jaſmin.

MELONS.

MELONS.

THE melons of Langers (a town upon the Loire, ſix leagues above Saumur) are counted the beſt in France; and from hence the court is ſupplied with them. Here, and at Saumur (where they are loth to give any preference to the melons of Langers) they ſet them in the common earth of their gardens without dung, or any other art, but barely nipping the tops of the branches when the young melons are knit, to hinder the ſap from running too much into leaves and branches.

PRUNES.

THE prunes we have from France are a great black plum, that grows about Montauban and thoſe parts: they dry them as much as they can in the ſun, and what wants to dry them perfectly, they make out by the heat of the oven.

PRUNELLA's, or rather brignols, are a ſort of plums that grow in Provence, not far from Aix: they gather them thorough ripe, and having ſtripped off the ſkins, they ſtick them on ſcuers about ſix inches long, and very ſlender; they take care not to put them too cloſe to one another on theſe ſcuers. Theſe little ſpits, loaded thus with plums, they faſten one above another, either in a cane, or a rope of ſtraw like that we make for onions; and as we hang them up in our houſes to keep, ſo do they thoſe in the ſun to dry.

WHEN they are a little hardened, or half dry, they take out the ſtones, and preſs them with their fingers into that flat figure we ſee them, wetting their fingers a little to hinder them from ſticking to them in handling: when t[illegible]is done, they put them to dry again in the ſun till they are quite cured; ſome ſay on the ſcuers again, others on boards. Thoſe that grow at Brignol are the beſt, and hence they have their name.

THEY ſometimes dry them with their ſtones in, and ſo they are better, as ſome that have eaten of them have told me.

S I L K.

THEY uſually put the eggs a hatching in the holy week, i. e. the week before Eaſter; but that which beſt regulates the time is the budding of the mulberry-trees, that, when the worms are hatched, they may have food.

To hatch them, they commonly wrap them up in a linnen rag, and ſo wear them in ſome warm place about them night and day till they are hatched, which will be in about three days.

WHEN they are hatched, they feed them with the leaves of the white mulberry-tree: the leaves of the young trees are beſt whilſt the worms are young; but when they are grown pretty big, and towards the latter end of their ſeeding, they muſt be fed with the leaves of old trees, elſe they will not be ſtrong to get up into the branches to work. The leaves of young trees given them in the beginning make the ſilk the finer: they take care alſo not to give them yellow or withered leaves; but to avoid the trouble of gathering freſh leaves every day, they will keep two or three days well enough in an earthen pot covered, or in a cellar.

THEY take great care alſo that no wet leaves or other moiſture come to them, for that will kill them; and in feeding them they throw away the tender deep coloured young leaves at the top of the branches, becauſe theſe, they ſay, will make the worms very big and yellow, and die alſo without working.

WHILST they are young, they keep them up in ſome box or cheſt from the cold, which will kill them: they ſay alſo that thunder will kill them, if it happen when they begin to work.

THEY change their ſkins four times from ten days to ten days, or thereabouts; this they call their ſickneſs; for about the time they change their ſkins they forbear to eat, and therefore they feed them but once a day; but at other times they give them freſh leaves oftener. At the time alſo of their ſickneſs they change them, taking away the cake of dry leaves and dung that was under them, by removing them with freſh leaves, which they will ſtick to: but after the fourth ſickneſs is over, they change them every day till they begin to work, which is about ten days after.

THE woman of the houſe where I lay, put her eggs to hatch on Good Friday, April the 3d; they were hatched the Monday following, and they began to work on Tueſday, June the 2d: ſo that, allowing one day for every ſickneſs, it fell out pretty near according to their reckoning.

WHEN the worms are ripe as they call it, they cull out the ripe ones, i. e. thoſe that are ready to work, from among thoſe that are feeding, and put them upon ſhelves, where they are to work. They know thoſe that are ripe by their clearneſs; for if you hold them up againſt the light with their bellies upwards, you will find them clear about the fore legs, ſome yellow, ſome white, according to the ſeveral colours of the ſilk they will ſpin; and by this clearneſs one may eaſily diſtinguiſh them from thoſe that are not yet ripe.

THE ſhelves they put them on to work are thus ordered: they place deal ſhelves one over another, as if they were for books; they make them about thirty inches broad, and the diſtance between them is about twenty-two inches: betwixt theſe ſhelves they ſet up rows of a ſmall bruſhy plant, ſomewhat like our heath, which reaching from one ſhelf to another are at the top turned partly one way, partly the other; ſo that the tops of the branches of theſe ſeveral rows or partitions reaching to one another touch, ſo that the whole length of each ſhelf is by theſe branches divided as it were into ſo many little caves, each of about nine or ten inches breadth; for the rows of branches that are ſet up to make theſe caves, which are as deep as the ſhelves are broad, are ſet at that diſtance. Into one of theſe caves they put the worms that are firſt ripe, which creeping up the branches find amongſt the little twigs places to work in. When one cave has as many of theſe ſpinners as it hath well room for, they fill the next, and ſo on.

THEY never give them any leaves of the red mulberry-tree when they are young, becauſe it being a ſtrong nouriſhment, will hurt them; but if one give them red mulberry-leaves towards the latter end, they will be the ſtronger, and mount the branches the better, which when they are weak they cannot do; and the ſilk of thoſe that thus eat red mulberry-leaves is as good as the other.

ABOUT a fortnight after they begin to work, they take the cocons (i. e. the pods of ſilk they have wrought) out of the branches; if you take them down too ſoon, they will not have done working, and if you ſtay too long, they will have eat their way out of the pods, and the ſilk will be ſpoiled. It is time to take them down out of the branches as ſoon as any of the papilions, i. e. the flies that come out of the pods, appear amongſt them.

As many of the cocons as they think neceſſary to keep for a breed for the next year they ſtrip off the looſe ſilk from, and then thread them; but paſs the needle warily through the ſide of the cocon, ſo as it may be

ſure not to hurt the worm within. They count that a pound of cocons will yield an ounce of eggs. The cocons, thus threaded, they hang up or lay in a convenient room, that ſo the papilions may come out, and make love to one another, and then lay their eggs on white paper laid there on purpoſe.

FROM the remaining cocons they preſently either wind off the ſilk, or if they cannot do that (for it is not every body can do it) they either with the heat of the ſun, or oven, or hot water, kill the worms in the cocons, ſo that they may keep them without having them ſpoiled by the worm, till they can get their ſilk wound.

EIGHT pounds of cocons uſually yield one pound of ſilk.

THE way of winding ſilk off from the cocons is a thing that cannot be taught without ſeeing; and there are but few amongſt them that can do it well, it lying in a dexterity not eaſy to be learnt, as they ſay: they put the cocons in hot water, and ſo ſtirring them about with a kind of rod, the ends of the ſilk twires of the cocons ſtick to it, which they laying on upon a turning reel draw off from the cocons, which lie all the while in the hot water; but the great ſkill is to have ſuch a number of theſe ſingle twires of the cocons running at a time, as may make the thread of ſilk which they compoſe of a due bigneſs; for in turning (which they do apace) many of the twires of the cocons break, and ſo by degrees the ſilk thread, made of ſundry of theſe drawn together, grows too little, and then the woman that is winding ſtirs her rod or little beeſom again with her left hand amongſt the cocons, to get new ends of twires to add to the thread, which all this while keeps running. To know when to make this addition of new twires and in what quantity, ſo as to keep an even thread all along, is the great ſkill of theſe winders; for they do it by gueſs, and keep the reel turning and the thread running all the while; for ſhould they, as oft as is occaſion, ſtand ſtill to count the twires or conſider the thread, and how many new twires were fit to be added, it would be an endleſs labour, and they could never make wages.

THE engines alſo that they uſe for twiſting this ſilk afterwards, are too curious to be deſcribed, but by a model. I have ſeen one, where one woman has turned a hundred and thirty-four ſpindles, and twiſted as many threads at a time; and I have ſeen another, wherein two women going in a wheel, like that of a crane, turned three hundred and ſixty.

THEIR mulberry-trees, where they ſtand near towns, yield them good profit; I have known the leaves of four white mulberry-trees (ſome whereof were not very large) ſold for a piſtole, i. e. between ſixteen and ſeventeen ſhillings ſterling.

THE END.

CMC
MVSEVM
BRITANNICVM

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TO THE

FOURTH VOLUME.

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